aticle in military review: communist errors in the anti-bandit war 66 77
TRANSCRIPT
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THE
OF M #&~
.itary
W6
view
In This Iss? e
i
Intelligence
+ Thoughtson War
~ Howto shoot a Duck
September5
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UNITED STATESARMY COMMANO
AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Maj
Gen Harrg J. Lendeg, Jr.
ASSISTANTCOMMANDANT
Brig Gen E. C. Townsend
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Military Review
P rofessiona l J ourna l of t he U S rmy
How to Shoot a Drfc lI . .. . . . . . . . Maj Donald J. Haid, USA 3
Kinestheti c Warfare . . . . . . . . . Cot Robert B. Rigg, USA 13
Air Mob i l i ty . . . . . .
Col Wladimir A. de Favit ski, French Army 20
Second Thoughts on War . . . . . . . . . . . Br ian Bond 23
In te l l igence . . . . . . . .
Lt Col Fiel ding L. Greaves, USA 33
The Far North . . . . . . . Maj Pierre Vincendon, French Army 39
Khrmen and M at su . . . . . . . . Lt Col Chen Wei-ya, CNMC 45
Uni f ied Force . . . . . . . .
Maj J. N. Elderk hs, Brit i sh Army 48
Quell i ng Mut ini es . . . . . . . Lt Col Wil l iam E. Burr 11,USA 54
The Nonprofessional . . . . . .
Col Shauk at Riza, Paki stan Army 80
Prudence Mi l i tary Necessity . . . . . . . Edmund Mc Caff rey 62
Communist Errors . . . . . . . Lt Col Robert W. Selt on, USA 66
Casualt y Handling . . . . . . . . . Lt Col D. W. Pratt, USA 78
Army Hospit al Ships . . . . . . . . . . Stanl ey L. Falk 85
Necessit y f or Change . . . . . M aj Cli nton E. Granger, Jr. , USA 92
M i l i t ar yNot e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
M i l i t ar yBook s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
The M81i tary Raview, a publi cat ion of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provi des a forum for t he expression
of mil i t ary thought with emphasis on doctr i ne concerni ng the division and higher l evels of command.
The VIEWS expressed in thi s magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not nec essari ly tho se of the
US Army or the Command and General Staf f Coll ege.
8
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ditor in Chief
ColDonaldJ. Delaney
Assistant Editor
Lt ColAlbertN.Garland
Features Editor
MajRobertL.Burke
r
Layout Editor
Capt John A. Maclntyre, Jr.
~ SpanishAmerican Editor
Major RerreRamos
Brazilian Editor
Lt Col Luiz de A. Araripe
I
Assoqiate Editor
Lt ColAlgmJ. Hughes
ArmyWarCollege
Production Officer
MajNormanC, Murray
i
}
Staff Artist
Charles A.Moore
i
MILITARY fl EVIEW-Pubhshed monthl y by the U S Army Command and General Staf f College, Fort Leaw
enworth, Kansas, m Eng16h, Spamsh, and Portuguese Use of funds for print ing of th!s pubhcatt on has
been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Za May 1965.
Secmrdc lass postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Subscri pti on rate% $3.50 (US cur rency) a
year m
the Um!ed $tates, Uni ted Stat es mi ldary post ofhces, and those countr i es whtch are members of
the Pan Amerman Postaf Umon (mcludir rg Spain); $450 a year m all othe r count ries. Address subscrlp
l ion mad to the Book Depart ment, U S Army Command and General Staf f College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kairsas 66027.
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The Military Review announces the selection of the following article
from the July 1965 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:
China Burma India: Study in Combhed Command
Colonel Charles J. Canella, USA
y almost any standards, the direction of military operations in the CBI
during World War II violated the basic concepts of management and the
rules of war. The author, presently assigned to the staff and faculty of
the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, points out that a
study of the ccmcepts and procedures employed in the CBI provides a
uni@e opportunity to develop valuable lessons for the conduct of future
combined operations.
COMING:
The British Army in the Far East,
by General Sir Reginald Hewetson,
Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer for 1965;
Computers and Service Schools, by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Ablett; and Allied CommandEuropes Mobile
Force by Colonel James G. Holland, Jr.
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\
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tiow to
s oot
Major i onald J. Haid,
The views expressed in this ar.
title ar the authors and are not
necessa il~ those of tke Depart~nent
!
o the
rmy, Department of De.
fewer o the U. S. Arrng Command
and Ge era,l staff Co/lege,-Edttor.
f
{~ F ~lIE ducks could shoot back,
there wouldn t
be so many duck
hunters.
Although probably spuri
ous, this remark ie widely attributed
to an ArmY general in answering a
question about the necessity of arm
Soptoinbcr3fi5
a uck
United Statea Arnrg
ing helicopters. Like so many maxims,
the answer contains truth and false
hood, wisdom and folly.
The individual who posed the ques
tion may have beeu stopped for the
moment, but the question has been
asked a thousand times before and
since. It has been asked by reporters;
it has been asked by generals in blue
uniforms; it has been asked by gen
erals in green uniforms; and it has
been anawered truthfully, falsely,
wisely, and foolishly. Helicopter arma
., 3
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tnent may have developed too far for
the question to be meaningful any
longer.
There is, however, a question that
has seldom been posed and never been
answered: What happens when
armed helicopter meets armed heli
copter ? My aim, here, is to justify
the question. If facts can be mar
shaled in a logical fashion, if atten
tion can be focused on the problem,
then, hopefully, the technicians and
the tacticians can solve the problem
and answer the question properly.
ArmyAviationProgram
Until the Korean War, organic
Army aviation was entirely confined
to the employment of small, fixed-
wing aircraft used for directing ar
tillery fire and for carrying out
OCCZI
simml liaison missions. The helicopter,
despite interest dating back to Leo
nardo da Vinci, did not become prac
tical until after World War II, but
the success of the helicopter in medi
cal evacuation missiom+ in Korea as
sured it a place in the military air
craft inventory. The combination of
the establishment of a separate Air
Fore> in 1947 and the helicopters
success ]n Korea resulted in the de
velopment of what has come to be
known as the Army Aviation Pro
gram.
Barely two decades have passed
Major Donald J. ffaid, a veteran
Army aviator, has ffown with 7th
Armv in Europe and 8th A rm~ in
Korea and has served as Chief of the
US A rmg A uiation Human Research
Unit. He is currentlv with the 145th
Aviation Battalion in
Vietnam. This
article is baaed on a treatise prepared
6U Majur Haid while a student in the
1964-65 Regular Cmeree of the U. S.
Arrnzs Command and General Stag
College.
since the first Piper Cubs were as.
signed to a few artillery battalions.
The Army, however, now operates
more than 6,000 aircraft, and aviators
comprise the third largest group of-
officers in the Army. To its credit, the
Army has never lost sight of the fun
damental mission of Army aviation
to support ground combat; nor has
Army aviation lost its fundamental
characteristicthat of being organic
to tactical Army units.
Although the small aviation section
gave way to the aviation company,
and the company to the battalion, the
aviation unit remains organic to the
brigade, division, corps, and field
army. And although the aircraft have
become bigger and more sophisti
cated, the missions more dumerous
and more complicated, the phrase
Army aviation is always used with
only one word capitalized and always
in that particular order.
In both World War II and Korea,
Army aircraft relied on their slow.
speed maneuverability for protection
against enemy fire. The classical lin.
ear alignment of forces usually fur
nished a visual indication of friendly
and enemy territory, There were
losses to enemy fire in both wars, but
Army aircraft were not unacceptably
v@erable.
TransportHelicopters
The advent of the troop transport
helicopter created a new problemat
one particular moment in time and
space, the transport helicopter was
considered to be unacceptably vulner
able. That was the moment when the
helicopter
was
stationary+ ither
hovering or Pandingwhile it disem
barked its load of fighting troops.
Since the moment of vulnerability
was, after all, brief, the Army began
to experiment with the idea of deliv-
Military
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I
SHOOTADUCK
ering suppressive fire from
copter. Originally conceived
large volume of essentially
fire designed solely to force
emyto keep his head down
the heli
to he a
unaimed
the en-
until onr
troops could disembark, assemble, and
take UPthe fight, the use of suppress
ive fire marked the actual birth of
the armed helicopter in the US Army.
the nap-of-the-earth
Army will have to
ited or general war:
cable regardless of
vironment.
flying that the
live with in lim~
it will be appli
the nuclear en-
Although the details are still
shrouded in the secrecy of intelli
gence . reports and studies, every
major power in the world today is ex-
US Am
A UH 1
helicopter in flight firing an SS-11missile
Development in weapons and tac
tics eirrceWorld War 11 have paral
leled the development of Army avia
tion. They have, at the came time,
imposed certain limitations. Except
in thoee areaa known to be absolutely
secure, the Army aviator must fly at
analtitude low enough to be below the
acquisition level of radar and infra
red weapons and close enough to the
terrain to make attack by high-per
formance enemy aircraft infemible.
