No. 1803October 4, 2004

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/europe/bg1803.cfm

Produced by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org

A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.

For the better part of the past 50 years, each suc-cessive U.S. Administration has eventually come tothe same conclusion about America’s relations withEurope. Every effort at closer European integrationis to be welcomed tepidly, as it is assumed that aprosperous Europe would prove more pro-free mar-ket, more pro-Atlanticist, and more pro-American.However, in the wake of the transatlantic divideover the Iraq war and the public diplomacy calam-ity that has followed, such a simplistic analysis doesnot explain the schism at the heart of the post–ColdWar transatlantic relationship.

Rather than continuing the pattern of merelyreacting to fundamental changes in Europe, atboth the state and European Union (EU) levels,the United States should proactively approach thetransatlantic relationship with fixed conservativeprinciples in mind that guide its reaction to spe-cific policy proposals. Specifically, four strategic,diplomatic, and analytical principles, which havepolitical, economic, and military dimensions,should guide Administration thinking on theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), theEU, and, critically, how to revive the overall trans-atlantic relationship:

• Europe will remain the foundation of all futureU.S. coalitions well into the 21st century.

• A Europe in which national sovereigntyremains paramount, where states can reactflexibly, suits the American national interest.

• The U.S.–British alliance must remain pivotalto long-term American strategic thinking.

• The European Union must be seen as it is, notas many Europeans might wish to see them-selves, if American policies are to prove suc-cessful. The EU is collectively far weaker thanits federalist adherents proclaim. Simply put, itis considerably less than the sum of its parts.

A Proactive Transatlantic AgendaGiven these broad principles, the U.S. should

advance the following policies toward Europe.

1. Politically, with regard to the EU, the U.S.should favor a multi-speed Europe, based on theprinciple of each individual state having greaterchoice about its level of integration with Brussels.

2. Politically, the U.S. must make a massive pub-lic diplomacy effort in Europe if it is to retainthe ability to engage European countries con-sistently as allies.

3. Economically, the United States should helpto establish a Global Free Trade Alliance(GFTA), opening the door to genuine free tradewith qualified European nations.

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or

hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

No. 1803 October 4, 2004

4. Militarily, the U.S. should continue to pressfor NATO reform centered around the conceptof increasing the alliance’s political flexibility.

5. Militarily, the U.S. must continue to encourageEuropean members of NATO to develop a rapidreaction force—quickly deployable, highlylethal, and expeditionary—so as not to erodethe political sharing of risks that is so vital to thecontinued functioning of the organization.

6. Militarily, the U.S. should realign its Europeanbase structure, updating it to meet the comingchallenges of the 21st century.

This vision for the future of Europe highlightsconservatism at its best—looking reality square inthe face and then making it better.

—John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., is Research Fellow inEuropean Affairs and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., is Fellowin Anglo–American Security Policy in the Kathryn andShelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies at The Heritage Foundation.

No. 1803October 4, 2004

• Rather than continuing the 50-year patternof merely reacting to fundamental changesin Europe, the United States should proac-tively approach the post–September 11transatlantic relationship with fixed conser-vative principles in mind, guiding its reac-tion to specific policy proposals.

• Europe will remain the foundation of allfuture U.S. coalitions well into the 21stcentury.

• A Europe where national sovereigntyremains paramount, where states can reactflexibly, best suits the American nationalinterest.

• The U.S.–British alliance must remain piv-otal to long-term U.S. strategic thinking.

• The European Union is collectively farweaker than its federalist adherents pro-claim. Simply put, it is considerably lessthan the sum of its parts. American policy-makers must see the EU as it really is if theirpolicies are to be successful.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/europe/bg1803.cfm

Produced by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitue for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org

Talking Points

A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.

For the better part of the past 50 years, each suc-cessive U.S. Administration has eventually come tothe same conclusion about America’s relations withEurope. Every effort at closer European integration isto be welcomed tepidly, as it is assumed that a pros-perous Europe would prove more pro-free market,more pro-Atlanticist, and more pro-American. How-ever, in the wake of the transatlantic divide over theIraq war and the public diplomacy calamity that hasfollowed, such a simplistic analysis does not explainthe schism at the heart of the post–Cold War transat-lantic relationship.

Rather than continuing the pattern of merelyreacting to fundamental changes in Europe, at boththe state and European Union (EU) levels, theUnited States should proactively approach thetransatlantic relationship with fixed conservativeprinciples in mind that guide its reaction to specificpolicy proposals. Specifically, four strategic, diplo-matic, and analytical principles, which have politi-cal, economic, and military dimensions, shouldguide Administration thinking on the North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and, criti-cally, how to revive the overall transatlanticrelationship:

• Europe will remain the foundation of all futureU.S. coalitions well into the 21st century.

• A Europe in which national sovereignty remainsparamount, where states can react flexibly, suitsthe American national interest.

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to

aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

October 4, 2004No. 1803

• The U.S.–British alliance must remain pivotalto long-term U.S. strategic thinking.

• The European Union must be seen as it is, notas many Europeans might wish to see them-selves, if American policies are to be success-ful. The EU collectively is far weaker than itsfederalist adherents proclaim. Simply put, it isconsiderably less than the sum of its parts.

The Strategic DimensionThe Centrality of Europe. Whatever the global

issue—be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Dohafree trade round, Iran’s efforts to develop weaponsof mass destruction, the Arab–Israeli conflict, orIraq—the United States simply cannot act effec-tively without the support of at least some Euro-pean powers. But neither is the world one inwhich a concert of powers dominates. Whateverthe issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. Thisglobal power reality makes America’s courting ofallies vital while also confirming U.S. leadership.

