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CASES: ARTICLE 3, SEC. 89

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR27 SCRA 41 (1916

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents,

the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of

Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the

registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association

hereinafter referred to as the SSSEAwhich is affiliated to the Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions hereinafter referred to as PAFLUas

well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to

prohibit respondents from enforcing Secti on 23 of Republic Act No. 875.

Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the finaldetermination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some

allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition.

Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo

Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the

present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision,

upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their

freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an

administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed repealed by

ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on

November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day

period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no

appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by

the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of

registration would cause irreparable injury.

To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor

organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department

of Labor the following documents:

(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization

together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses

and the address of the principal office of the organization;

(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization,

association or union to the effect that they are not members of

the Communist Party and that they are not members of any

organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by

force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and

(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or

more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.

The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said

personality, which are merestatutory creations, for the possession and exercise of

which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses,

fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of

the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police

power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of

workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore,

the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellationof a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the

members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or

membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts

of money due to them or to the organization.

prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not

mandatory in naturein the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the

expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to comply

with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delayunless the

intention to the contrary is manifest.

Justice Black: When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be

done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the

time, and not mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the

language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the

time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right.

The theory to the effect t hat Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the

freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of

factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is nota

limitation to the right of assembly or association, which maybe exercised with

or withoutsaid registration.2 The latter is merely a conditionsine qua non for

the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and

the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by l aw to legitimate labor

organizations".

The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have

been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits

have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, allofficers of the government, including those in the executive department, are

supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as t hey see the same. This i s specially true as

regards administrative agencies given by law the power to i nvestigate and renderdecisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of

which is entrusted thereto.

B.S.P. v. Araos, we held that there is noincompatibility between Republic Act No.875 and the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. Upon the other hand, thecancellation of the SSSEA's registration

certificate would not entail a dissolution of

said association or its suspension. The

existence of the SSSEA would not beaffected by said cancellation, although its

juridical personality and its statutory rightsand privilegesas distinguished from

those conferred by the Constitution

would be suspended thereby.

Footnotes:

"Any labor organization, association or union

of workers duly organized for the material,

intellectual and moral well being of i ts

members shall acquire legal personality and

be entitled to all the rights and privileges

granted by law to legitimate labor

organizations within thirty days of filing with theoffice of the Secretary of Labor notice of its

due organization and existence and the

following documents, together with the

amount of five pesos as registration fee.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZG.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964

FACTS DOCTRINE /OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously

thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they hadchosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the

said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the

Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts andidentities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking

officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),

which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thruact theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in thePhilippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly

known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "HukbongMapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms againstthe Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose

of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof asin fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken

arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacksagainst police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary

means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have

then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction ofprivate and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate

the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on

government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)

II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the saidaccused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as

aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained theCongress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations(CLO),with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other"mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and

instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, andinstrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activitiesas the CLO thus organized,

established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fullycooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng

Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the

Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success ofthe above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:

(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,Victor or Soliman;

(2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of theParty;

(3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations;(4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be

considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an

advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is

insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual

agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and

violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize

the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or

contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacyof the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of

Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging

in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action

and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit

rebellion.

In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism

would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the

hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the

purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the

principles of Communism.

The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect

that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were

impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political

ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the

head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely

to advance his political aspirations.

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Supreme Court of the United States:

In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on astatus or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that

status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of

violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the

concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization

engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized

by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .

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communications with its leaders and its members;(5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and

supplies for the military operations of the Huks;

(6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad tothe WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by

the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movementin the provinces.

The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress ofLabor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by

Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo

Capadocia, etc.

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of aims

and violence; thru armed revolution and replace i t with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat theCommunist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present government by organizing the

HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professionaland intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.

(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of theCLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital

undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau of the

Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a factthat since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no

time, there is no single time that those directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru

the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to howthe CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused

Amado V. Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the presentgovernment and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by

propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other formsof material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which

expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2,page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO.

What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when

accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an

insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal

activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to

permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be

recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal

organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his

assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other,

only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that

others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that

such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus

given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the

part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as

distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal

enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily

committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.

(Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

PEOPLE v. SIMEON FERRER

48 SCRA 382 (G.R. Nos. Li32613-14, 27 December 1972)

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared

RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,

dismissing the information of subversion against thefollowing: 1.)

Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the

Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the

benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a

legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured

as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The

Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32the U.S.

Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of

the City of Los Angeles which provided:

... [N]o person shall hold or retain

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insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men

to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being

members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and

overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating

Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is

of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)

Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP

without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a

presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP

regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It i s an act

to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership

therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being

although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to

overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also

by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP

is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section

4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the

CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a

designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to

filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for

furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open

court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows

the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under

oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its

valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto

law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

R.A. No. 1700 "AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP

THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied

retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively

is also an ex post facto law.)

the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy

for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of

SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also

to other organizations having the same purpose and their

successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be

shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the

goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of

MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required

proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership

punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the

organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4

prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of

the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given

an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in

accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of

mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been

made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to

overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of

guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The

EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise

of Freedom of Expressionand Association in this matter. Before

the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,

careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further

stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and

association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP

are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of

DEMOCRACY.

or be eligible for any public office

or employment in the service of

the City of Los Angeles, in any

office or department thereof,

either elective or appointive, who

has within five (5) years prior to the

effective date of this section

advised, advocated, or taught, or

who may, after this section

becomes effective, become a

member of or affiliated with any

group, society, association,

organization or party which

advises, advocates or teaches or

has within said period of five (5)

years advised, advocated, or

taught the overthrow by force or

violence of the Government of

the United States of America or of

the State of California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the

prospective application of the Act to the petitioner

therein, thus:

... Immaterial here is any opinion

we might have as to the charter

provision insofar as it purported to

apply restrospectively for a five-

year period to its effective date.

We assume that under the Federal

Constitution the Charter

Amendment is valid to the extent

that it bars from the city's public

service persons who, subsequently

to its adoption in 1941, advise,

advocate, or reach the v iolentoverthrow of the Government or

who are or become affiliated with

any group doing so. The provisions

operating thus prospectively were

a reasonable regulation to

protect the municipal service by

establishing an employment

qualification of loyalty to the State

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The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution

under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences

of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that

the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of

the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.

Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive

purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

and the United States.

... Unlike the provisions of the

charter and ordinance under

which petitioners were removed,

the statute in the Lovett case did

not declare general and

prospectively operative standards

of qualification and eligibility for

public employment. Rather, by its

terms it prohibited any further

payment of compensationtonamed individuals or employees.

Under these circumstances,

viewed against the legislative

background, the statutewas held

to have imposed penalties without

judicial trial.

RIVER BRIDGE v. WARREN BRIDGE,

11 Pet. 420, 641 (U.S. 1837)

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College

the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry by lease or otherwise from

Charlestown to Boston, passing over Charles River. The right to set up a

ferry between these places had been given by the governor under

the authority of the Court of Assistance, by an order dated November

9, 1636, to a particular individual, and was afterwards leased

successively to others, they having the privilege of taking tolls

regulated in the grant; and when, in 1650, the franchise of this ferry

was granted to the college, the rights of the lessees in the same had

expired. Under the grant, the college continued to hold the ferry by i tslessees and receive the profits therefrom until 1785, when the

Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company to build a

bridge over Charles River where the ferry stood, granting them tolls,

the company to pay to Harvard College two hundred pounds a year

during the charter, for forty years, which was afterwards extended to

seventy years, after which the bridge was to become the property of

the Commonwealth. The bridge was built under this charter, and the

corporation received the tolls allowed by the law, always keeping the

The object and the end of all Government is to promote the

happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is

established, and it can never be assumed that the Government

intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it

was created; and in a country like ours, free, active, and

enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new

channels of communication are daily found necessary both for

travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience,

and prosperity of the people.A State ought never to be presumed

to surrender this power because, like the taxing power, the wholecommunity have an interest in preserving it undiminished, and,

when a corporation alleges that a State has surrendered, for

seventy years, its power of improvement and public

accommodation in a great and important line of travel, along

which a vast number of its citizens must daily pass, the community

have a right to insist, in the language of this Court,"that its

abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the

deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear."

