assessment guide for hazardous facilities · 2013-09-18 · involving hazardous substances -...

1

Contents

The Quick Guide to Hazardous Facility Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1.3 What are hazardous facilities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1.4 Planning for and assessing hazardous facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1.5 Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2 Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.1 The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.1.1 Functions of regional councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.1.2 Functions of territorial authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2.2 The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) 27

2.2.1 The hazard classification system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2.2.2 Property performance and life cycle requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.3 Links between HSNO and planning controls under the RMA . . . . . 29

2.4 Other relevant legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.4.1 Building Act 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.4.2 Fire Service Act 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.4.3 Health Act 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.4.4 Radiation Protection Act 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.4.5 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.4.6 Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997 . . . . . . . 31

2.4.7 Transport Act 1962 and Land Transport Act 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3 General Siting, Design and Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.1 Selecting a site for a hazardous facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3.2 Considering alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.3 General requirements under the RMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Hazardous doc.art 6/7/00, 8:44 AM1

2

3.4 Minimum performance requirements for hazardous facilities . . . . . . 36

3.4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3.4.2 Minimum performance requirements under HSNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3.4.3 Minimum performance requirements under the RMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3.4.3.1 Site design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3.4.3.2 Site layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.4.3.3 Storage of hazardous substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.4.3.4 Site drainage systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.4.3.5 Spill containment systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.4.3.6 Washdown areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.4.3.7 Underground storage tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.4.3.8 Signage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.4.3.9 Waste management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.4.4 Minimum performance requirements under other Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.5 Site management systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.6 Risk management systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.7 Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

4 Hazardous Facilities and Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.2 The concept of risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.3 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4.4 Risks presented by hazardous substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4.5 Who or what can be at risk and when is risk acceptable? . . . . . . . . . 50

4.6 Risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4.6.1 Hazard analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4.6.2 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4.6.2.1 Risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4.6.2.2 Risk evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4.6.3 Risk control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5 Hazard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5.2 Tool box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.2.1 Site surveys and hazard audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.2.2 Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.2.3 Maps, drawings and overlays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.2.4 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.2.5 Matrices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.2.6 HAZOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59


3

6 Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

6.2 Information sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

6.3 Types of risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

6.3.1 Qualitative analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

6.3.2 Semi-quantitative analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

6.3.3 Quantitative analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

6.3.3.1 Estimating probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

6.3.3.2 Expressing probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6.3.3.3 Estimating consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6.3.3.4 Expressing risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6.3.4 Assessing cumulative risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6.4 Tool box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6.4.1 Site surveys and hazard audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6.4.2 Field studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6.4.3 Checklists and matrices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.4.4 Fault and event trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.4.5 Human reliability assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.4.6 Computer software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

6.4.7 The “Delphi” technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6.4.8 Cost-benefit analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6.5 Assessing the reliability of a risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6.5.1 Estimating uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6.5.2 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

7 Risk Evaluation and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

7.1 Risk evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

7.1.1 Risk acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

7.1.2 Risk criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

7.1.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

7.1.2.2 Definition of risk criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

7.2 Risk control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

8 Risk Communication and Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

8.1 Risk perception and communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

8.2 Who needs to be consulted? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

8.3 How and when does consultation take place? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

8.4 Consultation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

8.5 Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91


4

9 Scoping an Assessment of a Hazardous Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

9.1 Consultation between applicant and regulatory agencies . . . . . . . . . . 94

9.2 Hazard analysis and risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

9.3 When to involve specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

9.4 Preparing an AEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

10 Resource Consents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

10.1 Criteria for consent evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

10.2 Resource consent conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

10.2.1 Site design, construction and management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

10.2.2 Hazard communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

10.2.3 Hazardous substances management plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

10.2.4 Waste management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

10.2.5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

10.2.6 Emergency preparation and management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

10.2.7 Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

10.2.8 Codes of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

10.2.9 Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

10.3 Monitoring and enforcement by regulatory agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

11 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

12 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

13 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120


5

Tables

Table 1: Example of hazard word diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Table 2: Example of qualitative risk scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Table 3a: Example of semi-quantitative risk analysis used for the ranking

and short-listing of risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Table 3b: Example of semi-quantitative risk analysis used for the ranking

and short-listing of risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Table 4: Fatality risks for some voluntary and involuntary risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Table 5: Individual fatality risk criteria for New South Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

FIGURES

Figure 1: The three components of risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Figure 2: Risk management - conceptual overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Figure 3: Example of fault tree analysis for an underground storage tank . . . . . . . . . 61

Figure 4: Risk analysis process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Figure 5: Example of an event tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Figure 6: Risk control process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Figure 7: Checklist for risk communication and consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91


6

Acknowledgements

This guide has been prepared by Susie Wood of Environment and Business Group Limited

and Norbert Schaffoener of resources – Hazardous Substance and Resource Management

Consulting. The input provided by Patricia Blütner of the Auckland Regional Council

as project manager was much appreciated.

Many thanks also to the peer reviewers of the draft guide:

Rex Alexander, Dunedin City Council

Mike Avery, Stratford District Council

Bill Birch, NZ Chemical Industry Council

Dick Fong, Waitakere City Council

Janet Gough, ERMA New Zealand

Fiona Johnson, Wellington City Council

Matthew Trlin, Palmerston North City Council.

This guide has been designed to complement the Land Use Planning Guide for Hazardous

Facilities (Ministry for the Environment, 1999).


7

The Quick Guide to HazardousFacility Assessment

7


8

The Quick Guide to Hazardous Faciliity Assessment

8

1 Purpose

This Quick Guide to the Assessment Guide for Hazardous Facilities summarises and highlights

the key issues associated with assessing an application for and granting a resource consent

for a hazardous facility. A comprehensive description of the matters addressed here is

provided in the main document. While the Assessment Guide is intended for more detailed

study, the Quick Guide is meant to serve as a frequently used rapid reference.

2 Relevant Legislation

The management of hazardous substances is predominantly governed by the Hazardous

Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) and the Resource Management Act

1991 (RMA) and their respective Regulations. Other Acts, such as the Health and Safety

in Employment Act 1992 (HSE), the Building Act 1991, the Agricultural Compounds

and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997, the Transport Act 1962 and the Land Transport

Act 1993 also play a role.

The HSNO Act establishes a comprehensive assessment and approval process for

manufactured and imported hazardous substances and new organisms, to ensure that any

substances deemed to be hazardous as defined by the HSNO Regulations are subject to an

integrated, consistent and performance-based control system for all stages of their life

cycle. In practice, hazardous substances will be subject to minimum performance

requirements (set by Regulations) covering containment, packaging, identification/

labelling, tracking, competency of handling, emergency preparedness and disposal once

the HSNO Regulations come into force. These requirements apply regardless of

circumstances such as activity, location and quantity.

The RMA addresses those aspects of hazardous substances management associated with a

particular location or land use. Generally, this function is undertaken by territorial

authorities (TAs) which make provisions for the control of hazardous facilities (ie, sites

where hazardous substances are used, stored, handled or disposed of) in their district plans.

Regional councils may choose to exercise this function (or part of it), but they need to

state this intent in a regional policy statement.

The two Acts are designed to complement each other, with HSNO providing the overall

framework for managing hazardous substances anywhere in New Zealand, while the RMA

provides additional controls over and above those available through HSNO to ensure

that site-specific circumstances can be taken into account.


9

3 Hazardous Facilities Establishment and Management

The establishment and operation of a hazardous facility require careful consideration of

the following factors:

• Selection of an appropriate site

• Compliance with the minimum performance requirements of relevant legislation

• General resource management issues

• Adherence to recognised management systems.

3.1 Selection of an appropriate siteThe choice of an appropriate site for a hazardous facility is generally influenced by the

following criteria:

• Commercial considerations:

- location, size and access of/to the site

- vicinity of suppliers and customers

- proximity of competitors

- price.

• Planning/resource management requirements:

- regional and/or district plan provisions which may be favourable or present

barriers according to community aspirations

- the type and extent of the risk presented by the facility.

• Environmental aspects:

- proximity to sensitive environmental features such as a water body, natural

protected area or a similar environmentally valuable resource is likely to add to

the risk profile of the facility.

• Social considerations:

- the vicinity of sensitive land uses such as schools, hospitals or residential areas

will influence the suitability of the site.


10


3.2 Compliance with the minimum performance requirements of relevantlegislationA hazardous facility must comply with minimum performance requirements promulgated

under several pieces of legislation, as follows:

3.1.1 HSNO

• Limiting the ability of hazardous substances to manifest their hazardous characteristics

(explosiveness, flammability, oxidising capacity, corrosiveness, toxicity and/or ecotoxicity)

to the detriment of humans, ecosystems and/or the built environment through:

- secure packaging and containment

- clear and consistent identification (or hazard communication) through labels,

signs and material safety data sheets

- tracking of highly hazardous substances

- ensuring that persons dealing with hazardous substances are qualified to do so

- provision of clear and effective information on responding to an emergency

involving hazardous substances

- reducing the hazardous properties of substances to allow for safe disposal.

3.1.2 RMA

• Compliance with relevant rules in the “Hazardous Substances Management” part of

district and/or regional plans, which may set out requirements for:

- site design

- site layout

- storage of hazardous substances

- site drainage systems

- spill containment systems

- washdown areas

- underground storage tanks

- signage

- waste management

- maximum permissible quantities of hazardous substances, above which a resource

consent for the site will be required.

3.1.3 Building Act

• Compliance with Section 6[2](c) of the Building Act (Purposes and Principles) and

Part F3 of the Building Code (Hazardous Substances and Processes).


11

3.1.4 HSE Act

• Implementation of hazard identification processes and incident notification procedures.

• Compliance with designated Codes of Practice.

3.3 General resource management issuesThe establishment and operation of hazardous facilities also needs to consider aspects of

the RMA beyond the narrow focus of hazardous substances management, for example:

• Policies, rules and regulations at national (National Policy Statements (NPS) and/or

National Environmental Standards (NES)), regional (Regional Policy Statements

(RPS) and/or regional plans) and territorial (district plans) level

• Transport and traffic issues

• Landscaping matters

• Building restrictions

• Discharges to the environment.

3.4 Adherence to recognised management systemsThere is a variety of internationally recognised management systems, which provide an

effective framework for operating a hazardous facility in a responsible, efficient and legally

defensible manner. Adoption of one or more of such systems should be considered.

Examples particularly suited to hazardous facilities management are:

• ISO 14001, the international standard for environmental management systems

• ISO 9000, the international standard for quality management systems

• Responsible Care, a management system administered by the New Zealand Chemical

Industry Council (NZCIC)

• Fire Service Approved Evacuation Schemes, pursuant to the Fire Safety and Evacuation

of Buildings Regulations 1992.

4 Hazardous Facilities and Risk

An Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE) including a risk assessment is likely to be

part of the application and consent process for a hazardous facility under the RMA. For

this reason, an understanding of the concepts and methods of risk management is important

for those involved in all aspects of hazardous facility management. A detailed account of

the risk management process is provided in Sections 4 to 8 of the main document, while

the following section provides a brief summary of the key elements.

The terms “hazard” and “risk”, although often used interchangeably, have distinct meanings:

• Hazard describes physical situations, process and/or actions that have the potential to

exert adverse effects on people, ecosystems and/or the built environment.


12


• Risk is the likelihood of specified consequences of a specific event (eg, explosion) on

people, ecosystems and/or the built environment. Therefore, the magnitude of risk is

the product of probability and consequence (Risk = Probability x Consequences).

All stages in the life cycle of hazardous substances present potential risks, as accidents

such as structural failure of containment, operational malfunction or human error may

result in unwanted release or loss of control in the form of explosion, fire and/or spillage.

These risks can be assessed and managed by working through the following risk management

process:

• Establish the context by describing the nature, location, scale and timeframe of the

proposed hazardous facility as well as strategic and organisational aspects such as legal

obligations, relationships with stakeholders and company structure and responsibilities.

• Undertake a hazard analysis in a structured and systematic manner, using one or

more of the tools available for this purpose:

- site surveys and hazard audits

- checklists

- maps, drawings and overlays

- networks

- matrices

- hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)

• Analyse the risk by estimating probabilities and potential consequences of the hazards,

using one of the following types of analysis:

- qualitative

- semi-quantitative

- quantitative

Tools available to undertake this work include:

- site surveys and hazard audits

- field studies

- checklists and matrices

- fault and event trees

- human reliability assessment

- computer software

- Delphi technique

- cost-benefit analysis.

• Assess the reliability of the risk analysis by providing an estimate of uncertainty

and/or generating a sensitivity analysis.


13

• Evaluate the risk, using risk criteria appropriate to the situation. This will enable an

assessment of risk acceptance.

• Identify and implement risk control measures. Possible options include:

- reducing probabilities

- reducing consequences

- transferring risk

- avoiding risk.

The development and implementation of a risk control plan is a suitable method.

• Communicate the risks by disseminating information to relevant stakeholders that is

appropriate to the situation. This should be done with the guidance of a consultation

strategy, identifying:

- the stakeholders and interested parties to be consulted

- the stage at which consultation should occur

- the methods used.

5 Hazardous Facilities Consent Applications

The regulatory part of the process of establishing a hazardous facility should begin well

before a consent is actually applied for. This process can be categorised as follows:

• Consultation between the applicant and the regulatory authorities

• Preliminary risk analysis to assess the scope of the assessment required

• Identification of required expertise and consequent engagement of specialists (if necessary)

• Preparation of the AEE in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the RMA, addressing

the following matters:

- description of the nature and scale of the proposed facility as well as possible

alternatives

- outline of the AEEs scope

- description of affected environments

- summary and results of preliminary risk analysis

- detailed hazard and risk assessment of on-site hazardous facilities (refer Section 4 above)

- outline of hazardous waste management measures

- transport of hazardous substances

- description of proposed site management systems relating to hazardous substances

- emergency preparedness measures

- outline of the consultation strategy.


14


• Submission of consent application by the applicant

• Processing of the consent application in accordance with Part VI of the RMA by the

regulatory authority.

6 Hazardous Facilities Resource Consents

When processing a consent application for a hazardous facility, a regulatory authority

must apply the criteria for evaluating the application as outlined in the district plan.

Additional criteria may be applied on a case-by-case basis, but generally the criteria include,

but are not limited to, the following elements:

• Consistency with the objectives, policies and rules of the district plan and other relevant

planning documents

• Justification for the proposed site

• Appropriateness, accuracy and completeness of the AEE

• The nature of the environments affected by the proposal

• Scale and significance of the risks associated with the proposal

• Appropriateness of the proposed risk control and mitigation measures

• Adequacy and comprehensiveness of the consultation process

• Suitability of the proposed site management systems and plans

• Adequacy of the proposed hazardous waste management measures

• Consideration of hazardous substances transport management measures

• Suitability of emergency management proposals.

Once the application has been considered and the consent has been agreed to in principle,

conditions to suit the individual circumstances of the operation need to be developed.

These will usually follow the minimum performance requirements set out in the district

plan, but may also include additional conditions in line with the nature and scale of the

proposed facility. Resource consent conditions should address the following matters:

• Site design, construction and management, addressing such issues as:

- spill containment systems

- identification of stormwater drainage

- separation requirements between facilities and the site boundary

- emergency installations or equipment.

• Hazard communication, ie, signage on the site and facilities.

• Hazardous substances management plan, covering:

- site and process plans

- monitoring and maintenance schedules


15

- notification procedures and details for incident/accident reporting

- emergency preparedness and response procedures

- training and review procedures.

• Hazardous waste management, covering reduction measures, storage and disposal issues.

• Hazardous substances transport, on and off the site.

• Monitoring, covering:

- hazardous substances inventories, inspection schedules for the site, storage areas

and equipment

- equipment performance testing

- emergency procedures practice

- training programmes

- site audits

- management system audits.

• Codes of Practice, which may be specified with regard to complying with specific

consent conditions;

• Requirements for reporting requested data to the regulatory authority to demonstrate

compliance with consent conditions.

7 Case Study

The main document uses a case study to illustrate the concepts introduced. The separate

sections of this study may be found on pages 44, 60, 78, 79, 92, 98, 105-108 addressing issues

raised in Section 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 respectively. The case study is briefly summarised below.

Pink Ink Inc, a facility involved in the blending, mixing and wholesale of paint and ink

products, wants to establish in the commercial/industrial area of a medium-sized town.

The neighbours of the proposed facility are a panel beater and a warehouse for electrical

goods. A watercourse runs along the rear boundary of the property.

Research into the regulatory obligations revealed that (among other issues not addressed here)

the facility requires a discretionary land use consent from the TA. As part of the preparation

of the AEE (for which the company engaged a consultant as it did not have the required

expertise in house), a hazard analysis using a Hazard Word Diagram and a Fault Tree Analysis

(refer pages 59 and 61) was undertaken. This was followed by a semi-quantitative risk analysis

which showed that a fire in the methanol and toluene storage areas presented the greatest risk

in terms of the potential effects on people, property and the environment. To further assess

this risk, a quantitative risk analysis using an Event Tree (refer page 77) was carried out for the

above- and below-ground storage of flammable materials.


16


Upon evaluating the AEE and risk assessment submitted by Pink Ink Inc with its consent

application, the district council decided that the application did not need to be publicly

notified, provided that consent from all potentially affected parties (immediate neighbours,

other property owners in the vicinity and a local environmental group) was obtained.

The company developed a consultation strategy focusing on meetings with affected parties

and the preparation of written material on the proposals. Following this consultation,

Pink Ink Inc agreed to a range of additional measures, including the installation of a

firewall between its property and the electrical goods warehouse and additional planting

of shrubs on the back of the property to prevent the use of this area for the storage of

hazardous substances. An emergency response plan was prepared, and the Fire Service

was involved in the discussions. As an outcome of these negotiations, all parties gave

their consent to the proposal.

The district council then issued a consent for the facility with conditions relating to:

• Facility design, construction and management (addressing issues such as hazardous

substance storage, site drainage systems, spill containment systems, washdown areas,

underground storage tanks, and fire safety)

• Waste management

• Transport

• Monitoring and reporting.

In summary, the following are essential in dealing effectively with hazardous

facilities matters:

• An understanding of the legislative requirements for hazardous substances

and facilities.

• A systematic and consistent approach to describing and analysing the risks

associated with hazardous facilities.

• Early and comprehensive risk communication and consultation with

affected parties.

• The preparation of an Assessment of Environmental Effects (including a

risk assessment) when applying for a resource consent for the facility.

• Compliance with, monitoring and enforcement of the resource

consent conditions.


17

Chapter Overview

This guide provides the basis for assessing hazardous facilities which require a resource

consent under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). It sets out methods for the

identification and analysis of hazards and risks posed by hazardous facilities, information

requirements for land use consent applications and recommended consent conditions for

hazardous facilities to meet requirements under the RMA.

Section 1 of this Guide explains the purpose of the document and its background, as

well as providing a brief description of what constitutes a hazardous facility.

