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I ps** "'4g UNITED STATES,;.y .,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

E o REGION ||h ;$ 101 MARIETTA ST, N.W., SUITE 3100

o, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report No.: 50-389/83-29

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company9250 West Flagler StreetMiami, FL 33101

Docket No.: 50-389

License Nos.: CPPR-144 and NPF-16

Facility Name: St. Lucie 2

Inspection at St. Lucie sit near Ft. Pierce, Florida

Inspector: OA M[d. E. P. Krug" (/ Date Signed'

Approved by: 4 Qa s_ Y/J6/dF. Jape, Settion Chief f/ Dat~e Sig'necEngineering Program BranchDivision of Engineering and Operational Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 5-8, 1983

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 29 inspector-hours on site in thearea of emergency operating procedures (E0P) and the procedure for the initialloading of the core.

Results

Of the area inspected, one apparent violation was found in an E0P, Violation,Failure to Follow Procedure. paragraph 5.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager*D. A. Sager, Operations Supervisor*P. Fincher, Training Supervisor*R. R. Jennings, Technical Staff Supervisor*A. W. Bailey, QA Supervisor*N. Roos, Quality Control*J. J. Walls, Quality Control 1

*R. Hayes, Technical / Operations !

J. Spodick, Training InstructorD. Marple, Shift SupervisorK. Thomas, RC0C. Ward, RC0M. Dryden, Plant Engineer IIL. Pearce, Shift SupervisorB. Parks, Shift Technical AdvisorJ. Pestianni, Trainee

Other licensee employees contacted included three technicians, twooperators, and three office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

*S. A. El rodH. Bibb

* Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 8,1983, withthose persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledgedthe inspection findings.

a. Violation, 389/83-29-01: Failure to Follow a Procedure - paragraph 5.

b. Inspector Followup Item 389/83-29-02: Revise ATWS Procedure 2-0030132- paragraph 5.b.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved _ items were not identified during this inspection.

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5. Emergency Procedures (42452)

a. The licensee's Emergency Operating Procedure Number 2-0030141(Revision 2), titled " Control Room Inaccessibility (CRI).", wasreviewed and " walked through" by the inspector, with the assistanceof a licensed reactor operator of the licensee's operations staff.

On the "B" side of the Hot Shutdown Panel board, green lights appearedto be disabled on the cold leg temperature indicator. In addition,the "B" side temperature indicator appeared to be failed high atapproximately 590 F. A number of station personnel were uncertainwhether or not the door leading to the Hot Shutdown Panel Room wouldremain open or would be normally locked. On the Reactor Trip Breaker,

| Panel, one breaker showed a " closed" light and an "open" flag, and! numerous lights were burned out.

Item 10 on page 18 of the CRI procedure requires the isolation offeed to the 480V SS Transformer 2A2. Positioning this switch in theisolation position also isolated feed to the 2A5 Transformer. Thisis not indicated on the procedure but is indicated with marking pen on,

| the switch label. Similarly, Item 2 on page 23 requires the isolation; of feed to the 480V SS Transformer 2B2. Positioning this switch alsol isolates SS Transformer 285. This is not indicated on the procedure

but is indicated with marking pen on the switch label.

On page 19, Item 1 indicates " Makeup Bypass to Charging Pumps (V-2514)".The labelling is misleading in that the correct label should be" Emergency Borate" rather than " Makeup Bypass".

On page 22, the switch " Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-ID" was not labeledon the board.

On page 23, the ten items on the procedure are not in the same orderas they appear on the board. Information on page 23 is mute as to thenecessity of performing the items in increasing numerical order. Onpage 3, Item 2.B provides a list of boards and panels with the ,

!direction: " Place isolation switches in the ISOLATE position on thefollowing switchgear in the order listed:". This direction appears toapply to the list of boards and panels, and not necessarily to the,

; switches on any particular board or panel.;

For the switches associated with the directions on page 24, the labelsindicating the " normal" and " isolate" positions are difficult to read.

On page 25, while not indicated in the procedure or on the front of theboard, the switches associated with items 3 and 4 are located on theback of the board. Both sides of the board bear copies of page 25 ofthe procedure, but of Revision 0 rather than Revision 2, the latestrevision. In addition, one " extra" switch is on the board but is notlabeled. The " isolate" and " normal" switch positions are difficultto read.

