atlantic voices - nato’s bilateral security cooperation and contribution to the regional security...

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 10 1

- Flora Pidoux

First and foremost, NATO seeks to

secure the Euro-Atlantic region. First built

to encompass countries on both sides of the

Atlantic, the Alliance came to incorporate

more and more members for the reason

that its security does not solely depend on

itself but require global cooperation.

Indeed, it is often that threats rise beyond

the borders of a defined area, meaning that

they are not directly controllable. A

unilateral approach was first used in the

hope that hard power would suffice to

destroy those foreign problems. In light of

the limited results this approach brought,

the emphasis was then put on cooperative

security to engage those countries who are

either also affected by those threats or

within which the threats lie. Building on

NATO’s experience and values, several

partnerships were put in place, first to the

East, then to the South to counteract the

multiple dangers located at NATO’s flanks.

The MENA region is in focus in this

issue, as the region makes the headlines

more and more due to its inherent

instability. The three article dwell on the

Alliance’s partnerships which all aim to

stabilizing the other side of the

Mediterranean. in the hope that it would

also secure Europe and North America.

NATO’s Bilateral Security Cooperation And

Contribution To The Regional Security And Stability in MENA

Volume 5 - Issue 10 October 2015

Contents:

Algeria’s Role in Europe’s Migrant Crisis

Mr. Neil Thompson’s article specifically studies the working relationship

NATO has built with Algeria, mostly at sea, to prevent illegal migration and

human trafficking from reaching the European continent.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bridging The Regional Gap

Ms. Flora Pidoux focuses on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, a practical

partnership aimed at enhancing cooperation at the military level between

NATO and the Gulf countries.

Representatives from NATO, NATO member countries and ICI partners at the North Atlantic Council–ICI seminar in Doha, Qatar on 11. December 2014

(Picture: NATO)


By Neil Thompson

N ATO’s role in Europe’s migrant crisis

has so far been limited. There is no

clear legal role for the Alliance in

managing Europe’s border controls and investigating a

population that partially consists of refugees from

conflict, and partially consists of economic migrants

from failing, corrupt or autocratic states. The issue has

seemed beyond the organisation’s remit, particularly

at a time of renewed tensions with Russia. In addition

the Alliance’s most important member, the United

States, do not seem to have a direct national security

interest in disrupting the ever-shifting routes of

migrants and destroying the trafficking gangs that bring

them to the European continent. Other international

organisations, such as the Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have

instead taken the lead in trying to move European

states toward a common action that manages the

situation.

Nonetheless since 2004 NATO has committed

itself to a zero-tolerance policy on human trafficking.

Neither the Alliance nor the EU have yet declared a

military response of the sort that was launched against

Somali pirates to address the migrant crisis. But

NATO member countries are committed to

participating in any NATO-led operations to prevent

and combat such activity if and when such a policy is

formulated. European Union members have already

discussed proposals back in May for a naval operation

to go after the human trafficking networks bringing

migrants across the Mediterranean from Libya and

these could be reactivated shortly. At the time, NATO

said it was ready to aid in any such effort, especially

given the ties of the major criminal networks to well-

armed Libyan militia groups with access to heavy

weaponry.

But for NATO a part of realising its role in any

requested anti-trafficking operation is the cultivation of

better military and intelligence cooperation on land and

sea with a major southern Mediterranean littoral state.

The prime candidate for this would be Algeria, although

its coastline is rarely used for human trafficking

operations at present. The country occupies a strategic

position as a neighbour of the major Saharan states that

act as transit countries for migrant routes. Moreover its

interior contains a number of major land routes and

trafficking hubs for economic migrants going north and

east through Algeria to Libya and other destinations.

Routes Across The Mediterranean

Although the Mediterranean is a narrow sea it is still

a formidable obstacle to cross as migrant deaths every

year show. Frontex is the primary EU agency in charge

of maximising the effectiveness of member states’ joint

operations aimed at preventing cross border crime,

including human trafficking. According to its data the

Mediterranean hosts three major trafficking routes

crossing its east, centre and west. Of these, the western

Mediterranean route from Algeria and Morocco saw a

mere 6,600 people recorded heading illegally to Europe.

Meanwhile the eastern and central routes saw 132,000

and 91,300 illegal border crossings respectively, up to

July 2015. Further from Syria than Turkey, and in better

control of its territory than Libya’s rival administrations,

Algeria is demonstrably in better control of its coastal

areas than the other two countries.

Algeria’s Role in Europe’s Migrant Crisis


NATO member Turkey is the base for the largest

number of migrants attempting to cross via the Eastern

sea route. But organised criminal networks in Turkey are

unlikely to assume the threatening proportions they have

in nearby Libya. Though suffering from its own internal

security threats from Kurdish and left-wing militants,

Turkey still possesses effective state organs with which to

fight human trafficking originating from its territory.

Moreover as a NATO ally it has been able to call on the

Alliance previously for helping in handling Syrian issues,

such as the special talks under Article 4 held in July at

Ankara’s request.

The same is not true of post-revolutionary Libya since

the failure to form a unity

government there.

Detections for migrants

using the central

Mediterranean route into

Europe reached a

staggering level in 2014.

More than 170,000

migrants arrived in Italy

alone, representing the

largest influx into one

country in European

Union history. Traffickers

could not sustain such

large flows of people crossing the Mediterranean without

bases and infrastructure on land. The lack of rule of law

and basic police enforcement in post-Gadhafi Libya has

allowed traffickers’ smuggling networks to thrive. As a

result migrant detection missions in the central

Mediterranean have often turned into search and rescue

operations.

The Necessity Of North-South Agreements

Between 2009 and 2011 the Gadhafi regime’s

bilateral agreement on migration with Italy (which also

signed similar agreements with Tunisia and Egypt)

severely curbed human trafficking networks’ room for

manoeuvre. The 2011 outbreak of hostilities between

the autocratic regime and its Western partners then

removed the local cooperation that southern European

states had relied upon to curb human trafficking.

However if the political will is there, the present size

and brazenness of smuggling operations in Libya means

there are now identifiable land-based hubs for human

trafficking which can be disrupted in the short term by

military action.

At present naval migrant detection patrols alone are

ineffective as a deterrent because, even if intercepted

at sea, humanitarian

requirements mean that the

migrants are brought ashore

to Europe. Trafficking

groups often send migrants

out in massively

unseaworthy old fishing

vessels and overladen rubber

dinghies gambling they will

be intercepted and rescued.

Such naval operations also

do not disrupt the land-

based routes which bring

migrants to the Libyan coast, nor suppress the

trafficking infrastructures used to house and launch

them towards their destination. Furthermore

operations involving use of force against land-based

camps and smuggling boats beached ashore, such as

envisioned by the EU in May, need local intelligence,

bases and military/police cooperation to be effective in

the long run. Otherwise trafficking groups will simply

adapt and shift their operations to new areas.

President Bouteflika of Algeria shaking hands with former NATO

Secretary General, Lord Robertson at NATO Headquarters during

the Algerian President's first visit to NATO on December, 20th 2011,

a year after Algeria joined the Mediterranean Dialogue

(Photo: NATO)


Fortunately NATO has already been engaged in

the Middle East and North Africa for nearly twenty

years through the partnership programme known as

the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the more

recent Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The best

choice of local partner remains Algeria, both because

it is functional as a sovereign Mediterranean state, and

because it has been an MD member since 2000. The

MD provides an avenue to approach the Algerian

directly from NATO itself without having to rely on

EU intermediaries. Meanwhile control over territory

and the legal movement of people across borders are

common principles that NATO and its non-NATO

North African partners can all agree upon. With

cooperative security adopted at the Lisbon Summit in

November 2011 as one of three key priorities for the

Alliance’s new Strategic Concept for the MD forum,

the trafficking issue therefore offers a relatively

uncontroversial way to approach Algiers about

working more closely with the Alliance. This can be

politically difficult for North African governments to

do on some issues.

Cooperation At Sea - Local Partnership

Needed

Algeria’s government has a reputation for jealously

guarding its sovereignty on security issues and the

perceived lack of transparency on the part of the

Algerians has not helped foster a positive working

relationship with the US. But political consultations

are already held between NATO and Algiers on a

regular basis at both the ambassadorial and working

level to discuss and share views on issues relevant to

the security of the Mediterranean. As such the MD

forum is perfectly positioned to begin talks about

further cooperation with NATO patrol vessels at sea,

if the Alliance is called in, especially since the

Algerian navy is the branch of the Algerian security

services with the deepest history of institutional

cooperation with NATO.

One recent example had Alliance ships taking part

in a three day exercise last year with Algerian vessels in

a deployment which was scheduled a year ahead

through the MD’s annual Work Programme. That this

sort of long-planned operation can go forward

successfully shows the possibility exists for a successful

overture to be made to Algeria’s military and political

leadership regarding wider cooperation at sea. Algiers

has so far steadfastly refused to allow ‘boots on the

ground’ in its south. A modest proposal to expand the

frequency of naval exercises could bypass this and

eventually be a step toward joint migrant-detection

patrols, with Algerian vessels taking on a new role for

themselves in enforcing security in sectors of the

Mediterranean region outside home waters. In any case

a little cooperation with Algeria at sea now is better

than none at all.

In the longer term increased NATO-Algerian naval

cooperation pre-emptively guards against a sudden

future shift in migration patterns or favoured routes

across the Mediterranean. Today the western route

into Europe through Spain and Portugal is quieter than

the eastern and central paths, but this will change. The

geographic locations from which refugees or migrants

leave from constantly shift as regional political and

economic situations improve or decline. This year the

crisis is in Syria, but two years ago it was Mali where

state control collapsed, on Algeria’s own border.

Similarly if the law and order situation in Libya

improves, trafficking networks may seek to take

advantage of their penetration of Algeria’s interior to

move migrants north or west instead of east. By

developing nascent mechanisms for naval

interoperability and institutional collaboration now the


Alliance and Algiers will become much faster to

communicate and respond in the event of a sudden surge

or crisis later.

Guarding The Interior Routes

As stated above partnership leads to interoperability,

which then promotes understanding and therefore

security. Sadly Algeria’s army has had much less practice

at operating alongside NATO than its navy. In the recent

past Algeria has refused Western military bases or drones

to help it fight Islamic militants in its restive south.

However there has already been a 2010 plan for a joint

cross-border anti-terrorist force made up of elements

from all the Saharan states to patrol the interior of the

country. Envisaged as a ‘regional NATO’, it was to be

based at Tamanrasset, the capital of Algeria’s southern

Sahel province. At

the time the target

was Islamic militants

expanding in Mali,

but the people

trafficking networks

operate in the same

lawless

environment.

Reviving such a plan

with Algiers now

would create the

option of updating

the concept of regional cross-border cooperation to curb

trafficking networks long before migrants reached the

Mediterranean.

The MD is a good forum to discreetly raise the

problem of Algeria’s land-based trafficking routes, partly

because of the history of twenty years of day-to-day

discussions between NATO and Algerian officials there,

but also because of the qualitative evolution in relations

between Algeria and the Alliance since an Individual

Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) was

signed between Algeria and the NATO in October

2014. This document defines the major principles of

Algeria's foreign policy and defence but combined with

a reference to the strategic dimension of NATO's

Mediterranean Dialogue. It marks the start of a formal

legal framework outlining security cooperation

between the two and is thus a modest jumping off

point for a closer partnership with the Algerian

military than was possible in 2010.

A good start could be to use the impetus created by

last autumn’s naval visit to schedule an in-land

operation. This could be an on-site train-the-trainers

session led by NATO Mobile Training Teams, or visits

by NATO experts to assess the possibilities for further

cooperation in the

military field in Sahel

province. Both of these

are options under the MD

Work Programme which

can be adapted to the

mission of tackling

smuggling gangs. As with

cooperation at sea initial

progress might be slow as

the army is already tasked

with other security issues

such as tackling a low level

Islamist insurgency and

fighting drug trafficking.

However by developing links to military officers

now NATO will reap the benefits in years to come as

these men are promoted. Moreover any on the ground

capabilities inside Algeria’s interior will pay dividends

in an unstable region. Ties between terrorist networks

and organised criminal groups in North Africa are

traditionally close, such as the case with Libyan

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, with the 28 Permanent Represent-

atives of the North Atlantic Council and the Chairman of the Military Com-

mittee, Gen. Knud Bartels, marked the 20th anniversary of the Mediterrane-

an Dialogue on Tuesday (9 December 2014) in Amman, Jordan.

(Photo: NATO)


traffickers and local militias. Another example is the 2013

In Amenas hostage crisis in eastern Algeria, which was

financed by the cigarette smuggling operations of the al-

Qaeda-linked warlord who organised it. A modest

mission to train Algerian soldiers could yet lead to the

longer term creation of a joint cross-border force that

curbs trafficking and terrorist threats alike.

Conclusion

Even symbolic cooperation between NATO and a

major North African state would represent a step forward

in cross-Mediterranean security when it comes to tackling

human trafficking. Gaining Algerian cooperation at sea

could lead to an agreement to help secure its borders

better on land. This in turn could act as a building block

to creating a truly regional stability force headquartered

in Algeria’s southern Sahel to disrupt trafficking overland

in the Sahara. The indirect effects of this would be more

efficient at shutting down the traffickers than attacking

and destroying traffickers’ boats. Tackling a multifaceted

problem like trafficking from North Africa requires more

than one solution though, and both initiatives should be

pursued.

Neil Thompson is a freelance international relations

analyst whose work has appeared in the Diplomat, the

International Security Network, The Independent and

various other publications. He holds an MA in the

international relations of East Asia and has lived in China

for three years and is presently based in London.

Algeria Press Service, “Algeria Celebrates 20th Anniversary of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue”, October 2014

Algeria Press Service, “Qualitative Evolution in Algeria-NATO relations”, March 2015

Al-Monitor, “Algeria’s Relationship With NATO

Begins To Thaw After Long Chill”, July 2012

BBC website, “Sahara deaths: Niger to close illegal migrant camps”, Sahara Migration Routes Map, November 2013

Frontex, “Trends & Routes”, Migratory Routes Map & Data, May 2015

Global Risk Insight, “An Awkward Alliance: US-Algeria Security Cooperation”, September 2015

Guardian, “EU Draws Up Military Plans For Attacks On Libya Targets To Stop Migrant Boats”, May 2015

Heritage Foundation, “NATO Should Improve Relations With Its Southern Neighbours”, July 2012

Maghreb Confidential, “A Regional NATO in Tamanrasset”, April 2010

NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) website, “NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Visits Algeria”, September 2014

NATO website, “NATO and Tunisia Reaffirm Willingness to Deepen Cooperation”, June 2015

NATO website, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue”, February 2015

Naval Today, “Spain and Algeria Take Part In Joint Exercise”, June 2015

About the author

Bibliography


By Flora Pidoux

T he North Africa and Middle East

(MENA) region has been the apple of

discord amongst world powers for

centuries as the region stands in the crossroads

between continents and oceans, and also possesses

many natural resources of extreme importance. For

those reasons, and many more, conflicting interests

collide there, and combined with ethnical and religious

disparities, make it a very unstable region. Located in

the Old Continent’s backyard, Europe often feels the

effects of this volatility. The expression whereby a

region is in a country’s backyard needs to be

understood geographically and figuratively, as

illustrated by the importance MENA plays for NATO

and its member states due to its proximity with

Europe, and also because of the security imbrication of

the two regions.

For many decades, Western powers have

attempted to solve the issues of the region unilaterally.

The failures of this type of action and the emergence of

powerful regional actors, especially from the Gulf,

have pushed the West and NATO to incorporate the

locals into a dialogue to address the contention. In an

effort to improve the security of Euro-Atlantic region,

the emphasis has been put on cooperative security.

This concept now stands in the heart of the Alliance’s

work, which also provides a partial solution to the

financial constraints facing the member states.

Negotiating and developing local solutions to local

problems thus became central strategies to be pursued

as they cater to the needs and reality of the stricken

countries. It is following that idea that the Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was added to NATO’s

partnership list in 2004, in an effort to engage the

South further into the Alliance’s security and defense

efforts.

The importance of building cooperative

relationships with the Alliance’s surroundings and

direct neighbourhood was emphasized by Deputy

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Adm.

Luciano Zappata, who, in 2009 declared:

“The vast dimension of the emerging area of responsibility

and interest covers traditional NATO borders, but also ranges

from the Strait of Bering to Norway and Estonia; from the

Bosphorus-Dardanell es, the Gibraltar Strait and the

Mediterranean Sea to the High North; and from the Suez

Canal to the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, the Arabian Sea and

Persian Gulf – and possibly beyond.” (NATO International,

Allied Command Transformation, February 3, 2009)

In December 2014, NATO Secretary General Jens

Stoltenberg, focused specifically on the ICI as it

“send[s] a very strong signal that the security stability of

the Gulf region is important to NATO, just as the

security stability of the Euro-Atlantic region is

important to the Gulf.” In a time of political unrest in

North Africa, and of social repression in the Gulf,

securing the region is crucial for NATO. As illustrated

by the current refugee crisis flooding the European

continent, it would be unwise to look for solutions to

European problems without incorporating the other

side of the Mediterranean.

From Eastern Europe to MENA

The end of the Cold War triggered the creation of

new partnerships in an effort to integrate and

democratize the countries of the collapsed Warsaw

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative:

Bridging The Regional Gap


Pact. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was thus

initiated to involve Central and Eastern European

countries in questions related to the defense and

security of the transatlantic region with the ultimate

goal of fully integrating those nations into the Alliance.

A few years later, it was finally recognized and

acted upon the fact that the security of the European

continent was also linked to the fate of the Southern

flank of the Alliance. In order to foster better

understanding of each side of the Mediterranean, the

Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was put in place in

1994. Involving Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, this multilateral

political initiative has allowed for its members to

discuss relevant regional security issues, in an effort to

act in a coordinated manner on issues with

international implications.

Those two fora, however, only comprised part of

NATO’s Southern Flank: the Gulf countries remained

excluded from both the MD and the PfP. In June

2004, during the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of

State and

Government in

Istanbul, a new

initiative was put

forward to foster

closer cooperation

with countries in

the greater Middle

East. The Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative thus “aims to contribute to long

-term global and regional security by offering

countries of the broader Middle East region practical

bilateral security cooperation with NATO.” The ICI

also seeks to complement the Gulf Cooperation

Council, an intergovernmental economic and political

union for the Arab Gulf countries by adding a

cooperative defense component to the region.

Although the six countries of the Gulf were invited to

join, only Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) and Bahrain have joined the ICI – Saudi Arabia

and Oman have, however, neither accepted nor rejected

the possibility of joining in the future. Any country

could potentially demand to join the initiative; it would

be up to the North Atlantic Council to accept the

membership request.

A Practical Partnership

The focus of the ICI is primarily on practical

cooperation to coordinate NATO and the four Gulf

countries’ fight against terrorism and on weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) deterrence in the region. “ICI

relies on seven principles that frame the partnership’s

activities: non-discrimination, self-differentiation,

inclusiveness, two-way engagement, non-imposition,

complementarity and mutual engagement, and

diversity.” It also rests on regular consultation to ensure

that all parties contribute to the success of the initiative.

Based on a 28+1 format, this bilateral agreement allows

the Gulf countries to individually engage in practical

activities with the Alliance. Those activities include

“advice on defense

transformation”,

“military-to-military

cooperation to

contribute to

interoperability”,

intelligence sharing,

border security

coordination, and

“civil emergency planning” for disaster relief operations.

Training courses, such as the “NATO Regional

Cooperation Course” launched at the Riga Summit in

2006, have also been made available to the members of

the ICI.

The idea behind the initiative is to foster security

cooperation with the aim of contributing to the long

term regional, and in extenso, global stability. The goal is

Foreign Ministers from the ICI member states attending the NATO Wales Summit

(Photo: NATO )


also to build trust and familiarity between NATO and its

Gulf partners. It is hoped that the ICI will also improve

the negative perception that countries in the wider

Middle East region have of the Alliance. This feeling is

caused in part by NATO’s numerous missions in MENA

and also because NATO is often viewed as the United

States’ military force, whose actions have left much

discontent in the region. Setting up the ICI was therefore

a way, in the context of the early 2000s, to send a

message to the oil monarchies of the Gulf, in the hope

that the presence of the Alliance in the region would be

accepted. For that purpose, a strong emphasis has been

put on public diplomacy, translated into regular

Ambassadorial Conferences, to increase the visibility of

the ICI in the Gulf. By including the Gulf in the military

planning through cooperation, NATO thus ensured the

practical involvement of the regional powers in their

overlapping security concerns. The ICI also aims to

complement other organizations, such as the Gulf

Cooperation Forum, by sharing experience and

capabilities in an effort to improve the efficiency and the

interoperability of international missions.

The importance of this initiative has been emphasized

in NATO’s latest Strategic Concept of 2010 whereby it is

stated: “We attach great importance to peace and stability in

the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in

the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a

deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain

ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative.”

As opposed to the PfP, the ambitions for the ICI have

been set low as they aim to build confidence and trust

between its parties, and not to offer membership. So far,

the effects of the partnership have been limited; the most

notable achievement was Qatar and the UAE’s role in

Operation Unified Protector in Libya, for which the two

Middle Eastern countries supported the air effort. Bahrain

and the UAE contributed militarily to NATO’s ISAF

mission in Afghanistan while the other two supported

the effort in other ways. We therefore see efforts being

made at the tactical level, in the hope that they will

bring NATO and the Gulf countries closer on a

strategic level on a long-term scale. The ICI thus

follows a “bottom-up approach by building practical

military-to-military ties to flesh out the political

rapprochement.”

Limits to the NATO-Gulf Cooperation

Despite the efforts made to adapt the format of the

ICI to the demands of the Gulf countries and to avoid

repeating the mistakes of the MD, the initiative is still

facing inherent difficulties which will not be solved in

the near future. Those obstacles are mainly

geopolitical.

First, the absence of Saudi Arabia and Oman in the

ICI limits the intended impact of the partnership.

Indeed, these two countries’ military spending

amounts to 70% of the overall defense expenditures of

the Gulf Peninsula. Having Riyadh and Muscat on

board would tremendously improve the effectiveness

of the ICI and widened the scope of the

interoperability effort. Saudi Arabia also possesses a

strong political influence in the region, which could be

useful to force upon closer cooperation with NATO.

The defection of Oman can be partially explained by its

geographic location across from Iran. A rapprochement

with NATO could have grave repercussions for the

stability of Muscat.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also of importance

here, both in terms of terrorism and WMD

proliferation, but also in regards to alliances and

interests, with some of NATO member states siding

with Israel and the Arab states with Palestine. Regional

rivalries thus act as the most prominent obstacle to

more cooperation between the Alliance and the Gulf

and amongst the MENA region, but also to defining a

more comprehensive regional strategy. The division of


the region can be observed by the mere fact that two

separate cooperative assemblies have been created by

NATO.

