Notes1nc: T, Politics, Privatization CP (preferably over P3), K of your choice (probably Wilderson), and Cyber DA on case

The biggest problem with politics is that the plan uses the DOD, you just need to win that agencies will still be perceived somewhat by Congress. If they say we meet on the second part of the T violation, use that to your advantage to establish a link

Most of your privatization blocks from other files still apply, the evidence in here is just specific to the private sector program that will do the aff. There is also FAA bad stuff so, as a last resort, you could go for the CP with solvency as a net benefit and the perm is worse because it uses the FAA which inhibits solvency

The cyber DA is just that increasing our ATC will embolden terrorists because they will perceive weakness in our systems and want to take advantage. This probably isn’t a great option because it doesn’t have a huge distinction between status quo ATC and new DOD ATC, but if it is mishandled you can go for it or at least extend it in the block.

T

1NC A. Investment is capital spending on infrastructure’s physical capitalCBO, 9 – Congressional Budget Office (“Subsidizing Infrastructure Investment with Tax-Preferred Bonds”, October, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10667/10-26-taxpreferredbonds.pdf)

In this analysis, investment in infrastructure is defined as capital spending on transportation, utilities (for example, water and power supply), environmental projects, and schools. 1 In addition, because they account for a significant share of the tax-exempt debt issued, health care facilities and hospitals are treated as infrastructure in this study, although they might not be classified as such for

many other types of analyses. Capital spending under this study’s definition consists of investment in physical capital, such as structures and facilities, rather than intangible capital, which is formed by spending on educational programs or on research and development.

B. Violation - Aviation funding comes from O&M spending – it’s distinct from capital spendingKalyvitis and Vella 11 – professor in the Department of International and European Economic Studies at Athens University of Economics and Business, PhD candidate in the Department of International and European Economic Studies at Athens University of Economics and Business (Sarantis and Eugenia, Public Capital Maintenance, Decentralization, and US Productivity Growth, Public Finance Review 39(6) p. 788 Sage)//EM

In this section we focus on the role of the transport sector, since it has been one of the largest areas of public-sector investment and its good condition is considered to be crucial in enhancing productivity. For instance, highways and roads, which in their vast majority are state or locally owned, are seen as the quintessential transportation infrastructure and have been studied extensively in the literature (see e.g. Chandra and Thompson, 2000; Cohen and Paul, 2004; Fraumeni, 2009). As shown in Table 1, irrespective of government level, the GDP share of spending on transportation has been more than double compared with spending on water infrastructure. Using a more

detailed breakdown, CBO (2007) reports that the bulk of federal outlays has been dominated by capital spending on highways and roads (60 percent of total), whereas those for O&M have been concentrated on aviation. While federal O&M spending on highways and roads is relatively small, both capital and O&M expenditures on highways and roads comprise the largest share of spending for states and localities.

The aff is also the DOD, which is distinct from the USFG

C. Voting Issue1. Limits – They open up a whole new sector of transportation which could contain lots of small, squirrely affs2. Ground – Generic spending DAs won’t link because of different funding mechanisms. Also, the nature of aviation uniquely precludes neg CP ground. They can also spike out of politics disads by saying they are insulated from federal government policy

2NC

Infrastructure investment is capital spendingCBO and JCT, 2009 – Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation (“Subsidizing Infrastructure Investment with Tax-Preferred Bonds,” government publication, October 2009, pg. 1-2, available via google, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CE0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbo.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fcbofiles%2Fftpdocs%2F106xx%2Fdoc10667%2F10-26-taxpreferredbonds.pdf&ei=nwTqT8eqNYaQ9gTljJ37Dw&usg=AFQjCNF-SEI1hor8kjENoa_lVwxq4s0LIQ)//RDIn this analysis, investment in infrastructure is defined as capital spending on transportation , utilities (for example, water and power supply), environmental projects, and schools. 1 In addition, because they account for a significant share of the tax-exempt debt issued, health care facilities and hospitals are treated as infrastructure in this study, although they might not be classified as such for many other types of analyses. Capital spending under this study’s definition consists of investment in physical capital, such as structures and facilities, rather than intangible capital , which is formed by spending on educational programs or on research and development.

Investment is capital expendituresBaker et. al 2 - professor in the finance area of the Harvard Business School, a program director for corporate finance at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and an associate editor for the Journal of Finance (Malcolm, Jeremy Stein, Jeffrey Wurgler, WHEN DOES THE MARKET MATTER? STOCK PRICES AND THE INVESTMENT OF EQUITY-DEPENDENT FIRMS, 7/17/02, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/papers/wurgler_baker_stein.pdf)//EM

b. Investment is defined as capital expenditures over assets. Q is defined as the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow over assets.

Federal infrastructure investment means public spendingCBO, 8 – Congressional Budget Office (“Issues and Options in Infrastructure Investment”, May, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9135/05-16-infrastructure.pdf)//DH

Under any definition, “infrastructure investment” encompasses spending on a variety of projects. For present purposes, it is useful to distinguish transportation, which receives the bulk of federal support, from other types of infrastructure, such as utilities. Both types of assets promote other economic activities: An adequate road, for example, facilitates the transport of goods from one place to another and thereby promotes economic activity; utilities that provide such services as electricity, telecommunications, and waste disposal are also essential to modern economies. (Appendix A describes spending on research and development and on education. Those categories form the basis for supporting intellectual and human capital, respectively, and can provide benefits that are similar to those generated by infrastructure spending.)

The most recent comprehensive data, for 2004, indicate that total capital spending from all sources on transportation, utilities, and selected other public facilities— specifically, prisons, schools, and facilities related to water and other natural

resources, such as dams—was more than $400 billion in 2004 (see Table 1). 1 The federal government financed about $60 billion (including federal grants to state and local governments), or roughly 15 percent of the total. 2 State and local governments (net of the federal grants) funded 42 percent of the investment, and the private sector provided the balance. Those funding shares have changed over time and vary greatly from one infrastructure category to another.

Transit funds come from capital spendingde Alth and Rueben 5 – Research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, Senior Research Associate, Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute at the Public Policy Institute of California (Shelley and Kim, Understanding Infrastructure Financing for California, 6/2/05, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_605SAOP.pdf)//EM

For transit, state and local capital outlay spending in 1999-2000 was $2.6 billion-about 65 percent of

operating expenditures ($4.0 billion). Virtually all of the transit capital money is spent locally, although much of it comes from federal and state sources. Capital spending on mass transit was unusually high that year largely because of federal grants and local funds for the Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART) and the Los Angeles County Metro Transportation Authority to complete extension projects. In 2001-2002, total transit capital expenditures fell to $1.5 billion, a more representative level of recent transit infrastructure financing.

B-2 Bomber

1ncYour advantage is non-unique, current B-2 Bomber upgrades are sickEverstine 2/28 (Brian, Air Force Times staff writer, “Northrop Grumman to Upgrade USAF B-2 Bombers,” 2/28/13, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130228/DEFREG02/302280027/Northrop-Grumman-Upgrade-USAF-B-2-Bombers?odyssey=nav|head)

Northrop Grumman, the main contractor on the stealth bomber, is already planning ways to improve the B-2’s communications and targeting systems, and make changes to the aircraft’s maintenance schedule to give increased access to the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.¶ The contractor is looking to change the depot maintenance of the bomber from a complete overhaul once every seven years to a shorter tune-up every five years and an overhaul every 10, which will give the Air Force access to one more bomber at any given time and save the service $310 million over 10 years, said Dave Mazur, Northrop’s vice president and B-2 program manager.¶ Depot maintenance takes approximately 13 months at a Northrop facility at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif. It includes a complete restoration of the airframe, inspections and service of the aircraft’s mechanical and electrical systems, according to the contractor. ¶ The contractor is planning to demonstrate the changes to the Air Force in fiscal 2014, with possible adoption coming two years later.¶ Over the next few years, the B-2 is also expected to get several technological upgrades to improve its communications with air operations centers, upgrading processors on the plane’s computer systems and even possible changes to the weapons systems of the bomber. ¶ Currently, the bomber’s two weapons bays can carry either a rotary launcher or a “smart” bomb rack. Northrop is working toward upgrading the B-2’s integrating processing unit to give it the ability to carry one of each so pilots and mission planners will have more flexibility, Mazur said.¶ “We are building a new B-2 from the inside out,” he said.¶ Contractors and the Air Force are also working to better integrate the new 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator with current testing to get the bunker bombs accurate “within feet,” Mazur said.¶ Other upgrades include new systems to interface with the Air Force’s extremely high frequency satellite communications. The new software, which began with the awarding of a $108 million contract last fall, includes an integrated processing unit, high-capacity disk drive and a fiber- optic network to communicate with new satellites and in a contested environment, Mazur said.¶

Production on this system is scheduled to begin in July at Whiteman, with three B-2s already upgraded during system development, Mazur said.

We are ready to strike but coercive diplomacy would failReed 12 (John, Defense Tech columnist, “USAF Providing “Options” for Dealing With Iran,” 3/1/12, http://defensetech.org/2012/03/01/usaf-providing-options-for-dealing-with-iran/)

However, the general revealed a little bit more during a Capitol Hill hearing yesterday. As our buddy John Bennett reported over at the newly refurbished US News, the service has sent the President “options” on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. ¶ Iran’s defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons “has the attention of the [Joint] Chiefs and other national security officials,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz told reporters Wednesday. “Our obligation is to provide

options” to the defense secretary and the president, Schwartz said, “and we have done that.”¶

Now, this doesn’t mean that a strike is imminent, it’s the Air Force’s job to be monitoring geopolitical hot spots and to constantly update its plans on how it would conduct operations in them. Plus, Schwartz asked the most relevant question with regards to a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities on Wednesday; what would it really accomplish?¶ Meanwhile, former STRATCOM boss and vice chairman of the joint chiefs, recently retired Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright said last week that it will be nearly impossible to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Remember, he was in charge of the nations nukes while at STRATCOM and was the nation’s number two military officer until last summer, so he’s in a decent spot to opine on this.

