aust & nz journal of criminology (march 1987) 20 … · aust & nz journal of criminology...

AUST & NZ JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY (March 1987) 20 (45-53)

REVIEW ESSAY: THE MESOMORPHS STRIKE BACK

John Braithwaite*

45

Crime and Human Nature, James Q Wilson and Richard J Herrnstein, Simon andSchuster.

Crime and Human Nature is a remarkable book which resurrects Sheldon andEleanor Glueck, William Sheldon and other fallen stars of criminology and investsthem with a new respectability. Yes, Wilson and Herrnstein assert, the evidence isin, and mesomorphs are constitutionally predisposed to crime. As a thirdgeneration mesomorph, your reviewer feels it proper that he declare an interest inthis matter.

Criminology has always been something of a conspiracy against mesomorphs, inAustralia no less than elsewhere. Your reviewer laboured for years at theAustralian Institute of Criminology under the yoke of the ectomorph Biles and theendomorph Clifford. What a relief it was to move to ANU where mesomorphs aretreated with understanding and tolerance. If, and I say if, mesomorphs are morecriminal, it is only because of the labelling they suffer at the hands of criminologists,the degradation ceremonies of having their torsos displayed in books such as thatof Wilson and Herrnstein, naked apart from the tiny triangular cloth which coverstheir quaint genitalia.

The temptation in reviewing the work of genuine conservatives like Wilson andHerrnstein is to continue in a manner not very different from the above paragraphwhere barely credible alternative sociological explanations are posited for barelycredible constitutional and individualist accounts from the book. It is a temptationI shall resist, because this book is the most comprehensive assault yet in a battle toshift the intellectual balance of power in criminology.

The Sun Sets on Sociology

Prior to World War II, when the Gluecks were in their heyday, psychology wasthe dominant discipline within criminology. Post-war, with accumulating evidenceof the failure of psychology to deliver the goods through rehabilitation, thepsychologists were pretty much routed by the sociologists led most conspicuously bySutherland and Sellin. By the end of the 60s, strain or opportunity theorists(Merton, Cloward and Ohlin, Albert Cohen), cultural deviance descendants ofSellin such as Wolfgang, and differential association disciples of Sutherland such asCressy, were the intellectual leaders of criminology, who were being joined by anew generation of labelling theorists. Even today, criminology remains the onlyarea of public policy where sociology is the most influential discipline. This neverhas been true in Australia and New Zealand where law has consistently providedmost of the influential intellects. Internationally, however, most of the perceivedadvances in our understanding of crime come from sociology.

Yet sociology in the 1980s is generally a discipline in decline. This reality iscompounded by three tendencies within criminology which could easily makeWilson and Herrnstein's book the watershed which usurps sociology with a newpsychologism and a new biological determinism.

* Department of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

at Australian National University on January 13, 2015anj.sagepub.comDownloaded from

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46 J BRAITHWAITE (1987) 20 ANZJ Crim

The first tendency was the British assault on the primarily American sociology ofthe 60s under the auspices of the National Deviancy Conference. Taylor, Waltonand Young's (1973) The New Criminology was the most influential criminologicalwork of the decade. During the 1970s, this critical theorizing lent enormous vitalityto the sociology of deviance; the criminological action became even more focusedin sociology departments. But by the 1980s, the radical deviancy theorists, havinglaid waste much of positivist sociological criminology, had tended to move on toother things, leaving precious little by way of an ongoing alternative tradition ofresearch.

Secondly, the opportunity theorists of the 60s came to be seen as discredited bythe failure of the American War on Poverty programmes, and similar successors.Even though the War on Poverty was not in fact about reducing poverty but wasconcerned with fostering equality of opportunity, sociological criminology was seento have been discredited in the same way as had been the psychologists ofrehabilitation.

Thirdly, positivist sociology came to be increasngly dominated by theories witha psychological bent - control theory (Hirschi, 1969), and ironically, differentialassociation.

And so the stage is set for Wilson and Herrnstein to resurrect the Gluecks as thereal heroes of the history of criminology.