Lord Stowell, whose eminent qualifications as a

judge entitle him to great reverence, on that

occasion said:

"A general presumption arising from these

considerations is that government does not mean to

divest itself of this universal attribute of sovereignty

conferred for such purposes (to be used for peace,

as well as war) unless it is so clearly and

unequivocally expressed. In conjunction with this

universal presumption must be taken also the wisepolicy of our own peculiar law, which interprets the

grants of the Crown in this respect by other rules than

those which are applicable in the construction of the

grants of individuals. Against an individual, it is

presumed that he meant to convey a benefit with

the utmost liberality that his words will bear. It is

indifferent to the public in which person an interest

remains, whether in the grantor or the taker. With

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bridge in order and performing all that was enjoined on them to do. In

1828, the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated another company

for the erection of another bridge, the Warren Bridge, over Charles

River from Charlestown to Boston, allowing the company to take tolls,

commencing in Charlestown, near where the Charles River Bridge

commenced, and terminating in Boston about eight hundred feet

from the termination of the Charles River Bridge. The bridge was to

become free after a few years, and has actually become free.

Travelers who formerly passed over the Charles River Bridge from

Charlestown square now pass over the Warren Bridge, and thus the

Charles River Bridge Company are deprived of the tolls they would

have otherwise received. The value of the franchise granted by the

Act of 1783 is now entirely destroyed. The proprietors of the Charles

River Bridge filed a bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

against the proprietors of the Warren Bridge, first for an injunction to

prevent the erection of the bridge and afterwards for general relief,

stating that the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts authorizing the

building of the Warren Bridge was an act impairing the obligations of

a contract, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United

States. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill of the

complainants, and the case was brought by writ of error to the

Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of the 25th

Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissing the bill of the plaintiffs in

error was affirmed.

The plaintiffs in error insisted on two grounds for the reversal of the

judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 1. That,

by the grant of 1650, Harvard College was entitled, in perpetuity, to

the right to keep a ferry between Charlestown and Boston; that the

right was exclusive, and the legislature had no right to establish

another ferry on the same line of travel, because it would infringe the

rights of the college and those of the plaintiffs under the charter of

1785.

2. That the true construction of the acts of the Legislature of

Massachusetts granting the privilege to build a bridge necessarilyimported that the Legislature would not authorize another bridge, and

especially a free one, by the side of the Charles River Bridge, so that

the franchise which they held would be of no value, and that this

grant of the franchise of the ferry to the college, and the grant of the

right of pontage to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, is a

contract which is impaired by the law authorizing the erection of the

Warren Bridge. By the Court. It is very clear that, in the form in which

this case comes before us, being a writ of error to a State court, the

The continued existence of a Government would be of no greatvalue if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the

powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the

functions it was designed to perform transferred to the hands of

privileged corporations. The rule of construction announced by the

Court was not confined to the taxing power, nor is it so limited in the

opinion delivered. On the contrary, it was distinctly placed on the

ground that the interests of the community were concerned in

preserving, undiminished, the power then in question; and

whenever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or

diminished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affectingthe public interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of

construction must be the same. No one will question that the

interests of the great body of the people of the State would, in this

instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to

a single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude

competition for seventy years. While the rights of private property

are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also

have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen

depends on their faithful preservation.

When land is granted, the State can exercise no acts of ownership

over it unless it be taken for public use, and the same rule applies to

a grant for a bridge, a turnpike-road, or any other public

improvement. It would assume a bold position to say that a

subsequent Legislature may resume the ownership of a tract of land

which had been granted at a preceding session, and yet the

principle is the same in regard to vested rights under an act of

incorporation. By granting a franchise, the State does not divest

itself of any portion of its sovereignty, but to advance the public

interests, one or more individuals are vested with a capacity to

exercise the powers necessary to attain the desired object. In the

case under consideration, the necessary powers to construct and

keep up the Charles River Bridge were given to Thomas Russell and

his associates. This did not withdraw the bridge from the action of

the State sovereignty any more than it is withdrawn from land which

it has granted. In both cases, the extent of the grant may become

a question for judicial investigation and decision, but the rights

granted are protected by the law.

"Where the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it

seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and, in such a

case, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share

of consideration. "

regard to the grant of the sovereign, it is far

otherwise. It is not held by the sovereign himself, as

private property, and no alienation shall be

presumed except what is clearly and indisputably

expressed."

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plaintiffs, in claiming under either of these rights, must place

themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support

themselves upon the principles that the law divests vested rights. It is

well settled by the decisions of this Court that a State law may be

retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights, and yet

not violate the Constitution of the United States unless it also impairs

the obligation of contract.

