barack hussain obama, ‘remarks by the president in web viewsince time immemorial, peace in...

Virginia Review of Asian Studies

AFTER 2014: AMERICAN POLICY, THE TALIBAN AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

SAROJ KUMAR RATHHOSEI UNIVERSITY

Abstract Since time immemorial, peace in Afghanistan has always been absent. If ever peace made its presence, it becomes too costly for its inhabitants to afford. As time progressed its people developed the nebulous habit to cohabit with the elusive peace in the region. The bold and warlike character of the Afghans has always preserved them from being crushed by the despotic use of power by their chiefs or kings. Innovations are liable to be fiercely resented and opposed by the armed strength of the tribes concerned. The petty and selfish ambitions of the chiefs, tribal feuds and jealousies have always enabled an adroit ruler to maintain his authority. The circumstance in Afghanistan is identical since millenia. The present peril in Afghanistan is an outcome of an extended war amongst the Hamid Karzai-led Afghan government, Taliban including Haqqani, Northern Alliance, and petty or powerful warlords. Involvements of predatory foreign forces stretching the battle beyond limit. Combinedly all these present tough challenges for future peace in Afghanistan. This article deals with three principal questions - What will be the future situation of Afghanistan after 2014, whether Afghanistan would be the launching pad of international terror attacks, and whether War against terror in Afghanistan could be avoided?

Keywords: Taliban, Haqqani Network, Afghanistan, Northern Alliance, Terrorism.

On October 7, 2001, the United States launched airstrike on Afghanistan, which heralded the American reaction to the al Qaeda’s September 11 terrorist attacks on mainland America. The September 11 terror attacks caused nearly 2752 deaths1, which infuriated and forced the US government to take decisive and stringent action against the perpetrators of the attacks. In the ensuing war spread over a decade, 1979 US troops and 1028 coalition troops lost their lives in Afghanistan2. The casualties incurred on the lives of the Afghans are humongous. During the decade long war, 20,000 Afghans comprised of civilians, troops, and militants lost their lives3.

1 US authorities issued 2752 death certificates; -------------, ‘Acccused 9/11 plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed faces New York trial’, November 13, 2009, CNN, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid.sheikh.mohammed/index.html. 2 ----------, ‘US and Coalition Military Fatalities by Year and Month’, iCasualties, available at http://icasualties.org/oef/, the fatalities are as of May 2012. 3 There are various estimates about the deaths incurred by Afghanistan. However, no estimate is below 20,000; United Naitons Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, ‘Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2011, available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.

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http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf

http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf

http://icasualties.org/oef/

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid.sheikh.mohammed/index.html


When the US attacked Afghanistan, 95 percent of Afghans did not know anything about September 11 attacks and why the US decided to attack Afghanistan4.

A day after the September 11 attacks, Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf assembled his top generals at a secure bunker at the Operations Room of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in Chaklala garrison near Rawalpindi to discuss Pakistan’s strategy. Gen. Musharraf told to his generals that ‘The US will react like a wounded bear and it will attack Afghanistan.5’ The US goal in Afghanistan was to ‘Eliminate al-Qaida leadership and forces; Deal with al-Qaida in a manner that clearly signals the rest of the world that terrorists and terrorism will be punished; and collect intelligence for the worldwide campaign against terrorism’6. The US goal on Taliban was to ‘Terminate the rule of the Taliban and their leadership; End the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism; and Do so in a manner that signals the world that harboring terrorism will be punished severely’. However, the US had no plan, strategy, vision or interest for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. The US strategy was categorical that ‘The US should be involved in the diplomatic effort, but it is not in US power to assure a specific outcome. US preference for a specific outcome ought not paralyze US efforts to oust al Qaeda and Taliban. The US should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement, since the US will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide’7.

The US claimed military victory in Afghanistan before the end of November 2001 and by December 2001; the US supported the Hamid Karzai-led Afghanistan Government installed in Kabul. However, the lack of a vision or Marshal Plan in Afghanistan gave way to the post-Taliban chaos, conflict and uncertainties in the country. More than a decade had passed since the US achieved a quick victory in the trenches of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan is still on ferment without achieving either peace or progress in nation building. This article would empirically examine what will be the future situation of Afghanistan after 2014. There is fear and anxiety that after the departure of coalition troops, Afghanistan would return to its pre-9/11 stage. This hypothesis is closely scrutinized in this article and finally, in the light of declassified documents and research materials it is examined if war against terror in Afghanistan could be avoided.

