atlantic voices vol.2, no.11

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 11 1

Volume 2 - Issue 11, November 2012

Contents:

Global Pulse: Defining Terrorism

Joshua Samac examines different definitions of ’terrorism’ and explores the evolution

of the ‘War on Terror’. He concludes that the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has

evolved to become more precise through methods such as drone strikes, while the

critical problem remains the lack of an internationally accepted definition of terror-

ism.

NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative: A Critical Appraisal

Adérito R. Vicente examines the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) to highlight the

importance of greater military cooperation and cohesion within the Alliance. He

analyzes how NATO can use existing initiatives to increase cooperation and interde-

pendence without sacrificing sovereignty or operational capability.

CONNECTED FORCES INITIATIVE NATO’S COMMITMENTS TO SMART DEFENSE

Since the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO

has pledged to adhere to a new Strategic Con-

cept for the next 10 years that will prepare the

Alliance for tackling the new security challeng-

es of the 21st century such as climate change,

terrorism, energy security, cyber attacks, and

nuclear and missile proliferation.

Critical to this strategic reorientation is the

need for a full range of new capabilities to deter

and defend against threats before they fully

materialize. To effectively maintain transatlan-

tic security, greater cooperation and interoper-

ability is needed to ensure that NATO main-

tains the highest levels of motivation and opera-

tional capability for years to come.

With the Chicago Summit echoing the im-

portance of this goal, the Connected Forces

Initiative (CFI) represents a critical component

of Smart Defense and a symbolic political will

on behalf of NATO members. With greater

cooperation at the heart of this initiative, the

CFI ensures steps to achieve more than en-

hanced military capability, but also greater

fiscal transparency, shared investment strate-

gies, and most importantly, the alignment of

individual members’ priorities with NATO

priorities. - Jason Wiseman

IS

SN

2294-1

274

A Croatian and US soldier training together at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.


By Joshua Samac

T here is a stunning lack of consensus in international

policy circles and academia on a universally accepta-

ble and comprehensive definition of terrorism. Alt-

hough mixed statements out of Washington concerning the on-

going state of the international War on Terror leaves one rather

un-stunned, even baffled Washington bureaucrats are themselves

unsure. What is terrorism, and is the infa-

mous War on Terror still being waged? Fac-

ing a fast-approaching American election and

a precariously balanced Middle East, the

world looks on, following debates and un-

packing sound bites to try to understand where the War on Ter-

ror is headed.

Terrorism is not a new form of violence. In the after-

math of the First World War, the League of Nations (1930)

identified terrorism as a “criminal act directed against a state and

intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of

particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general public.”

Like the League itself, this convention failed to have much im-

pact on the world stage. The problem with crafting a holistic

definition of terrorism was and still is the inherently subjective

nature of the act itself. Hence, the UN’s proposed Comprehen-

sive Convention on International Terrorism has been deadlocked

since 2002 over a stark difference in opinion as to what the con-

vention should and should not include. The draft convention

identifies “any person that intentionally causes death and/or

public damage that may or may not result in

economic loss, for the purposes of intimidat-

ing and/or compelling people, governments,

or institutions to act or not act a certain

way.”

Perhaps the biggest impediment to achieving consensus

on this definition lies with the Organization of the Islamic Con-

ference (OIC). While accepting the above definition, the OIC

adamantly insists on it being qualified to exclude armed struggles

against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemo-

ny aimed at liberation and self-determination. The current im-

passe in Syria tellingly illustrates the tension at play here. While

the Assad regime insists on the ter-

roristic nature of Syrian rebels, the

Western majority fails to accept this

characterization. In this stalemate,

definitive action effectively grinds to

a halt. Who is to say that a national

liberation movement is not also a

terrorist organization? There is a

common adage that mentions ter-

rorists and freedom-fighters that

seems almost too cliché to quote in

full here.

As the Syrian impasse

demonstrates, defining terrorism is

hardly a matter of semantics for

reasons of both tact and principle,

Defining Terrorism

GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE

Who is to say that a national liberation movement is not also a

terrorist organization?

