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Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern RealismAuthor(s): Mohammed AyoobSource: International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 27-48Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association

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Inequality a n d Theorizingn nternational Relations

T h e a s e o r Subaltern e a l is m

MohammedAyoob

ow does theimpactof inequalityn internationalelationsaffecttheo-

rizing in InternationalRelations (IR)?' I use international elations

to refer to the subjectof our analysis and InternationalRelations to

describethe discipline thataspiresto studythe subject.InternationalRelations

reflects and reproducesthe inequality present in the disposition of material

capabilitiesin the international ystem.Power translates nto domination n the

sphereof themanufacturing ndreproductionof knowledge.Dominationin the

arenaof knowledge furtherlegitimizes inequality in the internationalsystem

because it augmentsthe capabilities at the command of dominant states andsocieties by adding soft power to hard power.Breakingthe monopolythat

controls knowledge demands that we seriously attemptto presentconceptualalternativesto the dominant theories in IR. Leading academic institutions in

powerfulcountrieshave produced hese theories and thus cater to theperceived

requirementsof the policymakingcommunities in major capitals. I attemptto

providean alternative,or at least a supplement, o make a dent,however mod-

est, into the inequalitythatpervadesthe field of IR.This essay makes several pleas andpresentsa perspective,but it does not

claim to furnish a paradigmcapableof explainingthe entiretyof internationalrelations to the exclusion of all otherperspectives.It pleads for greater nclu-

sivity in terms of the phenomenathat areobservedfor the purposeof drawing

generalizations n InternationalRelations.In social science terms,it arguesfor

broadeningthe universe from which data are selected to generatetheoretical

propositions.At the same time, it is a plea for less theory especially in the

1Anearlierdraftof thispaperwaspresentedt theInternationaltudiesAssociation

conventionn Chicago n February001 as one of the featured resentationsn thekeythemeof the convention.

? 2002 InternationalStudies AssociationPublishedby Blackwell Publishing,350 Main Street,Malden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, OxfordOX4 1JF,UK.







28 MohammedAyoob

singular)and more perspectives.It is, finally, a plea againstmindless scien-

tism, which attempts o find law-like generalizationson the model of thephys-ical sciences, and for more explicit reliance on the exercise of judgment and,

therefore,greatermodestyin our claims for our favoredperspective.This doesnot meanthat scholars shouldeschew rigorousandcarefultestingof alternative

explanations.All it denotes is that we must desist from making claims about

finding timeless universal laws divorced from historical context.

Simultaneously,I attemptto put forwarda perspectivethat is inadequately

emphasizedandbarelydiscussed in IR theoretical iterature.As I shall explainbelow, such a perspectivehas enormous capacity to explain two of the most

important ssues thatany IR theorymust satisfactorilyexplain to be credible:

(1) the origins of the majorityof currentconflicts in the internationalsystem,

and (2) the variables determiningthe domestic and external behavior of themajorityof membersof the international ociety regardingconflict andorder,as well as mattersof war andpeace. The two issues areinextricably ntertwined

with each other.

A perspective by definition does not exclude other perspectives because

unlike theory, t does not claim to be the sole repositoryof truth. Perspec-tive thrives by building upon earlierinsights, while modifying and adaptingearlierperspectivesto fit contemporary ituations.It is historically shapedand

does not lay claim to universalityacross time. Yet it does arguethatit is rele-

vant to aparticular poch becauseit canprovide meaningfulexplanationsaboutimportant ssues that are relevant to thatepoch. My perspective, which I call

subaltern ealism, sets out to do exactly this.2It does not claim to be timeless,nor does it profess to supplantotherperspectivesin IR. It does maintainthatit

has the capacityto fill importantgaps in the IR conceptualliterature hatcur-

rently dominanttheories, especially neorealism and neoliberalism,are unable

or unwilling to fill.

I shall builduponthreescholarlytraditionsand thenattempt o integrate he

insights gleanedfrom them with the internationalanddomestic contexts within

which the majorityof states operate currently.First, I build on the insights ofclassical realist thinkers,like Thomas Hobbes, who were primarilydomestic

ordertheorists,writing in a context of domestic as well as internationalanar-

chy. Second, I build on the insights of the historicalsociological literature hat

relateto stateformation n modernEuropefromthe sixteenthto the nineteenth

centuries and have contemporaryrelevance. Third, I build on the normative

insightsof the English School aboutprovidingorderto an international ociety

2For an earlyiterationof subaltern ealism,see MohammedAyoob, SubalternRealism:nternational elationsTheoryMeets heThirdWorld, nStephanieG.Neu-man, ed., InternationalRelations Theoryand the ThirdWorld New York:St. Martin's

Press,1998),pp.31-54.







The Casefor SubalternRealism 29

based on a fragile consensus among its members. In this context, I especially

engage Hedley Bull's attemptsin his later years to reconcile the norms de-

rived from a European nternationalorderwith the expansion of international

society afterWorldWarII, an expansion thathad its roots in what Bull char-acterized as the revolt against the West. 3 Finally, I attemptto marrythe

cumulative insights of these scholarly traditions to conclusions deduced by

observing the behavior of the majorityof states in the contemporarysystemandby decipheringthe causes of most of the currentand recurrentconflicts in

the internationalsystem.To achieve these multiple objectives, we mustbegin by grapplingwith the

issue I first stated. Put simply,we can sum up this issue as follows: not only is

knowledge power,butpoweris knowledge as well. In IR theory,dominated as

it is by American scholarship,the productionand reproduction,constructionand reconstructionof conceptual assumptions,as well as theoretical conclu-

sions thathave now come close to being acceptedas truths even if compet-

ing truths )worldwide,depictthisphenomenonmostclearly.4Thesetheoretical

assumptionsand conclusions may diverge from each other, some marginallyand others more dramatically.Yet all of the contesting truth claims have one

thing in common:they privilege the experiences, interests,and contemporarydilemmas of a certain portion of the society of states at the expense of the

experiences, interests, and contemporarydilemmas of the large majority of

states. This limitation does not render such theories completely irrelevant as

explanatory ools. These theoriessuccessfullyexplainimportantaspectsof how

the internationalsystem works. Yet it does restrictradicallytheirexplanatory

powerbecause they fail to reflect fully the totalityof the phenomenathey pur-

port to explain and aspireto predict.The monopoly over the constructionof theoreticalknowledge depicts fun-

damentallythe problemof inequalityin both internationalrelationsand Inter-

national Relations. It shapesthe thought patternsof policymakersandanalystsalike acrossmuch of the globe. This knowledgemonopoly is intimatelyrelated

to the monopoly over what forms the legitimatesubjectof studyin IR, as well

as, more substantively, whogets to make the rules within which international

relationsproceedand who decides how and where to enforce them. 5

3 Forexample, eeHedleyBull, TheRevoltagainstheWest, n HedleyBullandAdamWatson,eds., TheExpansion of InternationalSociety (Oxford,U.K.: Clarendon

Press,1984),pp.217-228.