In most cases, this will mean treetop
level, or, if possible, below, This is
September1SS5
perimenting with helicopter arma~
ment. Since the arming of ahelicopter
involves no secret or complicated proc
ess, this fact is not really surprising.
What ie strzbrge is the difference in
weaponry and philosophy among the
Varioue countries. Since there has
not yet heen awar inwhich both sides
have employed armed helicopters,
there will he, presurnnbly, at leaat as
much diversity in the field of tactics,
Ultimate weapona have come and
gone-from Hannibala elephants, to
the Iongbow, to gunpe+yder, to the
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SHOOTAOUCK
nuclear weapon. The armed helicopter
is certainly not an ultimate weapon.
But the development of the armed
helicopter employing effective tactics
may well become a significant element
of combat power in future wars.
AlgerianRevolt
For a period of seven yearsfrom
the m]ddle of 1955 until 1962tbe
French colony of Algeria writhed in
the agonies of revolution. Our inter.
eet in the Algerian revolt centers
around the fact that, for the first time
in history, armed helicopters were
extensively used.
At first, the French simply la?hed
an ordinary pintle-mounted nrachine
gun in the doorways of their Vet-to/
44s. When they received the more
powerful CH-34S, they began to uee
more than one machinegun. After dis
covering the limitation of the small-
caliber machineguns, the French
turned to rockets, wire-guided mis
siles, and even multiweaprm instalki
tions. Eventually, they achieved their
greatest success with a World War II
Mawscr 20-millimeter cannon which
they were able to mount so as vir
tual~ to el}minate the problems of
recoil and vihrwtion.
Pierre Habot ]s a lieutenant com
mtinder m the French Navy. He is
also an aeronaut]ca.1 engineer und
.comhat pllut. He flew in World War
11until the French surrendered and
then went underground for the rest
of the war wztb tbe
mayuw.
He later
flew
f ighters
for France in Indocbina,
until D]en B]wt Phu, A httk while
later h~ turned up flying helicopters
against the rebels in Algeria. While
there, he was in on most of the heli
copter armament experimentation.
Before the war ended, Babot had
be,en sh]pped to Frunce and put m
charge of all Frtinch helicopter iirma-
S
ment development. He was instru.
mental not only in the development
of the Mauser 20-millimeter inetaOa
tion, but also in the design of what
was, perhaps, the first true weapons
helicopterthe
Atocmfte III.
Before
the first armed f7H-f flew in Vietnam,
Bahot wae helping to design and pro
duce a 20-millimeter automatic can
non for the A{ouette 111.This weapon
would not only fire a 20-miHimeter
round with an explosive warhead, but
the gun, including its mount and
sight, weighed less than 50 pounds.
OrbitalFire
In addition to their obvious success
in technology, Babot and the French
also developed the first known tactic
for employing armed helicopters
orbital fire. The helicopter would
cruiee along until it spotted a band
of guerrillas. Then, from an altitude
of about 1,000 feet, the helicopter
would begin to circle its quarry. By
the time the angle of hank PIUSthe
angle of depression of the weapon
reached 90 degrees, the gunner was
not only shooting straight down, but
he was doing so with deadly accuracy.
The 20-millimeter cannon and or
bital fire notwithstanding, Pierre
Babot and the French Army felt that
there were no urriversd principles te
b~ derived from their experiences in
Algeria. It had been a special kind of
war, fought under special circum
stances, with equipment wited to the
tiask. If they learned anything from
seven years employment of armed
belmopters, it was that they wanted
a flexlble 20-milIirtreter automatic
cannon that weighed uo more than 50
pounds.
(:olonel Jay f). Vanderpool is not
even a rated US Army aviator. al
thuugh it is widely suspected that he
has done his share of flying. In 1956
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hewas assigned to what was then the
Combat Development Office of the
Aviation .School at Fort Rucker, Ala
bama. Vanderpool and his staff be
gan testing the feasibility of the
transport helicopter as a weapons
platform. And they did not limit
themselves to the considerations of
defensive fire alone. A wide range of
weapons was tested on various heli
copters.
The experiments were both inge
nious and imaginative. Hampered by
a lack of funds, facilities, and official
encouragement, the development was
spurred by the enthusiasm and ini
tiative of Colonel Vanderpool and his
staff of young aviators.
ACRCompany
To facilitate selling the idea that
weshould arm our helicopter, a unit
known as the 8305th Aerial Combat
Reconnaissance (ACR) Company was
organized at Fort Rucker. Influential
visitors to the US Army Aviation
Center viewed demonstrations of
armed helicopters staged by the
8305th.
By 1960 it had become apparent
that
machineguns, rockets, and
guided missiles offered the greatest
immediate promise for use on our
helicopters. But the essentially un
aimed character of suppressive fire
remaided predominant, and only in
the guided-missile field was any at
tempt made to achieve the accuracy
necessary to attack point Pargets.
The US Army Aviation Test Board,
then under the US Continental Army
Command (USCONARC ), began tu
attack some of the technical problems,
even while the ACR company dealt
with the concepte. Armament systems
for helicopters had always begun by
taking some existing weapon and at
tempting to mount it in some fashion
Sqrtember1965
on the helicopter. For the first several
years ofthe feaaihility studies at Fort
Rucker, all experiments were con
ducted with existing ground weapons.
although, rather late in the period,
experiments were made with actual
aircraft weapons.
As long as the principal concept
was that of unaimed suppressive fire,
any weapon that the helicopter could
lift was reasonable. Under this pro
gram, such pros&ic considerations as
ammunition feeding, effect of recoil
on structural membeks, in-flight re
loading, and ammunition lnad capa
bilities posed tbe major problems.
Degradation of aircraft perform
ance wae accepted as a necessary evil.
Quite hy chance, this degradation
generally manifested itself by reduc
ing speed and payload rather than in
dangerous flight characteristics. The
Fort Rucker people, Cnlonel Vander
pool, the ACR company, and the Avia
tion Test Board had their meet eig.
nificant success with a dual .30-cali
ber machinegun kit (precursor of the
Xlff ), the 4.5-inch rocket (later
abandoned in favor of the 2.75-inch
rocket ), and the French SS-11
(a
wire-guided missile originally d&
signed as a surface-to-surface, anti
tank weapon ).
NoApprovedDoctrine
I?ven though the concept of the
armed helicopter was considered feas
ible, there was no accepted or tw
prnved doctrine as to which aircraft
would he armed, with what weapons,
or in what quaat ities. To remedy this
bwk of offimal doctrine. USCONARC
convened an ml hoc committee on
army aircraft armament systems. In
two months during the summer of
1961, the committe+five generals
tind 14 field grade officers-formu
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SHOOTADUCK
lated much of what is now our doc
trine for helicopter armament.
The data and the report prepared
by that committee will atend as mile
stones in the history of the develop
ment of the armed helicopter, al
though events did alter some of their
recommendations. The committee felt
that the division aviation battalion,
the brigade aviation section, the ar
mored cavalry regiment, and the air
cavalry troop should have armed heli
copters. They recommended that no
aircraft he armed with more than
oneweapon system and that transport
helicopters not be armed. They set
forth three categories of weaponry-
light weapons, ~rea weapons, and
point weaprms. They ako pointed up
the necessity of developing a helicop
ter weapon with an air-to-air capa
bility.
VietnamConflict
Just like the French in Algeria and
Indochina, we found ourselves in 1961
fighting a ragged, poorly equipped,
guerrilla enemy o~er some of tbe
worst Jungle, mountain, and rice-
paddy terrain in the world. Just like
the ?&ench, we found t~t only by
using helicopters could we move
swiftly enough to match the guerrilla
advantage jn surprise, stealth, and
initiative.
For more than a year, three com
panies of ancient CH-21s flew the
soldiers of Vietnam into battle with
tbe Viet Cong guerrillas. And then
it happened. We awoke one day to
discover that those ragged guerrillas
were shooting at our helicopters. A.Yif
by magic, machineguns began appear
ing lashed in the doorways. And tbe
cry went back to USCONARC for heli
copter armament. BY this time, how
ever, it was generally accepted that
escort helicopters than to try to bur.
den the tired, old
CH-21S
with any
more weight.