The Free Syrian Army: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? (Photo: publicintelligence.net)


although understanding terrorism in the benignly semantic sense

does offer some interesting insight. Grammatically speaking,

terror and terrorism are two different things. Whereas terror is

a state of mind and terrorism an ideologically charged battle

tactic, neither of the two can technically be considered a tangible

enemy. For the United States, the emotively charged War on

Terror represents a commitment to protecting Americans and

perhaps even Westerners at large

from the fear, trauma, and sense of

insecurity that was collectively felt

following 9/11. Conversely, the

War on Terrorism represents an

attack against an ideological system

that supports terror as a means to

achieving a given religiopolitical end. In this regard, the War on

Terrorism represents a war of ideologies. This war is character-

ized by the tension between fanatically close-minded regimes

that just so happen to be concentrated throughout the Middle

East and the free and democratic governments of the West. This

is a war of regime versus government. Dictator versus elected

representative. Good versus evil.

Tactically, this war is as most analysts observe, unwinna-

ble in a traditional militaristic sense. A standing military force

can hit neither terror nor terrorism and surely there is no V.T.

Day (as there was once a V.E. Day) on the foreseeable horizon.

The end of the Cold-War system saw the disappearance of a

definable and personified ‘Other’, which Americans and the

democratic West might collectively identify and stand against.

The ominous Soviet was indeed a tangible enemy and Com-

munists were certainly found everywhere – even rumoured to

be dwelling in Hollywood. In this case, however, Communism

had an ideological, political, and social center located in the So-

viet Union.

The USSR was the geophysical embodiment of Com-

munism whereas the current War on Terror tends to lack such

qualities. If there ever was a tangible enemy in the War on Ter-

ror, it was Osama bin Laden, but I do believe that it would be

naive at best to think that killing bin Laden signals the end of the

War on Terror. This war, winnable or not, rather represents a

fundamental shift in Western strategic thought and a greater

evolution in the nature of modern warfare. As mentioned above,

this is a war of systemic proportions and will thus carry on – in

one form or another – into the prolonged future.

Legally, appending a definition to terrorism is a matter

of necessity insofar as placing it in the international legal dis-

course is concerned. There is always a measure of exactitude

required by codified law in defining any proscribed act, including

terrorism. Criminalizing terrorist acts requires a concerted ac-

ceptance by international legal institutions of a definition as well

as the subsequent adoption by national legislative bodies. The

purpose of criminalizing terrorism is three fold: to declare that

the conduct is forbidden, to prevent it,

and to express society’s moral condem-

nation of such acts. In so doing, the

immediate implications are found in the

reduced cost of prosecuting internation-

al terrorists with the long term objective

of hopefully deterring terrorism.

However, the international legal principle of nullum

crimen sine lege (no crime without law) requires that a society

define the prohibited act before anyone can be prosecuted for

committing the act. Thus, the international legal community – as

an amalgam of many national legal jurisdictions – requires a pre-

cise definition of terrorism so that national bodies may adopt and

employ the definition while prosecuting and possibly serving to

extradite perpetrators to their home nation.

The international legal principle of nul-lum crimen sine lege (no crime without

law) requires that a society define the pro-hibited act before anyone can be prosecuted

for committing the act.

It would be naive to think that killing Bin Laden signals the end of the war on terror (Photo: Irish Examiner)


By most accounts, Presi-

dent Bush’s War on Ter-

ror stands as the second

of such wars in a succes-

sion that began with the

Reagan administration’s

declaration of “war

against terrorism” in

reaction to the 1983

Beirut Barracks Bomb-

ing. Under both the

Reagan and Bush admin-

istrations, the argument

could be made that ter-

rorist cells were loosely organized as appendages of rogue

state-apparatuses. In both cases, Washington had an identi-

fiable target and a Clausewitzian “centre of gravity” to-

wards which it could take aim and fire. In the immediate

post-2001 environment tactical centers of gravity were

located in Kandahar and (to some extent) Baghdad. How-

ever, over the past half-decade there has been a qualitative

shift in the tone and texture of this ongoing war, leading

many to wonder whether it is even still ongoing at all.

Despite the drastic difference in approach to com-

bating the War on Terror, President Obama has neverthe-

less maintained America’s commitment to defending

against an ever-present and looming threat to the Ameri-

can way of life. The past four years of the Obama admin-

istration have arguably witnessed the subsumption of the

Bush Administration’s counter-terror foreign policy frame-

work to a supposedly more morally upright foreign policy.

Elected on the commitment to dial down the War on Ter-

ror, President Obama promised the American electorate a

war that was morally acceptable and overall more effective

– smatter, better, nimbler, stronger.