4

StanleyHoffmannapturedhisrealityclearlyaquarter entury goin AnAmer-icanSocialScience: nternationalelations, aedalus106,No. 3 (1977),pp.41-60.

5 NgaireWoods, Order, lobalization,nd nequalitynWorldPolitics, nAndrewHurrelland Ngaire Woods, eds., Inequality,Globalization,and WorldPolitics (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),p. 25.







30 MohammedAyoob

This leads to a major problem that could be potentially self-defeating,even for those who are the primary exponents of such theories and for their

natural constituencies among the policymakers and commentators in the

capitals of the major powers. Since much of the theoretically sophisticatedIR analysis is based on premises that are of limited relevance, it does not

reflect many of the majorrealities in the contemporary nternationalsystem.As a resultof this limitation,neorealismand neoliberalism,the dominantpar-

adigms in InternationalRelations, and the research thatbuilds upon theirba-

sic assumptionsare unable to satisfactorilymeet the challenge that Michael

Mann has posed to IR theorists: Whatwe outsiders really want from IR is

substantivetheoryon its most important ssue of all: the questionof war and

peace. 6

Since questions about war and peace cannot be addressed without refer-ring to the context in which conflicts occur and are managed and resolved,

theorizing on the basis of inadequate knowledge of the historical and geo-

graphic contexts can be misleading and counterproductive.Neorealism and

neoliberalism suffer from two problems in this regard.First, they neglect a

major part of the political universe that must form the basis of observation

(the source of data, as scientifically oriented scholars would aver) to pro-vide answers to the questionof war andpeace. Second, the predominant heo-

ries in InternationalRelations try to portraythemselves as scientific and

encouragethe misleadingconclusion that they are the repositoriesof univer-sal laws that transcend time and space. Such a portrayalof theory defies

the basic logic of theorizing in the social sciences, which Robert Cox sums

up succinctly. Cox notes that in the social or human sciences, All theories

have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space.Cox argues further: Thereis, accordingly,no such thing as theory in itself,divorced from a standpointin time and space. When any theory so repre-sents itself, it is the moreimportant o examineits ideology, andto lay bareits

concealed perspective. 7

In theirpursuitof scientism, neorealism andneoliberalism,and the neo-

neosynthesisthatcaptures he increasinglyexpandingcommongroundbetween

them,have lost substantially he sense of both geography(limited as theiruni-

verse is in termsof geographiclocale) andhistory (includingthe historyof the

6MichaelMann, AuthoritarianndLiberalMilitarism: ContributionromCom-

parative ndHistorical ociology, nSteveSmith,KenBooth,andMarysiaZalewski,eds., International

Theory:Positivism and

Beyond(New York:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),p. 221;emphasisn original.

7RobertW.Cox, SocialForces,States,andWorldOrders:BeyondInternationalRelationsTheory, n RobertW. Cox withTimothy .Sinclair,Approacheso WorldOrder NewYork:Cambridge niversityPress,1996),p. 87.








geographicareafrom which they drawmuch of theirdata).8This shortcoming

deprivesmuch of the theorizingdone under the rubricof the two paradigmsof

historicaldepthandgeographic comprehensiveness.In otherwords, it restricts

theirpotentialto accommodate andexplain changein the international ystem,for we can explain change only if we have a vision of historical continuity

(including the discontinuities embedded in the historical record) and spatialinclusiveness.

The contrastbecomes particularlyclearwhen we juxtaposethe scientific

approachof neorealism andneoliberalismagainstwhatHedley Bull called the

classicalapproach o InternationalRelations.9 Imbued with history, philoso-

phy, andlaw, andacutelyconscious of its temporalandgeographiccontextand

the limitationsaccompanying t, the classical approachespecially as employed

by the English School, does not make false scientific claims.'0 Nor does itlay claim to methods of analysis popular n the naturalsciences. Bull described

the classical approachas a scientifically imperfect process of perceptionor

intuition[thatis] characterizedabove all by theexplicit relianceuponthe exer-

cise of judgement.I

It is this explicitreliance on the exercise of judgement thatprovidesthe

clue to the fact that scholarsin the classical traditionarebetter able to expand

8According to Ole Waever, Duringhe 1980s,realismbecameneo-realism ndliberalismneo-liberal nstitutionalism. oth underwent self-limitingredefinitiontowards nanti-metaphysical,heoreticalminimalism,nd heybecameherebyncreas-

inglycompatible. dominant eo-neosynthesisecame heresearch rogrammef the1980s.... No longerwere realismandliberalism incommensurable'-onhe con-

traryheyshared 'rationalist'esearch rogramme,conception f science,a shared

willingnessooperate nthepremiseof anarchyWaltz)and nvestigatehe evolutionof co-operationndwhethernstitutionsmatterKeohane)... Regime heory, oop-erationunderanarchy,hegemonicstability,alliancetheory, radenegotiations, ndBuzanianecurityanalysiscanallbe seen as located n this field. OleWaever, TheRise and Fall of the

Inter-Paradigmebate,n

Smith,Booth,and

Zalewski,eds.,InternationalTheory,pp. 163-164. For anexampleof the scholarship ttemptingo

bridge he neorealist-neoliberalapandcreateaneo-neosynthesis,ee DavidA. Bald-win, ed.,Neorealismand Neoliberalism:TheContemporaryDebate(New York:Colum-biaUniversityPress,1993).

9HedleyBull, Internationalheory:TheCase oraClassicalApproach, nKlausKnorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., ContendingApproachesto InternationalPolitics

(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1969).

1oOne f theleading ightsof theEnglishSchool,MartinWight, laimed hat herecannotbe an internationalheory. See MartinWight, WhyIs ThereNo Inter-national

Theory?nHerbertButterfield ndMartin

Wight,eds.,Diplomaticnvesti-gations(London:Allen andUnwin,1966).TheEnglishSchool did not propoundtheory. tdeveloped napproachhatmayhaveturnedntoa tradition reven a school

(althoughhelatter ermmaybe too strong),but it certainlydidnotbecomea theory.

