ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 1

Volume 2 - Issue 3, March 2012

Contents:

Global Pulse: The Euro-zone Crisis and the Future of Greece. A Youth Perspective

A new feature of Atlantic Voices. Maria Stamatopoulou explains her understanding of the

Euro-zone crisis and the effect it is having on the present circumstance and future outlook

of the Greek youth.

Missile Defense: A Hazardous and Ineffective Indulgence

In his article, Oliver Jones provides a critical perspective on NATO’s Ballistic Missile De-

fense. He looks at the system that is currently being developed by different Allies, from a

technical and strategic perspective, while also including political aspects into his assessment.

He argues in favour of an adaptation of the program in order to effectively protect citizens

on NATO territory, and not limit the capability to the protection of military forces in thea-

tre.

NATO AND MISSILE DEFENSE: ROCKET SCIENCE OR GLOBAL SECURITY NECESSITY?

A ballistic missile defense architecture for

Europe is one of the current priorities in

NATO’s capability development, as strength-

ened on the occasion of the 2010 Lisbon Sum-

mit and within the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Allies are cooperating in building up the neces-

sary infrastructure for the protection of the

European citizens, and NATO’s Heads of State

and Government are supposed to announce an

important interim missile defense capability at

the upcoming Chicago Summit. Without it be-

ing officially confirmed the missile shield in

progress is currently mainly directed against a

potential missile threat from Iran.

However, several questions have to be asked

in an age of austerity, “Smart Defense” and new

security challenges: Will the missile defense

undertaking become just another example for

the US providing European Allies with essential

capabilities? How can NATO manage to finally

integrate Russia into the project in a way that

missile defense can serve as cornerstone of fur-

ther NATO-Russia partnership? And: What are

the alternatives to building up this program?

The proposed system is to protect NATO Allies from a perceived growing threat from countries like Iran(Photo: The Guardian)

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Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 2

The Crisis

For the past three years, Greece has been experiencing complete

economic turmoil. It is a national test that all the Greek people

have to "pass." The greatest

burden, however, falls on the

youth of the country as they

are expected to come of age

and begin their careers in a

much more pessimistic eco-

nomic climate than that of

their parents.

On January 1st 2002,

Greece and eleven other

countries in the Euro-zone

acquired one common cur-

rency, the Euro. Following

this integration, the Greek gross domestic product (GDP) con-

tinued to grow at rates above the European average, in part be-

cause of investment in infrastructure, associated with the 2004

Olympic Games, and because of easy credit access for consumer

spending. However, between 2001 and 2005, Greece continu-

ally violated the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as

its deficit to GDP ratio climbed well above the 3% rate estab-

lished by the Maastricht convergence criteria.

Greece’s fiscal security has continued to deteriorate since

late 2009 due to a combination of global economic recession and

the local effects of uncontrolled spending. The Greek economy

now faces serious problems. It has the second largest annual state

budget deficit and the second largest public debt in the European

Union.

Greece’s current loan was

secured by an agreement

between Athens and the

Troika (a group of represen-

tatives from the European

Commission, the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund, and

the European Central Bank).

The conditions that Greece

must fulfill until 2015 in-

clude: a 15% reduction in

main pension insurance for

workers in the Public Power

Company and national banks; a 7% reduction in pensions for

members of the Mariners' Retirement Fund; reduction of state

salaries at all levels by 22% and a 32% reduction for employees

under 25 years of age. It was further insisted that the maximum

duration of collective agreements between unions and employers

not exceed three years.

The Economic Future For the Greek Youth

One of the central problems Greece faces, and the main concern

of young people, is a lack of confidence in the country’s politi-

cians. Corruption and nepotism amidst economic downturn

The Euro-zone Crisis and the Future of Greece: A Youth Perspective

By Maria Stamatopoulou

The transatlantic partnership was forged in war two generations ago and maintained for decades under the looming threat of

renewed conflict. With the Alliance now at a crossroads, its future depends on the active engagement of its members’ young

citizens. Committed to this endeavor, YATA is proud to partner with Atlantic Voices and help bring the opinions, analysis, and

commentary of young Atlanticists to the forefront of international debate. By presenting security, economic, and diplomatic

issues through the eyes of future policy and decision makers, Global Pulse aims to build a bridge between the challenges of today

and the solutions of tomorrow. — James M. Bridger, Editor, Global Pulse

The discontent of the Greek youth is palpable (Photo: Reuters)

GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 3

combined with high levels of unemployment, has resulted in

widespread disenfranchisement amongst the youth.