Whereas under the Bush Administration, the mani-

festations of the War on Terror were plainly visible (IEDs

and body bags, torture hearings, and bin Laden’s no.1

placeholder on the FBI most wanted list) they have become

less so since 2008. Among other things, Obama promised

the closure of Guantanamo Bay, the withdrawal from Iraq,

and the capture of bin Laden. Signing the executive order

to close Guantanamo was paramount on his list of things to

do upon receiving office although President Obama has

since failed to maintain

this commitment. Guan-

tanamo Bay still operates

and holds detainees out-

side the transparent in-

ternational legal and hu-

man rights frameworks.

Furthermore, the mission

in Iraq has been dialed

down as American mili-

tary efforts have been

refocused on what most

in the White House view

as a greater threat to na-

tional security - the inse-

curity of Afghanistan.

That being so, the nature by which the Afghanistan

mission is being carried out under the Obama administra-

tion highlights an issue of central importance here. The use

of unmanned drones and targeted killings represents the

direction that the War on Terror is heading, regardless of

the outcome of November's presidential election. Un-

manned drone killings are quick, decisive, and occur on

what seems to be the murky underbelly of international

diplomacy. The Obama administration has indeed mas-

tered the art of striking a balance between maintaining a

minimal public awareness of American counterterrorism

and recognizing the pressing need for decisive and effective

action in this war of systemic proportions. Given the out-

come of the recent US election, the Obama Administration

is likely to continue with this formula that will frame

American counterterrorist policy for years to come.

Joshua achieved his Masters in International Relations from the

University of Windsor. He has written extensively on modern

political theory and his areas of expertise include international

law and Canadian foreign policy. Joshua is the editor of the

Emerging Security Program at the Atlantic Council. In Septem-

ber 2013, he plans to attend law school to earn his JD.

About the author

Unmanned drones represent the new face of the War on Terror


by Adérito R. Vicente

S ince its birth, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

zation (NATO) has been a collective defense

organization, as well as a community of demo-

cratic values. But since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

and the Soviet Union itself, NATO has struggled to seek a

new raison d'être. The absence of a traditional enemy to

serve as a centripetal force has placed a focus on the inter-

nal troubles of the Alliance that have been obscured in the

past by the presence of a common enemy.

At the Lisbon 2010 Summit, the adoption of a new

Strategic Concept for the next 10 years offered the oppor-

tunity to associate institutional reform with a renewed

sense of purpose. According to NATO’s Strategic Concept

in November 2010, “instability or conflict beyond NATO

borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including

by fostering extremism, terrorism and trans-national ille-

gal activities.”1 Therefore, NATO Allies are deeply devot-

ed to tackling the security challenges of the 21st century

facing the Euro-Atlantic region, such as climate change,

terrorism, energy security, cyber attacks, and nuclear and

missile proliferation. Allies pledged to ensure that NATO

has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and de-

fend against any threat to the safety and security of Allied

forces, territory, and populations.2 And, Article 5 contin-

ues to be the cornerstone of the Alliance.

In an ‘Age of Austerity,’3 however, the question of

how to manage the pressure on the defense budgets

emerged at the forefront of many Allies’ concerns, and

was, indeed, the most problematic and complex one. Al-

lies need to find ways to maintain and modernize their

defense capabilities, as promised at Lisbon, which is neces-

sary to ensure that NATO can operate as effectively in the

future as it has in the past. At the same time, the European

defense cuts, the end of NATO combat operations in Af-

ghanistan by 2014, the reduction of the U.S. military pres-

ence in Europe, and the Obama administration’s realign-

ment of diplomatic and military assets to East Asia and the

Pacific4 could leave the transatlantic Alliance to fend for

itself in future crises.

In his valedictory speech last year in Brussels, the for-

mer U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of a

“dim, if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance,”

and argued that the partnership between North America

and Europe needs a new stimulus.5 The current transition

phase, therefore, urges creative responses on both sides of

the Atlantic to find ways to make collective defense spend-

ing smarter and more efficient.