1'Bull, Internationalheory, . 20.







32 MohammedAyoob

their horizons and select materialfrom wider geographiclocales and historical

sources.'2This awareness made Bull realize duringthe last decade of his life

that the universe from which he had drawn his material for his magisterial

work, TheAnarchicalSociety,was even more limited thanhe hadbeen willingto concede until the mid-1970s.'3 In addition,he recognizedthat this universe

was shrinkingfurtherin importancebecause the major empirical source for

generalizingabout the futureof the international ystemhad moved beyondthe

original Europeanhomelandof the modernsystem of states.

As Bull's last works,whichemphasizedtheexpansionof international oci-

ety, demonstrateclearly,the classical approachprovidesa sense of historyand

is open to the idea of change andmovement. It does so not merelybecause it

can takeinto accountunfoldingevents and the emergenceof new social forces,

but also by permitting ts practitioners o learn,as Robert Jacksonpoints out,from thelong history of observation and reflection on internationalrelations

and from themanytheoristswho havecontributed o thattradition. Such reflec-

tion inclines them to accept the idea that change and movement are not only

possible, but also inevitable.Furthermore,his reflectionleads scholarsin this

traditionto realize that the crux of historicalanalysis reflects the maxim that

Theory is hostage to practice and not the other way about, as is often

assumed. 4

My own recent work has attempted o combine the historicalgroundingof

the classical tradition-in terms of both the history of institutions,includingthose thatembodyinternationalnorms,and ideas formulatedby thegreatthink-

ers of the past, which I find to be relevant to the contemporarysituation.'5I

12For example,see the works of R.J.Vincent,RobertJackson,and K.J.Holsti,amongothers.Avaluable ddition o thisgenre s JacintaO'Hagan's ook,Conceptu-alizing the West n InternationalRelations (New York:Palgrave,2002).

13HedleyBull, The Anarchical Society:A Study of Order in WorldPolitics (New

York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1977).14RobertJackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a Worldof States

(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),pp.75-76.

15Thehistorical ndintellectual epthof theEnglishSchoolbecomesclear whenwe comparets definition f institutionswiththe neoliberal ne. ForEnglishschooltheorists,nstitutionsrepractices mbeddednthe fabricof internationalociety....WithWightandBull,the nstitutions f internationalocietyhavealongerhistoryhantheproliferatingegimesof the atetwentiethentury;moreover, nglish choolschol-arsequate nstitutionswithpractices uchas sovereignty,balanceof power, nter-nationalaw, hediplomatic ialogue, ndwar. norderounderstandhe nstitutionf

sovereignty,or example,an Englishschoolapproachwould advocatea historicalsociologyof the termand themeaningsgivento it by state eadersatparticularis-toricalunctures. uchan nvestigations notamenableothe'neo-neo' equirementf

framingestablehypotheses cross ikecases.[Furthermore,]he crucial ontention fthe neoliberalmodel s thatcooperationanbe understoodwithout ecourseo com-








have tried to combinethis with a keen sense of, andparticular mphasison, the

transformations hat have taken place in the society of states duringthe past

fifty years. My approach s historically groundedbut makes no claim to time-

lessness, while assertingat the same time its pertinencein termsof unravelingthe currentmysteriesof war andpeace, conflict and order.

My perspectiveis particularlynfluencedby the normative ensionscreated

by two majorfactorsoperating n the international ystem duringthe pasthalf

century,but whose importancehasbeen inadequatelyrecognizedin IRtheoret-

ical literature.The first of these is the unprecedentedncreasein the numberof

new states as a resultof rapiddecolonizationin the 1950s and 1960s, repeatedin a smaller measure in the early 1990s. The second factor is the continuing

attemptby these new members of the system to replicatethe European rajec-

tory of statemakingand nationbuildingin a vastly different international et-ting where the postcolonial states are much more vulnerableto physical and

normative intrusionfromoutside.A combinationof these two interrelated ac-

torsholds thekey to explainingthe behaviorof the majorityof states,as well as

the origins of the majorityof conflicts in the international ystem.To meet Mann's criterion for successful theorizing in InternationalRela-

tions, it is importantto concentrateon these two factors as explanatoryvari-

ables. Any perspective that claims to provide an intellectually satisfactory

explanation n the field of IR mustbe able toexplainadequately he behavior of

the primaryunits constitutingthe internationalsystem. Furthermore,he per-spective must explain adequately ssues of war andpeace. To retain its signif-icance, the perspective must be able to explain why the majorityof conflicts

occur when and wherethey do. The latter functionmay also indicate how such

conflictscanbe managedanddiffused, hushelpingthepolicymaking ommunity.Neorealism and neoliberalismfail to performthese twin tasks because nei-

thercan explain adequatelywhy the majorityof states behave the way they do

internationallyand domestically.They also fail to explain sufficiently the ori-

gins, both as beginnings and causes, of the majorityof conflicts in the inter-

nationalsystemtoday.Theyfall shortin performingboth these tasksadequatelybecausetheypay insufficient attention o the preeminent ransformation risingfrom the numericalexpansioncited above.

A principalreasonwhy IRtheorists n the Westandespecially in theUnited

States neglected the importanceof this factor from 1950 to 1990 was their

preoccupationwith the bipolaritythat emerged in the wake of World WarII.

The analysts'fascination with bipolaritybecame anobsession with superpower

monbeliefs orshared alues.But .. a coreassumptionf HedleyBull's s thewayinwhich nternationalooperations rooted n thesense of beingboundby intersubjec-tively created rules. Tim Dunne, InventingInternationalSociety: A History of the

EnglishSchool(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1998),p. 186;emphasisn original.







34 MohammedAyoob

rivalry following the introductionof nuclearweapons. Not only the strategicstudiesdiscourse,but also a greatdealof theIRliterature ame to be dominated

by nuclearconcerns, spawning deterrence theories based upon the notion of

MutualAssured Deterrence(MAD). As two definingelements of theColdWar,bipolarityandnuclearweaponsnot merelyovershadowedall otherpost-WorldWarII developmentsas far as IR theorists were concerned,butthey also added

to the ahistoricalnatureof muchof the theorizing n the field. This was the case

becausebipolarityand nuclearweaponswere perceivedto be novel featuresbyboth theoristsandpractitioners.