By 1962 a company of
UH-1
heli
copters had been mustered in Oki
nawa. Although there had been much
scurrying about in the research and
development agencies, there was still
no
production-model weapon system
for the UH-I. By a combination of
soldierly zeal and outright thievery,
the UH-Is were finally equipped with
machineguns and sent to Vietnam.
Under tbe title Utility Tactical
Transport Helicopter Company, the
armed
UH-I .s began flying shotgun
for the airmobile assauIts that the
Vietnamese Government was launch
ing against the Viet Cong.
UH.1sSuccessful
The armed
UH-Is were an immedi
ate succesk The early
IYH-IA
models
were soon replaced with
UH-lBS
and
the homemade weapons with the
quadruple 7.62-millimeter machinegun
system. In this system, a World War
II
turret
mount was used to provide
flexibility to a pair of M60 light ma
chineguns. These were mounted, one
pair on each side of the helicopter,
and were aimed and fired as a unit
by a gunner seated in the copilots
seat. Later on, the utility tactical
tmmsport was also equipped with 2.75
inch rocket launchers to supplement
the fire of the machineguns. The
SS-21 ~missiies were not used because
they were expensive and because
there were few suitable hard tar
gets to be found.
Just like the French, we had tried
machineguns, rockets, and guided
missiles. The Viet Cong began to dis
cover that the armed
UH-1s
made a
great deal of noise, but that even a
ragged guerrilla could enjoy the
it would be better to provide armed , thrill of shooting at a helicopter if
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he stayed well hidden. Fortunately,
Ithe guerr@as were no more accurate
~with their weapone than were the
i
UJ7-Is.
Suppressive fire worked.
Aimed fire was just not within our
capabilities.
An even more shattering discovery
wae made when the Viet Cong eud
denlyturned UPwith some .50-caliber
machineguns. Now, they could ac
pression cmour senior officers in Viet
nam. Reports began flowing to Wash
ington comparing the cost effective
ness of the armed
T-.%
with that of
the armed
UH-1.
By 1963 there were a great many
officers who had heen to Vietnam, seen
Army hviation at work, and bleseed
the armed helicopter. With something
like two-thirds of the. Army forces
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;HOOTAOUCK
trying to derive universal principles
from a very special kind of war. In
my opinion, if the trend continues,
we shall find ourselves with an avia
tion element admirably suited to fight
in Vietnamand nowhere else.
FrontPage News
Because we are an airminded peo
ple, news stories are even more sen
sational if they involve the shooting
down of aircraft. Somehow the stories
conjure up memories of Eddie Ricken
hacker and the sensational air battles
of World War Ii and Korea. In Viet
nam news correspondents found a new
wrinkle. They could actually go along
as passengers in the helicopter and
thereby write, with thrilling authen
ticity, of their experiences under fire.
The supposed vulnerability of our
helicopters became front page news;
the facts of the matter eeem to indi
cate that the problem has been over
stated.
To the layman, and even to veteran
pilots, the helicopter looks too incon
gruous to fly, It looks as though you
could throw a handful of pebbles into
itsy-otor blades and cause it to thrash
itself to pieces. Even the earliest heli
copters used for medical evacuatimr in
the Korean War put the lie to this.
Although often fired npon at point-
blank range, the pilots discovered
that the bullets made neat little holes,
but that the machine went on flying.
Those early helicopters vibrated so
much under the best of circumstances
that even a rotor unbalanced by bullet
hoIes would still operate. Although
much bas been made of the vulnera
bility of the helicopters in Vietnam,
the documented facts indicate that, in
the light of hours and missions flown,
we have sustained greater losses from
materiel failure and pilot error than
we have from enemy small arms fire.
There is no recorded instance of a
helicopter in combat being shat dow~
by a fighter aircraft. Aside from the
fact that the helicopter is quite at
home in the nap-of-the-earth flight
regime, it is asking too much to bs.
Iieve that any fighter pilot would care
to venture among the tree limbs at
supersonic speeds to engage a ma
chine that can fly from zero to 100
knots, not to mention backwards and
sideways. Simply by using camou
flage paint on the rotor blades, the
helicopter has demonstrated that it
can be flown at treetop level virtually
undetected by tbe pilot of a highfly.
ing jet.
Needless to say, when the jet is it
self at ~a low altitude, the pilot is
hardly in a position to be looking
around for an unwary helicopter.
Yes;
SAYthe critics, bnt we will
have special low-performance aircraft
to use as helicopter hunters. Asids
from the fact that the feasibility of
this approach has yet to be demon
strated, one respects that the 150to
250-knot, fixed-wing aircraft might
find itself unacceptably vulnerable to
the fires of ii,s quarry.
InfraredWeapons
Even if the helicopter manages to
~~dyr~~I~~dthe acquisition ]evels of
antiaircraft weapons,
there is still the doomsayer who feels
that the shoulder-fired, infrared
weapon will end the helicopters sig
nificance on the battlefield. Admit
tedly, the infrared weapon is in its
infancy, but already tests have been
run pitting these weapons in simu
lated combat against the helicopters.
The tests were large]y discredited
when it was discovered that the only
way tbe testers could get any date
waa by requiring the helicopters to
arrive over specified pointe, at stip-
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~
ulated times, and then take absolutely
noevasive action.
Prior to this arrangement, the gun
ners bad been completely unsuccessful
; in even figuring out the direction
from which the helicopter was coming
&henthey heard its engine. The facte
suggest that there may be quite ade
quate means of shielding the infra
red emiesions of the helicopter. And
it might not be too optimistic to pre
dict that someone will invent a mis
sile that will home in on an infrared
weapon.
VulnerabilityMyth
The perpetrators of the myth of
helicopter vulnerability have been un
successful in their efforts largely be
cause no one seriously believee that
there is any requirement for the
Army aviator to be, like Achilles, in
vulnerable on the battlefield. The av
erage Army aviator, as a matter of
fact, considers himself to be far less
vulnerable than the infantry soldier
with his rifle for firepower and his
feet for mobility.
There might he, however, some
compelling questions that need an
swere in the area of the vulnerability
of a helicopter to an enemy armed
helicopter, It is thie question that hae
puzzledsome of the best minds in the
armies, of Germany, France, and
Britain. One can only surmiee that
it isalso the subject of thought on the
other side of the Iron Curtain.
Oddly enough, one of the major un
solved problems in helicopter arma
ment ie the question of who ehould
operate the weapon. By operate, I
mean the total tasktarget acquisi
tion, aiming, and firing the weapon.
The simplest helicopter weapon
syetems are the MI and M$?systems
onthe
OH-19 and OH-29 observation
helicopters. These are dual, fqed,
SHOOTADUCK
machinegun systems which are aimed
and tired by the pilot who simply
points his helicopter in the direction
of a target and pressee the trigger to
fire. By interspersing ball ammuni
tion with tracer bullets, the pilot can
bring the stream of bullets around
and o~ the targetas long as they
last.
SightingSystem
The 2.75-inch rockete are also fixed,
but operation of the eystem requires
the services of both the pilot and his
copilot or gunner. Lack of an ade
quate sighting system for the rockete
has usually necessitated having a
machinegun mounted to assiet in lay
ing the rockets.
The
SS-11 wire-guided missile ia
fired entirely by someone other than
the pilot. This is aleo true of the
l f6
quadruple machinegun system. The
latter, though, can be fired by the
pilot in the fixed, but not in the flex
ible, mode.
There are cogent reaeons for argu
ing that the beet syetem is one
which places the weapon in the
hands of the pilot. On the other eide
are the advocates of using a copilot
or gunner, thus leaving the pilot free
to fly, navigate, and observe. Need
less to say, tbe problem of who will
shoot has not yet been resolved.
Aside from the arguments regard
ing the kind of weapon best suited
for arming a helicopter, there is the
less obvious problem of whether the
weapon should be rigidly mounted on
the longitudinal axia of the helicop
terse certain Marine Corps experte
contend-or whether the weapon
should be flexible in both azimuth
and elevatiouas the French insist.
Again, it seems sufficient to point out
that the problem still exists.
Amore complex problem is involved
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SHOOTADUCK
with the question of how to teach heli
copter gunnery. Aside from the fact
that no one really knows the best way
to do this, it should be evident that
the training problems will vary from
weapon system to weapon system and
.from pilot-trainee to gunner-trainee.
Besides, there are today more than
6,000 rated aviators who have never
fired any kind Qf weapon from any
kind of helicopter. It would certainly
be difficult to estimate the order of
magnitude of the training problem
when we have ~large numbers of
armed helicopters, not to mention
three or four different weapon sys
tems.