War against terror in Afghanistan could be avoided

The Vietnam war of yore years started on August 7, 1964 with the passing of Tonkin Gulf Resolution by the US Congress, which gave the president a virtual carte blanche to wage war. 103 months later, in March 1973, the last US ground combat troops left Vietnam without achieving the desirable results. On October 7, 2001, the US walked into Afghanistan to wage war and as of May 2012, after a good 127 months, US troops are still languishing in Afghanistan while American generals fearing that the decade-old war is getting away from the US8. The US

4 Dalton Fury, ‘The CIA Ground Officer in Afghanistan’ (his real name is Gary Berntsen), interview to National Geography Channel, telecast on December 21, 2011.5 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin Publication, 2007, pp-27.6 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, Secret Cable, Department of Defence, Washington DC, October 30, 2001. The cable was sent to Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet. 7 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, Secret Cable, Department of Defence, Washington DC, October 30, 2001. 8 Eric Schmitt, ‘Obama Issues order for more troops in Afghanistan’, New York Times, November 30, 2009.

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war in Afghanistan has passed Vietnam as America’s longest war. America’s longest war with 1979 casualties is not the bloodiest compare to Vietnam’s 58209 casualties9. The war cost in Afghanistan with a 1557.9 billion dollar is not the highest either compared to the 4104 billion dollar war cost incurred in the Second World War10. But the message of the war in Afghanistan is clear that the war in Afghanistan was a foreign policy error and even the lone superpower of the world has its own limitation in winning a distant war.

This section of the article would describe the peculiarity of Afghan society, medievalic Arabia-like situation of Afghanistan, and the US had in the past several chances to have bin Laden extradited from Afghanistan by Taliban. The paper argues that, the US missed those chances because of misunderstanding of the thinking of Taliban and Afghan society as a whole. I contend that the war against terror in Afghanistan could be avoided and the US could learn from its Afghan experience to avoid future foreign policy mistake.

The US closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until the fall of the Taliban in 200111. The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured Kandahar in 1994, and engaged the movement after it took power. However, the US failed to wield any influence let alone moderate the policy of Taliban and consequentially relations worsened between the two12. The US withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. While the US refused to recognize any faction as the government in Afghanistan, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamaat-I-Islami faction continued to sit at the United Nations as the official representative of Afghanistan13. The Taliban captured Kandahar in November 1994, entered Kabul in September 1996 and after capturing Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif subsequently ruled Afghanistan until October 2001. While the Taliban rule started since 1994, the US tolerated their presence in the soil of US until August 1997, when the State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC to close its office14. Curiously, although the UN never recognize the Taliban, the US and UN allowed the Taliban to operate an office at New York till February 10, 2001 when the US, citing UN sanctions, told the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan to close their office in New York.15 The Taliban office in New York was acting as a liaison point for the UN and Washington that offered services to Afghans.

9 Rick Hampson, ‘Afghanistan: America’s Longest War’, USA Today, May 28, 2010. 10 Stephen Daggett, ‘Costs of Major US Wars’, Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010, pp-2; Amy Belasco, ‘The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11’, Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011, pp-17. 11 US Embassy Kabul closed on January 30, 1989 and the US Liaison Office in Kabul reopened on Dec 17, 2001; -----------, About the Embassy, US Embassy in Afghanistan, http://kabul.usembassy.gov/about_the_embassy.html. 12 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy’, Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2012, pp-5.13 Rabbani was the President of Afghanistan starting from 1992 till September 1996, when the Taliban took over kabul. 14 Agence France Presse (AFP), ‘Taliban Protest Closure of Afghan Mission in Washington’, August 16, 1997; ------------, ‘US Shuts Down Afghanistan's Embassy in Washington’, August 14, 1997.15 The office was in Flushing, Queens area of New York and had a staff of three. Mr. Alan Eastham, who later became assistant secretary of state told the Taliban’s New York representative, Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, of the decision on February 9, 2001; Richard Boucher, ‘Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing’, Press Section, American Embassy, Tel Aviv, February 9, 2001.

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Contrary to the common belief that the Taliban were the patron, supporter and defender of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, they had a suffocating policy towards al Qaeda and bin Laden. After the end of Afghan war in 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia but because of his ultra-Islamic activities against the Saudi ruling family, he was forced to vacate the country. He lived in exile in Sudan since 1992 after the Saudi King ejected him from Saudi Arabia. By 1996, the US accused bin Laden of hobnobbing with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and sponsoring international terrorism. The same year US Ambassador in Sudan Timothy Carney had received instruction from his home government to push the Sudanese to expel bin Laden. Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment outstanding against bin Laden16. In September 1996, Sudan expelled bin Laden from the country owing to increased US pressure. From Sudan, bin Laden travelled to Jalalabad to make Afghanistan as his new home. The US was infuriated in February 1998, when bin Laden announced the fatwa in the name of ‘World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders’, which advocated killing of Americans and liberate al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the holy mosque in Mecca from their grip17.

After the fatwa, the Clinton administration started a fresh initiative against bin Laden. In April 1998, a high level US team comprised of US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and National Security Council senior official Bruce Riedel, arrived in Kabul to press the Taliban government to either hand over or expel bin Laden. The Saudi government also joined US to seek the extradition or expulsion of bin Laden. The Taliban refused both requests and informed the visiting delegates that they did not know his whereabouts. The team returned without meeting Taliban chief Mullah Omar, who resided in Kandahar18.

Surprisingly, the Taliban took the Saudi and US demands to expel bin Laden seriously. However, the Taliban are a strictly religious movement and they cannot abdicate their tribal code of sheltering a guest. Apart from that, the Afghan people admired bin Laden for his support for the resistance during the jihad against the Soviets. The Pashtunwali code never refuses sanctuary to those who asked for it. Even Jews had been granted such sanctuary in Afghanistan during World War II. Taliban foreign minister Maulavi Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil revealed that, ‘If the Taliban throw him out, the people of Afghanistan will become very angry and they will overthrow the Taliban’19. The Taliban feared that if bin Laden is extradited, Afghan people would accuse them of taking money from the US and Saudi Arabia in exchange of bin Laden’s life.

The Taliban wanted to get rid of bin Laden but at the same time, they did not want disgrace or accusations of betrayal from their own people. Mullah Omar’s discomfort with bin Laden was also because of the fact that during this time the Taliban was active in its endeavor to

16 9/11 Commission Report, pp-110. 17 Osama Bin Laden, ‘World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: Initial Fatwa Statement’ in Arabic, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, February 23, 1998, retrieved from Cornell University Library http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm. 18 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy’, Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2012, pp- 6.19 William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances, in October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, October 11, 1998.

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establish tie with outside world especially with the US. Matter worsened further when bin Laden organized a press conference in May 1998 to publicize his ‘World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders’. The Taliban wanted good relations with Saudi Arabia and hence to resolve bin Laden issue, they had made two proposals to the Saudis in June 199820. The two proposals of the Taliban were designed to provide ‘religious sanctity to their action on bin Laden’ and also to appease their home constituency – basically the avowedly religious ardent cadres of the Taliban. The first proposal involved the formation of a joint Saudi/Afghan group of Ulemas that would look at the evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in terrorism and the second proposal was envisaged to allow family members of any Saudis killed in the Khobar towers (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia) explosion to bring their cases to an Afghan court21. These proposals were made by a religious regime to another religious regime (Saudi Arabia) directly and to the US indirectly. Saudi Arabia did not accept these proposals in its entirety but wanted further discussion and a deal with the Taliban regime. The US on the other hand ignored or remained indifferent to these proposals considering the Taliban too dwarfs a government to impose condition on the might of a superpower.

In June 1998, head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal met Mullah Omar in Kandahar where the Taliban leader agreed to a secret deal to hand over bin Laden for trial in Saudi Arabia for treason, a crime punishable by death. Omar wanted the same joint Afghan-Saudi Arabia Ulemas commission to explain about the justification of bin Laden’s expulsion from Afghanistan. A month later, in July 1998, Mullah Omar sent an envoy to Saudi Arabia to reaffirm his commitment to hand over bin Laden and as a precursor to the handing over of bin Laden, he replaced bin Laden’s team of Arab bodyguards with Afghan bodyguards loyal to him22. One of the most striking errors of US foreign policy was not to avail this opportunity, especially because by this time the US was already aware of bin Laden’s potential to devastate US interests. The US repeated the error in future as well while dealing with the Taliban.

Nevertheless, before the deal was materialized, a new twist reached into the relations in between the Saudi Prince and the Taliban leader. On August 7, 1998 al Qaeda bombers hit US embassies in Dar es Saleem and in Nairobi killing 224 people including 12 Americans. Soon bin Laden was accused of masterminding the bombings and the Clinton administration retaliated strongly by imposing US sanctions on Afghanistan and persuaded the UN for sanctions on Afghanistan. America launched ‘Operation Infinite Reach’ on August 20, 1998, which changed everything23. The US decision to launch 66 cruise missiles on the alleged al Qaeda terrorist camps in or around Khost, Afghanistan had alienated not only the Taliban and Afghan people as well. Moreover, although the Amir-ul-Momineen did not approve the US missile strike, even in the aftermath of the US strikes, he told bin Laden that there were no two governments in Afghanistan and that the Taliban would deal with the US, not bin Laden. In September 1998 Prince Turki reached Kandahar with two jets full of commandos to take back bin Laden. In a

20 The secret document revealed that a Government of Pakistan official reviewed these proposals in an October 7, 1998 meeting with the US Ambassador in Islamabad; the outcome is not known.21 William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances, in October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, October 11, 1998.22 Alan Cullison and Higgins, ‘A Once-Stormy Terror Alliance Was Solidified by Cruise Missile’, Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2002. 23 Bob Woodward and Thomas E. Ricks, ‘CIA Trained Pakistanis to Nab Terrorist but Military Coup Put and End to 1999 Plot’, The Washington Post, October 3, 2001.

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stormy meeting, Mullah Omar reneged on his promise to hand over bin Laden and when Prince Turki reminded Mullah Omar of the grant he has been receiving from Riyadh, Mullah Omar accused the prince of doing the Americans’ dirty work for them. Prince Turki returned empty handed but Omar was equally annoyed with bin Laden24.

The Taliban were tactfully deceived by bin Laden, who convinced them that he is not involved in the East Africa bombings and sent a written ‘pledge to the Amir-ul-Momineen’. Bin Laden said, ‘On this occasion we renew our pledge too that we consider you to be our noble Amir and that obedience, allegiance and assistance to you is as compulsory upon us as it is to an Amir appointed by Shariat’25. Bin Laden knew that the Taliban could not expel him as that would appears to the Islamic world as either the Taliban are frightened by America or they became the stooges of the Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden used this Taliban ambivalence to the best of his interest and consolidated his alliance with the Taliban. The US strategists and foreign policy analysts missed this point.

When the dust of US missile attacks on Afghanistan settled, the Clinton administration started fresh political maneuvring with the Taliban. On September 13, 1998, Mr. Alan Eastham, the US Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at Islamabad met with Abdul Hakim Mujahid, the Taliban designee to head their New York Office26 and a former ambassador to Pakistan. During this time, it was reported in the media that the Taliban had kept bin Laden under house arrest. However, Mujahid told Mr. Eastham that the news is inaccurate and the Taliban have only taken away all of his instruments of communication and warned him once again not to engage in political or press activities27. Strangely, Mujahid informed that 80 percent of the Taliban leadership opposes bin Laden’s presence, including Taliban deputy leader Mullah Rabbani28, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, and its acting minister of mines Mullah Jan. Hakim Mujahid said, Mullah Omar is the major supporter of bin Laden apart from the Kandahar governor Mullah Hassan29. A less known fact about the Taliban is that they are not a homogenous group and as Mujahid claimed, they are made up of 10 separate groups. Therefore, there was no uniform policy from the Taliban leadership either on bin Laden or on international terrorism. Taliban official admitted that they could not simply push bin Laden out because they will then fall under pressure from other Muslims. The Taliban expected bin Laden to leave the country on his own. The US policy during the Taliban rule was ‘not to pick a fight with the Taliban’. However, the problem of the US was the presence of bin Laden and his network in Afghanistan. Taliban official opined that the US and the Taliban will be inevitably drawn together because of regional

24 Jason Burke, ‘Al Qaeda’, London: Penguin Publication, 2006, pp-186; L. Wright, The Looming Tower, New York: Vintage Books, 2006. 25 Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden, dated September 15, 1998; Maulvi Obaid-ur-Rehman, ‘Nida-ul-Momineen (The Call of the Faithful)’, Karachi, September 1998. 26 Mujahid was the Taliban head at their New York Office till February 10, 2001. The UN or most nations did not recognize the Taliban as the legal government, though it controls most of Afghanistan.27 Alan Eastham, ‘Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, September 13, 1998. 28 Bin Laden met Mullah Mohammed Rabbani, the Taliban mayor of Kabul and deputy leader of the Taliban movement, at the latter’s Wazir Akbar Khan villa in Kabul to pacify him; Jason Burke, ‘Al Qaeda’, London: Penguin publication, 2004, pp-183. 29 Alan Eastham, ‘Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, September 13, 1998.

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factors, including a common dislike of Iran30. This Taliban bonhomie was never persuaded by the US.

A month after the Eastham-Mujahid meeting, on October 11, 1998 the US Ambassador of Pakistan William B. Milam met the Taliban Foreign Minister Maulavi Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil and charge of the Taliban-controlled Afghan Embassy in Pakistan Syed Rahman Haqqani in Islamabad to carry forward the discussion on the issue of Osama bin Laden. Maulavi Muttawakil was a close assistant of Mullah Omar, who was in Islamabad for discussions with UN special envoy Lakhdaar Brahimi31. Dispelling clarity about Taliban’s policy on bin Laden, Maulavi Muttawakil informed his American host that bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by the previous regime as in September 1996, when bin Laden came to Afghanistan, he settled in an area controlled by the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime32.

Interestingly, when the Taliban captured the area where bin Laden was based in September 1996, they contacted Saudi Arabia. However, as Muttawakil revealed, the Saudi King told the Taliban to ‘keep him there’. Thus, the first attempt and intension of the Taliban to send bin Laden to Saudi Arabia could not succeed. Subsequently, the Taliban shifted bin Laden to Kandahar in early 1997 allegedly ‘to keep a better watch on him’33. When bin Laden started issuing fatwa after fatwa, the Saudis pressed the Taliban to extradite him. The Amir-ul-Mumineen Mullah Omar increased his vigil on bin Laden and at one point, bin Laden decided to leave Afghanistan34, but he was unable to find an alternative abode.

In any case, the Taliban wanted US troops withdrawn from the gulf region and the commonality of thought amongst the Taliban leaders and bin Laden coupled with the arrogance of the US and Saudi Arabia sent the Taliban closer to al Qaeda. Even after the August 1998 missiles attacks, Taliban wanted to know from the US that ‘if the Taliban hand over bin Laden to Saudi Arabia would he then be sent to the US?’ The US ambassador did not provide a straight answer. Maulavi Muttawakil then asked, ‘would bin Laden be treated like Dr. Najib or Abdur Rahman if he was brought to Saudi Arabia35?’ The ambassador replied that the Abdur Rahman model was better. This was an indication of Taliban policy that even after the failure of July 1998-extradition effort, they were actively mulling the termination of bin Laden from Afghanistan. The only concern of the Taliban was, whether the US and Saudi Arabia were adhere to the religious ethics in the trial of bin Laden after his extradition or not. Faith is paramount in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was considered as close to their religious tradition of sheltering a mujahid who was instrumental not only in defeating the Soviet but also helping the Afghans during the after war period when the US walked away from the country. Nevertheless, bin Laden’s press activities and his frequent issuing of fatwa from Afghanistan troubling the 30 Alan Eastham, ‘Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, September 13, 1998.31 Brahimi arrived in Pakistan on October 8, 1998 for meetings with the Government of Pakistan and the Taliban.32 Jalalabad in the Nangarhar province where bin Laden landed was under Younus Khali’s Hizb-i-Islami’s control but under the broad regime of the so-called Burhanuddin Rabbani government. 33 William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances, in October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, October 11, 1998.34 He informed Mullah Rabbani, the Kabul Governor, his willingness to vacate Afghanistan if the Taliban asked bin Laden to do so; Jason Burke, ‘Al Qaeda’, London: Penguin publication, 2004, pp-183-84.35 Najibullah was the communist-era leader the Taliban summarily executed when they entered Kabul in September 1996 and Abdur is the Egyptian convicted for planning the World Trade Center bombing.

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Taliban. Muttawakil informed the US ambassador that the US should not think that the Taliban would ‘continue to hold bin Laden and not surrender him to the US or Saudi Arabia’. Muttawakil informed the difficulty of the Taliban in a Pashtu phrase, which said, ‘on one side we have a rock and on the other there is a tiger’36. The US-Taliban discussion is a testimony of the discomfort the Taliban were feeling with the stay of their militant guest. The US was not equipped to understand the underlining meaning of the Taliban’s posture vis-à-vis bin Laden.

However, although the US was unable to understand the culture, thinking and tradition of the Taliban, it understood their significance and indespensability. That is the reason why despite the sanction and recognition issue, it preferred to remain engaged with the Taliban till the verge of 9/1137. The US lost another chance in 1997-98 to engage the Taliban and while doing so avoid the war on terrorism. During these years rather than engaging the Taliban, the US left them high and dry to become a future incubator of international terrorism. During the year 1997 and 1998, when the Taliban had almost captured most part of Afghanistan, the South Asia bureau of the Departent of State engaged with the Taliban by way of a project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country. The former UNOCAL chief for the pipeline project, Marty Miller, denied working exclusively with the Taliban and told the 9/11 commission that his company sought to work with all Afghan factions to bring about the necessary stability to proceed with the project 38. UNOCAL hired, among others, Robert Oakley, a former state department official and former ambassador to Pakistan for lobbing at the state department on UNOCAL’s behalf 39. Although the US was dealing with the Taliban with a definite deal ‘recognition’ in exchange of ‘favoring UNOCAL’, the deal would have paved way for an altogether different outcome. The Taliban had the tremendous zeal and capacity to enforce any agreement. Had the US managed the UNOCAL deal with the Taliban, bin Laden would never have found a sanctuary in Afghanistan and be relegated into obscurity.

However, while The US and Saudi Arabia guided by their arrogant policies on Taliban and bin Laden, the Taliban are also an unpredictable and fatalist lot. The Taliban are not a force who think in terms of eternity or and sheldom think about future consequences. They are nobody’s puppet and they resist every attempt to control them by outsiders40. This is the reason they never chary of initiating a fight with even the US. The track record of Afghans, who had defeated super-powers like the UK and USSR, encourage them to fight against any invading power. Their pride, custom and faith is paramount and their life is not so significant41. This was testified during the Holy Koran burning incident in Afghanistan in February 2012, which provoked violence nationwide, while an intentional mass murder by a US soldier in March 2012 did not.

36 William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on bin Ladin with a Couple of Nuances, in October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, US Embassy in Islamabad, October 11, 1998. 37 Richard Boucher, ‘Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing’, Press Section, American Embassy, Tel Aviv, February 9, 2001. 38 9/11 Commission Report, pp-111. 39 9/11 Commission Report, pp-112.40 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001, pp-185. 41 Rod Nordland, ‘In Reactions to Two Incidents, a US-Afghan Disconnect’, New York Times, March 14, 2012.

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However, the arrivals of Undersecretary Thomas Pickering and Assistant Secretary Karl Inderfurth in 1997 changed the US perception about the Taliban. It was during this time that the UNOCAL deal was about to meet a dead-end and US was not happy with the Taliban. Among other reasons, UNOCAL and US State Department cited poor human rights condition and treatment of women by the Taliban as the deciding factors behind ending of ties with the Taliban. However, despite the decade old domination of US forces in Afghanistan, the human rights conditions and rights of women are far from any improvement. The error in US foreign policy continues, as it could not produce a better alternative to the highly mediatized Taliban atrocities42.

The sanctions by the US also drove Omar closer to the wealthy bin Laden who was also acting as a conduit for gulf money going to the Taliban via NGOs based in Pakistan. Additionally, the Taliban saw the sanctions as a ‘test of faith’ that may have made them more resilient to western pressure43. Bin Laden came to Afghanistan without the invitation of the Taliban and when the Taliban took over control of Afghanistan, he was operating in the country without their permission. However, after a couple of years, he managed an exceedingly robust rapport with the Taliban. Engaging the Taliban directly on the bin Laden issue was not easy as the Taliban were mostly guided by the Sharia and Pashtunwali code. This is where the US made the biggest mistake. They never tried to find out ways under the Sharia and Pashtunwali code to deal with the problem. Many grave matters, including the Raymond Davis shooting in Lahore and the killing of 16 civilians by a US soldier near Kandahar, where US interests were at stake resolved under the Sharia44.

When 9/11 happened, the Taliban were guided by the same Sharia and Pashtunwali Code while the US policy was suffering from the same vision blindness and lack of understanding of Afghan culture. The rage and reaction of the US after September 11 was justifiable, but the US leaders would find difficulty in defining the death of 1979 more US lives in addition to the 2752 unfortunate deaths of September 11 attacks. Besides this, the deaths and destruction in Afghanistan was another matter of grave concern. Whether military might of a superpower and the ability to build a coalition of great many countries is enough for a victory in a distant country would haunt foreign policy strategists in years to come. A surgical strike, a drone attack or a specialized military operation against Osama bin Laden would certainly avoided the US war against terror in Afghanistan. In 2001, when the World Trade Centres were still smouldering, the US could not tolerate the protector of Osama bin Laden. However, a decade later in 2001 when US found that another country is harbouring bin Laden in its

42 ----------, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan’, Department of State, Washington DC, April 8, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm; ------------, ‘Human Rights in Afghanistan Through the Transition of security responsibility and beyond: A briefing for delegates at the 2012 NATO summit’, Amnesty International, May 17, 2012; ----------, ‘World Report 2011: Afghanistan’, Human Right Watch. 43 Marvin Weinbaum, Interview to the 9/11 Commission, August 12, 2003, pp-2.44 Sean Noonan, ‘Afghanistan/Pakistan ISI Chief’, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting Inc, April 12, 2011, available at http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1664671_re-alpha-insight-afghanistan-pakistan-isi-chief-not-for.html; Omar Waraich, ‘Pakistan: How Sharia Freed American Ray Davis’, Time, March 16, 2011; Rod Nordland, ‘In Reactions to Two Incidents, a US-Afghan Disconnect’, New York Times, March 14, 2012.

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backyard45, Obama administration did not declare war against that country. In a calibrated move the US preferred commando action in a foreign country.

Future of Afghanistan: The Taliban; Northern Alliance; Karzai Government; and Haqqani Network

This section provides a detailed of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014. How the leading factions – like Northern Alliance, Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hamid Karzai and others would behave when the country would be left to them? The public image and postures of these groups will also be analyzed. A threadbare analysis about the stake of the stakeholders and the actual situation of Afghanistan would be undertaken and despite the limitation, the study would deal with what is the most likely scenario in Afghanistan after 2014 and why?

Afghans from the very first courageous, and animated by a love of independence – always warlike and energetic, retiring to their mountain fastnesses to escape from tyranny, and leaving them whenever the smallest hope presented itself of seizing lands46. Much has been said about the Afghan people’s warlike character, fearsome behavior, their pillage and plunder, their indiscipline and love for freedom and liberty! These all are true47. A variety of reasons contributed for these, abominable as well as adorable characters of the Afghans. Some of the significant reasons are – the barren, mountainous and terrainous geography of the country; the tribal ethical tradition Pashtunwali code48 of its people; the clannish loyalty of the tribes; the absence of strong centralized rulers in the country; and the inability or unwillingness of the past rulers to bring the country into modern age. The journey of the Afghans into the present static conditions where medievalic norms are still prevalent should be understood from long historical background, not just comparing the era of Taliban with civil war period. The present state of turmoil in Afghanistan is not new. The word Afghan was applied to them because they were always in a disunited state amongst themselves, and continually addressing their complaints to the sovereigns on whom they were dependent. Nevertheless, the name was but little used till the reign of Shah Abbas the Great49, who, tired with their incessant lamentations, ordered them

45 In August 2010, President Obama was briefed about the presence of bin Laden in Pakistan; Barack Hussain Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on Osama bin Laden’, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, May 2, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden. 46 Jean Pierre Ferrier, ‘History of the Afghans’, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Captain William Jesse, London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1858, pp-5.47 Numerous authors have narratted and explained in great details about these character of the Afghans; Lieut.-General Sir George Macmunn, ‘Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah’, London: G. Bell, 1929; Vincent Arthur Smith, ‘Akbar, Emperor of Hindustan, 1542-1605’, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919; Jadunath Sarkar, ‘Anecdotes of Aurangzeb’, Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988; Annette Beveridge, ‘Babur-Nama translated from the Turki’ London: Luzac and Co, 1922; Henry M. Durand, ‘First Afghan War’, New Delhi: Lancer Publisher, 2008; G. P. Tate, ‘The Frontiers of Balochistan: Travels on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan’, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1909; T. H. Holdich, ‘The Gates of India, London: Macmillan and Co., 1910; Jean Pierre Ferrier, ‘History of the Afghans’, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Captain William Jesse, London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1858. 48 Pashtunwali Code is the three obligations imposed on the tribesmen. Firstly, the right of asylum; secondly, the grant of hospitality, even to an enemy; and thirdly, the answer to an insult by an insult. Henry George Raverty, a British Indian army officer and linguist compiled a Pashto dictionary in 1860. According to this dictionary the meaning of Pashtunwali is ‘the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes, the Afghan code’. 49 Abbas Safavi Shah, who ruled Iran from 1588 – 1629, was the ruler of great part of Afghanistan including Herat, Kandahar and Balkh.

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henceforward to be called by that designation only50. Afghanistan has never been a country, which was united under the central government even under the royal regime. Since days immemorial, the country has been divided into four or five power centres mostly centred around – Herat, Balkh (Mazar-e-Sharif), Kabul, Kandahar and to some extent Badakshan. This is true even today51. There was a virtual absence of centralized government in Afghanistan until 1750. In fact, before that time the name Afghanistan was not in vogue. During the early years of 20 th

century, George Passsman Tate, a British officer posted on the border of Afghanistan wrote, ‘The name Afghanistan was invented in the 16th and 17th centuries, as a convenient term by the Mughal government in India’52. The Afghans used to speak of their country as Wilayat and less commonly as Khurassan.

When Ahmad Shah was elected as the king in Kandahar in 174753, Afghanistan of that day was a fragment of land pieces divided amongst the rulers of Persia, India, and other powerful kings and chiefs. Ahmad Shah made every attempt to unify Afghanistan by way of conquest of the provinces and power centres of Afghanistan namely Kabul, Ghazni, Heart, Seistan, Balkh, Badakhshan, Khurasan and other provinces north of the Hindu Kush, thereby completing the new kingdom as it is today. However, quickly the Afghan monarch realized that if he do not engage the tribes in war against India, which would provide plunder and food for his poor turbulent subjects, their rivalries and feuds, ‘unless they were occupied abroad, would have constituted a serious danger to the stability of his kingdom’54. The Afghan landscape, 90 percent of which are barren, desolate, mountanous and remote do not provide adequate livelihood for its inhabitants. That is why its people and rulers are at constant war with their neighbours and amongst themselves for their upkeep and livelihood. This practice become a tradition and has relegated to the present generation of Afghans with surprise acuracy. For this reason a good number of ordinary Afghans do not dislike the warring Taliban55.