The grant remains in full force that the thing granted shall not beresumed or impaired by the grantor.

the State impliedly contracts not to resume its grant or to do any

act to the prejudice or destruction of its grant.

CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA40 Phil 349, (G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919)

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [ChineseCommunity of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged

that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtueof the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit

and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila;that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in

paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was eithernecessary or expedientthat the said parcels be expropriated for street

purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of

communication for the public in the district covered by suchproposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or roadshould be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,

which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense

and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had aTorrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had

been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a greatnumber of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said

expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting placesof the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money

in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site andin the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of

existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in theirstead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant

and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and

monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff waswithout right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part orportion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact,

was not necessary as a public improvement.

The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact,

under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it mayexpropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court

in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question;that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the

"the necessity and expediency of exercising the right ofeminent domain are questions essentially political and

not judicial,"

It is well settled that although the legislature mustnecessarily determine in the first instance whether the

use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to

exercise the power is a public one or not, their(municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but issubject to correction by the courts, who may

undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it

shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposedto authorize the taking of private property is in reality notpublic but private."

what is a public use is a legislative question But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory

provision denying the right to take land for any use other

than a public use, it occurs to us that the questionwhether any particular use is a public one or not is

ultimately, at least, a judicial question.

It was then held that land already devoted to a public

use cannot be taken by the public for another use whichis inconsistent with the first, without special authority fromthe Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and

But when thestatute does not designate theproperty to be taken nor how may be taken,

then the necessity of takingparticularproperty is a question for the courts. Where

the application to condemn or appropriateis made directly to the court, the question

(of necessity) should be raised anddecided in limene. (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St.

rep., 622, 628)

The taking of private property for any usewhich is not required by the necessities or

convenience of the inhabitants of the state,is an unreasonable exercise of the right ofeminent domain, and beyond the power of

the legislature to delegate.

(Bennett vs.Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633;Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545;Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692,697.)

The very foundation of the right to exerciseeminent domain is a genuine necessity, and

that necessity must be of a publiccharacter. The ascertainment of thenecessity must precede or accompany, andnot follow, the taking of theland.(Morrison vs.Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,

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advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questionsconcerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere

appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and,

when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by thelaw, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

reasonable implication.

The court said that it is unquestionable that theLegislature has the power to authorize the taking of land

already applied to one public use and devote it toanother. When the power is granted to municipal orprivate corporations in express words, no question canarise.

166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72Ohio St., 368.)

LEONCIO SEA Y MEDINA vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and THE INSULAR GOVERNMENTG.R. No. 15915 September 7, 1921

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

This is an application for the registration of a parcel of land situated inthe barrio of Palsabagon, municipality of Pagbilao, Province of

Tayabas, containing three lots of which lot No. 2 is the only one inquestion. Said lot No. 2 is composed of 35, 327 square meters, and is

occupied by the Manila Railroad Company, the same being withincivil reservation No. 3 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (G. L. R.

O. reservation Case No. 242). The lower court denied the registrationof said lot upon the ground that the application for registration had

not been presented within the time required by law in said civilreservation proceedings.It appears that by Executive Order No. 112,

dated December 3, 1914, the Governor-General, pursuant to the

provisions ofAct No. 648,reserved "for railroad purposes" a strip of land30 meters wide and more than 80 kilometers long, from the

municipality of Lucena to the municipality of Caluag, Province ofTayabas. Lot No. 2 in question is included within said reservation.

Upon being duly notified by the Governor-General of said ExecutiveOrder, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of

Tayabas, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 ofAct No. 648,on the21st day of December, 1914, issued the following notice to all the

parties concerned:Whereas under the provisions ofAct No. 648 of the Philippine

Commission, by executive order there have been reserved fromsettlement or public sale and for railroad purposes the following

described lands the public domain the use of which has not otherwisebeen directed by law.

Notice is hereby given that claims for all private lands, buildings, andinterests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented in said

court for registration under 'The Land Registration Act' within six

calendar months from the date of this notice, and that all, lands,buildings and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid not sopresented within the time herein limited will be conclusively adjudged

to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals forsuch lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be

forever barred. The lower court denied said petition upon the groundthat, the same not having been presented within the six months'

period provided byAct No. 627,the land in question was conclusivelypresumed to be public land.

