article xii section 2

ARTICLE XII SECTION 2: REGALIAN DOCTRINE STA. ROSA MINING V. LEIDO, 156 SCRA 1 (1987)

FACTS: PD No. 1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining

under Philippine bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one year from the approval of the decree. The sta. Rosa mining company assailed the constitutionality of PD 1214 claiming that it amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether the PD 1214 is unconstitutional.

HELD: NO. The constitutional mandate of PD 1214 is found in sec. 2, Art.XII of the 1987

constitution. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner over lands of the public domain of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part.

JosephreyBelciñaLumabas

ARTICLE XII SECTION 3: LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN DIR. OF LANDS V. IAC, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)

FACTS: The tambac island in Lingayen Gulf is situated in the municipality of bani,

pangasinan, which consists of more or less 187,288 square meters. The initial application for registration was filed for pacific farms, Inc. Under the provisions of the land registration act (496). The director of lands opposed the application alleging that the pacific farms, Inc. Does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at 30 years immediately after filing the application. In an amended application, pacific farms, inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from pacific farms, Inc. To j. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. So, the director of lands alleged that the land is within the unclassified public land and inalienable.

ISSUE:Whether or not the land known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration.

HELD: The amendment of the application from the name of pacific farms Inc. To the name

of j. Antonio Araneta inc. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. Our constitution prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. The court ruled to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. They reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.


ARTICLE XII SECTION 7: PRIVATE LANDS FRENZEL V. CATITO, GR NO. 143958, JULY 11, 2003

FACTS: Alfred fritz frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent, was married to Teresita

Santos; while Ederlina Catito, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred and Ederlina met and later cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which Alfred acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, Ederlina‘s name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, Alfred filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of Ederlina, claiming that he was the real owner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to compensation for the properties?

HELD: No. The court refused to declare Alfred as the owner mainly because of the

constitutional prohibition. The court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. Even if, as claimed by Alfred, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Alfred, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.


ARTICLE XII SECTION 10: FILIPINIZATION TANADA V. ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

FACTS: Petitioners’ senator Tanada et. Al. Questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine senate of the president‘s ratification of the international agreement establishing the world trade organization. They argued that the WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos by giving preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO agreement places nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention the Filipino first policy of our constitution and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUE: Whether the 1987 constitution prohibit our country from participating in

worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

HELD: The court dismissed the petition. The 1987 constitution does not prohibit our

country from participating in worldwide trade agreements. While indeed the constitution mandates a bias in favors of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprise, at the same time, it recognized the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity. The constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and service in the development of the Philippine economy. While the constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange of good, services and products but frowns only on foreign competition that is unfair and unjust.


ARTICLE XII SECTION 11: PUBLIC UTILITIESROYAL CARGO CORP. V. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) 421 SCRA 21

FACTS:Royal Cargo Corporation is a stock corporation with a 70% owned by Filipino

citizens and 30% owned by foreigners. The president is a foreigner married to a Filipina, while The Chairman of the board, Executive Vice-president and all the Vice-presidents are all Filipinos. CAB initially granted petitioner an indefinite authority to engage in international air freight forwarding. Petitioner filed a petition, requesting for fix duration of its authority. Permit was extended for a period of five years. Petitioner applied for a renewal, was granted provided that that the position of the president be transferred to a Filipino citizen within thirty days from notice thereof, otherwise the permit would be cancelled.

A petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision resolution of CA was filed. the appellate court affirmed the resolution of the Civil Aeronautics Board directing the petitioner to transfer the top position of its corporation to a Filipino national.

ISSUE:Whether the resolution of CAB directing the petitioner to transfer the top position of its

corporation to a Filipino national is valid?

HELD:YES. Under Section 11 last sentence state: The participation of foreign investors in the

governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their corporate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens if the Philippines.


ARTICLE XII SECTION 18: NATIONALIZATION REPUBLIC V. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1968)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right

of the bureau of telecommunications to demand interconnection between the government telephone system and that of PLDT, so that the government telephone system could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the government telephone

system can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the republic may

require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.


article xii section 2

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