Indeed, the U.S. must accept these paradoxicaltruisms at the same time.

First, there is no other part of the world wherepolitical, diplomatic, military, and economicpower can be generated in sufficient strength tosupport American policies effectively. The clusterof international powers in Europe—led by theUnited Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain,and Poland—has no parallel in the rest of theworld. There are simply a larger number of majorpowers with which to ally in Europe than any-where else. Three of the five permanent membersof the U.N. Security Council are European; onlyone is from Asia.

Second, despite rhetoric from EU Commissionofficials in Brussels, these European powers rarelyagree on the majority of the great global issues ofthe day. As a result, the U.S. must engage Euro-pean states on an issue-by-issue, case-by-casebasis to maximize its diplomatic effectiveness,gaining the greatest number of allies for the larg-est number of missions. The U.S. must use thewidest range possible of diplomatic, political, andmilitary tools to advance its general interests inEurope.

A Europe of Nation-States. The second conser-vative principle that should drive America’s newtransatlantic relationship centers on the impor-tance of national choice and sovereignty. A Europein which states react flexibly according to theirunique interests, rather than collectively accordingto some utopian ideal, best suits American inter-ests. Clearly, a Europe exercising supranationalimperatives regarding foreign and security policymeans that a lack of unanimity would hamstringAmerican efforts to form coalitions, be the issuepolitical, military, or economic.

For example, to see that such a negative processalready exists, one need only look at the currentstate of U.S.–European trading relations, in which asupranational EU Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, hasadvanced the collective European trading agenda.However, the EU of today consists of countries thathave not reached a consensus on the very principleof free trade. Hence, the EU looks at free trade froma lowest-common-denominator perspective: It canproceed only as fast as its most protectionist mem-ber allows. This adherence to supranationalismkeeps largely free-trading nations with more openeconomies—such as the U.K., Ireland, Denmark,Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia—from following their own specific sovereign interestsand developing closer and mutually beneficial trad-ing ties with the U.S.

This one-size-fits-all approach does not fit themodern political realities of the continent. Euro-pean countries have politically diverse opinions onall aspects of international life: free trade issues,attitudes toward NATO, relations with the U.S.,and how to organize their own economies. Forexample, Ireland is a strongly free-trading country,is traditionally neutralist, has extensive ties to theU.S. through its history of immigration to the NewWorld, and is for a large degree of economic liber-alization. France, by contrast, is more protection-ist, more skeptical of NATO, more statist inorganizing its economy, and more competitive inits attitude toward America. Germany fallsbetween the two on issues of free trade and rela-tions with the United States, is more pro-NATOthan France but values U.N. involvement in crisesabove that of the alliance, and is for some liberal-

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ization of its economy in order to retain its corpo-ratist model.

This real European diversity ought to bereflected politically, as it is now, in terms of eachstate’s control over its foreign and security policy. Amore centralized Europe simply does not reflectthe political reality on the ground.

The Diplomatic Dimension:The Anglo–U.S. Alliance

The place to start in practically reforming thetransatlantic relationship is to underscore that theU.S.–U.K. special relationship must remain a cor-nerstone of U.S. strategic thinking. The U.K. islikely to remain America’s paramount ally for theforeseeable future. That is why it remains in Amer-ica’s fundamental national interest to help the U.K.maintain both its sovereignty and its flexibility tocontinue playing this pivotal role.

Since joining the European Economic Commu-nity (which later became the European Union) in1973, Britain has had an uneasy and sometimestumultuous relationship with Europe. During thisperiod, the EU has evolved from a largely out-ward-looking economic grouping of nation-statesinto an inward-looking political entity with ever-greater political centralization. The British havefound their national sovereignty gradually erodedby EU laws and regulations.

Despite highly publicized efforts by BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair to place the U.K. at the“heart” of Europe, disillusionment with Britain’sEU membership has grown in the past few years.The British public, which has for centuries takenpride in its country’s position as a global leader,has become increasingly skeptical of the notion of

a united Europe as the possible new cornerstone ofthe U.K.’s foreign policy. A recent ICM poll onEurope, commissioned by the New FrontiersFoundation, revealed that 59 percent of Britonsbelieve that the UK “should take back powers fromthe EU and develop a new global trade anddefence alliance with America, some in Europe,and other countries across the world.” Just 30 per-cent of respondents agreed that Britain “shouldjoin the euro and Constitution and aim for a polit-ical union in Europe.”1

The U.K. is vital to American strategic interests,and the future direction that it takes in Europe willdirectly affect the United States. Economically, it ishard to imagine how two countries could becloser. In terms of foreign direct investment—akey determinant of economic integration in theage of globalization—between 1995 and 2003, 64percent of total U.S. investment in the EU went tothe U.K. In terms of total EU investment to theU.S., 62 percent of total investment originated inthe U.K.2 In addition, the U.S. and U.K. easilyremain the largest sources of foreign direct invest-ment in each other’s country.3 These staggeringlyclose financial ties between the world’s largest andfourth largest economies are, by themselves,enough to make the U.K. a primary national secu-rity interest of the U.S.

Militarily, along with France and the U.S., theU.K. is one of only three NATO powers capable ofa sustained global military presence in terms ofboth lift and logistics.4 They are the only Atlanticallies that can participate in the entire militaryspectrum, from high-end, technologically intri-cate major war fighting through low-end peace-keeping. It is also helpful that both France and the

1. ICM Poll conducted for the New Frontiers Foundation, September 2004.

2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1995–2003 average.