Section 2 introduces the most relevant statutes for hazardous substances management,

the RMA and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO)

Act. The RMA is the principal statute containing land use controls for

hazardous facilities, while HSNO provides controls for the general

management of hazardous substances. Controls under both statutes are

intended to be consistent and complementary. Other relevant pieces of

legislation for hazardous substances management include the Health and

Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSE), the Building Act 1991 and the

Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997.

Section 3 discusses general siting, design and management considerations for hazardous

facilities. The selection of a suitable site for a hazardous facility must take

into account various elements over and above commercial factors, such as

relevant planning controls, types and quantities of hazardous substances and

proximity to sensitive environments or people-oriented activities. Minimum

performance requirements for hazardous facilities included in plans under

the RMA and in the HSNO legislation and other statutes need to be complied

with. Environmental and/or site management systems may also need to be

implemented, in accordance with national or international standards.

This section introduces a fictional case study – a facility for the manufacture

and storage of inks and paints.

Section 4 explains the risks associated with a hazardous facility as the combination of

the likelihood of an adverse event involving hazardous substances and the

significance or effects of that event. Potential effects can include damage

caused by fire or explosions, poisoning of people or wildlife, or injuries.

Risks from hazardous facilities need to be assessed and appropriately

managed. A complete risk assessment includes an analysis of the hazards

and risks, evaluation of the risks and decisions on their control.


18


Section 5 introduces the concept of hazard analysis. Hazard analysis relies on a

structured and systematic approach. There are various methods available

for the hazard analysis of a hazardous facility, including checklists, networks,

matrices, ranking and “hazard and operability studies”. There may be

considerable variation in the detail required for different hazard analyses,

depending on the complexity of operations in a facility, type and quantities

of hazardous substances used and/or stored, possible natural hazards of the

site, the sensitivity of the surrounding environment and various other factors.

The case study is continued in this section, providing the outline of a hazard

analysis for the facility introduced in Section 3.

Section 6 introduces the concept of risk analysis. Risk analysis focuses on estimating

probabilities of failures and potential consequences of hazards presented by

a hazardous facility. A wide range of qualitative and quantitative risk

assessment methods is available. Various assumptions and data can be used,

including statistical and generic failure data, relevant process and operational

data, or results from models. However, the outcome of a risk analysis is

only as good as the assumptions made and the quality of the data used, and

the reliability of a risk analysis should always be assessed as well.

The case study is continued with the outline of a risk analysis for the facility

introduced in Section 3.

Section 7 discusses the evaluation of risks presented by a hazardous facility and the

approach to risk control. The decision of whether the risks presented by a

hazardous facility are appropriate for a local community depends on the

acceptance of these risks. There is a range of international risk criteria

which can be used to determine the acceptability of risks, for example

individual fatality risk criteria for people. However, under the RMA, a

consenting authority may require more stringent criteria to be met to reflect

particular concerns of a community. Risk control focuses on the

identification of measures to avoid or mitigate risks, such as the use of

warning systems, or the implementation of a training programme or

contingency plans.

Section 8 sets out the requirements for a risk communication strategy for a proposed

hazardous facility. Different people tend to perceive risks in different ways,

depending on how significant they are, the associated benefits and whether

they are voluntary or not. Communication about the risks of a proposed

hazardous facility therefore needs to address both calculated and perceived

risks. Relevant stakeholders, including representatives of the community


19

and tangata whenua, need to be involved at the appropriate time to assist

with identifying and avoiding conflict at an early stage. Risk communication

is primarily the onus of the applicant, even though the consenting agency

may take part in this role when notifying consents.

The case study introduced earlier is continued with a discussion of risk

communication and consultation.

Section 9 explains why consultation between the applicant and the regulatory agency

when scoping an assessment of a hazardous facility is important. For larger

scale proposals and complex technical matters, one or both parties may

need to consider the use of technical experts. A preliminary hazard and

risk analysis may be necessary to clarify the scope of an assessment of a

hazardous facility and the need to involve technical experts. An Assessment

of Environmental Effects (AEE) has to be prepared addressing all relevant

matters. This should, as a minimum, include appropriate information on

hazards and risks and their control, consideration of alternatives, mitigating

measures and consultation.

The case study sets out the basic requirements for an AEE for the selected facility.

Section 10 outlines the criteria a consenting authority may use to evaluate an

application for a hazardous facility land use consent and to develop

appropriate resource consent conditions. Model resource consent conditions

for hazardous facilities are provided. Monitoring and enforcement of the

facility and resource consent conditions by regulatory agencies are other

important aspects. Self-monitoring by consent holders, including reporting

to the consenting authority, may be an appropriate option.

The case study includes a list of recommended consent conditions for the

selected facility.

Section 11 provides a summary of the main issues addressed in this document.

References gives a list of the documents used to prepare the guide.

Bibliography lists relevant guides, Codes of Practice and Standards for the management

of hazardous substances.

List of provides a quick reference list for the abbreviations used in this document.

Abbreviations

Glossary contains a list of important terms used in this Assessment Guide.


20


21

Part 1:

Introduction


22

1 Introduction

KEY POINTS

• This Assessment Guide provides assistance with the assessment of hazardous

facilities requiring a resource consent under the RMA.

• It sets out various methods for the identification and analysis of hazards and

risks posed by hazardous facilities, information requirements for land use

consent applications and recommended consent conditions for hazardous

facilities to meet RMA requirements.

• It will be revised as necessary to reflect changes in the regulatory regimes for

resource and hazardous substances management.

1.1 PurposeThe guide was produced to assist territorial authorities (TAs) with the assessment and

processing of RMA land use consent applications for hazardous facilities. It should also

be useful for the applicants for such consents. It applies to any hazardous facility,

independent of what planning methods are used to determine whether it needs a consent,

and may therefore be used by any TA in New Zealand, irrespective of whether it uses the

Hazardous Facility Screening Procedure (HFSP) or not. The Assessment Guide is, however,

complementary to the Land Use Planning for Hazardous Facilities (MfE, 1999).

The guide details:

• information requirements for hazardous facilities

• how to scope assessments of hazardous facilities and supporting documentation for

resource consent applications, including risk assessments

• criteria for the evaluation of resource consent applications

• the types of conditions that may be included in resource consents

• how resource consent conditions can be complied with.

1.2 BackgroundThis document has been prepared in response to a workshop and subsequent survey of

TAs carried out by the Auckland Regional Council in 1997. It established that over 90

percent of participating TAs rated guidance on how to assess hazardous facilities for resource

consenting purposes as a very high priority.

The information generated from the workshop and the survey helped to shape the

objectives for this guide, which intends to provide the principles and general requirements

for an assessment and evaluation of information on hazardous facilities under the RMA.


23

Guidance was requested in the following areas:

• details of the regulatory framework for hazardous substances

• criteria for the general siting and management of hazardous facilities

• suitable methods for hazard identification and risk assessment

• determining the scope and detail of information required from applicants

• the decision criteria to be used for the evaluation of resource consent applications

• model resource consent conditions and methods of enforcement.

1.3 What are hazardous facilities?The term “hazardous facility” is not defined in New Zealand legislation. However, it is

widely used to describe site-specific activities which involve the use and storage of hazardous

substances. The term is relevant to land use planning under the RMA as opposed to the

substance-specific controls under the HSNO Act.

For the purpose of this guide, hazardous facilities are defined as:

activities involving hazardous substances and sites, including vehicles for their

transport (if stationary for more than 1 hour), where hazardous substances are used,

stored, handled and disposed of. These activities can include industrial operations

such as chemical warehouses, manufacturing plants or bulk storage facilities, but also

workshops, agricultural or horticultural activities or home occupations.

The term may also apply to facilities involved in the storage, treatment and disposal of

hazardous wastes, including waste hazardous substances.

Hazardous facilities do not include:

• the incidental use and storage of hazardous substances in domestic quantities

• hazardous activities which do not involve hazardous substances but which may pose a

risk to people or the natural environment due to a physical or biological hazard (eg,

earthworks, electromagnetic radiation, genetically modified organisms etc)

• pipelines used for the transfer of hazardous substances such as gas, oil and sewage

• radioactive substances, which are covered by other legislation.

1.4 Planning for and assessing hazardous facilitiesThe RMA provides for managing the effects of hazardous substances at a particular location,

or, in other words, the use of land by hazardous facilities (ie, sites or operations where

hazardous substances are stored or used). As the planning framework for hazardous facilities

(and the HFSP) focuses solely on land use planning aspects, it is complementary to the

controls under the HSNO legislation and does not represent a competing control

mechanism (refer Section 2.1).


24

Most TAs have specific rules for the management of hazardous substances in their district

plans. About 30 TAs have adopted the HFSP to determine the consent status of a hazardous

facility, while a number of generally small councils rely on activity or threshold lists.

The proportion of hazardous facility land use consents to other land use consents is difficult

to establish. However, based on the experience of the authors it is not assumed to be

particularly high. In part, this is due to a lack of knowledge of both applicants and council

counter staff about requirements for hazardous facilities, and the (perceived) complexity

of the issue, which may result in “overlooking” hazardous facilities. Improved publicity

and education will be necessary to change this situation.

Once it has been determined that a hazardous facility requires a land use consent, the

applicant needs to supply the necessary information with the application. For controlled

activities (where provided) this is specified in the district plan. For discretionary (or

restricted discretionary) activities, further aspects may need to be addressed. They generally

include a risk assessment of a scale appropriate to the effects of the facility (including

potential effects), and detailed specifications on how adverse effects of hazardous substance

management can be avoided or mitigated.

1.5 RevisionsThis guide is not a statutory document, it provides means which should ensure the effective

and sustainable management of hazardous substances. The performance of this guide will

be assessed regularly and in line with any new regimes for hazardous substance management

under both the HSNO legislation and/or district plans. Possible amendments to the RMA

may also need to be considered, along with developments in transport legislation or national

hazardous waste standards. Revisions and updates of this guide will be published as needed.


25

Part 2:

Regulatory Framework


26

2 Regulatory Framework

KEY POINTS

• The most relevant statutes for hazardous substance management are the

Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and the Hazardous Substance and New

Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO).

• The RMA is the principal statute for land use controls for hazardous facilities.

• Controls under both statutes are intended to be consistent and

complementary.

• Other relevant statutes include the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992

(HSE), the Building Act 1991 and the Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary

Medicines Act 1997.

2.1 The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA)2.1.1 Functions of regional councils

The functions of regional councils with respect to hazardous substances management are

defined by section 30 of the RMA:

(1) Every regional council shall have the following functions for the purpose of giving effect to this

Act in its region:

[...]

(c) The control of the use of land for the purpose of-

[...]

(v) The prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage,

use, disposal, or transportation of hazardous substances; [...]

(f) The control of discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air, or water and discharges

of water into water.

A further dimension is added to regional council responsibilities by the Second Schedule

of the Act, which defines what matters may be provided for in regional policy statements

and plans. These include discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air and water, the

prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, and

transportation of hazardous substances (Clause 1), and any matters relating to the

management of any actual or potential effects of any use, development or protection

described in Clauses 1 or 2 on the creation, minimisation, recycling, treatment, disposal,

and containment of all forms of contaminants (Clause 4).


27

In 1993, an amendment to section 62 of the Act provided for regional councils determining

in the regional policy statement which local authority shall have responsibility for “ […]

developing objectives, policies and rules relating to the control of the use of land for […]

the prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal or

transportation of hazardous substances”. Regional councils therefore have a role in

controlling the use of land for the purpose of managing hazardous substances if they choose

to exercise this function. Changed again through the HSNO Act, however, the default

responsibility now lies with TAs if not specified in the regional policy statement.

2.1.2 Functions of territorial authorities

Historically, TAs have had a land use planning and operational role with respect to

hazardous substances management. Under the Dangerous Goods Act 1974, TAs have

controlled the storage of dangerous goods by issuing dangerous goods licenses. Basic controls

were also applied for land use under the old Country and Town Planning Act 1974.

Under section 31 of the Resource Management Act, TAs have been vested with the:

…control of any actual or potential effects of the use, development or protection of land,

including the implementation of rules for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards

and the prevention and mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal or

transportation of hazardous substances…

a role which is similar to that of a regional council. A TA may carry out this function

completely if so stated in the regional policy statement, or it may share this responsibility

with a regional council. In most regions of New Zealand, the majority of functions of

controlling hazardous substance land use are carried out by TAs.

2.2 The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO)The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO) replaces the Explosives

Act 1957, Dangerous Goods Act 1974, Toxic Substances Act 1979, a substantial part of

the Pesticides Act 1979 and parts of other legislation. The Act covers all substances

above defined minimum hazard threshold levels, excluding radioactivity.

The main purpose of the Act is the establishment of a comprehensive assessment and approval

process for hazardous substances and new organisms, and a consistent, performance-based

control framework. The Act also provides for the development of regulations specifying

minimum requirements for hazardous substances, regardless of the activity, location, land

use, quantity or the risk of cumulative effects of a number of substances.

A transitional period for existing hazardous substances is provided for in the Act, applying

controls from the repealed legislation. It is currently intended that this period will expire

on 1 January 2000 unless extended further. An extension up to three years has been

proposed, which would require a change to the Act.


28

Under HSNO, the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA New Zealand)

is the central government agency responsible for establishing and administering core

conditions for the management of all hazardous substances and new organisms. A number

of other central and local government agencies have an enforcement role under the Act.

The HSNO legislation provides for various regulations which, among other things, specify

a classification system and performance requirements for hazardous substances (MfE, 1994).

The classification system is closely linked to international systems such as the UNRTDG

(the United Nations Recommendations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods 1997, 10th

edition), but contains some variations to include levels of hazard which are relevant at

stages of a substance’s life cycle other than transport. Other performance requirements

cover matters such as the specific control of hazardous properties as well as the life cycle or

systems controls (such as containment/packaging or identification/hazard communication).

Under the performance-based nature of the HSNO legislation, compliance with (ERMA

New Zealand approved) Codes of Practices will become more important. Demonstrating

legal compliance with such codes and possibly other relevant documentation will become

an important legal defence mechanism both under the HSNO Act and other legislation.

2.2.1 The hazard classification system

The HSNO Hazard Classification System has been established under section 74 (a) of

the Act for the following hazardous properties:

• explosiveness

• flammability

• oxidising capacity

• corrosiveness

• toxicity

• ecotoxicity

• substances which, upon contact with water or air, develop any of the above hazard properties.

The system provides minimum hazard threshold levels below which substances are not

covered by the legislation. It also establishes between one and six or seven hazard categories

for the various hazards allowing for more stringent controls to be placed on substances

with higher hazards. These controls are termed hazard classification controls or property

performance requirements.


29

2.2.2 Property performance and life cycle requirements

Property performance requirements are established under section 75 of the HSNO

legislation. They are designed to reduce the likelihood of an unintended event caused by

the hazardous properties of a substance and to control the adverse effects of the event.

The HSNO “pan-life cycle” (or systems) requirements cover the following areas :

• packaging and containers

• identification

• tracking and competency

• emergency preparedness

• disposal.

These requirements apply at all or some defined stages of the life cycle of a hazardous

substance, regardless of location or land use.

2.3 Links between HSNO and planning controls under the RMAAs stated, HSNO requirements are minimum requirements which need to be met in all

parts of New Zealand. Local planning documents cannot specify requirements for hazardous

substances covered by the HSNO legislation lesser than those specified by HSNO. However,

planning controls can be more stringent in some cases, for example to protect sensitive

environments and locations, or in cases of risk of synergistic and/or cumulative effects of

several hazardous substances, or to reflect particular concerns of local communities.

The scope of what is considered a hazardous substance from a RMA perspective may also

be wider than that for HSNO concerns. In practice, this means that substances with

radioactive properties or potentially environmentally damaging substances (eg, in terms

of a high biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)) can also be covered by planning controls.

Hazard thresholds or cut-off levels may vary in some instances from those defined under

HSNO, although this is not recommended.

It should be noted that, apart from HSNO property performance requirements and life

cycle controls, other requirements may be relevant for hazardous substances planning. In

particular, national standards for hazardous waste management may need to be reflected

in planning documents. Such standards are currently being developed by the Ministry for

the Environment and are expected to be finalised in the year 2002.

2.4 Other relevant legislationHazardous substances are also managed under a number of other Acts of Parliament and

associated Regulations, which are administered by various agencies. The most important

of these Acts are listed below. However, particular aspects of hazardous substances

management may also be affected by other statutes not listed, such as medicines, local

government or civil defence legislation.


30

2.4.1 Building Act 1991

The Building Act covers issues associated with the construction, design and fire protection

of buildings. It provides for the safe storage of hazardous substances to prevent their

release into the environment in the case of fire (Section 6(2)(c)). The Act uses the

general, qualitative definition of “hazardous substance” of the Fire Service Act. The

Building Code and “approved documents” provide means of compliance with the

requirements of the Act. Part F 3 deals specifically with hazardous substances in buildings.

2.4.2 Fire Service Act 1975

The Fire Service Act deals with matters relating to the structure, function and funding of

the New Zealand Fire Service. Under this Act, incidents involving hazardous substances

are considered to be emergencies that are attended by the Fire Service. Of interest is

Section 17N, which stipulates that the National (Fire Service) Commander shall provide

for cooperation with territorial local authorities and regional councils, with special reference

to hazardous substances emergencies.

2.4.3 Health Act 1956

The Health Act provides for TAs to control nuisances, offensive trades, and the handling

and storage of noxious substances, among other things. Although dated in some respects

and long considered to require updating or replacing, this Act still provides considerable

powers for managing hazardous substances.

2.4.4 Radiation Protection Act 1965

The Radiation Protection Act is administered by the Ministry of Health. It deals with

the control of radioactive substances, including radiation emitting equipment such as x-

ray machines, and the occupational safety and health of workers who use radioactive

substances. The National Radiation Laboratory in Christchurch is the principal agency

providing advice and guidance in these matters.

2.4.5 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992

This Act is administered by the Department of Labour and provides comprehensive safety

and health requirements for all places of work (covered by a very general and far-reaching

definition). Particular emphasis is placed on hazard identification, analysis and management.

Codes of Practice provide the means for meeting the requirements of the legislation.


31

2.4.6 Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997

This Act is administered by the Ministry for Food and Fibre (previously Agriculture) and

addresses, among other things, requirements for the registration and use of chemicals as

agricultural compounds or veterinary medicines. The assessment and approval process

for hazardous substances covered by this Act is designed to be closely linked to the process

under the HSNO legislation. The Act comes into effect at the same time as the hazardous

substance parts of the HSNO Act.

2.4.7 Transport Act 1962 and Land Transport Act 1993

These acts are especially relevant for the transport of hazardous substances on land. The

Transport Act establishes classes of hazardous substances and places a duty on consignors

and transporters of goods to package, label, segregate and provide documentation for

hazardous substances, as well as requiring the training of drivers who transport hazardous

substances. The Land Transport Act 1993 provides for the promulgation of Land Transport

Rules, one of which, the Land Transport Rule: Dangerous Goods, 1999 deals with the

land transport of dangerous goods (used instead of the term “hazardous substances”). The

Dangerous Goods Rule and the associated New Zealand Standard 5433:1999 will replace

the provisions of the Transport Act 1962 and the old New Zealand Standard 5433:1988.