Yet when seen from a long-termhistoricalperspective,these two develop-ments,while unquestionably mportant,did notmakea fundamentaldifference

to either the workingsof the international ystem or the norms of international

society. Bipolaritywas butone, albeitthe latest, transitorymanifestationof thebalanceof powermechanismthat hadhelpedordergreat powerrelationsin the

international ystem for some four hundredyears.The developmentof nuclear

weaponswas a partof the continuing saga of the revolutionsin militaryaffairs

that have renderedweapons more lethal and accurate. Such revolutions have

been a consistentfeatureof the modernsystem of states.16 The nuclearrevolu-

tionmayhave ruledout directconfrontation mongnuclearpowerswith second-

strikecapability,but it ended neithercompetitionamongthe greatpowers nor

their rise and fall. The last was clearly demonstratedby the events of 1989-

1991. More important,it failed to end war and conflict in the internationalsystem.17

Wecanargue hatbipolarityandnuclearweaponsweresecond-order hanges,

especiallywhencompared o theunprecedented xpansionof thesystem'smem-

bership.This expansion of the internationalsociety led to the entry into the

systemof postcolonialstateswith certainsharedcharacteristics,which set them

16LawrenceFreedmantates thatthe revolution n militaryaffairs,of whichthe

nuclear evolutions a part,has manifested threebasic trendsoverthepastcentury.First,the reachof militarypowerhas been steadilyextended.... [Second,]as the

rangehasbeen extended o all aspectsof civil societyhave becomesteadilymorevulnerable o attack.... [Thirdandparadoxically,]he degreeof dependence ponsocietyas a wholeseems o bedecliningwhen t comestowagingwar.Manpowerasbecome essimportant,conomicmobilizationessrelevant, ndaccumulationsf raw

powerunnecessarysprecision eplacesbrute orce. Lawrence reedman, Revolu-tionsin MilitaryAffairs, n GwynPrinsandHylkeTromp, ds., TheFutureof War

(Boston:KluwerLaw International,000), p. 230. Thenuclearrevolution its this

descriptionf revolutionsnmilitary ffairs RMA)well. Thecurrent haseof RMA,which s manifestedn conventional

igh-techweaponsand inked o the information

andcommunicationsevolutions,s the ateststageof thisrevolution ndcomplementsthe nuclear ne.

'7HedleyBull argued hat the balance f terror was but aspecialcase of thebalance of power (TheAnarchicalSociety, p. 112).








apart from most other established members. Astute observers of the inter-

nationalsystem should have perceivedthis expansionas possessing the poten-tial for major ong-termnormativeandempiricalimpact,since it hadtheability

to generatechangesthat would outlive the temporary ascination with bipolar-ity and nucleardeterrence.Yet this was not the case duringthepasthalf centurybecause postcolonial states were generallyweak, vulnerable,and poor.There-

fore, these states were vastly unequalto those seen as the moversand shakers

within the international ystem.The neglect of this variable in theorizingabout

internationalrelations was a glaringdemonstrationof how inequalityworks in

both internationalrelationsandInternationalRelations.

This neglect persisted, despite the fact that in the realm of security-the

major preoccupationof neorealist thinkers-the new states redefinedthe very

notionof the securitydilemmaby makingit primarilya domestic rather han aninterstatephenomenon.Their securitypredicamentalso demonstrated hat the

external security concerns of the majorityof states could not be easily sepa-rated from those of internalsecurity.'8Such preoccupationwith internalsecu-

ritywould have beenperfectly ntelligible oHobbesbut eludedtheunderstandingof contemporaryneorealist thinkers.In the realm of economics, the postcolo-nial statesstoodthe logic of interdependenceon its head,upsettingmuch of the

validity of the neoliberalargument.Dependence,not interdependence,defined

the patternof their economic relationshipwith the established, affluent, and

powerful membersof the international ystem, thus renderingabsurdthe con-cept of absolutegains-the leadingneoliberalassumptionwith regard o coop-eration underanarchy.19

KennethWaltz'sand John Mearsheimer'sargumentsabout the superiorityof bipolarityover multipolarity n termsof providingorder and stabilityto the

internationalsystem expose more clearly than others the inabilityof the dom-

inantparadigms o addressmoststates'security ssues and to capture hedynam-ics of the overwhelming majorityof conflicts in the international ystem.20 In

makingthis case, they ignore the fact thatstability in Europewas achieved at

18s ordetails, eeMohammed yoob,The ThirdWorldSecurityPredicament:State

Making,Regional Conflict,and the InternationalSystem(Boulder,Colo.: LynneRien-

ner, 1995). Also see Kalevi J.Holsti, TheState, War,and the State of War New York:

Cambridge niversityPress,1996).

'19Fordetails, see Amiya KumarBagchi, The Political Economyof Underdevelop-ment NewYork:Cambridge niversityPress,1983).

20KennethN. Waltz, TheStabilityof a BipolarWorld, n PhilWilliams,Donald

Goldstein, and Jay Shafritz, eds., Classic Readings in InternationalRelations, 2d ed.(FortWorth,Tex.:Harcourt race,1999),pp.77-85; andJohnMearsheimer,Backothe Future: nstabilityn Europeafter the ColdWar, n SeanM. Lynn-Jones ndSteven E. Miller, eds., The Cold Warand After: Prospectsfor Peace, 2d. ed. (Cam-bridge,Mass.:MITPress,1994),pp. 141-192.







TheCasefor SubalternRealism 37

state andinterstateconflicts. These costs raise doubts aboutthe notion of abso-

lute gains in termsof North-Southrelations.

Moreover,theoverwhelming majorityof economic interactions,which lead

to interdependencein a globalizing world, take place among the triad ofNorth America, Europe, and Japan.As Paul Hirst and GrahameThompson

point out, Capitalmobility is not producinga massive shift of investmentand

employment from the advanced to the developing countries. Rather foreigndirectinvestment(FDI) is highly concentratedamong the advancedindustrial

economies and the ThirdWorldremainsmarginal n bothinvestment andtrade,a small minorityof newly industrializingcountriesapart. 4

Bruce Scott has pointedout the following:

The total stock of foreigndirect nvestmentdid rise almostsevenfold rom1980to 1997,increasingrom4 percent o 12 percentof worldGDPduringthatperiod.Butvery ittlehasgoneto thepoorest ountries.n 1997,about70

percentwent romonerichcountryoanother, developing ountries eceivedabout20 percent,andtheremainder as dividedamongmorethan 100poornations.Accordingo the WorldBank, hetrulypoorcountries eceived essthan7 percentof theforeigndirect nvestment o all developing ountriesn1992-98.25

Such statistics make much of the interdependence nd absolutegains argu-

ments appear rrelevantas far as the majorityof states areconcerned.Equally, f not moreimportant, heconceptof absolutegains fails to capture

the realityof interstaterelationshipsamongThirdWorldcountriesthemselves.