Surely, some research in the selec
tiOn and motivation of armed heli
copter pilots will be necessary. Not
every aviator will want to be a
tiger; not all who do will have the
aptitude. The heterogeneous aviation
unit may not be the ideal environment
for a daring and aggressive armed hel
icopter pilot. This is not to suggest
that the only choice is to be a tiger
or a pussycat, hut it is certainly true
that the average aviation unit is thor
oughly imbued with tbe idea of safe
flyi~
These and other organizational
problems may add weight to consid
eration of homogeneous light observa
tion helicopter and utility tactical
transport companies. It is far more
likely that tbe necessary
esprit
de
corps could be fostered in a unit in
which all tbe aviators had received
the same indoctrination and training.
If one grants tbe premises that
have been presented, it becomes pos
sible to single out one, perhaps over
riding, problemthat of what kind
of weapon, what kind of training, and
what kind of tactics to use when the
armed helicopter, on same future bat
tlefield, meets an enemy armed heli
copter. We can justify tbe arming of
a helicopter for self-clefense and even
for offensive tactics. It is even pOs
sible to hope that our technology wiO
permit the resolution of the questions
about who should handle the weapon
and whether it should be fixedor flex
ible. We can surely decide, in time,
whether rockets are better than mis
siles and whether ball ammunition is .
better than explosive warheads.
One recalls the old cliche that the
best weapon to use against a tank is
another tank. Will this be the only
answer to the ultimate problem of
armed helicopter versus armed heli
copter ? If it is, then it is time to de
sign antihelicopter weaponsj develop
helicopter:fighting tactics, and train
pilots in helicopter-to-helicopter com
bat.
Certainly, we must recognize that
there are many unresolved problems
in weaponry, tactics, doctrine, and
organization. But our past efforts will
have been in vain and the lives of the
men lost in Vietnam will have been
wasted if our helicopters are shot out
of the air the first time they run up
against an enemy who
is
also
equipped with armed helicopters.
&rf it j~ true that the hardest part
of solving a problem is recognizing it,
then let us recognize it. Let us con
cede that it exists; let us direct the
efforts of our scientiata, our indus
tries, our tacticians, and our pilots
toward finding the best weapon, the
best tactics, the best way
to
shoot a
duck if you are that duck.
MilitarfReview
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h.
.
w
KltfESTHETIC
WARFARE
Modefor the Future
ColonelRobert B. Rig% United States Armg
VOLVING in the veh~cles, weap
ons, and military means that
American technology promises to pro
duce ie a slightly new form of land
warfare that may someday be termed
kinesthetic, This form of warfare has
its roots in blitzkrieg, but blitzkrieg
is to the past and present what kines
thetic warfare is to the future.
t 0 Robert966 byColonel B.Rigg.
AllRiEhbReserved.
September965 .
Kinesthetic warfare is not alone
ultraswift motion and impact, it is
aIso perception. Thus, the foundation
of such a mode of warfare would reet
not only on unusual mobility PIUSfire
power, but also on a high order of ,
modernized
reconnaissance,
target
acquisition means, and military in
telligence. The term and concept of
kinesthetic is derived from kinesthe
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KINESTHETICWARFARE
sia meaning originality:
kimein,
to
move +
aisthi +is,
perception.
It might appear that this is a trite
play on words or semantic doodling.
Actually, it is not, for the basic term
is descriptive of a form of future
warfare that will be:
Best suited for a war of quick
decision.
Served by vehicles, weapons,
and means yet to come,
Four-DimensionalCombat
Kinesthetic Warfare will be rapid
movement, maneuver, and destruction
by virtue of its rapid target finding
and sensing. This form of warfare is
four-dimensional in character: It is
ultraperceptive in its first dimension.
It is through the air in its second.
Thus, in consequence to these, its
third dimensicm is velocity, while its
fourth is shock impact.
In combat ar hitecture, then, these
dimensions cot bine to where the
shockpower and Iimpact of certain US
Army forces w
A
uld be multiplied on
the battleground in disproportional
favor to their numerical strength.
These forces, designed for deep-in
pehtrations of rapid order and vio-
Ience, would be so organized, e
quipped, armed, and transported as to
permit them to operate with more
precision and speed than the normaI
and heavier combat forces.
Colonel
Robert B. Rigg is with the
US Armu Combat
Development CO*
mand Institute of Advanced Studies,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dur-
ing World War 11 he served in Eu-
rope as a military observer with So-
viet Army units
and
other Allied
mi{ i tarr j
forcee. He is a graduate of
the United States Arm~ War College,
and wrw previously a88 tL?d
to the
stafl of the
Commander in
Chief,
.Pa@c.
In a sense,
one may
ask: 1s this
just blitzkrieg with better equip.
ment ? No, not quite the case.
Blitzkrieg Warfare
Blitzkrieg is not eempletely
sya.
orrymous with kinesthetic warfare
because the latter embraces not only
ultraswift motion, but also extreme
depth of operation and perception,
This brand of perception would em
brace much more ra~id, accurate, and
automated reconnaissance and intel
ligence than we have today. Once such
a perception system is attained, it
wouId produce unusuaI arrays of
deep-in targets well in the enemys
rear areas.
Whereas in the past an airborue
division jumped deep inside enemy
territory to attack one target area for
a few days, future striking forces of
the type, envisioned would be able to
attack several deep-in targets in the
same few days. These forces, for ex.
ample, should be able to engage, ea
circle, destroy, and disengage rapidly.
Falsely implied here may be hit-and
run tactics. On the ccertrary, the re.
Iated tactics would be deep in, bit
finish, and runand only in an ex
treme circumstance, hit and mu
where survival becomes paramount.
The con~ept of kinesthetic warfare
does not vwualize an entire army or
~ field army specially organized for
this form of combat. It does envisage
some elements of about corps size
that wouid be organized and equipped
for such combatperhaps one els
ment per field army.
To wage kinesthetic warfare, tac
tical (air) mobility must not only be
of the highest order, but balanced and
integrated in terms of the.:
Individual soldier.
Combat unit and system.
Logistical unit and system.
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KINESTHETICWARFARE
Military hisfiry provides a library also require organic aircraft for ite
of evidetye to the effect that the
role.
progrsss and pattern. of combat is Kineethetie forces will be cost y
directly related to the excellence and
eIementS in terms of materiel and
limitations of logistics. Tactical and dollar investment, plus logistical sup-
logistical elements must be closeIy port. They wiK be costly to organize
related in respect to air mobility.
and ma~ntain, particularly in war.
Amv N.iLIeFeatwe
The foundation for kinesthetic warfare has been laid over the pact decade and a
half in the Armys buildup of Army aviation and its general quest for improved
mobility
Combat unite moved by air must be
But it is essential to weigh their cost
supported logistically by air.
agairmt the value of the results which
In general terms, the pattern en- kinesthetic forces could help to at-
visages a field army that will have
tain. By virtue of their character and
ultramobile striking elements, and
mode of operation, kinesthetic forces
that these kinesthetic combat ele-
could serve to shorten a war.
ments will be air transported and air
The daily average cost of World
supported for swift and deep strikes
War II was something on the order
of bold and multiple nature. Part of
of 221 million dollars; the Korean
tbe field army will largely move and
War about 91 million dollars. It may
fight overlandbut that part will be assumed with some degree of
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KINESTHETICWARFARE
safety that a future war of limited
nature could come to a daily average
of 150 to 200 million dollars--m an
assumed average of about 175 mil
lion dollars per day. Possessed of a
distinctly superior co~bat mobility
inherent in kinesthetic forces, a f u
ture US ArmY would{ likely shorten
a limited war. If a two-year war could
be shortened by only 46 daye, a dollar
saving of approximately 7.8 billion
dollars could be achieved. lhe saving
in human sacrifice and suffering is
obvious, and hefein lies a value that
has no dollar price tag.
While the Armys future quest for
mobiiity must be measured against
the prime objective of victoryand
an early victory, if possible--it must
also be weighed against the human
and dollar costs that would be incur
red if it had to go to war just on a
military-technological par with an
enemy.
Foundation and Principle
The foundation for kinesthetic war
fare has been laid over the past dec
ade and a half in the Armys Resea~ch
and Development Program, its build
up f Army aviation, and its general
ques$ for Improved mobility. The llth
Air Assault Division recently tested
a component of this foundation.
There is still more to be accomplished,
developed, and proved.
In respect to new hardware and re
lated aircraft, kinesthetic warfare
may be a decade or two distant. But
the foundation exists today not only
in concepts, but in American military
mindsand the effort has momentum.