3. U.K. Ministry of Trade, “UK/US Trade and Investment Brief,” revised January 7, 2004, at www.trade.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/files/us_tradeinvest_jan04.doc (September 17, 2004).

4. It is, however, unfortunate that the British government is embarking upon major cuts in the U.K.’s armed forces as part of its modernization program. The British Army will be reduced from 108,500 troops to 102,000, with four infantry battal-ions being disbanded. The Royal Air Force will lose 7,500 personnel and four squadrons. While supposedly improving Britain’s niche military capabilities, the cuts are likely to leave the British military severely overstretched. See U.K. Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, July 2004, at www.mod.uk/issues/security/cm6269/index.html (September 23, 2004).

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U.K. are unique in Europe, with a genuine geopo-litical grasp of military realities (partly due to theircolonial histories) and a political tolerance forcasualties, and this state of affairs is unlikely tochange.

Of 1.5 million soldiers available to NATO’sEuropean members, fewer than 100,000 can actu-ally be deployed.5 It is highly unlikely that anyother NATO power besides the U.K. and Francewill obtain a significant global reach in themedium term.

Even beyond its vital economic ties to the U.S.and its military prowess, the U.K.’s proven politicalslant toward America is perhaps the single greatestasset in the relationship for the United States. TheU.K. and the U.S. have a unique, longstanding tra-dition of diplomatically siding and working inti-mately with one another, as demonstrated inWorld Wars I and II, the Cold War, Afghanistan,Iraq, and the fight against al-Qaeda.

This political affinity—the product of a com-mon cultural heritage, a common commitment tofree markets and free elections, and a commongeopolitical view of the world—means that thetwo great nations have an ingrained habit of work-ing together. This political closeness, reinforced bycommon economic and military ties, is withoutparallel in the world. It illustrates why the U.K. isso vital to U.S. coalition-building and is likely toremain so in the future.

The Analytical DimensionSeeing Europe As It Is. The U.S. must follow

the conservative thinker Edmund Burke’s adviceand see the world as it is, not as some might hopeit to be. This means that for America’s transatlanticpolicy to be successful, Europe must be evaluatedwarts and all, and not viewed as many Europeans

might wish: Not only does an overly supranationalEurope not suit America’s interests, but Europecollectively is far weaker than its federalist adher-ents proclaim.

Simply put, Europe is considerably less than thesum of its parts. In fact, in the wake of the Iraq war,at the macro level, Brussels looks economically scle-rotic, militarily weak, and politically disunited. Thisdismal reality must be recognized if America’s newtransatlantic policy is to be successful.

Economically, the Franco–German–Italian coreof the euro-zone has structurally high unemploy-ment. Over the 12-month period ending in April2004, joblessness rates averaged 9.4 percent inFrance, 9.8 percent in Germany, and 8.5 percentin Italy.6 Staggeringly, according to the Organisa-tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment, during 1970–2000, the euro-zone area didnot create any net private-sector jobs.7

Even more damning for Europe’s collective eco-nomic well-being, its demographic problems—tied to the continent’s overly generous safety net—make the preservation of its way of life highlydubious in the medium term without radicalreform. In fact, according to The Economist,Europe’s pension problems will become “a night-mare”8 as Europe’s birthrate continues to drop andits population ages. As a result, the workforce willgroan under the burden of supporting ever morepensioners with lavish benefits. Unless Europe as awhole—currently, Ireland has the problem well inhand—deals with this massive problem, it will beconsigned to the status of an aging economictheme park.

Militarily, the collective picture also remainsgrim. Despite a market that is slightly larger thanthat of the United States, Europe spends only two-thirds of what the U.S. spends on defense and pro-

5. “Those Who Can’t Fight, Train,” The Economist, July 3, 2004, p. 41.

6. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Standardized Unemployment Rates,” June 2004, at www.oecd.org/document/2/0,2340,en_2649_34487_32053762_1_1_1_1,00.html (September 17, 2004).

7. “New Studies Highlight Higher Taxation and Unemployment in Euro Zone,” Business for Sterling Bulletin, No. 49 (June 29, 2000).

8. “Enough to Live On: For Now, at Least,” in “Forever Young,” The Economist, March 27, 2004, pp. 11–13, at www.economist. com/surveys (September 17, 2004).

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duces around 20 percent of America’s deployablefighting strength.9 German defense spending hasdropped to a laughable 1.5 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP). Given Europe’s eco-nomic malaise, even the current level of spendingand capability is in peril. As Richard Perle bluntlyput it, Europe’s armed forces have already “atro-phied to the point of virtual irrelevance.”10

Politically, contrary to any number of mislead-ing European Commission communiqués, theEuropeans remain critically divided on the seminalissue of war and peace. Regarding what to doabout Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the fundamentalissue of the past 18 months, one sees a completelack of coordination at the European level. Ini-tially, the U.K. strongly supported the U.S.; Ger-many’s militant pacifists were against any use offorce (whether sanctioned by the U.N. or not); andFrance held a wary middle position, favoringintervention only if the U.N. (i.e., Paris) retained aveto over American actions. It is hard to imaginethe three major European powers staking outstarker and more different foreign policy positions.