The appellant makes two principal assignments of error: That the lowercourt erred (1) in not finding that Executive Order No. 112 was void

A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use'

to be one of constant growth. As society advances, it demandsupon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to

which the resources of the individual may be devoted."

It cannot be denied that a railroad is a public necessity in thiscountrya factor indispensable to its economic development andmaterial welfare. It is in recognition of this fact that railroadcorporations are empowered by law to exercise the right ofeminent domain. therefore of the opinion that a railroad is apublic use, for "whatever is beneficially employed for thecommunity is a public use."

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and of no effect; and (2) in finding that the right of the petitioner hadprescribed.

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decisionbecame final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ

of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as prayed forby the landowner Tuason & Company.

the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act wasunconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its

property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the

property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold tothe public; and that respondent officers threatened to enforce saidlaw by initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request,

Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance(to whom the prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of

preliminary injunction on November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bondof P20,000.

The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift the preliminary

injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon motion of one of the

respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previouswrit of preliminary injunction.

The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of the

injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial of the motion todismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the injunction, and the refusal

to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse ofdiscretion and excess of jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was

improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is personal incharacter, and neither petitioner nor any of the respondents in said

prohibition case were domiciled in Quezon City. Petitioner LandTenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge Caluag be

ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibitioncase, from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein,

from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's houses, and to allow

the expropriation case to be docketed and regularly proceeded with.

The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be takenfor public use without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4

in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of justcompensation , the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into

small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit anydisturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of

just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnationproceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone,

lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether ofpossession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case

where final and executory judgments of ejectment have beenobtained against the occupants of the property.

the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial questionto the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time and effort toappoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of

the property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the

condemnation was illegal.

It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner

from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recoverpossession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons

of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and histitle is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprivedof those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property isvirtually taken from him without compensation and in violation ofthe Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlikeprevious Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a

deposit of the current rentals by the tenants during the pendencyof the proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in

requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use

without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribingthat "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation,the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots andconveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance ofproprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity.

Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the

benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the

condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment,

or disposition.

Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Courtquoted with approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the

rule that

It is recognized, however, that an injunctionwill lie to restrain the threatenedenforcement of an invalid law where the

lawful use and enjoyment of private

property will be injuriously affected by itsenforcement ...,

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE v. DULAY149 SCRA 305, 311312 (1987)

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FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential

Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed andsuperseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,

such that in determining the just compensation of property in anexpropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as

declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever islower. On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of

condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right totake the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of

just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint.The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this

petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain andreport to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to

be expropriated.

The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8,

Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemedamended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of

commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned.Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid andconstitutional?

The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of

his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the

petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting thecommissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, whichis the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be

the fair and current market value declared by the owner of theproperty sought to be expropriated or such market value as

determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is nomore need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the

Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider otherhighly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The

petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on theassessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix

the market value of the properties and that said property owners are

given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of

Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to

determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, withappropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, isvalid and constitutional.

in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would stillhave the power to determine the just compensation for theproperty, following the applicable decrees, its task would berelegated to simply stating the lower value of the property asdeclared either by the owner or the assessor.

. However, the strict application of the decrees during theproceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charadeas the court has only to choose between the valuation of the ownerand that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower

of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independencein determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil couldsubstitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutionaljust compensation is concerned.

[Court ruled that under the conceded facts,] there should be arecognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the

decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls forobedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks

in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yieldto its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize

that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent

decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or theconstitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the

owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of

the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,

its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain casesis a judicial function.The executive department or the legislaturemay make the initial determinations but when a party claims a

violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private propertymay not be taken for public use without just compensation, no

statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its owndetermination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can

the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the

decreed compensation.

.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,

31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now ChiefJustice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule)

that just compensation means the equivalent for thevalue of the property at the time of its taking.

Anything beyond that is more and anything short ofthat is less, than just compensation. It means a fair

and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is themeasure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would

accrue to the expropriating entity."

GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION84 Phil. 847, 47 Off. Gaz. 1848 G.R. No. L-2089,

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress

Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "thepromotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic

The expropriation proceedings at bar have been institutedfor the economic relief of a few families devoid of any

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Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the

petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part

commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters,situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila

boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Fourgrounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:

(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted

without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriationcomplaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of

P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.