Most of these states are neither economically affluent nor socially cohesive,andmanysuffer from the impulseof irredentismand the threatof secessionism.

Since much of the interactionof ThirdWorldstates-especially in the security

sphere-is limited to their immediateneighborhood,they interact with other

states hatpossess similarcharacteristics. lthough herehavebeensomeattemptsat buildinginstitutions to promotesecurity cooperationand increaseeconomic

interactionsamong regional states (includingASEAN, SAARC, and ECOW-AS), they have met with limited success. The relationshipamong contiguousandproximatestates has been mostly one of suspicion, if not outrightconflict.

Many regional cooperationarrangementshave been bedeviled by the covert if

not overt hostility amongmembers of regional institutions.

Furthermore,ntrastateandinterstateconflicts have become intertwined n

theThirdWorldfor numerousreasons.These includethe arbitrary atureof the

coloniallycraftedboundariesof postcolonialstates;the fact thattheycutthrough

24Paul Hirstand GrahameThompson,Globalizationn Question,2d ed. (Cam-bridge,U.K.:Polity,1999),p. 2.

25Bruce R. Scott, The Great Divide in the Global Village, Foreign Affairs 80,No. 1 (2001),p. 164.







38 MohammedAyoob

groupsthat can be considered to have primordial ies to each other;the nature

of manyof the regimeswithin these countries thatpromote exclusionaryrather

thaninclusionarynationbuilding projects;and,above all, the realitythat some

violence inevitablyaccompanies early stages of statemaking.As most contig-uous andproximatestates areusuallyat similarstagesof state and nation build-

ing and theirpopulations overlapwith each other,these processes often have

transbordermpact.As the history of early modern Europe clearly demonstrates,concurrent

statebuilding among neighboring political entities is usually a recipe for con-

flict and leads to the search for relativerather han absolutegains. This search

is based on the simple logic that favorableregional balances, which can be

constructedusually at the expense of neighboringstates, aid the state-making

projectsof particular tates,and unfavorableones obstructsuch efforts.It wouldtake a very farsightedpolitical leaderto visualize the benefit of absolutegainsin such a politically charged context, where the security and sometimes the

survivalof states andregimes hang in the balance.26

The inabilityof the dominantparadigms o addressthese realities,let alone

capture hem,resultsin theirincapacityto explainthe originsof most conflicts

in the international ystem.Italso illustrates heir nabilityto explainthe behav-

ior of most states in the internationalsystem. It is essential to posit a supple-

mentary,perhapsalternative,perspectiveto thecurrentlydominantIRtheories.

Such a perspectivemust surpassthe simplistic structuralassumptionsof neo-realism.It must investigateabove all the natureand internaldynamicsof most

states in the internationalsystem. By doing so, it will be able to expose the

interconnectionsamongdomesticand internationalorder ssues. This has been

a subjectof perennial importancein politics, as any reader of Hobbes or Nic-

col6 Machiavelli would divine. Also, I believe the perspectivealso mustdem-

onstratethe capacityto provideintellectually satisfactoryexplanationsfor the

origins of the majorityof contemporaryconflicts in the international ystem.In addition,such a perspectivemustbe able to transcend he ethnocentrism

of neoliberalism that limits its universe largely to one corner of the globe.Moreover, it must be able to demonstratethe illusory natureof the broader

liberalagendaandespeciallyof its maverickoffshoot,globalism,whichattemptsto impose a set of normative constraintson state action that are largely inap-

plicable to the state-makingstage where most states find themselves. Most

states that have emergedinto formal independencewithin the past fifty yearsare currentlystrugglingto approximate he ideal of the Westphalianstate by

acquiringeffectivenessandlegitimacywithin a drasticallyshortened imeframe

and in highly unfavorablenormativeand practicalcircumstances.To demand

that they transcend the Westphalianmodel and open themselves to unbridled

26For details, see Ayoob, The Third WorldSecurityPredicament,esp. ch. 3.







40 MohammedAyoob

quately regulate intrasocietal and intersocietal interactionscan prosper and

thrive in the twenty-firstcentury.30

Consequently,the road map for weak states is not to transcendthe West-

phalian state and adopt post-Westphaliancharacteristics(whateverthat maymean for polities struggling to establish themselves), but to create politicalstructures hatapproximate o a muchgreaterdegree than at presenttheWest-

phalianideal type by increasingboth their effectiveness and legitimacy. It is

true that to be effective over the long haulstates must be legitimate; t is equallytrue that to be legitimateover the long term,states must be effective. Only by

approaching heWestphaliandeal moreclosely can thepostcolonialstatespro-vide stablepolitical orderdomesticallyandparticipateon a moreequalfootingin writingandrewritingthe rules of internationalorder.

Moreover,onlyeffective statehoodcanhelpsolve theeconomic underdevel-opmentandpoverty problemsthatplaguemuch of theThirdWorld. The state's

crucial role is evidentin the West's economicdevelopment.Europeaneconomic

supremacywasforgednotbyactorswho followed a 'Washingtononsensus'model

butby strongstates. 1 It is disingenuousto advise ThirdWorldstatesto remove

allbarriersoexternaleconomicpenetration ndreduce herole of the state nfor-

mulatingeconomicpolicy inthehopethat oreigntradeand nvestmentwill solve

theirunderdevelopment ndpovertyproblems.As Dani Rodrikpointsout,a per-versionof priorities esults when openness o tradeand nvestmentflows is no

longerviewed simplyas a componentof a country'sdevelopment strategy, butbecomes synonymouswith that strategy.32Moreover,economic liberalization

appearsirrationalwhen, in exchange for opening theireconomies, most poorstates receive but a pittancein terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) from

the multinationalcorporations MNCs) based in the global North.