The threat is just smoke-and-mirrors – there’s no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons programHersh, 6/6 – Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist, uncovered My Lai and Abu Ghraib [Seymour, “Iran and the Bomb; Annals of National Security”, The New Yorker, Volume 87, Issue 16, p. 3, proquest, AL]

Is Iran actively trying to develop nuclear weapons? Members of the Obama Administration often talk as if this were a foregone conclusion, as did their predecessors under George W. Bush. There is a large body of evidence, however, including some of America's most highly classified intelligence assessments, suggesting that the United States could be in danger of repeating a mistake similar to the one made with Saddam Hussein's Iraq eight years ago--allowing anxieties about the policies of a tyrannical regime to distort

our estimations of the state's military capacities and intentions. The two most recent National Intelligence Estimates (N.I.E.s) on Iranian nuclear progress, representing the best judgment of the senior officers from all the major American

intelligence agencies, have stated that there is no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any effort to build the bomb since 2003. Despite years of covert operations inside Iran, extensive

satellite imagery, and the recruitment of many Iranian intelligence assets, the United States and its allies, including Israel, have been unable to find irrefutable evidence of an ongoing hidden nuclear-weapons program in Iran, according to intelligence and diplomatic officials here and abroad. One American defense consultant told me that as yet there is "no smoking calutron," although, like many Western government officials, he is convinced that Iran is intent on becoming a nuclear state sometime in the future. The general anxiety about the Iranian regime is firmly grounded. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly questioned the Holocaust and expressed a desire to see the state of Israel eliminated, and he has defied the 2006 United Nations resolution calling on Iran to suspend its nuclear-enrichment program. Tehran is also active in arming Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Iran is heavily invested in nuclear technology, and has a power plant ready to go on line in the port city of Bushehr, with a second in the planning stage. In the past four years, it has tripled the number of centrifuges in operation at its main

enrichment facility at Natanz, which is buried deep underground. On the other hand, the Iranian enrichment program is being monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Natanz and all Iran's major declared nuclear installations are under extensive video surveillance. I.A.E.A. inspectors have expressed frustration with Iran's level of cooperation and cited an increase in production of uranium, but they

have been unable to find any evidence that enriched uranium has been diverted to an illicit weapons program.

No Middle East ProlifMiklos 3/3 (Timothy, 2nd year M.A. student at the Elliott School of International Affairs in Security Policy Studies with a focus on nuclear weapons, “Iran Proliferation Triggering a Nuclear Domino Effect in the Middle East: An Unrealistic Scenario,” 3/3/13, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/468)

President Obama has stated that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon will spark an arms race in the Middle East. This view is a status quo dogma among policymakers of both the Republican and Democratic parties, and dissenting views are generally ignored. Ari Shavit of Haaretz identifies the most

at-risk states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East in response to an Iranian weapon is highly unlikely. For those countries most likely to proliferate, the political and financial costs are too high. The nuclear domino scenario has been an accepted doctrine since 1962 when President Kennedy warned that by the 1970s there would be around 25 nuclear weapon states. Yet, today there are only nine.¶ According to a recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report, “Cairo does not see Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat.” Egypt’s true enemy is Israel, which has defeated Egypt in four consecutive wars. If Egypt did not pursue a nuclear option to deter its nuclear-armed enemy Israel, then it will not do so against Iran. Egypt simply does not have the financial resources, nuclear infrastructure, or motive to build a successful clandestine nuclear program, as its facilities are under IAEA safeguards. As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Egypt has remained committed to non-proliferation since the Treaty’s inception and would be unlikely to withdraw.¶ Even if Egypt had the capability and intention to pursue nuclear weapons, its security would not be enhanced. An attempted breakout would likely be destroyed in a preemptive strike by Israel, which has proven the credibility of this threat twice by destroying the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Al Kibar reactor in Syria in 2007. Unlike Iran, Egypt does not have long distances, deep reactors, and strong air defenses to protect itself from Israeli preemption.¶ Iran poses the largest threat to Saudi Arabia and, as such, the Kingdom would have the strongest security motive to pursue a deterrent. Riyadh has called on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, yet has repeatedly warned that an Iranian nuclear weapon may compel it to follow suit. This is not credible and is likely an attempt to pressure the United States to take greater action against Tehran. According to Philipp Bleek of the Monterey Institute, “states whose rivals pursue or acquire nuclear weapons are much likely to themselves explore a nuclear weapons option…but are no more (or less) likely to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons” ("Why do states proliferate?," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory). Nasser of Egypt made a similar threat in response to Israel’s nuclear program and explored Egypt’s nuclear possibilities, but in 1968 chose to sign the NPT instead.¶ Saudi Arabia has virtually no domestic nuclear infrastructure, resources, or knowledge base to conduct a “crash” program. It is also an NPT state and has many U.S. military and foreign investors on its territory, making it difficult to support such a program. Its only option would be to purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. However, Islamabad is unlikely to spare any weapons, as they are needed to deter India. Additionally, selling a nuclear weapon would bring world condemnation on Pakistan and leave it a pariah state surrounded by nuclear enemies. Riyadh would risk losing the support of the United States if it were to attempt to pursue a deterrent, leaving it open to an Israeli strike. Instead, Saudi Arabia will likely rely on its preferred weapons of “cash and diplomacy,” finding the U.S. nuclear umbrella a “more attractive offer.”¶ Turkey is a NATO member with around 70 tactical nuclear weapons on its soil and is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. An indigenous nuclear program would forfeit this position. Etel Solingen (“Domestic Models of Political Survival," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory) asserts that states with integrated economies face greater costs to proliferating and are therefore less likely to do so.¶ There is too much at stake for these nations to develop nuclear weapons, as they each stand to suffer great financial and political losses and will ultimately be less secure because of it. The United States has far greater influence over these nations than it does over Iran. Washington should keep the pressure on Tehran to adhere to IAEA safeguards. However, alarmist rhetoric of a Middle East arms race is unjustified and not conducive to reaching an agreeable diplomatic settlement with Iran.

No Israel-Iran conflict---even if it happens, no impact CNN 11 12/9, “Israel remains unlikely to strike Iran,” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/09/israeli-remains-unlikely-to-strike-iran/, AJ

Increased international pressure on Iran following last month’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report has reduced the likelihood of any imminent Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program . The overall risk of an attack occurring before next year's U.S. presidential vote remains low .

However, the renewed prospect of unilateral Israeli action has raised concerns about the start of a new conflict at a time of heightened Middle East instability. The IAEA report contained the agency’s strongest warning to date of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program; it suggested that Iran is now close to 'breakout' - the point at which it acquires all the skills and parts needed to build a nuclear weapon quickly. The IAEA suggested that Iran could obtain the crucial missing component (weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium) fairly readily through further enrichment of its low-grade stockpiles. The issue of a pre-emptive strike returned to Israel’s domestic agenda ahead of the IAEA report. Defence Minister Ehud Barak hinted that Israel might need to take unilateral action; media reports suggested that he was working

with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to win cabinet backing for this. The report did little to change the Israeli government's view of the Iran threat. What the report did do was feed into Israeli debates about the timing of any action. Israeli proponents of an early attack argue that sanctions and covert action have run their course, and that the window of opportunity for an effective attack is closing.

Netanyahu and Barak have both said that given recent Iranian moves (including to insulate facilities and defend them from aerial

attack), Israel may only have months left to carry out an effective attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Opponents of this view include former defence and intelligence chiefs, who argue that containment and deterrence methods have not yet been exhausted. For this group, a strike must remain a last resort , given the likelihood that Israel would suffer heavy blowback while gaining possibly no more than a three-year setback to Iran's nuclear capabilities. Increased international pressure on Iran has reduced Israel’s sense of isolation. Before the IAEA report, it saw itself as standing alone in its estimates of Iranian progress towards a deployable nuclear weapon. Israel now sees the West acting with a greater sense of urgency. President Obama yesterday reiterated that the U.S. would work with Israel and others to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. The U.S., United Kingdom and Canada responded to the IAEA report by introducing new sanctions on Iran's central bank and oil industry. The EU added a further 39

people and 141 companies to its sanctions list, and is considering an oil embargo. The reinvigorated international campaign has reduced the likelihood of an imminent strike , strengthening the case of those inside Israel favoring delaying action for now. Despite this, Israel's leadership has continued to assert the possibility of taking unilateral action. On December 5, Netanyahu hinted that an attack was still under consideration. It remains possible, but unlikely, that he would order a strike before the U.S. presidential election, gambling on a quick and successful strike with limited consequences, as happened after the 2007 attack on a Syrian nuclear site. The more probable scenario is that he will delay a decision until after November next year. At home, Netanyahu faces possible early general elections in 2012, a social protest

movement and threats to his coalition. Thus, even if he decides against an attack, he may maintain his rhetoric about one in order to strengthen his domestic position . This could backfire: Iran is increasingly isolated and preoccupied with its own internal struggles. A strategic misstep by players in Tehran could dramatically escalate the situation, forcing Netanyahu to carry out his threat ahead of schedule. What is clear is that domestic political factors in both Israel and Iran will have a decisive influence on the timing of any Israeli strike.