The transport legislation is administered by the Land Transport Safety Authority.


32


33

Part 3:General Siting, Design andManagement Considerations


34

3 General Siting, Design and Management Considerations

KEY POINTS

• The selection of a suitable site for a hazardous facility must take into account

various considerations over and above commercial factors, such as relevant

planning controls, types and quantities and hazardous substances and

proximity to sensitive environments or people-oriented activities.

• Minimum performance requirements for hazardous facilities included in plans

under the RMA and in the HSNO legislation and other statutes need to be

complied with.

• Environmental and/or site management systems may need to be implemented,

in accordance with national or international standards.

3.1 Selecting a site for a hazardous facilitySelecting a site for a hazardous facility is often primarily driven by a range of commercial

factors, including:

• specific site requirements (eg, location, size and access)

• competition

• vicinity of suppliers and customers

• price.

However, there are a range of other factors which need to be taken into account when

assessing the suitability of a site for a hazardous facility. These include:

• relevant regional and district planning objectives and policies under the RMA

• the district plan zoning strategy

• district plan screening methods to determine the resource consent status of hazardous

facilities (for example, the HFSP)

• vicinity to sensitive resources, environments or activities, such as residential zones,

schools, hospitals or ecologically valuable resources

• extent of risks presented by hazardous substances to human health and life, ecosystems

and physical assets.


35

3.2 Considering alternativesThe RMA requires the consideration of alternative locations or methods for undertaking an

activity where significant adverse effects (including risks) may result from the activity.

Therefore, any significant risks presented by a hazardous facility need to be considered when

selecting a suitable site and defining the operations to be carried out on it. Where risks are too

high for a particular locality, the activity may need to be relocated to another site. Alternatively,

the nature of site operations may need to be changed, or suitable site protection and management

measures introduced to ensure that risks are reduced to an acceptable level.

The consideration of risks related to hazardous substances in the evaluation of alternative

sites is advisable at the outset of planning for a hazardous facility, at least for major facilities.

This helps to avoid the chances of an unsuitable site being chosen and money being

wasted on planning and design work.

3.3 General requirements under the RMAProponents of a hazardous facility are obliged to investigate all pertinent requirements for

the facility under the RMA and under relevant planning documents such as district and

regional plans. In the future, national standards (eg, for hazardous waste management) may

also be of importance. As the implementation of the RMA is largely devolved to the regional

and district level, planning controls are likely to vary between regions and between districts.

District plans generally contain rules applying to hazardous facilities, including

requirements for consents and minimum performance standards. Minimum performance

standards apply to all new and significantly modified activities, irrespective of circumstances

or whether the activity is permitted or requires a consent. This guide specifically focuses

on hazardous facilities management associated with district plans. However, there may

be other requirements (eg, in regional plans) that need to be considered.

It is therefore important to consult all relevant planning documents before deciding to

proceed with hazardous facility at a particular site. In particular, the following documents

may need to be perused:

• national guidelines and standards

• regional policy statements

• regional coastal plans (if the site is in the vicinity of the coastline)

• regional plans (there may be a series in each region)

• district plans

• Codes of Practice (where applicable).

Copies of relevant documents are usually held by public libraries and the libraries of regional

and district councils. Officers in regional and district councils will be able to indicate

which documents need to be reviewed for particular sites.


36

A hazardous facility may require a series of resource consents relating to different aspects

of its operations, including hazardous substances use, zoning, traffic, stormwater design,

landscape design, discharges to the environment, and so on. Where several resource

consents are required, these are usually handled in a single application and approval process.

3.4 Minimum performance requirements for hazardous facilities3.4.1 Background

There are legal minimum performance requirements which apply to hazardous facilities

irrespective of their operation or location. These minimum performance requirements

are primarily embedded in the HSNO legislation (refer Section 2). A developer of a

proposed facility must be aware of these minimum performance standards, as any non-

compliance may result in regulatory penalties.

3.4.2 Minimum performance requirements under HSNO

Property performance requirements under HSNO apply to all substances under the hazard

classification system, ie, all substances with one or more of the hazardous properties covered

by the legislation, above defined minimum hazard threshold levels. These threshold levels

are generally based on those used internationally (UNRTDG, 1997) but do not include

radioactive substances, which are covered by separate legislation.

The classification criteria for substances with ecotoxic properties are primarily based on OECD

specifications. They do not include substances which can be environmentally damaging by

depleting oxygen in natural waters due to a high biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).

Performance requirements specify, as the name makes clear, a required performance, not

prescriptive controls. The property performance requirements are designed to reduce the

likelihood of an unintended event caused by the hazardous properties of a substance, and to

control the adverse effects of the event. Specifically, the following events are to be controlled:

• Explosiveness (the capability of sudden expansion due to a release of internal energy):

- limiting the chance of an accidental explosion

- limiting the effects of an unintended explosion (or of an intended explosion

outside a defined impact area)

- managing areas where substances with explosive properties are manufactured,

loaded/unloaded, stored or used.

• Flammability (the capability to be ignited in the presence of oxygen and to sustain

combustion):

- limiting the chance of accidental ignition of substances with flammable properties

- limiting the effects of unintended ignition and of intended combustion outside

defined area

- managing areas where substances with flammable properties are manufactured,

loaded/unloaded, stored or used.


37

• Oxidising capacity (the capacity to contribute to fire or explosion due to release of oxygen):

- limiting the chance of unintended combustion or explosion by either accidental

contact with incompatible materials or occurring as a result of exposure to

energy sources (including by desensitisation or temperature control)

- limiting the effects of unintended combustion, explosion or spills

- managing areas where substances with oxidising capacity are stored or used.

• Corrosiveness (the capability to chemically break down metal or human tissue on contact):

- implementing measures to avoid adverse effects on human tissue, such as

protective clothing/equipment or purpose-specific equipment

- limiting exposure of people by setting Maximum Exposure Levels (for the

purpose of property performance corrosiveness controls are considered a subset

of the toxicity requirements).

• Toxicity (the capability for adverse health effects, short or long term, following exposure):

- limiting access to highly toxic substances; implementing measures to avoid

adverse health effects such as protective clothing/equipment or purpose-specific

equipment

- limiting exposure of people by setting of so-called “Acceptable Daily Intakes”

and “Maximum Exposure Levels”.

• Ecotoxicity (the capability for adverse toxic effects on non-human organisms or ecosystems):

- limiting access to highly ecotoxic substances

- implementing measures to avoid adverse effects on organisms and ecosystems

such as purpose-specific equipment

- limiting exposure by setting “Maximum Concern Levels” for target areas and

“Environmental Concern Levels” for non-target areas

- notification of the application of ecotoxic substances as a biocide.

HSNO “pan-life cycle” (or systems) performance requirements are applicable in the

following areas:

• Packaging and Containers (including strength, durability and containment

requirements of anything from small retail packages to tank-wagons or explosive

magazines)

• Identification (or “hazard communication” requirements, covering labels, signs and

workplace material safety data documentation)

• Tracking and Competency (for highly hazardous substances and defined persons

dealing with certain hazardous substances, including test certifiers)


38

• Emergency Preparedness (covering minimum emergency response information as well

as more specific information for locations with substances above specified quantities;

specifying the type of information necessary and the performance of systems and

equipment for a hazardous substance emergency response)

• Disposal (requiring the reduction of all defined hazardous properties of waste substances

finally disposed of beyond the point of disposal to defined levels)

These system requirements apply at all or some defined stages of the life cycle of a hazardous

substance, regardless of location or land use (with the exception, to some degree, of the

disposal requirements).

3.4.3 Minimum performance requirements under the RMA

Under the land use provisions of respective district plans in New Zealand, hazardous

facilities are normally required to comply with a series of minimum performance

requirements. These apply irrespective of the consent status of the hazardous facility,

that is, they apply to permitted activities also.

Minimum performance requirements for hazardous facilities in district plans may address

general, zone-related and hazardous substance specific requirements. General and zone-

specific requirements vary from district to district. In contrast, minimum performance

requirements for hazardous facilities tend to be more consistent and to apply in areas where

minimum requirements stipulated by other legislation (in particular, life cycle controls under

the HSNO Act) are not deemed sufficient to provide adequate site-specific protection.

Overall, minimum performance requirements under the RMA intend to ensure that

hazardous facilities are designed and operated in a manner that prevents or minimises the

adverse environmental effects of an accident or loss of control of hazardous substances.

They cover mainly areas that are not addressed by other legislation such as requirements

for site design, spill containment, stormwater, sewerage and wash-water systems, waste

management and site signage. These are outlined in greater detail below.

3.4.3.1 Site design

Any part of a hazardous facility which is involved in the manufacture, mixing, packaging,

storage, loading, unloading, transfer, use or handling of hazardous substances must be

designed, constructed and operated to prevent:

• the occurrence of any off-site adverse effects from the above listed activities on people,

ecosystems, physical structures and/or other parts of the environment unless permitted

by a resource consent

• the contamination of air, land and/or water (including groundwater, potable water supplies

and surface waters) in the event of a spill or other type of release of hazardous substances.


39

3.4.3.2 Site layout

A hazardous facility must be designed to ensure that separation between on-site facilities

and the property boundary is sufficient for the adequate protection of neighbouring

facilities, land uses and sensitive environments.

3.4.3.3 Storage of hazardous substances

The storage of any hazardous substances must be carried out to prevent:

• the unintentional release of the hazardous substance

• the accumulation of any liquid or solid spills or fugitive vapours and gases in enclosed off-

site areas resulting in potentially adverse effects on people, ecosystems or built structures.

Specific performance requirements for packaging and containers of hazardous substances

are covered by HSNO Regulations.

3.4.3.4 Site drainage systems

Site drainage systems must be designed, constructed and operated to prevents hazardous

substances entering into the stormwater and/or sewerage systems unless permitted to do

so by a network utility operator.

Suitable means of compliance include clearly identified stormwater grates and manholes,

roofing, sloped pavements, interceptor drains, containment and diversion valves, oil-water

separators, sumps and similar systems.

3.4.3.5 Spill containment systems

Any parts of the hazardous facility site where a hazardous substances spill may occur must

be serviced by suitable spill containment systems that are:

• constructed from impervious materials resistant to the hazardous substances used, stored,

manufactured, mixed, packaged, loaded, unloaded or otherwise handled on the site

• for liquid hazardous substances:

- able to contain the maximum volume of the largest tank present plus an

allowance for stormwater or fire water

- for drums or other smaller containers, able to contain 50 percent of the maximum

volume of substances stored plus an allowance for stormwater or fire water

• able to prevent the entry of any spill or other unintentional release of hazardous

substances, or any contaminated stormwater and/or fire water into site drainage systems

unless permitted to do so by a network utility operator.

Suitable means of compliance include graded floors and surfaces, bunding, roofing, sumps,

fire water catchments, overfill protection and alarms, and similar systems.


40

3.4.3.6 Washdown areas

Any part of the hazardous facility site where vehicles, equipment or containers that are or

may have become contaminated with hazardous substances are washed must be designed,

constructed and managed to prevent any contaminated wash-water from:

• entry or discharge into the stormwater drainage or sewerage systems unless permitted

by a network utility operator

• discharge into or onto land and/or water (including groundwater and potable water

supplies) unless permitted by a resource consent.

Suitable means of compliance include roofing, sloped pavements, interceptor drains,

containment and diversion valves, oil-water separators, sumps and similar systems.

3.4.3.7 Underground storage tanks

Underground tanks for the storage of petroleum products must be designed, constructed

and managed to prevent any leakage and spills and resulting adverse effects on people,

ecosystems and property.

Suitable means of compliance include:

• using materials that are resistant to the hazardous substances concerned

• using secondary containment facilities in areas of environmental sensitivity

• providing leak detection or monitoring systems capable of detecting a failure or breach

in the structural integrity of the primary containment vessel.

3.4.3.8 Signage

Any hazardous facility must be adequately signposted to indicate the nature of the

substances stored, used or otherwise handled.

Suitable means of compliance include adherence to relevant Codes of Practice or the

HAZCHEM signage system.

3.4.3.9 Waste management

Any process waste or other waste containing hazardous substances must be managed to prevent:

• entry or discharge into the stormwater drainage or sewerage system unless permitted

by a network utility operator

• discharge into or onto land and/or water (including groundwater and potable water


The storage of hazardous waste or other waste containing hazardous substances must comply

with the performance requirements outlined in 3.4.3.3 to 3.4.3.5 above.


41

Any hazardous facility generating waste containing hazardous substances must dispose

of these wastes to appropriately permitted facilities, or be serviced by a reputable waste

disposal contractor.

Any hazardous facility must comply with other performance requirements and controls

for hazardous wastes under the RMA.

3.4.4 Minimum performance requirements under other Acts

Both the Building Act and the HSE Act contain some basic performance-based controls for

hazardous substance management. The Building Act provides for Part F3 of the

New Zealand Building Code as a means of compliance with the requirements of the Act for

buildings containing hazardous substances . The Health and Safety in Employment Act requires

a hazard identification process for workplaces as well as incident notification procedures which

are relevant to the performance of workplaces which are also hazardous facilities.

3.5 Site management systemsIncreasingly stringent requirements for hazardous substances under the RMA and other

legislation result in growing legal liabilities for operators of hazardous facilities. As a

result, companies need to deal with these liabilities in a systematic and well organised

fashion. Management systems are key tools to demonstrate legal compliance and underpin

a company’s ability to demonstrate due diligence and mount a defence in a legal court.

For some facilities, site management systems may be required under the conditions attached

to a resource consent. However, in many cases a management system is a voluntary

measure companies implement for internal quality assurance and due diligence purposes.

Site management systems can take many shapes and forms, although there are some that

are particularly suitable for incorporating provisions related to hazardous substances:

• ISO 14001 - This international standard sets the blueprint for Environmental

Management Systems (EMS). It was finalised in 1996 and superseded an earlier British

Standard. While ISO 14001 covers the fundamentals of an EMS, a series of other

related standards are in preparation that relate to environmental management and

environmental performance. Under ISO 14001, organisations commit themselves to

identify and manage significant environmental issues related to their activities and to

comply with the law and other requirements.

• ISO 9000 - This international standard focuses on ensuring product and/or service

quality according to specified customer requirements. Even though not primarily

targeting environmental quality, many aspects of an ISO 9000 quality management

system have beneficial effects on environmental performance and can be directly linked

with an ISO 14001 EMS.


42

• Responsible Care - This management system was introduced in 1984 by the Canadian

Chemical Producers Association and is administered by the New Zealand Chemical

Industry Council in New Zealand (NZCIC). The programme is designed to help

industry manage health, safety and environmental protection issues through

improvement in performance.

• Fire Service Approved Evacuation Schemes - These are pursuant to the Fire Safety

and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 1992. Such schemes relate to the site

management of hazardous substances, as control measures for storage and use must be

specified and integrated into the overall scheme.

3.6 Risk management systemsRisk management is an integral part of good site management practice. Standards Australia

and New Zealand have recently developed a risk management standard (AS/NZ

4360:1999), which addresses risk management in a systems context and ties in with the

general approach taken under ISO 14001 (AS/NZ ISO 14001, 1997).

3.7 ChecklistThe following checklist provides a summary of the points that need to be covered when

considering siting, design and management requirements for a new hazardous facility or

an existing facility undergoing significant expansion.

Site Selection

• Commercial factors

• Planning requirements, including:

- Interface with other activities and sensitive environments

- Extent of risks posed by facility

- Consideration of alternatives.

General Resource Management Requirements

• Check following documents:

- National guidelines and standards (as available)

- Regional Policy Statements

- Regional Plans

- District Plans.


43

• Check for relevant issues, including:

- Traffic and carparking

- Discharges

- Landscaping

- Building height, shape, volume etc.

Minimum Performance Requirements

• HSNO (independent of location)

• Resource management controls, including:

- Design and construction of all relevant facilities and installations

- Emergency response capability

- Monitoring

• Building Act

• Health and Safety legislation

Management Systems

• Basic or more complex (depending on scale of facility)

• Could be based on standards or industry programmes

• Include training, maintenance, improvement processes.


44

CASE STUDY: A PAINT AND INK MANUFACTURING FACILITY

General Siting, Design and Management Considerations

This case study, using a fictional facility for the blending, mixing and wholesale of various paint

products and inks, illustrates the issues discussed in the Assessment Guide.

An Australian company, Pink Ink Inc, wants to develop a site in the commercial/ industrial area of

a medium-sized New Zealand town. A large number of hazardous substances in quantities of several

hundred tonnes are proposed to be used and stored on a newly developed site.

Next to the site is a panel beater and a warehouse for electrical goods. About 20 metres behind the

site is a watercourse. Below is a basic map of the site and its vicinity.

The proposed site layout includes an office block, a manufacturing unit, raw materials and finished

products storage facilities, as well as above and below ground storage facilities for bulk hazardous liquids.

Street

PanelBeater

Pink Ink Incsite

Warehouse

Watercourse


45

CASE STUDY: CONTINUED

The provisions of the relevant district plan identify the facility as requiring a discretionary land use

consent. (A consent for the discharge of stormwater from the site and an air discharge consent are

also required by the regional council. Issues associated with these two consents are not addressed in

this case study.)

Pink Ink Inc is a responsible company and endeavours to meet all requirements of the consenting

authorities (which, apart from RMA requirements would also include Building Act and HSNO

requirements not addressed here). The site design includes the following features:

• The site is to be completely sealed apart from some landscaping of the front yard.

• Underground tanks and pipework have generally either secondary containment or a leak

monitoring system.

• The site stormwater system is capable of retaining a surface spill of the maximum quantity

contained in the largest above-ground container.

• The site stormwater system is capable of retaining contaminated fire water released during a

credible fire of specified intensity and duration.

An environmental management system of the parent company is to be adopted for the site. Some

amendments are envisaged to achieve compliance with New Zealand legislation.

The hazardous substances inventory (basic) for the site is shown below:

Hazardous Substance Quantity (tonnes) Storage Type

Methanol 20 Underground tanks

Mineral turpentine 20 Underground tanks

Toluene 20 Underground tanks

White spirits 20 Underground tanks

Solvents 10 Underground tanks

Flammable liquids 80 Above-ground containers/ drums

Emulsions 120 Above-ground tanks

Resins 50 Above-ground tanks

Nitrocellulose 5 Above-ground containers

Pigments 2 Above-ground containers

Finished product 100 Warehouse


46


47

Part 4:

Hazardous Facilities and Risks


48

4 Hazardous Facilities and Risks

KEY POINTS

• The risk associated with a hazardous facility is the combination of the

probability of an adverse event involving hazardous substances occurring and

the significance of effects of that event.

• Potential effects can include damage to buildings caused by fire or explosions,

poisoning of people or wildlife, or injuries.

• Risks from hazardous facilities need to be assessed and appropriately managed.

• A complete risk assessment includes an analysis of the hazards and risks,

evaluation of the risks and decisions on their control.

4.1 OverviewLand use planning controls for hazardous facilities under the RMA aim to prevent and

mitigate potentially significant environmental effects resulting from accidental events.

