avoiding adjudication in william faulkner's 'go down ... · the jury to think like a...
TRANSCRIPT
TICIEN MARIE SASSOUBRE
Avoiding Adjudication in William Faulkner's Go Down, Moses
and Intruder in the Dust
William Faulkner was ten years old when a black man named Nelse Patton
was lynched in Oxford, Mississippi. In a single day, Patton had been accused of
slitting the throat of a white woman with a razor, arrested, and jailed under guard.
During the night a mob of two thousand whites gathered outside the jail while
local authorities, including the sheriff, a judge, and a minister, tried to prevent the
lynching. Their efforts finally failed when a prominent Oxford lawyer who had
served in the United States Senate exhorted the crowd to lynch Patton in the name
of justice.1 The young Faulkner may well have heard, if he did not in fact see, the
lynching—his childhood home was only a few blocks from the Oxford jail.2 The "New South" into which Faulkner was born in 1897 had its roots in the
South's political and ideological reaction to Reconstruction.3 Not only had the
South been forced to capitulate to the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments as a condition of reentry into the federal government after the Civil
War4—legally sanctioning what felt to Southerners like the destruction of their
economy—but loyalty oaths prevented many antebellum and Confederate white
leaders from participating in state and local government, effectively divorcing
Reconstruction rule of law from the existing social and political order.5 White
Northerners and freedmen filled the official positions of Southern state and local
governments during Reconstruction, writing and ratifying the constitutions of the
restored states and overturning the Black Codes with which Southerners had rein
scribed racial hierarchy and black economic dependence after emancipation. In
response, vigilante organizations intent on the return of their states to "home rule"
quickly sprang up in Mississippi and across the South, justifying their recourse to
"intimidation, violence and murder" as resistance to an "unjust and tyrannical
power [that] had filled their state with mourning, beggared them, freed their
slaves and as a last insult and injury made the ex-slave a political equal."6
Criticism, Spring 2007, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 183-214
Copyright © 2008 Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI 48201
183
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184 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
In 1875 Mississippi Democrats "resolved to use as much force as was neces
sary" to regain control of their state government through elections, and their cam
paign of intimidation, which included the overt killing of blacks, succeeded.7 Over
the next two years, the rest of the South was "redeemed," or returned to local white
rule, unleashing a wave of racial violence. This violence was fueled in part by anx
iety about the maintenance of racial hierarchy, but also by frustration with the blight
of the Southern economy, which the Redeemers blamed largely on emancipation.8
The violence was justified, however, in terms of an imagined threat to law and
order: "a 'new' Negro, freed from the necessarily very tight bonds of slavery and ret
rogressing rapidly toward his natural state of savagery and bestiality."9 And for
racial radicals, "the single most significant and awful manifestation of black retro
gression was an increasing frequency of sexual assaults on white women ... by
black men."10 By 1903, when James K. Vardaman was elected governor of Missis
sippi, racial radicalism had become mainstream and the lynching of black men by
mobs of white Southerners was a regular, and many argued necessary, occur
rence.11 Between 1889 and 1909 there were nearly three hundred documented
lynchings of black men in Mississippi alone.12
Not surprisingly, the logic of the Nelse Patton lynching—the ritualized
reassertion of racial hierarchy through violence—permeates Faulkner's early fic
tion. This is not to say that Faulkner accepted the radical account. On the con
trary, the details and victims of Faulkner's early fictional lynchings belie its facile
stereotypes. In "Dry September" (1931), for example, we suspect not only that
Will Mayes, the black man lynched for attacking a white woman, is innocent, but
that the attack never in fact occurred. Joe Christmas is lynched for killing a white
woman in Light in August (1932), but he has himself passed for white, and his vic tim was his willing sexual partner. Still, Faulkner's characters in these early texts
clearly do think and live in a climate of racial radicalism.13 The crowd that gath
ers to watch the murdered Miss Burden's house burn in Light in August is quick to
assume a black man is guilty of the crime, and the arrested Joe Brown easily shifts
suspicion away from himself by identifying Christmas as black. Even though the
wrong man, and a white man, is lynched for the rape of a white girl in Sanctuary
(1931), Faulkner's invention of the impotent black rapist Popeye obviously turns
on the anxieties of racial radicalism. And in "Dry September," when McLendon,
the instigator of the lynch mob, is confronted with his ignorance of the facts, he
answers, "What the hell difference does it make? Are you going to let the black
sons get away with it until one really does it?"14
In this climate, the lawlessness of lynchings apparently poses no threat to
community stability or local legal authority. In Faulkner's early texts the ability of
lawyers and judges to safeguard the community in public and official capacities is unaffected, despite the community's (and sometimes the legal authorities')
recourse to extralegal violence. Indeed, the District Attorney in Sanctuary invites
the jury to think like a lynch mob in its consideration of expert testimony during
Goodwin's trial.15 And in Light in August, Sheriff Watt Kennedy uses the threat of
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 185
the forming mob to coerce information from a reluctant black witness at the Bur
den place.16 A mob in Mottstown, where Joe Christmas is finally caught in Light
in August, wants to lynch him but refrains out of a sense of jurisdiction—they feel
he "belongs" to Jefferson and so allow Sheriff Kennedy, Jefferson's legal represen
tative, to come get him.17 And even Christmas's death and mutilation at the hands
of Percy Grimm is not exactly a collapse of law and order, since Christmas's
attempt to escape strikes the people ofjefferson as a form of passive suicide.18 Not
only does the mob in Sanctuary wait until the jury has legally (though erro
neously) convicted Goodwin to lynch him, but the fact that it takes an Alabama
jury the same amount of time—eight minutes—to convict Popeye of a murder he
didn't commit as it took the Jefferson jury to convict Goodwin of a murder Pop
eye did commit, and Popeye's hanging is entirely legal, elides any bright-line dis tinctions between their two deaths.19
The lawlessness of lynching does not threaten but rather coexists with the
rule of law in these texts, because Faulkner conceives law as properly the expres
sion of the values of the community. Individuals who wield the power of law are
responsible for the protection and maintenance of those values and the stability
of the community the law serves. As Jay Watson observes, Faulkner not only
"came of age in a regional society that exalted the legal vocation," but was
"remarkably sensitive to the role played by the law in the articulation of that
society's norms, codes, and boundaries."20 In Faulkner's early novels, lynching
clearly falls within this rubric.
But by the late 1930s, Faulkner would have cause to reconsider the role of
lynching in Southern culture.21 Changing economic and social conditions accel
erated by the New Deal and a subsequent trend toward federally imposed deseg
regation struck Faulkner as not merely a threat to the South as he knew
it—indeed, historians have described the effect of New Deal legislation on the
South as a "second civil war"22—but also a transformation of law itself. For
Southern politicians and legal thinkers, these developments represented a con
test between state sovereignty and federal authority. For Faulkner, they repre
sented the imposition of exogamous law, indifferently and artificially generated
by a bureaucratic state, on historically specific and distinct communities—with
potentially disastrous consequences for those communities. Faulkner registers
this new threat in Go Down, Moses (1942) and Intruder in the Dust (1948), and in both novels the preservation of something Southerners recognize as justice
involves resisting federally imposed law by employing extralegal norms and
practices in the place of official adjudication. In order to provide a viable alternative to exogamous law, the extralegal activ
ity in which lawyers, judges, and sheriffs engage to protect and maintain the com
munity in these texts must effectively answer the concerns that motivated federal
intervention: economic instability and persistent racial inequality. Historically,
Southern racial and economic anxiety had been expressed through the culture of
lynching, which effectively intimidated black labor and reinforced the power and
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186 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
status of white owners.23 But" [i] f southern whites were never more white and
southern than when they were participating in a lynch mob, by the 1930s that same
experience made them considerably less than modern white Americans." More
over, "the violence against African Americans that had previously helped publicly
fuse white unity now paradoxically pulled open buried fissures of class and gen der."24 In Go Down, Moses Faulkner dissociates lynching from Southern customs,
identifying the practice instead with the depersonalizing effects of market forces
imposed from the North. Only in a local community of interdependence, Faulkner
suggests, are blacks or whites secure. In Intruder in the Dust the lynch mob is asso
ciated with the impersonal and market-driven logic of the Northern-influenced
town, while local legal authorities work together with an authentic, racially inte
grated, country-based community to prevent both a lynching and a trial.
It is my contention that Faulkner was acutely aware of the ways that law affects
lived experience and personal identity, not just at points of direct contact between
them, but through the pervasive influence of legal meaning on everyday life.25
Rereading Go Down, Moses and Intruderin the Dust against their legal-historical con
texts suggests new and more coherent readings of both texts. Though it is widely
considered Faulkner's last great novel, there are few satisfactory readings of Go
Down, Moses, and it is frequently described as lacking a unified thematic core,
despite Faulkner's assertion that he intended the book to be read as a novel.26
Accounts of Intruder in the Dust tend to bog down in discussions of Gavin Stevens's
gradualism with respect to desegregation, ignoring much of the rich and nuanced
text in a narrow focus on the extent to which Stevens voices Faulkner's own views.27
Faulkner's representation of the tension between local communities and fed
eral law in the 1930s and '40s registers what has been described as "the slippage
between the production and the reception of law and legal meanings, [and] the
ways in which specific cultural practices or identities coincide or collide with
specific legal rules or conventions, thereby altering the meanings of both."28 Of
course, the idea of community-based justice for blacks and whites that Faulkner
elaborates in these novels is neither historically viable nor free from assumptions
we would now easily identify as racist and paternalistic. But Go Down, Moses and
Intruder in the Dust unexpectedly and provocatively associate lynching with the
impact of federal legal change on the South in the 1930s and '40s and imagine a
mediation of this impact through the avoidance of adjudication through local,
nonviolent, community-based dispute resolution.
The Historical Tension between Federal Law
and Social Norms in the South
Southern anxiety about the disjuncture between federal law and social norms far
predates the secession crisis and the Civil War. As early as the 1787 Constitu
tional Convention, the legal protection of the customs of slavery "formed the real
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner
basis of divisions" between the states.29 For the South, protection of the customs
of slavery amounted to the protection of private property and economic stability;
for many in the North, the question of slavery turned on the idea of liberty. The
tension between the Southern view of slaves as property and the racial hierarchy
inherent in the logic of slavery, on the one hand, and Northern conceptions of free
labor and at least formal equality, on the other, pervaded the antebellum period.