2NC uniquenessThey have the fundsSBDJ 3/28 (San Diego Business Journal, “Northrop Grumman Receives $433.5M Contract,” 3/28/13, http://www.sdbj.com/news/2013/mar/28/northrop-grumman-receives-4335m-contract/)

The Defense Department recently said it awarded Northrop Grumman Corp. a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars, covering logistics support for the U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk unmanned spy aircraft. ¶ The contract is structured to be a cost plus fixed fee deal. Its estimated value is $433.5 million.¶ Northrop Grumman manages the Global Hawk program out of it Rancho Bernardo office complex, which is its unmanned systems center of excellence. While the sustainment contract will employ people locally, it will also go toward efforts at the unspecified forward bases where these aircraft operate, a Northrop Grumman spokeswoman said.¶ The deal covers two and a half years — April 2012 through September 2014 — and “ensures no break in coverage to war fighters,” said company spokeswoman Gemma Loochkartt.¶ The U.S. Air Force is currently flying 38 Global Hawks in several configurations. The Block 20, Block 30 and Block 40 models carry different sensor packages.¶ The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Robins Air Force Base, Ga., awarded the contract.

2nc Israel-IranNo incentive to go to warPoor 2/16—quoting Charles Krauthammer (Jeff, 2/16/12, http://dailycaller.com/2012/02/16/krauthammer-israeli-strike-on-iran-will-not-cause-a-world-war-video/, RBatra)

On Wednesday’s “Special Report Online” segment on FoxNews.com, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer said that if Israel decides to attack Iran in order to thwart its development of nuclear weapons, the collateral damage wouldn’t start a third world war.Krauthammer based that hypothesis on Iran not having allies that would be willing to intervene significantly on a military level. (RELATED: More analysis from Charles Krauthammer)

“It could cause a regional war,” Krauthammer said. “It will not cause a world war by any means. It’s not August 1914, because Iran has no great power allies who will intervene militarily . Iran is going to be alone with its clients, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas — all of whom are on their heels right now.”

He said it would require Iran acting out in an irrational way and luring the United States into engagement for any conflict to become more widespread.“If Iran is smart, it will not attack the United States in retaliation because that would involve us,” he said. “It would retaliate against Israel and it could remain a limited engagement. Now of

course, irrationality is possible and you cannot predict. If the Iran ians either close the Strait of Hormuz or attack Americans at the naval facility in Bahrain, that would be suicide because that would occasion American intervention, almost like Wilson in the First World War in the sinking of the Lusitania. You don’t do that if you’re rational, but who knows. The Iranians haven’t always been rational.”

Israel cannot attack IranPanArmenian 2/16 (2/16/12, “Armenian expert says Israel can’t strike Iran alone,” http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/94108/Armenian_expert_says_Israel_cant_strike_Iran_alone, RBatra)

The European Union has not officially confirmed yet the information regarding suspension of Iranian oil export to 6 countries, according to Armenian political analyst.“Iran is certain about sanctions against the Iranian oil import to harm the EU first. Iran has already started searching for new markets. For instance, oil supplies to India increased by 37%,” Roman Smbatyan told PanARMENIAN.Net

Dwelling on Israel’s stance on Iran issue and statements on possible strike on Iran, the expert noted that Iran has no potential for launch of hostilities by itself. “Israel can’t attack Iran alone, without the U.S. assistance which currently faces complex situation as to forthcoming presidential elections and international financial crisis ,” Mr. Smbatyan said.

Their authors have been wrong beforeFriedman 1/25—associate editor at Foreign Policy (Uri, 1/25/12, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/25/whats_new_in_the_latest_speculation_over_whether_israel_will_attack_iran, RBatra)

The New York Times Magazine is out today with a 7,585-word piece by Ronen Bergman on whether Israel will attack Iran. After speaking with top Israeli civilian, military, and intelligence leaders, the Israeli journalist arrives at a frightening conclusion: "Israel will indeed strike Iran in 2012."

Of course, we've heard this claim before. In August 2009 , Micah Zenko warned at the Los Angeles Times that if Iran failed to

respond to international proposals on its nuclear program by September, the "world should be prepared for an Israeli attack on

Iran's suspected nuclear weapons facilities." In September 2010, the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg noted that " one day next spring,"

Israeli officials might very well inform their U.S. counterparts that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had dispatched fighter jets to strike Iran ian nuclear

facilities. John Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has repeatedly issued timelines regarding an Israeli strike on Iran. Anshel Pfeffer predicts an attack this spring.

Their impact is empirically deniedLA Times 2/3 (2/3/12, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/02/will-israel-attack-iran-its-been-asked-before.html, RBatra)

Will Israel attack Iran? The question is everywhere since Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman concluded in the New York Times Magazine: "After speaking with many senior Israeli leaders and chiefs of the military and the intelligence, I have come to believe that Israel will indeed strike Iran in 2012."It's a very serious question, and not just for Israel and Iran. "Rarely if ever have the stakes been higher," Harvard fellow Chuck Freilich recently opined for the Los Angeles Times:... on the one hand, a threat to Israel's very existence, and the Jewish people have already undergone one Holocaust in recent history. Israel was established so that the Jewish people would never again face the threat of extermination. Never again.Conversely, the consequences of acting are also potentially dire, even assuming a successful attack. Iran already has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb, and an attack could set the program back by no more than a few years — of value in itself but not a solution.

But it's worth remembering that the same question has been all over the media before . At Foreign Policy

magazine, Blake Hounshell dubs it "Washington's favorite parlor game." Just look at headlines, including both news articles and opinion pieces from newspapers and news websites:

November 2011: Chicago Tribune, Will Israel bomb Iran?

November 2010: The Atlantic, Will Israel Attack Iran by Christmas?

August 2010: The Week, Will Israel attack Iran in the next three days?

April 2010: Middle East Post, Will Israel attack Iran?

August 2009: Talking Points Memo, Will Israel Attack Iran This Year?, Los Angeles Times, Expect Israel to hit Iran without warning

April 2009: Salon.com, Will Israel attack Iran?

July 2008: The Atlantic, Will Israel Attack Iran?, ABC News, Will Israel Attack Iran?

May 2008: The Daily Star (Lebanon), As things look, Israel may well attack Iran soon

February 2008: Haaretz, Pentagon: Israel increasingly likely to attack Iran

December 2007: The Daily Beast, What Will Israel Do? (The writer says that a unilateral military strike against Iran has grown more likely.)

March 2005: Philippine Daily Inquirer, Israel has plans to attack Iran, says London Times

August 2004: The New York Times, Sharon on the warpath: Is Israel planning to attack Iran?

2nc Middle East ProlifDomino proliferation could never occur in the Middle East – Technological constraintsJohan Bergenas Research Associate at Henry L. Stimson Center 10Council Of Foreign Affairs, “The Nuclear Domino Myth” 9/31/2010 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-bergenas/the-nuclear-domino-myth?page=show [ ]

Such mistaken beliefs are due in part to the West's poor understanding of Iran . After more than 30 years of severed diplomatic, cultural, and educational relations with the country, the West knows little about Iran's leadership, national aspirations, and

culture. Because of this , policymakers have a difficult time thinking about the implications of a nuclear Iran and resort to simplistic grandstanding, reprising outdated political fears that lack historical nuance or modern perspective. The exaggerated fears have been useful, too: had the United States not presented Iran's nuclear aspirations in the darkest of lights, it may not have

been able to gain support for four rounds of UN sanctions against the Islamic Republic in the last few years. Another reason for the persistence of worst-case thinking is that the domino analogy is often discussed interchangeably with bilateral arms races, such as those between the United States and the former Soviet Union, and between India and Pakistan.

These are two distinct concepts, however. The Cold War and South Asian cases represent dyadic arms buildups -- a scenario that cannot be ruled out in the Middle East. Even though this hypothetical should be of great concern , it is far from the nightmare nuclear domino effect , which by definition requires many more countries to speedily develop nuclear weapons . In the Middle East, this type of rapid development is just not technologically feasible.

Few middle eastern countries have to ability to acquire nuclear weaponsGraham Allison Director at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Faculty Chair

at Dubai Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School 10 Foreign Affairs 89 no. 1, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats," Jan/Feb 2010 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19819/nuclear_disorder.html [ ]

In the Middle East, it is important to separate abstract aspirations from realistic plans. Few countries in the region have the scientific and technical infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is a plausible buyer, although the United States would certainly make a vigorous effort to persuade it that it would be more secure under a U. S. nuclear umbrella than under its own. Egypt's determination to acquire nuclear

weapons, meanwhile, is limited by its weak scientific and technical infrastructure, unless it were able to rent foreign expertise. And a Turkish nuclear bomb would not only jeopardize Turkey's role in NATO but also undercut whatever chances the country has for acceding to the EU.

Drones

1ncTurn – U.S. drone development incites international drone use Savage ’10 [Charlie, columnist for the New York Times, New York Times, “U.N. Report Highly Critical of American Drone Attacks, Warning of Use by Others”, June 6th, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/world/ 03drones.html, Academic Search Premier]

A senior United Nations official said on Wednesday that the growing use of armed drones by the United States to kill terrorism suspects was undermining global constraints on the use of military force. He warned that the American example would lead to a chaotic world as the new weapons technology inevitably spread. In a 29-page report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, the official, Philip Alston, the United Nations special representative on extrajudicial executions, called on the United States to exercise greater restraint in its use of drones in places like Pakistan and Yemen, outside the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq. The report -- the most extensive effort by the United Nations to grapple with the legal implications of armed drones -- also proposed a summit meeting of ''key military powers'' to clarify legal limits on such killings. In an interview, Mr. Alston said the United States appeared to think that it was ''facing a unique threat from transnational terrorist networks'' that justified its effort to put forward legal justifications that would make the rules ''as flexible as possible.'' But that example, he said, could quickly lead to a situation in which dozens of countries carry out ''competing drone attacks'' outside their borders against people ''labeled as terrorists by one group or another.'' ''I'm particularly concerned that the United States seems oblivious to this fact when it asserts an ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe,'' Mr. Alston said in an accompanying statement. ''But this strongly asserted but ill-defined license to kill without accountability is not an entitlement which the United States or other states can have without doing grave damage to the rules designed to protect the right to life and prevent extrajudicial executions.''