(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial andtherefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.

(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner

valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, andexpropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.

(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the

land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondentRPA.

security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is adeclaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the

Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino

people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the

Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom ofconscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of

happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economicfreedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and

under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existinglarge estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant

evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the

property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to

authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the givingof it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property,

the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which realestate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with everyaspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived inthe Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities andused legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and theformation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be thebulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive andhappy country.In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trustsin perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a largesection of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of peoplebenefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by

the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and

public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economicslavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to communityprosperity and contentment and public peace and order. No fixedline of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what isnot can be made; each case has to be judge according to itspeculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of thisdecision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those

elements which make for public convenience or public use. It ispatterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in

our system of government and embraced by the majority of thecitizens of this country.

consideration of public health, public peace and order, orother public advantage. What is proposed to be done is totake plaintiff's property, which for all we know sheacquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family'ssecurity, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse topay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.

To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why theRural Progress Administration could not take bycondemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots forresale to its occupants or those who want to buildthereon.

NARRA v. FRANCISCO109 Phil 764, 768 (1960)

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instanceof Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 2006) dismissing condemnation

proceedings instituted by the National Resettlement and Rehabilition

Administration (NARRA).

It appears from the record that on June 11, 1955, Republic Act No.

The power to expropriate, under both Republic Act 1266 andCommonwealth Act No. 539, is predicated upon the provisions of

Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution providing:

Sec. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of justcompensation, the expropriation of lands to be

subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to

Guido and Baylosis cases, has already ruled that,under the quoted constitutional provision, the

government may only expropriate landed estate

with extensive areas, and that once a landed estate

has been broken up and divided into parcels ofreasonable extent, the resulting portions are no

longer subject to further expropriation, the existence

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1266 became operative. This law provided as follows:

SECTION 1. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) is hereby

authorized to expropriate within six months from the approval of this Act, the H acienda del

Rosario situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City, and pay the price of the land and cost

of such expropriation out of its funds. The said hacienda shall be subdivided into lots not

bigger than one hectare each and resold to bona-fide occupants thereof at such price is

may be determined by the Board of Directors of the NARRA which shall include the price

of the land and the cost of such expropriation, administration, subdivision, resale and

interests. The purchase price of the resale to bona-fide tenants and lessees shall be

payable in installments within the period of not more than ten y ears.

SEC. 2. This shall take effect upon its approval.

In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminentdomain proceedings in the Court below against the heirs of the

original owner of the Hacienda (the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario,who died in 1947) and their subsequent vendees. The lands involved

totalled 669 hectares, more or less; but during the pendency of theproceedings, the heirs Dolores R. Concepcion Teresa R. de Francisco

and Paz R. de Tubangui agreed to the expropriation of theirrespective holding; while defendant spouses Carmen R. de Ciocon

and Jaime Ciocon also agreed to the expropriation of theircorresponding share, except a portion of 85.0414 hectares, which said

spouses were occupying and wished to reserve for their seven (7)children and sixteen (16) grandchildren. As a result, all the defendants

mentioned voluntarily ceded to the NARRA about 3891.7583 hectares.

The NARRA appealed from the decision, contending that the

authorities cited by the Court below were not applicable becausethey involved condemnation proceedings under Commonwealth ActNo. 539; that in view of the terms of the Republic Act 1266, "the Court

can not inquire into nor review the action of the Legislature indesignating the paricular property it has authorizes the NARRA to

expropriate."

individuals";

hence, the rulings of this Court as to the limits of the condemningpower in expropriation proceedings instituted persuant to

Commonwealth Act No. 539 are applicable to the case at bar.

(same rulingsvizGuido and Baylosis cases)

of tenancy troubles therein notwithstanding.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 350,wherein it was stated that where the legislature has

directly determined the necessity of appropriating

private property for a particular public improvement

at a specified location, the utility, necessity and

expediency of the improvement and the suitable ofthe location are questions for the legislature to

determine and the courts have no power to interfereand substitute their own discretion. The doctrine thus

invoked is entirely inappropriate, for the questionnow before the Court is not the necessity of the

expropriation but the power or authority toexpropriate under Article XIII, Sec. 4, of the

Constitution. The validity of the statute directing theexpropriation is certainly a judicial question.