When young people were asked, "what are your plans

for your future?" as part of a Deal News poll, 36% answered "to

create my own business," 34% "to work as an employee in the

private sector," 10.7% "to move to a rural area and engage in

agriculture," while only 5% desired “to work in government.”

Expressing a similar sentiment, 67% of respondents saw the

public sector as "the main obstacle to economic development of

the country.” Given that 64% of respondents answered that

“unemployment” was the “biggest prob-

lem facing young people in the country,”

the threat exists that Greece will experi-

ence a “brain drain” of its young bright

minds. When asked, "if you had the

chance, would you leave Greece?" 66%

of young people answered "yes," while only 22% answered

"no." As a Greek youth, it is true that these circumstances make

us even more pessimistic about our future, but it also makes us

strive even harder for a just society full of opportunity. We real-

ize in our everyday life that many people have lost their jobs and

that recent graduates with remarkable degrees, skills, and poten-

tial remain unemployed.

Continental Dimensions

It is also important to examine the European dimension of the

problem. Many young people who are skeptical of the EU’s re-

sponse to the Greek debt crisis refer to the “European responsi-

bility” to assist Greece.

At the same time that Greece tries to settle its debt crisis,

there is the persistent threat of wealthy EU members revolting

against the Greek rescue package if its conditions are not seen as

tough enough. The concern that Athens will fail to meet its tar-

tough enough. The concern that Athens will fail to meet its tar-

gets has caused deep frustration and divided Greek society.

Since the late-2000s financial crisis, the Euro-zone has estab-

lished and used provisions for granting emergency loans to mem-

ber states in return for the enactment of economic reforms. In

addition, the Euro-zone has enacted measures such as limited

fiscal integration and peer reviews of each state’s national budg-

ets.

So even if the current Greek politicians did not correctly

exploit the money entering the country by making real invest-

ments in the internal economy, and even if they over-borrowed

from banks and other countries inappreciably, that doesn't di-

minish the responsibility of other members of the Euro-zone.

Speaking at the annual meeting of the International Monetary

Fund, the head of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, made a

controversial statement: "The Greek crisis could have been

avoided, but not with the address of the last one or two years,

but two or three decades before. I knew that even France and

Germany have earned huge sums from their exports to Greece,

but I could not say in public what I knew...” This was a state-

ment that shone new light on the problem and added a new layer

to the Greek debate about Euro-zone confidence.

As young people, we don't want to be-

lieve that our membership in the Euro-

zone was fruitless and that all these years

of a flourishing economy were an illu-

sion. It is a fact that the common cur-

rency and the cooperation in financial

policy were very helpful for our country. It was seen as a great

boost to our economic stability and it was the main pillar of our

financial activities.

This economic crisis has hit all of Europe hard, so it means

that the economic framework which all Euro-zone members

followed has failed. It is up to today’s leaders to make necessary

changes to reform basic principles and policies in order to safe-

guard the economic stability in the future. While lacking a direct

role in policy formation, it is the youth of Greece, and the wider

continent, that will have to live with the consequences.

Maria Stamatopoulou is a graduate student in the Interna-

tional and European Relations program at the University of Pi-

raeus, Greece. She is a member of Youth Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion, interning at the Greek Association for Atlantic and European

Cooperation (G.A.A.E.C).

An elderly woman begs outside the Athens headquarters of the Bank of

Greece. The graffiti reads “Police, your children will eat you.”

(Photo: AFP)

While lacking a direct role in policy formation, it is the youth of Greece,

and the wider continent, that will have to live with the consequences.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 4

by Oliver Jones

T he North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Must re-think its missile defence program, failure

to do so will result in unacceptable long term

strategic and political developments that will do far more to

jeopardize the security of the Alliance than the already vague

threat of ballistic missiles launched from “rogue” states in the

international system.

A clear mission married to an apparently tangible capability

may be a political dream-come-true for NATO, but the missile

defence program, like the fabled “Maginot Line” represents a

retrogressive step, a last hurrah of an Alliance that will struggle

to find its place in the modern world. It is an expensive and ulti-

mately obsolete exercise in self-justification that will forestall a

necessary process of introspection, and NATO investment in

other, more relevant and important programs. In an age of finan-

cial austerity and “Smart Defense”, it is a program that certainly

does not represent a smart choice for the allocation of resources,

political capital, and funds.