New drone deployments in Niger solve the advantageSchmitt and Sayare 2/22 (Eric and Scott, New York Times reporters, “New Drone Base in Niger Builds U.S. Presence in Africa,” 2/22/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)

Opening a new front in the drone wars against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, President Obama announced on Friday that about 100 American troops had been sent to Niger in West Africa to help set up a new base from which unarmed Predator aircraft would conduct surveillance in the region. ¶

The new drone base, located for now in the capital, Niamey, is an indication of the priority Africa has become in American antiterrorism efforts. The United States military has a limited presence in Africa, with only one permanent base, in Djibouti, more than 3,000 miles from Mali, where insurgents had taken over half the country until repelled by a French-led force.¶ In a letter to Congress, Mr. Obama said about 40 United States military service members arrived in Niger on Wednesday, bringing the total number of those deployed in the country to about 100 people. A military official said the troops were largely Air Force logistics specialists, intelligence analysts and security officers. ¶ Mr. Obama said the troops, who are armed for self-protection, would support the French-led operation that last month drove the Qaeda and affiliated fighters out of a desert refuge the size of Texas in neighboring Mali.¶ Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, signed a status-of-forces agreement last month with the United States that has cleared the way for greater American military involvement in the country and has provided legal protection to American troops there.¶ In an interview last month in Niamey, President Mahamadou Issoufou voiced concern about the spillover of violence and refugees from Mali, as well as growing

threats from Boko Haram, an Islamist extremist group to the south, in neighboring Nigeria.¶

French and African troops have retaken Mali’s northern cities, including Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, but about 2,000 militants have melted back into desert and mountain hideaways and have begun a small campaign of harassment and terror, dispatching suicide bombers, attacking guard posts, infiltrating liberated cities or ordering attacks by militants hidden among civilians.¶ “Africa Command has positioned unarmed remotely piloted aircraft in Niger to support a range of regional security missions and engagements with partner nations,” Benjamin Benson, a command spokesman in Stuttgart, Germany, said in an e-mail message on Friday.¶ Mr. Benson did not say how many aircraft or troops would ultimately be deployed, but other American officials have said the base could eventually have as many as 300 United States military service members and contractors. ¶ For now, American officials said, Predator drones will be unarmed and will fly only on surveillance missions, although they have not ruled out conducting missile strikes at some point if the threat worsens.

New security measure prevent smugglingISS 12 (Institute for Security Studies, “Progress Towards Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources, Compiled by Amelia Broodryk and Noel Stott,” 12/1/12, http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=31486%2621)Although the need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and associated technologies has been on the international agenda for many years, it has taken on heightened significance in recent times.1 This is as a result of the uncovering of an international nuclear smuggling ring – the A.Q. Kahn network2 – in 2004, implicating a number of citizens of various countries in spreading sensitive nuclear technologies without authorisation; and, post-9/11 evidence suggesting that al Qaeda-linked groups may have an interest in acquiring or developing a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and in particular a nuclear or radiological explosive/dispersal device.¶ Radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or ‘dirty bombs’ combine a conventional explosive device, such as TNT, with radioactive material. Compared with a nuclear explosive device (any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy) RDDs generally require limited technical knowledge to develop and the radiological isotopes can be obtained from a wide variety of sources, including nuclear weapon arsenals, nuclear research reactors, nuclear power plants and orphan sources – discarded and abandoned redundant industrial products and waste from medical facilities – as well as uranium mines and other mines that produce uranium as a by-product.¶ In response to the growing demand for a nuclear-weapon-free world, in April 2009, US President Barack Obama presented an ambitious three-part strategy to address international nuclear threats and in particular the increase in the risk of nuclear material diversion and illicit trafficking by: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear weapon arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and, 3) preventing ‘terrorists’ from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials. ¶

Despite the differences between these types of sources, clearly small and insignificant (from their potential to be used maliciously) sources greatly outnumber larger and more hazardous sources, while fissile material (in the form either of nuclear weapons or of materials related to nuclear power) is under tighter control at a much smaller number of sites than radiological sources.¶

Researching the African nuclear security environment¶ This publication is the result of research on the current status of nuclear security in Africa undertaken by the ‘Africa’s Development and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction Project’ (WMD Project) at the Institute for Security

Studies (ISS), with support from the British High Commission in South Africa. The United Kingdom’s interest lies in its belief that an armed attack using nuclear devices represents one of the most destructive risks to global security. The UK was influential in shaping the outcomes of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, which aimed to generate agreement on a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material and to prevent nuclear smuggling and is playing its part by setting the highest domestic security standards and encouraging the adoption of comparable standards elsewhere, including through its support of the IAEA.¶ The ISS is an independent African human security research institution working towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. The ISS has a staff of 130 people in five offices; two in South Africa, Pretoria and Cape Town and in Nairobi, Kenya, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Dakar, Senegal. As such, the ISS is well placed to undertake research outlining the African nuclear security environment and identifying the current threats, as well to determine the status of implementation of nuclear security regimes in Africa. In addition, as a non-governmental organisation, the ISS is in an ideal position to provide a ‘safe’ platform for operators and regulators to share lessons and experiences in strengthening nuclear security in Africa and to explore the feasibility of co-ordinating their actions to secure vulnerable materials from unauthorised persons or organisations.

Turn – status quo efforts are shifting away from inefficient drone use, reapplication harms our military readinessFreedberg 2/20 (Sydney, deputy editor for AOL Defense, “Navy Cyber Chief: Budget Crunch Will Drive Innovation, Force Jointness,” 2/20/13, http://defense.aol.com/2013/02/20/navy-cyber-budget-innovation-sequester-cr/)

Since 9/11, the armed services have made great strides in applying information technology to warfare -- but their implementation to date has relied on costly, manpower-intensive "brute force," said the Navy's director for "information dominance," Rear Adm. William Leigher. As budgets tighten, he said, the services will have no choice but to operate more efficiently and, above all, more cooperatively with one another. ¶ "This is going to force us to take a different approach with jointness," Leigher told the audience at an Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) luncheon yesterday. Under the growing fiscal pressure, he said, consolidation of separate networks to a single "joint information environment [JIE] becomes more possible in this downturn ... than it might have been." ¶ It's hard to think about the future, though, when you don't know how much money you'll have next month. With the automatic cuts known as sequestration set to start March 1st, and the Continuing Resolution funding the government expiring March 27th, all the services are frantically cutting back on costs. That includes conferences and speaking engagements requiring travel: "For those of you who expected a panel, I'm your panel," said Leigher, the sole speaker left on the day's agenda.¶ The real near-term damage is to military readiness, with the Navy cancelling ship maintenance and even deployments overseas -- most dramatically of the aircraft carrier USS Truman. But modernization programs will feel the pain as well, said Leigher: While major procurements are often funded years in advance, smaller improvements are routinely installed during maintenance "availabilities" now being cancelled.¶ For example, eight warships won't be upgraded as scheduled with a new shipboard network called CANES (Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services). That's a single system meant to replace the no less than five separate

networks, each serving a different purpose, currently installed on the typical warship.¶ Five networks on one ship is just a simple example of the inefficient kludges characteristic of today's military information technology. Information pouring back from high-tech drones, for example, hits a low-tech chokepoint at analysis centers doing the "processing, exploitation, and dissemination" (PED), Leigher said, where the chief method of sifting through that data is entire rooms full of "22-year-old sailors" sitting and staring at screens for hours, watching for the one moment of life-or-death significance in hours of data.

Their Murphy evidence does not say that US naval power is key, it just says that checkpoints are vulnerable but doesn’t offer a reason the other countries that trade at those checkpoints don’t prevent oil shocks

Iran is an alt causeLuft 12 (Gal, Foreign Policy author, “Choke Point,” 7/19/12, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/19/choke_points)Fast forward 100 years and free passage through another strategic strait, the Strait of Hormuz, is endangered. This time it is the disruption of the oil supply, not grain, that has great powers vexed, and it is Iran that's doing the threatening. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and its Sunni neighbors -- with China's help -- are assuming Russia's role in altering the world's geopolitics.¶ Today, Iran's economy is in shambles. Its oil exports have plummeted by nearly 50 percent since last year because of U.S. and European sanctions, while its annual inflation rate has surpassed 30 percent and its currency has declined by 50 percent against the dollar. And the more desperate the Iranians become, the more aggressively they threaten to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's seaborne oil passes each day.¶ In late June, the commander of the Iranian army's ground forces, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Pourdastan said that "if conditions arise in which the Iranian nation feels threatened, it will use all [its] means of pressure, including in the Strait of Hormuz" -- a sentiment that his superior, Maj. Gen. Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi, echoed a few days later. Iranian naval officials have confirmed that they have already installed sea-to-sea missiles on small, speedy patrol vessels with advanced maneuvering capabilities. Later this month, Iran's parliament is scheduled to vote on a bill to block passage through the Strait to oil tankers linked to countries applying new European Union (EU) sanctions -- a measure that would apply to 27 EU counties and the United States and violate the Law of the Sea Treaty, which permits passage through the Strait in both directions even though part of the navigation route falls within Iran's territorial waters.

Nuclear weapons would run counter to the goals of most terrorist organizations.Kapur, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2008 (S. Paul. The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21 st Century Asia. pg. 32)Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter

2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be - have rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could

nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons

could be too de structive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy

the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counterproductive for the terrorists in this scenario.

Changes in demand and production make oil price swings and financial burdens inevitablePaul Roberts, energy expert and writer for Harpers,2004, The End of Oil, pg. 99

For as the international oil companies had learned long before, oil is inherently volatile. Production is continually running ahead of demand or behind it, causing the market to shuttle back and forth between shortage and glut and creating huge swings in price. This volatility leads to addi tional costs: either for consumers , who must pay more for oil in a tight market, or for producers, who earn less for their oil in a glutted market. These costs are known as the burden of adjustment, and much of the recent history of oil has been characterized by a ceaseless battle between producers and consumers, each group trying to avoid the burden of adjustment by pushing it onto the other.