PEOPLE v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, Et al,G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency ofdefendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of

Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance inquestion providing as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before

constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each build ing permit and

P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTYAny violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall

make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or

imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the di scretion

of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any

public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or

house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITYThis ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the

beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort andhappiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the

interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State mayprohibit structures offensive to the sight.

the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of

building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populousparts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be

constructed or repaired within them.

(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the Statemay not, under the guise of police power,

permanently divest owners of the beneficial use oftheir property and practically confiscate them solely

to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance ofthe community. As the case now stands, everystructure that may be erected on appellants' land,

regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned

under the ordinance in question, because it wouldinterfere with the view of the public plaza from the

highway.

Zoning which admittedly limits property to a usewhich can not reasonably be made of it cannot be

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Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor hadexpired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written

request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct

a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of landregistered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and

separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16,1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the

proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the publicplaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their

request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turneddown by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the

construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a

place of residence very badly, their former house having been

destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leasedproperty.On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and

convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur,for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the

Court of First I nstance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentencedappellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to

demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of thepublic plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the

National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, theaccused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded

the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality ofthe ordinance in question.

..the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that i t operatesto permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own

property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, andamounts to a taking of appellants property without just

compensation.

Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality ofBaao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality

to enact, and is therefore null and void.

said to set aside such property to a use butconstitutes the taking of such property without just

compensation. Use of property is an element of

ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion ofzealots that property may properly, by zoning, be

utterly destroyed without compensation, suchprinciple finds no support in the genius of our

government nor in the principles of justice as weknown them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of

justice. If it be of public benefit that property remainopen and unused, then certainly the public, and not

the private individuals, should bear the cost of

reasonable compensation for such property under

the rules of law governing the condemnation ofprivate property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser

(1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827)

An ordinance whichpermanentlyso restricts the use

of property that it can not be used for anyreasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond

regulation and must be recognized as a taking of theproperty. The only substantial difference, in such

case, between restriction and actual taking, is thatthe restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden

of payment of taxation, while outright confiscationwould relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.Co.vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

FELIPE R. HIPOLITO v. THE CITY OF MANILAG.R. No. L-3887 August 21, 1950

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

This is an action to compel the respondents to issue a building permit

in favor of Felipe R. Hipolito.

The petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of a parcel of

land situated at the corner of Invernes and Renaissance Streets, SantaAna, Manila. On March 22, 1950, petitioner applied to the respondent

Alejo Aquino, as City Engineer, for permission to erect a strongmaterial residential building on his above-mentioned lot. For more

than forty days, the respondent took no action. Wherefore, petitionerwrote him a letter manifesting his readiness to pay the fee and to

comply with existing ordinances governing the issuance of buildingpermits.

The petitioner, who is a lawyer, replied that the said Commission andits plans could not legally affect the construction of residential

buildings, like his own, that are not subsidized in whole or in part withpublic funds, citing section 6 of Executive Order No. 98, s. 1946, which

partly reads:

adopted a General Plan, applies only to "residential buildings

subsidized in whole or in part by public funds or assistance." Theresidential building which petitioner intends to construct may not be

so classified, because he asserts, without contradiction, that hisproposed construction will be financed wholly by himself, not with

public funds or assistance. Therefore, the excuse given byrespondent is not valid.

The City has not expropriated the strip of petitioner's land affectedby the proposed widening of Invernes Street, and inasmuch as thereis no legislative authority to establish a building line, the denial ofthis permit would amount to the taking of private property for publicuse under the power of eminent domain without following theprocedure prescribed for the exercise of such power.(

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SEC. 6. Legal status of general plans.Whenever the Commission shall have adopted a

General Plan, amendment, extension or addition thereto of any urban area or any part

thereof, then and thenceforth no street, park or other public way, ground place, orspace; no public building or structure, including residential buildings subsidized in whole

or part by public funds or assistance; . . . shall be constructed or authorized in such urban

area until and unless the location and extent thereof conform to said general plan or

have been submitted and approved by the Commission, . . . .

The defense to this petition is planted on the opinion that unless

Hipolito's building conforms to the new street line fixed by the NationalUrban Planning Commission, the building permit will not be issued.