The basic reason for this is obvious: Nationalinterests still dominate foreign policy making at themost critical moments, even for states ostensiblycommitted to some vague form of supranational-ism. For the European powers, Iraq has never beenprimarily about Iraq. What happens in Baghdad, itsgeopolitical ramifications, has always been periph-eral to European concerns about the war. Iraq hasbeen fundamentally about two things for Europeanstates: their specific attitude toward post–Cold WarAmerican power and their jockeying for powerwithin common European institutions.

Europe remains torn asunder by conflictingpoints of view on these two critical points. Onecamp, championed by France, is distrustful ofAmerican power and strives to dominate a central-ized EU in such a way that it becomes a rival to

America as a pole of power. The other camp, ledby Britain and the Central and Eastern Europeanstates (“New Europe”), sees American power assomething to be engaged and traditionally views amore decentralized Brussels as best for the constit-uent members of the union.

The European divide, which transcends thedebates over Iraq, was exemplified by the recentcontroversy over who should succeed RomanoProdi as President of the European Commission.France, Germany, and Belgium, all of whom werein the anti-war camp, supported Belgian PrimeMinister Guy Verhofstadt, who chaired the notori-ous “chocolate summit,” a meeting of Europeanstates determined to coordinate opposition movesagainst the Bush Administration’s policies in Iraq.Britain, Italy, Poland, and Portugal all opposedVerhofstadt and supported the war.11 Conse-quently, the pro-American camp put forward thename of Chris Patten, the U.K.’s Commissioner,only to have French President Jacques Chiracmake clear that he would not accept a British can-didate. His deep resentment of Britain’s successfulrallying of opposition to Franco–German domi-nance within the EU obviously played a part inthese political shenanigans.12

On the critical question of the future course ofthe EU—with Germany for deepening integrationand widening membership, the U.K. for wideningmembership but not much deepening, and theFrench stressing the deepening of EU institutions—one finds a cacophony of European voices ratherthan everyone singing from the same hymnal.

This very disparate political, economic, and mil-itary picture of Europe explains why the EU con-stitution—the most recent attempt to imposegreater central control over the European pro-cess—is unlikely to be ratified. There is no doubtthat the framers of the constitution started withtheir usual overly lofty goals. As former French

9. John Hulsman, “A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century,” Georgetown Public Policy Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 2000), p. 73.

10. “Transformation Postponed,” The Economist, February 16, 2002, pp. 28–29.

11. Charlemagne, “The Making of a President,” The Economist, June 26, 2004, p. 57.

12. Ibid.

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President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, chairman ofthe EU’s constitutional convention, put it, “I triedto play a little bit the role that Jefferson played,which was to install leading ideas into the sys-tem.”13 The basic problem with this statement isthat Thomas Jefferson had nothing to do withdrafting the U.S. Constitution, as he was U.S.Ambassador to France at the time. This pattern ofgrandiose hopes backed by a misreading of historywas to plague the entire project.

According to the Laeken Declaration, whichlaunched the process of writing a new constitutionto replace the existing treaties, the documentwould (1) clarify the division of competenciesamong the EU, the states, and the people, makingthe EU more efficient and open; (2) be transparentin order to be more explicable as Europe’s institu-tions were to be brought closer to its citizens in aneffort to lessen the democratic deficit; and (3) be atwo-way process, with some powers returned tothe states and the people while other new compe-tencies were bestowed on Brussels.14 It is nowclear that these high hopes bear little resemblanceto the finished product.

At over 300 pages, written so only a lawyer canunderstand it and with absolutely no powers beingreturned to the states or the people, the constitu-tion has failed by the Laeken Declaration’s owndescription. It has ended up as just anotheropaque attempt at further EU centralization,including the first formal statement of the primacyof EU law over national law; the incorporation of avery broad Charter of Fundamental Rights(including the inalienable right to strike) that hasthe full force of law; and the creation of commonrules on asylum and immigration by majority vote.

While national vetoes remain over direct taxa-tion, foreign and defense policy, and financing of

the EU budget, the constitution commits the EUmembers to the progressive framing of a commondefense policy. In fact, the document is filled withsuch contradictions. Many of these discrepanciesare to be worked out over time by the EuropeanCourt of Justice, which has interpretation of the lawwith the goal of “ever-closer union” as its mandate.This can readily be seen as an effort at further cen-tralization by the back door, a process wholly out ofline with the notion of a diverse Europe. Tellingly,the constitution does nothing to provide citizenswith any sense of control over the process of Euro-pean government or the evolution of the EU.15

These egregious flaws explain why the constitu-tion is unlikely to be ratified. Theoretically, anystate can nullify the constitution by voting “no” ina referendum, which is highly likely. In Britain,traditionally very skeptical of EU centralization, alarge majority of voters are opposed to ratification.In a June 18–19, 2004, YouGov/Sunday Times sur-vey of 1,279 respondents, 23 percent favored rati-fication of the constitution, and 49 percent wereopposed.16

In addition, neutralist Ireland has fears aboutcloser EU defense cooperation and voted “no” in therecent Nice Treaty EU referendum. Voters in theNetherlands, furious at German and French flout-ing of the economic Stability Pact, also might voteagainst the constitution. In Poland, a very unpopu-lar pro-EU government could well lose such a vote.The skeptical Danes, who voted against the originalversion of the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty, couldagain vote “no,” for both defense and economic rea-sons. Ironically, Danes see the EU’s economicagenda as far too laissez-faire.

Even the French, traditional champions of allefforts at further integration, might vote againstthe constitution. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992,

13. David Frum, “Fabulists,” National Review, June 15, 2003, at www.nationalreview.com/frum/diary061503.asp (September 17, 2004).