I call this alternativeperspective subaltern ealism because it drawsuponthe experience of subalterns n the internationalsystem. These subalternsare

largely ignoredby theelitist historiographypopularizedby both neorealists and

neoliberals as a result of their concentrationon, respectively,the dynamicsof

interactionamongthe greatpowers and the affluent,industrialized tates of the

globalNorth.Thedictionarydefinitionof subaltern enotesthose thatareweak

and nferior.Yetit is the commonexperienceof all humansocieties thatthese are

30For orroborationf thisargument,ee LindaWeiss,TheMythof the PowerlessState Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1998);PeterEvans, TheEclipseof theState?Reflectionson Statenessn an Eraof Globalization,World olitics50, No. 1

(1997), pp. 62-87; Dani Rodrik, WhyDo More OpenEconomies Have Bigger Gov-

ernments?Cambridge,Mass.:NationalBureau f EconomicResearch, 996);NBERWorking aperNo. 5537.

31 Scott, TheGreatDividein theGlobalVillage, p. 171.

32DaniRodrik, Tradingn Illusions, ForeignPolicy123(2001),p. 55.








the elements that constitutethe large majorityof members n any social system.

Althoughborrowed rom the subaltern chool of history,my use of the termdoes

not conformstrictlyto theusage by thatschool.33 ThirdWorldstates,rather han

subaltern lasses, form thequintessentialsubaltern lement within thesociety ofstates,given their relativepowerlessnessand theirpositionas a large majority n

the international ystem.This is a deliberateapplicationof the term,emanatingfrom my position that,despite the emergenceof a plethoraof nonstateactors,the contemporarynternational ystem is essentially a system of states. There-

fore,statesshouldstill formtheprimaryunitof analysis n International elations.

At the sametime, this perspectiveis a partof the realist traditionbecause it

accepts the three fundamental elements of essential realism -statism, sur-

vival, andself-help.34I referto realismas a traditionrather han as a theoryor

school because the term tradition does greater justice to the richness andvariety of realist thinking.35The subaltern realist perspective attemptsto go

beyond the narrowstructural onfines of neorealism and examine the essential

natureof the subalterncategory of states. It does so by adoptinga historical

sociology approach hat conforms to ThedaSkocpol's prescription: Trulyhis-

toricalsociological studies... [m]ost basicallyaskquestionsabout social struc-

tures or processes understood to be concretely situatedin time and space....

They addressprocesses over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in

accountingfor outcomes. 6

In situatingthe Third Worldstate in time andspace, subalternrealism bor-rows from the insights of classical realist thinkerssensitive to both domestic

order and internationalorder issues. Hobbes is the foremostexample of such

thinkers, for, as Bull has pointed out Hobbes's account of relations between

sovereign princes is a subordinatepartof his explanationandjustification of

governmentamong individual men. 7

33For a collectionof seminalarticles n subalterntudies,see RanajitGuhaand

GayatriChakravortypivak, ds.,SelectedSubaltern tudies NewYork:OxfordUni-versityPress,1988).

34TimothyDunne, Realism, n JohnBaylisand SteveSmith,eds., TheGlobal-izationof World olitics(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),pp. 114-119.

35MichaelOakeshott otes: Itbelongs o thenature f a traditiono tolerateandunitean nternalariety, ot nsisting pon onformityoasinglecharacter,ndbecause,further,t has the abilityto changewithout osing its identity. n Rationalism nPolitics and OtherEssays,2d ed. (Indianapolis,nd.:LibertyPress,1991),p. 227.

36 ThedaSkocpol, Sociology'sHistoricalmagination,nThedaSkocpol, d.,Visionand Method in Historical

Sociology (NewYork:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984),p. 1.

37Bull,TheAnarchicalSociety,pp.46-47. Also see MichaelWilliams, Hobbesand InternationalRelations:A Reconsideration, nternationalOrganization, 0,No. 2 (1996), pp. 213-236.







42 MohammedAyoob

Hobbes's writingsalso highlightthe tension between liberty andauthority.Forhim, the solution was to concentratepower in the personof the sovereign,but,equally important, o insist that thesovereignbe legitimate(theproductof

a contract)and legal (boundby laws). Hobbesconceives the Sovereign as alaw-makerandhis rule,notarbitrary,ut the ruleof law.... What .. is excluded

from Hobbes's civitas is not the freedom of the individual,butthe independent

rightsof spurious authorities' nd of collectionsof individualssuchaschurches,which he saw as the sourceof civil strife of his time. 38

Anyone familiarwith the problemof competing authorities n multieth-

nic andmultireligioussocieties, which makeup most of the ThirdWorldtoday,would immediatelyunderstandHobbes's basic predicamentand his attemptto

overcome it by creatingan institution-the sovereign-based on the master-

conceptionsof Will andArtifice. 39 Similarly, anyone familiar with the legit-imacy problemof manyThirdWorldstateswill recognize the need for a social

contractbetween citizens and citizens and citizens and the state. Such a con-

tractwould free the statefromchallenges to its authority.Hobbes's social con-

tractwas obviously abstract, f not mythical,based as it was on deductivelogic.Nonetheless, it captured he essential dilemmaof modernstatemakingand the

fundamentaldeparturethis entailed from the multiple overlapping authoritystructuresof the medieval period that lay at the root of much of the violence

and chaos of Hobbes's time.

In uncanny ways, the domestic context in which many Third Worldstatesfunctiontodayresembles that of the late medieval andearly modernperiodin

Europe. This explains the relevance of Hobbes's conclusions to our times.

Unless the insights provided by Hobbes's deductive reasoning are accompa-nied by the historical sociology of the modern state based on inductive rea-

soning, our perspectivewill remainincomplete.Historiansof state makingin

earlymodernEuropeprovidethe best source for these additional nsightsbased

on inductive reasoning since Europe was the original home of the modern

sovereign state.40 Above all, such historical explanationsdebunk the neoreal-

38Oakeshott, ationalismin Politics, p. 282.

39Ibid.,p. 227.

40Forsome of the bestdifferingperspectives f theoriginsof the modern tate n

Europe, ee E.L.Jones,TheEuropeanMiracle,2d ed. (Cambridge, .K.:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987); CharlesTilly, Coercion, Capital, and EuropeanStates,AD990-1990(Cambridge, .K.:BasilBlackwell,1990);andHendrick pruyt,TheSov-

ereignStateand Its CompetitorsPrinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994).