The "Facts" about CrimeThe book deals fairly systematically with what the authors see as the facts which

are well established about crime. It is perhaps some tribute to criminology thatcriminologists as different as Wilson and Herrnstein and myself can at least agreeon this much. Putting aside the sensitive issue of mesomorphy, yes the empiricalresearch does show quite consistently that criminals are disproportionately male,15-25years of age, residents of large cities, residentially mobile, children of parentswho were convicted criminals, associates of peers who engage in crime, youngpeople who do poorly at school, of low IQ, heavy users of alcohol or heroin, weaklyattached to their parents, and from families which lack both warmth and discipline.We even agree that for most types of crime the poor and blacks (at least in theUnited States) disproportionately engage in crime.

Where we disagree is on what most of these "facts" mean. For Wilson andHerrnstein, these are facts about "human nature", but for incorrigible sociologistssuch as myself, they tell us more about the way societies tend to be organized thanabout human nature. But more than that, while we can agree that the research doesconsistently support these "facts", some of them can be accounted for by thesystematic bias of criminological research in excluding white-collar crime. Initially,Wilson and Herrnstein seem to deny that white-collar crime is real crime by limitingtheir focus to "predatory crime", which is never defined. We know that predatorycrime includes murder, theft, robbery and incest and that it excludes price fixing andpolitical corruption. The latter two types of offences are excluded because "in manycountries these actions are not regarded as criminal at all" (p 24). I know of nocountry with a criminal law which does not prohibit political corruption. PerhapsWilson and Herrnstein mean that while bribery is a criminal offence, in manycountries bribery is not regarded as a serious offence. While there is someinternational variation in tolerance of bribery, as there is for all offences, Scott andAl-Thakeb's (1977) study showed both bribery and price fixing to be stronglydisapproved offences which a majority of citizens interviewed in the United States,



THE MESOMORPHS STRIKE BACK 47

Britain, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Kuwait thoughtworthy of prison sentences longer on average than those recommended for motorvehicle theft and other types of larceny over $100. Contrary to Wilson andHerrnstein's suggestion that price fixing is something criminal only by Americanstandards, the Uni.ed States sample in the Scott and AI-Thakeb study was relativelylesspunitive on the price fixing item. United States respondents rated it as deservinghalf the duration of imprisonment as rape, while for other countries therecommended punishment for price fixing was much the same as for rape.

Wilson and Herrnstein also make much of Graeme Newman's (1976) classic studyComparative Deviance to sustain their narrow view of "predatory crimes". How canthey have failed to notice that Newman's survey included questions on twowhite-collar offences: "A person puts government funds to his own use"(appropriation), and "A factory director continues to permit his factory to releasepoisonous gases into the air" (factory pollution). In India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy andYugoslavia, respondents recommended longer prison terms for appropriation thanfor robbery ("A person forcefully takes $50 from another person who, as a result,is injured and has to be hospitalized"). The United States sample was again theexception here, with robbery being responded to slightly more punitively thanappropriation. However, the average prison terms recommended for robbery werehigher than those for factory pollution in all six countries. In part, this was due toconsiderable proportions of respondents recommending fines for factory pollution.Such responses were recorded as zeros for the averaging of recommended prisonterms. Those respondents who did prefer imprisonment as the appropriate sanctionrecommended heavier average sentences for factory pollution than for robbery infive of the six countries. For the Indian and Iranian samples, factory pollution wasrated as more "serious" than robbery.

In these and a great many other studies empirical criminology has demonstratedthat Sutherland's conventional wisdom about the lack of community resentmentover white-collar crime is probably wrong (see Braithwaite, 1982 for a review). Itwas perhaps excusable for James Q Wilson in his 1975 book to justify the exclusionof a consideration of white-collar crime with: "it also reflects my conviction, whichI believe is the conviction of most citizens, that precatory street crime is a far moreserious matter than consumer fraud, antitrust violations ..." (Wilson, 1975: xx).Against the background of the research of the past decade on public attitudes towhite-collar crime, we can only say that this may be the conviction of James QWilson, but it is not the conviction of "most citizens" in his country or ours.