14. European Union, “The Laeken Declaration,” in EUROPA, December 15, 2001, at europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm (September 17, 2004).

15. “The Right Verdict on the Constitution,” The Economist, June 26, 2004, p. 14.

16. YouGov, “YouGov/Sunday Times Survey Results: The European Constitution,” June 18–19, 2004, at www.YouGov.com/YouGov_website/asp_bespollarchives/pdf/omi040101040.pdf (September 17, 2004).

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which established the process that led to theEuropean common currency, was undoubtedly amove toward greater centralization of the Euro-pean project. Yet the French barely passed the ref-erendum by margin of less than 1 percent, asmany saw it as being skewed toward the advan-tage of Germany. Frustrated by its very lack ofambition, the French might also vote against theconstitution.

Surely, one or several of these political outcomesis almost certain. If so, American policymakersneed to recognize that the EU drive toward ever-closer union has at last decisively sputtered andthat engaging Europeans at the state level will begenerally far more effective than engaging the EU.

Seeing Europe As It Would Be: The Euro-Federalist Fantasy. Former British Prime MinisterMargaret Thatcher recently remarked that theFranco–German vision of a United States ofEurope was “a classic utopian project, a monu-ment to the vanity of intellectuals, a programmewhose inevitable destiny is failure.” Indeed, thefact that “such an unnecessary and irrationalproject as building a European superstate was everembarked upon will seem in future years to beperhaps the greatest folly of the modern era.”17

Lady Thatcher will probably be proved right inher assessment of the grand European project asan elaborate illusion conjured in the fevered mindsof strategists in Brussels who dream of a unitedEurope as a counterweight to American power. Forthe sake of argument, however, what if the Gaullistvision was to become a reality? How would a polit-ically unified Europe affect the United States?

It is frightening to imagine what would happento American interests if the supranational impera-tive extended further into the foreign and securitypolicy realm. For example, if a Common EuropeanForeign and Security Policy had genuinely func-tioned in 2003, however badly, then Belgium,France, or Greece (all states with strongly anti-American publics) could have vetoed the U.K.,

Poland, and Italy from aiding America in Iraq. Sig-nificantly, a majority of the EU’s current 25 mem-ber states supported the U.S. decision to liberateIraq, and 12 European Union countries have senttroops to help stabilize Iraq.18 None of this wouldhave been possible with a common EU foreign andsecurity policy.

Those who wish to preserve America’s ability topursue coalition-building must therefore strenu-ously oppose efforts to increase the level of EU for-eign policy integration. Such a process wouldperpetually prevent many European states in adivided EU from realizing their national interestsand from working closely with the U.S. to solveglobal problems.

A single European Union seat on the U.N. Secu-rity Council would also be against the U.S.national interest. While removing France as a per-manent veto-wielding member might benefit theUnited States, the loss of the British seat at theSecurity Council would leave America isolated. Apowerful alliance could be struck among the EU,Russia, and China, placing the United States in afar weaker political position. Washington shouldfirmly oppose any move toward creating a perma-nent EU seat, which would effectively marginalizeBritain.

Indeed, the most prominent major casualty of aunited European foreign policy would be theAnglo–U.S. special relationship, forcibly con-signed to the scrapheap of history. America’s clos-est ally in the war on terrorism would be unable tooperate its own foreign policy and stand alongsideAmerica when and where it chooses to do so. Aneutralized Britain would be forced to remain onthe sidelines while America confronted roguestates such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

The consequences for American foreign policywould be hugely damaging. In fact, it is highlyconceivable that in such circumstances, the UnitedStates would have to wage its next major war onits own, with no significant military ally present.

17. Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (London: HarperCollins, 2002), pp. 359 and 410.

18. See Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., “The Myth of U.S. Isolation: Why America Is Not Alone in the War on Terror,” Heritage Founda-tion WebMemo No. 558, September 7, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm558.cfm.

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A Proactive Transatlantic AgendaGiven these broad principles, the U.S. should

advance the following policies toward Europe.

Policy #1: Politically, with regard to the EU,the U.S. should favor a multi-speed Europe,based on the principle of each individual statehaving greater choice about its level of integra-tion with Brussels.

If, as is likely, the EU constitution fails to be rat-ified, France has called for the creation of a morecentralized, confederated European core domi-nated by France and Germany, with Italy, Luxem-bourg, and Belgium as probable members.19

The U.S. should support this French initiative ifit leads to a genuinely multi-speed Europe. That is,the French cannot be the only ones to redefine theirrelationship within the EU. There must be at leastthree speeds to such a reconstituted EU: the inner-core confederation, a status quo group of states thatwish to remain roughly as integrated as they arenow, and an outer core that wishes looser ties withBrussels. This latter group ought to regain the rightto join trading blocs with non-EU countries. Thiswill require a trade opt-out, just as a new confederalopt-in will be necessary for the inner core.20

Such a reconstituted process must be negotiatedall at once so that a newly defined inner core, ledby France, cannot stop other states from also alter-ing their relationship with the EU. If such a policyis adopted, individual European states will be freeto decide their own destinies.

Policy #2: Politically, the U.S. must make amassive public diplomacy effort in Europe if itis to retain the ability to engage European coun-tries consistently as allies.

For a problem to be remedied, its true dimen-sions must be clearly examined. There is littledoubt that the U.S.–Europe diplomatic contro-versy over Iraq and its aftermath, involving boththose committed to the mission and thoseopposed, has been a public diplomacy disaster ofthe first magnitude.

While governmental support for U.S. policy inIraq is still strong in many European countries,public hostility toward American foreign policyremains extremely high. The recently publishedGallup Transatlantic Trends 2004 poll of publicopinion in nine major European Union memberstates21 should make disturbing reading for theU.S. Department of State: 76 percent of thosesurveyed disapproved of the U.S. President’sinternational policies, and 75 percent wereopposed to the war in Iraq. Most worrying of all,58 percent of European respondents held theview that strong U.S. leadership in the world is“undesirable.”

If Europe is the most likely place for America tofind allies well into the new century,22 the U.S.must launch a public diplomacy campaign on thecontinent to make such a long-term strategy possi-ble. Indeed, it must become the main focus of glo-bal efforts at public diplomacy, as nowhere else inthe world will safeguarding American goodwillmake such a practical difference.

The U.S. must recognize that much of Europe isalienated from the American worldview, be thesubject trade, Iraq, or the wider war on terrorism.It may take a generation to rejuvenate the transat-lantic alliance, and America must not underesti-mate the scale of the problem if this new strategy isto work. Unless the public diplomacy tool is used

19. “The EU Question: Integrate or Separate?” Deutsche Welle, December 15, 2003, at www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1716_A_1060937,00.html (September 17, 2004).

20. See John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., The World Turned Rightside Up: A New Trading Agenda for the Age of Globalisation (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2001), p. 61.

21. The poll, commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Campagnia di San Paolo of Italy, sur-veyed public opinion in the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. Transat-lantic Trends 2004, “Transatlantic Trends Overview,” at www.transatlantictrends.org (September 27, 2004).

22. Significantly, this view is supported in the Transatlantic Trends 2004 poll of American public opinion, which reported that 54 percent of Americans see Europe as most important to “American vital interests today.” Just 29 percent of Americans surveyed believed that Asia was more important to the United States than Europe is.

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in Europe, America may have no allies with whichto work in the future.

Policy #3: Economically, the United Statesshould help to establish a Global Free TradeAlliance (GFTA), opening the door to genuinefree trade with qualified European nations inthe outer core.23

A GFTA would be an economic coalition of thewilling, determined to liberalize trade among itsmembers. A GFTA would augment already existingbilateral, regional, and multilateral free trade nego-tiations. It would not be a treaty; it would be a leg-islative initiative offering free trade between theU.S. and other nations that have a demonstrablecommitment to free trade and investment, mini-mal regulation, and property rights. Congresswould authorize GFTA members’ access to theU.S. market, with no tariffs, quotas, or other tradebarriers, on the single condition that they recipro-cate this access to the U.S. and other members ofthe GFTA.

GFTA membership should be based on objec-tive analysis of the country’s commitment to freetrade in goods, services, and investment, such asthat used in the Index of Economic Freedom,24 pub-lished annually by The Heritage Foundation andThe Wall Street Journal. Four of the Index’s 10 fac-tors constitute a sound measure of the openness ofa country’s markets:25

• Trade policy. A prospective GFTA memberwould have to have minimal barriers to trade,including low tariffs and minimal importlicenses, controls, quotas, and other non-tariffbarriers.

• Capital flows and foreign investment.Another key requirement would be an openinvestment regime, including a transparentand open investment code, impartial domestic

treatment of foreign investment, and an effi-cient and speedy approval process.

• Property rights. A central tenet for theexchange of goods and services is an estab-lished rule of law enforced by an independent,fair, and efficient judicial system that protectsprivate property and provides an environmentin which business transactions take place witha high degree of certainty.

• Regulation. A GFTA member must not imposean undue regulatory burden on entrepreneursor business. Key elements include an efficient,transparent licensing system that allows a busi-ness to be established quickly, equal applica-tion of regulations, and transparency.

The Index ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 5,with 1 being the score of the most economicallyopen states. Using the Index, countries receiving ascore of either 1 or 2 on trade policy, capital flowsand foreign investment, property rights, and regula-tion would qualify. While only 12 countries wouldcurrently qualify for a GFTA, another 19 countriesrepresenting every region of the world qualify inthree of the four factors and thus would need onlyto improve their scores in the remaining factor.

A GFTA would offer a viable alternative to wait-ing vainly for the EU to favor free trade. In 2004,GFTA members could include Denmark, Estonia,Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the UnitedKingdom. A GFTA would associate genuine free-trading European nations with other dynamic econ-omies around the world. For example, in 2004,Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore,and the United States would also have qualified.

Rather than having a standing secretariat, theGFTA would merely be a formalized meeting ofthe member countries’ trade ministers, staffs, andtechnical experts. Any specific technical working

23. Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D., John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Brett D. Schaefer, “Free Trade by Any Means: How the Global Free Trade Alliance Enhances America’s Overall Trading Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1786, August 5, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/bg1786.cfm.

24. For the most recent edition, see Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2004 Index of Economic Free-dom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2004), at www.heritage.org/index.

25. John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., and Aaron Schavey, “The Global Free Trade Association: A New Trade Agenda,” Heritage Founda-tion Backgrounder No. 1441, May 16, 2001, at www.heritage.org/research/tradeandforeignaid/bg1441.cfm.

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group would exist only so long as its specific taskwas being addressed (e.g., agreeing on commonaccounting standards). Further decisions on trad-ing initiatives—such as codifying uniform stan-dards on subsidies and capital flows—would bemade on a consensual basis to further minimizebarriers within the alliance.