For similarities nd differencesn the state-making rocess n the ThirdWorldascomparedo itsEuropeanounterpart,ee Mohammed yoob, TheSecurityPredic-amentof theThirdWorldState:Reflectionson StateMaking n a Comparativeer-

spective, in BrianJob, ed., TheInsecurityDilemma:National Security of ThirdWorldStates(Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner, 992),pp.63-80.








ist claim that all states are the same. The central featureof historicalsociol-

ogy has been an interest in how structureswe take for granted(as 'natural')are the productsof a set of complex social processes. . . . Historicalsociology

undercuts neo-realism because it shows that the state is not one functionallysimilarorganization,but instead has altered over time. 41 This insight lies at

the base of Janice Thomson's assertion that international elationsspecialistswould do well to abandonthe notion that the state is the state is the state.The

national state that emerged in 1900 was fundamentally different from its

predecessor. 2

The historicalsociology literature boutstateformationnEuropealso relates

to another undamental spectof the currentdilemma acingThirdWorldstates-

namely, that violence inevitably accompanies the process of state formation

andconsolidation.Tilly's famous dictum that warmadestates andstates madewar capturesthis realityin a nutshell.Tilly's conclusion is based on the Euro-

peanexperience,which must be read n its properhistoricalcontext.This should

lead us to recognize that what we now call internalwar contributed o state

makingequally,if not more so, thaninterstatewar.Constructingandimposing

political order is by necessity more a domestic than an internationalactivity.This becomes clear by Tilly's own admission that Earlyin the state-making

process, many parties sharedthe right to use violence, the practiceof using it

routinelyto accomplishtheirends, or both at once. ... The distinctionsbetween

'legitimate'and 'illegitimate'users of violence came clearonly very slowly, intheprocessduringwhichthe state's armed orces becamerelativelyunified and

permanent. 43In the case of many ThirdWorldcountries,most states were initially con-

stituted by juridical sovereignty conferredupon them by departingcolonial

powers and subsequentlyendorsed by the internationalcommunity through

membership n the U.N. Yet this did not make them immune to challenges to

theirauthority, heir rightto rule, on the partof recalcitrantelements withintheirpopulationsor by those who aspiredto replacethe successorelites and

take over thereins of statepowerthemselves.Inmanycases, establishingeffec-tive statehood, to whatever extent this was possible, entailed the exercise of

41 SteveSmith, NewApproachesoInternationalheory, nJohnBaylisandSteveSmith, eds., TheGlobalizationof WorldPolitics, pp. 178, 181.

42Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-BuildingandExtraterritorialViolence in

EarlyModern

Europe(Princeton,N.J.:

PrincetonUniver-sityPress,1994),p. 149.

43CharlesTilly, WarMakingand StateMakingas OrganizedCrime, n PeterB.Evans, tal.,eds.,BringingheStateBack n(NewYork:Cambridge niversityPress,1985), p. 173.








juridicalsovereigntyprecededthe establishmentof such control. Rather t was

a precondition orestablishing erritorial nddemographic ontrol.47Thismakes

the taskof ThirdWorldstate makersbothdifficult and easier-difficult because

it makes state elites less legitimatethan those in Europe,who had won controlof territoryby the exercise of superiorforce; and easier because the trajectoryfor ThirdWorldstates is clearly mappedoutandunforeseendirections areruled

out.

It is not merely the geopolitical contours of Third World states that have

been shapedby externalforces. Externalactorsalso have determined he nor-

mative environment and the distributionof power in the internationalsystem.As a result, the historyof state creationin the ThirdWorldhas been subjectto

majorexternalinfluences and determinants.The internationalpowerhierarchy

and its capacityto displace greatpower conflicts onto Third Worldstates andregions have impinged greatly on the process of state formationin the post-colonial countries. In addition, internationalnorms that define effective and

legitimatestatehood,as well as those thatincreasingly encourageinternational

intervention nto the affairs of weakerstates,have influencedcruciallythe tra-

jectories of state formationamong subalternstates. This has had majorconse-

quences for the level of conflict both within andamongThird Worldstates.

These states are faced with severe problems related to the operation of

internationalnorms and therecentchangesthat have occurred n that normative

environment, argely at the behest of the developed states of the global North.As new entrants nto the internationalsystem, their state structures ack ade-

quateeffectiveness andunconditional egitimacy.Yetinternationalnormscom-

pel them to acquireboth in a much shorter time comparedto their European

predecessorsor to face internationalderision.Furthermore,ontemporarynter-

nationalnormsplace contradictorydemands on ThirdWorld state elites. They

enjointhe demonstrationof effective territorialanddemographiccontrolby the

state.At the same time, they requirethe state elites to treat the domestic oppo-nents of the statehumanely.These concurrentbutcontradictorydemandsmake

the taskof ThirdWorldstate makersenormouslydifficult.Europeanstatemak-ers at a correspondingstage of state building did not have Amnesty Inter-

national and the U.N. HumanRights Commissionbreathingdown theirnecks.These problems have been compoundedfurtherby the policies of great

powers that have traditionallyinterferedin the process of state building in

manyThirdWorldcountriesto advancetheir own global andregional politicalagendas.In doing so, they magnify the difficulties inherent n providing polit-ical order to emerging polities. Vietnam,Angola, Mozambique,Zaire/Congo,

Territory,ublicAuthority,ndSovereignty, nternationaltudiesReview2, No. 2(2000),p. 10.

47 RobertJackson,Quasi-States.







46 MohammedAyoob

Afghanistan,and Somalia, among others,bear direct testimony to this fact.48

Consequently,Third World state makinghas proceededin a far more difficult

internationalenvironment hanin Europetwo or threecenturiesago.

Clearly,thereare domestic repression problemswithin manyThird Worldstates, as well as actual or potentialinstances of state failure. Yet use of force

and statecollapse areintegralpartsof the state-makingsaga, especially atearly

stages of state formation. This is not to condone state repressionof selected

groups,especially if therepression s systematicandsustained.Nor is the intent

to justify repression by predatoryregimes for self-aggrandizement.The intent

is to invite reflection on two dimensionsof this problem.First, state repression for consolidating state authorityshould be distin-

guishedfrom thepurely predatoryactivities of self-seekingrulerswho areinter-

ested not in consolidatingstate authoritybut merely in privatizingthe state toenrich and empower themselves. For instance, Indian actions in Kashmir or

Turkey's repressionof its Kurdishpopulationshould not be equatedwith the

predatoryactions of the Mobuturegime in Zaire/Congo or the Nigerianmili-

tary regime's suppressionof the Ogoni people, who protest against the envi-

ronmentaldegradationof theiroil-rich lands.