Alarmed by the common law adoption of a 1772 English fugitive slave case, Som erset v. Stewart, by Northern courts, Southern congressional delegations lobbied
fiercely for the first federal Fugitive Slave Act (1793), officially sanctioning slave holders' practice of seizing alleged runaways.30 In 1820 the necessity of the Mis
souri Compromise highlighted the vulnerability of the social and economic institution of slavery to a shift in federal power balance resulting from westward
expansion.31 And as early as the 1830s, Southern leaders worried that secession
might be the only way to prevent the erosion of the economic and social norms
of slavery through federal legislation.32 Southerners also watched federal courts
hear a wide range of cases regarding the legal status of free and enslaved blacks,
as well as the legal rights of slave owners in the antebellum period, with trem
blingly inconsistent outcomes.33
By the secession crisis of 1850, Southern leaders were deeply concerned that
"the South was in danger of being discriminated against by the free states, of being
denied the right to expand into the West, and, ultimately, of being plunged into
a civil war of slaves against masters" resulting from abolitionist pressure on the
federal government.34 The crisis was averted through a congressional compro
mise that "asserted federal power over the interstate slave trade" but simultane
ously enacted an even more robust Fugitive Slave Act.35 Rather than effectively
reasserting slaveholders' property rights, however, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
intensified Northern antislavery sentiment and introduced a host of legal chal
lenges that played out in state and federal courts over the next several years.36
These cases culminated in the Supreme Court's pro-slavery, pro-state's rights
decision in Dred Scott (1857), which "provided an early indication of the vast
judicial power that could be generated if political issues were converted by defi
nition into constitutional questions."37 The Court had sided with the South in
Dred Scott, but there was no guarantee that it would continue to do so as the
nation expanded to the West.
In the sectional conflict over slavery, violence tended "to replace legal and
political processes" long before the Civil War.38 As early as 1854, the dispute over whether the Kansas Territory would be a slave territory devolved into armed con
flict between pro-slavery Missourians and free-state settlers. After the Civil War, Southern resistance to emancipation and the federally imposed civil rights acts was partially legal: before Reconstruction the Black Codes reinstated social and
economic conditions that mimicked slavery; after Reconstruction, the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1875 only briefly impeded the Redeemers' efforts to impose
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188 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
segregation and the economic dependence of former slaves.39 But postbellum
resistance to the federally imposed end of slavery in the South was largely extrale
gal.40 It was not until the widespread adoption of state and local Jim Crow laws
in the 1890s that official law and Southern custom were realigned through the
legal enforcement of segregation in public spaces, employment, housing, and the
systematic disenfranchisement of blacks through poll taxes, property require
ments, and literacy tests.41
The Jim Crow laws that proliferated in the first two decades of the twentieth
century responded to the agricultural depression that threatened the South in the
1880s and 1890s by protecting the hierarchy of white owners and dependent black labor.42 In the rhetoric of the South, Jim Crow laws merely reflected the
reality of the existing community—they did not dictate it.43 And as early as Plessy
v. Ferguson (1886), the Supreme Court accepted this proposition, asserting that " [legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts" and that in determining
the reasonableness of a statute, the Court was "at liberty to act with reference to
the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people."44 But the South
ern contention, in William Sumner's famous 1907 formulation, that "stateways
cannot change folkways" was profoundly challenged by the economic upheaval
of the Depression and the sweeping federal intervention of the New Deal.45
New Deal legislation enacted by the federal government in response to the
Depression had profound, and often unintended, consequences for both the
Southern economy and Southern society. Until the Depression, Mississippi's
economy was largely dependent on sharecropping, which reproduced the tradi
tional Southern racial hierarchy in the form of dependent black labor bound
(often by debt) to specific plots of white-owned land. A functioning wage-labor market did develop in the South after the Civil War, but most Southern blacks
did not want to be part of it. Sharecropping offered long-term stability, whereas
work for wages was often seasonal and geographically mobile.46 In 1933 the fed
eral Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) attempted to arrest the falling prices of
staple crops, dairy products, and livestock by encouraging farmers to reduce pro
duction. In the South cotton and tobacco growers were subsidized to plow under
their crops. As a result, half of the South's cotton acreage went out of production,
forcing an unprecedented number of blacks onto the wage-labor market.47 Local
communities were transformed as former sharecroppers moved to find work and
plantation owners became dependent on government subsidies.
In 1935 the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) initiated a profound shift
in power between labor and employers, which exacerbated the effects of the AAA
in the South.48 Responding specifically to the conditions of industrial capitalism in the North and Midwest, where workers had increasingly resorted to strikes
that often turned violent, the NLRA guaranteed employees the right to join
unions and engage in collective bargaining while prohibiting employers from
engaging in coercive tactics or discriminating against union members. In the still
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 189
largely preindustrial South, where labor relations were also race relations, the
NLRA seemed to threaten the very fabric of society.49 And like most New Deal leg
islation requiring legal interpretation and enforcement, the NLRA left the deter
mination of "the boundaries of'legitimate' labor activity" to federal courts.50 The
power of these courts to restructure local economies, combined with the more
diffuse effects of the AAA and other New Deal legislation, renewed white South
ern anxiety that federal legal intervention would destroy their way of life.
This anxiety was reflected in Southern politicians' vehement and successful
resistance to federal antilynching legislation proposed in 1935 and again in
1938.51 By the 1930s, race relations had grown sufficiently stable under Jim Crow that extralegal white-on-black violence in the South was much less fre
quent than it had been even a decade before.52 But black migration to urban cen
ters had substantially increased the lobbying power of the NAACP, which backed
the antilynching legislation of the 1930s.53 The NAACP's growing political power in the North, combined with the egalitarian political rhetoric of the depression
era raised the specter of a national political fight over segregation. In short, there
was reason to associate federal legal intervention with both a threat to Southern
racial hierarchy (and the social structure that hierarchy supported) and a threat
to Southern economic stability. It was against this backdrop that Faulkner wrote
Go Down, Moses.
Law and Community in Go Down, Moses
Faulkner believed that New Deal policies had, "instead of offering relief to dis
tressed farmers and workers, undermined independence and encouraged idle
ness."54 For his own part, Faulkner found he had to make frequent trips to
Flollywood to earn money as a screenwriter during the 1930s in order to support
his extended household of black and white dependents and pay the mortgages
on his home and farm in Mississippi. Substantially written in 1939 and 1940, Go
Down, Moses clearly registers the specific social and economic changes precipi
tated by New Deal legislation in the South and represents the destabilization of
race relations Faulkner sees as their result.55 In the novel, white owners who were
once secure in their status suddenly find themselves transformed into managers
dependent on black labor for their survival. But black labor is equally disadvan
taged by the same changes: wage labor fundamentally disrupts domestic and
community security. In the new South, in Faulkner's view, blacks are more vul
nerable than they had been as sharecroppers, not less.
Go Down, Moses also registers the ways in which the exercise of federal leg
islative power not only threatened Southern social stability—and the status quo
of race relations—but signaled a transformation of law itself. Instead of law
embedded in and reflective of the needs and values of the community, judicial
authority in the text is increasingly indifferent, bureaucratic, and divorced from
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I go Ticien Marie Sassoubre
the community. Faulkner's description of the arrival of a white planter and a black
sharecropper at the federal courthouse makes this disjuncture clear:
When they reached town, the streets leading into it and the Square itself
were crowded with cars and wagons; the flag rippled and flew in the
bright May weather above the federal courthouse. [They] crossed the
thronged pavement, walking in a narrow lane of faces they knew—
other people from their place, people from other places along the creek
and neighborhood, come the seventeen miles also with no hope of get
ting into the courtroom itself but just to wait in the street and see them
pass—the faces they only knew by hearsay: the rich white lawyers and
judges and marshals talking to one another around their proud cigars,
the haughty and powerful of the earth.56
The law here is inaccessible, indifferent, and above all, alien.57
In order to resolve disputes in a way that preserves the integrity of the com
munity, local legal authorities (as opposed to "the haughty and powerful" lawyers
associated with the federal courthouse) in Go Down, Moses consistently avoid offi
cial adjudication by resorting to private, extralegal means. But Faulkner is care
ful to distinguish this extralegal activity from the lawlessness of lynching, the
kind of lawlessness that would invite federal intervention. In Go Down, Moses
lynching is refigured as the result of the dehumanization of both blacks and
whites in an economy of exploitation and consumerism imposed by the North.
Faulkner establishes a precedent for the extralegal dispute resolution in
which his Southern legal authorities will engage in the first chapter of Go Down, Moses. In "Was," set in 1859, white planters play poker to settle a disagreement.
The stakes are terribly high: if one man loses, his brother has to marry his oppo
nents sister; if he wins, his black half-brother gets to marry one of his opponent's
slaves (which also means the player will acquire her for free).58 The conflict is
both a private domestic matter and a contract dispute arising from a previous
wager. By resolving it through a poker game, Faulkner identifies extralegal,
community-based dispute resolution with an antebellum code of Southern
honor that binds society together.59 In antebellum planter culture, white owner
ship doubles as legal authority. There is no need for official law in this setting: pri vate parties can—and often must—resolve their own disputes.
The code of honor Faulkner invokes here maps onto a familiar Southern
nostalgia for a romantic, and largely mythical, chivalric antebellum world. But it
is also connected to the revolutionary period ideal of the lawyer-statesman
embodied in the South by Thomas Jefferson. (It is no accident that the county seat
of Faulkner's fictional Yoknapatawpha County is named Jefferson.) The author
ity of the lawyer-statesman originated in his personal honor and his stature in the
community.60 And Southern lawyers continued to enjoy a close affiliation with
"agrarian society" and to play "a role of responsible leadership in the community"
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 191
in the nineteenth century even as anti-lawyer sentiment flourished in the
North.61 The local legal authorities in the sections of Go Down, Moses set in the
1930s bear this legacy as they resist federal law. But they are significantly hin
dered by the restructuring of property relations precipitated by the New Deal. In
Faulkner's South, legal authority remains inextricably tied to ownership.
Carothers McCaslin, progenitor of the black and white families that popu
late Go Down, Moses and founder of the plantation on which they live, is imag ined in terms of pure and uncontested authority. As his great-great-grandson
Roth remarks wistfully, "Old Carothers got his nigger bastards right in his back
yard and I would like to have seen the husband or anybody else that said him nay"
(112). Carothers is no lawyer, but the point is that he doesn't need to be. Faulkner
represents Carothers's authority as pre-legal, derived from his status as an origi
nary owner and founder of the community. He is the man who "saw the oppor
tunity and took it, bought the land, took the land, got the land no matter how...
when it was a wilderness of wild beasts and wilder men, and cleared it, translated
it into something to bequeath to his children" (245). Carothers's authority is never matched in the text: his sons (one of whom is the winner in the poker game
that begins the novel) enjoy diminished control over the land and its inhabitants,
as does each subsequent generation of white owners. This gradual diminution of
authority tracks the imposition of federal law on the South, first through Recon
struction and later through "governmental interference with the raising and mar
keting of [cotton]" (119) and the restructuring of labor relations under the New
Deal. The result of this diminished authority, as the novel moves forward in time
(the chapters themselves do not appear in chronological order), is that dis
putes—even if they are domestic—increasingly require external mediation. But
subjecting these disputes to legal adjudication only exacerbates the intrusion of
exogamous law into Southern culture, something no one knows better, in the
novel, than local legal authorities.