Uncertainty cannot be avoided in the oil and gas marketsManouchehr Takin, Senior Petroleum Upstream Analyst, Centre for Global Energy Studies, October 2002, Mining Annual Review

In recent years, OPEC has been driven into more short-term measures. It has also tried to play a more pro-active role. The ministers meet more frequently. They continue to examine the market, consult each other on the phone or hold bilateral or regional meetings and negotiate with non-OPEC producers. These occur several times between their official OPEC meetings. They try to foresee the trends and initiate policies aimed at stabilising the oil market. However, OPEC has also been criticised on the details of its policy, eg, doing too little too late to avoid price hikes or a price collapse. It should be remembered that many factors influence the market especially over the short term and they cannot be easily compensated by producers' policies. Speculations, changing market perceptions and global geopolitics all play a role in the international oil market. Uncertainty cannot be avoided and OPEC obviously prefers the upside to the downside risk.

2nc Africa DronesThere are also other bases throughout the countryWhitlock 3/21 (Craig, National Security Expert for the Washington Post, “Drone base in Niger gives U.S. a strategic foothold in West Africa,” 3/21/13, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-21/world/37905284_1_drone-bases-unarmed-predator-drones-surveillance-drones)

The newest outpost in the U.S. government’s empire of drone bases sits behind a razor-wire-topped wall outside this West African capital, blasted by 110-degree heat and the occasional sandstorm blowing from the Sahara.¶ The U.S. Air Force began flying a handful of unarmed Predator drones from here last month. The gray, mosquito-shaped aircraft emerge sporadically from a borrowed hangar and soar north in search of al-Qaeda fighters and guerrillas from other groups hiding in the region’s untamed deserts and hills.¶ The harsh terrain of North and West Africa is rapidly emerging as yet another front in the United States’ long-running war against terrorist networks, a conflict that has fueled a revolution in drone warfare.¶ Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has relied heavily on drones for operations, both declared and covert, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya and Somalia. U.S. drones also fly from allied bases in Turkey, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Philippines.¶ Now, they are becoming a fixture in Africa. The U.S. military has built a major drone hub in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, and flies unarmed Reaper drones from Ethiopia. Until recently, it conducted reconnaissance flights over East Africa from the island nation of the Seychelles.¶ The Predator drones in Niger, a landlocked and dirt-poor country, give the Pentagon a strategic foothold in West Africa. Niger shares a long border with Mali, where an al-Qaeda affiliate and other Islamist groups have taken root. Niger also borders Libya and Nigeria, which are also struggling to contain armed extremist movements.¶ Like other U.S. drone bases, the Predator operations in Niger are shrouded in secrecy. The White House announced Feb. 22 that Obama had deployed about 100 military personnel to Niger on an “intelligence collection” mission, but it did not make any explicit reference to drones.¶ Since then, the Defense Department has publicly acknowledged the presence of drones here but has revealed little else. The Africa Command, which oversees U.S. military missions on the continent, denied requests from a Washington Post reporter to interview American troops in Niger or to tour the military airfield where the drones are based, near Niamey’s international airport.¶ Government officials in Niger, a former French colony, were slightly more forthcoming. President Issoufou Mahamadou said his government invited Washington to send surveillance drones because he was worried that the country might not be able to defend its borders from Islamist fighters based in Mali, Libya or Nigeria.¶ “We welcome the drones,” Mahamadou said in an interview at the presidential palace in Niamey. Citing the “feeble capability” of many West African militaries, he said Niger — which is three times the size of California — and its neighbors desperately needed foreign help to track the movements of guerrillas across the Sahara and Sahel, an arid territorial belt that covers much of the region.¶

“Our countries are like the blind leading the blind,” he said. “We rely on countries like France and the United States. We need cooperation to ensure our security.”¶ Surveillance operations¶ The Predator drones in Niger are unarmed, U.S. officials said, though they have not ruled out equipping the aircraft with Hellfire missiles in the future. For now, the drones are conducting

surveillance over Mali and Niger.¶ U.S. officials said they share video footage and other intelligence collected by the unmanned aircraft with French forces and African troops — including 670 soldiers from Niger — who are fighting the Islamist insurgency in Mali. Liaison officers from Niger, France and Chad work alongside U.S. Air Force personnel who launch and land the drones from the base in Niamey.¶ Most of the surveillance missions are designed to track broad patterns of human activity and are not aimed at hunting individuals, said a senior U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss military operations. Although French and African troops are engaged in combat in Mali, the Obama administration has not given the U.S. military the same authorization.¶ “The whole issue is lethality,” the senior official said. “We don’t want to abet a lethal action.”¶ But the rules of engagement are blurry. Intelligence gathered by the Predators could indirectly help the French fix targets for airstrikes or prompt Nigerien security forces to take action on their territory.¶ Moreover, U.S. officials have acknowledged that they could use lethal force under certain circumstances. Last month, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress that the U.S. military had designated “a handful of high-value individuals” in North Africa for their suspected connections to al-Qaeda, making them potential targets for capture or killing.¶ Mission’s duration unclear¶ The Pentagon declined to say exactly how many Predator aircraft it has sent to Niger or how long it intends to keep them there. But there are signs that the U.S. military wants to establish a long-term presence in West Africa. ¶ After years of negotiations, the Obama administration signed an agreement with Niger in January that provides judicial protection and other safeguards for U.S. troops in the country.¶ Two U.S. defense officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal planning, said the Pentagon ultimately wants to move the Predators to the Saharan city of Agadez, in northern Niger. ¶ Agadez is closer to parts of southern Algeria and southern Libya where fighters and arms traffickers allied with al-Qaeda have taken refuge. The airfield in Agadez, however, is rudimentary and needs improvements before it can host drones, officials said.

2nc SmugglingUS and Algeria are cooperating on the issueDepartment of State 13 (US Department of State, “United States and Algeria Consult to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling and Strengthen Strategic Trade Controls,” 2/12/13, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/204505.htm)

Officials from the United States and Algeria met in Algiers February 10-11, 2013, to discuss ways to strengthen cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, and border security. These discussions furthered a first round of bilateral consultations initiated in January 2012 to explore ways and means to advance capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radiological material smuggling incidents, consistent with the Work Plan adopted by members of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C.¶ At the two-day meeting, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Programs Simon Limage and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Political Affairs and International Security Taous Feroukhi reaffirmed their readiness to cooperate more closely to prevent terrorists and other criminals from acquiring black market nuclear material. Recognizing the importance of a coordinated whole-of-government response to nuclear smuggling, meeting participants included representatives from several ministries within the Government of Algeria, and representatives from the U.S. Government interagency.¶ During the meeting in Algiers, both sides exchanged views and shared information on current smuggling threats and trends, and discussed best practices in the areas of border security, and nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, law enforcement, and other tools to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling.¶ Officials from the United States presented an overview of best practices in border security, and strategic trade controls through cooperation with the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program aimed at joining efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and illicit transfers of conventional weapons including MANPADS and related criminal activities by strengthening national control systems over the export, import, transit, and transshipment of strategic items.¶

These discussions pave the way for future cooperation between the United States and Algeria to strengthen national, international and regional capabilities to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

International cooperation solvesVOA 12 (Voice of America, “Countering Nuclear Terrorism,” 10/10/12, http://editorials.voa.gov/content/countering-nuclear-terrorism-atomic-dirty-bomb/1524225.html)The United States is taking several steps to thwart the nuclear ambitions of terrorists. First among them is to develop national Counter Nuclear Smuggling teams. Through efforts like the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program, the U.S. is helping to build and strengthen national government investigative capacities that have proven most effective in removing nuclear and radioactive material from the black market. ¶ The United States wants to continue its work with other governments and international organizations to strengthen nuclear security and the Financial Action Task Force to create a basic framework for international cooperation to shut down illicit financing networks that support nuclear smuggling or other proliferation activity.¶ A third goal is to work with partner countries to secure international land borders, seaports and airports, and

enhance global capacity to detect and respond to smuggling activities. This includes initiatives such as the Export Control and Related Border Security program, the Second Line of Defense and the Megaports Initiative.¶ “Securing materials, countering smuggling and protecting borders,” said Deputy Secretary Burns, “these are challenges that no country can solve on its own, but also challenges that will not be solved without leadership. They remind me of the words of American founding father Benjamin Franklin, who said ‘we must all hang together, or assuredly we will all hang separately.’ The only path to nuclear security is through intensive cooperation, determined efforts, more widespread capacity, a shared sense of ownership and a shared sense of urgency.”¶ The United States stands ready to work with all nations to translate shared concern into shared responsibility for each country and increased security for all people.

2nc IranNaval Power can only aggravate the scenarioBusiness Insider 13 (Business Insider, “Iran Says War Is The Only Thing That Can Stop Them Now,” 1/24/13, http://www.businessinsider.com/iran-threatens-to-close-strait-of-hormuz-in-response-to-foreign-agression-2013-1)The United States has nothing left to pressure Tehran over its nuclear programme except for war, and if it chooses conflict Iran could close a key energy chokepoint, its envoy to Baghdad told AFP on Thursday.¶ Ambassador Hassan Danaie-Far insisted in an interview that Tehran retained the right to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of the world's traded oil passes, in response to any aggression, military or otherwise. ¶ "What else (US President Barack) Mr. Obama can do?" Danaie-Far said through an Iranian embassy translator.¶ "The only remaining card on the table is war. Is it to their benefit? Is it to the benefit of the world? Is it to the benefit of the region?"¶ The diplomat said that if it faced a "problem," Tehran would be within its rights "to react and to defend itself." ¶ Asked if it could try to close off the strait, Danaie-Far replied: "If there is some movement and action from our enemies, including US, against us, as a part of natural reaction, that may happen."¶ "Everybody would be a loser in that case," he added.¶ On whether only military or other types of pressure could spur Iran to make such a move, he said: "It can include all of them."