This requires that the hazards and risks presented by hazardous facilities are well understood

and managed.

The terms “hazard” and “risk” are often used interchangeably, but have distinct meanings:

• Hazard: physical situations, processes and actions that have the potential to exert

adverse effects on people, ecosystems or the built environment

• Risk: the likelihood of specified consequences of a specific event (for example, an

explosion, a fire or a toxic release) on people, ecosystems or the built environment.

It is not the presence of the hazard in itself, but the magnitude of the risk it presents

which determines its significance and consequently its need to be managed.

4.2 The concept of riskThe concept of risk is used in a wide range of disciplines including hazardous facilities

management, finance, politics, hazard management, engineering design and environmental

management. In all cases, risk describes the likelihood of something adverse that may

happen in the future:

1. What can go wrong?

2. How likely is it to happen?

3. If it happens, what are the consequences?

A structured and systematic assessment of risk enables managers to better understand

hazards and risks, and to reduce uncertainties about potential future adverse outcomes.


49

CONTEXT

Likelihood Consequences

Risk is calculated as the product of probability and consequences:

RISK = PROBABILITY X CONSEQUENCES

Given the above equation, the magnitude of risk is equally determined by probability and

consequences. Risks with an inherently low probability of occurrence but high potential

consequences can be comparable with other risks that may happen frequently but which

have low level potential consequences. However, it should be recognised that the two

combinations of events and consequences are very different in character and should

therefore be treated differently.

To reduce risks, either the likelihood of an adverse event can be minimised or the

magnitude of effects can be decreased (or both). For example, by installing a level gauge

and an alarm in an underground fuel storage tank, the probability of both overflows and

leaks is reduced. To reduce the potential effects of an overflow, the tank could be removed

from sensitive environmental receptors. Both actions (joint or individually) would reduce

the level of risk.

The recent Australia/New Zealand Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS 4360:1999) expands

the concept of risk to include context, the overall framework within the risk assessment

process is being applied, including strategic, organisational and operational aspects. The

overall concept of risk is shown in Figure 1.

The term cumulative risk is applied in situations where risks from different sources are

accumulate over either space or time. For example, two neighbouring facilities which store

bulk flammable liquids may present a combined cumulative off-site fire risk which is deemed

to be significant. Similarly, numerous small hazardous substances spills on a site may result

in cumulative potentially significant long-term effects in the receiving environment.

Figure 1: The three components of risk

(based on AS/NZS 4360:1999 and Elms, 1998)


50

4.3 TerminologyMany terms are used to describe concepts of risk. However, a standardised terminology

has recently been included in AS/NZS 4360:1999. Most of these terms are included in

the Glossary at the end of this document. For the sake of consistency, the process and

terminology used in this document have been aligned as much as possible with the

Standard. However, some minor changes have been made, and these are explained in the

appropriate places.

4.4 Risks presented by hazardous substancesHazardous substances and their use, storage and handling present potential sources of

risk. Under normal operating conditions and environmental circumstances, hazardous

substances may be perfectly safe.

However, accidents such as structural failures of containment or process facilities,

operational malfunction or human error can cause the release, or loss of control, of

hazardous substances and consequent events such as:

• fire resulting in heat exposure

• explosion resulting in overpressure and/or missile projection

• hazardous substance release resulting in acute toxic/ecotoxic exposure

• corrosive spill resulting in irritative exposure.

It should be noted that a risk assessment of a hazardous facility for land use safety planning

generally focuses on accidental events involving hazardous substances. Such an assessment does

not normally address any long-term effects or risks caused by routine and long-term discharges of

environmental contaminants as authorised under the RMA through discharge consents.

4.5 Who or what can be at risk and when is risk acceptable?The potential consequences caused by accidents involving hazardous substances are

generally categorised into the following three broad groups:

• physical injury, death or health effects to people

• physical or health effects to ecosystems

• physical damage to the built environment, including buildings and other structures.

The acceptance of risk levels ultimately boils down to what communities or their

representatives are prepared to tolerate in a given situation or environment. Everybody

voluntarily accepts a range of risks, such as driving cars, smoking cigarettes or bungy

jumping. In contrast, risks imposed by external sources (such as a hazardous facility) are

deemed less acceptable and are therefore called “involuntary”.

Generally, involuntary risks which do not significantly increase risk levels from voluntary

sources are deemed to be acceptable. Approaches to determine the acceptance of risk are

further discussed in Sections 7 and 8.


51

4.6 Risk managementThe Standard AS/NZS 4360:1999 describes the term risk management as “an iterative

process consisting of well-defined steps, which, taken in sequence, support better decision-

making by contributing a greater insight into risks and their impacts. The risk management

process can be applied to any situation where an undesired or unexpected outcome could

be significant or where opportunities are identified.”

The risk management process outlined in AS/NZS 4360:1999 comprises the systematic

application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying,

analysing, evaluating, controlling and monitoring risk. This concept is based on a systems

management process such as that taken in the ISO 14001 Environmental Management

Standard (AS/NZ ISO 14001, 1997).

Therefore, the framework for risk management involves the concept of continuous feedback

and improvement as well as risk communication. Figure 2 shows an outline of this risk

management process.

Figure 2: Risk management – conceptual overview

(AS/NZS 4360:1999, with modifications)

Establish the context

Analyse hazards

Analyse risks

Evaluate risks

Control risks

Com

mun

icat

e an

d co

nsul

t

Mon

itor a

nd re

view

Risk Assessment


52

Context needs to be established at the outset of the risk management process. It is

determined partially by the nature, location, scale and timeframe of the proposed hazardous

facility and associated risk management requirements. However, strategic and

organisational factors also need to be taken into consideration - for example, internal

company structure and responsibilities as well as relationships with the external

environment and relevant stakeholders.

Initiating the risk management process also requires the setting of “benchmarks” or risk

criteria against which the acceptability of the risks is assessed. Which risk criteria are

applied depends on the context of the risk concerned, as well as a range of internal and

external driving forces. External risk criteria may be driven by regulatory requirements or

established Standards and Codes of Practice, and/or the perceptions of affected stakeholders.

Internal risk criteria may be driven by available technology and finances.

Risk communication is an important aspect of risk management, as the availability of

information and perception of trust and goodwill may significantly change risk perceptions

of stakeholders. This is further discussed in Section 8. Similarly, ongoing review and

monitoring ensures that information from the risk assessment process is continuously re-

evaluated and communicated to internal and external stakeholders and interested parties.

The following sections provide a brief overview of the various elements of risk management.

4.6.1 Hazard analysis

The first step in the risk management process is to identify and analyse all the hazards on

a site that have the potential for significant effects. The term used in this document is

“hazard analysis”, which differs from the term “risk identification” in AS/NZS 4360:1999.

Hazard analysis is based on a comprehensive and systematic review of:

• what can happen - identify the hazards

• how can it happen - identify possible accidents leading to potential effects

• why can it happen - evaluate the contributing causes which can lead to an accident.

Tools and techniques available to undertake a hazard analysis are discussed in greater

detail in Section 5.

4.6.2 Risk assessment

The term “risk assessment” is used to encompass the following aspects of the risk

management process:

• risk analysis

• risk evaluation.


53

4.6.2.1 Risk analysis

This step involves an analysis of the likely probabilities and consequences of feasible

accidents, given proposed control measures. A range of qualitative and quantitative

methods are used to determine the magnitude of probabilities and consequences, and the

relative significance and priorities of the risks which are analysed.

The detail of a risk analysis can vary significantly, depending on the type of information

required and the scale of risks involved. Often, a preliminary risk analysis is carried out at

the outset of a proposed development to aid decisions on suitable siting (ie, selection of

alternative sites), scale of development and necessary controls. This risk analysis process

can then be refined as planning, design and construction of a proposed facility proceeds

and necessary amendments can be made.

Sensitivity analysis is often employed where the assumptions and data used for the risk analysis

are imprecise, to estimate the effect that a change in assumptions and data may have.

4.6.2.2 Risk evaluation

In this step, the results generated in the risk analysis are evaluated and compared with risk

acceptance criteria established at the outset of the risk management process. The term

used in this document is “hazard analysis”, which is defined in Section 4.6.1 and differs

from the term “risk identification” in AS/NZS 4360:1999.

Risk evaluation leads to a process of prioritising risks and determining, based on the criteria

used for risk acceptance, whether additional control measures are required.

Further detail on risk analysis and evaluation is provided in Sections 6 and 7.

4.6.3 Risk control

The term risk control is applied to a systematic process of identifying and evaluating

options for risk control, and the preparation and implementation of risk control plans.

Note that “risk control” used here differs from the term “risk identification” in AS/NZS

4360:1999. Further detail on risk control is provided in Section 7.2.


54


55

Part 5:

Hazard Analysis


56

5 Hazard Analysis

KEY POINTS

• Hazard analysis relies on a structured and systematic approach.

• There are various methods which can be applied to hazardous facilities, such as

checklists, networks, matrices, ranking and “hazard and operability studies”

(HAZOP).

• There may be considerable variation in the detail required for different hazard

analyses, depending on the complexity of operations in a facility, the type and

quantities of hazardous substances used and/or stored, possible natural hazards of

the site, the sensitivity of the surrounding environment and various other factors.

5.1 OverviewHazard analysis involves the identification of hazards on a site and evaluating possible

scenarios leading to potentially significant consequences. The hazard analysis stage is a

very important part of the risk management process, as the omission of hazards at the

outset of this process can lead to significant accidents further down the track.

Hazard analysis relies on a structured and systematic approach to identify potential hazards

arising from sources such as fixed installations, on- and off-site operations, natural hazards

(ie, earthquakes, volcanic activity, geological instability, etc) or human error. It also

incorporates an analysis of possible accidents or failure modes to determine what can go

wrong and what the contributing causes may be.

Hazards presented by hazardous facilities depend on the types and quantities of substances

used, the nature of containment and transfer installations, as well as physical storage/

processing conditions. Hazards may also be presented by permanent or intermittent

activities, such as an underground fuel storage tank or a product batch.

The hazard analysis needs to be tailored to the nature of the installations and activities of

the hazardous facility in question, the types and scales of hazards present, as well as the

sensitivity of receptors which could potentially be affected in the event of an accident.


57

A hazard analysis process could therefore be a very short, or quite a lengthy and detailed

exercise. There is a range of simple to more complicated hazard identification methods,

briefly discussed below:

• site surveys and hazard audits

• checklists

• maps, drawings and overlays

• networks

• matrices

• HAZOP (hazards and operability analysis)

• computer software.

Any or several of the above methods may be used in a hazard analysis. In many cases, a tiered

approach is taken where an initial checklist is followed by a scaling and ranking exercise.

One of the outcomes of the hazard analysis process is a comprehensive list of hazards on

the site being assessed, in the form of a hazard register. This register forms the basis for

the subsequent risk analysis, decisions on risk management priorities and future reviews.

5.2 Tool box5.2.1 Site surveys and hazard audits

In some instances, hazardous facilities are already in existence and require a resource

consent because it is proposed to significantly change the scale of their operations. In

such cases, site surveys are an invaluable tool in the process of identifying hazards,

particularly in conjunction with checklists (see next paragraph). Site surveys and hazard

audits should include site walkovers, inspections of above and below ground installations

(including drains), as well as descriptions of the surrounding environment (including

land uses and ecosystems, particularly natural waters).

5.2.2 Checklists

Checklists generally involve lists of site and operational/physical parameters that represent

potential hazards, failure modes and contributing causes. They permit a systematic check

of a hazardous facility and associated operations by ticking off items on the list. Checklists

are useful as an initial step to enable the compilation of a hazard inventory. However,

they are generally not used to evaluate risks.

5.2.3 Maps, drawings and overlays

Maps and drawings are essential components of any hazard analysis and often form

important records for future reference. They enable visual identification and location of

hazards in relation to other on-site and off-site characteristics, and any potential receptors.


58

Overlays can be used where one site feature needs to be compared with another - for example,

the location of site drainage pipes or an earthquake fault line in relation to site installations.

Many local authorities (and other organisations) are using Geographic Information Systems

(GIS) to record and present data. This can include hazard data and other relevant

information about hazardous facilities.

5.2.4 Networks

Networks are another visual tool often used in hazard analysis. Networks are based on

graphical illustrations of a particular problem which needs to be analysed - for example, a

flow chart.

In hazard analysis, a commonly used network method is fault tree analysis. Fault trees

analyse the various contributing causes leading to a specified accident involving hazardous

substances. Often, it is not one cause alone but a combination of one or more causative

factors which may lead to a particular accident. A fault tree uses a range of devices such as

event descriptions, AND and OR gates, as well as references to other fault trees. AND and

OR gates refer to mutually inclusive (ie, both events have to happen at the same time) or

mutually exclusive events (ie, one or the other event, but not both, has to occur) respectively.

Fault trees are also used when analysing probabilities of occurrence for specific accident

scenarios. The fault tree remains the same, but probabilities are assigned to each of the

contributing events to determine the overall probability for an accident scenario. This is

discussed further in Section 6. Figure 3 shows an example of a fault tree for a tank leak.

5.2.5 Matrices

Matrices are an extended version of checklists but differ from these in that they are two-

dimensional and are used to check links between hazards, potential failure modes and

potential receptors. Normally, hazards are listed in the first column, while potential

receptors (eg, a school, a sensitive wetland, pedestrians) are listed in subsequent columns.

Possible or likely interactions are described in words, or by using simple scores to rate the

magnitude of the various interactions.

Matrices can also be used for a preliminary prioritisation of hazards, where either narrative

descriptions or scores are noted in different cells of the matrix. This process allows a

preliminary scaling and ranking of hazards and identification of those risks that should be

investigated in greater detail. It may also enable some early decisions about the acceptability

of a proposed hazardous facility at a particular location, or about the need for additional

control measures. An example of a matrix in word-diagram format is shown in Table 1

and provided in the case study.


59

Table 1: Example of hazard word diagram

Hazardous Hazardous Potential Failure Affected Parts NarrativeSubstance Properties Mode of Environment Hazard Rating

Acetic acid Corrosive, Tank leak or rupture, People, ecosystems, Low, can beflammable pipeline or valve property mitigated

failure

Tanker collision on People, ecosystems, Low to medium,site, tank overfilling property can be

mitigated

LPG Flammable Container failure People, property Low, can bemitigated

Silver nitrate Oxidising, Storage container Ecosystems, property, Medium, canecotoxic failure people (indirect) be mitigated

Process equipment Ecosystems, property, Medium, canfailure people (indirect) be mitigated

Sodium hydroxide Corrosive (toxic), Tank leak or rupture, Ecosystems, property, Lowsolution ecotoxic pipeline or valve failure people

Tanker collision on Ecosystems, property, Low to medium,site, tank overfilling people can be

mitigated

Process equipment Ecosystems, property, Medium, canfailure people be mitigated

5.2.6 HAZOP

HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability Studies. It is a technique used to analyse

hazards and operability throughout an entire facility and comprises:

• a full description of the facility or the process, including existing or proposed design conditions

• a systematic review of every part of the facility or process to discover how deviations

from planned design or operating conditions can occur

• decisions on whether the deviations can lead to significant hazards or operability problems.

HAZOP studies are generally undertaken for existing operations. However, they are also

applicable in the iterative process of design, construction and commissioning of a hazardous

facility and associated processes as a valuable tool to facilitate information and decisions

about the need for additional safety measures. HAZOP studies are normally carried out in

a team environment comprising people with appropriate technical knowledge on design,

operational and management parameters. A HAZOP normally also includes an evaluation

of the likely effects of deviations. An example of a HAZOP can be found in the Approved

Code of Practice for Managing Hazards to Prevent Major Industrial Accidents (OSH, 1994).


60


Hazard analysis

The hazard analysis necessary for the land use consent for Pink Ink Inc’s manufacturing

site includes different elements. For the manufacturing unit and the above-ground storage of

drummed goods (solvents, thinners, nitrocellulose and finished products), hazard word diagrams

were used. The example below shows a diagram for the drum storage of some raw materials on

the site.

Given the large quantities involved, a fault tree analysis was used for the bulk storage of resins in

above-ground tanks and the storage of flammable materials in underground tanks (refer Figure 3).

Hazard word diagram for above-ground storage of some raw material

Hazardous Quantity Hazardous Potential Affected Parts of IndicativeSubstance (tonnes) Properties Faliure Mode Environment Hazard Rating

Methanol 20 Flammable, Drum leak or People, property Low, can betoxic rupture (in case of ignition) mitigated

Fire in People, property Low to medium,storage area can be mitigated

Toluene 20 Flammable, Drum leak or Ecosystems, Low, can beecotoxic rupture (people, property – mitigated

in case of ignition)

Fire in Ecosystems, Medium, can bestorage area property, people mitigated

Emulsions 120 Potentially Drum leak Ecosystems Low, can beenvironmentally or rupture mitigateddamaging

Nitrocellulose 5 Flammable Storage Property, people Low to medium,container (both in case can be mitigatedfailure of ignition)

Fire in Property, people Medium, can bestorage area mitigated

Note: This is not the complete list of substances stored on the site.


61

Undetectedtank leak

AND

Undetectedfault in circuit

Tank failure

Operator fails tocheck computer

AND

A

Operator fails to doweekly manual checks

AND

OR

Fault inlevel recorder

Faulty receptionof signal

AND

Development ofcracks

B

Faultyinstallation of

tank

Weakness intank materials

Fault incircuit A

Fault incircuit B

OR OR

C

Lackinginspectionpre/post

installation

Fault inlevel recorder

Fault incircuit A

AND

OR

B

Initiating event

Description of failure event

AND gate – Links mutually inclusive events

OR gate – Links Mutually exclusive events

Transfer-in – Event defined by other fault tree

0.03

1.6

0.02

0.02

1

4

Electronic failure

0.4

0.2

0.2

0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

0.1

0.02

0.2

Figure 3 Example of fault tree analysis for an underground storage tank


62


63

Part 6:

Risk Analysis


64

6 Risk Analysis

KEY POINTS

• Risk analysis focuses on estimating probabilities and potential consequences of

the hazards presented by hazardous facilities.

• A wide range of qualitative and quantitative methods and various assumptions

and data can be used in a risk analysis, including statistical and generic failure

data, relevant process and operational data, as well as results from models.

• The value of the outcome of a risk analysis is only as good as the assumptions

made and the quality of the data used. Therefore, the reliability of a risk

analysis should always be assessed as well.

6.1 OverviewThe risk analysis process commences once a comprehensive hazard register has been

compiled. Risk analysis focuses on estimating probabilities and potential consequences

of each hazard within the context of existing or proposed control measures. The objective

of control measures is to reduce or eliminate potential consequences.

A hazard may have negligible adverse consequences following a failure if control measures

are fail-safe. However, control measures themselves may have built-in probabilities of

failure. Therefore, the risk analysis needs to take into account the combined probabilities

of possible failures and adverse events that may lead to potential consequences.