At this year’s Munich Security Conference plenary ses-

sion on “Building Euro-Atlantic Security,” NATO’s Secre-

tary General Anders Rasmussen proposed the Connected

Forces Initiative (CFI) as a complement to the Smart De-

fence.6 Rasmussen has argued that “Allies need to work

together more effectively in a truly connected way” to en-

sure that NATO preserves the lessons learned from the

Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan.7 Given the con-

straints of an increasingly austere economic environment,

this political initiative arises to prevent deterioration in

NATO’s collective capability in the face of the twin reali-

ties of fewer forces and scarcer resources for training and

ongoing operational challenges. At the 2012 Chicago Sum-

mit, the Alliance was expected to agree on a political dec-

laration providing the conceptual basis for CFI, and to

“adopt a series of measures in the fields of education and

training, exercises and technology,” to make sure that

NATO forces maintain the strong connections achieved in

combat actions, i.e. Operation Unified Protector in Libya.8

The three components of CFI are education and train-

NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative: A Critical Appraisal

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presents the new NATO Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit.


tice through a package of multinational projects addressing

key capability areas. But this needs to be reinforced, and

complemented, with other elements. First…the Connect-

ed Forces Initiative mobilizes all of NATO’s resources to

strengthen the Allies’ ability to work together in a truly

connected way. This is particularly important as we wind

down our combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of

2014.”9

At the Secretary General's monthly press briefing on 5

March 2012, he distinguishes Smart Defense from CFI, and

adds its components, stating that:

“Smart Defense is about building capabilities together.

But we also need to be able to operate them together.

That is why I have launched the Connected Forces Initia-

tive. It puts a premium on training and education, exercis-

es, and better use of technology.”10

Such is the conceptual basis for the institutional perspec-

tive on CFI. In particular, CFI is defined by five interrelated

features.

First, it is a political initiative that em-

phasizes the importance of interoperability

among Allies and Partners as a result of

NATO’s recent operations, as well as the

ability for them to work effectively together in a connected

way.

Second, CFI should be considered an element of

Smart Defense. The initiative also incorporates the contin-

ued adaptation of Alliance structures (NATO Command

Structure and NATO Agencies Reform) and procedures; a

closer cooperation between NATO and industry; the oppor-

tunity to assess progress on the Lisbon Package of Critical

Capabilities and reinforce them with the Capabilities for

NATO 2020, to ensure all these key capabilities are deliv-

ered; and, most importantly, sets the scene for enhancing

the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) to carry all of

these elements into the future.11

Third, the connectivity feature: the ability to connect

all Allied forces. This is also the core business of CFI strate-

gy. Without the development of this feature, it is reasonable

to argue that CFI will not work, for a variety of reasons.

One of which is that this is the most important factor distin-

guishing Smart Defense from CFI. If Smart Defense “is

about acquiring the necessary capabilities,” CFI, and connec-

tivity for that matter, “is about making these capabilities

ing (maximizing the value of NATO facilities and Centers

of Excellence, with the participation of Partners, like the

European Union), increased exercises (especially with the

NATO Response Force), and better use of technology

(including increased use of adapters, which will facilitate

interoperability and plug-and-play capabilities among allied

systems). Implementation would thus rely on active mem-

ber state engagement. Yet, despite a lot of activity and high

-level political commitment from the Secretary-General,

NATO Heads of State and Government, and other NATO

officials, it is still unclear whether governments will suc-

ceed in defining and implementing a coherent approach to

CFI. Many questions are still unanswered: given the lim-

ited tangible results achieved by past attempts to promote

pooling and sharing, why should CFI be considered a credi-

ble political initiative? How can NATO and its Partners

better integrate and share education and training pro-

grams? How can Partners be involved in NATO’s future

exercises? Finally, can sovereignty concerns and better use

of resources be reconciled?

Moreover, CFI itself remains a ra-

ther vague concept. Without a truly

official definition, it has so far been

presented by NATO officials as a politi-

cal initiative that emphasizes the importance of interopera-

bility, often in a rather critical manner, and without a com-

prehensive analysis. But then again, for over sixty years

what was NATO doing if not promoting the ability of

States to work together? Thus, before dissecting the afore-

mentioned questions, we have to ask ourselves: what is the

Connected Forces Initiative all about?