Problems with the rationale behind the missile defense program

In 1961, President and statesman Dwight D. Eisenhower, the

first man to hold the position of Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR), the highest military

authority in command of the Western

Allies’ liberation of Europe, gave his

farewell address. During this famous

speech President Eisenhower warned

against the emergence of a military-

industrial complex, and whilst to invoke the comments of such a

figure here in a discussion of NATO’s ballistic missile defense

program may be considered excessive hyperbole, surely it must

be true that Eisenhower would likely be worried that a NATO

feasibility study into ballistic missile defense (BMD) was

“executed by a transatlantic, multinational industry team, which

concluded that BMD is technically feasible.” [my emphasis].

Whilst it is highly unlikely that “industry” deliberately mislead

NATO, asking them to lead a review into the feasibility of a

BMD shield was almost guaranteed to reach a positive conclu-

sion. This should provide a first clue to anyone seeking to criti-

cally examine the program that there has been a lack of serious

consideration for its implications.

In addition to this missile defense is likely to become one of

NATO’s defining missions over the coming years, yet the cur-

rent scale of the threat may not warrant such significant invest-

ment and, conversely, such investment may actually encourage

the development of capabilities possessed by those deemed a

“threat” in addition to manufacturing or enhancing other

“threats” based upon notions of perceived NATO hostility. For

example, the current focus of NATO’s missile defense efforts is

almost certainly Iran, however Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities

are currently relatively limited. In addition, if attack from Iran is

feared against Europe, then Iran is far more likely to utilize other

methods, such as proxy terror groups or state instigated terror-

ism in order to strike. Iran has a history of utilizing both of these

methods to strike targets in Europe and globally. This idea will

be explored in greater depth in some of the latter portions of this

article, as it is directly linked to the consequences of the pro-

gram, as well as the rationale.

Implementing ballistic missile defense – an unsat-isfactory solution

Recently NATO announced the first successful test of its Theatre

Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) shield, apparently demonstrat-

ing that the technology is now theoretically capable of neutralis-

ing ballistic missile attacks. However

despite the obvious pleasure expressed

by NATO officials at this achievement,

the “success” of the test in-fact proves

very little in terms of demonstrating that

NATO is now well on the way to devel-

oping an effective system of BMD that will protect civilian popu-

lations from the scourge of “Ballistic Missiles”.

Firstly, the system as it currently exists is a system developed

and designed to provide protection for military forces deployed

to a combat zone, rather than to defend civilian populations.

Whilst on the surface this might not seem like a huge distinction,

it is in-fact significant, for it determines the acceptable capabili-

ties of what a missile defense shield is. Military forces, are unde-

niably more “hardened” than civilian population centers.

Through a combination of training, dispersal of personnel, provi-

sion of NRBC defensive equipment, and ability to absorb

Missile Defense: A Hazardous and Ineffective Indulgence

The missile defense program, like the fabled “Maginot Line” , represents a

retrogressive step.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 5

Obama lent his backing to the naval Aegis system over the de-

ployment of BMD platforms in Eastern Europe, in part to allay

Russian anxiety and anger, the naval systems may also prove to

be equally controversial.

Obama’s deployment of Aegis Cruisers to Europe and the

Black Sea remain controversial when the “defense” shield assets

in question have dual use and are potent

military assets in the own right. As a

result their deployment can have tricky

diplomatic consequences – US tours of

the Black Sea are always controversial

with Russia and its Black Sea fleet, espe-

cially when combined with Russian sus-

picions over NATO/Western intentions

in Ukraine, which in turn is vital for the

maintenance of the Russian (ex-Soviet)

Black Sea fleet. In addition, the Russian

government has warned the US govern-

ment and NATO that the deployment of

these systems to Northern waters will

not be taken lightly by Russia. What this

demonstrates is that NATO cannot view

missile defense in isolation, the deploy-

ment of missile defense assets will have

diplomatic consequences, and may

therefore be limited by these. In addi-

tion to the issue of pressure from external powers, the placing of

missile defense capabilities on vital and limited naval assets will

also have consequences for the deployability and flexibility of

forces, forcing NATO members, especially those with more

limited numbers of vessels, to choose between the deployment

of assets and other mission sets or crisis response.