Figure 4 presents an overview of risk analysis. Starting with a particular hazard - such as

a hazardous substance storage facility - the probability of specific failure modes and events

is analysed - for example a leak of a flammable substance resulting in a fire. Potential

pathways are analysed to determine whether the event can spread out and reach receptors

such as people, sensitive ecosystems or buildings. Further, existing and proposed control

measures are checked to see what their chance of failure is.

The consequences of a specific event or events are then assessed - normally a worst-case

scenario and/or some lesser event scenario. The outcome of this process is a detailed

description of each hazard in terms of the combined probability of failures/adverse events

and the potential associated consequences.


65

6.2 Information sourcesThe analysis of probabilities and consequences can be based on a wide range of information,

including:

• relevant design, process and operational data

• existing/proposed control measures

• information on pathways leading to the potential exposure of receptors (that is, people,

ecosystems and the built environment) and their relative sensitivity

• available literature and generic data for similar types of facilities

• historical records including information on failures and accidents and related

consequences

• professional expertise, experience and judgement

• to-scale models and prototypes

• engineering and environmental models used to simulate probabilities and consequences

under a range of scenarios.

Figure 4: Risk analysis process

6.3 Types of risk analysisThe detail and quality of a risk analysis relies in part on the detail and quality of the

available information, as well as being determined by the objectives set for the analysis.

If, for example, the objective is to rank 100 hazards identified on a hazard register in order

of risk level, a quick ranking exercise can be sufficient. The top ten ranking risks on the

register may then have to be submitted to a more detailed risk analysis to make sure these

hazards are fully understood.

EVENT(fire, explosion,

spill)

PATHWAY(open space,

drain)

CONSEQUENCES(people,

ecosystems, builtenvironment)

SYSTEM FAILURE(leak, loss of

control)HAZARD

CONTROL MEASURE(firewall, bund, sump,

alarm, etc)

Probability offailure/occurrence


Combinedprobability ofoccurrence



66

There is a wide range of methods for undertaking a risk analysis. The choice of methods

depends on the objectives of the risk analysis and the significance of the risks in question, as

well as on the availability and quality of information. However, the risk analysis process

almost always proceeds from an initially simple risk screening and comparison exercise to

progressively more complicated techniques and tools. A risk analysis for a small hazardous

facility may never progress further than a simple risk screening exercise, as undertaken for the

HFSP. The following sections provide a brief overview of different approaches to risk analysis.

6.3.1 Qualitative analysis

Qualitative risk analysis uses narrative or qualitative scales to describe probabilities and

consequences of particular hazards. Such qualitative methods are used primarily where

preliminary screening or assessment of risks is required, or where funds or information are

insufficient to carry out a full analysis. An example of narrative/qualitative scales is

provided in Table 2.

6.3.2 Semi-quantitative analysis

Semi-quantitative analyses are based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative scales to

describe probabilities and consequences of different hazards, such as those described in

Table 2. The respective scores are then used to calculate risk indices, which in turn form

the basis to compare and prioritise similar kinds of risk and to identify which risks need to

be analysed in greater detail. This approach is based on the 80/20 principle, where the

top ranking risks often contribute to 80 percent or more of the total risk index presented

by a hazardous facility.

Although the scores and the calculated risk index are numerical, the values do not

accurately reflect the actual magnitude of probabilities and risks. This approach is only

valid for ranking and prioritising risks, as long as the respective scores are carefully defined,

justified and consistently applied.

Overall, semi-quantitative risk analysis is a very valuable screening, decision and

management tool, but may not suffice where risks need to be analysed more quantitatively

in terms of their acceptability to regulators and communities.

Table 3 provides an example of a semi-quantitative risk analysis used for a study of the

Rosebank Peninsula industrial area in Auckland. This study comprised a survey of ten

representative hazardous facilities and associated hazardous substances related risks. A

hazards register was compiled for each facility and each hazard was analysed using a semi-

quantitative scoring system. Risk indices so calculated were then sorted and ranked to

help identify priorities for risk management and effective resource allocation (Tweeddale

et al, 1992; Tweeddale, 1992).


67

6.3.3 Quantitative analysis

Quantitative risk analysis uses actual numerical values for probabilities and consequences,

as discussed below.

6.3.3.1 Estimating probabilities

Quantitative probability analysis defines probability as the estimated frequency of a specific

event, for example as once per 10,000 years (or 0.0001/year). The accurate estimation of

probabilities is often not easy, especially if the likelihood of a specific event is unknown

or very rare. Probabilities may be estimated by any of the following methods:

• using historical statistics or frequencies

• using generic failure data which have been established experimentally

• Monte Carlo simulations assuming a random distribution of failures/events

• applying professional judgement.

The probability of a specific failure or event is often made up from several contributing

probabilities. These contributing probabilities have to be combined according to

probability theory. The basic rules for calculating combined probabilities for a specific

failure are:

• For mutually excluding events (linked by the OR gate), probabilities are added.

• For mutually including events (linked by the AND gate), probabilities are multiplied.

Figure 3 illustrates the application of these concepts by including probabilities into the fault tree.


68

Table 2: Example of qualitative risk scores(extracted from AS/NZ 4360:1999, with minor modifications)

QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF LIKELIHOOD

Level Descriptor Possible Description

A Almost certain The event is expected to occur in most circumstances

B Likely The event will probably occur in most circumstances

C Moderate The event should occur at some time

D Unlikely The event could occur at some time

E Rare The event may occur only in exceptional circumstances

QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTS

Level Descriptor Possible Description

1 Insignificant No injuries, negligible environmental damage, etc.

2 Minor First aid treatment required, on-site release contained withspill kit, minor damage to property, etc.

3 Moderate First aid treatment required, on-site release contained withoutside assistance, moderate damage to on-site property,minor damage to off-site property, etc.

4 Major Extensive injuries, loss of production capability, significantenvironmental damage, moderate damage to off-site property.

5 Catastrophic Fatalities both on- and off-site, major and widespreadenvironmental damage, exposure to toxic release bynumerous people, etc.

QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX - LEVEL OF RISK

Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic1 2 3 4 5

A (almost certain) S S H H H

B (likely) M S S H H

C (moderate) L M S H H

D (unlikely) L L M S H

E (rare) L L M S S

LegendH = High risk, detailed research and management planning required at senior levels.S = Significant risk, senior management attention needed.M = Moderate risk, management responsibility must be specified.L = Low risk, manage through routine procedures.

Consequences

Likelihood


69

Table 3a: Example of semi-quantitative risk analysis used for the rankingand short-listing of risks(extracted from GCNZ Consultants and H M Tweeddale Consulting Services, 1989)

1. Scale for frequency of initiation of incidents (expressed as frequency per million per year)

Frequency Score

Very frequent (eg, once in two years) 500 000

Probable in the lifetime of the activity (eg, once in 10 years) 100 000

Possible in the lifetime of the activity (eg, once in 100 years) 10 000

Unlikely (eg, once in 1000 years) 1 000

Very unlikely (eg, once in 10,000 years) 100

Barely credible (eg ,once in 100,000 years) 10

2. Scale of severity on people

Effect Score

Several dead Number of dead

One dead 1

Significant chance of fatality 0.8

Small chance of fatality or severe nuisance/injury to many people 0.3

Severe nuisance to few people, or nuisance to many 0.1

Nuisance to few people 0.01

Minor nuisance to few people 0.001


70

3. Scale of severity of effect on the environment

Effect Score

Intense local and long–term effect (>12 months) or highpotential for widespread effect 2 - 10

Intense local but short-term effect (<12 months) or moderatepotential for widespread effect 1

Moderate local and long-term effect (>12 months) or lowpotential for widespread effect. 0.3

Moderate local but short-term effect (<12 months) 0.1

Minor local short-term effect (<12 months) 0.01

Minor local and very short-term effect (<3 months) 0.001 - 0.003

4. Scale of effect on property

Effect Score

Several houses destroyed Number of houses

Whole of neighbouring factory destroyed 3 - 10

One house destroyed 1

Originating factory destroyed, or part of neighbouringfactory destroyed 0.3

Part of originating factory destroyed, or minor damage toneighbouring factory 0.03 - 0.1

Minor damage to originating factory 0.001 - 0.01

5. Scale for probability of failure of protective or emergency response

Chance of effective response Probability of failure

Negligible 1 (100%)

Low 0.7 (70%)

Fair 0.3 (30%)

Good 0.1 (10%)

Very 0.03 (3%)

Exceptional 0.01 (1%)


71

Table 3b Example of semi-quantitative risk analysis used for theranking and short-listing of risks(extracted from GCNZ Consultants and H M Tweeddale Consulting

Services, 1989)

Pro

duc

tQ

uan

tity

Faci

lity

Inci

den

tC

on

trib

utin

gTy

pe

of

Typ

e o

fSe

veri

tyFr

eque

ncy

Pro

tect

ive

Pro

bab

ility

Ris

k in

dex

(to

nn

es)

Typ

eC

ause

Even

tEf

fect

Sco

rep

er M

illio

nR

esp

on

seo

f Fa

ilure

per

Yea

r

Aer

osol

s15

Prod

uct

Fire

Smok

ing

or

Fire

wat

erEn

viro

nmen

t0.

110

0,00

0C

onta

inm

ent/

stor

era

dia

tor

in o

ffice

run

off

clea

n-up

0.7

7000

Toxi

cPe

ople

0.05

smok

eFi

re s

ervi

ce0.

315

00

Hea

tPr

oper

ty0.

1Fi

re p

rote

ctio

n.0.

1ra

dia

tion

fire

serv

ice

1000

Cal

cium

10

Prod

uct

Fire

Exp

osur

e to

Hea

tPr

oper

ty0.

0510

,000

Litt

le p

ossi

ble

150

0hy

poc

hlor

itest

ore

inco

mp

atib

lera

dia

tion

mat

eria

ls

Die

ldrin

1U

nloa

din

gTo

xic

Fork

tru

ckTo

xic

spill

Envi

ronm

ent

0.5

10,0

00C

onta

in, m

op

0.05

250

bay

spill

acc

iden

tto

est

uary

up w

ithab

sorb

ent

Solv

ent

1Ra

w

Fire

Igni

tion

Hea

t Pe

ople

0.05

10,0

00Fi

re p

rote

ctio

n.

0.1

50d

rum

sm

ater

ial

of s

pill

rad

iatio

nfir

e se

rvic

est

ore

Dru

m fi

reEx

plo

sion

Peop

le0.

32,

000

Fire

pro

tect

ion.

0.

160

exp

oses

oth

erof

fum

esfir

e se

rvic

ed

rum

s

Die

ldrin

1Tr

uck

Toxi

c sp

illTr

ansp

ort

Toxi

c sp

illEn

viro

nmen

t0.

510

0C

onta

in, m

op0.

315

acci

den

tto

est

uary

up

with

ab

sorb

ent

Toxi

c1

Dan

ger

ous

Toxi

c sp

illFo

rk t

ruck

Toxi

c sp

illEn

viro

nmen

t0.

110

,000

Con

tain

by

0.00

11

mat

eria

lgo

ods

stor

eac

cid

ent

to e

stua

ry

bun

d, m

op u

p

Exp

lan

atio

n:

1. A

sep

arat

e as

sess

men

t of

ris

k is

und

erta

ken

for

ever

y ha

zard

ous

sub

stan

ce a

nd t

ype

of e

nviro

nmen

tal e

ffect

s (e

g, p

eop

le, e

nviro

nmen

t an

d p

rop

erty

).2.

Ris

k in

dic

es a

re c

alcu

late

d b

y m

ultip

lyin

g t

he s

ever

ity s

core

, fre

que

ncy

scor

e an

d fa

ilure

pro

bab

ility

sco

re w

ith e

ach

othe

r.3.

Ris

k in

dic

es a

re r

anke

d t

o sh

ortli

st t

hose

haz

ard

s th

at p

rese

nt t

he g

reat

est

risk

on t

he s

ite a

nd w

hich

will

nee

d t

he g

reat

est

leve

l of a

tten

tion.


72

6.3.3.2 Expressing probabilities

There are a number of ways in which probabilities can be expressed, for example:

• as a percentage or fraction (0.1 percent or 0.01)

• as an estimated frequency over time, such as:

- frequency per year

- frequency per million per year

- frequency per number of years.

6.3.3.3 Estimating consequences

Quantitative consequence analysis involves estimating potential effects on receptors such

as people, ecosystems and the built environment. Consequences are normally defined in

precise terms, such as numbers of injuries or deaths, extent of adverse effects on a receiving

ecosystem, or extent of structural damage.

The type of consequence analysis to be carried out depends very much on the hazardous

substances concerned and their physicochemical properties, the effectiveness of available

pathways and the vicinity and sensitivity of receptors.

For example, in the case of a toxic gas storage, an air dispersion model may need to be

applied to assess critical endpoint concentrations in the event of a release (ie, residual air

concentrations at the interface of the dispersion plume and potential receptors). Similar

models may need to be employed to assess the specific consequences of other types of

hazards such as fires or explosions, or toxic releases to surface waters.

6.3.3.4 Expressing risks

There is a range of ways of expressing the quantitative risk from an activity, for example:

• individual or societal fatality or injury risk from an activity, based on the number of

deaths/injuries per person per year (individual risk) or total number of people affected

within a population per year (societal risk) within a given area

• health risk from an activity based on the number of cases of illness, or chronic or sub-chronic

symptoms within a defined population or per individual per year within a given area

• ecotoxic risk from an activity based on the extent of damage or injury within a given

area per year

• risk of damage to individual or groups of buildings, other structures or the natural

environment per time period.


73

The way risk is expressed is often determined by norm, for example, how certain kinds of

risks are referred to in literature or defined by regulatory agencies, or the type of risk

criteria they are compared against. Examples of this are a five-year return flood or the

individual risk of death from smoking per year.

Overall, quantitative risks need to be expressed in a form that is readily understandable

and complies with the norm where applicable. Of equal importance is that risk values

can be compared directly with any acceptability criteria that have been set at the outset

of the risk management process.

6.3.4 Assessing cumulative risks

A risk analysis of a hazardous facility needs to consider the presence of cumulative risks.

Cumulative risks may result from similar types of risks presented by neighbouring facilities,

or from potential multiple adverse events through time. For most small to medium facilities,

cumulative risks may not be a significant issue. However, for many major facilities, the

assessment of cumulative risks will be an integral part of the risk analysis. Depending on the

scale and significance of cumulative risks, these can be assessed qualitatively or quantitatively.

6.4 Tool boxThe choice of an appropriate risk analysis method depends on the proposed objectives

and scope of the analysis to be undertaken, and the overall adopted approach following

the concepts outlined in Section 6.3. Many of the methods follow the same principles as

those described for a hazard analysis but tend to go into much greater detail.

The methods described below are considered to be of equal importance and can be used

either separately or in conjunction with each other, depending on the circumstances.

6.4.1 Site surveys and hazard audits

Where facilities are already in existence, site surveys are an invaluable tool in the process

of risk analysis. Site surveys and hazard audits should include site walkovers, inspections

of above and below ground installations, as well as descriptions of the surrounding

environment (refer Section 5.2).

6.4.2 Field studies

Field studies may be required where there is insufficient information on the environment

which may be potentially affected by the adverse consequences of an event in a hazardous

facility. Such field studies may entail site visits, the taking of photographs as well as

baseline surveys of local human populations, the physicochemical environment and

ecosystems. Field studies often form an integral part of the AEE undertaken for other

aspects of a proposed or existing hazardous facility.


74

6.4.3 Checklists and matrices

Checklists and matrices were described in detail in Section 5.2. Matrices in particular

can be expanded from the hazard analysis process to include a qualitative or semi-

quantitative risk analysis, such as the one shown in Tables 2 and 3. The HFSP is a good

semi-quantitative method which can be used for preliminary risk screening purposes.

Matrices are particularly useful where the purpose of the risk analysis is the ranking and

prioritisation of identified hazards. A range of scales can be used to describe probabilities

and consequences.

6.4.4 Fault and event trees

Networks were described in Section 5.2, using the example of a fault tree (Figure 3).

Where fault trees are used to analyse the contributing events leading to a failure, they can

also be used to calculate the probability of occurrence for that failure. The combined

probability for the tank leak illustrated in Figure 3 has been estimated at 0.08/year, or

once in every 125 years.

Event trees (as shown in Figure 5) are used in a very similar way to estimate the probability

of potential consequences from a specific hazard. Event trees are frequently used to analyse

the sequence of events leading to a series of outcome scenarios from a defined failure

event. Event trees are generally such that each successive event can either be a failure or

a success, each associated with a probability of occurrence.

Combined probabilities for specific outcome scenarios are then calculated, again using the

principles of probability theory, where the probabilities leading to a particular outcome all have

to happen (that is, they are mutually inclusive) and are therefore multiplied with each other.

Event tree analysis is a systematic tool to allow the evaluation of a series of possible

consequences caused by a single initiating event (such as a tank leak). The accuracy of

the event tree depends on all successive events and associated probabilities being correctly

identified and estimated.

6.4.5 Human reliability assessment

Human error is an important factor that can play a major contributing role in accidents.

In some cases, human actions may be the only available way to prevent an accident and

subsequent adverse consequences from occurring.


75

Human error and reliability need to be considered in risk analysis wherever humans play

a significant part in the performance and reliability of a particular process or installation.

Human reliability assessment identifies the various types of erroneous actions and their

associated probabilities, such as:

• error of omission, such as the failure to carry out a certain action

• error of execution, such as an error in the task that needs to be carried out

• external errors, such as unplanned actions outside of the particular installation or

process that may have an influence on site performance or safety.

Human error analysis is usually based on a systematic analysis of the tasks involving humans

that influence the performance and safety of installations and processes, the human errors

that can occur, and an assessment of human reliability.

6.4.6 Computer software

A range of computer software is available for both hazard analysis and risk assessment, as

well as for the development of fault trees. Various software has been initially developed

for a particular purpose such as effects assessments of air, water and land, occupational

health and safety assessments, or safety assessments of large petroleum installations. The

applicability of such software to hazard analysis/risk assessments of hazardous facilities in

the land use context needs to be checked and probably requires the involvement of a

technical expert.

Conventional off-the-shelf software, especially spreadsheets (eg, Lotus®, Excel®) and

graphics packages (eg, GIS - refer Section 5.2.3) can also be used to facilitate the hazard

and risk analysis process.

While this guide does not endorse a particular product, the following computer software

may be useful for risk assessment:

• @RISK and RiskOptimiser: these software packages are risk analysis and simulation

add-ins for Lotus® or Excel® (Hoare Research Software, Hamilton)

• ProSafe, Thesis (RBT Petroleum (Australia), EQE International)

• HAZSUB (QAXL Management Systems, Australia)

• SAFETI Professional, DNV-Pro (DNV Technica, which also has various other software).


76

The Internet provides further sources for risk assessment software:

• www.eea.dk/Projects/EnvMaST/RiskAss/1553IntH.html contains references to

other hazard analysis or risk assessment software.

• www.epa.govt/ceppo (the US Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention

Office) also offers a wide range of useful information.

6.4.7 The “Delphi” technique

The use of the Delphi technique in risk analysis is based on best combined expert opinion

in cases where there are no suitable data, or risk models and methods which can be used.