Definition: The Connectivity Revolution? CFI remains largely a NATO concept. In recent times,

it has become a persistent topic of political and technical

debate – almost a buzzword – within the Alliance. NATO

Secretary- General Rasmussen publicly started to use the

term “Connected Forces Initiative” at the beginning of

2012, giving a number of speeches and press conferences

in which he endorsed the increase of efficiency and in-

teroperability of Allied forces and capabilities. In a speech

at the Allied Command Transformation Seminar in Wash-

ington, D.C., on 28 February 2012, Rasmussen said that:

“I expect us to put Smart Defense firmly into prac-

Connectivity...is the core business of CFI strategy.


work together most effec-

tively.”12 Another im-

portant distinction is to

r e c o g n i z e t h a t

“connectivity” – a renewed

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

“interoperability” – goes

beyond a material “plug-

and-play” angle, and to-

wards a human-centered

approach, which will ena-

ble Allies to maintain and

enhance NATO’s combat

effectiveness.13 In fact, CFI

demonstrates the ability to

connect all NATO forces and capabilities; i.e. by using a

common strategic understanding and language, joint com-

mand and control arrangements, shared doctrine, common

standards and procedures. This is also one of the major chal-

lenges of the CFI initiative, and it will be analyzed below.

Fourth, the practical measures designed to help Allied and

Partner states, requires a more efficient means of maintaining

and developing required capabilities. This means a greater

cohesion of the three CFI components: training and educa-

tion, increased exercises, and better use of technology.

Finally, the lessons learned from Allies’ and Partners’

operations. Ultimately, these lessons would lead the transat-

lantic organization to update their doctrines and concepts in

order to make the Alliance fit for the whole spectrum of mis-

sions outlined by the 2010 Strategic Concept. Consequently,

the doctrine should reflect and highlight NATO’s education,

training and exercises. For instance, the ongoing regrouping

of individual and collective training under the responsibility

of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) provides a unique

opportunity to have a holistic, coherent view of the current

training landscape together with the future trends.14

Based on these official statements and documents, CFI can

be defined as a political initiative by NATO to reinforce and

support Smart Defense, encouraged by a new strategic frame-

work and a more effective institutional coordination that mo-

bilizes all of NATO’s resources to strengthen the Allies’ abil-

ity to work together in a truly connected way. This is facili-

tated by three main components: expanded education and

training, increased exercises, and better use of technology.

Moreover, it is an effort to ensure that NATO retains and

builds on the valuable

gains of interoperability

among Allies and Part-

ners as a result of the

lessons learned from

NATO’s recent opera-

tions. Indeed, the main

focus of CFI is on the

Allied creative respons-

es on both sides of the

Atlantic to make col-

lective defense spend-

ing smarter and more

efficient, by encourag-

ing greater coordina-

tion when sharing capabilities.

The Chicago Plan: Implementing NATO’s Forces 2020

Along with the Smart Defense initiative, the CFI is one

of Chicago’s most significant outcomes. It is aimed at en-

suring that NATO retains and builds on the valuable gains

of a renewed interoperability among Allies and Partners as

a result of NATO’s recent operations.

At the 2012 Munich Security Conference on 4 Febru-

ary 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta called for a

long term plan to achieve the forces that the Alliance

should have by the end of the decade: NATO Forces 2020.

The Obama administration encouraged allies to integrate

the reforms agreed to at Lisbon, the Smart Defense initia-

tive, proposed improvements in training and exercises

(CFI), and enhancements to the NDPP – to include greater

transparency in national defence budget decisions, and

investments in critical capabilities.15

On 18 April, NATO Defense Ministers started to dis-

cuss the best way to make sure that NATO has the best

modern capabilities, including a Defense Package for Chi-

cago and the proposal for a Summit Declaration on De-

fense Capabilities, entitled “Toward NATO Forces 2020,”

which outlines the critical elements to build and maintain

NATO Forces over the next decade. While the Strategic

Concept focuses on what NATO will do in the next dec-

ade, this is an enabling goal to help define what NATO

should look like from a capabilities perspective. The two

key elements of this new Defense Package embraces two

Troops from 13 countries participating in Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. (Photo: NATO)


In the context of post-summit implementation, two

proposals developed by the National Defense University

(NDU) – related to two key summit initiatives: CFI, as a

complement to the Smart Defense, and NATO Forces 2020

– are worthy of further examination: Mission Focus Groups

(MFGs) and the role of United States European Command

(USEUCOM) in long-term transatlantic interoperability.19

On the one hand, the MFG concept is a tool to optimize

the planning, training, resources, and capabilities of a core

group of likeminded Allies and Partners about particular

NATO missions. The aim is to provide NATO with reliable

mission capabilities as well as expertise that can be promul-

gated across the Alliance as required. Eventually, working

within the NDPP, all important missions would benefit

from a focus group in this way. MFGs would adhere to the

logic of CFI guided by NATO’s political and military au-

thorities. In due course, MFGs would lower the risk of gaps

in capabilities by highlighting Allies who have prioritized

specific capabilities. Ultimately, the NATO Response Force

(NRF) could also be the basis for creating

resilient, capable MFGs. For instance,

strengthening the NRF role by building on

the U.S. commitment to rotate elements

of a U.S.-based Brigade Combat Team to

Europe. However, the MFG concept would “build out”