Without the maintenance of a missile defense equivalent of a

“Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD)”, a concept familiar to

nuclear deterrence, a missile shield will prove hard to maintain

effectively. However this in itself may turn out to be a tricky

solution. Potential competition for limited resources for differ-

ing missions has already been mentioned, but the task of main-

taining a continuous missile defense patrol in itself requires huge

resources. For the United Kingdom to maintain its current single

boat CASD, it requires four Vanguard Class nuclear submarines

(though recent defense reviews have proposed that this may be

cut to three). At the very least, a CASD equivalent would need

at any one time, one vessel undertaking patrol, one undertaking

“acceptable” numbers of casualties, military forces are already

relatively well prepared to absorb the impact of ballistic weap-

onry. Civilian populations lack this “hardening”, making them a

much harder target to defend. NATO has declared the current

system based, on the military TBMD, to be the initial phase of

the program. However, the development of a shield able to de-

fend civilians will require more ad-

vanced capabilities.

In terms of the capabilities missile

defenses operate three envelopes of

interception: “Boost Phase”,

“Midcourse”, and “Terminal Phase”.

The current NATO defenses are based

around the Patriot SAM system which

consists of Mid-Course/Terminal Phase

interceptors, primarily the PAC 2

(Patriot Advanced Capability 2) and the

PAC 3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3)

and the Aegis Naval Missile defense

system. Both the PAC 2 and PAC 3

have differing characteristics. Broadly

speaking the PAC 3, the more recent

development, operates on a “hard kill”

basis, whereby the interceptor physi-

cally impacts the incoming missile,

destroying it. The PAC 2 operates using

a proximity fuse system, carrying a warhead that detonates

within a given distance of the incoming missile, damaging it,

disrupting its flight, or destroying it. In very simple terms, each

interceptor has its own advantages and disadvantages, with PAC

3 interceptors needing a far greater level of accuracy to hit the

incoming missile (such interceptions have been likened to trying

to shoot down a bullet with a second bullet), but also guarantee-

ing it and its payload’s destruction. But both systems remain

vulnerable in their current guises. The “Medium Extended Air

Defense System (MEADS)” is intended to replace the now aging

Patriot system in the future, though this system is broadly speak-

ing based upon the PAC3 Patriot. In addition to this, the RIM-

161 SM3 Missile (employed on the naval Aegis Ballistic Missile

Defense System) also employs a kinetic warhead (hard kill).

Although the Aegis system is widely believed to be more capable

than the land based Patriot, it carries with it its own drawbacks,

both in terms of its capabilities and in terms of the political im-

plications and disadvantages of its use. Although President

Dutch launch crew preparing he Patriot battery for firing

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 6

re-fit and repair, and one undergoing training and leave in prepa-

ration of deployment. Unlike submarine based nuclear CASDs, a

missile defense CASD would also remain vulnerable (despite the

potency of the ship’s weapon systems), with surface vessels un-

able to “get lost” like their submersible counterparts, this in turn

would require additional assets to be deployed in support to

strengthen this potential weak link in the

defense chain.

In regards to all systems, the limited

number of interceptor launchers, and

current procedures calling for multiple

interceptors to be launched per target,

the system is vulnerable to “swarming” by opponents. In order to

counter this blatant vulnerability the system will require signifi-

cant expansion in its scope. The “success” of the recent NATO

test of the system has been pointed to as a vindication of the

program, yet the system remains vulnerable under “combat”

conditions. The particular characteristics of the PAC 2 and PAC

3 systems have been discussed already, but previous experiences

of missile defense during the wars in the gulf have shown that,

remarkably often, the poor quality of missiles manufactured

makes them undertake unpredictable flight paths. This makes

them hugely difficult for PAC 3 hard kill missiles to hit, and still

difficult for PAC 2 to neutralise. In addition to this, as midcourse

interceptors, both risk the contamination or collateral damage

from their interceptions within NATO territory for example as

wreckage or payloads from successfully intercepted missiles fall

over NATO territories. Naval assets are likely to suffer more

acutely from the issue of limited interceptor stockpiles due to

the restrictions on their carrying capacity and their need to be

flexible in the capabilities they can bring to bear against a variety

of targets.

The current defenses are also woefully inadequate in terms

of their inability to deal with other threats. In particular the re-

cent 2003 Iraq war, in which both sys-

tems were deployed, saw both light air-

craft and cruise missiles fail to even be

picked up by the systems, let alone inter-

cepted. Whilst it may be possible to dis-

miss these failings by arguing other tradi-

tional NATO air assets should be able to adequately deal with

such threats, such crowding of air space, using craft from multi-

ple states, and with a defense system that requires very fast deci-

sions to be made is a recipe for friendly fire casualties, as oc-

curred in the 2003 Iraq war for just this reason.

The consequences of a shield

However, beyond these weaknesses, which can be potentially

rectified with massive increases in the scope and cost of the pro-

gram, there are more concerning potential implications, espe-

cially where expansion of the program is concerned.

A major point of contention between NATO and the Russian

Federation has been NATO’s plan for a missile shield. Russia

fears that such a shield is designed to challenge its continuing

nuclear parity with the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United

States in particular. This is a point of serious contention for a

In many ways, the primacy of such a program serves to re-impose a kind of

siege mentality, largely absent since the end of the Cold War.

US missile cruisers launch test missiles (Photo: US Navy)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 7

NATO’s relations with Russia, uneasy at the best of times, is one

that may be far in excess of the benefits of such a shield. In fact it

may prompt the Russian Federation to embark upon a range of

policies designed to not only undermine the shield itself, but also

to actively pursue NATO “containment” in an international set-

ting. This could include threats (explicit or implicit) to NATO

partners and potential candidates for expansion, or perhaps more

troubling diplomatic opposition to matters that are of impor-

tance to NATO, wielding its UN Security Council veto to great

effect. Already Russia’s protection of the Syrian regime has trou-

bled international efforts and the desires of NATO members,

and its 2008 war with Georgia was seen by many commentators

as partly prompted by Georgia’s close relations with NATO.

For other emerging global powers a NATO missile shield

may also prove hard to stomach. In particular China and India

may well feel challenged by such developments, especially if they

are seen to move the goal posts for achieving a place at the

“Great Power” table.

But for NATO also there are worrying

political consequences of pinning our

colours to missile defense. In many ways

the primacy of such a program serves to

re-impose a kind of siege mentality,

largely absent since the end of the Cold War. Explicitly aiming

the program at states such as Iran also undermines NATO’s po-

tential relations with such states, normalising a view within

NATO of these states as active threats waiting to strike. Other

policies aimed at preventing an attack upon NATO, i.e. conven-

tional and nuclear deterrence, do not single out opponents in the

same fashion, and are less damaging in terms of shaping percep-

tions of other states. Despite relying on “offensive” weapons,

these policies are far more defensive in their outlook.

In practical terms NATO could see the development of a

missile defense shield becoming a major obstacle to the preserva-

tion and strengthening of international non-proliferation re-

gimes. Major powers such as China, Russia, and potentially In-

dia, could see the proliferation of ballistic missile technology as a

cost effective, indeed a lucrative, means of out-manoeuvring

NATO’s defenses, and ensuring that the program becomes expo-

nentially more expensive for NATO to maintain as a viable de-

fense. Even outside of international arms shipments, the states

that NATO seeks to use the shield to counter “threats”, namely

Iran, are more than capable of using the shield to their advantage

Russian leadership, which in many ways still mistrusts the

NATO Alliance, and fears its expansion into what it deems its

“sphere of influence”.

Russian concerns are not entirely unfounded, especially

given their interests. For a NATO missile shield to be even close

to effective as a protector of civilian populations, its capabilities

would need to be significantly enhanced. It would require the

ability to intercept significant numbers of incoming targets, si-

multaneously, and with a very high probability of kill ratio. As

has already been discussed, the current system remains vulner-

able to “swarming” attacks, unable to cope with large numbers of

targets, especially given the fact that doctrines are likely to call

for the firing of two or more interceptors per target to ensure a

“kill". Such a shield therefore would seem to begin to threaten

Russian capabilities, as it may well blunt, if not negate, its ability

to threaten nuclear strikes on targets in Europe.

Some analysts have proposed that it is unnecessary to worry

about Russian fears, as the scale of invest-

ment required for Russia to implement

its own missile defense program which

maintains similar capabilities to NATO’s

would be huge. However this is a mis-

guided notion. A NATO defense pro-

gram would not be in competition with a Russian shield, it

would rather be in competition with Russian missile technology.

In this arena the playing field is far more level, if not sloped in

Russia’s favour. The recent deployment of Iskander missiles to

Kaliningrad highlights a Russian understanding of this, with these

relatively sophisticated weapons presenting a real threat to

NATO’s missile defense and to its civilian and military popula-

tions. Russia could easily choose to enhance the threat NATO

faces from missiles in the future through exports, especially to

states of concern to NATO, spreading NATO’s defenses further

whilst opening up potential revenue streams for Russian missile

programs.

As a result of this, NATO’s relationship with Russia may

well suffer. Although Russian fears of such a missile defense

system were somewhat appeased by the 2010 Lisbon Summit,

where moves were made to include Russia in the NATO defense

architecture. The decision to approach this through the concept

of two systems working in cooperation, but not dependent upon

one another is one that has almost destroyed any diplomatic pro-

gress on the issue. The political cost of this system vis-à-vis

A real consequence of a missile shield may be an increase in interest by the

Iranian government in the support and promotion of terrorism.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 8

in terms of engaging NATO in costly asymmetric arms races,

where relatively cheap ballistic missiles (as discussed earlier, the

cruder the better) pitted against expansive and complex defense

systems.

In addition, more technologically capable states are likely to

increasingly rely on the development of countermeasures such as

multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capa-

ble ballistic missiles, which, due to their fragmentation into mul-

tiple warheads (or decoys and warheads), are infinitely more

difficult for NATO systems to neutralize, requiring the develop-

ment of far more complex and invasive “boost phase” intercep-

tors in order to deal with such a threat.

States are almost certain to seek to

develop alternative strategies to outflank

a missile shield. During the 2003 Iraq

war it was noted that ballistic missile

defense systems are poorly equipped to

deal with the threat of cruise missiles and

light aircraft. Both of which are actually more effective mecha-

nisms for the deployment of chemical and biological agents.

Whilst light aircraft attacks may seem highly unlikely and easy to

counter with conventional air-power, the threat of cruise mis-

siles developed for long range attacks is certainly not one to be

taken so lightly. These systems are potentially cheaper to manu-

facture than ballistic missiles and easier to deploy.

The potential for missile defense shields to become a vehicle

for the militarisation of space must also not be overlooked. The

importance of communications and satellites in NATO’s missile

defense system cannot be stressed enough in the numerous

NATO web-pages, booklets, and graphics. Targeting this weak

link may become the primary focus of those who feel threatened

by such a shield. This is a trend NATO should not be encourag-

ing, in the same vein as it should not be attempting to encourage

the abandonment of other internationally agreed arms limita-

tions.

Additionally, NATO needs to consider some of the ways in

which a civilian missile defense shield may actually prove counter

-productive in creating a safer environment for the citizens of

NATO states.

As has now been examined in some detail, a costly and com-

plex missile defense shield is vulnerable to technological shifts by

adversaries, however it is also important to examine how such a

shield may also impact adversaries and potential adversaries tar-

geting strategies and other policies which are liable to have direct

implications for the relative safety and security of NATO citi-

zenry.

Arguably such a shield encourages a regression in terms of

targeting priorities. Faced with a real possibility that when calcu-

lating the impact of a strike, it cannot be guaranteed that weap-

ons will get through, or that larger numbers of cruder weapons

may be required to counter the threat of a defense shield, states

are more likely to opt for strategies which focus on counter-

value (i.e. the targeting of civilian population centers) opera-

tions. This goes for all ballistic missile deployable weapons, be

they non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or

conventional warheads. As an addition to

this, the potential for such a capability in

the possession of NATO may have wor-

rying consequences in terms of lowering

the threshold for the use of such weap-

ons, and encouraging their proliferation.

States may consider the use of ballistic missiles a safe method of

“signalling” resolve and intentions to NATO powers. Whilst this

may be seen as a somewhat extreme idea, with more states in

possession of such weapons (as a result of the active proliferation

of technologies by NATO’s global strategic “rivals”) the possibili-

ties become more likely. In 1986, Libya launched ballistic missile

attacks on the US Coastguard station on the Italian island of

Lampedusa. The missiles overshot their intended target, but

were fired in retaliation for the US bombing of Tripoli. So far

this has been the only incident of NATO territory being targeted

by hostile ballistic missile forces.