In essence, this effort can best be
labeled as the principle of invoking
obsolescence: endeavoring to attain
such military technological superior
ity in firepower, mobility, and intel
ligence so as to render obeole~e a large
segment of any enemys armament
and materiel inventory.
The US creation of a really new
tdtramodemized form of tank, for ex.
ample, could render the USSRS enthe
inventory of armor obsolete--m at
least force the Soviet Union into a
major conversion program. The crea
tion of a distinctly new and ultraper
ceptible combat intelligence system
eorrld make enemy forces much more
volnerahle than they are now. The
Armys recent air-assault tests rep
resent a step in the direction of try
ing to attain the means to fight that
will not be in the image of an enemys
meansplainly the principle of in
voking obsolescence in enemy ranks.
This principle is in motion, but it
requires continual injection of em
phasis, originality, and imagination
that will give us more than just a tra
ditional edge or a modernized margin
of military-technological superiority
over
potential enemies. This ie espe
cially true with respect to combat in
telligence and mobility since the at
tainment of intelligence and mobility
superiority can multiply firepower
effects and impact.
Intelligsncs Perception
For thie form of warfare ever to
be a reality, there must be consider
able advances made in the field of
$
erational
intelligence collection
means. Ultramobility and the ability
to penetrate deep into enemy terri
tory wiH be relatively meaningless un-
Iees the intelligence gathering capa
bility matches up. The requirement,
then, is for long-range reconnaissance
means which are speedy, accurate,
and ultraresponsive.
What such future reconnaissance
vehicles will be, no one quite knows.
They may be embodied in earth sat
ellites and long-range Ping Pong
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KINESTHETICARFANE
missiles, or some new means as vet
undiscovered. The means probably
will be multiple rather than singular
in nature.
Is there hope that such sophisti
cated intelligence gathering means
can be attained? It would seem so
considering the advancee American
technology is making.
Some
15 years
ago it would have sounded outlandish
to predict that an orbiting communi
cation satellite could in one day ex
change with earth stations the num-
VS AmvJ
A future
army will leap over the trsdi.
tiOiIal terrain and man-made harriers to
embrace a cuuntry or continent within
a ahurt capsule of time
ber of worde equal to 6,000 novels.
This the Courier experimental satel
lite did in 1960.
What else is needed to make kines
thetic warfare a reality? Tbe answer
lies in a yet to be created family of
air vehicles. Kinesthetic warfare re
quires the depth of military penetra
tion in combat at least equal to pres
ent-day airborne troops. Such forcee
Mitlember965
mnst be able to strike deep in. Beyond
this, kinesthetic forces must have a
second-wind mobility which airburne
troups do not poseess.
Second-wind mobility meane that
troops uperating deep in enemy terri
tory must be capable of moving tac
tically by-their own organic air means
to attack a geries of objectives. Since
these forces must pussess such mubil
ity unce delivered, it is axiomatic that
their tactical vehicles be air vehicles.
Thus, the aircraft for such a fight
ing force would be of fuur general
categories:
Armed tactical tranaport air
craft ,,carrying cumbat troops.
Air-to-giound attack aircraft
for the traditional air suppurt ru~e,
but traveling with the tactical forma
tions.
Logistical transport aircraft.
Interceptor aircraft.
Aircraft Profiles
Certain general aircraft profiles
can index the future requirements.
One approach to attain better than
foot or ground vehicular mobility is
the concept of placing each individual
soldier in a su-called flying platform
or its future equivalent. Except for
special purpose units, this concept
should be largely discarded. Profile
number one, then, takes the form uf
individual flying platforms for special
purpose use in mountains and jungles,
but the over-all military-air invest
ment will not be in large swarms of
these vehicles.
Profile number two cuuld be in sev
eral imagea. These images could
range from small team air vehicles to
combat unit transports of heavier
variety. The fm%er would embrace a
flying platform or vertical takeoff
landing-short takeoff and landing
(VTOL-STOL) craft carrying a
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I
KINESTHETICWARFARE
three-man gun crew and pilot gunner,
whereas the latter image would be a
vehicle that could carry up to a pla
toon of riflemen or an equivalent load.
Dual.Purpose Armament
Both images should be compatible
in speed, hut the smaller vehicle
should be able to land in almost the
space of the vehicle itself. Both should
have dual-purpose armamentma
chineguns, recoilless rifles, or other
weapons that are mounted in the air
craft for air-to-ground fire and yet
can be of the breakaway type which
can be conveniently removed from the
vehicle for ground fighting use.
In present-day terms, one can vis
ualize the so-called flying saucer as
the first image, and the larger STOL
VTOL aircraft as the second. These
are but the prototypes of the more
sophisticated vehicles requiredand
to come.
A third profile may suggest itself
in the form of a much larger capacity
air vehicle. This concept should be
rejected, however, because we do not
want large packages of men and ma
teriel in one aerial basket to the point
whWe the enemy is given just a few,
large, profitable targets. Instead, it is
better to place the military eggs in
multiple baskets, thus reducing sin-
gle-shot liabilities. At the same time,
we would be protecting ourselves
more by providing masses of targets
to the enemy rather than a few large
ones.
Since kinesthetic forces would be
entirely supplied by air, a logistical
cmgo aircraft of some form is neces
sary. The crane-type helicopter with
a detachable cargo pod is presently a
possible prototype, but other aircraft
designs could emerge in the future.
In kinesthetic warfare, supplies would
be both dropped and air landed,
Supplies to be dropped will not al.
ways parachute down. Technology
promises to improve on the parachute,
and it may be that revolving packagw
can be developed to slow vertical de.
scent of supplies as nature has done
in the spinning seed of a maple tree.
Landing supplies by aircraft will
be carried out by STOL or VTOL
aircraft, a process that will have dual
value where evacuation of casualties
and selected prisoners represents the
return load.
Additionally, drone aircargo car.
riers may become a reality; they
could be template flown by remote
computers, and would be very useful
on the more dangerous missions.
Interceptor aircraft would form
the tactical air command umbrella to
keep enemy aircraft off the back of
kinesthetic forces. It would be desir
able for such aircraft to have the
duality to serve also as air-to-ground
attack vehicles.
Drone Reconnaissance Vehicles
Since a high order of intelligence
is necessary to secure profitable tar
gets for kinesthetic war task forces,
the importance of drone reconnais
sance aircraft and missiles is evident.
Over and above just seeking to find
and report enemy targets by such
means is an additional goal for which
we should strive.
Plainly, the concept of one machine,
man, or means finding a target, and
another man and weapon system
shooting and destroying that target, ,
is going to become largely obsolete
in the future. The requirement, then,
will be to combine the seeing eye re
connaissance vehicle with a destruc
tive weapon to create a single pack
age capable of performing both func
tions.
The combat reconnaissance drone
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KINESTHETIC WARFARE
or missile
of the future must not be
viewed alone in isolation boOth teym~
of a single characteristic, but in
twins of the complete combat cycle
of find,
fix
and deetroy. The creation
of these weapone would place some
segmente of combat in a stage ad
vsnced even beyond kinesthetic war
fsre, a tactical stage that might be
termed remote-control warfare. For
strategic distances at fixed targets,
we already have this in the intercon
tinental ballistic missile. But for tac
tical and operational level warfare
and against moving targets, we do not
have this complete package.
Some futurs army is going to fight
with certain portions of its men in
swarms of low-flying aircraft, leap.
ing the traditional terrain and man.
made barriers to arrive at multiple
points of its own chooeing, departing
from these destructive scenee to
sweep and swarm in order to create
others. This will be kinesthetic war.
fare, fotw-dimensional combat of a
swift and violent nature that will see
military forces embrace a country or
continent within a short capsule of
time. This is the essence ofia concept
pureued today in the United Statee,
because US Army planners adhere to
this rather singular but traditional
goalwe do not want to fight in the
came image and terms of any of our
potential enemiee.
As a general rule we visualize the future battlefield as one requiring
more dispersion and greater mobility employing either nuclear or corrven
tiondoperations.We must alsn consider the possibility of employment of
Army forces in counterinsurgency operations in remote areas of the world.
To
accomplish these missinns effectively certain advances in tirepnwer are
required.
Major General Frank T. Mildren
.
$eptcmbor965 9
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AIRMOBILITY
AND
GROUND FORCES
Colonel Wladimir A. de Favitski, French Arm
REPOWER now dominates the
uclear battlefield, shaping all
doctrine and dictating tbe employ
ment of ground units. There is at
least a possibility, however, that this
may not always he the case. The ad
vent of the new airmobile forces may
restore to maneuver many of the tac
tical opportunities which have thus
far heen considered out of the ques
t ion.