over time, and not all mission areas would need to have a

corresponding focus group.20

On the other hand, the role of USEUCOM could bring a

long-term challenge to transatlantic interoperability. As

previously mentioned, taking steps to change the course of

Allied defense capabilities requires a new cooperative mind-

set on the west side of the Atlantic as much as, or more so,

than within Europe. The NDU proposal highlights that the

main instrument for this connection should be a revitalized

and more adaptive USEUCOM. It is the most critical agent

for ensuring U.S. forces can operate in concert with any

Ally or formal Partner, a staggering 69 nations in all that

already adhere to some or all NATO practices as a result of

operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans over the past 17

years. USEUCOM should put the U.S. commitment to the

NRF to maximum advantage in terms of mission planning,

multinational training, and participation in NRF exercises.

The U.S. commitment of a battalion (usually 3,000 to

5,000 soldiers) to each annual NRF rotation beginning in

2014 should translate into a deployment of no less than a

innovative conceptions: Smart Defense and the CFI. At its

core lies a unique capacity for Allies to work together.

At the May 2012 Chicago Summit, the Heads of State

and Government agreed that:

“At a time of complex security challenges and finan-

cial difficulties, it is more important than ever to make

the best use of our resources and to continue to adapt our

forces and structures. We remain committed to our

common values, and are determined to ensure NATO’s

ability to meet any challenges to our shared security.”16

NATO forcefully addressed the widening capabilities

gap at the Chicago Summit when NATO leaders under-

scored key defense priorities and emphasized the need for

cooperation in defense through multinational solutions.

They endorsed new initiatives to preserve the capabilities

most needed to meet the two core tasks of collective de-

fense: crisis management and cooperative security. In that

regard, a vision for the future of NATO forces was articu-

lated by NATO Allies and referred to as ‘NATO Forces

2020,’ with transformation and reform

as key concepts. Additionally, there

will be further effort at NATO and EU

cooperation in procurement “to avoid

unnecessary duplication and maximize

cost-effectiveness.” The ‘Summit Declaration on Defense

Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020’ states that:

“We have confidently set ourselves the goal of NATO

Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped,

trained, exercised, and commanded so that they can op-

erate together and with partners in any environment.”17

Moreover, the Chicago Summit formally approved the

Secretary General’s Connected Forces Initiative as a key

part of Smart Defense and NATO Forces 2020. The Allies

agreed that this framework will rely on a coherent set of

deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces equipped,

trained, exercised, and directed so as to meet NATO’s

Level of Ambition (LoA). In other words, the ability to

conduct operations, including two Major Joint Operations

(MJO) and six Smaller Joint Operations (SJO) concurrent-

ly, outside the area of responsibility.18

Over the next several months, NATO staffs and mili-

tary leaders must elaborate how summit goals will be

achieved. Therefore, there is need for ‘a new mind-set’

within the Alliance to actively support the NATO Forces

2020 objectives and, consequently, CFI.

At the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders emphasized the need for

multinational solutions.


a battalion for 3 months annually to Europe for multinational

training.21

Challenges and Obstacles to Be Overcome

For CFI to work, Allies must be willing to give up certain

capabilities so that the Alliance can collectively fund and

maintain them. However, this creates the risk that a shared

capability will not be available or authorized for use when

another Ally needs it. Therefore, the major challenge of CFI

is to help align nations’ priorities with NATO’s collective

priorities as they develop during NATO operations.