Solvency

1ncAlt causes the aff can’t solveDymet ‘11(Michael J., General Partner – NextGen Equipage Fund, “Transitioning to Satellite-Based Air Traffic Control”, Geospatial Today, 9-15, Lexis)The US airline position on NextGen Airline scepticism of the FAA's ability to deploy, as well as implement, NextGen infrastructure remains high. Al-though FAA procurement reforms have produced significant improvements by using more solid contracting practices that better balance risks, airlines remain concerned about the long lead times between required capital investment, and net benefit realisation. While US airlines seek ATC modernisation and are generally supportive of the NextGen program, vexing challenges remain: * NextGen architecture requires an extensive investment in aircraft equipage, from antennas to black box avionics, displays, and ongoing software upgrades. It is widely accepted, for example, that the cost savings afforded by ADS-B "Out" reside primarily with the FAA and its ability to phase out expensive secondary radar systems, while airlines bear most of the cost. This comes when US airlines can little afford to make such nonproductive investments. * Major NextGen benefits can be delivered only when more than half of the air transport fleets are equipped and running the new systems. For example,

enroute airspace congestion today causes delays from ATC workload saturation and radar-based separation standards.

Capacity is limited by controllers' ability to handle multiple aircraft in a given congested enroute sector with delays from excessive miles-in- trail spacing, inefficient vectoring, and airborne holding. A substantial benefit of DataComm for airlines is the reduction in operating costs associated with reducing these delays. Regression analysis shows a 90 per cent correlation between capacity

expansion and equipage level. * Aircraft equipage issues aside, FAA controllers will need ATC display changes, new procedures, and training in order to cut over to NextGen operations, to realise the benefits. But details remain in the cut-over to NextGen, and will require close cooperation between FAA and airlines. * Global interoperability with these new systems and

architectures will be essential, and while many working groups are seeking solutions to harmonisation challenges, questions remain about the end-state architectures, requirements and investment costs for both airlines and ATC service providers. NextGen equipage costs While FAA infrastructure cost estimates have produced stable figures, not much is agreed upon with respect to exact aircraft equipage costs. Consequently, NextGen Equipage Fund conducted a detailed domestic turbine fleet forecast from 2009 through 2020 to provide estimated aircraft population and demographics as the foundation for the Fund's performance and capacity. Accurate depiction of the equipage environment requires categorisation of the existing domestic fleet since there are various configurations of avionics within the aircraft fleet currently in service. The NextGen Fund developed a list of categories with the assistance of industry experts. These categories ("Families") are based on aircraft production year and the ARINC engineering standards in operation. Target equipage segments in the turbine aircraft category and associated unit costs range in estimated cost from about $100,000 to as much as $1 million per aircraft. These estimates are subject to continued equipage cost updates from the analysts at NEXA in surveys of the supply chain vendors hoping to sell into the market in coming years. Assuming that fully NextGen-equipped aircraft from OEMs are not expected to be available until about 2017, it is expected that nearly all deliveries over the next few years will still require some form of retrofit, update, or up-grade. The forecast used these Families to construct an equipage cost outlook with each existing avionics configuration and the new equipment required to achieve NextGen DataComm, ADS-B, and Air-SWIM capability, including varying com-binations of required equipment. The NextGen Fund prepared this information to project the cost of equipage for eligible retrofit aircraft within the domestic US fleet. The results from this fleet and cost forecasting process show that the NextGen Fund is expected to equip up to 75 per cent of the commercial air transport retrofit fleet. To address this total cost, the Fund antic-ipates a mix of investment proceeds from the debt and equity raise and future cash flows generated from NextGen Fund operations. Equipage risk sharing partnership A plan to share the capital investment risks among key stakeholders is the best way to ensure NextGen equipage targets are met. Figure 5 summarises costs and benefits of participation and risk-sharing by the major stakeholder groups. Discussions with airlines and FAA have pointed to the need for the parties to enter into agreements to memorialise these shared risks. It is anticipated that a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") would commit the three parties to certain obligations and to incur costs as certain capabilities come online, and by extension can begin to produce benefits such as reduced delays, lower fuel costs, greater aircraft utilization, and related incremental new revenues. Conclusion Without a large and well-funded equipage financing solution capable of addressing key stakeholder risks, there will be no NextGen system for the United States. The NextGen Fund intends to remove barriers to equipage that could impede or threaten the long-term success of NextGen program, and to otherwise accelerate airline equipage through a carefully designed financial incentive pack-age , and a business infrastructure to administer equipment purchases and inventories. With the ground-based NextGen infrastructure build-out proceeding, stakeholders now recognise that properly equipping the nation's aircraft fleet stands on the critical path to realising the benefits of a fully functioning NextGen system.

Sequester means the aff can’t solveTrautvetter 12 (Chad, Editor of Aviation International News, “Natca: Sequestration Would Cripple ATC, NextGen,” 12/13/12, http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainalerts/2012-12-13/natca-sequestration-would-cripple-atc-nextgen)The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (Natca) has released a report outlining the effects sequestration will have on the aviation industry, as well as the U.S. economy, if Congress does not act to avert the across-the-board cuts scheduled to

take effect January 1. “As the front-line safety professionals in the aviation community, it is our role to warn the rest of the country that these cuts will be detrimental to our National Airspace System and the economy,” said Natca president Paul Rinaldi. “We

urge Congress to act to prevent the sequester before it’s too late.”¶ According to its report, all users of and operators in the NAS–

including airline passengers, general/business aviation pilots, airlines, businesses and the military–will be affected by the cuts “in the form of a reduction in airport and air traffic control services, a diminishing of the NAS’s flight capacity,

increased delays and costs to airlines and lags in air traffic modernization.Ӧ Natca further warns that cutting the FAA operations budget by the mandated 8.2 percent could result in furloughing between 2,000 and 2,200 air traffic controllers, about 12

percent of the workforce. The sequester cuts would also put at risk several NextGen modernization projects, including en route automation modernization (Eram) and metroplex airspace optimization, among others.

Hackers will be able to spoof Next Gen system and cause mayhem, emboldens cyberterrorists and turns solvencyGreenberg ‘12(, Andy. "Next-Gen Air Traffic Control Vulnerable To Hackers Spoofing Planes Out Of Thin Air." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 25 July 2012. Web. 18 Jan. 2013. <http://www.forbes.co...ut-of-thin-air/>.)A hacker attack that leads to planes dropping from the sky is the stuff of every cyberwar doomsday prophesy. But some security researchers imagine a less sensational, if equally troubling possibility: Hundreds or thousands of   aircraft radioing their approach to an   air traffic control  tower, and no way to sort through which are real and which are ghost plane signals crafted by a malicious hacker . At the Black Hat and Defcon security conference this week in Las Vegas, two security researchers plan to give separate talks on the same troubling issue: By 2020, a new system known as Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B will be required as the primary mode of aircraft tracking and control for commercial aircraft in the U.S.–earlier in other countries such as Australia. And both researchers say that ADS-B lacks both the encryption necessary to keep those communications private and the authentication necessary to prevent spoofed communications from mixing with real ones, potentially allowing hackers to fabricate messages and even entire   aircraft with radio tools that are cheaperand more accessible than ever before. “Anyone can technically transmit these messages,” says Andrei Costin, a Ph.D. candidate at the French security institute Eurecom who plans to give a talk called “Ghosts In The Air (Traffic)” at Black Hat. “It’s practically possible for a medium-technical savvy person to mount an attack and impersonate a plane that’s not there.” ADS-B promises to make air traffic control easier, cheaper and in many ways safer by allowing planes to transmit their locations by radio frequency instead of depending on towers to use radar to track and coordinate them. But without encryption or authentication, ADS-B both exposes flyers to more potential tracking and fails to provide a trusted authority for planes’ location to the same degree as radar, says Costin. Anyone with a radio tuned to the system’s 1090 megaherz frequency can listen in and track planes. That’s a notion that may disturb some privacy-conscious flyers, but it’s hardly a new phenomenon—sites and apps like FlightAware and PlaneTracker already make that data available from the FAA’s databases. More troubling is the ability to fabricate fake signals that are indistinguishable from real ones. Using a software-defined radio, a PC-based receiver and transmitter that’s far more versatile than the average consumer radio, anyone from a prankster to a determined attacker could create a message alerting a tower or a plane to an oncoming jet that doesn’t exist. “This is the most important problem,”  says Costin. “You can put out a method that looks valid in the ether, and they can’t verify whether it’s real or malicious.” Pilots and air traffic controllers wouldn’t be entirely helpless against that kind of spoofing attack; They could still check the purported messages against radar signals and against their database of flight plans. Butthe trick could be scaled up to hundreds or thousands of fake signals, much like a denial-of-service attack that uses thousands of computers to choke a website with a flood of fraudulent requests for information, Costin says. “Imagine 100,000 fake airplanes targeted at a specific air control tower, and it has to manually check them. It’s almost impossible to do,” says Costin. In some cases, the spoofed signals could trigger a so-called ”short term conflict alert” that forces air traffic controllers to attempt space out the non-existent planes at regulated intervals,  causing mayhem in the   control  room and  potentially in the sky. I reached out to the FAA for comment, and a spokesperson responded in a statement that “The FAA has a thorough process in place to identify and mitigate possible risks to ADS-B, such as intentional jamming, ” and “ conducts ongoing assessments of ADS-B signal vulnerabilities. The contract for the ADS-B ground station network requires continual independent validation of the accuracy and reliability of ADS-B and aircraft avionics signals. An FAA ADS-B security action plan identified and mitigated risks and monitors the progress of corrective action. These risks are security sensitive and are not publicly available.”Perhaps the most comforting part of the FAA’s response was its assurance of  ”redundancies to ensure safe operations.” The agency says it plans to maintain half its current network of radar systems “as a backup to ADS-B in the unlikely event it is needed.” While it’s unlikely the spoofing attack could cause a collision–as the FAA says, the planes could be checked against radar or visual cues–it it might cause momentary panic for pilots or   air traffic controllers and even scare them into rash, unpredictable actions, says Dustin Hoffman, a pilot and security who plans to give a talk on air traffic control privacy at the hacker conference Defcon following Black Hat. “If a pilot sees a plane suddenly coming at him from half a mile away, he might yank the hell out of the yoke before looking out the window. Or he could cause the plane to dive erratically and without warning,” says Hoffman. “It’s illegal. But how would you track down the transmtter? The possibility for chaos is substantial.