It is not claimed that the City of Manila has expropriated, or desires to

expropriate, that portion of petitioner's lot between the existing streetline and the new street line adopted by the National Urban PlanningCommission. No law or ordinance is cited requiring private landowners

in Manila to conform to the new street line marked by the NationalUrban Planning Commission, except the section above quoted. And

the question relates only to its interpretation.REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLVI

58 SCRA 336, 352 (August 15, 1974)

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed, on June 26,

1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee,Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the

late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over aparcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,

Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among otherthings, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands,

according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province ofPampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market

value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of thelands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take

immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount withthe Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three

commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the justcompensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that

the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding

that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commencedwith the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that

the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue ofa special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee

Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy theproperty should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the

event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value shouldbe as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent

improvements amounting to more that half a million pesosconstructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of

expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanencyand stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of

The first (time) occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, andthat the just compensation to be paid for the property should not bedetermined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with thecommencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes placesubsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the justcompensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint.

It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisionalvalue of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarilyrepresent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only"provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediateoccupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor.

The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner isawarded the just compensation for his property.

In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale priceof other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market valueof the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among other things,be shown to be similar.

So many and varied are the circumstances to be takeninto account in determining the value of propertycondemned for public purposes, that it is practicallyimpossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement

in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify themost carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, weshould say that the compensation of the owner is to beestimated by reference to the use for which the property issuitable, having regard to the existing business or wantsof the community, or such as may be reasonablyexpected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum RiverBoom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).

Any lawyer with a modicum of abilityhandling this expropriation case would haveright away though [sic] of digging updocuments diligently showing conveyancesof lands near or around the parcels of landsought to be expropriated in this case in theoffices that would have naturally come to hismind such as the offices mentioned above,and had counsel for the movant reallyexercised the reasonable diligence requiredby the Rule' undoubtedly they would havebeen able to find these documents and/orcaused the issuance of subpoena duces

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national Security.7Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of

property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential

elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or uponthe private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and

(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner anddeprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee

argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for thecontract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year;

that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic waspaying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the

contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege"

to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."

tecum. ...

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA22 SCRA 1334, 1341 (1968)G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of

Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then ZamboangaProvince. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved

converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec.50 of the Act also provided thatBuildings and properties which the

province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to anotherplace will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a

price to be fixed by the Auditor General.The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and

some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of

Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title inthe name of Zamboanga Province.

Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,

apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of

Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61%for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became

entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots andbuildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.

On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of thePresident, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a

vested right as owner (should be co-ownerpro-indiviso) of theproperties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is

entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This rulingrevoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said

50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945,

when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to

Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regularinternal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter

ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and

again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961.all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High

School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties ofthe former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospitaland leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered

For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over

the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province isone. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by themunicipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public andgovernmental capacity, the property is public and Congresshas absolute controlover it. But if the property is owned in its privateor proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has noabsolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it withoutdue process and payment of just compensation. 6

Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and theschool sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public

use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for publicservice" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generisrule,

such public works must be forfree and indiscriminate use by

anyone to be considered public, it is enough that the propertybe held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local

administration, public education, public health, etc.

that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mereaccessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, theyfollow the nature of said lands, i.e., public.buildings, thoughlocated in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit ofcity residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial

residents. The province thenand its successors-in-interestarenot really deprived of the benefits thereof.

this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held anddevoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary

private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary privateproperties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even

be acquired thru adverse possessionall these to the detriment ofthe local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other

than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under

Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of

Lands,8and inMunicipality of Tacloban v. Director ofLands,9it was held that the capitol site and the

school sites in municipalities constitute theirpatrimonial properties. This result is understandable

because, unlike in the classification regarding Stateproperties, properties for public service in the

municipalities are not classified as public.

(1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it

was stated that "... where the municipality hasoccupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as

for the municipal court house, the public school, thepublic market, or other necessary municipal building,

we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary,

presume a grant from the States in favor of themunicipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that

rule may be invoked only as to property which isused distinctly for public purposes...."

(2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OFILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for

governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus,the auto trucks used by the municipality for street

sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, policestations and concrete structures with the

corresponding lots used as markets were declaredexempt from execution and attachment since they

were not patrimonial properties.

(3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held

squarely that a municipal lot which had always beendevoted to school purposes is one dedicated to

public use and is not patrimonial property of a

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patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under thephrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under

theejusdem generisrule, such public works must be forfree and

indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerate