balochistan af pak s forgotton frontier

Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1

BALOCHISTAN:AF-PAKS FORGOTTEN FRONTIER

Rabeah Sabri Policy Options for Rebuilding Afghanistan

May 4, 2009Professor Rani Mullen

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ABSTRACT:

Balochistans strategic importance to the United States objectives in Afghanistan and to

stability in the region is multiple-fold: it shares a long, porous border with Afghanistan that is

facilitating instability and violence in southeast Afghanistan; the Taliban have a safe haven for

operation in the northern region of Balochistan, and are widely considered to be based in Quetta,

Balochistans capital; the Afghanistan-Balochistan border has long served as the principal smuggling

route for opium from Afghanistan to the West; Balochistan serves as an abundant recruiting ground

for the Taliban; and finally, Balochistan houses a highly-trafficked supply route from Karachi to

Afghanistan that is used by U.S. and ISAF forces and other commercial actors. Separate but linked to

the U.S.s strategic interest in the region are the decades-old ethnic Baloch grievances with the

Pakistani central government that are now threatening the stability of the Pakistani government.

It is Balochistans centrality in these two broad challenges the strength of the Taliban/al-

Qaeda and the unaddressed grievances of the Baloch separatists, and the potential of the two groups

merging their objectives that necessitates a comprehensive strategy on the part of the United States,

Pakistan, and Afghanistan to reduce the threats emanating from the region. While U.S. and Pakistani

policies towards the northern AF-PAK border in the NWFP and FATA have been clear in their

objectives, Balochistan policy seems to have been, at best, kept under the radar, and at worst, under-

formulated and not prioritized as highly as it ought to be.

The paper outlines the relationship between Baloch nationalism and the central Pakistani

government. For the past five years, some Baloch insurgents have been fighting for economic and

political rights, while others have been pushing for and independent Balochistan. Meanwhile, the

Taliban have been evolving in dynamic ways and taking advantage of their safe haven in Quetta to

expand their sphere of influence throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan. The two insurgencies in

Balochistan are destabilizing Pakistan and the region as a whole; while they remain distinct, they

may over time find it strategically beneficial to cooperate in their activities, greatly emboldening

them.

The paper ends with recommendations for the United States and Pakistan for formulating an

appropriate policy approach towards Balochistan in the context of the AF-PAK strategy. The United

States and its AF-PAK partners must work to quell the Taliban insurgency, disrupt its networks for


recruitment, and address the Baloch nationalist grievances through granting political and economic

autonomy. In the absence of a comprehensive plan, Balochistan could be come the lost frontier.

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INTRODUCTION

The White Houses new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) strategy focuses on eliminating al-

Qaeda as a threat to security and disrupting the Taliban insurgency. The new strategy links stability

in Pakistan to success in Afghanistan. This paper argues that US strategy and policy towards

Afghanistan-Pakistan must include a wise policy towards Balochistan1, and in particular towards the

northern, Pashtun-dominated area of the province, known as the Pashtun Corridor.

Balochistans strategic importance to the United States objectives in Afghanistan and to

stability in the region in general is multiple-fold. First, Balochistan shares a 600-mile border with

Afghanistan. The large, porous, poorly monitored border is facilitating the instability and violence

taking place in southeast Afghanistan, in provinces such as Kandahar and Helmand, the sites of the

greatest challenges to the Afghan national governments stability and reach. The Taliban have a safe

haven for operation in the northern region of Balochistan, and are widely considered to be based in

Quetta, Balochistans capital. Further, the Afghanistan-Balochistan border has long served as the

principal smuggling route for opium from Afghanistan to the West. Today, the opium trade is

funding Taliban activity on both sides of the border. In addition, the lack of economic development

and opportunity in Balochistan has provided the Taliban an abundant recruiting ground among adults

and children; the Taliban pay local residents high salaries or strong-arm them to join their ranks and

have wide-scale recruitment process in place for children. Finally, Balochistan is home to a highly-

trafficked supply route from Karachi to Afghanistan that is used by U.S. and ISAF forces and other

commercial actors. Its presence in the turbulent province offers a number of challenges and

opportunities for all regional interests.

1 Balochistan and Baluchistan are two common spellings for the province. This paper uses the former spelling, but some quotations and maps use the latter. Balochi is used as the singular noun, Baloch is used as the plural noun (rather than Balochis) and adjective.

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Balochistan is not only vital to US, Pakistani, and Afghan interests because of its proximity

to and role in perpetuating the conflict in Afghanistan. Balochistan is also home to a number of

unsettled conflicts that today manifest themselves in the form of an insurgency and sporadic violence

that threatens to challenge the already weakened central government. It is Balochistans centrality in

these two broad challenges the strength of the Taliban/al-Qaeda and the unaddressed grievances of

the Baloch separatists that is the basis upon which the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

should enact a comprehensive strategy within the scheme of the current AF-PAK strategy to reduce

the threats emanating from the region. The causes of the Baloch nationalist separatists and the

Taliban at present remain distinct. But, as will be demonstrated below, the dynamic nature of the

Taliban and the growing unrest among the Baloch nationalists could be a formula for a joining of the

two groups in their objectives. Taken separately, each group threatens to destabilize Pakistan, and

ultimately derail international ambitions for a stable Afghanistan. A coalition of the Taliban and

Baloch nationalists though not imminent given their ideological, geographical, and ethnic divides

could be a formula for vast destabilization Pakistani government and could bring progress in

Afghanistan and in the region as a whole to a standstill.

This paper seeks to provide context for the current threats brewing in Afghanistan. It does so

by framing the importance of Balochistan vis--vis the new AF-PAK strategy by offering an outline

of the Baloch separatists, past and present, and an analysis of the Talibans evolving activities in the

border regions of Pakistan. The paper ends with recommendations for the United States and Pakistan

for formulating an appropriate policy approach towards Balochistan in the context of the AF-PAK

strategy.

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STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALOCHISTAN

Pashtun Corridor and Quetta

Balochistan is a key area from which the Taliban plan operations in areas of Afghanistan

experiencing the heaviest Taliban insurgency activity, such as Kandahar and Helmand.2 Unlike the

majority of Balochistan, which is ethnically Baloch, the northwest tip of the province has a large

number of Pashtuns. This area, which is a natural ethnic extension of the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas which it borders to the north, has been termed the Pashtun Corridor because it holds

one of the main border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and offers fluid passage for

travel for Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border.3 The capital of Balochistan, Quetta, is a city

populated by both Baloch and Pashtuns, and lies in the south of the Pashtun corridor.

2 Poppies a Target in Fight Against Taliban. New York Times. April 29, 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/world/asia/29afghan.html?sq=taliban%20afghanistan%20&st=cse&scp=2&pagewanted=all (accessed May 4, 2009)]3 Pakistan: Trouble Along another US-NATO Supply Line. STRATFOR. January 15, 2009. [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090115_pakistan_trouble_along_another_u_s_nato_supply_route (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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On the map above, the Pashtun Corridor is highlighted in yellow, while the Pashtun regions

of the AF-PAK border are marked by white stripes. The Pahstun Corridor is the northern region of

Balochistan, south of South Waziristan in the FATA regions. The importance of the Pashtun

Corridor to U.S. interests in the region is multiple-fold. Most vitally, it is where the Afghan Talibans

leadership is based and is the location from which the Taliban are leading the insurgency in

Kandahar, Helmand, and the southeast more broadly. The strength of the Taliban insurgency is

greatest in this region. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban is widely believed to be based

in Quetta, at the southern end of the Pashtun Corridor.4 The U.S. has targeted Mullah Omar since

2001 as the grantor of refuge to al-Qaeda and for inciting, leading, and planning the Taliban

insurgency in Afghanistan.

Supply Route: Highway from Karachi to Kandahar

The United States and international forces in Afghanistan depend on two overland supply

routes through Pakistan for most of their supply transportation. The most highly trafficked route runs

from Karachi in the south of Pakistan through the provinces of Sindh and Punjab through the

tumultuous Khyber Pass in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The second of the

U.S.-ISAFs main land routes into Afghanistan starts in Karachi and runs through Balochistan,

passing through to Afghanistan at the Chaman border crossing.5 Approximately one quarter of U.S.-

ISAF supplies run through this route. Most of the route is free from potential disruption, and the

supply route as a whole has not been the target of as many attacks as the main supply route that runs

4 Afghanistan, Pakistan: The Battlespace of the Border. STRATFOR. October 14, 2008. [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081014_afghanistan_pakistan_battlespace_border (accessed May 4, 2009)] and US lawmakers express doubts on Pak willingness to fight terror. DNA India. March 11, 2009. [http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1238146 (accessed May 4, 2009)]5 Pakistan: Trouble Along Another US-NATO Supply Line 10.

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along Highway N-5 through Khyber Pass in the FATA.6 The map below shows the two supply

routes running from Karachi to Afghanistan.

The supply route through Balochistan, Highway N-5, is vulnerable to disruption by Baloch

insurgency attacks in eastern Balochistan and to Taliban attacks in the west near the border and on

the Afghan side of the border in Kandahar and the surrounding areas.

Opium

The production and trade of opium serves as the Talibans lifeline for funding its insurgency.

Some estimates place annual funding from opium at $300 million.7 The opium is centered in

6 Ibid 2.7Poppies a Target in Fight Against Taliban.

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Afghanistans southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul; their proximity to Balochistan

makes the Chaman pass and Highway N-5 the most efficient way of transporting the narcotics out of

the country.8 Afghanistan now supplies 90% of the worlds opium.9 It serves as the source of income

for the majority of Afghan farmers, and makes up an estimated 60% of Afghanistans GDP.10

As opium revenues have increased over the past several years, the Taliban are able to offer

lucrative salaries for local residents on either side of the AF-PAK border to run the business. The

illegal production of opium in Afghanistan is confounding the ability of the Afghan National

Government to enforce eradication efforts. The federally run Anti Narcotics Force Balochistan has

had mild successes in stopping the opium smuggling, but on the whole is not equipped to manage the

volume being smuggled through the Chaman border crossing and across its supply routes.11,12

HISTORY OF THE BALOCHISTAN CONFLICT8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Huge quantity of opium seized in Pishin district. Dawn.com. April 23, 2009. [http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/balochistan/huge-quantity-of-opium-seized-in-pishin-district--szh (accessed May 4, 2009)] 12 See also: Ahmed Rashid. Pakistan risks new battlefront. BBC News. January 17, 2005. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4182151.stm (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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Balochistan is the largest and most sparsely populated province of Pakistan, containing 43%

of the countrys land mass but, with an estimated population of ten million, is home to only five

percent of the population.13 Much of the country lies on a thousand meter high plateau, surrounded

by two mountain ranges. The region is bordered by the Punjab and Sindh provinces in the east.

Bordering Afghanistan to the east and Iran to the north, the Baloch within the borders of Pakistan

have fellow tribesmen in sparsely populated regions of southern Afghanistan and northern Iran.

Within Pakistan, two-thirds of the population of Balochistan is ethnically Baloch, with a sizeable

Pashtun population in the north. The map below shows a general ethnic breakdown by geography

between the Pashtun and Baloch tribes in Balochistan:

13 Burki Historical Dictionary of Pakistan 93.

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Since Pakistans founding six decades ago, political tensions between regional political actors

in Balochistan and the central government have led to violent turbulence. Balochistan has

experienced armed conflict in 1948, 1958, 1973, and today, in the form of ethnic/nationalist

insurgencies. Balochistan was annexed by Pakistan in March 1948. At the end of British rule, as the

creation of Pakistan became a more clear reality, the Baloch tribes pursued their own nationalistic

interests. Aspirations for an independent Balochistan that would span from western Pakistan to

northeast Iran and southern Afghanistan were crushed by the Pakistan Army during each insurgency.

The first insurgency, sparked by the Khan of Khalat a tribal leader who sought to defend against

the Baloch tribes being absorbed into a centralized government, transformed the Baloch from a group

of independent tribes into a nationalist separatist movement. The trauma of three insurgencies being

crushed between 1948 and 1973 have left scars that defined the Baloch nationalist psyche and have

informed the latest stretch of separatist activism.14

Balochistans present-day geography was defined in 1970. Before then, Balochistan was a

group of princely states ruled by nawabs and sardars that ultimately succumbed to blandishments,

bribes, or threats and acceded to join the new state of Pakistan.15 Under President Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto, the central government worked with the Baloch sardars, or tribal leaders, to carve out rights

to provincial autonomy under the 1973 constitution, including provisions for creating a Baloch

provincial government.16 Despite the concession, Bhutto preferred keeping a tight reign on provincial

control by having his own party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), govern in Balochistan. Soon after

the constitution was approved, the two main political parties with ethnic roots in Balochistan the

National Awami Party (largely Pashtun) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) came to control

various ministries in the new Baloch provinicial government. It is important to note that the National

14 Weaver 93-95.15 Ibid 94.16 Blood 60.

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Awami Party, a nationalist secular party had formed a coalition with the JUI, an Islamist party.

Undermining the constitution he had just had approved, Bhutto dissolved the ministries run by the

Baloch parties. The granting and then rescinding of provincial autonomy was the final straw in

coalescing the Baloch grievances with the central government.

A four-year long insurgency ensued that would last until a military coup by Zia ul-Haq

replaced the Bhutto government.17 The separatist insurgency in Balochistan of 1973-1977 was a

bloody conflict. Coming on the heels of East Pakistans (later Bangladeshs) secession from

Pakistan, no action on the part of the central government could be seen as an overreaction to maintain

Pakistans territorial integrity. It is estimated that 6,000 Baloch and 3,300 Pakistani soldiers died in

the conflict.18

Most of the five million Afghan refugees that fled to Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan settled in camps in Balochistan and the NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province).19 The

wave of refugees strained relations between the generally harmonious Baloch and Pashtuns in

Balochistan: millions of refugees fleeing the violence in Afghanistan flooded across the border in the

1980s, which strained the economy and shifted the provinces ethnic demography.20 Later, these

relations would be strained further by the favoritism that the central government displayed to the

Taliban and the JUI in Balochistan to the detriment of Baloch nationalist interests.21 17 Burki 94.18 Weaver 95.19 On the Afghan side of the border, in the early 1970s, when President Mohammed Daoud Khan came to power through the start of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, some Baloch tribes allied with the Soviets both for ideological and strategic reasons. Balochis on both sides of the Afghnistan-Pakistan border established alliances with the communist-led Afghan government. Daouds communist bent led him to crackdown on the nascent Islamic movements, led by a diverse group of Pashtuns and Tajiks. Pakistans fear that a communist Afghanistan would embolden the Baloch and Pashtun Marxist separatists in the western Pakistani province of Balochistan was confirmed when Daoud began supporting Marxist Baloch and Pashtun groups in eastern Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan began training the Islamic opposition movements, led by the Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and the Tajiks Ahmed Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani. These Pakistani-trained Islamist movements would soon become the Mujahideen insurgency, the main opponents to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Ironically, these groups would later become the Pakistan-trained Talibans main competitors for power in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. 20 Rashid Descent Into Chaos 283. 21 Ibid 284.