In effect, this means that a group of suitable experts sit together and, by way of examining

available information and applying professional knowledge and judgement, arrive at a

consensus on which particular parameters or assumptions should be used in a risk analysis.

6.4.8 Cost-benefit analysis

A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) may be an option for risk analysis if relative costs, risks and

benefits can be clearly identified. Generally, this needs to be done in quantitative (ie

monetary) terms. A CBA is not normally appropriate if risks are negligible and costs (or

benefits) are limited to the user of a hazardous substance.

Very general information on CBAs in relation to hazardous substances can be found in the

ERMA New Zealand Protocols on the HSNO Methodology Order. Protocol 2 addresses

issues such as the combination of different types of risk, distribution of costs and benefits

and the balancing of risks, costs and benefits (ERMA New Zealand, 1998a). Protocol 6

provides a basic template for the identification and assessment of risks, costs and benefits for

the approval to manufacture or import a hazardous substance (ERMA New Zealand, 1998b).

6.5 Assessing the reliability of a risk analysis6.5.1 Estimating uncertainty

One of the greatest problems with risk analysis is that the results generated can be used out

of context and without knowledge of the reliability of the results. This sometimes results in

undue emphasis placed on calculated numerical values as an absolute measure of risk.


77

There are many uncertainties associated with the estimation of risk. An understanding

of these uncertainties is vital when interpreting results and making decisions. In effect, a

risk analysis is only as precise as the underlying data, methods and models that are used.

It is therefore vital that any given risk method states the sources and the extent of

uncertainties associated with the results generated, based on the collective variation and

imprecision of the underlying parameters and assumptions.

6.5.2 Sensitivity analysis

Sensitivity analysis is a tool whereby the extent of variation of results of the adopted risk

method is measured in response to changing different parameters. By changing only one

parameter at one time in a series of calculations using a range of numerical values, it is

possible to check the effect of this particular parameter on the technique used and the

results generated. This in turn provides information on the reliability of the method and

the variability of the generated results.

Figure 5: Example of an event tree

Monthly Checkingof Monitoring

Wells

ConsequenceScenarios

FrequencySecondaryContainment

Working

Initiating Event

0.016/year(1/63 years)

0.062/year(1/16 years)

0.00032/year(1/3125 years)

0.0013/year(1/770 years)

Tank leak

No0.02

Yes0.98 No

0.2

Yes0.8

No0.2

Yes0.8

Leak containedand detected

Leak contained andnot detected

Leak not containedand detected

Leak not containedand not detected


78


Risk analysis

The risk analysis necessary for the land use consent for Pink Ink Inc’s manufacturing site is based

on the hazard analysis presented in Section 5. For the manufacturing units and the above-ground

storage of goods in drums and containers (solvents, thinners, nitrocellulose and finished product), a

semi-quantitative risk analysis was used, based on the scales in Table 3. The matrix below shows

an example of such an analysis (assumptions may need to be provided). The probability of failure

of protective measures and emergency response can also be included in the analysis, but has been

omitted from the matrix. Overall, a qualitative risk analysis is deemed to be acceptable for a facility

of this type and size.

The risk indices calculated in the matrix shown below indicate that a fire in the methanol and

toluene drum storage areas presents the greatest risk in terms of the potential effects to people,

property and the environment.

Semi-quantitative risk analysis for above-ground storage of some raw materialsat the Pink Ink Inc site

Hazardous Quantity Hazardous Potential Affected Parts of Severity Likeli- RiskSubstance (tonnes) Properties Faliure Mode Environment Rating(1) hood(2) Index

Methanol 20 Flammable, Drum leak or People, property 0.01 20,000 200toxic rupture (in case of ignition)

Fire in People, property 0.3 10,000 3,000storage areaapplicationof fire water

Toluene 20 Flammable, Drum leak or Ecosystems, 0.01 20,000 200ecotoxic rupture (people, property –

in case of ignition)

Fire in Ecosystems, 0.3 10,000 3,000storage area property, peopleapplicationof fire water

Emulsions 120 Potentially Drum leak Ecosystems 0.001 20,000 20environmentally or rupturedamaging

Nitrocellulose 5 Flammable Storage Property, people 0.3 1,000 300container (both in casefailure of ignition)

Fire in Property, people 0.3 1,000 300storage area

Note: This is not the complete list of substances stored on the site.


79


Notes: (1) Scores for the rating of severity are outlined in Table 3. Rating for top listed

receptor applies.

(2) Scores for the likelihood of occurrence are shown in Table 3; likelihood expressed

as frequency per million per year.

Consequently, a quantitative risk analysis was carried out for the above and below ground bulk

storage facilities for flammable materials. Figure 5 (main text) shows an example of an event tree

for an assumed leak from an underground storage tank, and the probabilities of associated outcomes.

The consequences of the individual outcome scenarios are described in a separate technical report.


80


81

Part 7:

Risk Evaluation and Control


82

7 Risk Evaluation and Control

KEY POINTS

• This section discusses the evaluation of risks presented by hazardous facilities

and the implementation of risk control measures.

• The decision on whether the risks presented by a hazardous facility are

appropriate for a local community depends on the acceptance of these risks.

• A range of international risk criteria is used to determine the acceptability of

risks, for example individual fatality risk criteria for people.

• Under the RMA, a consenting authority may require more stringent criteria to

be met to reflect particular concerns of a community.

• Risk control focuses on the identification of measures to avoid or mitigate risks,

such as the use of warning systems, implementation of a training programme

or contingency planning.

7.1 Risk evaluationThe ultimate purpose of risk management is the accurate assessment of risks, followed by

decisions on whether the risks are “acceptable”, or what can be done to make them

acceptable. At the basis of this process is a fundamental understanding and agreement on

what “acceptability” means and to whom, by asking: “How safe is safe enough?” Such

questions need to be asked very early on in the risk management process. Risk acceptance

criteria form the benchmark against which to evaluate risks, determine whether risks are

significant and to make decisions on risk control.

7.1.1 Risk acceptance

The acceptance of risk ultimately depends on the tolerance and perception of regulators

and communities in terms of what is considered to be safe and sustainable for people,

ecosystems and the built environment in the long term.

People are generally prepared to voluntarily tolerate substantial personal risks, such as

smoking, driving or bungy jumping. On the other hand, society is much less prepared to

accept involuntary risks from external sources, such as hazardous facilities in the vicinity

of residential areas or the transport of hazardous substances (Gough, 1989).

One approach that can be used in the definition of acceptable risk is that the risk imposed

by external sources should be well below all known voluntary and involuntary day-to-day

risks experienced by people, ecosystems and the built environment. An example of this is

the individual risk of fatality from a range of different sources, as shown in Table 4.


83

Based on this table, the fatality risk presented by a proposed hazardous facility can be

assumed to be in the order of one per million per year per person. This risk would not

significantly increase the fatality risk incurred by the community on a day-to-day basis

from other sources and would therefore not be considered as being significant.

Risk acceptance is usually based on a wide range of factors, including scientific evidence,

community perception and socioeconomic benefits. Scientific evidence or information is

often the starting point to define risk acceptance, as community perceptions are generally

harder to understand and quantify. Nonetheless, community perceptions are an important

factor to consider. This is discussed further in Section 8.

Table 4: Fatality risks for some voluntary and involuntary risks

(New South Wales Department of Planning)

Voluntary risks Chance of fatality per millionper person per year

Smoking (20 cigarettes/day) 5000Driving a car 145Swimming 50Playing rugby 30Train accident 10

Involuntary risksInvoluntary risksInvoluntary risksInvoluntary risksInvoluntary risks

Cancers from all causes 1800Accidents in the home 110Fires and accidental burns 10Falling object 3Being struck by lightning 0.1

7.1.2 Risk criteria

7.1.2.1 Background

Risk criteria are generally used to determine the acceptability of risks in specific terms.

Depending on the type of hazardous facility and the associated risks, a range of risk criteria

may need to be defined, such as for:

• human fatalities from heat exposure, explosion (overpressure), irritation or toxic

exposure

• human injury from heat exposure, explosion (overpressure) or irritation

• human illness from toxic exposure (acute and chronic)

• ecosystem damage from toxic exposure or, to a lesser degree, heat exposure or explosion

(overpressure)

• property/asset damage from heat exposure or an explosion (overpressure).

Risk criteria may be expressed in a variety of ways, including qualitative (narrative) or

quantitative forms, depending on the detail of the risk analysis carried out. In quantitative

risk analysis, risk criteria can be quite specific.


84

Examples of this are how much heat radiation will be tolerated at a given point and

frequency in the event of a fire, or the acceptability of toxic gas concentrations at a given

point in time. Such risk criteria can be expressed as follows:

• incident heat flux radiation (which is a measure of heat radiation) in residential areas

should not exceed 4.7 kW/m2 at frequencies of 50 chances in a million per year

(equivalent to 0.00005/year or 1/20,000 years) (New South Wales Department of

Planning, 1985)

• exposure to critical toxic gas concentrations in residential areas should not exceed

periods of 0.5 - 1 hour at a frequency of 10 chances in a million per year (equivalent to

0.00001/year or 1/100,000 years) (New South Wales Department of Planning, 1985).

7.1.2.2 Definition of risk criteria

The risk criteria used in a particular risk assessment may vary, depending on the locality of

a proposed hazardous facility and the sensitivity of potential receptors, as well as other factors

such as community perception and socio-economic benefits. A series of risk criteria have

been developed internationally by organisations such as the New South Wales Department

of Planning, the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive and the USEPA. An example

are the fatality risk criteria adopted for New South Wales (Table 5).

Table 5: Individual fatality risk criteria for New South Wales(New South Wales Department of Planning)

Land useLand useLand useLand useLand use Individual fatality risk criteriaIndividual fatality risk criteriaIndividual fatality risk criteriaIndividual fatality risk criteriaIndividual fatality risk criteriaper million per year per personper million per year per personper million per year per personper million per year per personper million per year per person

Residential <1

Open space – active <10

Open space – passive <5

Commercial <5

Public roads <20

Industrial <50

There are at present no standard risk criteria which have been developed for the New

Zealand context. However, in the development of NZ risk criteria, a range of information

sources can be used:

• international risk criteria

• international and/or New Zealand environmental standards (for example, water quality

standards for the protection of aquatic biota or potable water, air quality standards,

occupational health and safety standards, soil and sediment standards, etc)

• HSNO property performance requirements for hazardous substances.


85

HSNO property performance requirements are in effect minimum risk criteria which specify

the acceptable level of exposure of people, ecosystems or property/assets to various hazardous

substance categories. While these are minimum performance requirements, more stringent

risk criteria may be imposed under the RMA, taking into account site-specific conditions

and perceptions.

7.2 Risk controlThe last step in the risk assessment process comprises a review of the need to implement

risk control measures. Risk control is a process focusing on the need to mitigate risks and

identifying best practicable options and plans to achieve effective control of risks.

The risk control process outlined in Figure 5 is based on a series of steps and involves

continuous monitoring and review. It focuses on those risks which have been confirmed as

being significant. A series of suitable risks control measures are then identified and evaluated

in terms of their effectiveness in reducing residual risks and their acceptance. Where residual

risks are still not acceptable, different risk control options may need to be considered.

Options for risk control include (AS/NZS 4360:1999):

• reducing probabilities: for example, by adding risk mitigation measures and

programmes, or staff training

• reducing consequences: for example, by adding risk mitigation measures and

programmes, or emergency/contingency plans

• transferring risks to other sites or responsibilities: for example, by shifting part or

all of the operation to another geographical site, or through the use of contractors or

insurance arrangements. A transfer of risk, while reducing the level of responsibility

for a hazardous facility operator, may not necessarily result in an overall reduction of

risk levels for a particular facility

• risk avoidance: for example, by intentionally avoiding all or part of a proposed activity,

or substituting it with a less hazardous activity.


86

Risk control plans provide the “how-to” to implement the proposed risk control strategy.

These plans should provide detailed guidance on the proposed risk control options, and

may include the following:

• design drawings and flow charts

• installation and maintenance requirements

• monitoring requirements

• operational procedures

• emergency and contingency plans.

Monitoring and review are an essential aspect of risk control, as much as they are a vital

part of the overall risk management process (Figure 2). This ensures a continuous

evaluation of risks, their levels and acceptance, and performance of risk control measures.

Figure 6: Risk control process

(based on AS/NZS 4360:1999)

Reduceprobability

Riskevaluation

Consider feasability, costs and benefits and level of risk

Recommend control strategy

Choose control strategy

Prepare risk control plans to reduce, transfer oravoid risk, address feasibility, design and costs

Reduceconsequences

Transferrisk Avoid

Significant/priority risks

Are risks acceptable?

Implement risk control plan

Are residual risks acceptable?YesNo

Yes

No

Identifycontrol options

Evaluatecontrol options

Preparecontrol plan

Implementcontrol plan

MONITORAND

REVIEW


87

Part 8:Risk Communicationand Consultation


88

8 Risk Communication and Consultation

KEY POINTS

• Different people tend to perceive risks in different ways, depending on how

significant the risks are, the associated benefits and whether the risks are

voluntary or non-voluntary.

• Communication about the risks of a proposed hazardous facility therefore

needs to address both actual and perceived risks.

• Relevant stakeholders, including community representatives and tangata

whenua, need to be involved at the appropriate time to assist with identifying

and avoiding conflict at an early stage.

• Risk communication is primarily the onus of the applicant, even though

regulatory agencies may play a role when notifying consent applications.

8.1 Risk perception and communicationRisk is generally perceived differently by communities, interest groups, regulators or

developers, depending on a number of factors. These include whether the risk is voluntary

(eg, smoking, driving) or involuntary (eg, nuclear power, electromagnetic radiation from

cellphone sites, genetically modified food). Other factors include the level of knowledge

of risks, the perceived benefits, the level of complacency due to familiarity with the risk

or whether an individual is directly and personally exposed to the risk.

There are many hazardous substances that people are generally comfortable with, for example

cleaners, petrol, paints or some pesticides which are widely used in households or gardens.

However, familiarity may lead to risks being underestimated. Other substances with similar

hazardous properties may be considered much more dangerous due to unfamiliarity or lack

of knowledge about them, such as some agricultural chemicals or explosives.

Risk communication is an important part of risk management. Improved knowledge of

risk may lead to a more accurate perception of risk and hence to greater acceptance.

However, the choice of information which is made available and the manner in which it

is conveyed play an important role. For example, too much emphasis on purely scientific

data may result in lack of trust and a consequent perception that the risk is greater than is

actually the case. Risk communication should therefore also consider non-scientific or

numerically intangible factors.


89

Information about risk perception can appear contradictory or inconsistent. However, it

is important that such information is treated appropriately and that unfavourable

information is not dismissed as “without basis” or “unscientific”. Community concerns in

particular must be taken seriously, and an honest exchange of information and discussion

can generally be expected to lead to a viable compromise.

Risk communication relating to hazardous facilities is part of the wider consultation with

potentially affected parties. It may need to commence before applications for consents or

even design and process details are finalised. In terms of major hazardous facilities, this

could mean some initial delays and additional costs to the originally planned process.

However, there may be savings in possible legal costs or delays at later stages, for example

because of a lack of appeals. The perception of the facility in the community may also

improve leading to possible marketing and commercial advantages and better public relations.

In the US, the “Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 1986” provides

for the sharing of information on hazardous substances between government agencies,

industries and communities (USEPA, 1988). The Act, passed after the Bhopal incident

in 1984, establishes systems that allow any person to obtain information on hazardous

substances held in particular communities as well as emission data. The data are compiled

by the USEPA from information provided by industry.

8.2 Who needs to be consulted?There are various stakeholders and interested parties that need to be involved when a

new hazardous facility is proposed for a particular location. They include the proposer/

developer, regulators, immediate neighbours, community and relevant interest groups,

tangata whenua, potential customers/clients and possibly others. Not every stakeholder

is equally affected by the proposal and it is important to identify the reasons why a particular

stakeholder needs to be involved. Environmental groups or tangata whenua representatives

can be expected to have different reasons for involvement than immediate neighbors or

business competitors.

Focus on the objectives of the RMA, that is, the sustainable management of resources,

needs to be maintained. Protection of the environment, including all the aspects that

term includes by definition, is important. The HSNO legislation includes a section on

the “precautionary approach” which must be applied in cases of scientific and technical

uncertainty about the effects of hazardous substances. This means that both actual and

potential effects of hazardous facilities on people, property and the natural environment

need to be taken into account. The Acts are, however, not concerned about the effects of

a particular facility on the business and commercial environment of a community (such

as trade competition), if adverse effects do not extend to the community itself.


90

8.3 How and when does consultation take place?The first stage of a consultation strategy is to identify the stakeholders which may need to

be consulted. Often, the initial list of persons or organisations consulted is small and may

need to be expanded during the development process. It is for a proposer/developer to

decide what balance to strike between possible marketing/public relations advantages of

wide and extensive consultation against possible delays, at least initially, in the process.

In many instances, local authorities will advise on the (minimum) extent of consultation

necessary if a resource consent is required for a hazardous facility. In this context, it is interesting

to note that in 1996/97 only about 4 percent of all land use consent applications were publicly

notified. In approximately 28 percent of all cases, TAs do not publicly notify an application if

written approval of those parties identified as being affected has been obtained.

Timing of consultation will vary depending on the scale of the proposed facility, the

degree of risks from hazardous substances and the number of affected persons. In many

cases, other issues not related to the use or storage of hazardous substances may also need

to be considered. Generally, it is advisable to have early consultation with affected parties

to allow for design and management changes if necessary. Late variations due to objections

by affected parties may incur additional costs for a different design or process, amendments

to or even a completely new resource consent application and associated AEE and/or

possible legal costs, as well as delays in the completion of the project.

8.4 Consultation strategyThe choice of an appropriate method for consultation depends on the scale of the proposal,

the types and hazard levels of substances to be used or stored, relevant planning documents

and the potential for adverse effects of the facility. A documented consultation strategy is

recommended, particularly for larger proposals with the potential for significant effects.

Such a strategy needs to identify:

• the stakeholders and interested parties to be consulted

• the stages at which such consultation should occur

• any particular methods of consultation.

These may include mailouts, (newspaper) advertisements, (public) meetings, and written or

electronic correspondence. The content and outcome of the consultation should be documented.


91

8.5 ChecklistFigure 7 provides an overview of the essential steps to be taken in risk communication

and consultation.

Figure 7: Checklist for risk communication and consultation

Define issues

Amend proposal as necessary

Document process anddesired outcomes

Identify stakeholders andinterested parties

- Provide information to stakeholdersand interested parties

- Hold meetings if appropriate

- Provide additional informationif required

- Hold meetings if appropriate

Submit/amend consentapplication

Feedback

Notification

Document process and obtainwritten agreement from

stakeholders/interested parties

Analyse responses and re-define issues as appropriate


92


Consultation

Upon evaluating the risk assessment put forward by Pink Ink Inc, the district council decided that

the land use consent application for the new manufacturing plant did not require public notification

if consent from all potentially affected parties was obtained. These parties were identified as the

immediate neighbours to the left and right of the site, and four other property owners on the street.