The second chapter of Go Down, Moses, "The Fire and the Hearth," set in the
late 1930s, charts the relationships of two of Carothers's descendants, one black
and one white, still living on the McCaslin plantation. Twice in the chapter, Tucas
Beauchamp, the son of the slave at stake in the poker game in "Was," and Roth
Edwards, the white heir of one of the poker players, find themselves in the Jef ferson courthouse. The central importance of these courthouse scenes is sug
gested by the fact that the chapter's working title was "A Point of Law."62 Both
times that Roth and Lucas end up at the courthouse, the dispute that has brought
them there is a domestic matter. And in both cases, local legal authorities with
deep personal ties to the community are unwilling to subject disputes that would
traditionally have been resolved through the private authority of white owners to
the increasingly formal, indifferent authority of the law.
The first trip to the courthouse is the result of a miscalculation on Lucas's part
in his attempt to get Roth to have George Wilkins—who is not only sleeping with
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192 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
Lucas's daughter, Nat, but also competing with Lucas in the production of boot
leg whiskey—arrested (and thereby removed from the plantation). Lucas is suc
cessful in his manipulation of Roth, which he conceives of as "like dropping the
nickel in the slot machine and pulling the lever: all he would have to do then
would be just to watch it" (36). Lucas knows Roth's dependence on sharecrop
pers has eroded his sense of his own authority to the point that he will not con
front George privately, even though Roth is George's landlord and the whiskey still is on Roth's land. (58). When Lucas tells him about George's still, Roth imme
diately calls the sheriff—which is exactly what Lucas wants him to do.
But Lucas has underestimated his own daughter, who cleverly plants a sec
ond still at Lucas's house in retaliation. The sheriffs discovery of the two stills
lands Lucas, George, and Roth in what Faulkner describes as "the commissioner's
office in the federal courthouse in Jefferson" (62). Luckily for Lucas, the com
missioner's office turns out to be an enclave of local, community-based author
ity. Ignoring the agency of the two black men in the dispute, the commissioner
chastises Roth for not having control over the sharecroppers on his own planta
tion, and asks the white sheriff and deputy to describe the evidence. Although
Lucas has no voice at this pretrial meeting, the conversation between the white
men provides Lucas with the information he needs to protect himself from being
found guilty of a crime at trial: the commissioner indicates that family members
cannot testify against one another. So once Roth pays bail for Lucas and George
(it is planting season and he needs them to plant their acres), Lucas negotiates a
dowry with Nat (a porch, a stove, and a well for George's house) and obtains a
fraudulent marriage license indicating that his daughter and George are already
married. The threat of exogamous and indifferent law is represented in the courtroom
on the day of Lucas and George's scheduled trial in the persons of the "deputy
marshal" chewing a toothpick and reading "a Memphis newspaper" and "an
angry-looking man whom Lucas did not know—the United States Attorney, who
had moved to Jefferson only after the administration changed" (70-71). But the
judge himself is a man Lucas has known all his life, a man who stayed on the
McCaslin plantation "for weeks during the quail season" when Roth's grandfather
owned it and whose horse Lucas had often held while the judge was hunting with
Roth's father. Once this connection is established, the narration of the novel
observes that "[i]t took hardly any time at all" (71). Ignoring the United States
Attorney's attempts to make a case, and clearly unconcerned with the authentic
ity of the marriage license Lucas has produced, Judge Gowan declares the charges
against Lucas to be "nonsense" (71). Instead of conducting a trial, the judge
inquires paternalistically about Nat's marriage. At the end of this interview, he
instructs the sheriff to destroy the stills and Roth to "get them out of here"—the
charges are dropped, since the matter was always, in the judge's view, properly a
private one (72). Official adjudication—in the sense of the impersonal applica
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 193
tion of formal rules—is avoided and, in the process, community-based norms of
racial hierarchy but also of personal autonomy are restored.
Roth and Lucas's second trip to the Jefferson courthouse comes after Lucas
becomes convinced that there is a fortune in gold coin buried on the McCaslin
plantation. In order to obtain a divining machine without having to pay for it,
Lucas engages in a variety of conceits, including proffering one of Roth's mules as
collateral and burying money of his own to trick the divining machine salesman.
Impersonal and uninformed by cultural context, the contract between the divin
ing machine salesman and Lucas that follows constitutes an extreme case of the
formalism of Northern market logic.63 And while the salesman's disinterest in
gradations of status, most significantly race, ultimately permits Lucas to gain the
upper hand in the transaction, freedom of contract is imagined as dangerous in
Go Down, Moses precisely because it facilitates the denial of social and personal
context.
Lucas's fraudulent contract is not, however, the reason Roth and Lucas once
again find themselves in court. In the logic of the novel the contract doesn't mat
ter, because the unnamed salesman from St. Louis and the divining machine
itself, "an oblong metal box," "compact and solid and businesslike and complex
with knobs and dials," are utterly alien (79).64 Instead, it is Lucas's wife, Molly,
who causes the second court appearance by demanding a divorce after forty-five
years of marriage, because his purchase of the divining machine (and the obses
sion it represents) has effectively ended Lucas's life as a husband and sharecrop
per. "When a man that old takes up money hunting," she reasons, "it's like when
he takes up gambling or whiskey or women. He ain't going to have time to quit
... All I can do is to go clean away from him" (100). Roth tries and fails to nego
tiate an alternative to the divorce: Molly won't agree to Roth's feeble compromise
that Lucas only search for the money two nights a week. Finally, Molly forces the
issue by almost killing herself trying to hide the divining machine on her own.
Since Lucas refuses to defer to the authority of a man dependent on him for a
livelihood—"I'm the one to say about my private business," Lucas insists—all
Roth can do is take Lucas and Molly to Jefferson to get a divorce (116).
The case is heard in a "small detached building beside the courthouse
proper" by a man Faulkner takes pains to identify with the old regime of planter owners and local customs (122-23). The judicial figure is also identified as the
"Chancellor," indicating that the divorce is being heard in a court of equity, not a
court of law.65 Nevertheless, the threat of impersonal, exogamous law—embod
ied by the angry-looking United States Attorney in the first case—is represented
in the divorce proceedings by the clerk of the court, who would prevent Lucas
from speaking at all, and who instructs Lucas to "Say sir to the court" (124), sug
gesting that legal authority is vested in the office rather than the person of the
judge. Like the commissioner in the first case, the judge laments Roth's inability
to resolve the matter privately:
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IQ4 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
He made a clucking sound. "After forty-five years. You can't do any
thing about it?"
"No, sir," [Roth] said. "I tried. I..." The Chancellor made the cluck
sound again. (123)
The judge's reticence buys Lucas enough time to rescue this private matter from
adjudication himself. He interrupts the proceeding, from which he has been offi
cially excluded, to insist" [w] e aint gonter have no contest or no voce neither ...
1 dont want no court" (124). The judge accepts Lucas's interruption and has the
case stricken from the docket, erasing any record of its existence. Before leaving
Jefferson, Lucas disappears and returns with a gift of candy for Molly, reinscrib
ing the relationship in a private, domestic economy.66 For a second time, the offi
cial adjudication of what is properly a private matter has been avoided, and
community-based norms are restored.
Both of Lucas and Roth's trips to the federal courthouse involve domestic dis
putes, but they also both clearly reflect the encroachment of market relations
(rapidly replacing long-standing community relations in the South during the
1930s) into domestic settings. Indeed, in this chapter, and throughout Go Down,
Moses, Faulkner directly associates federal law's indifference to person and place
with the impersonality of the free market. In "The Fire and the Hearth," the ide
alized past of interdependence and honor that provide the context of the poker
game in "Was" have been replaced with contracts between strangers and compe
tition within families.67 Most of the sharecroppers on whom Roth is dependent
are strangers to him, and he exercises what control he has at the plantation com
missary, where they must buy supplies from him. Lucas, who has enjoyed
extraordinary financial and personal security as a black man because of his famil
ial relationship to the white McCaslins (102), nearly loses his immediate family when he adopts the logic of the market, first as a bootlegger and then in his treas
ure hunting, which Faulkner gives us to understand is really the pursuit of money
"on which there was no sweat, at least none of his own" (119)—the equivalent of
"profit" in a market economy.68
Despite Roth's anxiety about the erosion of his own status—"an accumulation
of floutings and outrages covering not only his span but his father's lifetime too back
into the time of his grandfather" (101) resulting in the past from the federal inter
ventions of Reconstruction and in his time from New Deal policies—blacks do not
enj oy a palpable increase in security or the opportunity to negotiate advantageously
for the benefit of their own labor in Go Down, Moses.69 Regardless of the intentions
of the AAA, NLRA, and other federal legislation that drove blacks onto the wage
labor market, Faulkner insists that freedom of contract could never have equalized
the relative power of (white) owners and (black) nonowners in the postbellum
South.70 For Faulkner, the ascendance of market relations in the South makes
blacks more socially and economically vulnerable, not less so.
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 195
There is substantial historical support for Faulkner's position. In addition to
Jim Crow laws, widespread social and economic practices in the South enforced
racial segregation and the dependence of labor—most dramatically through vio
lence, but perhaps more insidiously through control over the entrance of blacks
into the market as consumers.71 This control was exerted over what blacks were
able to buy and the prices they paid in local white-owned stores and farm com
missaries. It was also exercised to prevent blacks from buying land of their own.72
As a result of these practices, black laborers' wages did not bring the freedom
associated with earning potential in the logic of market capitalism. Rather, those
wages reinforced their dependence. In "Pantaloon in Black," the chapter that fol
lows "The Fire and the Hearth," Faulkner imagines the Southern wage-labor
market of the 1930s as not merely destructive for communities but literally fatal
to individuals.73 Without the stabilizing context of community and family, Faulkner suggests, personal identity is inevitably threatened.
In the first section of "Pantaloon in Black," Rider, a black sawmill worker of
prodigious strength, discovers that he cannot transcend his status as labor, no mat
ter how hard he works. This reality is brought home, symbolically, by the death of
his wife, because for Rider marriage represents the promise of stability of place and
of identity.74 After his marriage, Rider and his wife, Mannie, spend their wages mak
ing improvements to a house they don't own and bank the remainder of Rider's pay
(which will never be enough to buy it) with the man who owns it. After Mannie dies,
Rider realizes that "the house had never been his anyway" and never could be (135).
He can translate his labor into cash, but not into capital assets that might assure him
security and independence in the future. When Rider realizes this, he experiences
a profound alienation from his labor and from himself.
His initial response is to attempt to subsume himself in his work at the mill,
to become, in a sense, only labor. In work, "he could stop needing to invent to
himself reasons for his breathing, until after a while he began to believe he had
forgot about breathing since now he could not hear it himself above the steady
thunder of the rolling logs" (141). When this distraction fails, he undertakes an
extraordinary feat of strength, single-handedly moving an enormous log, which
demonstrates both the tremendous value of his labor and its uselessness to him.
He then takes recourse to the liquor he knows he will be allowed to buy with pre
dictably unsatisfying results. Finally, he decides that death is the only form of self
possession available to him and kills a white man, knowing he will be killed for
it.75 But Rider doesn't kill just any white man. He kills the white man who runs a
crooked dice game at the lumber mill, cheating black laborers out of their money
at night just as the white owners of the mill exploit them by day. Thus, in sharp contrast with the lynching in Faulkner's 1932 novel Light in August (in which a black man is lynched for sleeping with and then murdering a white woman), the
lynching in "Pantaloon in Black" is both a suicide and an inarticulate protest
against an economic regime stacked against black labor.76
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I 46 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
The second section of "Pantaloon in Black" is written from the perspective of
the sheriff's deputy, who has allowed the white victim's relatives to take Rider
from the jail and lynch him before there can be a trial. (Rider's body is found hang
ing from "the bell-rope in a Negro schoolhouse" [ 149].) The deputy misinterprets
Rider's abject grief as indifference, rendering Rider's subsequent acts incompre
hensible. The deputy concludes that Rider "aint human" (149), that "when it
comes to the normal human feelings and sentiments of human being, [blacks]
might just as well be a damned herd of wild buffaloes" (150). In part, Faulkner's
point here is that urban segregation—a product, on Faulkner's account, of the
destruction of the agrarian economy's mutually interdependent mixed race com
munities—results in dangerous misunderstanding between the races. The per
sonal and economic interconnectedness of Roth and Lucas casts the gulf between
the deputy and Rider in sharp relief.
But Faulkner is not only concerned with race here. The deputy's incompre
hension of Rider is also a symptom of the dysfunction of all of the deputy's rela
tionships, including his marriage—a dysfunction Faulkner associates with the
new legal and economic regime. Preoccupied with her own affairs ("she had
attended a club rook-party that afternoon and had won the first, the fifty-cent,
prize until another member had insisted on a recount of the scores and the ulti
mate throwing out of one entire game" [150]), the deputy's wife is an unwilling
audience for his version of Rider's story. She is not interested in Rider ("take him
out of my kitchen," she insists vainly as her husband begins to tell the story [150]),
nor is she particularly interested in her husband (at the end of the chapter, she
announces that she is "going to the picture show" without him [154].) This self
absorbed, middle-class urban housewife is the opposite of Rider's wife, Mannie,
who is Rider's partner and friend. And the deputy, who allows Rider to be taken
and lynched despite a halfhearted assertion that "interference with the law cant be
condoned" (152), is characterized as a passive employee, collecting a paycheck
rather than protecting the community. Not only is the lynching in "Pantaloon in
Black" a consequence of indifferent law and the market economy it fosters, but
blacks and whites both suffer the depersonalizing affects of those forces.
In the last chapter of Go Down, Moses (also titled "Go Down, Moses"),
Faulkner's account of the impact of federally imposed legal and economic change
is reworked a third time in the story of Molly and Lucas's grandson, Samuel, who moves North to escape the dead-end labor market that destroys Rider. Samuel is
alive, briefly, at the beginning of the chapter—smoking on a "steel cot" in the
"steel cubicle" of an Illinois jail cell. His hair is straightened, and his voice is "any
thing under the sun but a southern voice, or even a Negro voice" (351). In other
words, he is unrecognizable. Samuel tells a census taker that his occupation has
been "getting rich too fast" (352) and the anonymity that money and mobility
have afforded him has proven to be a fatal liability. Samuel has been sentenced to
death for killing a cop that he claims a different, equally anonymous black man
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 197
actually killed. The census taker is indifferent to this mistake of identity, as the
Northern judicial system clearly has been. In a world of discrete contractual
exchanges between strangers, Faulkner implies, identity no longer matters.77 In
"Go Down, Moses" Samuel's execution is figured as a Northern lynching.
When Lucas becomes obsessed with finding the buried treasure, Molly and
Roth and Judge Gowan are there to remind him of what he'll sacrifice (domestic
security, personal autonomy) to get it. But in the North, Samuel—"in a business
called numbers, that people like him make money in" (357)—is effectively killed
for the same fantasy of money on which there is no sweat of his own. Before his
execution the census taker asks Samuel how his remains will get back to Missis
sippi if his family doesn't know where he is. Samuel responds, "What will that
matter to me?" (352). But the rest of "Go Down, Moses" is about the return of
Samuel's body to Yoknapatawpha County, because it does matter there. In this
way, Faulkner suggests that it is up to the South to redress, if not right, the wrong
of Samuel's execution by restoring him to the security of the community.
On the day before Samuel's execution, Molly asks Gavin Stevens, a white
lawyer in Jefferson, to help her find him. Molly doesn't know what's about to hap
pen to Samuel, only that he has gone North because there is no future for him on
the plantation, something she conceives through the lens of her own experience:
she tells Stevens that Samuel has been "sold ... in Egypt. I don't know whar he
is. I just knows Pharaoh got him. And you the Law. I wants to find my boy" (354).
Molly's association of conditions in the North with oppression and slavery is
telling, as is her sense that the law is the only means of access to this regime.
Still, Faulkner is careful to identify Stevens with the lawyer-citizens of
Southern tradition, as opposed to federal law and its connection to the market.
We are told that Stevens's "office was his hobby, although it made his living for
him, and [his] serious vocation was a twenty-two-year-old unfinished translation
of the Old Testament back into classic Greek" (353). Nevertheless, Stevens is not
entirely of the community: he has been educated abroad ("Phi Beta Kappa, Har
vard, Ph.D., Heidelberg" [353]), he lives in town in a boardinghouse, and he is unable to fathom the shared grief of Molly and Miss Worsham, the elderly white
woman with whom Molly "grew up together as sisters" (357). This distance qual
ifies Stevens to mediate between the alien world into which Samuel has been lost
and the community in the text. He enlists the help of the town newspaper's edi
tor to help him locate Samuel, and the two find the notice of his impending exe
cution in an Illinois paper. By the time they find the notice, it is too late to save
Samuel, but not too late to recover his remains. Stevens lets Miss Worsham
believe that her twenty-five dollars will cover the expenses, and solicits donations
from the white businesses in Jefferson to defray the remainder of the cost of
retrieving and burying Samuel's body (360).
In contrast with the interventions of Judge Gowan and Chancellor in "The
Fire and the Hearth," Stevens's intervention is professional—an expression of his
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198 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
public persona—rather than personal. It insulates Stevens's private indifference
and masks the arbitrariness of Samuel's death. Ultimately, the homecoming
Stevens arranges for Samuel is a kind of staged catharsis—an elaborate and arti
ficial gesture intended to reassure the community that it has not changed. In real
ity, Faulkner asserts, the ties that united the community have been replaced with
a new system of mutable and impersonal relations that may preserve the com
munity but also transform it. Much of Go Down, Moses is an elegy for the old
South, but the final words are Stevens's: "Let's get back to town. I haven't seen my
desk in two days" (365). The benevolent but impersonal businessmen of "Go Down, Moses" stand at
the end of the arc of legal authority in the novel from an idealized agrarian past to
the increasingly urban and commodified present of the South. In the idealized
past—before Reconstruction—the power to resolve disputes and protect com
munity norms is embedded in the community to such an extent that legal author
ity is inseparable from personal authority.78 In the chapters set in the 1930s, legal
authorities associated with the old regime preserve community norms by resolv
ing disputes by extralegal means, while legal authorities associated with town
and exogamous law threaten community stability and allow Rider's lynching. At
the end of Go Down, Moses Faulkner attempts to imagine a new version of legal
authority under new economic and social conditions that is still recognizably
Southern. But Gavin Stevens's performance in "Go Down, Moses" is clearly not
satisfactory. Faulkner would have to try again.
Avoiding Adjudication in Intruder
"Go Down, Moses" sets the stage for Intruder in the Dust, in which Gavin Stevens and
Sheriff Hampton save Lucas by preventing both a lynching and a trial. The period
between the novels, 1942 to 1948, is the longest gap between novels in Faulkner's
career. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred just as Faulkner was finishing Go
Down, Moses, and he was deeply preoccupied by the war.79 The financial distress
that had marked much of his career also forced him to return to Hollywood in 1942
to work as a writer for the movie industry. He spent the better part of the next seven
years under contract there.80 Thus it was with a sense of dislocation and disem
powerment that Faulkner watched the transformation of the national landscape
wrought first by the war and then by the Truman administration.
The most significant aspect of this transformation, for Faulkner and perhaps
forthe South, was the beginning ofthe end of segregation. In 1941 Roosevelt cre
ated the Fair Employment Practices Committee, which initiated the desegrega
tion of the civil service, and only a few years later Truman began the long process
of desegregating the military. In addition to the increase in government employ
ment of blacks, wartime industrial production generated large-scale private sec
tor employment of blacks. These new industrial jobs not only precipitated the
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 199
relocation of many Southern blacks to Northern and Western urban centers, but
created a new middle class of black workers who earned competitive wages and
joined unions.81 Membership in the NAACP increased from 50,000 in 1940 to
350,000 in 1945.82 In other words, the interests of blacks began to carry
unprecedented political and economic weight. This new reality was reflected in
a series of Supreme Court decisions in the early 1940s regarding public accom
modations and voting rights that made significant inroads into long-established
Jim Crow practices.83 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, America's vision of
itself as the defender of the free world and advocate for human rights during
World War II made segregation increasingly embarrassing.84
This vision was further tarnished by a rash of violence against blacks in the
South in 1946 perpetrated by returning veterans surprised by blacks' rapid rise
in social and economic status.85 Congress and the Truman administration
answered the violence by resurrecting federal antilynching and anti-poll tax leg
islation that the South had considered dead for a decade, reopening an old fault line between federal law and Southern customs.86 Although the legislation was
successfully blocked by the Southern states, Truman's newly established Com
mittee on Civil Rights publicly reported Southern abuses to Congress, and civil
rights became a key issue in the 1948 presidential campaign.87 Indeed, the
Democratic Party split over language in the platform calling for "full and equal
political participation," "equal opportunity of employment," "the right of secu
rity of person," and "equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation."88
Southern states, including Mississippi, nominated an alternative ticket with
Strom Thurmond listed as the Democratic Party's presidential candidate.
It was against this backdrop that Faulkner wrote Intruder in the Dust.
Faulkner believed that federally mandated desegregation in the twentieth cen
tury would fail as surely as emancipation and Reconstruction had in the nine
teenth century.89 He thought that the result would be, if not a second civil war, a
reactionary response on the part of Southerners answered by federal occupa
tion.90 Only the South could effectively redress the injustices of slavery and make
social equality of the races possible.91 In its insistence that justice must come
from within the community, Intruder in the Dust proposes an alternative to federal
intervention in the problem of race relations that restores the values on which
Faulkner believed Southern identity and community depended.92
Since the vast majority of Southerners opposed desegregation, however,
Faulkner recognized that legal authority would be necessary to drive cultural
change. His solution is local, indigenous legal authorities, deeply embedded in
the community, who understand the mutual independence of whites and blacks,
and the mutual benefit of change. In other words, what has been widely read as
gradualism with regard to race relations on Faulkner's part can also be read as
legal regionalism, a rejection of federal legislation in favor of the South develop
ing its own, culturally and economically appropriate, legal protection of liberty
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200 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
and equality. The inherent difficulties of this solution, however, are clear from
Faulkner's use of the exceptional Lucas Beauchamp to establish the terms of
mutual interdependence, and the conditions under which he collaborates with
local white authorities.
At the beginning of Intruder in the Dust, Lucas has been arrested for the mur
der of a white man named Vinson Gowrie. Discovered standing over Vinson
Gowrie's dead body, Lucas survives long enough to be arrested through the
serendipitous presence of the local constable, Skipworth—"a little driedup wiz
ened stonedeaf old man not much larger than a half-grown boy with a big nick
elplated pistol. . . who on this occasion anyway revealed an almost gratuitous
hardihood and courage."93 But no one expects Lucas to survive the night—let
alone make it to trial.94 As a member of the lynch mob that gathers outside the
jail asks, "Who in this county or state either is going to help [the sheriff] protect a nigger that shoots white men in the back?" (39-40). What's more, the victim's
family, the Gowries, are notoriously independent and violent: "a ramification of
cousins and inlaws covering a whole corner of the county"—"brawlers and fox
hunters and whiskeymakers not even... a simple clan or tribe but a race a species
which before now had made their hill stronghold good against the county and
the federal government too, . . . where peace officers from town didn't even go
unless they were sent for and strange white men didn't wander far from the high
way after dark and no Negro at any time" (35). In response to the news of the mur
der and arrest, the black population remains out of sight while the white
population streams into the town square in order to be there for the lynching.
Faulkner makes it clear that the white community looks forward to Lucas's
death with particular relish, because, as we know from Go Down, Moses, Lucas has
never shown the deference or dependence it expects. Gavin Stevens's own
brother-in-law, who imagines himself superior to the lynch mob gathering in the
square, nevertheless shares their view of Lucas's fate: "They're going to make a
nigger out of him once in his life anyway" (31). But Lucas's association with the
old planter culture of his white grandfather—the source of his aggravating inde
pendence—is also the reason he makes it to the town jail. Like Judge Gowan, the
commissioner, and the Chancellor in Go Down, Moses, Skipworth protects Lucas
because he and Lucas are both relics of the old South. Indeed, the avoidance of
adjudication in Go Down, Moses sets the stage for the avoidance of both a trial and
a lynching in Intruder in the Dust. Sheriff Hope Hampton and Gavin Stevens ulti
mately engage in a broad array of extralegal practices (exhuming a body, hiding Lucas at the sheriff's house, entrapping the real killer) in order to protect Lucas
and preserve the integrity of the community.
Rather than providing a solution to the threat of interracial violence, federal
law and the market relations of the North are figured as the root causes of that vio
lence in Intruder in the Dust. The tension between indigenous Southern values and
the imposition of Northern power is figured in the description of the town square
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner
as Stevens drives to meet with Lucas in the jail: "the amphitheatric lightless stores,
the slender white pencil of the Confederate monument against the mass of the [fed
eral] courthouse looming in columned upsoar" (48). The j ail and the church are the
only original buildings in the square, the rest "having been burned to rubble by
Federal occupation forces after a battle in 1864" (49). The town is the location of
the translation of the old South, where on Faulkner's account, men worked
together "doing the base jobs and the splendid ones not for pay or politics but to
shape the land for their posterity" (50), into something foreign (the "amphitheatric stores") and anarchic (the lynch mob). Stevens's conclusion, as he arrives, that "no
man can cause more grief than that one clinging blindly to the vices of his ances
tors" (48), is only half of Faulkner's point. By the end of the novel it is just as clear
that one's ancestors' virtues are worth struggling to preserve.
It makes all the difference, in the logic of the novel, that the lynch mob that
forms outside the jail is comprised not of farmers but
young men or men under forty, bachelors, the homeless who had the
Saturday and Sunday baths in the barbershop—truckdrivers and
garagehands, the oiler from the cotton gin, a sodajerker from the drug
store and the ones who could be seen all week long in or around the
poolhall who did nothing at all that anybody knew, who owned auto
mobiles and spent money nobody really knew exactly how they earned
on weekends in Memphis or New Orleans brothels—the men ... in
every little Southern town, who never really led mobs nor even insti
gated them but were always the nucleus of them because of their mass
availability. (42)
These men, wage laborers and petty criminals, are creatures of the federally willed
transformation of the South. They are not, in Faulkner's mind, indigenous. In con
trast, the Gowries, who represent the old South, ultimately—and unexpectedly—
participate in Lucas's vindication while the mob still waits in the square.95
When he saves Lucas, Constable Skip worth puts Lucas's fate in the hands of
the local sheriff, whose charge is to protect and preserve the values and security
of the county—the rural community in which the murder occurred. Sheriff
Hampton is described as a "countryman, a farmer and a son of farmers" (105),
and his authority derives from the values and traditions of that community. When
he arrives in town with Lucas, he protects Lucas by the sheer force of his will. "I
told you folks once to get out of here," he tells the waiting mob in his "mild cold
bland heatless voice," "I aint going to tell you again" (44). Hampton, we are to
understand, is a man who will do his job regardless of external pressure, a man
with the independence and assurance to defy the town because of his standing in
the community.
Hampton also answers the question of who will help him protect Lucas by
posting Will Legate, a farmer and the "finest shot" in the county, at the jailhouse
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202 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
door instead of the jailer or one of his own deputies. Like Judge Gowan in Go
Down, Moses, Will Legate has hunted with Lucas and his white cousins in the old
days. He can also keep an entire town at bay with a single gun he won't have to
use, because everyone knows he won't hesitate to use it, or miss (51). Hampton
will also have the lawyer Gavin Stevens's help. And in a significant change from
his characterization in Go Down, Moses, in Intruder in the Dust Stevens occupies
the same office as his father, who was the county attorney before him, through
which "the county's legal business" had passed for as long as anyone could
remember, the "dogeared faded papers and the needs and passions they repre
sented and the measured and bounded county too were all coeval and one" (29).
Like Hampton and Legate, Stevens's authority is embedded in Southern tradition
and values.
Though Faulkner means ultimately to redeem them, these men are not with
out their flaws.96 For instance, in the initial interview between Lucas and Stevens,
Stevens takes Lucas's guilt so completely for granted that he won't let Lucas talk.
Even if he would listen to Lucas, though, Lucas wouldn't tell him who killed Vin
son Gowrie (he witnessed, rather than committed, the murder). Lucas knows
naming the white murderer would carry its own kind of death sentence. Instead,
the exchange between Lucas and Stevens proceeds as a kind of poker game, with
each man trying to call the other's bluff.97 Stevens offers to defend Lucas in the
hypothetical event that Lucas lives long enough to be tried by a judge and a "Dis
trict Attorney," who "dont live within fifty miles of Yoknapatawpha County" (63). But Lucas doesn't want a defense attorney. His only hope is for someone to
exhume the body and have the bullet hole examined, which will prove his inno
cence. Over the course of the exchange, Lucas realizes Stevens is too sure of
Lucas's guilt to ask him to do it. So instead he asks Stevens's sixteen-year-old
nephew, Chick Mallison.
Lucas can make this request of Chick because when Lucas saved Chick's life
four years earlier, instead of expressing his gratitude, Chick tried to reassert his
racial superiority by offering Lucas money. When Lucas refused the money,
Chick suffered a humiliation that haunts him right up to the moment Lucas
makes his request. And it gradually becomes evident in the novel that Faulkner
intends this relationship between Lucas and Chick to provide a model for a new
regime of race relations in the South: continued mutual interdependence, with
whites acknowledging their debt to black labor instead of denying it. And per
sonally seeing justice done.
Even if Lucas had asked for Stevens's help, Chick knows there wouldn't be
time for his "uncle to go to the sheriff's house and convince him and then find a
[Justice of the Peace] or whoever they would have to find and then convince too
to open the grave" (73) before the mob got to Lucas. Chick must find the courage
to help Lucas without the aid of the adult men. But there is precedent in Chick's
experience for this—he has already learned that "[i]f you ever needs to get any
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 203
thing done outside the common run, don't waste yo time on the menfolks; get the
womens and children to working at it." Men "cant listen. They aint got time.
They're too busy with facks" (70) ,98 And mere facts, Faulkner insists, cannot cap
ture the truth of a community's history—or understanding of itself (49). So it is
Chick, his black best friend, Aleck Sander, and an elderly white woman named
Miss Habersham (Miss Worsham in Go Down, Moses) who will have to save Lucas
by digging up Vinson Gowrie's grave in the middle of the night." Instead of finding Vinson Gowrie's body, however, they witness an uniden
tifiable figure on a mule carrying a body-shaped load and find in Gowrie's grave the body of another man. These developments put Chick, Aleck Sander, and Miss
Habersham in real peril from the actual murderer, making it necessary to enlist
the help of the very local legal authorities whose j ob they have had to do. But their
determination "to preserve not even justice and decency but innocence" (114)
has set an example for Stevens and Hampton.