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Thousands of madrassas were setup to house and educate the refugees and the rural poor for

the two provinces. Funding for these madrassas came from the central government and from a

steady wave of funding from Saudi Arabia. The number of madrassas increased from approximately

900 in 1971 to 33,000 in 1988.22 The JUI, which, prior to 1970, had been an apolitical religious and

educational movement, setup many of these schools in Balochistan and the NWFP. Ideologically, the

schools were influenced by two main strains of thought. First was a form of Deobandi Islam that was

influenced heavily by Pashtunwali, or the Pashtun tribal code of honor.23 Second was the puritan

theology of Wahhabism, which Saudi funding of madrassas helped to propagate. Both ideologies

have a long history and presence in Balochistan and the tribal areas, but most relevant to this

discussion is that the madrassas that were setup to house the millions of refugees were the early

training grounds for a generation of extremists. The madrassa culture continues today and is one of

the Talibans most fertile recruitment centers.

22 Rashid Taliban 89.23 Ibid 88.

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BALOCHISTAN TODAY

Today in Balochistan, the missions of the JUI-supported Taliban and the secular Baloch

nationalists are separate, but their alliance as recently as the 1970s should be a warning for the

consequences of the two groups merging their causes. The main point of contention between the

Baloch nationalists and the Pashtun militias has been Pakistani central government support for the

latter at the cost of the formers interests. The relationship between the Taliban and the government is

now shifting towards one of enmity, as will be discussed later, and thus the main obstruction to

harmony and perhaps cooperation between the two causes is fast becoming obsolete.

Baloch Nationalist Grievances

The main grievances of the nationalists are: 1) Exploitation (or even expropriation) of

natural resources. Exploitation of gas resources has been a major grievance of the Baloch for

decades; despite their efforts to stake a rightful claim in the natural gas market, they have been

continually blocked by the central government.24 In 2005, for example, state-owned companies earn

$1.4 billion in gas revenue for the central government from the Sui gas fields, of which the province

earned only $116 million in revenues.25 2) Marginalization from development efforts. Due to its

geographical location in Central Asia and along the coast of the Arabian Sea, Balochistan is a natural

transit hub for energy resources and trade. Violent tensions have risen over the construction of a port

at Gwadar, on the Arabian coast. The task of building the port which links China, South Asia,

Central Asia, and the Arabian Gulf through Balochistan, was given almost exclusively to Sindhis,

Punjabis, and the Chinese. 3) Lack of autonomy in security, political, and economic affairs. In the

tradition that began with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, successive central governments have pushed for their

24 Grare 5.25 Rashid Descent Into Chaos 283.

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own parties to administer Balochistans provincial government rather than the nationalist parties.

President Musharrafs track record was particularly reviled by the Baloch: he was believed to have

rigged provincial and parliamentary elections in Balochistan in favor for the JUI-F, which had the

secondary consequence of souring relations between the Islamists and the nationalists.26 Pakistan has

taken a divide and conquer approach to dismantling the nationalist challenge to Islamabad

stemming from the political arena. Intelligence and security agencies have gained a reputation for

assassinating nationalist political leaders, and then pressuring the remaining leadership of the

political parties, and ultimately succeed in fracturing them.27

April 2009 witnessed a dark chapter that compounded the grievances of the Baloch

nationalists: three top Baloch leaders were murdered. While the culprits and motives behind the

murders remain unclear, Baloch nationalists suspected the Pakistani government was behind the

killings.28 The mysterious murders of the Baloch leaders fit well into the pattern of Pakistani heavy-

handedness in the region. Its solution to Baloch unrest has involved political assassinations and

summary indefinite detention of thousands of political activists.29

Development, Natural Resources, & Economy

Balochistan is a resource-rich province. It has large natural gas, coal, copper and uranium

reserves and untapped oil resources. Nearly 70% of Pakistans natural gas reserves an estimated 19

trillion of the countrys total 28 trillion cubic feet (tcf) are located in Balochistan and 45% of gas

production takes place in the province.30 Natural gas accounts for approximately 50% of Pakistans

26 Ibid 284. 27 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan. Update Briefing: Asia Briefing No. 69. Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 22, 2007, 11.28 Furore in Balochistan over killing of nationalist leaders. Dawn.com. April 10, 2009. [http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/balochistan/one-policeman-killed-as-riots-break-out-in-balochistan-ha (accessed May 4, 2009).]29 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan 10.30 Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources. 6-7.

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total energy consumption; thus, Pakistan is heavily reliant on Balochistan for its natural gas

reserves.31 In addition to natural gas, coal and copper are other main resources of the region.

As of 2008, the Pakistani government was receiving 300 billion rupees (Rs) in revenue

annually Balochistans natural gas market.32 Meanwhile, the total operating budget of the Baloch

provincial government is Rs 71 billion with Rs 15 billion allocated to development.33 This is a small

amount considering the resource-richness of the region and the need for development there. The lack

of revenue returns to the province has consequently resulted in a lack of development in the province.

One of the main complicating factors to allowing greater economic autonomy is the issue of

taxation; more autonomy ultimately means less tax revenue going to the central government.34 In

addition, the central government of Pakistan is giving little attention to development in Balochistan

while also not giving the provincial government Balochistan the freedom to pursue development

opportunities. In fact, despite its potential wealth, Balochistan has consistently ranked lowest in

develop indicators comparing Pakistans four provinces.35 This is particularly alarming given the

abysmal state of education and social services in the North-West Frontier Province. An estimated

45% of the Baloch population lives beneath the poverty line.36 Literacy, for example, in 1998 was

estimated to be 24%.

Another explanation for the central governments lack of attention to development in

Balochistan is the provinces sparse population. Because only five percent of the population of

Pakistan resides in Balochistan, the government has little motivation to allocate large amounts of

resources to the region. Development is a problem across Pakistan, with the exception of wealthy

31 Rs 71.19 billion Balochistan budget is unveiled. Associated Press of Pakistan. June 21, 2008. (http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42565&Itemid=124 [access May 4, 2009)]32 Lecture by Imran Khan, Pakistani Politician. Center for Strategic and International Studies. January 24, 2008.33 Ibid.34 Selig Harrison Pakistans Baluch Insurgency. Le Monde Diplomatique. October 2006.35 Grare 3. 36 Rashid Descent into Chaos 283.

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hamlets scattered throughout the major urban areas of the country. Lack of development in

Balochistan, then, can be seen in the same light as the dearth of development efforts on the part of the

central government across the country. Whereas many international organizations and NGOs

administer aid for development in Sindh and Balochistan, comparatively little international or private

domestic aid has gone to Balochistan. The exception to this trend has been scattered projects funded

by the World Bank and the Aga Khan Development Network.37

Perhaps the most defining aspect of Pakistans policy in Balochistan is its relationship with

India and its desire for strategic depth in the region via Balochistan.38 A preoccupation with the

intentions of India, its neighbor with whom it has established an uneasy peace, has shaped Pakistans

strategy towards Balochistan into a regional game of power plays implemented through heavy-

handed policies. The debate over Indias subversive role in supporting (or instigating) the Baloch

insurgencies of past and present is an ongoing one, though popular sentiment appears to view India

as a mere bogeyman in Baloch affairs.39

The Zardari government has made overtures to the Baloch people. Recently, he demanded

that a parliamentary committee be formed to address their grievances and offered a large aid package

for development projects.40 It is unclear whether this action is part of a strategic shift by the central

government to quell the unrest through non-military means or if it is an isolated act of lip service. It

remains to be seen whether this committee will be formed and if its work will bring concrete steps

toward reconciliation to fruition.

37 See: Pakistan: World Bank Supports Education Sector in Balochistan Province with US$22 Million. WorldBank.org. June 22, 2006. [http://go.worldbank.org/R5AL0103U0 (accessed May 4, 2009)]38 Rashid, Weaver, and Jones discuss this as the basis for their analyses of the Pakistan central governments relationship with Balochistan.39 Understanding Balochistan. Dawn.com. April 23, 2009. [http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/balochistan/Understanding-Balochistan--qs (accessed May 4, 2009)]40 Zardari vows to pacify disgruntled Baloch. Daily Times Pakistan. March 27, 2009. [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\03\27\story_27-3-2009_pg1_1 (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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The Current Insurgency

Many Baloch leaders seek full independence from Pakistan, while the Pashtuns, Sindhis, and

other ethnic minorities seek an end to the economic discrimination.41 The current insurgency that

began in 2003 is being led by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a unified front of disciplined

fighters and can be well understood in the context of these grievances. One analysis summarizes the

strengthening insurgency:

By targeting the Baloch leadership, marginalising secular nationalist parties, sidelining the provincial legislature, forging ahead with contentious development plans and using military force to subdue dissent, the government has shown a disregard for the political process that is now widely mirrored in Balochistan. Many young Baloch have lost faith in politics and picked up the gun.42

The above quote hints at a divide that has formed in recent years in the Baloch nationalists strategy.

Partly as a consequence of repressive and brutal tactics on the part of the central government, many

Baloch, particularly youth, see militantism, rather than the political process, as the legitimate means

of pursuing their aspirations. Meanwhile, older sardars prefer to pursue their agendas through

political and diplomatic means.43 This generational divide is dangerous because it leaves violence as

the preferred modus operandi of the next generation of embittered nationalists.

In 2003 and 2004, the BLA made a series of attacks on provincial infrastructure, targeting

military and economic sites, such as military outposts and gas pipelines.44 The climax of BLA

violence came in May 2004 when the group murdered three Chinese engineers working on the

Gwardar port.45 Fighting continued over the months as the BLA attacked convoys, railway tracks,

pipelines, and electricity pylons. After the BLA attempted to assassinate President Musharraf, the

41 Ibid 10.42 Ibid 12.43 Ibid 12.44 Rashid Descent Into Chaos 285.45 Ibid 284.

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army launched a military campaign that included widespread airstrikes and large-scale deployment

that began in December 2005, killing hundreds and leaving tens of thousands internally displaced.

The above analysis is not predicated on the assumption that every element of the Baloch insurgency

is a response to a legitimate grievance, or that military intervention was inappropriate. However, it is

clear that Pakistan policy has greatly exacerbated the situation in Balochistan, particularly based on

the perception that the actions were iron-fisted.

*****

The above sections have provided a context for understanding Balochistans strategic

importance and the roots and history of nationalist unrest in the region. Next, the paper turns to a

discussion of the Taliban that seeks to outline precisely the nature of the militant organization, its

evolving tactics, and the way in which the western and northern regions of Balochistan are key to the

Talibans expanding sphere of influence.

*****

THE TALIBAN TODAY

Taliban Structure Today

A broad way of characterizing the Taliban today is that they are a network of mostly Pashtun

militias that vary in their motives, targets, and grievances. Some are focused on regaining power in

Afghanistan; others are focused on gaining influence or at least destabilizing Pakistan through

fighting the Pakistani military or conducing terrorist activities. The identities of each group of

Taliban are fluid, but several distinctive characteristics help in clarifying the otherwise nebulous

natures of the groups. The United States understanding of the factions, organization, and leadership

of the various Taliban groups operating in the AF-PAK border regions is limited. This is partly

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because the Taliban are a dynamic group whose tactics and objectives are evolving frequently and

rapidly. The Taliban are widely known to maintain ties with Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence,

or ISI, which presents a great challenge to the United States in coordinating intelligence with

Pakistan.46

Organizational Structure

This structure, created through consultation with Pakistan Army sources for a recent article in

Military Review in June 2008 is useful in providing a picture of what the Taliban organizational

structure may look like.47 The structural layout of the Taliban organization can be understood as a

network of franchises fitting for an insurgency group of tribal origins:

A small militant group begins calling itself the local Taliban. It gains some form of recognition from the central Taliban hierarchy in return for its support and

46 For example, see: Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say. New York Times. March 25, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html (accessed May 4, 2009)]47 Taliban: An Organizational Analysis. Military Review. May/June 2008. 64.

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cooperation. The new cell supports Taliban grand strategy, but retains local freedom of action. The modus operandi preserves tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries.48

To the extent that this organizational layout was accurate last year, the Taliban has no doubt evolved

significantly even over the past year.

Mullah Omar remains the leader of the Taliban, but there is a wide debate in the intelligence

and military communities about the extent of his role. Many analysts believe that his is simply a

titular role, while others argue that he is an active planner and strategist of Taliban activity. The

widely held belief that he lives and operates with relative freedom in the Quetta Taliban Shura might

be evidence that he is indeed active in day-to-day and strategic affairs. In March 2009, the New York

Times leaked a story from the Pentagon stating that it intended to extend its Predator drone attacks to

Balochistan. Given that the drone attacks to date in Pakistan have targeted Afghan Taliban figures,

the leaked story indicates that the United States may also believe that Mullah Omar and/or other

upper echelon Afghan Taliban figures are operating from Balochistan. Some experts have noted

Mullah Omars presence in Quetta since 2002, though it is not clear why the intelligence and defense

communities in the U.S. might be taking that claim more seriously now. 49,50

The structure also highlights the independence with which the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan

(TTP), or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan functions. It is not necessarily linked with any of the

Afghan Talibans specialized resources, though it is likely that the TTP and Afghan Taliban do share

intelligence and coordinate logistics. What is missing from this layout is the liaison-style relationship

that the Taliban, and particularly the TTP, is now forging with other rebel and separatist groups

operating in Pakistan.

48 Ibid, 65.49 Mullah Omar Calls for a Taliban Surge New York Times (The Lede Blog). March 6, 2009. [http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/mullah-omar-tries-to-rein-in-pakistans-taliban/?scp=4&sq=baluchistan&st=cse (accessed May 4, 2009)]50 Rashid Ahmed treats Mullah Omars presence in Quetta since 2002 as a common fact.

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In March 2009, there was some indication that the TTP and Afghan Taliban were pursuing

closer relations in preparation for the planned increases in international troops in Afghanistan.51

According to a New York Times article, several members of the Taliban have reported that Mullah

Omar has tried to persuade TTP leaders to scale down their activities in Pakistan and join forces with

the Afghan Taliban to plan for the prospect of an American buildup of troops.52 This report offers a

number of insights. First, given the recent spate of Pakistani Taliban activity and the TTPs efforts to

expand control beyond the tribal areas, it appears that the TTP has not been convinced to scale down

its activities in Pakistan. Secondly, while Taliban activity may be increasing in Pakistan, there may

also be increasing cooperation between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. Third, if Mullah Omar did

indeed send emissaries to convince TTP leaders to shift their attention, then this would indicate that

Mullah Omar may be more of a titular leader rather than a central strategic commander of Taliban

acitivity.

Supplementing the activities and aims of the various Taliban groups are other armed groups.

Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (widely believed to have executed the November 2008 Mumbai

attacks) and Jaish-e-Mohammed are nominally motivated by the goal of liberating Kashmir.

However, these militias in tandem to the TTP use the tactic of destabilizing Islamabad to pursue their

goals.

Afghan Taliban

The Afghan Taliban are those who ruled Afghanistan from 1994-2001, and then retreated to

the mountainous border regions after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Ahmed Rashid

describes the Taliban as arriving in droves by the thousands and being ushered into Balochistan by

51 Pakistan and Afghan Taliban Close Ranks. New York Times. March 26, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/world/asia/27taliban.html?scp=4&sq=taliban%20afghanistan%20&st=cse (accessed May 4, 2009)]52 Ibid.

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Pakistani officials.53 The Afghan Taliban re-gathered in the border regions, and now run the

insurgency in southeast Afghanistan from either side of the Balochistan-southern Afghanistan border

and recruit from the local populations. Many of the older Taliban were refugees in Pakistan during

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and returned to Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviets and

helped the Pahstuns dominate and wrest control of much of the country in the 1990s. Their main

target today is fighting Afghan and ISAF forces.

The Afghan Taliban are not necessarily citizens or residents of Afghanistan. They are distinct

from the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) only in their objectives: the Afghan Taliban are focused on

expanding control in Afghanistan and fighting the U.S. and ISAF military presence there. The TTP

are focused broadly on retaliating against U.S. presence in the region by targeting Pakistani domestic

targets and on expanding their sphere of influence in Pakistan.

The Afghan Taliban serve both as a network of insurgent groups vying for control of territory

and also as administrators of governance. The Afghan Talibans role in governance and

implementing law is expanding. However, thorough information is more widely available on the

hot-button matters relating to Taliban governance, such as implementations of justice that shock

the sensibilities.54

Day-by-day, the Afghan Taliban are expanding their control over more villages and lands in

Afghanistan, defeating the efforts of the international forces and nascent Afghan National Army,

Afghan National Police to bring stability and central government control to much of the country.

The Afghan central government faces numerous debilitating obstacles in competing for governance

rights with the Taliban. It is undertaking several gargantuan tasks while simultaneously fighting an

insurgency. As Vali Nasr has observed, You have a weak state, and trying to create reconstruction,

53 Rashid Descent Into Chaos 242.54 See Taliban Fill NATOs Big Gaps in Afghan South. New York Times. January 22, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22taliban.html (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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run a government, run a state, and manage a war in a territory that really doesnt have the

rudimentary administrative, bureaucratic, economic infrastructures institutions.55

Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban, also known as the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), are those who

target Pakistani security forces and other Pakistani targets with the objective of fighting U.S.

presence in the region. Their focus is on overthrowing or at least destabilizing the Pakistani state by

wresting control of more territory and encroaching closer towards the cities. Most recently, in April

2009, the Pakistani media confirmed that the TTP had taken control of Buner, a district sixty miles

from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad.56 In cooperation with other sympathetic militant groups, they

are conducting terrorist attacks in major cities themselves. The attacks have become bolder: for

example, in April 2009, they attacked a police academy in Lahore, killing eleven. Lahore is the heart

of the Punjab province, and had not previously experienced Taliban terrorism. Beyond the

disconcerting security implications of targeting Punjab, the recent attacks touch on the long-standing

ethnic tensions between the Pashtuns and the Punjabis. The attacks are also becoming bigger: the

September 2008 bombing of the Marriott that killed 53 in Islamabad required the use of more

powerful and sophisticated explosives than had previously been seen.57

Baitullah Mehsud, a Pashtun from a prominent clan, created the TTP by forming an alliance

with 40 other Taliban leaders and their militias. It is a federation centered in South Waziristan, the

tribal agency in FATA that borders Balochistan, but is operating in the entire border region. The TTP

55 Interview with Vali Nasr in The War Briefing Room. Frontline (Documentary). October 28, 2008. 56 Buner Falls Into the Hands of Swat Taliban. Dawn. April 22, 2009. [http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/nwfp/buner-falls-to-swat-talibanbi (accessed April 22, 2009)]57 Al Qaeda Suspected of Pakistans Marriott Bombing. Reuters. September 21, 2009. [http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLK18396120080921?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews (accessed April 22, 2009)]

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has claimed responsibility for dozens of suicide attacks and bombings since its founding in

December 2007. Most prominently, Baitullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for the assassination of

Benazir Bhutto, the popular Pakistani presidential candidate and former prime minister.58

Much of the TTPs grievances have to do with the perceived illegitimacy of the Pakistani

state and military, particularly with respect to its alliance with the United States. In their rhetoric, the

TTP cites their main motivation as retaliation for American and Pakistani attacks/military

intervention in their previously autonomous regions. Hakimullah Mehsud, the new Deputy leader of

the TTP, and a cousin of Baitullah, explained that American attacks are increasing the Talibans

resolve to fight: If America continues bombing and martyrs people, then we have to attack. If the

Pakistani leaders and army maintain their stance, then we will try to take control of Peshawar and

other cities.59 Another TTP commander has stated, We never used to fight against Pakistan because

we thought they were an army of Muslims. But when they started bombing us, we had to wage jihad

against them.60

Balochistan

As recently as April 2009, evidence emerged of the creation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban

Balochistan, or the TTB. A man identifying himself as Engineer Asad and claiming to be the

TTBs spokesman informed Pakistan media outlets via telephone of the groups creation and

alliance. According to the Pakistani newspaper, Daily News, He said the struggle of the TTB was

against non-Muslims and Western forces that had attacked and occupied Islamic countries. He said

the TTB was opposed to fighting the Pakistani security forces and law-enforcement agencies and

turning Pakistan into a battlefield. Instead, he said, the TTB was committed to fighting the enemies

58 Citation no longer accessible. [http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/dec-2007/15/index10.php] 59 The War Briefing Room.60 Ibid.

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of Islam.61 It remains to be seen whether the TTB will emerge as a threat to U.S. and regional

interests, and whether the TTB will link up with the TTP in coordinating their activities.

Swat

Swat was once a tranquil vacation spot, often called the Sweden of the East. Despite efforts

by the Taliban to create new havens for themselves in Swat, for years, the Pashtuns of Swat rejected

the spread of the Taliban. Deeply religious, they stood against the Islamic law that the Taliban sought

to impose, insisting that their commitment to Islamic law did not allow supporting violence. The

TTP, undeterred, built a massive madrassa on the outskirts of Swats capital. Mawlana Fazlallah, the

head of JUI-F, the most popular branch of the JUI, began preaching via radio in favor of the Taliban.

The anti-Taliban Pashtun leaders persisted in their opposition to a Taliban takeover. To rid

the Swat Valley of these strong leaders, the Taliban implemented a technique previously unobserved

by analysts: recognizing that these tribal leaders were also the valleys landowners, the Taliban

organized the leaders landless tenants into armed gangs to strong-arm their landlords out of Swat.62

The Taliban exploited economic grievances between landowner and tenant, and appropriated the

cause of the lower class to their own. The tactic was successful, and Swats largest landowners were

force to flee.

This combination of techniques allowed the Taliban to begin occupying Swat in the fall of

2007. They began to easily defeat the Pakistani Frontier Corps. The majority of the population of

Swat remained against the Taliban takeover, and sought the provincial and central governments aid.

In December 2007, President Musharraf sent twenty thousand army troops into Swat far too late

according to most analysts. The army took back the main parts of Swat, but did not capture any 61 And Now Theres the Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan The News International. March 4, 2009. [http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=165495 (accessed May 4, 2009)]62 Taliban Exploit Class Rifts. New York Times. April 16, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html (accessed April 22, 2009)]

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leadership; fighting continued. Musharraf later tried to quell the Taliban and Mawlana Fazlur

Rehman through a deal which culminated in the February 2009 implementation of Sharia. The

Taliban would be allowed to implement their version of Islamic law, which would be officially

recognized by the federal government, and in exchange, the Taliban would lay down their arms and

not expand beyond Swat. In practice this has not happened: recently, Taliban from Swat have take

control of the district of Buner, located between the Swat valley and Islamabad, which has sparked a

large-scale military operation.63

Allowing the Taliban and Islamists to run Swat on their own system of law was a blow to the

credibility and perception of strength of the Pakistani government. The Swat deal represents a major

victory for the Taliban, as Swat lies outside the tribal areas, the Talibans traditional base of

operation. This indicates that the Talibans sphere of influence is spreading beyond the tribal areas.

The Pakistani government suffered a major defeat in terms of its legitimacy and control of the

country.

The central governments concession to the JUI-F to implement their version of Sharia in

Swat calls for a comparison to be drawn with the central governments lack of accommodation for

provincial autonomy in Balochistan. That the central government would allow for a parallel system

of justice is a clear abrogation of the write of state. Allowing for this level of autonomy in Swat while

not acceding demands for greater control of economic resources or political affairs in Balochistan

can serve only to further frustrate and inspire Baloch nationalists. To some, the concession also

signals the long-standing suspicion of close ties between the Taliban and the central government. It

may also have sent the message to Baloch militias that once enough havoc is created, the government

63 Pak forces kill 60 Taliban in Buner. Press Trust of India. May 1, 2009. [http://www.ptinews.com/pti\ptisite.nsf/0/FBC10FF0EDA612FA652575A9004B8D8A?OpenDocument (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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may be willing to negotiate and respond to their grievances. For the Taliban in Balochistans Pashtun

Corridor, the event was an emboldening one.

Relationship with al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda can loosely be understood as Arabs and other non-Afghan and non-Pakistani

militants who are planning attacks against the United States homeland and interests abroad. In the

North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan, al-Qaeda can

be understood as the foreign, non-tribal people that live and operate under the custodianship of the

native populations. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are considered the ostensible leaders

of al-Qaeda. The distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban has become blurred as the Taliban

continue to diversify their objectives across the region. The relationship between al-Qaeda and the

Taliban spans back to the 1980s. Foreign fighters from across the Arab world and Eastern Europe

trained for the Afghan jihad in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan. Many foreign fighters in

Afghanistan integrated themselves to some degree into the tribal structure through inter-marriage.

There is no consensus on the closeness of bin Ladens relationship to Mullah Omar. In 1996,

after bowing to pressure from the United States, bin Laden was expelled from Sudan.64 After

choosing Afghanistan as his next home, he depended on non-Taliban Pashtun leaders in Jalalabad,

rather than the Taliban. This indicates that although he had ties with the Taliban leadership going

back to the Soviet jihad days, at the time of his arrival in Jalalabad in 1996, he had not yet built

strong relations with them.65 One analyst argues that while they may have known each other, there is

64 Osama bin Laden had spent much time in Afghanistan. After having setup his own jihad training camps in Pakistan and having fought in the Afghan jihad, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan several times. After Bin Laden was exiled from Saudi Arabia with the beginning of the first Gulf War in 1990, the Sudanese leader, Hasan al-Turabi, invited bin Laden to take up residence in Khartoum. Bin Laden organized al-Qaeda activities without the aid of the Taliban during the years he was in Khartoum.65 Steven Coll. Ghost Wars. New York: Penguin Books, 2004, 323.

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little evidence that they have remained in touch since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001.66 Others

argue that the two are closely tied, and cite possible inter-marriages and other social connections

between the two leaders families. According to one former Department of State official, there is

growing consensus in the intelligence community that bin Laden is residing in Chtiral, a valley in the

northern tip NWFP, far away from his protector-host, Mullah Omar.67

During the late 1990s, the United States did negotiate with the Taliban to deny bin Laden

sanctuary in Afghanistan. While the Clinton administration wanted to disrupt bin Ladens networks

of funding and prevent him from planning further attacks, it lacked the justifications under

international law to charge bin Laden within the United States for any crime.68 The United States

leveled sanctions against the Taliban regime; the sanctions had little effect, and were likely

counterproductive in that, with its assets frozen and travel restricted, the Taliban leadership was

forced to rely on bin Laden more.69,70

There are indications that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are working together to some extent in

the northern border regions of FATA and NWFP. It is clear that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have a

symbiotic relationship, wherein al-Qaeda has benefited from the Talibans sanctuaries in Afghanistan

and Pakistan and the Taliban have benefited from al-Qaedas fighters and funding from private

sources in the Gulf. Given that the Taliban are now taking on a greater degree of activity and have

secured their own funding sources through the opium trade, it is unclear whether the Taliban will

66 Interview, Kamran Bokhari, Strategic Forecasting, April 3, 2009.67 Interview with former Department of State official, April 22, 2009.68 Ibid.69 Lecture by Marvin Weinbaum. Johns Hopkins University SAIS. January 29, 2009.70 Some evidence suggests that the Taliban did offer to extradite bin Laden to Pakistan in 2001 and when Pakistan rejected, to have him tried in an international Sharia tribunal. This further indicates that the Taliban were willing to negotiate al-Qaedas future, and thus, the relationship between the two groups was second to the Talibans self-interest. Marvin Weinbaum argues that it was the ISI that reassured the Taliban against its fears of a U.S. invasion: the U.S. would not aim for regime change in Afghanistan, but would rather limit its objectives to routing out al-Qaeda. Some argue that Mullah Omar did not concede to the United States because he believed that in the worst case scenario, the Americans would win, forcing the Taliban to retreat temporarily until the occupying powers left.

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continue to benefit from their alliance with al-Qaeda beyond having the al-Qaeda brand name to

associate with their activities. U.S. intelligence analysts have stated that, as of August 2008, al-Qaeda

and the Taliban run at least 157 training camps in the FATA and NWFP. As recently as April 2009, a

U.S. drone attack in the Orakzai agency in the southern FATA targeted an alleged al-Qaeda-Taliban

meeting, wherein four Arabs (suspected members of al-Qaeda) and an estimated 20 suspected

Taliban were killed, indicating continued cooperation between the groups and presence of foreign

fighters in the tribal regions.71

The Dynamic Taliban

The Taliban are seizing every opportunity to expand their sphere of influence in the

Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Their havens in Balochistan and particularly in Quetta are facilitating

this. As they expand, their organization, tactics, and alliances evolve. Below is an outline of some

changes that are facilitating the Talibans sphere of influence and areas of control.

Focus on Pakistan

The Talibans reorientation towards destabilizing Pakistan represents the groups largest

strategic shift since 2001. Having always had a cozy relationship with the Pakistani military and

intelligence services, this shift has been a surprise and has certainly caught the Pakistani government

utterly unprepared. Focusing on Pakistan is a strategic move for a number of reasons. First, Pakistan

remains a sovereign nation without the presence of foreign interference on the scale that Afghanistan

is experiencing. The Taliban are dealing with the Pakistanis alone with comparatively minor

interventions from the United States in the form of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks. Further,

71 Taliban Commander Hakimullah Mehsud Escapes Air Strike. India TV News. April 21, 2009. [http://www.indiatvnews.com/election09/newsdetails.php?id=310&pg=index (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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given the franchise-like nature of the Taliban, heavy activity in Pakistan does not detract from its

activities in Afghanistan.

Some estimated characterizer the TTP threat to Pakistan as dire. In March 2009, a top adviser

to CENTCOM, David Kilcullen warned of a collapse of the Pakistani state within six months based

on the following realities: Pakistan has 173 million people, 100 nuclear weapons, an army bigger

than the US Army, and al-Qaeda headquarters sitting right there in the two-thirds of the country that

the government doesnt control.72 He also pointed to the Inter-Services Intelligences (ISIs)

continued ties with the Taliban. Success for the Taliban in Afghanistan has been achieved already in

the sense that they have successfully begun to destabilize the country. The collapse or near-collapse

of the Pakistani state and the potential for a partial Taliban takeover would be an even greater victory

for the Taliban.

Branding

Supplementing the activities and aims of the various Taliban groups are other armed groups.

Militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (widely believed to have executed the November 2008

Mumbai attacks) and Jaish-e-Mohammed are nominally motivated by the goal of liberating Kashmir,

but benefit from the Talibans use of the tactic of destabilizing the outskirts of major urban centers

such as Islamabad and Lahore to pursue their goals. The Talibans cooperation with such nationalist/

separatist groups seems to be key to their dynamics of expansion. Allying with militant groups that

target the Pakistani state allows the Taliban great access into the depths of urban Pakistan.

The extent to which these groups collaborate in staging attacks is unclear. It is difficult to

know which groups have actually been behind each terrorist attack. For example, Abdullah Mehsud,

the TTP deputy commander, claimed responsibility for the Marriott bombing in Islamabdad in

72 Pakistan Could Collapse in Six Months. The News International. March 24, 2009. [http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21109 (accessed April 22, 2009)]

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September 2008. Similarly, Baitullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for the Lahore police academy

attack of April 2009. The Talibans role may have been limited in these attacks; what is clear is that

the Taliban benefit from tagging their name on terrorist activities for which they are not exclusively

responsible. The result is an increase in the power of the Taliban in the publics perception, which is

a significant achievement in the psychological battlefield.

The Talibans apparent alliance with Kashmiri nationalist groups might be a forewarning of a

potential future alliance with Baloch nationalist groups.

New Groups Deeper Inside Pakistan

U.S. predator-drone attacks in the FATA have successfully forced the Taliban to flee and

seek refuge deeper inside the settled areas of Pakistan.73 The Quetta shura, or the Talibans council in

Quetta, have operated with impunity there, though recent discussion in the military community in

light of the new AF-PAK strategy have identified Quetta as potential next target for predator-drone

attacks.74

The Taliban are also expanding further towards the urban centers of Pakistan as a means of

expanding their influence. The newness of this approach lies in geography: for the first time, the

Taliban cells are popping up outside of the tribal areas. The creation of the Tehreek-e Taliban

Balochistan (TTB) in March 2009 is an example of this.

Exploiting Social Grievances

The Taliban keep their finger on the pulse of the most vulnerable portions of the tribal

populations. They are able to channel their recruitment and PR efforts through appropriating social

73James Traub. Can Pakistan be Governed? New York Times Magazine. March 31, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-t.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=baluchistan&st=cse (accessed May 4, 2009)]; Also Al-Qaida, Taliban are not in Balochistan: Pak. ExpressIndia.com. March 19, 2009. [http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/AlQaida-Taliban-are-not-in-Balochistan-Pak/436562/ (accessed May 4, 2009)]74 US' plans to broaden air strikes in Pak meets roadblock. IBN Live. March 20, 2009. [http://ibnlive.in.com/news/us-plans-to-broaden-air-strikes-in-pak-meets-roadblock/88187-2.html (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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grievances to their cause in several ways: 1) Capitalize on anger of U.S. drone attacks and violations

of Pakistani sovereignty. 2) Exploit class divisions and economic issues. The takeover of Swat is a

powerful example of identifying a wronged population (peasants), tying the Talibans cause to the

cause of the wronged, and gaining recruits, sympathy, and influence. Evidence that the Taliban are

now recruiting in the slums of Karachi offers a glimpse into the power of this tactic. The counter-

current to this tactic is that large portions of the Pashtun population are vehemently anti-Taliban for

various reasons; these irreconcilables are lumped into the same category as the Pakistani

government betrayers and are dealt with by force.75

This is particularly relevant within the context of Balochistan, wherein grievances against the

central government abound.

Recruiting Children

The Taliban have been recruiting children through Deobandi madrassas since their

earliest days.76 The innovation they are now displaying is in the spread of recruitment practices in

urban madrassas among non-Pashtuns as well as Pashtuns. Young boys from, sometimes from

middle class backgrounds, are being persuaded to join the ranks of the Taliban to fight off the

American kuffar or infidels. Most recruitment, however, remains within the lowest socio-economic

rungs, which poses a particular challenge to Balochistan, whose impoverished Pashtun and Baloch

youth have become the most vulnerable for Taliban conscription.77

*****

75 War Briefing Room. 76 For lengthy discussion of past Taliban recruitment practices, see: Ahmed Rashid. Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. See also: On the job with a Taliban Recruiter. Asia Times. November 26, 2003. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK26Df03.html (accessed May 4, 2009)]77 See: Shermeen Obaid-Choudhury. Children of the Taliban. Frontline (Documentary), 2008.

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The above discussion has sought to delineate the nature of the Taliban and its connection with

Balochistan; the previous analysis discussed Baloch nationalist separatism and the economic and

political tensions between Balochistan and the central Pakistani government. In the context of Baloch

provincial grievances and the Talibans operations in Balochistan, the paper will next discuss policy

options in the context of the still-developing AF-PAK strategy.

*****

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POLICY OPTIONS

The New Strategy

President Obama has made it clear that the U.S.s victory in Afghanistan is tied to defeating

al-Qaeda. The White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward

Afghanistan and Pakistan released on March 27, 2009 states, the core goal of the U.S. must be to

disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to

Pakistan or Afghanistan.78,79 This paper has focused more on the Taliban and less on al-Qaeda

because there is sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Taliban pose a vital challenge to the

interests of the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, beyond simply harboring al-Qaeda. Al-

Qaeda continues to pose the unique challenge of targeting the homeland of the United States and its

allies; nonetheless, the United States has linked its strategic interests to the stability of the Afghan

and Pakistani states and thus, managing the Taliban threat ought to be a top priority in itself.

U.S. and Pakistani policy towards Balochistan to date has been inadequate. The Pakistanis, as

discussed above, have ignored the region, allowing hostilities to boil over into a new insurgency. The

U.S. has also largely ignored the region in its official policy until very recently, despite clear

evidence that the Taliban has been operating freely from Quetta since at least 2006, and by some

analyses, since 2002.80

To this point, the United States has focused its counter-insurgency efforts on the NWFP and

FATA regions, but not the Pashtun corridor. The Pashtun Corridor is contiguous with the FATA, and

given the tentative nature of borders in Pakistan, it would seem reasonable to simply extend the 78 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Groups Report on U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. The White House. March 27, 2009. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf (accessed May 4, 2009)]79 The White Paper does acknowledge that Taliban activity has provided al-Qaeda the safe havens from which to operate, though it does not state the defeat of the Taliban as a goal. This is a departure from the previous administrations stated goals, which rhetorically pitted the Taliban ideology against the goal of establish a central Afghan democracy.80 Baluchistan feeds Taliban's growing power. San Francisco Chronicle. May 31, 2006. [http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/05/31/MNGT1J4ULI1.DTL (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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efforts southward. There are several explanations both political and strategic that this has not

been the case. The political justification is that the United States presence and activities within

Pakistani territory has poisoned Pakistani public opinion to even higher levels of anti-Americanism.

Given the history of tension and neglect between the Pakistani government and Balochistan, the

Pashtun Corridor has remained off limits in negotiations over the geography within which the United

States can take action within Pakistans borders.

The strategic reasoning is that the United States is focusing on defeating the threat of al-

Qaeda rather than defeating or dismantling al-Qaeda. The Obama administration has communicated

this distinction quite clearly. Within the military and diplomatic communities, there is a perception of

an al-Qaeda-Taliban divide. Indeed, special envoy Richard Holbrooke, Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton, and President Obama have sought to make the distinction between al-Qaeda and the

Taliban, implying that they are distinct geographically. Al-Qaeda is based in the north in the NWFP

and FATA regions whereas the Taliban strongholds are in the southern border regions spanning

Balochistan. This is supported symbolically by the growing consensus that Osama bin Laden is

based in the northern regions of the NWFP while Mullah Omar is based several hundred kilometers

south in Quetta.

The United States faces a third obstacle in expanding its reach into Balochistan: Pakistans

ambivalence towards Afghan Taliban. There is strong evidence suggesting that the ISI may still be

aiding the Afghan Taliban. Further, as one analyst has argued, Pakistan doesnt see the Taliban as a

global threat: Pakistan has traditionally resisted going after the Afghan Taliban, arguing that they

are primarily interested in regaining power in Afghanistan and do not present a global threat in the

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same way as al-Qaeda doesAccording to this argument, if the Taliban could be persuaded to sever

ties with al-Qaeda, they could be included in any eventual political settlement in Afghanistan.81

The attitudes of the United States and Pakistan towards the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban

represent a dangerous oversimplification. To the extent that the United States mission in

Afghanistan is to defeat the insurgencies that are preventing stabilization in the country, such a false

dichotomy denies that the Taliban, beyond providing safe havens for al-Qaeda, have squads of

insurgents in their ranks wreaking havoc in the southeastern regions of Afghanistan. Because

establishing stability in Afghanistan is the main priority of the United States, it should engage the

Taliban regardless of their longitude on the AF-PAK border.

Two Current Policies

Abandon the predator-drone tactic, respect sovereignty

According to information leaked to the New York Times in March 2009, Gen. Petraeus and

Lt. Gen. Lute both support expanding recommended expanding the CIAs use of missile strikes via

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Balochistan because the strikes in the tribal regions north of

Balochistan have forced Taliban leadership to flee southward, thus making them easier targets. On

the one hand, the predator-drone tactic seems to be working: once targeted by drones, Taliban

members are fleeing their havens in the northern border regions and moving eastward to the outskirts

of Islamabad and southward into Balochistan. Once forced into areas over which the military has

better control, the Pakistan Army can move in and defeat the militants in more comfortable ground. It

is not clear that this is part of a U.S.-Pakistan military strategy, but it may be an effective tactic in

eliminating militants. However, the drone attacks have been utterly despised by the Pakistani people

81 Myra MacDonald. Pakistan: Now or Never? Reuters Blogs. March 29, 2009. [http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/03/23/talking-to-the-taliban-and-the-last-man-standing/ (accessed May 4, 2009)]

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on the basis of civilian deaths and violation of sovereignty.82 The United States must re-evaluate the

costs and benefits of the predator-drone tactic and create an alternative approach that ultimately

brings more benefit than harm on in the long-run.

Drone attacks in Balochistan will likely inspire more militant activity in the cities. Baitullah

Mehsud announced that the attack on the Lahore police academy in early April 2009 was done in

retaliation for the deaths caused by an earlier drone attack. Missile strikes will push militants deeper

into the urban areas of Pakistan, which would have a further destabilizing effect. Moreover, they may

disrupt the vital development work that needs to take place in the province. Finally, missile strikes in

the Pashtun Corridor may endanger the Highway N-5 supply route.83

Continue trust-building between the U.S.s and Pakistans military and intelligence

Disrupting the Taliban network in Balochistan, and indeed the entire effort to defeat al-Qaeda

and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, requires a revolutionary change in the relationship

between the United States military and intelligence outlets and its Pakistani counterparts. This

process is under way to a large extent, and must continue. The fundamental challenge that the

militaries of the United States and Pakistan face is to implement effective methods of managing the

insurgency while building and maintaining the legitimacy of their actions in the eyes of the local and

national populations.

Policy Recommendations

Far from a comprehensive policy prescription, this section offers policy recommendations

that are not currently being implemented. It identifies three objectives to pursue in Balochistan that

synthesize the priorities of the AF-PAK strategy with the analysis offered in this paper.

82 Juan Cole. Urdu Editorials Condemn US Predator Strikes on Pakistan. Informed Comment (blog). March 28, 2009. [http://www.juancole.com/2009/03/urdu-editorials-condemn-us-predator.html (accessed May 4, 2009)]83 Pakistan: Trouble Along another US-NATO Supply Line.

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Objective 1: Disrupt the Taliban Insurgency: The most urgent priority as it relates to security in

Afghanistan is to disrupt the Talibans attacks into southern Afghanistan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and

the United States should pursue its counter-insurgency strategy in Balochistan, and also consider the

following policy supplements.

Policy 1) Pakistan should transfer security responsibilities to the local population in Balochistan.

Parallel to its efforts in Afghanistan to strengthen law enforcement institutions, the United States

should train the residents of Balochistan to guard their borders and weed out Taliban elements. The

Baloch people have been demanding the right to autonomy over their security and law enforcement,

and, once trained, will haven an innate advantage in securing their own territory. Baloch civilians of

all ethnicities should manage their land to the extent that a counter-insurgency can be managed by

law enforcement.

Baloch citizens should also be charged with securing the supply route from Karachi to

Chaman and work in counter-narcotics. Offering funds competitive with the Talibans hiring rates

may help drive a wedge between the Taliban and their mid-level recruitment pool.

Objective 2: Prevent Recruitment of Children: Establishing long-term security in Afghanistan and

Pakistan will require a generations-long commitment from all involved parties. The Taliban have

been preparing for this by recruiting heavily among children as young as five years old and from a

lower and middle classes.84 Pakistan must recognize that it is in a in a long-term battle for hearts and

minds, and that the neglect that has been paid to creating a functioning educational system and

economic opportunities has wrought the present crisis reflected in the success of Taliban recruitment.

Recruitment will not be significantly disrupted until a viable alternative to the educational system and

career options are created.

84 Obaid-Choudhury Children of the Taliban.

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Policy 2) Create an educational system in Balochistan to render the madrassas system obsolete.

There is no way around creating an education system that endows primary and secondary school

children with tools they need to be contributing members to society. While the United States can play

a major role in overseeing this project, particularly in the likely event that the Enhanced Partnership

with Pakistan Act of 2009 will pass, regional players such as Turkey, which has deep experience in

progressive religious education in tribal regions, may be best suited for the task.

Objective 3: Establish stability through autonomy in Balochistan. As has been described previously,

for decades, the central government of Pakistan has served injustices upon the Baloch people.

Pakistans priorities lie in managing the threat of extremism from within its borders and in

Afghanistan. The Taliban and its allied militias in Pakistan have destabilized the country and threaten

the states collapse if they adopt the cause of the Baloch insurgency. For the sake of its own survival,

the Zardari administration should commit to establishing stability in Balochistan through allowing

the province its constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.

Policy 3a) Create the institutions necessary for Baloch economic autonomy. Balochistan is in the

midst of major economic transformations due to its strategic location and natural resources. The

Baloch people are ill-equipped to participate in the burgeoning economy and have been denied the

resources to become competitive players in it. Creating technical training and other opportunities to

prepare the Baloch people to compete and innovate in their economy will contribute to economic

growth, lowering unemployment, and have other positive economic and social consequences. Over

time, economic development in Balochistan will offer opportunities for residents to counter the

economic incentives that the Taliban provide.

Policy 3b) Restore the democratic system by returning integrity to provincial governance and

politics: For decades, Pakistan has interfered in the provincial political system and in its elections to

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favor its own interests. This has led to propping up the JUI and other pro-Taliban elements in the

region to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan. This policy backfired when the Taliban turned

against the Pakistani government. Restoring free and fair elections and allowing the Baloch

nationalists to compete will have multiple benefits, including the restoration of justice, the prospects

for simmering the insurgency as the older generations approach of politics and diplomacy is given

an opportunity to flourish.

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CONCLUSION

Balochistan sits at the nexus of several dangerous realities in a strategically critical region. A

strengthened Taliban acts with relative impunity in the west of the province. A belligerent nationalist

movement seeking autonomy is in the east of the province. Given the changing dynamics in the

region, greater destabilization of the Pakistan and Afghanistan are plausible in the near future.

However, the geopolitical and economic strengths of Balochistan also present opportunities for

Pakistan, the United States, and Afghanistan to improve their strategic standings in the region and

shape a more positive future for the province, for each country, and for the region as a whole. Wise

policies that seek to disrupt the Talibans expansive projects, build the institutions that the Baloch

need, and grant the people their long-overdue rights can have an effect and can very likely reverse

course in the region. A better formulated policy could release the lynchpin on Balochistans troubles

and pave the way to a more stable Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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balochistan af pak s forgotton frontier

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