According to Julian Lindley-French, Eisenhower Profes-

sor of Defense Strategy at the Netherlands Defense Academy,

for NATO forces to be properly connected armed forces,

there needs to be a radical, unified concept of how best to:

1. Exploit the five dimensions of twenty-first centu-ry military effects - air, land, sea, cyber and space;

2. Recognize that a new inner-relationship must be sought with the U.S.; and

3. Inject some real meaning into the woeful non-relationship with the EU.22

That will require a NATO which reconceives itself as a

critical strategic hub at the core of a web of real strategic

partnerships around the world, with NATO Standards that

promote effective ways of working, acting as the Alliance’s

core ‘product’.23 Therefore, NATO must recognize the oper-

ational, financial and po-

litical contributions of its

P a r t n e r s . T h e

‘Partnerships’ issue is

another big challenge that

NATO has on its hands,

and was one of the major

themes at the Chicago

Summit. However, the so

-called ‘connectivity rev-

olution’ must start within

NATO. And, conse-

quently, ‘a new mind-set’

will need to be integrated

in the interior of the Alliance. So far, NATO has been

streamlining the partnership tools – Partnership Cooperation

Menu (PCM), Individual Partnership Co-operation Program

(IPCP) – and mechanisms – opening up of Partnership for

Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational

Capabilities Concept (OCC) to all Partners – and building

upon existing partnership frameworks, as well as develop-

ing new global partnerships (Partners across the Globe).24

Additionally, in order to increase multinational

cooperation across the Alliance over the mid to long-term,

the two biggest obstacles that must be overcome are: the

deep roots of traditional national defence (protectionism)

and the cultural dominance of national sovereignty.

To begin with, nations turn to national sources of sup-

ply whenever such means are manufactured within their

territory, regardless of cost. Allies subsidize domestic de-

fense industries in order to preserve sovereignty over the

means of national defense, nurture national pride, and pro-

tect jobs. And, ultimately, Allies prefer national versus

collective capabilities to assure access to them should they

be needed for national purposes. Dramatic changes in atti-

tudes about protectionism or sovereignty should not be

expected. Nonetheless, the severity of the defense resource

situation cannot be dismissed. The depth of the current

financial crisis provides an opportunity to break down these

obstacles. Austerity measures have already triggered public

protest and contributed numerous changes in political lead-

ership in a number of European powers. For instance, the

European aerospace industry model, well advanced yet still

incomplete, shows the way for other defense industry’s to

consolidate their operations through multinational projects

and joint ven-

tures.25

Moreover, since

Allies, namely

Europeans, pro-

tectively guard

their sovereign-

ty, they carefully

choose to com-

mit to collective

efforts in ways

they regard as

reversible. The

price of reversi-

bility can be very high, as members of the EU and Euro-

zone are finding at present. However, it is a cherished na-

tional prerogative exercised regularly and visibly in the

North Atlantic Council decision-making process. The crea-

tive concept of “reversible pooling of sovereignty” suggests

NATO Members Participating in Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT).


andSecurityoftheMembersoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization,

adoptedbyHeadsofStateandGovernment inLisbon”,19-20Novem-

ber 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-

eng.pdf 2These capabilities identi+ied at the Lisbon Summit, include Ballistic

missiledefence, intelligence, surveillanceandreconnaissance,mainte-

nance of readiness, training and force preparation, effective engage-

mentandforceprotection. 3ThetermwaspopularizedbyBritishPrimeMinisterDavidCameronin

hiskeynotespeechtotheConservativepartyforuminCheltenhamon

26April2009,whenhecommittedtoputanendtoyearsofexcessive

governmentspending.DavidCameron,“Theageofausterity,”26April

2009, http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/04/

The_age_of_austerity_speech_to_the_2009_Spring_Forum.aspx. 4HillaryClinton, “America’s Paci+icCentury”,ForeignPolicy,November

2011;U.S.DepartmentofDefence, “SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:

Priorities for 21st Century Defense”, January 2012, http://

www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 5RobertM.Gates,“TheSecurityandDefenseAgenda(FutureofNATO)”,

Brussels, 6 June 2011, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/

Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1581.6Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General An-

dersF.Rasmussenat theMunichSecurityConferenceplenarysession

on ‘Building Euro-Atlantic Security’, Munich, Germany”, February 4

2012,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_84197.htm.7Anders Rasmussen, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders

Fogh Rasmussen at the Allied Command Transformation Seminar,

Washington D.C.”, 28 February 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/opinions_84689.htm.8“NATODefenceMinistersplanforNATOForces2020”,18April2012,

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2462FC58-9250BB16/natolive/

news_86107.htm.9Rasmussen, “Remarks at the Allied Command Transformation Semi-

nar,WashingtonD.C.”.10Rasmussen,“Secretary General's Monthly press brie+ing”, 5 March

2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-55ABE943-7EC8EA23/

natolive/opinions_84865.htm.11Colonel Franck Desit, “A NewAlliance Goal – Capabilities for NATO