Once Chick, Aleck Sander, and Miss Habersham initiate the process in
Intruder in the Dust, the local legal authorities begin to serve the interests of jus
tice through private and community-based action. As Chick has reasoned the
night before, Stevens and Hampton quickly determine that there isn't enough
time to get a judge's order to exhume the body, even if they could convince a judge
to issue such an order given the way the "evidence" to support it has been gath
ered. Instead, Hampton doesn't so much ask the Gowries' permission as tell them
to meet him at the grave. When he convinces them to let him open it, they find it
empty. At this point, the sheriff and the lawyer have to do what Faulkner imag
ines only community-based legal authority can and must do: figure out where the
bodies are and who killed them based on their specific local knowledge. This
knowledge is partly geographical. They know where the softest dirt someone could dig a hasty new grave in is, they know the location of the quicksand in the
riverbed that a man driven to desperation by having to dispose of the second
body in one night would resort to. It is also social and historical. They know not
only what kind of gun Lucas carries but also that Vinson's brother Crawford owns
the kind of gun Vinson appears to have been shot with, and that Crawford was in
business with Jake Montgomery, the man Chick and Aleck and Miss Habersham
found in Vinson's grave.
In the old cemetery nine miles from town, this local knowledge allows
Hampton and Stevens to unravel the mystery: Crawford had been skimming
lumber from his partnership with Vinson and selling it to Montgomery on the
side. When Lucas, who has stumbled on the knowledge, threatens to reveal the
scam, Crawford kills his own brother (and later Montgomery) and frames Lucas
for the murder. The murder is thus the result of the market logic of the North—
the promise of a profit worth killing for.
The specter of racial violence, too, is generated by Crawford's corruption—
Lucas's race is not the reason Crawford frames him, though Crawford clearly
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204 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
hopes to exploit racial animus to save himself by framing Lucas. In the process of
discovering the truth, black jail inmates whom the sheriff has brought to do the
digging and the grieving Gowries dig together (173). The community is symbol
ically restored.100 And this restoration is the opposite of the spectacle that the
lynching would have been. Lucas is never publicly exonerated, nor is the hero
ism of Chick, Aleck, and Miss Habersham acknowledged. But Chick would nei
ther have wanted nor accepted this, "since it would have abrogated and made
void the whole sum of what part he had done which had to be anonymous else it
was valueless" (189). The value of their actions lies in preserving the integrity of
the community. Justice, here, is what is best for the community, not the individ
ual. And the point is not so much that Lucas has been saved, but that by saving
Lucas, Chick and the others have protected the community from the violence of
a lynching. They have not just saved Lucas; they have saved the mob, which
silently disperses, from itself (180). Moreover, since Vinson's real killer is his own
brother, the specter of interracial violence that haunts the book is revealed to be
fratricide at its core—fratricide deriving not from forces indigenous to the South
but from the depersonalizing effects of the market.101
In the final episode of the novel, Lucas and the sheriff partner to catch the real
murderer, using Lucas as bait. There is no question of a trial for Crawford Gowrie—
not only has Hampton "disposed of what little evidence they had by giving it back"
to the Gowries to rebury (193), but a trial is not in the best interests of the commu
nity. "[W]e're after just a murderer, not a lawyer," Stevens observes tellingly as the
plan unfolds. And the murder is, after all, a family matter. Indeed, the matter is kept
so private, Faulkner provides only glimpses of Crawford's capture to the reader: a
phony message is sent to lure the killer to a remote spot where Lucas and Hampton
will be waiting; later Crawford has reportedly committed suicide in the sheriff's cus
tody (231). Faulkner is apparently unwilling to speculate about the details of an
actual partnership between Hampton and Lucas—which in his scheme for the
South is both necessary and so distant a prospect that it is unimaginable. Instead,
in the closing pages of the novel Faulkner offers the details of the initial murder, in
its rich cultural specificity.
Intruder in the Dust imagines three stages of the transformation of race rela
tions—and legal authority—in the South. Faulkner concedes that white men, par
ticularly men in power, will find it hardest to change, because their very power
derives from the status quo. But women and children, perhaps because they are
already variously disempowered and dependent, and perhaps because they live
their lives in daily contact with blacks, Faulkner imagines as willing to risk their own security to create justice for blacks. Once a humble and courageous few set the
change in motion, local legal authority will begin to follow by finding solutions within the established norms of the community. The final stage—the stage of coop
eration between Lucas and the sheriff—stands for the possibility of a future part
nership of blacks and whites in the service of the greater communal good.
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 205
In Faulkner's vision the lawyer-citizen of the past must become, like Stevens,
the lawyer-paternalist: guiding both blacks and whites in the right direction.102
Faulkner's lawyer-paternalist moderates those elements of the community prone
to violence (the origins of which are universal, not racial, as the fratricide makes
clear) while protecting community-based norms that are properly the source and
limit of law. He also resists the corrupting influence of market forces. This vision
is obviously fundamentally conservative. But it is also already deeply nostalgic.
Faulkner's community of rural, interdependent black and white Southerners was
all but extinct by the publication of Intruder in the Dust in 1948.103
Faulkner's attention to the impact of federal law on the South may finally be
directed less at imagining an alternative legal regime than at imagining a differ
ent South. In writing Intruder in the Dust, Faulkner played the very role he assigns
to the Southern lawyer-paternalist.104 Faulkner meant to redeem the South by
saving Lucas, to create a different, better (if fictional) South. Instead, the novel
resulted in Faulkner's own redemption in the South. In part because of its
provocative racial politics, Intruder in the Dust was a commercial success—
Faulkner's first commercial success in twenty years.105 Not only was his imagined
South widely disseminated, but after a lifetime of financial frustration, Faulkner
would be solvent for the rest of his life. The novel's success also precipitated a
film version, which, in the interest of authenticity, was shot in Oxford, Mississippi,
in 1949.106 Despite initial resistance connected to the plotline and the long
standing perception of Faulkner as a drunk and an embarrassment, the white
community of Oxford embraced the movie production and, finally, embraced
Faulkner himself.107
University of California, Berkeley
Notes
1. Joel Williamson, WiUiamFaulknerandSouthernHistory (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 156, 160. Ostensibly, the justice that required swift and unequivocal
action was the protection of white property, and especially white women, from the
lawless desire of blacks—protection official law had failed to provide, in the South
ern imagination, at least since Reconstruction. But lynching was deeply tied to the
maintenance of racial hierarchy and control (through intimidation) of black labor.
Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynch
ings, 1882-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 18-19. "Spectacle
lynchings," like that of Nelse Patton, attempted to "publicly resolv[e] the race, gen
der, and class ambiguities at the very center of the culture of segregation," while "bru
tally conjur[ing] a collective, all-powerful whiteness" intended to rationalize the
"color line." Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the
South, 1890-1940 (New York: Vintage, 1999), 203.
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206 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
2. The mob's fury was in no way mitigated by the absence of a sexual aspect of the crime.
Because the sheriff refused to reveal where he had hidden the keys, the mob spent
three hours trying to ram through the steel doors of the jail until they finally gave up
and went to work on the steel-shuttered windows with saws, hammers, and chisels.
Eventually they opened up a hole that was large enough to fire guns into the cell where
Patton was held. When they finally got into the jail, they found he was badly
wounded, but they still dragged him out, strung him naked from a telephone pole,
and "riddled his body with bullets." Williamson, Faulkner, 159.
3. C. Vann Woodward makes this argument in Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (New
Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1951).
4. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1988), 239.
5. Kenneth Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (New York: Vintage, 1965),
158-77. See also Foner, Reconstruction, 316-17. Confederate leaders were able to
reenter government once President Johnson began issuing pardons.
6. Stampp, Era of Reconstruction, 199.
7. Ibid., 200.
8. Foner, Reconstruction, 198. Southerners also blamed the corruption and incompe
tence of carpetbaggers during Reconstruction.
9. Joel Williamson, A Rage for Order: Black/White Relations in the American South since
Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 71.
10. Ibid., 84. 11. Vardaman argued that Southern blacks were increasingly criminal (one-third more
criminal in 1890 than they had been in 1880, he asserted) and blamed that increas
ing criminality on "the aspiration of blacks to social equality." Williamson, Faulkner,
157. See also Orlando Patterson, Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two Amer
ican Centuries (New York: Basic, 1998), 179, 192.
12. Williamson, Faulkner, 157.
13. Faulkner seems to have thought and lived in this climate, too, as Neil McMillen and
Noel Polk have observed. See McMillen and Polk, "Faulkner on Lynching," Faulkner
Journal 8, no. 1 (1992): 3-13.
14. William Faulkner, "Dry September," in Collected Stories (New York: Vintage, 1995),
172.
15. William Faulkner, Sanctuary (New York: Vintage, 1993), 284.
16. William Faulkner, Light in August (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 276.
17. Ibid., 328. 18. Ibid., 419. 19. Ibid., 291, 312, 316. 20. Jay Watson, Forensic Fictions: The Lawyer Figure in Faulkner (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1993), 6. According to Watson, "the idea of the forensic figure as
lawyer-citizen, animated by an ethic of service and typically aligned, for better or
worse, with communal values, exerted a powerful pull on Faulkner's imagination
throughout his career" (6). Lawyers populated Faulkner's immediate circle of family
and friends. His great-grandfather, grandfather, uncle, and brother were all lawyers,
as were his wife Estelle's father and first husband (7,10). His close friend and early lit
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 207
erary mentor, Phil Stone, was a lawyer as well. Williamson, Faulkner, 174. Watson
argues that Faulkner conceived of the lawyer figure as "part mentor, part competitor.
A kindred soul to the writer as fellow humanist and rhetor, yet also an authority fig
ure, possessed of the power and status that Faulkner no doubt coveted for himself but
resisted in others." Watson, Forensic Fictions, 11.
21. The fact that lynchings were originally a community-based means of preserving sta
bility and order makes them increasingly significant, and vexed, for Faulkner in the
1930s and 1940s as he tries to imagine an alternative to federal law.
22. Richard Godden, Fictions of Labor: William Faulkner and the South's Long Revolution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 115. Godden explores the changes
wrought in Faulkner's perspective by the historical developments of the 1930s
through a comparison of Absalom! Absalom! (1936) and If I Forget Thee, Jerusalem
(1939). He also offers a reading of The Sound and the Fury (1929) in terms of labor rela
tions in the South.