Great power escalation. Fritz, 2009 [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf]This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations,

and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state t o attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear powe r . This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance , and a relatively low cost . Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders , and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations,

point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals . All

computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry point s . For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This

virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable,

perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further

enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered . Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russi a . Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible . Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly . Terrorists could also

knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response . These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-

mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own , without the need for compromising command and control centres directly .

2nc Cyber DAGPS interference allows cyberattacksPNT Advisory Board, 10National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board, Jamming the Global Positioning System A National Security Threat: Recent Events and Potential Cures November 4, 2010, http://www.pnt.gov/advisory/

The United States is now critically dependent on GPS. For example, cell phone towers, power grid synchronization,

new aircraft landing systems, and the future FAA Air Traffic Control System (NEXGEN) cannot function without it. Yet we find increasing incidents of deliberate or inadvertent interference that render GPS inoperable for critical infrastructure operations . Most alarming, the very recent web availability of small

GPS-Jammers suggests the problem will get worse. These so-called personal protection devices (PPDs) as well as

other, readily available, more powerful devices can deliberately jam the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal over tens of square miles. They also can be devastating to the other, new foreign satellite navigation systems being deployed worldwide. PPDs are illegal to operate, but many versions are available (for as little as $30) from foreign manufacturers over the Internet. The simplest models plug in to a cigarette lighter and prevent all GPS reception within a line of sight range of 5 to 10 miles. Current penalty for operation is simply that the

device is confiscated. We currently lack sufficient capabilities to locate and mitigate GPS jamming. It literally

took months to locate such a device that was interfering with a new GPS based landing system being installed at Newark Airport, NJ. This paper provides background on satellite navigation and describes the impact of these dangerous PPDs and other disruptive radio frequency

interference (Jamming). It also suggests needed action and discusses technical measures needed to harden GPS receivers against PPDs. The PNT Advisory Board believes that countermeasures and actions must be urgently developed. We strongly believe that the Executive Branch should formally declare GPS a “Critical Infrastructure. But that is clearly only the

first action and is by no means sufficient. A multiple agency approach must be urgently developed and executed We must quickly develop and field systems that will rapidly locate, mitigate and shutdown the interference. In addition, laws are needed with the power to arrest and prosecute deliberate offenders. [This would be similar to legal action in response to the recent spate of laser attacks on pilots in flight]. Finally, we discuss the need for alternate navigation systems such as eLoran or a backup system currently being configured by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While the foreign GPSequivalent systems may offer some help against accidental interference, web sites are already offering devices that will effectively shut down all satellite-based radio navigation signals. Note that

all of these actions and jamming countermeasures tend to deter those who would deliberately

interfere with the signals .

Extremely vulnerableLewis 02 Ph.D., Senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program CSIS. Before joining CSIS, he worked at the Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. Lewis’s recent work has focused on cybersecurity (James, December 2002, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats:” Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf)//DR. H

Interference with national air traffic systems to disrupt flights, shut down air transport and endanger passenger and crews is another frequently cited cyber-threat. 10 We are not yet at a stage where computer networks operate aircraft remotely, so it is not possible for a cyber-attacker to take over an aircraft. Aircraft still carry pilots who are

trained to operate the plane in an emergency. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Authority does not depend solely on computer networks to manage air traffic, nor are its communications dependent on the Internet. The high level of human involvement in the control and decision making process for air traffic reduces the risk of any cyber attack. In a normal month storms, electrical failures and programming glitches all ensure a consistently high level of disruption in air traffic. Pilots and air traffic controllers are accustomed to unexpected disruptions and have adapted their practices to minimize the effect. Airlines and travelers are also accustomed to and expect a high degree of disruption in the system. In the United States, it is normal for 15,000 to 20,000 flights to be delayed or cancelled every month. A cyber attack that degraded the air traffic system would create delays and annoyance, but it would not pose a risk to national security.

Politics Links

1ncPlan causes backlash from congressPoole 10 (Robert W. Jr., Director of Transportation Policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow – Reason Foundation, and Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Airports and Air Traffic Control”, June, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc) 

Political Constraints. A third impediment to ATC reform is political. The redesign of the ATC system foreseen

in NextGen could potentially deliver major cost savings and greatly expand ATC capacity. However, realizing those gains would require retirement of large numbers of costly radars and other ground-based navigation aids and the consolidation of ATC facilities. One current proposal would replace 21 en route centers and 171 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities with just 35 air traffic service hubs in a redesign of U.S. airspace.28 Physical control towers located at many smaller airports would gradually be phased out as "virtual tower"

functions are built into the new super-hubs.¶ However, Congress tends to resist consolidating ATC facilities because of concerns about job losses and the like, which is similar to the political resistance to closing post offices and military bases. A major 1982 proposal for consolidating ATC facilities was quietly dropped after it became clear that getting it through Congress would be very difficult. Similarly, Congress came extremely close to forbidding the FAA's recent success in outsourcing its Flight Service Station system, which involved reducing the system from 58 facilities to 20. The prohibition was

defeated only by a credible veto threat from the White House. In sum, as long as ATC remains government-owned and controlled, making the needed reforms to improve efficiency and implement NextGen will be very difficult.

AT: DOD shields the linkCongress will backlash against the DODChoo 00 [Robert, prof of law at Yale, Summer, Rutgers Law Review]Negotiation is as much a matter of power as it is of technique, principle, or procedure. Agencies, of course, possess the capacity to promulgate regulations that have a substantial impact on the well-being of individuals, firms, labor unions, public interest groups, and other organizations.

But depending on the context, regulated parties may also possess a variety of means to force delays or alterations in agency plans - from withholding information, galvanizing adverse media attention, mobilizing political allies in Congress, and initiating court challenges. Taken together, such actions can amount to significant countervailing power, such that an agency cannot control the outcome of the rulemaking process.

Furthermore, the agency can expect to incur significant costs in terms of time, money, and political capital even if it achieves its regulatory goals. Indeed, it is the very diffusion of power created by the imposition of "paper hearing" and "hybrid" rulemaking requirements on the informal rulemaking process in the 1960s and 1970s which led federal agencies to consider utilizing alternative procedures such as reg neg in the first place.

Agencies link to politicsThomas McGarity, Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas School of Law, May 2012, ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT: POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY PARTISAN AGE, 61 Duke L.J. 1671The interchange-fee rulemaking experience illustrates how stakeholders in high-stakes rulemakings have begun going beyond the conventional responses to rulemaking initiatives by

adopting a new toolbox of strategies better suited to the deeply divided political economy . If the

players on one side of the policy debate perceive that they are unlikely to prevail in the administrative arena, they will move the implementation game to another arena - the White

House , a congressional hearing , a political fundraising dinner, a think-tank white paper, talk-

radio programs, attack advertising , telephone solicitation and "push polls," or Internet blogs. Many of these new venues were amply used in the battle that accompanied the interchange-fee rulemaking. In addition, although lawyers for the stakeholders employ the careful language of administrative law in arenas in which that language is expected, spokespersons and allies also employ the heated rhetoric of modern political discourse in arenas in which that language is more likely to succeed. This Part probes these, among other, contours of blood-sport rulemaking.

Privatization CP

1NCText: The United States federal government should commercialize the air traffic control system by creating a self-supporting non-civil service Air Traffic Organization funded.

Counterplan solves efficiency and safety better—avoids the FAA bad turns and politicsPoole 10 (Robert W. Jr., Director of Transportation Policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow – Reason Foundation, and Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Airports and Air Traffic Control”, June 2010,http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pdf/transportation-airports-atc.pdf)

The way to address all three of these organizational problems is to take the ATC system out of the federal budget process and make it a¶ self-supporting entity, funded directly by its customers. Variants of this commercialization approach have been recommended by a series¶ of federal studies and commissions over the past 15 years.¶ As part of Vice PresidentAl Gore's efforts at "reinventing government" in the 1990s, for example, the Clinton administration proposed¶ turning the ATC system into a separate, self-funded, nonprofit government corporation within the Department of Transportation. The 1997¶ National CivilAviation Review Commission, which was chaired by Norman Mineta, similarly proposed moving toward a self-supporting air¶ traffic control organization.¶ Commercialization would entail shifting from aviation-related taxes paid to the U.S. Treasury to fees for ATC services paid directly by¶ customers to a new self-supporting Air Traffic Organization. This change would allow fees to grow in proportion to the growth of flight¶ activity, rather than being tied to a less-stable variable, such as fuel prices or airline ticket prices. Moreover, a predictable revenue stream¶ that was not subject to the federal budget process would provide the basis for the ATO to issue long-term bonds for funding capital¶ investments.¶