Nuclear weapons are not equally ef
fective in all tactical circumstances.
In order to achieve a high order of
destruction, they must be used against
forces which have concentrated and
present a signithnt tiarget density.
No ,enemy commander will consider
such a concentration unless he has
to do it in order to fuRill his assigned
mission.
It is possible to force him to con.
eentrate by opposing him with ones
own strong, concentrated force, but
this, in turn, creates a lucrative tar.
cet which the enemv commander mav
Th18
article was
translated and
digested from the original, pub-
lished in
LABM$E
(France) Feb-
ruary 1965, under t A6-title,
ro?nobilitc et Forces Terrestres.
Translation by Mr. LaVergne
Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.
Colonel de Favit8ki ie amrigned
to the French Armv General
Staff.
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.:)
choose to attack with his own nuclear
weapons. The price that must be paid
for strength is increased vulnerabil
ity; the longer it lasts, the more dan
gerous it is. Alrmobile forces, can
greatly decrease this vulnerability by
making it possible to concentrate
quickly, engage the enemy, and then
rapidly disperse.
MobililYand Vulnerability
Greater speed also provides in
creased security in exploiting the
neutralization obtained with nuclear
weapons. Exploitation forces must be
highly mobile in order to obtain max
imum profit from the neutralization
effect of this fire and to avoid the
nuclear reactions of the adversary.
Groundmobile units, always hampered
by the natural difficulties of the ter
rain, are likely to move even slower
on a nuclear battlefield which is dotted
with contaminated zones and obstacles
created by nuclear explosions.
The reserve, aiways a vital part of
tbe commanders plans, must also be
able to move rapidly.
In a
system built
up around the tactical nuclear weapon,
the meet dependable reserve is con
stituted by the nuclear weapons avail
able. But there are cases in which the
commander must use conventional
troop
reservee,
particularly when
forces infiltrate his position or units
become so interlocked with friendly
forces that nuclear bursts are unsafe.
Tbe reeerve has to intervene in
time. Considering the size of the zones
of action in nuclear operations, the
increased terrain difficulties, and the
time required to assemble dispersed
units, there is reason to doubt the
usefulness of earthbound reserves.
They may be able to do no more than
secure small zones adjncent to their
assembly areas. Outside these zones,
it will be necessary to cdl on mobile
AIR MOBILITV
reserves unaffected by terrain obsta
cles.
The vulnerability of forces tied to
the ground deserves some attention.
Even when they are dispersed, Iarge
ground units are faced with a di
lemma. If they disperse enough to
avoid being neutralized by nuclear
weapons, they will be incapable of
defeating the enemy in ground combat.
To be sure, the increase of armor
and tbe possibilities of digging in of
fer some unite reasonable chances of
surviving the devastating salvos of
the adversary. But it will never be
more than random nnits, and the co
herent structure of the parent organi
zation will have dieappeared.
Airmolrile Units
Although tbe aircraft of airmohile
units are more fragile, they will actu
all y be less vulnerable to nuclear fires
because of the rapidity with which
they can concentrate and disperse, and
because of the suddenness with which
they can ehift their combst power.
They could, in fact, remain dispersed
until the moment of their interven
tion, thus eliminating any possibility
of nuclear damage. As targets, they
would be too fleeting to be destroyed.
The ways to escape from the paths
beaten by the track vehicles appear
to converge in the direction of air mo
bilityin the domaiu which extends
from just above tbe surface of the
ground to the tops of the cottonwoods.
Experiments dealing with this mat
ter have already been conducted for
several years in tbe United States, and
tbe problem is being studied in Yiet
nam where helicopter-borne opera
tions are a normal occurrence. In
other armies, efforts are being made
to, perfect a combat helicopter capa
ble of fulfilling at least a part of the
missions now assigned to tanks. New
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AIR MOBILITY
methods such as air-cushion vehicles,
ducted propeller, and flexible wings
are being tested and could lead to new
typss of airmobile vehicles.
In view of the rapid progress being
made in the formation of airmobile
units, it seems fitting to attempt to
define as accurately as possibk the role
of this adaptation of ground forces.
- We have already noted that, al
though the airmobile forces have less
over-all vulnerability
than other
ground forces, their materiel is much
more vulnerable. Furthermore, air
craft cannot yet navigate adequately
under all conditions of weather and
visibility. Nor can these airmobile
forces secure the ground as well as
conventional units. Moreover, the nu
clear vulnerability of ground units re
sults from the need to concentrate and
the lack of means to do it quickly.
These considerations suggest a for
mula for ground forces, at some ech
elon, which wouk associate:
Mechanized units with an am
phibious capability to hug tbe terrain
and control axes and corridors fav
orable to tanks, while infantry in hel
icopters or fixed-wing airplanes per
form the same task in zones not suit
able for )arge, mechanized units.
Low-altjtude,
airmobile units
equipped with air-to-surface missilee
capable of rapidly concentrating fwe
power at a given point, and dispersing
before tbe enemy can react.
The task of the mechanized units
would be reconnaissance and harass
ment. Units would be so dispersed and
so fluid that they would not constitute
targete which could be seized or at
tacked with nuclear fire. They would
have lese firepower than the airmobile
units whose task would be sudden,
brief, and violent intervention.
Both categories of forces comple
ment each other, and their close coor
dination within the ground forces as
a whole is needed.
Even this cursory examination of
air mobility reveals that the list of
problems still unresolved is a king one,
It includes these important ones:
/
The capabilities and lim tations
of air mobility.
The relative importance of air
mobile forces within the ground
forces. .
The echelon at which they should
be employed with conventional forces.
The organization and equipmsnt
of the airmobile unit.
More advanced studies may show
that todays solution would end in an
impasse in the foreseeable future, or
they may conclude that airmobile
forces will once again return maneu
ver to ts former tactical importance.
What is needed now is to take the
next step in development and to pre
pare for the future. It is not only
trees that require 20 years for growth.
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SECOND ONWARHOUGHTS
A ConversationWith B. H. I.jddell Hart
rian ond
This gear marks a notewo?lhy stage in the long career of Cap-
tain
B. H. Liddell Hart British
Army
Retired. His 70th birthdag
will be honored by a
Festschrift
edited by
Professor
Michael Hozu-
ard; his memoirs mill be published in
two
volumes; and
this month
ke ?uill be
in
the United Stutes as Distinguished Visiting Profes-
sor at the University of
California.
In this conversat io?t he answers questions by
Brian Bond lec
turer in
History at Liverpool University on various aePects of his
thinking on military matters.
Mr.
Bond is the author of Some At-
tractions and Pitfalls of Military History which a?JPeaved in the
February 1965 iesue of the
MILITARYREvIEw.-t?ditor.
September1965
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Tff fs t f 6t fTS ON WAN
BOND
\
. .
LIDDELLHART
BOND
)
LIODELL HART
hr 1944 yo u p ub l is he d a st imulat ing book ent i t led THOUGHTSON WAR
whichembodiedt he essenc e of your mi l i t ary t hi nk ing bet ween t he
w ar s. In t h e Pr efac e yo u r emar ke d t h at t h is w ss a ne ce ssa ry pr el i mi .
nary to an u l t ima te comple te syn thesis . Has the revo lut iona ry change
i n t he whol e nat ure of w ar mark ed by t he devel opment of nuc lear
w eapons made yo u f eel t h at
a
gener al su rve y on I lausew i t zi an f i ne s
i s no l onger w or th at t e mp t ing?
Cert ai nl y suc h a sur vey w oul d now be mai nl y nf hi st ori c al i nt erest .
si nc e t he expl osi on of t he f i rst at emi c bombs i n 1S45, t he t heor y of
w ar h as been i n a st a te of f l ux, and i n my vi ew t he t r adi t i onal not i on
-of
la
grande guerre i s as dead as a doe rnai l . Nevertheless, a compre
hen si ve stu dy e f st r ate gy on Cl ar rsew i t zi ar r l i nes c oul d w el l ai d t h e
proc ess of readj ust ment t o modern c ondi t ions of f i mi t ed w arf are. I
she rr ld st i l l l i ke t o at t e mpt suc h a stu dy i f t i me, and age, al l ow .
THOUGHTS ON WAR revealed how assiduously you developed and chis
el ed aw ay at your i deas t hrough regul ar not ebook j ot t ings. I k now
you a re st i l l an indefa t igable reco rder o f though ts and conversa t ions,
and I w onder how your present c onc erns c ompare w it h t hose of t he
1920 s and 1930 s. I have i n mi nd t h at i n t ho se d ays yo u w er e a mi l i .
ta ry correspondent t ry ing to in f luence events f rom day to day , whereas
now yo ur posi t i on i s one of g re ate r deta chment . I w oul d expe ct yo ur
mai n i nt e rest s now to be w i t h hi st or ic al r eappr ai sal s?