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With respect to the directions on page 26, the motor control centercontains unlabeled " spare" switches, and all the switches bear" isolate" and " normal" labels which are difficult to read.

The isolation panel addressed on page 27 is located in the batterycharging room and this fact is not indicated in the procedure. Thepanel also contains six unlabeled switches. The panel is called" Isolation Panel 2AB" on page 27, but the panel label says " Transfer2AB". Finally, the panel cover, which must be opened to access theswitches, is not fitted with wing nuts, so that is difficult toopen by hand.

On page 28, the order of the items does not conform to the order oflocation of the switches on the panel. The procedure does not indicatewhether or not the order of isolation of the switches is important.The procedure refers to " Isolation Panel 2A", whereas the panel islabeled " Transformer Panel 2A".

Page 29 calls the panel " Isolation Panel 2B", whereas the panel islabeled " Transfer Panel 2B". Here again, the importance of switchordering is not addressed, but the panel cover is secured with wingnuts.

Page 30 addresses the Communications Isolation Panel. Page 30 of theprocedure (but Revision 0 rather than Revision 2) was posted on thewrong panel. The posted (wrong) panel was not secured with wing nuts,was difficult to open, and contained no switches. The apparently" correct" panel, which appeared to be mislabeled, was to the left ofthe posted panel and contained only two switches, rather than thethree identified on page 30 of the procedure. In addition, the twoswitches were not labeled.

With resoect to page 23, the switch associated with Item 1 indicates" Local" or " Remote", not " Normal" or " Isolate". Same problem onpage 34.

With respect to page 36, Items 1 and 2, the procedure refers to a" Local" switch position, but the switch contains no such label. Theswitch positions are labeled " Isolate", " Normal-Manual", " Normal", and" Auto".

Page 37 refers to two switches which are not directly labeled.Identification numbers near the switches must be correlated withidentical numbers on the adjacent board (two switches are on theright side of the board, the third is out of sight on the left sideof the board). These identification numbers are not in the procedure.

Page 40 consists of a graph for plotting the cooldown profile of thepressurizer and the reactor coolant system. The controlled copy inthe Hot Shutdown Panel Room was difficult to read.

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Section 6.8 of the procedure requires that a listing of isolationswitches will be posted on boards and panels which the procedurethen identifies. The lists posted correspond to Revision 0 of theprocedure, whereas Revision 2 had been promulgated by the licensee(Violation 389/83-29-01).

b. The licensee's Emergency Operating Procedure Number 2-0030132(Revision 2) titled " Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)"was reviewed by the inspector and extensively discussed withrepresentatives of the Training Department. Two omissions wereidentified. Under initiating event 37, an "and" or an "or"appears to be missing; and under 4.8, the words " manually insertCEA" appear to be missing following the word "and".

The procedure appears to be too terse. For example, emergency borationis addressed by the immediate operator instruction " Emergency Borate"and the specification of the location "RTGB 205". No other emergencyboration procedure is addressed. No additional instructions associatedwith verification of the operation of both trains are included.Fractional Scrams are not addressed. Information associated withexpected plant behavior with boron injection for the guidance of theoperators is not included.

This is identified as inspector followup item 389/83-29-02.

Within the areas inspected in the ATWS procedure, no violations ordeviations were identified.

6. Initial Fuel Load Witnessing (72524B)

The licensee's preoperational test procedure number 2-1600021, Revision 0,titled " Unit No. 2, Initial Core Loading", was previously reviewed by theinspector. As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-389/83-14, no viola-tions or deviations were identified in the areas examined.

With the assistance of licensee personnel, the inspector performed anevaluation of the fuel loading operations in progress. Licensee personnelwere observed and interviewed in the control room, in the fuel storagearea, inside the containment on the refueling bridge, and at the locationwhere the inverse multiplication (1/m) plots were being performed. Theinspector examined the two 1/m plots, each with a different scale, and theywere well behaved. The engineer performing the 1/m plots had previouslyperformed the same function on Unit 1.

Activities at all three locations were progressing smoothly and none of theseven personnel interviewed reported any problems or departures from theprocedure; nor did the inspector observe any.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

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