If they had not arbitrarily excluded white-collar crimes from their concept ofcrime, it would have been much harder for the authors to conclude that low IQ and"impulsiveness" are causes of crime, for example. One of the annoying things aboutthe book is that the authors do not maintain the integrity of their own definition.Thus, when it helps to establish the robustness of the association between race andcrime, we are treated to the observation that for white-collar crime, "it is oftenforgotten that blacks are overrepresented among persons arrested for most of theseoffences to about the same degree that they are overrepresented among personsarrested for burglary, larceny, and auto theft" (p 462). This overrepresentation ofblacks is accounted for by offences like welfare and credit card fraud which do notmeet Sutherland's definition of white-collar crime in any case.

Wilson and Herrnstein might contend that low IQ would be part human natureof crime even if white-collar crimes were included because the latter arecomparatively few in number. Without rehashing the entire white-collar crimeliterature here, it suggests that the reverse is true. To take just one example,




without counting state enforcement, the two leading federal occupational healthand safety agencies in the United States (the Occupational Safety and Health andSafety Administration and the Mine Safety and Health Administration) imposefines for approximately a quarter of a million offences by companies each year.Since most white-collar offences involve multiple offenders, we can see howincluding just one area of regulatory enforcement can have a marked influence onhow we see the "human nature" of criminals. This juxtaposition becomes moredramatic with larger, if less serious, areas of white-collar crime such as tax offencesor weights and measures offences.

There is of course absolutely nothing wrong with having a theory of a subset ofcrime. So long as a theory of rape is described as a theory of rape rather than as ageneral theory of crime, that's fine. But this is Wilson and Herrnstein's greatestfailing; they present as a general explanation of crime something which could notbe sustained if confronted with the totality of the patterns of crime in society ratherthan with a class-biased subset of criminal behaviour.

The Essential Theory

Wilson and Herrnstein are to be congratulated for being more explicit about theirtheory than are most criminologists. Chapter 2 succinctly sets out the theory, andsome of the later chapters on substantive issues are beautifully linked back to thistheory chapter. Others seem to bear almost no relationship to it.

The theory is essentially one of crime as choice. Crime is the choice made byoffenders when it is perceived as having consequences preferable to doingsomething else. The larger the ratio of the net rewards of crime to the net rewardsof non-crime, the more likely is crime. The net rewards of crime include a balancingof such things as the likely material gain from crime and social approval from peersagainst pangs of conscience or social disapproval of onlookers, The net rewards ofnon-crime brings. in, for example, the remunerativeness of legitimate work as analternative way of using one's time to illegitimate work, and the desire to avoidfuture punishment.

The Wilson-Herrstein theory is not one of simple calculative reward-cost becausethey see important roles for classical as well as instrumental (or operant)conditioning. Pangs of conscience are one of the most important punishers of crime;they basically accept Eysenck's (1973) formulation that "conscience is a conditionedreflex" .

Here is where so much of the constitutional basis for crime comes in. "Personsdeficient in conscience may turn out to be persons who for various reasons resistclassical conditioning - they do not internalize rules as easily as do others" (p 49).This is one basis for IQ as a correlate of crime. People whose constitution makesthem low on conditionability will be both slow to learn (low IQ) and slow to developa classically conditioned conscience. Criminals are people with automatic nervoussystems that respond more slowly and less vigorously to stimuli.

The rewards of crime are more immediate than the rewards of non-crime, it isargued, so persons who, even with a strong conscience, commit crime, may bepersons who have difficulty imaging the future consequences of present action.Again, unintelligent people may have trouble with such imagining. Alternatively,highly impulsive persons may discount very heavily even those consequences theycan foresee, and thus resist the instrumental conditioning that might lead them tochoose non-crime over crime.




Gender

Wilson and Herrnstein painstakingly review the twin studies which lead them toconclude that criminality is in considerable measure inherited. The strong tendencyin all societies for women to engage in less crime than men is also seen as havinga biological basis. Greater male aggression precedes socialization practices whichmight explain it, though the authors concede that this conclusion does not explainmassive gender differences in property offending. Here they turn to primary driveswhich flow into the definition of sex roles: "The underpinnings of the sexualdivisions of labor in human society, from the family to commerce and industry togovernment, may not be rigidly fixed in the genes, but their roots go so deep intothe biological substratum that beyond certain limits they are hard to change. Atleast until now, the gender gap in serious criminal behaviour has fallen outside thelimits of change in the sexual divisions of labor" (p 125).