Second, in many newly establishedstates, the securityof the stateand the

regime become closely intertwined. Without the security of the regime, the

security of the state is likely to fall into utterdisrepair, f not disappearalto-

gether.HistoriansstudyingBourbonFrance,TudorEngland,or KemalistTur-key will immediately recognize the verity of this assertion.Although analysts

ought to distinguish among the purelypredatoryactivities of rulingelites and

those relating to state consolidation strategies, they must also be aware that

sometimes actions to secure regimes in the Third World are essential for the

existence and security of the state. Scholars must not shirk from exercisingtheir informedjudgmenton this issue in relation to discrete cases. One cannot

make law-like generalizationsin this regardthat would fit all cases of state

repressionand the exercise of violence domestically.

I have deliberatelynot addressed the issue of the plight of the subalternclasses, groups, and individuals within ThirdWorld states. The reason is that

the internationalsystem has not yet progressedfrom being an international

society to that of a worldsociety.49It is only at this latterstagethatquestionsof

equityand ustice withinpolitieswould reachthetopof the international gendaand invite concerted internationalaction. Fortunatelyor unfortunately,we are

still stuck at the stage where most people's primary political loyalties are to

their states and nations. Most importantdecisions about securityand welfare

48Fordetails,seeAyoob,TheThirdWorldSecurityPredicament,esp.chs.5 and7.

49For thedistinction etween nternationalocietyandworldsociety, eeBull,TheAnarchical Society, ch. 1.








aremadeat the stateandnationallevel, with state and nationalconcernsdeter-

mining such decisions. As long as this is the case, we must continue to see

states as the primaryactors on the international cene.

Treatingthe internationalsystem in normativeterms,as if a world societywerealready nexistence,wouldbe self-defeatingandcounterproductiveecauseit wouldprojecta solidaristconceptionof the international ystemthat does not

correspondto contemporary nternationalrealities. Conceiving international

society in such false terms will permitthe dominantpowers to act even more

arbitrarilyby arrogatingto themselves the right to act on behalf of the inter-

nationalcommunity.50 ome cases of so-calledhumanitarianntervention lready

point toward this trend. The danger is that repeatedarrogationof authoritybased on a solidaristconception of world orderis likely to erode severely the

fragileconsensusundergirdinghecurrentpluralistnotion of international oci-ety. It is likely to have a majornegative impact on the level of orderexistingwithin the international ystem andincrease the level of confrontationalrheto-ric and action.

The subalternrealistperspectiveis grounded n what it perceives to be the

existing realities of the internationalsystem. It also exhibits a clear normative

preferencefor the pluraliststructureand ethos of international ociety for rea-

sons repeatedlycited. Its contribution o the analysisof InternationalRelationsis likely to come fromits capacityto providemorecomprehensiveexplanations

for the originsof themajorityof conflicts in the international ystemand forthebehavior of most states inhabitingit. It attemptsto constructthis comprehen-sive pictureby weaving together several differentintellectual strands.Again,these strandscomprisethe insights regarding he creationandorderingof polit-ical communitiesprovidedby classical realist thought; by historicalsociolog-ical literatureconcerningthe formationand legitimizationof states in Europe;by the intriguingbut importantrole played by the operationof internationalnormsin orderingbothdomesticand international ocieties; andby the current

predicamentsfacing weak and vulnerable Third World states that are at the

early stages of statemaking.As a result of the confluence of these various strands,the subalternrealist

perspective assumes that issues relating to the maintenanceand creation ofdomestic order and those of internationalorder are inextricablyintertwined,

especially in the arena of conflict and security.It also assumes that domesticorder ssues, primarilyconnectedwith the state-makingenterprisewithinstates,must receive analyticalpriorityif we are to explain successfully most currentconflicts in the international ystem becausethey are the primarydeterminantsof such conflicts. In addition, issues of domestic order and conflict are not

50Fordetails, eeMohammed yoob, HumanitariannterventionndStateSover-eignty, InternationalJournal of HumanRights, 6, No. 1 (2002), pp. 81-102.







48 MohammedAyoob

immune to either regional or global external influences, especially given the

permeabilityof the majorityof statesto externalpoliticalandeconomic actors.

The subalternrealist position also posits the linkage between domestic and

external variables to explain the nexus between intrastateand interstate con-flicts. It does so by highlightingthe intertwiningof the state-makingenterprisewith regionalbalance of power issues.

Finally, this perspectivetakes into account the impactof the international

normativeframeworkon statemakingandnationbuildingin the ThirdWorld,as well as theThirdWorldstates'insistence on maintaining he essential norms

of the Westphalian ystem to protectthemselves from unwantedexternalinter-

vention.By integratinghesevariousstrandsof analysis, hisperspectiveattemptsto provide explanations or both the originsof mostcontemporary onflicts and

the behavior of the majorityof statescurrently nhabiting he international ys-tem. It is this combinationof explanatorycapacities that makes it a powerfultool that can be used quite successfully to analyze issues of war and peace,conflict and order in the currentera.

Althoughsubalternrealism does not necessarily aspireto supersedeor sup-

plantneorealism and neoliberalism as the theory hatfully can explain how

the internationalsystem operates,it does go a long way towardfilling impor-tantgaps in the theoretical iteratureandcorrecting he acute state of inequalitythatpervadesInternationalRelationstheorizing.It does so by makingtheexpe-

riences and concerns of the majorityof states the centerpieceof theorizinginInternationalRelations.Inequality s certainlynotnew,yet it seems to be inten-

sifying as a result of globalizationand the latest revolution in militaryaffairs.

There is no doubtin my mindthat the issue of inequalityin internationalrela-

tions needs to be addressedmore seriouslyat the beginningof the twenty-first

centurythan has been done so far.Otherwise,there is the dangerthat the glo-bal covenant hatsustains internationalordermay begin to fray beyond repair.As professionalscommittedto teachingand research n InternationalRelations,we could begin the task of addressing inequality in internationalrelationsby

incorporatingmore widely in our discussions the subalternrealistperspectiveas an analyticaldevice.

One last word about theory: to be elegant and comprehensible,theories

attempt o be parsimonious.Yetparsimonyperpetuates nequalityby providingthe opportunity o the more powerful to exclude and occlude the interestsand

experiences of those who have less power and less voice. Acknowledgingthe

complexity in human affairs-less theory and more perspectives -opens

up avenues for accommodation and adaptationthat permit the subalternsto

enter the world of ideas, concepts, and, yes, theory.

ayoob m. - 2002 - inequality and theorizing in international relations_the case of subaltern realism

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