23. Tolnay and Beck, Festival of Violence, 18-19.
24. Hale, Making Whiteness, 285.
25. Over the last thirty years, the field of cultural studies has become increasingly aware
that "we come, in uncertain and contingent ways, to see ourselves as the law sees us;
we participate in the construction of law's 'meanings' and its representations of us
even as we internalize them, so much that our own purposes and understandings can
no longer be extricated from those meanings." Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns,
"The Cultural Lives of Law," in Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1998), 7-8.
26. Joseph Blotner, Faulkner: A Biography, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1974),
1102. The status of Go Down, Moses as a novel has been the subject of critical debate.
See, for example, John Limon, "The Integration of Faulkner's Go Down, Moses," Crit
ical Inquiry 12 (1986); Walter Taylor, "Faulkner's Pantaloon," American Literature 44,
no. 3 (1972): 430; John E. Cleman, '"Pantaloon in Black': Its Place in Go Down,
Moses," Tennessee Studies in Literature 22 (1977): 170; and John T. Matthews, "Touch
ing Race in Go Down, Moses," in New Essays on Go Down, Moses, ed. Linda Wagner
Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21-47. Thadious Davis's
Games of Property: Law, Race, Gender, and Faulkner's Go Down, Moses (2003) treats the
role of law in the novel particularly as it relates to questions of rights and ownership. 27. See, for example, Erik Dussere, "The Debts of History: Southern Honor, Affirmative
Action, and Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust," Faulkner Journal 17, no. 1 (2001); Charles
D. Peavy, Go Slow Now: Faulkner and the Race Question (Eugene: University of Oregon
Press, 1971); Noel Polk, "Man in the Middle: Faulkner and the Southern White Mod
erate," in Faulkner and Race, eds. Doreen Fowler and Ann J. Abadie (Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1986); and Neil Schmitz, "Faulkner and the Post-Confederate," in
Faulkner in Cultural Context, eds. Donald M. Kartiganer and Ann J. Abadie (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 1995).
28. Naomi Mezey, "Law as Culture," in Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Law, eds.
Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 54.
29. Harold H. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice under Law: Constitutional
Development, 1835-1875 (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 89.
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208 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
30. Ibid., 90.
31. Through the compromise, Missouri was admitted to the Union as a slave state, but
slavery was forbidden in the remainder of the Louisiana Territory north of Missouri.
The controversy both "provoked an exhaustive congressional review of the constitu
tional status of slavery and black people," and "alerted" both North and South "to the
constitutional implications of slavery's westward expansion." Hyman and Wiecek,
Equal Justice, 91.
32. Ibid., 139.
33. See ibid., 94-113. See also Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred
Scott Case in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7-40.
One high-profile example was the Amistad case, which reached the Supreme Court in
1841. The Amistad's Spanish owners sued for the return of its cargo of captured
Africans, who had mutinied, as property. The Court found the Africans who had
taken over the ship to be free men because they had been captured in violation of
treaties suppressing the international slave trade.
34. Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice, 143.
35. The compromise did not, however, settle the question of the constitutional status of
slavery in much of the West. Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice, 144.
36. See ibid., 150-59. The return of the fugitive slave Anthony Burns to his Virginia
owner on the order of a Massachusetts court prompted Henry David Thoreau to write
"Slavery in Massachusetts." Also in 1854, Sherman Booth, a white citizen of Wiscon
sin, was arrested and found guilty of violating the Fugitive Slave Act. Booth chal
lenged the act as unconstitutional in a habeas proceeding in the Wisconsin state
courts, which agreed with him. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state courts.
Ableman v. Booth 62 U.S. 506 (1858).
37. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law, and Politics, 5.
38. Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice, 167.
39. Woodward, Origins, 23, 28, 33.
40. At the peak of this violence, in 1892 alone there were 156 reported lynchings. The
frequency dropped to one lynching every four days in the first decade of the 1900s.
Williamson, Rage, 84. See also Foner, Reconstruction, 119-23.
41. Woodward, Origins, 71, 85.
42. Ibid., 98-101, 77, 81.
43. Woodward argues, however, that it is a mistake to reify the rigid racial relations that
emerged after Reconstruction as natural or inevitable outgrowths of Southern soci
ety; these norms were not so much existing as evolving. Woodward, Origins, 65,
103-04.
44. Plessyv. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537(1896), 551-52.
45. Woodward, Origins, 103 (quoting Sumner).
46. See Gavin Wright, "Postbellum Southern Labor Markets," in Quantity and Quiddity:
Essays in U.S. Economic History, ed. Peter Kilby (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan Univer
sity Press, 1987), 101, 112, 116. See also Foner, Reconstruction, 174. See generally
Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil
War (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
47. Godden, Fictions of Labor, 117.
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 209
48. The goals of the NLRA included strengthening collective bargaining and the right to
unionize, redressing the unequal bargaining power of employers and employees, and
increasing workers' buying power. Karl E. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941," Minnesota
Law Review 62 (1978): 281-83.
49. The same economic changes precipitated by New Deal policies that were destabiliz
ing race relations were also transforming the South more generally: "The new South
might best be seen as an evolving bourgeois society in which a capitalist social struc
ture was arising on the ruins of a pre-modern slave society. It was going through a
process of social change, of modernization, that the rest of the nation had gone
through a half a century earlier. But where the rest of the nation had made the change
with a social and political structure and an ideology that generally supported such
changes, the postwar South was going through the change with the remnants of a
social and political structure and an ideology that had been antagonistic to such
changes." Godden, Fictions of Labor, 121.
50. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization," 268.
51. Failed attempts to pass federal antilynching legislation dated back to the late nine
teenth century and had long represented the Northern assault on Southern traditions
and culture in the Southern imagination. See Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Cru
sade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), and
Claudine Ferrell, Nightmare and Dream: Antilynching in Congress, 1917-1922 (New
York: Garland, 1986).
52. Williamson, Rage, 85.
53. Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the
Truman Administration (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), 7-9. See also
Hale, Making Whiteness, 285, and Zangrando, NAACP Crusade, generally.
54. Williamson, Faulkner, 265.
55. Ibid., 227. Faulkner himself described the novel as about the "relationship between
the white and Negro races here." Ibid., 265 (quoting Faulkner).
56. William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York: Vintage, 1990), 69-70.
57. All law is tainted by federal influence in Go Down, Moses. Jim Crow laws—which did
reflect Southern norms—are conspicuously absent in the text. Though there is no
tension between state law and federal law as different categories in the text, Faulkner
does imagine two categories of lawyers and judges: those who are indigenous to the
South and those who are interlopers from the North.
58. Thadious Davis offers an interesting reading of this complexity in "The Game of
Courts: Go Down, Moses, Arbitrary Legalities, and Compensatory Boundaries," in New
Essays on Go Down, Moses, ed. Linda Wagner-Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 1996).
59. It was through a "tradition of honor" that Southerners "differentiated themselves from
the North and the Federal government." Dussere, "Debts of History," 37. In the ante
bellum South, the "debt of honor was most commonly a debt incurred through gam
bling, through a contest between two men of equal—aristocratic—standing." Debts
incurred through gambling "were one of the central rituals upon which Southern
planter society was built." Ibid., 38.
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210 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
60. Robert Ferguson uses the term "lawyer-framers" to describe the lawyers who shaped
the early republic. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge: Har
vard University Press, 1984), 60. Jay Watson uses the term "lawyer-citizen" inter
changeably to describe both the founders and twentieth-century lawyers like Gavin
Stevens. Watson, Forensic Fictions, 31-35. In my reading, Faulkner replaces the pub
lic, law-making "lawyer-citizen" of the antebellum period with a new conception of
the "lawyer-paternalist," committed to the private, extralegal enforcement of com
munity norms and protection of community autonomy by the end of Intruder in the
Dust.
61. Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1976), 50.
62. Blotner, Faulkner, 1028.
63. This contract embodies the "classical-formalist" logic of the market, which, in con
trast to status-based norms of exchange, understands contracts in terms of
autonomous, self-interested individuals agreeing to discrete exchanges. Robert W
Gordon, "Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law," Wisconsin Law Review (1985), 566. The specific identities of contracting parties
and their cultural contexts are irrelevant, as is the content of the contract. Contract
ing parties have no obligations to one another beyond those prescribed by the con
tract itself, and the fairness of the bargain is considered irrelevant once the deal is
made. P S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), 402-03,416. 64. John Matthews reads the "business" transactions in the novel as emblematic of slav
ery's commodification of persons. John T. Matthews, "Touching Race in Go Down,
Moses," in New Essays on Go Down, Moses, ed. Linda Wagner-Martin (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40. But this reading suppresses the extent to
which the ascendancy of market logic in the postwar South strikes Faulkner as threat
ening the commodification of everyone and everything.
65. "[I]n 1791 the English legal system was divided into separate equity and common
law courts. Equity developed as a distinct system of justice largely in order to com
pensate for the deficiencies of the common-law courts. Because pleading and practice
in the law courts had become inflexible and highly technical, injustice frequently
resulted, for which equity provided a partial safety valve." The United States inher
ited this divided system. Significantly, courts of equity began to disappear in the
United States as states began adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
Jack Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane, and Arthur Miller, eds. Civil Procedure, 3rd ed. (St.
Paul, MN: West Group, 1999), 503. Faulkner seems here to be figuring local justice
in terms of equity as against the new federal regime.
66. On the connection between gift giving and the Southern notion of honor, see Dussere,
"Debts of History," 45.
67. This contrast is also evident in the language of the two chapters. The vocabulary of
"Was" is personal and domestic—in its first scene Uncle Buddy's "cursing and bel
lowing" fails to prevent the household dogs from chasing a fox through the kitchen
and around the house. Go Down, Moses, 4. In contrast, "The Fire and the Hearth"
opens with Lucas's frustration over "the temporary interruption of business," his
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 211
weariness "compounded in advance," and the problem of his "competitor"—intro
ducing the commercial vocabulary that permeates the chapter. Ibid., 33.
68. "As the promise of infinite buying power," the buried money "appears to offer a way
out of the coercive relations of a real economy." It holds this promise because it rep
resents "pure surplus value completely dissociated from either its utility or the
accrued real value of whatever labor went into the production of a comparable mate
rial good." Arthur VanderVeen, "Faulkner, the Interwar Gold Standard, and the Dis
courses of Value in the 1930s," FaulknerJournal 12, no. 1 (1996): 46,44. In Go Down,
Moses the promise of money in a market economy, like freedom of contract, fails to
provide an alternative to the existing hierarchies of race and of ownership. Rather,
their tendency toward decontextualization weakens identity and community. In
other words, cash fails to provide relief from the property relations of the South,
because cash doesn't provide the freedom to stay where you are and change the terms
on which you stay. Instead, cash corresponds to the freedom of mobility established
by contractual relations, freedom Faulkner characterizes as not only illusory but dan
gerous.