Their failure to come to grips with alternative accounts of the gender gap inoffending deserves a book length response. Wilson and Herrnstein conclude, rightlyI think, that the evidence suggests that "most women commit crimes for essentiallythe same reasons as most men." (p 124). By this I believe they mean that the samecontrol, opportunity, personality, and differential association theory variables thatare correlated with male delinquency, have rather similar correlations with femaledelinquency (Jensen and Eve, 1976; Johnson, 1979; Hagan et al, 1979; Shover et al,1979; Smith, 1979; Thornton; 1982; Canter, 1982; McCarthy and Hoge, 1984;Segrave and Hastad, 1985; Elliott et al, 1985). While women may commit crime forthe same reasons as men, they are less exposed to those reasons. Weak attachmentto parents and having friends who are delinquents are correlates of male and femaledelinquency, but girls are less likely than boys to be weakly attached to theirparents, to be unconcerned about the respect of their parents, to have delinquentfriends. Dependency on the family for approval may surely in turn be a part of thenurturant, socially integrative role into which girls are socialized from very early inlife. It is logically flawed to assume that variables which are similarly correlated withmale and female delinquency cannot explain gender differences.

The gender chapter is one where there is a failure to make a link with the generaltheory. It seems implied that females are not less criminal because they have higherIQs or lower impulsiveness. The suggestion seems to be that the gender gap isbiologically determined but in a way which is unspecified and unrelated to thegeneral theory.

Age

The book does a much better job of linking the association between age andoffending to the theory in a way that is quite persuasive:

The rise in crime in childhood and early puberty accompanies the awakening of major sources ofreinforcement for delinquent behaviour - money, sex, and peers who value independence of, or evendefiance of, conventional morality. At the same time, the growing child is becoming literally, as well aspsychologically, independent of powerful adults (parents etc) who might enforce conventional standards.Given energy, strength, potent new sources of drive but few legitimate means of consummation, a lackof economic and social skills, and peers who are similarly vigorous and frustrated, the adolescent yearsare destined to foster a rise in delinquency. (p 146)Some account is also provided of young people as more impulsive.

IntelligenceSystematic blindness to competing views and data is at its worst with the analysis

of intelligence. IQ is a consistent correlate of delinquency, and if we restrict the




debate to juvenile delinquency we largely avoid the problems posed by white-collarcrime. But IQ differences between offenders and non-offenders are not soenormous, and Wilson and Herrnstein are unpersuasive in discounting that thesedifferences may be largely accounted for by a greater propensity for unintelligentcrooks to get caught or to admit their crimes to an interviewer, or by the propensityfor intelligence tests to be biased against blacks, Hispanics, the poor, and othersdisproportionately represented among offenders.

The authors concede that the work of Hirschi and Hindelang (1977) shows IQ toexplain virtually no variance in delinquency after controlling for poor schoolperformance and attachment to the school, but then proceed to ignore what theyhave conceded. Beyond the Hirschi and Hindelang review, Menard and Morse(1984) have shown that the school-failure-delinquency association is itself almosttotally explained by institutional practices such as negative social labelling.

In short, the evidence seems convincing that there is no causal link between IQand delinquency. Rather, IQ is the basis for social selection into life experiences(rejection by the status system of the school, transmission of expectations of failurein the wider status system based on occupation) which increase the attractions ofkids for such alternative sources of status as can be provided by delinquent peerswho have been similarly rejected by the status system of the school. Thisinterpretation fits the data much better than the diminished capacity of unintelligentpeople to see what is wrong with their offences, the IQ-impulsiveness, andIQ-conditionability interpretations in which the authors put greater store.

Wilson and Herrnstein do not totally dismiss the institutional practices of schoolsas causes of crime, they simply relegate them to lower importance than granderbiological forces.

At times the authors draw a very long bow on IQ as an explanation for crime.After commenting upon the extraordinary differences in crime rates between theUnited States and Japan by reference, for example, to David Bayley's (1976)estimate that the risk of being robbed was 208 times greater in the United Statesthan in Japan, the authors suggest that one explanation might be the (rathermodest) tendency for Japanese to score higher on IQ tests than Americans. Whilerejecting, without explanation, the views of those who account for high Japanese IQscores in terms of Japanese culture, Wilson and Herrnstein mercifully do concedethat IQ would not "account fully for the large difference in crime rates betweenJapan and the United States" (p 456).