2020 and Beyond”, ACT, Norfolk, Virginia, 2012, http://

www.act.nato.int/transformer-2012-01/article-3. 12Rasmussen, “Remarksat theAlliedCommandTransformationSemi-

nar,WashingtonD.C.”.13“StrategicMilitaryPartnerConference: ‘Currentand futurechalleng-

es’, Zagreb, Croatia”, 18-20 June 2012, http://www.emgfa.pt/

useruploads/+iles/readahead_-_smpc_conference_2012.pdf.14Ibid.15Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and

Secretaryof StateHillaryClintonat the48thMunichSecurityConfer-

ence, Bayerischer Hof, Munich, Germany”, 4 February 2012, http://

www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4972.16“ChicagoSummitDeclaration, issuedby theHeadsofStateandGov-

ernment participating in themeeting of theNorthAtlantic Council in

Chicago”, 20 May 2012, article 3, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-

541C99B9-3834F941/natolive/of+icial_texts_87593.htm?

mode=pressrelease.17“Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: TowardNATO Forces

2020”, 20May 2012, article 5, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

of+icial_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease.18Colonel Clayton Goya, “Connected Forces through Collective Train-

ing”,ACT,Norfolk,Virginia,2012,http://www.act.nato.int/transformer

-2012-01/article-11.19HansBinnendijkandCharlesBarry,“WideningGapsinU.S.andEuro-

pean Defense Capabilities and Cooperation”, TransatlanticCurrent6

(July2012):8.20Ibid.TheNRFisahighlyreadyandtechnologicallyadvancedmultina-

tional forcemadeupof land,air,maritimeandSpecialForcescompo-

nentsthattheAlliancecandeployquicklytowhereveritisneeded.21Ibid:8-10. 22JulianLindley–French,“NATO:ConnectedForces,ConnectedMinds?“,

NewAtlanticist, 23 July 2012, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/

nato-connected-forces-connected-minds. 23Ibid

24Thoseprogrammesandtoolsarefocusedontheprioritiesofbuilding

capabilities, interoperability, and supporting defence and security

sectorreforms. 25Untilveryrecently,threeofthetoptenarmsproducersintheworld

areEuropeanaerospace +irms:BAESystems,EADS,andFinmeccanica

(theothersevenareU.S.+irms).

26BinnendijkandBarry:11.

optimism for CFI and Smart Defense in terms of cooperation

that can be guided toward priorities of sharing capabilities

and commonly agreed specialization. The 2012 NATO Sum-

mit launched those initiatives in a way designed to sustain

momentum long after Chicago, creating a new mindset of

confidence and assurance in the merging of national and

multinational defense. Eventually, that will lead to increased

cooperation and connected armed forces, and that is the

goal.26

In conclusion, the Chicago Summit was an opportunity

for the Alliance to define a focused, coherent, and compre-

hensive vision for developing new strategies and capabilities.

Based on decisions taken at the Summit, the Alliance will

further develop its political and practical cooperation with

Partners. The Alliance may well support Partners in the

capability development field to acquire and retain key capa-

bilities. The Alliance should continue identifying the proper

methods for integrating Partners in CFI when and where

applicable. The CFI presents an opportunity, building on

NATO experiences, to ensure that Allies develop and retain

the ability to work effectively together, allowing partners to

also seek capability development opportunities with NATO.

Joint training and exercises will be another essential enabler

in maintaining NATO’s interoperability and

‘interconnectivity’ with Partner forces. In the end, the suc-

cess of CFI implementation will depend on the ability of

NATO Allies and Partners to overcome the stated challenges

and obstacles. If not, the CFI will always be a Prokofiev’s Ro-

meo and Juliet “undanceable” ballet, or initiative.

Adérito R. Vicente holds a Master’s Degree in International

Relations and Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science and

International Relations from the New University of Lisbon. He

served as international relations professional at the Portuguese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidency of the Council of

Ministers, as well as research assistant at Lisbon University

Institute (ISCTE-IUL) in Lisbon and at the European Parliament in

Brussels. In 2012, he worked in the Defence Policy and Planning

Division, at NATO HQ.

1“ActiveEngagement,ModernDefence.StrategicConceptfortheDefence

About the author

This publication is coThis publication is coThis publication is co---sponsored by sponsored by sponsored by

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On Nov. 14, the ATA partici-

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