(With the plant being located in a commercial/industrial area, there are no immediate neighbours

with people-oriented activities.) A local environmental group concerned about water quality in

the area was also included. Pink Ink Inc developed a consultation strategy. The measures taken

included meetings with the parties on an individual basis and the preparation of some written

material on the proposals.

The proposal to install a firewall between the paint manufacturing facility and a neighbouring

electrical goods warehouse was accepted by its owner as being sufficient to protect this property.

The owner/operator of the adjacent panel beating shop had some concerns about flammable materials

stored on his site being ignited in the case of a fire in the paint manufacturing facility. He was also

concerned about potential odours and fumes from the facility and associated effects on his facility.

This issue was addressed by the regional council as part of the air discharge consent required for the

paint manufacturing facility.

There is a secondary school about 200 metres from the site. The council did not consider the

school would be affected by the new plant if Pink Ink Inc addressed hazardous substance transport

issues adequately. Other property owners in the vicinity also raised transport issues as their only

matters of concern but were prepared to give their consent.

Pink Ink Inc agreed to meet with representatives of the environmental group concerned about the

waterway at the back of the property to discuss hazardous substance management on its new site.

This meeting took place before the actual consent application was lodged. The environmental

group accepted that the measures Pink Ink Inc proposed were sufficient to control and mitigate any

risks of spilled hazardous substances to the waterway.

Some additional planting of shrubs and other plants on the back of the property was proposed by

the environmental group to prevent using the back of the yard for chemical or container storage.

This was accepted by the company. It was also agreed that the environmental group would be kept

informed at certain stages of the development.

Pink Ink Inc also prepared draft spill and emergency response plans before the actual consent

application was heard by the council. These were used in the discussions with the environmental

group, the Fire Service, the neighbours and the council during the consultation process. The plans

were to become part of the environmental management system for the site.

The owner/operator of the neighbouring panel beating shop was convinced that the measures for

fire fighting and response were adequate to protect his site. The involvement of the Fire Service in

the consultation process at this stage assisted in resolving this issue.


93

Part 9:Scoping an Assessmentof a Hazardous Facility


94

9 Scoping an Assessment of a Hazardous Facility

KEY POINTS

• Consultation between the applicant and the regulatory agencies is very

important when scoping an assessment of a hazardous facility.

• For larger scale proposals and complex technical matters, one or both parties

may need to consider the use of technical experts.

• A preliminary hazard and risk analysis may be necessary to clarify the scope of

an assessment of a hazardous facility and the need to involve technical experts.

• An Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE) addressing all relevant matters

has to be prepared. This should as a minimum include appropriate information

on hazards and risks and their control, consideration of alternatives, as well as

mitigating measures and consultation.

9.1 Consultation between applicant and regulatory agenciesGood consultation between the applicant and the relevant regulatory agency or agencies

is very important. Depending on the scale of a proposed hazardous facility, this may need

to start well before any applications are lodged. Obtaining and issuing consents for

hazardous facilities are seldom routine procedures, due to the varying nature of such

facilities, the sometimes highly technical nature of the information and the reasonably

small number of applications in comparison with other consent applications.

For non-routine and/or large-scale proposals, in-depth discussions about the proposal may

be necessary, and it is important that the lines of communication between the applicant

and council representatives are kept open and maintained during the entire process. In

many instances, technical advisors and hazardous substance specialists may be engaged by

one or both parties. A clear understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of

everyone involved in the process will assist in constructive discussions and the smooth

processing of an application. The development of a consultation strategy (see Section

9.3) is strongly recommended.

9.2 Hazard analysis and risk assessmentThe detail of any hazard identification and risk assessment of a hazardous facility for a

land use consent application must reflect the nature and scale of the proposal. This

includes relevant aspects of installations and operations utilising hazardous substances, as

well as the hazard levels of the substances and their quantities. The scope of the AEE

supporting the application can therefore vary significantly. For a home occupation or

small commercial operation, several pages of information on the hazardous substance

aspects of the proposal may be sufficient. For large-scale industrial facilities, hundreds of

pages may be necessary.


95

For any medium to large facilities or proposals for non-routine operations, a preliminary

hazard and risk analysis process should be used. The HFSP may be an appropriate tool for

this, in particular if this is used to determine the consent status of the proposal. Suitable

methods such as checklists, networks or matrices (refer Section 5.2) could also be used.

Such an exercise could be carried out in conjunction with the hazard identification required

under the Health and Safety in Employment Act, although it is important that the

objectives of different pieces of legislation are reflected appropriately. For example, hazard

identification for a resource consent under the RMA needs to include effects on the

natural environment.

9.3 When to involve specialistsFor most land use consent applications, consultants with planning expertise or health

and safety skills will be called on to assist the applicant, and occasionally the regulatory

authority receiving the application. However, in the case of a large-scale, complex and/

or non-routine application for a hazardous facility it may be necessary or advisable to seek

the assistance of a hazardous substance/ hazardous facilities expert. Such experts should

be able to demonstrate the following knowledge and skills:

• hazardous facilities planning (including application of the HFSP, where applicable)

• regulatory requirements of the RMA, the HSE Act and the HSNO legislation, including

approved Codes of Practice

• sufficient technical, engineering and scientific knowledge about the substances,

installations and processes involved

• hazard analysis and risk assessment, especially where quantitative assessments are

concerned

• emergency and spill response planning, environmental management and auditing

• other applicable legislation such as HSE legislation, Building Act, transport legislation etc.

At present, the number of hazardous substance/hazardous facilities experts in New Zealand

is relatively small. This situation may improve in the near future when the HSNO

Regulations come into full force. ERMA New Zealand is expected to have a register of

HSNO specialists (eg, test certifiers and/or enforcement officers) who may be able to

offer the necessary expertise. Nonetheless, care with the selection of a specialist is highly

recommended to ensure that skills match individual issues and circumstances.


96

9.4 Preparing an AEEWhen preparing an application for a land use consent for a hazardous facility, the following

points need to be addressed as part of the AEE:

1. A full description of the nature and scale of the proposed facility and associated

operations, and a preliminary outline of the scope of the AEE to be undertaken.

2. Documentation of alternatives (sites/locations, substances, quantities, processes/

equipment, site management etc).

3. Description of the environment potentially affected by the proposal, including pathways

and receptors).

4. Preliminary hazard and risk analysis (a screening process such as the HFSP could be used).

5. Detailed hazard and risk analysis of installations, operations and processes involving

the use, handling, storage, transport and disposal of hazardous substances which is

appropriate to the type and scale of the proposed facility. A qualitative or, in some

cases, a quantitative risk assessment may be required, depending on the scale or potential

effects of the proposed development. This assessment should place emphasis on:

• a hazardous substance inventory and description of proposed/existing

installations, operations and processes on the site

• the biophysical characteristics of the site and surrounding area and relevant

infrastructure on and off-site (eg, drainage, roads)

• the location of the facility in relation to people-oriented activities (eg, child

care facilities, schools, rest homes, hospitals), sensitive environments (eg, natural

waters, ecosystems) and infrastructures (neighbouring roads, buildings etc)

• identification of potential hazards, failure modes and exposure pathways

• assessment of the probability and potential consequences of an accident leading

to a release of a hazardous substance or loss of control, including, as applicable,

cumulative and/or synergistic effects

• acceptability of the assessed risks, including cumulative risks

• proposed risk control and environmental mitigation measures, with emphasis

on sensitive activities and environments, including, as applicable, fire safety

and site management systems, engineered safety measures such as containment

devices, spill contingency and emergency plans, monitoring and maintenance

schedules as well as training programmes.


97

6. Management of wastes containing hazardous substances.

7. The transport of hazardous substances, where this forms a significant part of the

operations. Hazardous substances transport poses risks that are similar to those of use

and storage in terms of uncontrolled releases, but may require different methods of

control. For an assessment of the transport of hazardous substances, it should be

demonstrated that the proposal will generate no significant adverse effects on the

safety of the operation of the adjoining road network and that vehicles transporting

hazardous substances will utilise appropriate roads as a regular means of transport.

8. Outline of proposed site management systems and plans, as necessary.

9. An emergency management plan detailing emergency preparation and response measures.

10. Development of a consultation strategy to facilitate communication with the regulatory

authority and stakeholders/affected parties.

11. Final review of the AEE to ensure that it is in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of RMA.

This is a general guide only. The detail of the individual steps and the AEE itself will vary

considerably from application to application. Depending on the nature and scale of the

proposal, the order of the tasks may change somewhat, some may require less detail, and

others may need to be repeated in a reiterative process. It is even possible that the consent

status of the proposal may change favourably in the process due to a reduction in risk

presented by the proposed facility.

The Ministry for the Environment has published A Guide to Preparing a Basic AEE (MfE,

1999b) to assist with preparation of AEEs, and Auditing Assessments of Environmental Effects

- A good practice guide (MfE, 1999c) to provide guidance on auditing AEEs.

Following the preparation of the AEE, the consent application should be compiled to the

highest standard of quality and in accordance with the specifications of the regulatory

authority before submitting it to the relevant authority.


98


AEE Preparation

Pink Ink Inc’s management had sufficient in-house expertise to specify the necessary measures for

managing risks on the site. However, it lacked knowledge about the local planning process and

specific legislative requirements. A consultant was engaged to liaise with the district council and

OSH about planning controls, health and safety issues and HSNO requirements.

The AEE for the new site was prepared jointly by Pink Ink Inc’s staff and its consultant. Results

from the early stages of the consultation programme were fed into the process and resulted in some

minor modifications to the proposed site design and management plan. An undertaking to use only

licensed specialist carriers for the transport of hazardous substances and wastes was included in the

AEE. Further, the transport of hazardous products was to be audited by Pink Ink Inc regularly.

As part of the AEE preparation process, various alternatives were considered by the company. The

proposed site proved to be the most appropriate both from a commercial and planning perspective.

Any potential adverse effects of the facility on the waterway in the vicinity of the site were able to

be avoided or mitigated. Alternatives to the proposed processes and storage areas were considered

and taken into account. Pink Ink Inc also provided a commitment to review the use of hazardous

substances on the site on a regular basis as part of its proposed environmental management system.

The detailed hazard analysis and risk assessment of the new facility (refer Sections 5 and 6) was

included in the AEE. These showed that, given appropriate control and mitigation measures, the

facility would not pose a significant risk to people, neighbouring properties or ecosystems.

Based on the information provided to affected parties, all of them gave their consent for the new

facility.


99

Part 10:Resource Consents


100

10 Resource Consents

KEY POINTS

• This section outlines the criteria a regulatory authority may use to evaluate an

application for a hazardous facility land use consent and to develop appropriate

resource consent conditions.

• A series of model resource consent conditions for hazardous facilities is provided.

• Monitoring and enforcement of the facility and the resource consent conditions

by regulatory agencies is another important aspect.

• Self-monitoring by hazardous facilities operators/consent holders, including

reporting to the regulatory authority, may be an appropriate option.

10.1 Criteria for consent evaluationUpon receipt of the consent application, the regulatory authority will process it in

accordance with Part VI of the RMA. When evaluating an application for a hazardous

facility land use consent, the regulatory authority needs to consider the following matters:

• consistency with the objectives, policies and rules outlined in the district plan, or any

regional policy statements or plans, as applicable, for the relevant location

• justification for the proposed site, including consideration of alternatives where off-

site effects are considered to be significant

• the appropriateness of the assessment of environments and risks carried out for the

proposed facility, and the accuracy and completeness of the presented information

• the scale and significance of environments and risks associated with the hazardous

substances proposed to be used, stored, transported or disposed of by the proposed

facility, including the potential for cumulative risks

• the appropriateness of the proposed risk control and mitigation measures

• adequacy and comprehensiveness of the employed consultation process, the nature of

submissions received and/or written confirmations by relevant stakeholders

• the adequacy of proposed site management systems and plans, particularly in relation

to hazardous substances

• proposed measures for the management and disposal of hazardous wastes

• scale and significance of off-site transport of hazardous substances, and proposed

measures for control

• the scope and suitability of the emergency management proposals.


101

10.2 Resource consent conditionsResource consent conditions for hazardous facilities can be as varied as the facilities

themselves, and should be specific to a particular facility. The following recommendations

for conditions cover various, but not necessarily all, aspects for which land use conditions

may need to be specified (additional conditions may apply for discharges, if applicable).

Some minimum conditions are likely to be specified in district plans as minimum

performance standards for permitted hazardous facilities (see Section 3.4.3). These apply

generally regardless of the conditions stated in resource consents, but may often be restated

in resource consents. In some instances, minimum performance standards may make up

the bulk of consent conditions, with few additional conditions imposed, while large facilities

are likely to attract more additional conditions.

10.2.1 Site design, construction and management

Site design conditions should ensure that hazardous facilities are designed, constructed

and managed in a manner that avoids or minimises the risk of adverse effects on the

environment from the activities carried out on the site. This should include provisions

for the intentional use of hazardous substances and for the unintentional reaction or release

of hazardous substances. Adverse effects on the environment include adverse health

effects or injury to people, damage to other living organisms and ecosystems, and damage

to off-site property.

Resource consent conditions on site design, construction and management may cover:

• appropriate spill containment systems for liquid hazardous substances

• separation requirements between facilities and the property boundary

• the identification of the stormwater drainage system

• emergency response installations and equipment.

Conditions may also require compliance with development plans submitted by the

developer or specify additional design requirements.

10.2.2 Hazard communication

Hazard communication conditions should be used to ensure that hazardous facilities are

adequately signposted to indicate the nature of the substances stored, used or otherwise

handled. Generally, compliance with the HSNO identification and hazard communication

performance requirements can be expected to be sufficient, although substances not covered

by the HSNO legislation may need to be considered.

It is unlikely that additional requirements for resource management purposes are necessary

in regard to labels and information on packaging and containers, or documentation such

as Material Safety Data Sheets.


102

10.2.3 Hazardous substances management plan

A hazardous substances management plan may be required through a consent condition

if appropriate to the scale of the operation and its hazards. Such a plan should include:

• inventories of hazardous substances, facilities, and locations

• emergency response procedures specific to particular hazardous events identified in

the risk assessment process

• notification procedures and details (internally and externally), including those

appropriate to incident and accident reporting

• site and process plans

• monitoring and maintenance schedules

• training and review procedures.

The hazardous substances management plan could be part of a wider site management

plan, health and safety plan or an environmental management system.

10.2.4 Waste management

Waste management conditions should ensure that process waste or waste containing

hazardous substances is stored, managed and disposed of in a manner that minimises the

risk of adverse effects on the environment. Conditions may require the selection of waste

management contractors who must have the appropriate facilities, processes, consents

and trained staff to manage the wastes in compliance with all relevant statutes. If hazardous

wastes are a part of the operation, a hazardous waste management plan may also be required.

10.2.5 Transport

Conditions may be required to ensure that on-site transport of hazardous substances is

carried out in a manner that minimises the risk of adverse effects on the environment.

Matters specified may include specific areas for maneuvering and loading/unloading of

hazardous substance transports or restrictions of other vehicle movements in parts of a

site where hazardous substances are handled or stored.

Off-site transport is generally difficult to control as part of a land use consent. In individual

cases, dedicated transport routes or times could be specified, although this is difficult to

monitor. Where a council identifies specific transport routes, it needs to ensure that

these are compatible with the district/regional plans of other affected authorities.


103

10.2.6 Emergency preparation and management

During an emergency, it is unlikely that there will be enough time to decide who is in

charge, identify sources of help, train people to respond adequately and decide on a plan

of action to follow. For this reason, it is important that an emergency plan, tailored to the

specific requirements of the facility, is prepared and adhered to.

10.2.7 Monitoring

Hazardous facilities require monitoring, which ranges from assessing general environmental

performance indicators to compliance with district plan rules and resource consent

conditions. Monitoring may be carried out by regulatory authorities or by the hazardous

facilities operator (self-monitoring), with appropriate reporting procedures to the regulatory

authority (see Section 10.2.8).

Self-monitoring by the consent holder may cover specific matters or be part of a wider

management system, and needs to include reporting to the regulatory authority on a regular

basis. Issues covered by self-monitoring regimes can include inspection and site/equipment

maintenance, incident/accident reporting, training and any changes in the management

of hazardous substances on the site during the consent period.

A monitoring strategy for a hazardous facility can include:

• hazardous substance inventories

• inspection schedules for site, storage areas and equipment (daily, weekly, monthly,

events-based)

• testing of performance of equipment (eg, examination of tanks/pipelines/ valves,

stormwater retention/treatment devices)

• testing of procedures (eg, evacuation or spill response)

• training programmes for new staff, updates for existing staff

• audits of sites and site management systems.


104

10.2.8 Codes of Practice

Codes of Practice may be used as means to achieve compliance with specific resource

consent conditions. Examples of relevant codes include the Code of Practice for Design,

Installation and Operation of Underground Petroleum Systems (Department of Labour - OSH)

or the Code of Practice for Warning Signs for Premises Storing Hazardous Substances of the

NZCIC. It is expected that new Codes of Practice will be developed and existing Codes

updated under the HSNO Act. Section 13 gives a bibliography of useful guides, Codes of

Practice and Standards.

10.2.9 Reporting

Reporting requirements for the consent holder will primarily focus on supplying data to the

regulatory agency at specified intervals to demonstrate compliance with the RMA, relevant

rules, as well as resource consent conditions. Reporting requirements may cover hazardous

substance inventories, relevant inspection/monitoring data, records on incidents/accidents,

testing of equipment and staff training, as well as results of site or systems audits.

10.3 Monitoring and enforcement by regulatory agenciesMonitoring and enforcement of district plan and other applicable rules for hazardous

facilities/substances and hazardous facilities land use consent conditions are generally

carried out by TAs. This includes nomination of enforcement staff. While regional

councils generally monitor and enforce conditions in relation to discharges, gaps and/or

overlaps between these jurisdictions need to be addressed.

Any persons carrying out monitoring functions under the RMA in respect to hazardous

substance management will require appropriate training, for example planning/resource

management or technical skills.

A monitoring fee may apply for monitoring carried out by the regulatory authority.


105


Consent conditions

The district council considered Pink Ink Inc’s application and issued the following consent,

addressing hazardous substance use and storage (a number of the conditions are based on the

minimum requirements for permitted activities):

“A consent for the use of land has been granted to Pink Ink Inc for a site at … to store and handle

the hazardous substances in the quantities listed in Appendix X subject to the following conditions:

1 Facility design, construction and managementa) Site design

Any part of a hazardous facility which is involved in the manufacture, mixing, packaging, storage,

loading, unloading, transfer, use or handling of hazardous substances must be designed, constructed

and operated in a manner which prevents:

• the occurrence of any off-site adverse effects from the above listed activities on people, ecosystems,

physical structures and/or other parts of the environment unless permitted by a resource consent

• the contamination of air, land and/or water (including groundwater, potable water supplies and

surface waters) in the event of a spill or other type of release of hazardous substances.

b) Site layout

The hazardous facility must be designed in a manner to ensure that separation between on-site

facilities and the property boundary is sufficient for the adequate protection of neighbouring facilities,

land uses and sensitive environments.

c) Storage of hazardous substances

The storage of any hazardous substances must be carried out in a manner that prevents:

• the unintentional release of the hazardous substance

• the accumulation of any liquid or solid spills or fugitive vapours and gases in enclosed off-site

areas resulting in potentially adverse effects on people, ecosystems or built structures.