Cultural bias is also rejected as an explanation of lower black IQ in the UnitedStates. Low IQ is accepted as one of the possible partial explanations of higherblack offending rates (along with other constitutional characteristics of blacks suchas a greater propensity to mesomorphy), as also are explanations based oneconomic deprivation, deficiencies in black family life and a black subculture ofviolence. Treatment of the literature critical of the latter two traditions is thin.

Families, Schools, Communities

The chapter on families is stimulating, and the major conclusion was bothintegrated with the general theory and well supported by the evidence: familieswhich prevent delinquency are neither permissive nor authoritarian, butauthoritative - they provide discipline within a continuum of love.

If the rules are consistently enforced by parents whose approval the child values, then the experienceof conforming to the rules will itself become pleasurable and the prospect of breaking them a source ofanxiety. In this way, the impact of conscience is enhanced. (p 239)




A parallel finding is made on schools: schools which at the same time provide anenvironment of warmth and discipline will produce fewer delinquents. Apart froma discussion of streaming, there is no systematic discussion of the question whether,consistent with an association between school failure and delinquency, there maybe less delinquency in schools which have less failure for poor performers designedinto them.

The treatment of the impact of community characteristics on crime displays majorgaps in the authors' knowledge of this literature. The major conclusion is: "Most ofthe variation among individuals in criminality can be accounted for by personaltraits, family socialization and (perhaps) school experiences". The evidence thatsocio-economic status of the area in which individuals live makes a substantialcontribution to their criminality net of their personal socio-economic status, muchof the evidence on differential association and crime, and the evidence which isearlier discussed on the strong association between city size and crime andresidential mobility and crime, is all seemingly ignored in this conclusion.

Everything you wanted to know about Crime but were afraid to ask

Wilson and Herrnstein struggle diligently with the contradictory andmethodologically abysmal literature on labour markets and crime withoutultimately being able to make head or tail of what it means for their theory. Thereis a chapter on the effect of television and the mass media on crime which somehowseemed out of place in the book, another on heroin and alcohol, another onhistorical trends in crime, and more. The book thus amounts to one of the mostcomprehensive treatments in existence on most of the major issues in criminology.

I have criticized the authors above for gaps in their knowledge and grasp of theliterature, and there are many other places I could have done so. For example, itis incumbent on me to say that almost no account is taken of Australian and NewZealand criminological research, and there are many places where work done in ourpart of the world would have cast a different complexion on some conclusions. Thisis not an unfair criticism since the book sets out to establish the causes of crime inhuman natures that are invariate across cultures. Apart from references to the workof Cambridge criminologists, citations to the work of non-American scholars isalmost non-existent. While these are not unfair criticisms, they are uncharitable, asone cannot but stand in awe of the vast literature Wilson and Herrnstein havecovered.

Wherever one stands on their conclusions, these authors deserve our admirationfor their courage in taking on such a sweeping challenge. This is a book which criticsmust take seriously. It is powerfully argued on so many fronts. By and large itdevotes lengthy treatment to alternatives which see the explanation of crime as lyingother than in human nature. It will be given credibility in many quarters because itreads as a balanced account.

In short, it is a book which should be read by anyone who is seriously interestedin crinimology. The authors are no doubt embarrassed by the claim on the dustcover that it is "the most significant social science study of the decade". That it isnot. But it may become one of the handful of genuinely influential contributions tocriminology in the post-war period. Irrespective of where they are coming from, Idoubt if any fair minded criminologist could read this book without changing to aslightly different perspective on some issue treated in the book.




What is to be done?

Wilson and Herrnstein are pessimistic about rehabilitation programmes as meansof reducing crime because they cannot see how such programmes can change theratio of the net rewards of crime to the net rewards of non-crime. This pessimismextends to behaviour modification programmes which are seen as capable ofchanging this ratio within closed institutions, but in difficulty in extending sucheffects to the wider world. this part of the book was impressive.