Commercialization would also address the management problems that have plagued the FAA's efforts to modernize. A non-civil-service¶ ATO could attract the best private-sector managers and engineers skilled at implementing complex technology projects. Such anA TO¶ could hire, fire, and compensate its employees as other high-tech businesses do. Private sector managers would have an incentive to ask¶ tough questions about whether new investments offered real value for the money, a process that often doesn't occur at the FAA or in¶ Congress.¶ In addition, a separate, self-supporting ATO—no longer part of the FAA—would be overseen at arm's length for aviation safety by the¶ remaining FAA. Numerous studies have pointed out that the FAA's air-safety role is compromised when it comes to the ATC system, since¶ that system is operated "in-house" by a different branch of the same FAA.All other players in aviation—pilots, mechanics, aircraft¶

manufacturers, airlines, and so forth—are regulated at arm's length for safety by the FAA. This separation of ATC operations from safety¶ regulation is especially critical given the major changes entailed by shifting to the semi-automated NextGen, where numerous safety versus¶ capacity questions will need to be addressed in a rigorous and transparent manner.¶ Finally, a self-supporting ATO would address the political obstacles to improving system efficiency, such as making decisions to close¶ facilities. By passing the enabling legislation for ATC reform, Congress would delegate such contentious issues to the customer-oriented¶ ATO organization.¶

During the past two decades, nearly 50 governments have commercialized their air traffic control systems. That means they have¶ separated their ATC activities from their transport ministries,

removed them from the civil service, and made them self-supporting from fees¶ charged to aircraft operators. These new air navigation service providers (ANSPs) are usually regulated at arm's length by their¶ government's aviation safety agency.¶ Britain's ATC system has been commercialized by means of a "public-private partnership." NationalAir Traffic Services is a jointly owned¶ company, with British airlines owning 42 percent, airport company BAA owning 4 percent, employees owning 5 percent, and the¶ government owning the remaining minority stake. NATS is operated on a not-for-profit basis.¶ 29Canada's ATC system has been fully commercialized. In 1996, Canada set up a private, nonprofitATC corporation, Nav Canada, which¶ is self-supporting from charges on aviation users. The Canadian system has been widely praised for its sound finances, solid¶ management, and its investment in new technologies. The Canadian system is a very good reform model for the United States to¶ consider.¶ Nav Canada's corporate board is composed largely of aviation stakeholders. It has 4 seats for the airlines, 3 for the government, 2 for¶ employees, and 1 for the non-commercial aviation industry. Those 10 stakeholders select 4 directors from outside aviation, and then those¶ 14 select the company president, who becomes the 15th board member. To further strengthen governance, neither elected officials nor¶ anyone connected with suppliers to Nav Canada can serve on the board. Nav Canada also has a 20-member outside Advisory Committee.¶ A number of studies have found thatATC commercialization has generally resulted in improvements to service quality, better management,¶ and reduced costs. At the same time, air safety has remained the same or improved in the countries that have pursued reforms to set up¶ independentANSP organizations.¶ A thorough 2009 report byGlen McDougall and Alasdair Roberts compared the performance of 10 commercialized ATC systems and the¶ FAA during the 1997 to 2004 period. They looked at large amounts of performance and safety data from the systems in the various¶ countries and conducted over 200 interviews with managers, workers, and users of the different systems. The researchers found:¶ ANSP commercialization has generally achieved its objectives. Service quality has improved in most cases. SeveralANSPs¶ have successfully modernized workplace technologies. The safety records ofANSPs are not adversely affected by¶ commercialization, and in some cases safety is improved. Costs are generally reduced, sometimes significantly. Other risks of¶ commercialization—such as erosion of accountability to government, deterioration of labor relations, or worsened relationships¶ between civil and military air traffic controllers—have not materialized.¶ For the United States, a commercialized ATC organization would be more likely than the FAA to efficiently implement the major aviation¶ infrastructure advances that the nation desperately needs.Air traffic control is more complex and dynamic than ever, and it needs to be¶

managed in the sort of efficient and flexible manner that only a commercialized environment can offer. Countries like Canada have shown¶ the way forward for air traffic control, and U.S. policymakers should adopt the proven organizational reforms that have been implemented¶

abroad.

FAA Fails—culture and lack of technical expertise make implementation impossiblePoole 7 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. is the director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation. “The Urgent Need To Reform The FAA’s Air Traffic Control System.” March 2007.http://reason.org/files/7e27c68e7675e8a599716bab220978f5.pdf)

Thus, many observers are greatly concerned that the FAA’s institutional culture is poorly suited to ¶ implementing anything as dramatic as the shift from human-centric ATC to network-centric ATM. ¶ In late 2004, the National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel to assist the

GAO in ¶ understanding the cultural and technical factors that have impeded previous ATC modernization ¶ efforts.10 It found that “the key cultural factor impeding modernization has been resistance to ¶ change…[which is] characteristic of FAA personnel at all levels” and that “the key technical factor ¶ affecting modernization…has been a shortfall in the technical expertise needed to design, develop, ¶ or manage complex air traffic systems.”11¶ The FAA is not designed to take risks, make investments, manage people to produce results, ¶ reward excellence, or punish incompetence. It is therefore not equipped to effect fundamental ¶ reform of the ATC system. Thus, major institutional change is probably a prerequisite for ¶ implementing the proposed network-centric ATM system.

Incompetence turns the case – causes cost overruns and links to our stimulus turns – assumes their “only funding key” warrantsPoole and Edwards 10 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. is the director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation. Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee. “Airports and Air Traffic Control.” June 2010.http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc)

However, the challenge ahead for the ATC system is more complex than just financial. NextGen will be a major paradigm shift—from 20th-century (manual) air traffic control to 21st-century (semi-automated) air traffic management—and it will be more complex and riskier than any other challenge the FAA has previously attempted. Given the FAA's management and cost overrun problems in the past, simply fixing the funding problem for the ATC system without dramatically reforming its governance poses risks of larger and more dramatic failures and greater congestion down the road.

2ncThe FAA inhibits solvency, also means that the permutation failsMitchell 11 (Sam, Equity portfolio manager with experience in governmental agencies, “Course Reversal: Why We Need It and What Will Happen If We Don't Get It,” 11/11/11, http://sammitchellsblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/course-reversal.html)The safety of air travel depends on the quality of the system's infrastructure, which is obsolete. The Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] has been tasked with implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System [NextGen] which would use GPS technology to improve routing flexibility and enable more precise, safer separation of aircraft. The benefit is large savings in time and fuel. ¶ It is universally agreed that the FAA has performed poorly. Delays, cost overruns, and lack of improvement have been the hallmark of its modernization efforts so far. The FAA culture has shown a remarkable resistance to change. It has neither the incentive nor the technical expertise to introduce NextGen efficiently and promptly. Funding is constrained by political considerations that make it difficult to get rid of air traffic control operations that are obsolete but provide employment. ¶ As Robert Poole, Jr. and Chris Edwards note, a better way is to make the ATC system self-supporting with its revenues coming entirely from fees paid by its customers, the airlines and general aviation. Commercialization would enable a non-civil-service air traffic organization to attract the managerial and technical talent needed to get NextGen up and running. A private organization would have the incentives to produce the best possible product for the money and would not be bound by politics in terms of deciding what to close and what to invest in. ¶ Government should, however, retain the function of assuring air safety by setting and enforcing appropriate standards as well as providing the analysis required to improve safety. ¶

There is good evidence that commercialization of air traffic control works. Both UK and Canada have commercialized their air traffic control systems with highly satisfactory results -- reduced costs and better service quality at no sacrifice of safety.

P3

1ncP3 solves better than the aff, empirics proveEdwards and DeHaven, 10 – budget experts at the Cato Institute (Chris and Tad, “Privatize Transportation Spending,” 6/17, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/privatize-transportation-spendingA final area in DOT to make budget savings is aviation. Federal aid to airports should be ended and local governments encouraged to privatize their airports and operate without subsidies. In recent decades, dozens of

airports have been privatized in major cities such as Amsterdam, Auckland, Frankfurt, London, Melbourne, Sydney and Vienna.¶ Air traffic control (ATC) can also be privatized. The DOT's Federal Aviation Administration has a terrible record in implementing new technologies in a timely and cost-effective manner. Many nations have moved toward a commercialized ATC structure, and the results have been very positive. ¶ Canada privatized its ATC system in

1996 in the form of a nonprofit corporation. The company, NavCanada, has a very good record on both safety and innovation. Moving to a Canadian-style ATC system would help solve the FAA's chronic management and funding problems, and allow our

aviation infrastructure to meet rising aviation demand.¶ There are few advantages in funding transportation infrastructure from Washington, but many disadvantages. America should study the market-based transportation reforms of other countries and use the best ideas to revitalize our infrastructure while ending taxpayer subsidies.¶

2ncPrivate sector solves NextGen funding – more efficient than the federal government, Canada and the United Kingdom prove that privatized ATC worksENO Center for Transportation 12 (April 2012, “NextGen Aligning Costs, Benefits and Political Leadership”, http://www.infrastructureusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nextgen-paper.pdf, )

The private sector could also potentially be a driving force behind funding NextGen. Private sector modernization efforts could be in the form of a full-fledged privatized ATC ¶ system to a public-private financing partnership. ¶ Privatization of ATC is a controversial topic. Proponents ¶ of privatization invoke free-market competitive efficiencies ¶ and optimal pricing that alleviates congestion and is self-sufficient in raising adequate operating revenues without need for bureaucratic delays and the appropriation process. Some ¶ have argued for privately funding NextGen by separating ¶ ATC from the FAA and funding its operations by charging ¶ private user fees to all aviation users.¶ 51¶ The idea is

that the ¶ long-term trend of declining ticket prices due to increased ¶ market share for low-cost carriers means that the passenger ¶ ticket tax cannot be relied on as a source of funding for ¶

NextGen. Furthermore, political stagnancy is a hindrance to ¶ bringing about changes in a timely fashion. Finally, there are ¶

examples of successful privatized ATCs from countries such ¶ as Canada and the United Kingdom. Arguments against ¶ privatizing ATC make the general case that the private sector might not cater to an outcome that is in the interest of ¶ society. A privatized ATC would still require some form of ¶ government oversight to ensure safety standards are met and ¶ pricing practices are fair.