69. Lucas is the exception that proves this rule. Critics have frequently observed Lucas's
exceptional status in the text. See, for example, Bly den Jackson, "Faulkner's Negroes
Twain," in Faulkner and Race: Faulkner and Yoknapatawpha, eds. Doreen Fowler and
Ann J. Abadie (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1987), and Richard H. King,
"Lucas Beauchamp and William Faulkner: Blood Brothers," in Critical Essays on
William Faulkner: The McCaslin Family, ed. Arthur F Kinney (Boston: G. K. Hall,
1990).
70. As Ian Macneil has observed, freedom of contract "looks equalitarian" but is actually
"inequalitarian in its immediate effect to whatever the degree the status quo is
inequalitarian, and generally more so." Ian R. Macneil, "Values in Contract: Internal
and External," 78 Northwestern University Law Review (1983): 359. In other words,
the "extent to which the total amount of 'freedom' within a given legal community is
actually increased depends entirely upon the concrete economic order and especially
upon the property distribution." Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, ed. Max
Rheinstein (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 189.
71. Faulkner's portrayal of the Southern labor market reflects the success of early twentieth
century Jim Crow legislation in "weav[ing] about the ignorant laborer ... a system of
laws intended to keep him utterly dependent upon the will of the employer and the land
owner." Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1972), 66. William Cohen calls it a "compulsory free labor
system." William Cohen, At Freedom's Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest
for Racial Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991),
9-11. This system included the contracting of black convicts to work off their sentences
on plantations and in mills—a fate Lucas fully expects as a result of his illegal whiskey
distilling in "The Fire and the Hearth"—and the legal and extralegal protection of peon
age. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, 20,24.
72. Gavin Wright argues that what black labor aspired to "was not an ever-increasing
wage as their productivity increased, because the labor market did not offer that, but
accumulation of wealth leading to eventual farm ownership." Wright, Old South, 99.
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212 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
But the translation of cash capital into land was impeded by white unwillingness to
allow blacks to own land. Ibid., 101. The percentage of blacks who owned land in the
South did not increase between 1900 and 1920, and increased only 5 percent
between 1880 and 1900. Ibid., 119. "In a nutshell," Wright concludes, "the typical
white unskilled worker could expect to move up over time, the typical black could
expect to go nowhere." Ibid., 185.
73. The connection between "Pantaloon in Black" and the rest of Co Down, Moses has been
the subject of extensive critical debate. See Limon, "Integration," Taylor, "Faulkner's
Pantaloon," and Cleman," 'Pantaloon in Black.'" In my reading, "Pantaloon in Black"
and "The Fire and the Hearth" are parallel investigations of the possibility of black
personal and economic security. In both cases, Faulkner imagines that security in
terms of domesticity, the ability to establish and maintain a home. The lovely image
of the fire in the hearth that is the symbol of the permanence of their commitment in
both Lucas and Molly's and Rider and Mannie's homes is also symbolic of the longing
for full personhood of the men who live there. Against the increasingly contractual
logic of the labor market, marriage represents the promise of interpersonal relations
that are stable, integrated with the community, and reflect long-term mutual obliga
tions—relations necessary to stable identity.
74. Wright observes that laborers in the Southern timber industry (in which Rider works)
had little job security, because logging and sawmill operations were mobile, leaving
an area when resources had been exhausted. Wright, Old South, 159-61. He also
argues that land ownership and its nearest correlative for blacks, the kind of tenancy
Lucas enjoys, provided the greatest domestic security for blacks, even after industrial
wages superseded agricultural wages. Ibid., 91-94, 185. But by the time of Mannie
and Rider's marriage, less and less acreage was available to tenants and croppers as a
result of the New Deal. Ibid., 199, 229.
75. Faulkner suggests a reason why Rider will need someone else to kill him earlier in
"Pantaloon in Black" when Rider feels between himself and Mannie's ghost "the insu
perable barrier of that very strength which could handle alone a log which would have
taken any two other men to handle, of the blood and bones and flesh too strong, invin
cible for life." Go Down, Moses, 137. Rider is no match for his own vitality. Neverthe
less, killing a white man is suicide. When the sheriff and his deputy find Rider, he
offers no resistance. "Ah done it," he tells them, "Jest don't lock me up." Ibid., 152.
76. Rider's final words before the murder support this reading: "Ah kin pass even wid mis
souts," he tells his victim, "But dese hyar yuther boys—." Ibid. ,148.
77. Indeed, the tension between the abstract idea of freedom promulgated by market
logic and the security of the status quo, which Faulkner finds preferable even as he
insists it is deeply flawed and unsustainable in the face of market pressure, permeates
the novel.
78. The tenure of McCaslin Edmonds, the white owner who sees the plantation through
Reconstruction and the depression of the 1880s and 1890s, is treated in the novel in
"The Bear." But "The Bear" figures McCaslin as an exception, and the discussion of
justice in the chapter is oriented around property, not judicial authority.
79. Blotner, Faulkner, 1090.
80. Ibid., 1105-1107,1113.
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Avoiding Adjudication in Faulkner 213
81. McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, 7-9. See also Barton J. Bernstein, ed. Poli
tics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
Faulkner himself realized early on that World War II would have to change race rela
tions in the South. Williamson, Faulkner, 271.
82. McCoy and Reutten, Quest and Response, 11.
83. Ibid., 10.
84. Ibid., 16.
85. Ibid.,43-45.
86. Ibid., 34, 46. 87. Ibid., 86, 96.
88. Charles Hannon, "Race Fantasies: The Filming of Intruder in the Dust," in Faulkner in
Cultural Context, eds. Donald M. Kartiganer and Ann J. Abadie (Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1997), 275.
89. Williamson, Faulkner, 303, 306.
90. The possible spread of fascism to the United States is registered in both Go Down,
Moses and Intruder in the Dust. In "Delta Autumn" Roth worries that Hitler, or "Smith
or Jones or Roosevelt or Wilkie or whatever he will call himself in this country," will
transform American life. Go Down, Moses, 322. In Intruder the lynch mob of
unthinking, urban white Southerners merges, in Chick's perception, into a "com
posite Face," one of the staples of fascist iconography. William Faulkner, Intruder in
the Dust (New York: Vintage, 1991), 190.
91. Faulkner and his character Gavin Stevens agree about this in principle, but Faulkner's
vision of a mutually interdependent community is beyond Stevens for most of the text.
Stevens's views have often been read as Faulkner's own, but Faulkner always asserted
that Stevens is a fictional representation of the typical white Southern liberal of the
1930s. Gene D. Phillips, Fiction, Film, and Faulkner: The Art of Adaptation (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 89. In 1949 Faulkner published a book of sto
ries, Knight's Gambit, in which Stevens plays the role of detective in a variety of cases
where justice is not necessarily served by the law.
92. Williamson argues that Intruder in the Dust was a racially progressive text in its day,
though it has frequently since been read through the lens of statements made later
in Faulkner's life as a reactionary text. Williamson, Faulkner, 270, 310. Contempo
rary reviewers shared Williamson's position. See, for example, Edmund Wilson,
"William Faulkner's Reply to the Civil-Rights Program"; Elizabeth Hardwick,
"Faulkner and the South Today"; and Andrew Lyle, "Regeneration for the Man," in
Faulkner: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Penn Warren (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
93. Faulkner, Intruder, 37.
94. It is also clear from the outset of the novel that even if Lucas makes it to trial, his guilt
will be a foregone conclusion and the result will be a lynching officially sanctioned by law. The same men who form the mob would form the jury. Faulkner, Intruder, 134.
95. This is in sharp contrast to the "Southern" coalition of drummers and locals like
McLendon in "Dry September." Faulkner, Collected Stories, 171.
96. Watson argues that in Faulkner's work "the integrity of the lawyer-citizen is a direct
function of the integrity of the community on whose behalf he speaks and acts. If its
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214 Ticien Marie Sassoubre
values are basically sound, he emerges as worthy of respect and emulation, but if
they are narrow or intolerant, he is often all the more so." Watson, Forensic Fictions,
36. In Intruder in the Dust Faulkner seems interit on revealing the community as bet
ter than it seems to be by revealing the ways in which its legal authorities are better
men than they initially seem to be.
97. Chick himself describes it as a poker game. Faulkner, Intruder, 59. See also Dussere,
"Debts of History," 49.
98. This advice is recast in even more explicitly legal terms after the body is exhumed:
"If you got something outside the common run that's got to be done and cant wait,
don't waste your time on the menfolks; they works on what your uncle calls the rules
and the cases. Get the womens and the children at it; they works on the circum
stances." Faulkner, Intruder, 110-11.
99. Miss Habersham not only has a personal connection to Lucas through his wife, but
is herself a relic of the old regime. Her "name was now the oldest which remained in
the county," and her forebears had "ridden horseback into the county before its
boundaries had ever been surveyed and located and named." Faulkner, Intruder, 75.
100. This is not to say that the community has meaningfully changed at this point—black
labor is still bound.
101. In Stevens's analysis, it is the result of the Northern capitalist obsession with "the
divinity of the individual man (which we in America have debased into a national
religion of the entrails in which man owes no duty to his soul because he has been
absolved of soul to owe duty to and instead is static heir at birth to an inevictible quit
claim on a wife a car a radio and an old-age pension)." Faulkner, Intruder, 197.
102. The lawyer-citizen owes fidelity to law and to the nation; the lawyer-paternalist owes
fidelity to the community.
103. The encroachment of Northern values—embodied in the "subdivisions" of "pros
perous young married couples with ... an automobile each and the memberships
in the country club/and the bridge clubs and the junior rotary and the chamber of
commerce and the patented electric gadgets"—is as foreign as the federal law.
Faulkner, Intruder, 118. This is what prompts Dussere to argue that the "actual pre
occupation" of the novel is not race but "capitalist Northemization." Dussere,
"Debts of History," 55.
104. Watson argues that Faulkner is attracted to the lawyer figure because lawyers must
simultaneously submit to the symbolic order of the culture and resist it, providing a
model for how one can be critical of the community to which one belongs yet remain
a part of it. Watson, Forensic Fictions, 14.
105. Phillips, Fiction, Film, 89.
106. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer purchased the movie rights to Intruder in the Dust before it
was even published and immediately began production. Faulkner helped scout
locations and was involved with both the screenplay adaptation and casting deci
sions. Phillips, Fiction, Film, 92-93.
107. Ibid., 92; Hannon, "Race Fantasies," 269, 276-77.
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