Yes, you are ri ght on t he mark . To put i t mi ldl y, I f i nd muc h of t he
w ri t ing on c ont empor ar y mi l it a~ af f ai rs f ul l of j argon and repet i t ion
+-n short , bori ng. si nc e WorldWarN,1havefr equent l yset out my
views on the most hopefu l s t ra tegy
f or t he West , and t hese have
c ome t o be adopt ed af t er a t hne. But i t i s a t edi ous pr oc ess, and I
f i nd mo re i nt er est i n t h e r eappr ai sal o f hi st o ri c al eve nt s.
BONO
In 1934 you not ed: The more 1st udy w ar, t he more I c ome t o f eel
t h at t he c ause of w ar i s f u ndamen tal l y psyc hol ogi c al r ath er t han PO
Ii t i cal or economic . . . .
Unt i l we underst and w ar i n t he f ul lest
24
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THOUWITS ON WAR
.
lIDDELL HART
BOND
sense w hi ch i nvol ves an under st andi ng of men i n w ar , among ot her
el ement s, i t seems t o me t hat w e c an have no mor e pr ospec t of pr e
vent i ng w ar t han t he savage has of pr event i ng pl ague.
Woul d you agree t hat t here i s st i l l a deart h of book s w hi ch i magi
nat i vel y and success ful l y por t ray men s reac t i ons i n war? I somet imes
th ink that THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE remains unsurpassed al thougl i ,
of c our se, St ephen Crane w as not w ri t ing f r om exper ienc e.
Wel l , h arc ll y a d ea rt h . i t h in k yo u ove rva lu e THE RED BADGE OF COUR- ,
AGE fo r , a l thoogh I wou ld st i l l i nc lude i t i n recommended reading l i s t s
as a r emar kabl e w or k of i magi nat i on, I have r eser vat i ons about i t
which probab ly ar ise because Crane then lacked a f i rs thand exper ience
o f b at t l e .
The bock which part ic ularl y exert ed a f ormat ive inf luence on my
t hought a s a c ompl ement t e my ow n experi enc e i n t he Fi rst Werl d
Warwas Ardant du Pi cqs BATTLE STUDIES: AHCIEHT AND MODERN
BATTLE. Fe rd inand Fochs book on THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR put me
on t o Ar dant du Pi cq, and I r ead hi m (i n Fr enc h, I t hi nk ) about 1920.
Thi s w as bef or e t he spat e of w ar beok s si rc h as C. E. M ont ague s
DISENCHANTMENT, and i t c l i c ked w i th my ewn ref l ec t i ons. I t st ressed ,
f or exampl e, t hat , despi t e al l t he t al k and propaganda, sw ords and
bayonet s rarel y c rossed i n ac t i on-bat t l es w ere dec ided, rat her, i n
t he t roops mi nds.
Of mo de rn w r it e rs, S. L. A. M arsh al l , i n b oo ks l i ke PORK CHOP HI LL
and THE RIVER ANO THE GAUNTLET, i s par t i cu larly good in convey ing
t he f eel of c ombat . I do have reservat ions about t he possi bi li ty of
su ch d et ai l ed rec on st ruc t i on s o f ba t t le f ie ld e ve nt s be cau se o f m y e x
per ienc e of t he f al t i t r il i ty o f human memor y- whi c h nat or al l y t ends t o
be al l t h e g re at e r when w i t ne sse s a re t r yi ng t o r ec ol l ec t . e xa c t f ywha t
ha pp ene d i n t h e h ea t o f ac t i on . Wi t h a f a st -mo vi ng t i gh t , t h e di f f i c ul t y
i nc reases. But I i mmenset y admi re Sl am M arshal l s w ork on suc h
c ase hi st or i es-bet t er w ork t han anyone el se has done i n t hat w ay.
I w onder i f you st i ll bel ieve t hat phi losopher s w o~d mak e t he best
r ul er s? I do ubt whet h er m en w i t ho ut t h e l ust f o r p ower woul d do e ve n
as wel l i n o f f i ceas those w i th i t ; a f te r a ll , i n any rea l i st i c se t t i ng, they
woul d be su bj ec t t o e no rm ous p re ssu re s f r om di sc on t en t ed a nd am bi
t i ous contenders. Do you th ink you yourse l f wou ld have been co rrup ted
by pow er i f y ou had hel d, sa y, an i mpor tant hf i ni st r y i n t he 1930 s or
1940s?
Sept embsr1965 25
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THOUGHTS ON WAR
. LIODELL HART
BONO
LIOOELL HART
\
BONO
LIDDELL HART
Not p ro fess ional phi losophers, Bu t Iwould s tand bywhat 1 then wrote ,
You put i t t oo s t rongly in saying a l ust f o r power ; I wou ld say , rather ,
a l i k ing f o r r esponsibi l i t y. So m any men a re wor ri ad by
responsibi l i ty
and f ind i t we ighs on them, whereas I have never f e l t t h i s wax indeed,
I should have a lways wel c omed m or e o f i t .
I wou ld al so m ak e a di st i nc t i on be tween want i ng t o exe rc i se e f f ec t i ve
i nf luenc e and w ant ing t o hol d of f ic e-i t s t he t endenc y t o c ovet a nd
t hen c l i ng t o o ff i c e t hat c o rr up t s. As f o r m y own c ar ee r, I t hi nk I was
f ai rl y r eal i st i c . It w as Lest i e Here-Bel i sha s c ompr omi ses on k ey i s.
sues, in t he hepe o f easing acceptance o f t he general pol i cy o f re form
and moderni zat i on, t hat st ul t if i ed t he ef f ec t of Ids ef f or ts w it hout
appeasing h is c r i t i cs. He came to recogn ize that h imse l f i n ret rospec t ,
a f t er h is r emova l f r om t he War Of f i c e.
Aren t you rea l l y asking for wise professional pol it ic ians who wil l seek
expert advice?
Yes, e ven a phi l osopher i n my se nse w oul d need a sui t abl e t eam o f
c ow or ker s- men w ho w eul d be ment al l y and meral l y r ead y t o r ec oi n.
mend rad ical change i nstead o f s i t t i ng on the fence . I have made th is
poin t s t rong ly whenever I have been approached in recen t years about
under tak ing an o f f i c ial t ask in Whi tehal l .
i n 1936 you not ed t ha t ga s w as pl ayi ng a dec i si ve pa rt i n t he It al i an
c onquest o f Et hi op ia . I t has a lways puzzled m e why gas was not em
p loyed in t he Second World War. I s t h is a curious case
where popular,
ant iwar sent iment and emot ional ism has prevented the use of a rela
t ively indestructive weapon, or do you think soldiers and governments
have been restrained by more practical considerat ions?
A m ixt u re o f r easons and f eel i ngs. Be tween t he war s, c onven t iona fi q
w as t he domi nant f ac tor, and i n t hi s respec t i t i s si gni f i cant t hat
l i t t l e was don~ t o deve lop nonlet ha l t ypes o f gas. Dur i ng t he Second
Worl d War mut ual det errenc e w as t he mai n expl anat i o~ bot h si des
k new t he ot her had new l et hal g ases avai l abl e, and t her e w er e al so
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BONO
IIDDELL HART
P
Now the time was the time of
fhe first ripe grapes.
Theyear was about 1200 B.C.
A iittle later one reads, in the sec.
ond chapter of Joshua, of an early
Lieutenant Colonel Fielding L.
Greates is
with the Ofiee of the As
sistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,
Department of the Arvnv. He served
i?z Europe during World War II, and
subsequentl~ was stationed
in Ger
many, China, and Turkey, and was
assigned to the Brifish Crown CO1OTZII
of Hong Kong. FoUozoing kis com
pletion qf the 1961 Regular Course of
the U., S. An?rtIJ Command and Gen
eral Sfaff College, he served for three
yeffrs on the facultti.
tactical intelligence mission. In this
irrstance, Joshua, one of the agents
sent earIier into Canaan, in
hia turn
sent two spies into the city of Jericho.
Even more ancient than those in.
tel]igence missions is the account of
the Battle of Kadesh. Kadesh was the
scene of a clash in 1288 B.C. between
two mighty kingdoms, and the out
come ended forever the hopes of the
one to invade and conquer the other,
Both Egyptian and Hittite accounts
of the battle, and of a subsequent
treaty, have survived toourtime, and
both record the key role played by
intelligence.