Not so impressive was the highly selective review of the literature, which led theauthors to conclude that one way of changing the ratio of the net rewards of crimeto the net rewards of non-crime is to increase the probability of imprisonment. Alittle cross-cultural perspective might have been applied to the failure of the UnitedStates' already extraordinary heavy use of imprisonment compared to othercountries. Then with so many black mesomorphs running around, I suppose highcrime rates are inevitable.

One conclusion I found provocative, and ultimately, to my surprise, perhapspersuasive, was on human history and crime:

Crime rates in the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century declined faster thancan be explained by dropping birth rates, owing, we think, to intense efforts to inculcate an ethnic ofself-control ("Victorian morality"), and rose faster in the twentieth century than can be explained byhigher birth rates, owing to a shift from that ethic to one emphasizing self-expression. Crime rates areunusually low in nations such as Japan where the norms inculcated by the family (and the general culture)emphasize obligations as much or more than rights and where families transmit a sense of collectiveresponsibility for behaviour. (pp 526-7)

Thus, while Wilson and Herrnstein see a great deal of the variance in crime asexplained by constitutional factors, they do see some hope for correcting the deficitswith which criminals are born:

An impulsive person can be taught greater self-control, a low-IO individual can engage in satisfyinglearning experiences, and extroverted mesomorphs with slow autonomic nervous system response ratesmay earn honest money in the National Football League instead of dishonest money robbing banks.(p 66)

Your reviewer must say that he found this the most offensive sentence in thebook. Following Wilson and Herrnstein's advice, your reviewer is one mesomorphwho did decide to struggle against his biological inheritance by helping pay his waythrough university working on weekends as a second-rate professional rugby leagueplayer. As a short mesomorph, my experience was, as always, that it was theendomorphs who were my greatest oppressors, until one day the boot of anendomorph came out of a scrum to end my programme of rehabilitation.

REFERENCES

Bayley, D H (1976) Forces of Order: Police Behaviour in Japan and the United State, Berkeley:University of California Press.Braithwaite, J (1982) "Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals" 3 Journal ofCriminal Law and Criminology 723-63.Canter, R J (1982) "Family Correlates of Male and Female Delinquency" 20 Criminology 149-67.Elliot, D S, Huizinga, D and Ageton, S S (1985) Explaining Delinquency and Drug Use. Beverly Hills:Sage.Eysenck, H J (1973) Crime and Personality. St Albans: Paladin.Hagan, J, Simpson, J H and Gillis, A R (1979) "The Sexual Stratification of Social Control" 30 BritishJournal of Sociology 25-38.Jensen, G J and Eve, R (1976) "Sex Differences in Delinquency:' An Examination of PopularSociological Explanations" 13 Criminology, 427-48.Johnson, R E (1979) Juvenile Delinquency and Its qrigin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.McCarthy, J D and Hoge, D R (1984) "The Dynamics of Self-Esteem and Delinquency" 90 AmericanJournal of Sociology 396-410.




Hirschi, T (1969) Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.Hirschi, T and Hindelang, M (1977) "Intelligence and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review" 42 AmericanSociological Review 571-86.Menard, S and Morse, B J (1984) "A Structuralist Critique of the IQ-Delinquency Hypothesis: Theoryand Evidence" 89 american Journal of Sociology 1347-78.Njewman, G (1976) Comparative Deviance: Perception and Law in Six Cultures. New York: Elsevier.Scott, J E and AI-Thakeb, F (1977) "The Public's Perceptions of Crime: A Comparative Analysis ofScandinavia, Western Europe, the Middle East and the United States", in CHuff (ed), ContemporaryCorrections, Beverly Hills: Sage.Segrave, J D and Hastad, D N (1985) "Evaluating Three Models of Delinquency Causation for Malesand Females: Strain Theory, Subcultural Theory, and Control Theory" 18 Sociological Focus 1-17.Shover, N, Norland, S, James, J and Thornton, WE (1979) "Gender Roles and Delinquency" 58 SocialForces, 162-75.Smith, D A (1979) "Sex and Deviance: An Assessment of Major Sociological Variables" 20 TheSociological Quarterly 183-95.Taylor, I, Walton, P and Young, J (1973) The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Thornton, WE (1982) "Gender Traits and Delinquency Involvement of Boys and Girls" 17Adolescence,749-68.Wilson, J Q (1975) Thinking About Crime. New York: Random House.



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