The GFTA can change the very way people andcountries think about free trade. Further globaltrade liberalization would no longer require wran-gling over “concessions.” Instead, free trade wouldbe seen for what it is: a policy that gives countriesthat embrace it a massive economic advantage. Asthe advantages of the alliance became apparent,the GFTA would serve as a practical advertisementfor the enduring global benefits of free trade. Suchan organization would be extremely attractive tothe outer European core, tired of the overly statiststrictures of protectionist Brussels.

Policy #4: Militarily, the U.S. should con-tinue to press for NATO reform centeredaround the concept of increasing the alliance’sflexibility through the increased use of theCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF) mechanism.

While agreeing with unilateralists that full,unqualified approval of specific missions mayprove difficult to achieve diplomatically withNATO in the new era, conservatives disagree withthem about continuing to engage others at thebroadest level. As Iraq illustrates, there are almostalways some allies who will go along with any spe-cific American policy initiative.

In April 1999, the NATO governments ratifiedthe CJTF mechanism that adds a needed dimen-sion of flexibility to the alliance.26 Until recently,alliance members had only two decision-makingoptions: Either agree en masse to take on a missionor have one member or more block the consensusrequired for a mission to proceed. Through theCJTF mechanism, NATO member states do nothave to participate actively in a specific mission if

they do not feel their vital interests are involved,but their opting out of a mission would not stopother NATO members from participating in anintervention if they so desired.

The new modus operandi is a two-way street. Infact, its first usage (de facto) involved Europeanefforts to head off civil conflict in Macedonia. TheUnited States, wisely enough, noted that Mace-donia was, to put it mildly, not a primary nationalinterest. However, for Italians, with the Adriatic astheir Rio Grande, the explosion of Skopje wouldhave had immediate and direct geostrategic conse-quences, both by destabilizing a nearby region andby causing an inevitable flow of refugees. By allow-ing certain European states to use common NATOwherewithal—such as logistics, lift, and intelli-gence capabilities, most of which were Americanin origin—while refraining from putting U.S.boots on the ground in Macedonia, the BushAdministration followed a sensible middle coursethat averted a possible crisis in the alliance.

Beyond the sacrosanct Article V commitment,which holds that an attack on one alliance mem-ber is an assault on all members,27 the future ofNATO consists of just these sorts of coalitions ofthe willing acting out of area. Such operations arelikely to become the norm in an era of a politicallyfragmented Europe. The CJTF strategy is critical tothe development of a conservative modus operandifor engaging allies in the new era.

Here the conservative strategy confounds theimpulses of both unilateralists and strict multilat-eralists. Disregarding unilateralist attitudes towardcoalitions as not worth the bother, conservativesshould call for full NATO consultation on almostevery major politico-military issue of the day. Aswas the case with Iraq, if full NATO support is notforthcoming, conservatives would doggedly pur-sue the diplomatic dance rather than seeing such arebuff as the end of the process, as many strictmultilateralists would counsel.

26. See John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., “Getting Real: An Unromantic Look at the NATO Alliance,” National Interest, No. 75 (Spring 2004).

27. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (Sep-tember 17, 2004).

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A CJTF, in which a subset of the alliance forms acoalition of the willing to carry out a specific mis-sion using common NATO resources, would be theconservatives’ second preference. If this too provedimpossible due to a general blocking of such an ini-tiative, a coalition of the willing outside of NATO,composed of states around the globe committed toa specific initiative based on shared immediateinterests, would be the third best option.

Only after exhausting these three options, iffundamental national interests were at stake,should America act alone. By championing initia-tives such as the CJTF, conservatives are fashioningNATO as a toolbox that can further Americaninterests around the globe by constructing ad hoccoalitions of the willing, both within and withoutNATO, that can bolster U.S. diplomatic, political,and military efforts in specific cases.

Policy #5: Militarily, the U.S. must continueto encourage European members of NATO tomeet the Prague goals28 of modernizing thealliance by developing a rapid reaction force—quickly deployable, highly lethal, and expedi-tionary—so as not to erode the sharing of risksthat is so vital to the continued functioning ofthe organization.

The present unequal division of labor betweenthe U.S. and its European allies—with the U.S.fighting the wars and the Europeans keeping thepeace—sets a terrible precedent for the future ofthe transatlantic alliance.29 There is a raft of statis-tics to bolster this conclusion. In 2003, Francespent 2.6 percent of its GDP on defense, and theU.K. spent 2.4 percent. From here, Europeanspending falls off a cliff. In the same year, Italyspent just 1.9 percent, Germany 1.5 percent, andSpain a miserly 1.2 percent.30

Such a paltry effort illustrates why Europe’s onlyhope of making a viable contribution to the com-mon NATO defense is to modernize and poolresources in an effort to play niche roles in anoverall American-led defense strategy. There is nodoubt that Europe’s armies are top-heavy. Stagger-ingly, out of around 1.5 million European person-nel in arms, only around 100,000 are deployable.Evidently, there are a lot of European colonelswandering around Brussels.

Technologically, there is also a vast and growingdiscrepancy. The U.S. spends nearly four times asmuch as its European allies on defense researchand development.31 This has obvious repercus-sions. Of the 5,000 attack aircraft available to West-ern European militaries for deployment, barely 10percent are capable of precision bombing.32

The technological discrepancies continue in thefield of “lift,” the ability to transport an army atwill. Europe has almost no independent lift capac-ity. While unglamorous, logistical lift is probablythe key component for fighting wars in the post–Cold War era. For example, even in their back-yard, the Balkans, the Europeans are dependent onAmerican lift capabilities.