Fidse Infnrmstion
Ramses II of Egypt, marching
northward along the Orontes Rivet,
reached a point about halfway be
tween the present-day cities of Horns
and Dam4seus when he fell victim to
a counterintelligence gambithe took
at face value false information prO
vided him by two Hittite agents. Ac
cepting them as deserters from the
Hittite Army, and believing theirre.
port that King Muvattallish and bis
Hittite warriors had withdrawn far
to the north, he allowed his strung
out and divided forces, moving with
out adequate reconnaissance, to be
ambushed and taken in flank while on
the march, and a large part of his
army was routed.
The victorious Hittites then fell to
looting the camp of the foremost
Egyptian march unit, whkh had en
camped earlier, and in their eager
pursuit of plunder they failed to sta
tion sefurity guards. This, combined
witbthe timely arrival of an Egyptian
detachment which had marched by a
different route, prevented the com
plete destruction of Ramses army
The heavy Egyptian losses, brought
about as a result of their intelligence
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zore important,
the prompt piecing together of these
bit~ and scraps to. make a pattera,
David United States Nauv could
never have coped with the Japanese
Goliath.
Although Tarawa wasan American
victory, an intelligence failure re
35
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INTELLIGENCE
.mdted in landing craft grounding
some 450 meters from shore, forcing
the marine landing force to wade that
entire distance exposed to a murder
ous fire. A large part of the first days
1,500 casualties were thus directly
attributable to faulty terrain intelli
gence.
General Douglas MacArthurs mas
terful uee of terrain intelligence, tO-
US troops
head for the heath on Wohai
in
1950
-gether with the failure of North
Korean intelligence to anticipate his
move, saw the daring and eminently
successful landing at Inchon, deep in
the enemy rear, This was counterbal
anced later by the failure of Ameri
can intelligence fully
to
appreciate
Chinese Communist intentions prior
to their massive intervention south
of the Yalu.
The Bay of Pigs is another classic
example, this time of a three-way in
telligence failure. Security was nrac.
-
tically nonexistent, and Fidel Castro~s
intelligence was aware of the impend.
ing landing, as evidenced by the fact
that the landing force waa met and
destroyed on the beach. Althaugh it
was known that the security was bad
and that rumors and reports were
even appearing in the public press of
an impending operation, the force
US
Island dnring the Inchon landing operations
was sent in. And the appreciation of
the attitude and intentions of the
Cuban populace at large-that the
people would rise to support the land
ingproved disastrously wrong.
The number of such examples is
legion. Speaking of legion-consider
hnw the three legions of Quintilius
Varus were annihilated in A.D. 9 in
the Teutobu rger Wald by the German
Arminius. Varus fault, as the reader
may have guessed by now, was faulty
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INTELLIGENCE
reconnaissance-lack of intelligence.
The reader may exercise his imag
ination to consider how the outcomes
of these battles cited might have dif
fered had the quality of the intelli
gence available to the commander
been different. Rather than extend
the liet indefinitely, we will coneider
only two more battles, claesic battlee
which have received much attention
from students of military history.
Cannae
The Battle of Cannae has been held
up as a model for the tactical double
envelopment, as an excellent example
of the defensive-offensive battle, and,
above all, ae the claesic battle of an
nihilation. It is also a prime example
of the role of intelligence as the key
to victory.
Roman habitual failure to provide
adequate reconnaieeance had earlier
allowed Hannibal to destroy two
Roman Armies, one at the Trebbia
in 218 B.C. and the other at Lake
Trasimeno the following year. Han
nibals inteRigence chief had spice in
Rome itself, and Hannibal wae well
informed not only of the mood pre
vailing at the capital, but also of the
quality of the newly raieed levies led
jointly by the coneule Luciue Aemil
ius Paulue and Marcus Terentius
Varro, levies which outnumbered his
own army nearly 2 to 1.
In addition, he wae aware that
Paulus was a conservative, experi
enced soldier, while Varro was impet
uons, a newly elected consul with
little or no previous military experi
ence. And he knew tbe key fact
that when two consuls took the field
together, they commanded on alter
nate days. He knew when the eager
but unskilled Varro would be in com
mand. On that fateful eummer day
September1965
in 216 B.C., therefore, he made hie
move and hrred Varro into battle.
The Carthaginians also took ad.
vantage of the occaeion to practice
two deceptions. Early in the action,
we are told by Livy, a party of come
500 Numidian horsemen pretended to
defect from Hannibals army, were
accepted as defectore,
and were
passed to the rear of the cavalry on
the Roman left. From that vantage
point they later struck the Roman
rear and haetened their defeat. Later,
in the main infantry battle, Hanni
bals thin but carefully placed infan
try center allowed itself for a time
to be pushed back to form a pocket,
anchored by stronger units on both
flanks, into which the eagerly ad
vancing Roman infantry was first
lured, then compressed before being
hit in flank and rear, and, thereby,
annihilated.
Tannenberg
Tbe other claesic battle is Tannen
berg. It, like Cannae, ,is taught both
at the United States Military Acad
emy to cadets and at tbe United
States Army Command and General
Staff CORege to more senior practi
tioners of the military art. The em
phasis ie always placed on tbe skiR
ful use by the Germans of their
interior lines, and their brilliant ap
plication of aIl of the principles of
war.
But again, Tannenberg is more
than just an example of masterful
tactics, or of the application of the
principles of war. It is a classic ex
ample of both victory and defeat owed
to intelligence-good intelligence on
the part of tbe Germans, faulty intel
ligence on the part of the Russians.
Russian communication problems
and equipment shortages led to their
extensive reliance on commercial tele
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INTELLIGENCE
phone and telegraph facilities. On
two successive daystwo critical
days ae it turned outthe Russians
used radio to communicate in un.
coded, clear text their troops loca.
tions and planned moves. German in
telligence, in historys first use of ra
dio
intercept correctly estimated that
the broadcast were genuine and not
Russian efforts at deception. General
Paul von Hindenburg was thereby
emboldened to str ip the German
forces from opposite General Pavel
K. Rennenkampfs Ist Army and to
mass all his forces to meet General
Alekeandr Samsonovs 2d Army,
leaving only a single cavalry division
as a screen to delay the Ist Army.
An additional bit of intelligence in
formation was available to the Ger
man intelligence staff, namely, that
Rennenkampf and Samsonov were
not kindly disposed toward one
another and, therefore, might not be
ardent iB coming to one anothers as
sistance. A German officer then on
Von Hindenburgs staff had, as an
observer in Manchuria during the
Russo-Japanese War, seen those same
two individuals engaged in a fist fight
on t
h
e railway station platform at
Mukden. It is interesting how such
seemingly trivial affairs may contrib
ute
to
great events in later times.
On the Russian side of the inteRi
gence battle, in addition to the lack of
commurucation seeurity, there was
another serious shortcoming. The
Russians
generally
reconnoitered
adequately to their flanks, but con
ducted practically no reconnaissance
to their front. Thus, tbe 1st Army
dawdled instead of knifing through
tbe hne cavalry division opposing it.
Thu~ too, 2d Army marched head
long :into the German trap, Samsonov
himself being unaware of the danger
nntil an entire corps had been deci.
mated.
By then it was too late; his army
was doomed. This lack of adequate
reconnaissance by the Russians is
doubly curious, inasmuch as all three
Russian commandersboth
army
commanders and their superior, Gen
eral Jilinski, the army group tom.
manderwere generals of cavalry,
that branch of the service most closely
devoted to the business of reconnais
sance.
Without his precise knowledge of
the present and future positions of
tbe main Russian forces, Von Hin.
denburg would have been unbeliev.
ably reckless to move units as he did
to meet and destroy tbe 2d Army.
Had tbe Russians reconnoitered ag
gressively to the front, 1st Army
would not have been deceived and de
layed by a mere division of cavalry,
and 2d Army, instead of blundering
headlong into disaster, would have
had time to form up properly to meet
the Germans at Tannenberg.
Thue, both Cannae and Tannen
berg, long cited as claesic examplee of
the battle of annihilation, are also
classics of another sort-classic bat
tles won, and lost, by intelligence.
It matters not what the field of en
deavor or the professionwbether
battle or commerce or politics, med]
cine or footballthe basic rule is uni.
versal end invariable. To make a good
decision, the decision maker requires
good information.
In the conflicts of today and to
morrow, we can never lose sight of
the lesson learned from the battles of
yesterdayintelligence is tbe key
which unjocke the door
to
victory.
Mil i tary Revie