It must be noted that any effective missile shield may carry

with it a certain opportunity cost. Successfully creating an effec-

tive shield will actively incentivize states to adopt new strategies

which will allow them to achieve some form of strategic parity

with adversaries. For the primary target of NATO’s missile

shield, Iran, this could almost certainly involve greater support

for terror groups. In the early years of the Cuban revolution, in

response to fears over believed US hostility, and in the knowl-

edge that Cuban conventional forces would have great difficulty

in imposing costs on the US and its civilian populations, the Cu-

ban government embarked upon a number of measures designed

to redress this situation. Best known are the agreements made

between Cuba and the USSR, which led to the Crisis in 1962,

but less well known is the Cuban support for terrorist groups in

At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security provided to NATO citizens; more likely is it actually un-

dermines that security.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 9

spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially if the weapons

were to remain under the control of the existing NATO nuclear

weapons states, and if measures are taken to ensure that the up-

dating of arsenals is accompanied by a rigorous effort to reduce

overall weapons numbers and to strengthen international meas-

ures against the spread of nuclear weaponry. Conventional capa-

bilities are also deserving of the investment that the missile de-

fense program promises. NATO would be well advised to use

the resources to invest in important new shared assets such as its

recently acquired AWACs aircraft. The funds could also be in-

vested in the groundwork for “Smart Defense” policies, coordi-

nated by NATO Headquarters.

NATO should also look towards solidifying consensus within

the Alliance, and externally, on the risk posed by ballistic missile

weaponry and potentially on the threat posed by states that are

thought hostile to NATO. The Alliance is hardly in agreement

on how to resolve problems with states such as Iran, and whilst a

missile shield may seem like an easy solution to a problem that

does not seem to require political introspection or consensus

building, NATO should also begin to examine what its role in

the world may be. For years, NATO has conducted operations

which reflect the values of ideas such as the responsibility to

protect. NATO can use this commitment to international values

in order to expand international security, firmly supporting in-

ternational arms control treaties. A defense shield will not only

distract NATO resources from this, but also looks set to seri-

ously harm existing voluntary accords on the prevention of the

spread of missile technologies. NATO would be far better served

attempting to gain solid international commitment to these.

In conclusion then, a number of potential problems directly

associated with BMD are highlighted here. Although it would be

easy to dismiss the thought offered here as a variety of “What Ifs”

and counter-factual argument, the crux of the point being argued

is that a BMD shield will certainly do little to improve security

for NATO members. The project as it currently exists offers

relatively little protection, and may easily be out-manoeuvred or

overrun. Making the kind of improvements necessary to prevent

this requires not only huge expenditure, but represents an ex-

pansion that would begin to seriously threaten other global pow-

ers, and could fundamentally change the international political

landscape.

Politically it is clear that missile defense is important to

NATO for a variety of reasons, not least because as an initiative

the region. Two operations (DEFENSA ACTIVA

REVOLUCIONARIA, and Operation BOOMERANG) orches-

trated large training programs for “urban and rural guerrillas”,

who, in return, would attack US citizens, military installations,

and interests in the event of a US invasion of Cuba. Iran already

possesses known ties to several terrorist organisations. Iranian

intelligence services performed a number of terrorist attacks and

assassinations throughout Europe in the 1990s against political

opposition movements, and Iran is also accredited with close

involvement in the Hezbollah attacks against Israeli and Jewish

targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. This kind of history

strongly suggests that a real consequence of a missile shield may

be an increase in interest by the Iranian government in the sup-

port and promotion of terrorism. Such groups are far more

prone to “accidental” use than a ballistic missile, and represent

real problems for NATO’s security, and for sparking hostilities.

Whilst the threat of WMD terrorism is a subject which is often

wildly over-speculated upon, with ill-founded fears of violent

and/or extremist sub-state groups actually managing to acquire

some kind of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear

(CBRN) weapon, attempts to redress an imbalance may encour-

age foolhardy leaders to consider this option in the future.