Specific performance requirements for the storage of hazardous substances are covered by

HSNO Regulations.


106


d) Site drainage systems

Site drainage systems must be designed, constructed and operated in a manner which prevents the

entry or discharge of hazardous substances into the stormwater and/or sewerage systems unless

permitted to do so by a network utility operator.

Suitable means of compliance include clearly identified stormwater grates and manholes, roofing,

sloped pavements, interceptor drains, containment and diversion valves, oil-water separators, sumps

and similar systems.

e) Spill containment systems

Any parts of the hazardous facility site where a hazardous substances spill may occur must be serviced

by suitable spill containment systems that are:

• constructed from impervious materials resistant to the hazardous substances used, stored,

manufactured, mixed, packaged, loaded, unloaded or otherwise handled on the site

• for liquid hazardous substances:

- able to contain the maximum volume of the largest tank present plus an a allowance for

stormwater or fire water

- for drums or other smaller containers, able to contain 50 percent of the maximum volume

of substances stored plus an a allowance for stormwater or fire water

- able to prevent the entry of any spill or other unintentional release of hazardous substances,

or any contaminated stormwater and/or fire water into site drainage systems unless permitted

to do so by a network utility operator.

Suitable means of compliance include graded floors and surfaces, bunding, roofing, sumps, fire water

catchments, overfill protection and alarms, and similar systems.

f) Washdown areas

Any part of the hazardous facility site where vehicles, equipment or containers that are or may have

become contaminated with hazardous substances are washed must be designed, constructed and

managed to prevent any contaminated wash water from:

• entry or discharge into the stormwater drainage or the sewerage systems unless permitted by a

network utility operator

• discharge into or onto land and/or water (including groundwater and potable water supplies)

unless permitted by a resource consent


107


Suitable means of compliance include roofing, sloped pavements, interceptor drains, containment

and diversion valves, oil-water separators, sumps and similar systems.

g) Underground storage tanks

Underground tanks for the storage of petroleum products must be designed, constructed and managed

to prevent any leakage and spills and resulting adverse effects on people, ecosystems and property.

Suitable means of compliance include:

• using materials that are resistant to the hazardous substances concerned

• using secondary containment facilities in areas of environmental sensitivity

• providing leak detection or a monitoring system capable of detecting a failure or breech in the

structural integrity of the primary containment vessel

• adherence to the Code of Practice for Design, Installation and Operation of Underground

Petroleum Systems (OSH) is deemed to be one method of complying with this condition.

h) Building construction and site coverage

The site shall be built on in accordance with the plans submitted to allow sufficient space for

maneuvering of heavy vehicles away from hazardous substance storage areas. The back yard is not

to be used for the storage of hazardous substances, empty containers or any wastes. Planting with

native trees or shrubs along the back boundary of the site shall be carried out in accordance with

the landscape plan submitted.

i) Fire safety

Design, management and operations shall comply with the submitted fire safety provisions at all times.

j) Signage

Any hazardous facility must be adequately signposted to indicate the nature of the substances stored,

used or otherwise handled.

Suitable means of compliance include adherence to relevant Codes of Practice or the HAZCHEM

signage system.


108


2 Waste managementAny process waste or waste containing hazardous substances shall be managed to prevent:

(i) the waste entering or discharging into the stormwater drainage system

(ii) the waste entering or discharging into the sewerage system unless permitted by the sewerage

utility operator

(iii) the waste discharging into or onto land and/or water (including groundwater and potable water


The storage and management of any process waste or waste containing hazardous substance on the

site shall at all times comply with the conditions specified for hazardous substances.

All waste containing hazardous substances shall be disposed of to facilities holding the necessary

consents, or be serviced by a registered waste disposal contractor.

3 TransportThe transport of hazardous substances to and from the site shall be undertaken by licensed transport

operators. Necessary documentation shall be made available to the council upon request.

4 Monitoring and reportingThe operator has to provide an annual audit report to the council outlining any significant changes

to hazardous substance management on the site, changes in type and quantities of substances used

or stored, and any incidents with the potential for off-site effects. The report shall also specify the

training and monitoring procedures and activities for the period covered.

An emergency response and contingency plan shall be prepared for the site and contain all necessary

procedures, including fire safety and spill response, plans, responsibilities and contact details to deal

with any incident involving hazardous substances. A copy of the plan shall be submitted to council

before commencement of operations.

Dated:…

Signed:…


109

Part 11:Conclusions


110

11 Conclusions

The sound management of hazardous facilities is an important aspect of legislation such as

the RMA, HSE and HSNO Acts. The requirements set out under these Acts are consistent

and complementary, and any improvements in the control and management of risks

presented by hazardous substances and facilities will enhance compliance with all sets of

legislation and minimise liabilities for operators.

The RMA and plans developed under it define the regime under which a land use consent

is required for new hazardous facilities or for existing hazardous facilities proposing

significant changes. Many TAs use the HFSP as a screening mechanism to determine a

facility’s resource consent status. The HFSP has been in use for approximately four years,

and is by now relatively well understood and implemented. There is also a range of other

screening mechanisms used by district councils in New Zealand for hazardous facilities,

usually based on lists of industry and/or hazardous substances types.

While resource consent assessment tools are relatively well established, district councils

around New Zealand have indicated that they are in need of guidance on how to assess

the risks of a hazardous facility once it has been determined that a resource consent is

required. It is the purpose of this Assessment Guide to provide such guidance.

Many hazardous facilities do not continuously discharge contaminants to the environment.

However, many of the installations, processes and operations associated with hazardous

facilities present risks, that is, potential for accidents with adverse effects on the

environment. The RMA requires such environmental risks to be assessed as part of resource

consent applications for the use of land.

The concept of risk is often poorly understood. Hazards may not be recognised or may

even be ignored, with potentially significant consequences to people, ecosystems and the

built environment. However, there are widely recognised approaches and methods for

the analysis and management of risk, with a wide range of circumstances and applications,

although they must be used in a consistent and systematic fashion.


111

Generally, risks cannot be completely eliminated, but they may be reduced to a level

where residual risks are deemed to be acceptable in relation to the criteria applied by both

regulators and communities. The objective of this Assessment Guide has been to establish

a common platform for both applicants and regulatory agencies to operate on, building

on the following elements:

• an understanding of the legislative requirements for hazardous substances and facilities,

including the use, handling, storage, transport and disposal of hazardous substances

and wastes

• a systematic description of the concept of hazard and risk, and of the methods used to

analyse these

• an explanation of how risks are evaluated, controlled and managed

• requirements for consultation and risk communication

• requirements for the preparation of an AEE

• the criteria used for the evaluation of resource consents

• model resource consent conditions, including requirements for monitoring, reporting

and enforcement.


112


113

Part 12:References


114

12 References

AS/NZS 3931:1995 (interim): Risk analysis of technological systems - application guide.

Published jointly by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand

AS/NZS ISO 14050, 1997 Australian/New Zealand Standard: Environmental management

systems – glossary of terms. Published jointly by Standards Australia and Standards New

Zealand.

AS/NZS ISO 14001, 1997: Australian/New Zealand Standard: Environmental management

systems – specification with guidance for use. Published jointly by Standards Australia and

Standards New Zealand.

Australia and New Zealand Industry Task Force, 1996 Planning For Land Use Safety –

Hazardous industries. Draft for ANZHIPT – 27 March 1996.

Davies J C, Covello V T and Allen F W 1986 Risk communication: proceedings of the national

conference on risk communication. The Conservation Foundation, Washington DC.

Elms D 1998 Risk management - general issues. In: Owning the Future: Integrated risk

management in practice (D Elms, editor). Centre for Advanced Engineering, Christchurch.

ERMA New Zealand 1998a Combined Consideration of Risks, Costs and Benefits - Protocol

2. Environmental Risk Management Authority New Zealand, Wellington.

ERMA New Zealand 1998b General Requirements for Identifying and Assessing Risks, Costs And

Benefits - Protocol 6. Environmental Risk Management Authority New Zealand, Wellington.

Gough J D 1989 A Review of the Literature Pertaining to “Perceived Risk” and “Acceptable

Risk” and the Methods Used to Estimate Them. Centre for Resource Management, University

of Canterbury and Lincoln College

GCNZ Consultants and H M Tweeddale Consulting Services 1989 Rosebank Peninsula

risk assessment study. Prepared for the Auckland City Council.

Land Transport Safety Authority 1998 Land Transport Rule: Dangerous goods 1998, Draft.

Ministry for the Environment 1994 Proposals for Regulations under the Hazardous Substance

and New Organisms Bill - Discussion Document. Wellington.

Ministry for the Environment 1998 Managing Hazardous Wastes - a discussion paper, Wellington.

Ministry for the Environment 1999a Land Use Planning Guide For Hazardous Facilities - A

resource for local authorities and hazardous facility operators (in preparation). Ministry for

the Environment, Wellington.


115

Ministry for the Environment 1999b A Guide to Preparing a Basic AEE. Ministry for the

Environment, Wellington.

Ministry for the Environment 1999c Auditing Assessments of Environmental Effects -

A good practice guide. Ministry for the Environment, Wellington.

New South Wales Department of Planning 1985 Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory

Paper No 4 - risk criteria for land use safety planning.

New Zealand Chemical Industry Council 1998 The Responsible Care Management System

- Manager’s Handbook, 1994 and amendments 1, 2 and 3.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1994 Approved Code of Practice for Managing

Major Industrial Accidents, Wellington.

Royal Society 1992: Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. Report of a Royal Society

Study group. London.

Standards Australia 1999 Environmental Risk Management Handbook. In preparation.

Standards Australia and New Zealand 1999 Risk management (AS/NZ 4360:1999).

Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand 1995 Risk management (AS/NZS 4360: 1995).

Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand 1997 Risk Analysis Of Technological Systems

– Application guide (Interim Standard AS/NZS 3931 (Int.): 1995).

Tweeddale H M 1992 Balancing Quantitative and Non-quantitative Risk Assessment.

Australian Centre of Advanced Risk and Reliability Engineering Ltd, Dept. of Chemical

Engineering, University of Sydney.

Tweeddale H M, Cameron R F, and Sylvester S S 1992 Some Experiences in Hazard

Identification and Risk Short Listing. Australian Centre of Advanced Risk and Reliability

Engineering Ltd, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Sydney.

United Nations 1997 United Nations Recommendations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods

(UNRTDG), 10th Edition, Geneva.

USEPA 1988 Environmental backgrounder - hazardous chemicals: Emergency planning and

community right to know. Office of Public Affairs (A-107), Washington DC 20460.

USEPA 1996 Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment. United States

Environmental Protection Agency EPA/630/R-95/002B.


116


117

Part 13:

Bibliography


118

13 Bibliography

Australia and New Zealand Industry Task Force 1996 Planning for Land Use Safety -

Hazardous Industries, Australia and New Zealand Industry Task Force, Draft for ANZHIPT

- 27 March 1996.

Land Transport Safety Authority 1999 Land Transport Rule: Dangerous Goods 1999 Land

Transport Safety Authority, Draft 1998.

Ministry for the Environment 1995 Above-ground Bulk Tank Containment Systems -

Environmental Guidelines for the Petroleum Marketing Companies. Ministry for the

Environment, Wellington.

NZ Chemical Industry Council 1987 Code of Practice for Warning Signs for Premises Storing

Hazardous Substances, NZ Chemical Industry Council, Wellington.

NZ Chemical Industry Council 1994 The Responsible Care Management System - Manager’s

Handbook, and Amendments 1 - 3, 1998 NZ Chemical Industry Council, Wellington

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1992 Code of Practice for the Design, Installation

and Operation of Underground Petroleum Storage Systems Occupational Safety and Health

Service, Wellington.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1994 Approved Code of Practice for Managing Hazards

to Prevent Major Industrial Accidents. Occupational Safety and Health Service, Wellington.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1994 Approved Code of Practice for the Safe Use

of Isocyanates. Occupational Safety and Health Service, Wellington 1994.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1994 Approved Code of Practice for the Safe Use of Timber

Preservatives and Antisapstain Chemicals Occupational Safety and Health Service, Wellington.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1996 Guidelines for the Safe Use of Chemicals in

Electroplating and Related Industries. Occupational Safety and Health Service, Wellington.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1997 A Practical Guide and Workbook for Completing

a MOSHH Assessment, Occupational Safety and Health Service, Wellington 1997.

Occupational Safety and Health Service 1997 Approved Code of Practice for the

Management of Substances Hazardous to Health in the Place of Work, Occupational Safety

and Health Service, Wellington.

Standards New Zealand 1999 NZS 5433:1999 - Transport of Dangerous Goods on Land,

Standards New Zealand.


119

List of Abbreviations

AEE Assessment of Environmental Effects

ARC Auckland Regional Council

BOD Biochemical Oxygen Demand

CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis

EMS Environmental Management System

ERMA Environmental Risk Management Authority

GIS Geographic Information Systems

HAZOP Hazard Operability Study

HFSP Hazardous Facility Screening Procedure

HSE Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992

HSNO Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996

ISO International Standards Organisation

MfE Ministry for the Environment

NES National Environmental Standard (under the RMA)

NPS National Policy Statement (under the RMA)

NZCIC New Zealand Chemical Industry Council

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSH Occupational Safety and Health

RMA Resource Management Act 1991

RPS Regional Policy Statement (under the RMA)

TA Territorial Authority

UNRTDG United Nations Recommendations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods

USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency


120

Glossary

Consequence The outcome of an event or situation expressed qualitatively or

quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain (AS/NZS

4360:1999).

Corrosive Capable of breaking down metal or human tissue on contact - see

HSNO Regulations.

Cumulative risk The risk posed by a hazardous facility added to or multiplied by risks

from other facilities.

Ecosystem A biotic community and its abiotic environment, considered

together as a unit. Ecosystems are characterised by a flow of energy

that leads to trophic status and material recycling.

Ecotoxic Capable of toxic effects on non-human organisms and ecosystems -

see HSNO Regulations.

Environment Includes:

(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people

and communities

(b) all natural and physical resources

(c) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which

affect the matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition

or which are affected by those matters (RMA/HSNO).

Environmental effect Any change to the environment regardless of scale, intensity,

duration or frequency, in relation to the use, development, or

protection of natural and physical resources (based on RMA).

Environmental Part of the overall management system that includes

management system organisational structure, planning activities, responsibilities,

practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing,

implementing, achieving, reviewing and maintaining the

environmental policy (AS/NZS-ISO/DIS 14050).

Event An incident or situation, which occurs in a particular place during

a particular interval of time (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Event tree analysis Technique that describes the possible range and sequence of

the outcomes which may arise from a single initiating event

(AS/NZS 4360:1999).


121

Explosive Capable of sudden expansion due to a release of internal energy -


Fault tree analysis A systems engineering method for representing the logical

combination of various systems states and possible causes which can

contribute to a specified event (called the top event).

Flammable Capable of being ignited in the presence of oxygen and to sustain

combustion - see HSNO Regulations.

Frequency Measure of likelihood of occurrence of an event expressed as the

number of occurrences of an event in a given time. See also

Likelihood and Probability (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Hazard Physical situations, processes and actions that have the potential to

exert adverse effects on people, ecosystems or the built environment.

Hazard analysis The systematic identification and analysis of what can happen, why,

and how (modified definition of risk identification in AS/NZS

4360:1999).

Hazardous facility Activities involving hazardous substances and sites, including

vehicles for their transport, at which these substances are used,

stored, handled or disposed of - see Section 1.3.

Hazardous substance Any substance with hazardous properties including those substances

defined as hazardous for the purpose of the HSNO Act 1996 (RMA)

Hazardous waste As defined in hazardous waste discussion document (MfE, 1998).

HSNO Includes both the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act

1996 and HSNO Regulations in relation to hazard classification and

life cycle requirements for hazardous substances.

Likelihood Qualitative description of probability or frequency (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Monte Carlo A frequency analysis which uses a model of the system to evaluate

simulation variations in input conditions and assumptions. (AS/NZS 3931:1995

(interim): Risk analysis of technological systems - application guide.)

Oxidising capacity Capacity to contribute to fire or explosion due to release of oxygen -


Performance Controls which say what is to be achieved (including in measurable

requirements terms), without being prescriptive (based on MfE, 1994).


122

Precautionary The need for caution in managing adverse effects of hazardous

approach substances where there is scientific and technical uncertainty about

those effects (based on HSNO).

Probability Likelihood of a specific outcome, measured by the ratio of specific

outcomes to the total number of possible outcomes. Probability is

expressed as a percentage or a number between 0 and 1, with 0

indicating an impossible outcome and 1 indicating an outcome is

certain (based on AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Property performance Standards relating to the nature of the hazardous properties

requirements (eg, explosive, toxic, corrosive) of a given hazardous substance (based

on MfE, 1994)

Receptor Ecological entity exposed to the stressor (USEPA Federal Register:

Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 1996).

Residual risk The remaining level of risk control after risk treatment measures

have been taken (modified AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Risk Represents the likelihood of specified consequences of a specific

event (for example, an explosion, a fire or a toxic release) on people,

ecosystems or the built environment.

Risk acceptance Informed decision to accept the likelihood and the consequences of a

particular risk (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Risk analysis Systematic use of available information to determine how often

specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences

(AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Risk assessment Overall process of hazard identification, risk analysis and risk

evaluation (modified from AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Risk avoidance An informed decision not to become involved in a risk situation

(AS/NZS 4360:1999).


123

Risk communication A purposeful and interactive exchange of information about risk

between interested parties, based on conveying information about

levels of risk, their meaning and significance, and any decisions,

actions, or policies aimed at managing or controlling such risks

(adapted from Davies et al, 1986)

Risk control Selection and implementation of appropriate options for dealing with

risk (based on definition of risk treatment in AS/NZS 4360: 1999).

Risk evaluation The process in which judgements are made on the tolerability of the

risk on the basis of risk analysis and taking into account factors such

as socio-economic and environmental aspects (AS/NZS 4360:1999

and AS/NZS 3931)

Risk management The systematic application of management policies, procedures and

practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, treating and

monitoring risk (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Risk perception Risk as seen by individuals or societal groups. Risk perception

cannot be reduced to a single parameter of a particular aspect of risk,

such as the product of the probabilities and consequences of any

event. Risk perception is inherently multi-dimensional and personal,

with a particular risk or hazard meaning different things to different

people, and different things in different contexts (adapted from

Royal Society, 1992, and Gough, 1989, and as cited in Standards

Australia, 1999)

Risk reduction Selective application of appropriate techniques and management

principles to reduce either likelihood of an occurrence or its

consequences, or both (AS/NZS 4360:1999).

Toxic Capable of causing adverse health effects, short- or long-term,

following exposure - see HSNO Regulations.


124


assessment guide for hazardous facilities · 2013-09-18 · involving hazardous substances -...

Documents