Second, the nature of the ICI has been judged as

inadequate and counterproductive for the simple

reason that the Gulf countries do not wish to deal

with NATO directly, but prefer bilateral trade with

individual states. For example, they do not hesitate to

pursue bilateral agendas in terms of arms trade,

energy deals and civil nuclear cooperation directly

with the United States, the

United Kingdom, France,

Russia, China, and India. In

addition, bilateral security

agreements stand in the way

of the Alliance as they

prevent NATO from

developing deeper

cooperation with the

countries of the Gulf. For

example, the US have a built

a strong bilateral relationship

with Bahrain: “Bahrain plays

a key role in regional security architecture and is a

vital U.S. partner in defense initiatives. Bahrain hosts

the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet and participates in U.S.-

led military coalitions”, namely the US-led coalition

fighting ISIL. NATO member states are thus standing

as strong competitors to the ICI for the simple reason

that bilateral agreements between some of the NATO

Member states and the Gulf nations are stronger than

that of NATO.

The ICI therefore needs to be more than the sum

of its parts in order to matter for the Gulf Peninsula.

NATO could have assets to bring to the table if its

members decided to act in concert. The US could

bring its hard power, Europe its smart power which

would enable NATO to be perceived as a security

exporter to the Gulf Peninsula. In addition, the

Alliance has expertise when it comes to post-conflict

reconstruction, which could be of importance in cases

like Yemen. However, from NATO members’ side,

there is a general lack of common understanding

amongst the Alliance as to what the vision is towards

the Gulf countries. For the Eastern members, the

South is of little importance, especially now that Russia

has risen again.

Finally, the lack of incentive for the Gulf countries

to engage further with the Alliance and for new

countries to join the ICI have

been pointed out. Article V

does not apply to NATO’s

partners. The volatility of the

region makes it difficult for

countries to present the

required characteristics to

join. More importantly,

NATO and the Gulf

countries are based on

different societal models,

which impedes

understanding on some

fundamental questions, as illustrated by the Gulf

countries’ refusal to lift Sharia Law for NATO troops.

Although the Alliance is not pushing for the

democratization of the Gulf countries, it would be

hypocritical to deepen the political cooperation with

nations who do not strive for the same societal goals.

Conclusion

The ICI has the potential to bring MENA and

NATO closer together. In a time of high instability in

the former, with repercussions in the latter,

cooperation is needed more than ever. NATO could

replace the US’s “insurance policy” in the region,

which would probably improve the local populations’

opinion of the ICI as it would take away some of the

negative feelings caused by American presence in the

region. But political, geopolitical and cultural

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivering his

speech at the North Atlantic Council – ICI seminar

celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative, Doha, Qatar (Photo: NATO)


considerations are on the forefront and prevent the

partnership from moving forward.

The next step forward, directly linked to the

mission of the ICI, should be to define common

grounds to facilitate the action of the Initiative. For

example, a crucial step would be to find a common

definition of terrorism, as the Gulf and NATO have

conflicting understandings of what qualifies as such,

especially in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

and to the Jihadist movements. In addition, it would

be of extreme importance to see eye to eye on the

question of Iran as it is a central topic when tackling

the security of the Gulf and MENA At large, a

question on which NATO and the Gulf have opposite

sentiments.

The main priority should, however, remain on

acknowledging and acting on the fact that the security

of Europe, of the US and of the Middle East are

indivisible and intertwined. NATO must thus

continue to take a step back and consider the big

picture to find a long-term solution rather than acting

unilaterally to impose a quick fix, which might trigger

resentment and more problems further down the

line. Building partnerships in the Gulf and the MENA

region at large is thus the best way to go.

Flora Pidoux is currently Program Assistant at the

Atlantic Treaty Association. Ms. Pidoux obtained a

Masters in International Relations at Université

Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. She is particularly

interested in analyzing the long term effects of history

on international relations and politics.

Beshr, Hany; “NATO and the Gulf: What’s Next?”; Middle East Institute, 03.03.15 – [Available at:] http://www.mei.edu/content/article/nato-and-gulf-what%E2%80%99s-next

Hallams, Ellen; “NATO at 60: Going Global?”;

About the author

Bibliography

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NATO Wales Summit 2014 http://natosummit2014-usnato.squarespace.com/partnership/

Paloméro, Jean-Paul; “Partnerships – A Part of the Future of NATO”; No.8, 2014, p.42

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