In determining the alternatives for NATO’s expenditures of

“blood and treasure” on a missile shield, there are many factors

to consider. These involve both the examination of measures

designed to directly face the threat posed by Iran, and other such

states, who possess ballistic missile technology and are on the

cusp of developing weaponries nuclear capabilities, and address-

ing what would be better programs for NATO to invest its re-

sources in, and how the Alliance should evolve in the future.

In dealing with the “immediate” (or at least apparent) threat

that the entire system is avowedly aimed at countering, that of

states such as Iran gaining access to more advanced ballistic mis-

sile technology, and coupling this with nuclear, chemical or bio-

logical weaponry, there are other options.

The development of existing deterrence capabilities: conven-

tional and nuclear. In particular this will likely involve the con-

tinued basing of US nuclear weaponry in European states and the

continuation of France and the United Kingdom as nuclear

weapons states. It should also involve the continuation of the

development of a flexible and diverse nuclear arsenal employable

by NATO and its member states under Article 5. The develop-

ment of such forces may also not necessarily contravene the

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 10

About the author

Oliver Jones

Oliver Jones holds a Masters Degree in Intelligence Studies

and International History from Aberystwyth University. He is

currently a research coordinator for the United Kingdom De-

fence Forum and a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, a geo-

strategic analysis firm. Previously, he worked as Program Assis-

tant for the ATA.

that has been primarily championed by the United States, it pro-

vides an opportunity for European Allies to demonstrate their

commitment to the Alliance and a means to placate American

demands for greater demonstrations of political and financial

commitment. Publically it is also somewhat easier to sell to do-

mestic audiences than similar investment in more overtly aggres-

sive weapon systems may be (A new fighter squadron or tank

regiment is harder to sell as purely defensive given many of the

Allies’ recent operations have been expeditionary in nature).

However, even though this is a seductive aspect of the defense

shield, it is not a justifiable reason for investment in it. Despite

this, European leaders remain committed in an effort to prove

their commitment to the US.

At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security

provided to NATO citizens, but more likely is it actually under-

mines that security. Whilst it can be argued that many of the

scenarios hypothesized within this article are ones which may

come to pass regardless of the existence of a shield, nevertheless,

this still calls into question the point of the shield in the first

place. This is not a peripheral program; it represents huge costs

to NATO in development, deployment, and resources, which in

this time of austerity could be far better spent. It also represents

a program that does more to undermine the development of

NATO, and NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War world.

The political consequences of this program in alienating key

international actors, in imposing a siege mentality upon NATO

thinking, and in undermining already fragile international con-

sensuses on arms control would be tragically corrosive to NATO

and the security of the Alliance’s members. In a time of limited

resources NATO should not waste its funds on unnecessary de-

fenses, fundamentally NATO is currently less at risk from ballis-

tic missiles than it has been during the majority of its existence.

Traditional mechanisms of deterrence are more than adequate to

deal with emerging ballistic missile states, who will not be fool-

hardy enough to attack NATO powers, and face the threat of

destruction should they do so.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author.

They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty

Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3 11

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Asso-

ciation. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work pub-

lished in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA

promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy,

Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA

membership extends to 39 countries from North America to the Caucasus

throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

(YATA) was created to specifially include the successor generation in our

work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security,

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational

Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goal

include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on

international security issues.

◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events

for its members.

◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to

countries in Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-

able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues

of importance to the NATO Alliance.

For details of how to submit your work please see our website.

Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the

address listed below.

All images published in this issue of Atlantic Voices are the property of NATO, reproduced with NATO’s permission, unless otherwise stated. Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources.

Editor: Florian Bauernfeind

ATA Programs

On March 18th to 23rd March 18th 2012, winners of the

Transatlantic Research Study Award Tour joined the ATA

in Brussels for a week long study tour. The winners of this compe-

tition were chosen by a panel of judges based on an essay that they

submitted. The essays focused on new security challenges such as

energy, food security, and cyber space. During their study tour,

the winners, in conjunction with a few Europeans, visited a num-

ber of key Transatlantic institutions and individuals representing

the EU, and NATO. Participants also heard from a variety of

speakers which challenged participants to think about the future of

security, and their countries’ impact on the world. Another key

component of the Transatlantic Research Study Award Tour was a

discussion which revolved around the future of NATO, and Trans-

atlantic Security. The purpose of this activity was to facilitate a

lively discussion on the future of security with a diverse set of

views.