In the post–September 11 era, NATO’s two-tierdivision could well imperil the viability of the alli-ance. If the U.S. continues to be the “mercenary”of the alliance while the Europeans are the “socialworkers,” this functional disparity will lead to aconstant difference in political points of view.

Such a functional and political gulf, impossible toeradicate, must be kept to a minimum through ini-tiatives like the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF).The NRF tries to reestablish the principle of a genu-ine sharing of military risk, which is so vital to thecontinued political functioning of the alliance.

28. After the failure of the Defense Capabilities Initiative of the late 1990s, NATO agreed at its summit in Prague to attempt yet again to modernize the European pillar of the alliance. Foremost among the “Prague Goals” is construction of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force composed of European troops, which is to involve the allies in high-end war fighting.

29. See Hulsman, “A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century.”

30. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2004, September 14, 2004, at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (September 17, 2004).

31. Kenneth I. Juster, “The Mistake of a Separate Peace,” The Washington Post, August 9, 1999, p. A15.

32. Bruce Clark, “Armies and Arms,” The Economist, April 24, 1999, p. 12.

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The NRF, comprised of European forces, is to bequickly deployable, highly lethal, and expeditionary,involving European troops in high-end war fighting.It was agreed to at the Prague NATO summit as partof a series of goals designed to modernize the Euro-pean pillar of NATO. The U.S. must continue topress the Europeans to live up to their commitmentsmade in Prague, as NATO has become more vitalthan ever, especially in a time where changing andfar from identical European and American interestsrequire ever more consultation.

Policy #6: Militarily, the U.S. should realignits European base structure, updating it to meetthe coming challenges of the 21st century.

On August 16, 2004, as part of America’s globalbase realignment and closure program, PresidentGeorge W. Bush called for the removal of up to70,000 U.S. troops from Europe and Asia over 10years, a sweeping reorganization that would betterprepare the armed forces to handle post–Septem-ber 11 crises.33 Two armored divisions wouldreturn to the United States from Germany, whileone Stryker brigade would take their place. Theplan calls for more troops to be deployed farthersouth and east in Europe, nearer the arc of insta-bility (the Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East,and North Africa), where future crises are mostlikely to originate.

This redeployment is more consistent with therealities of today’s threats.34 The ability to deploytroops quickly is a huge problem for NATO. Byincreasing the number of American troops that canbe quickly deployed, the U.S. will help to revital-ize the alliance, making it relevant for the new era.

This restructuring will increase America’s geo-strategic flexibility. Currently, the United States istoo dependent on a few vital NATO countries.Developing a presence in other nations in Europewill spread the strategic risk, decreasing America’sdependence on any one NATO ally. For example,as happened over Iraq, Turkey will not be one of

the few critical pressure points in mounting a mili-tary campaign in the Middle East. Basing in Bul-garia and Romania would shift some of the burdenaway from this hard-pressed ally, allowing Ankarato emphasize military action as regional in nature,not solely as a make-or-break U.S.–Turkish matter.

It is also important to emphasize that anyrestructuring of American forces is not a reactionto Germany’s opposition to the war with Iraq. It isimperative to reaffirm that the U.S. values its tradi-tional European alliances, especially with Ger-many, and that its restructuring efforts will benefitall of Europe by adjusting NATO’s force structureto reflect the seminal fact that the world hasentered a new era.

A Conservative Transatlantic Strategy for the 21st Century

Only by grounding American policy prescrip-tions in overall conservative philosophy does itprove possible to escape from the reactive natureof current American efforts to deal with the bewil-dering continent of Europe. By following Burke’sadage of looking at things as they are, it becomesclear that “Europe” is less than its admirers claimand more than its detractors admit.

It is clear that European countries remain thefoundation of all future coalitions that America canassemble well into the future, with the U.K. play-ing a critical role in their formation. It is also truethat the United States simply cannot act effectivelyin the world without at least some European allies,whatever the issue.

Furthermore, Europe is not the monolith manyGaullist centralizers would have one believe. Itshows amazing diversity, whether the issues areeconomic, military, or political. Europe is ulti-mately a hodgepodge, and this perfectly suitsAmerican interests.

Simply put, a Europe where national sover-eignty remains paramount regarding foreign and

33. Peter Wallsten and John Hendren, “Bush Unveils Plan to Move Troops Home,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2004, at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-bush17 (September 17, 2004).

34. See Jack Spencer and John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., “Restructuring America’s European Base Structure for the New Era,” Heri-tage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1648, April 28, 2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1648.cfm.

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security policy, where states act flexibly rather thancollectively, will enable America to engage Euro-pean states most successfully.

This flexibility, whether in international institu-tions or in ad hoc coalitions of the willing, is thefuture of the transatlantic relationship, for it fitsthe objective realities of the state of the continent;such a Europe is worth conserving. Accordingly,America should:

• Favor a multi-speed Europe, based on theprinciple of each individual state havinggreater choice about its level of integrationwith Brussels;

• Make a massive effort in public diplomacy tosafeguard the vital relationship;

• Propose the establishment of a GFTA, a coali-tion of the willing based on free trade;

• Press for continued NATO reform of decision-making structures such as the CJTF;

• Advocate increased European commitment toshared war fighting with Europe’s Americanallies through the development of the NATOrapid reaction force.

This vision for the future of Europe highlightsconservatism at its best—looking reality square inthe face and then making it better.

—John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., is Research Fellow inEuropean Affairs and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., is Fellowin Anglo–American Security Policy in the Kathryn andShelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies at The Heritage Foundation.

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