The Taliban

After a couple of decades of bloody destabilization, during the mid-1990s, majority of Afghans found a strange ally in the Taliban. The Taliban are a force from the masses – who strike a chord with the masses of Afghanistan. Outsiders, who consider the Taliban rulers as evil, would disagree with their philosophy, their culture, their personal believe – but they are the only people who belongs to the vast masses of Southern Afghanistan.

50 Jean Pierre Ferrier, ‘History of the Afghans’, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Captain William Jesse, London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1858, pp-651 The Taliban conquired these power centres one after another from 1994-1998, in their bid to overwhelm Afghanistan. The US also followed the same rule in 2001; Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Macmillan Publication, 2001; Donald Rumsfeld, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, Secret Cable, Department of Defence, Washington DC, October 30, 2001. 52 G. P. Tate, ‘The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch’, Bombay: Bennett Coleman and Co., 1911, pp –2; Col. R.E. Burrard and B.A. Hayden, ‘Geography and Geology of the Himalayas’, Part III, pp-122-123. 53 Percy Sykes, ‘A History of Afghanistan’, London: MacMillan and Co., 1940, pp-353.54 Percy Sykes, ‘A History of Afghanistan’, London: MacMillan and Co., 1940, pp-355. 55 Gaith Abdul-Ahad, Face to face with the Taliban: 'The people are fed up with the government', The Guardian, August 18, 2009.

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With the onset of Taliban rule in 1994, a decade long civil war ended. The Taliban had brought relative peace and security to Kandahar and neighbouring provinces56. Rape against women and children reduced dramatically as admitted by the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), the most vocal NGO of Afghanistan against the Taliban57. Factional fighting cases, internal dispute matters, or court cases use to get resolved within the same day. This new arrangement suit best the war ravaged people of cities as well as countryside. These reforms were long overdue in Afghanistan and the Afghans likened them like anything. However, by the time of summer 1997 when Taliban had already captured Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, General Presidency of Amr Bil Maruf and Maulvi Qalamuddin, the minister for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice of the Taliban government issued new regulations, which banned women from wearing high heels, stylish clothes, make-up and working anywhere other than in the medical sector58. Series of edicts issued by the Taliban pitted the Taliban against the masses of Afghanistan. Public flogging, open punishment and rigid implementation of Sharia scarred the psyche of Afghan population. No activities other than religious were allowed in Afghanistan, which turned the Taliban into one of the most brutal, and hated regimes of Afghanistan. However, the worst condition in Afghanistan was not entirely created by the Taliban. Even before the Taliban, Women and girls were constantly raped by armed guards. ‘In fact, rape is apparently condoned by most leaders as a means of terrorizing conquered populations and or rewarding soldiers59.’ Before the arrival of the Taliban, there was near zero literacy for the girls (90 percent) and a lower percentage of literacy for boys (60 percent) existed60. Prolonged war left vast areas of the country without any sign of school. Thus, the Taliban’s policies only worsened an ongoing crisis.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan was equipped to accommodate such a brutal regime. The countryside is nothing but mud-rugged rustic villages with no sign of development. People there hardly bother who is ruling at Kabul. They had no participation or stake in the government at Kabul even before the arrival of the Taliban. Most of the countryside was untouched with whatever little development initiative of past regimes and hence when the Taliban introduced a standstill policy on development, countryside Afghans noticed hardly any change and were living the same way as before the arrival of Taliban. However, this was only true for the Pashtuns in particular and Sunni in general but not for the Shias and Hazaras, who were either fled to Pakistan or faced the Taliban’s prosecution.

Immediately after the defeat of the Taliban, the US and NATO thought that the Taliban are decimated beyond the chance of return into Afghanistan. This thinking was mostly based on the assumption that the people of Afghanistan, who were supposedly under the brutal suppression of the Taliban, would rejoice their liberty and never give any further ground to the dreaded Taliban. At a cursory look, the assumption looks valid. However, contrary to this believe

56 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Macmillan Publication, 2001, pp-1. 57 -----------------, ‘Some of the restrictions imposed by Taliban on women in Afghanistan’,http://www.rawa.org/rules.htm. 58 Amr Bil Maruf , Nai Az Munkar and Maulvi Qalamuddin, ‘Religious Decree Announced by the GeneralPresidency and Ministry Promotion of Virtue and Preventiion of Vice’, Kabul, November 1996. 59 Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: International responsibility for human rights disaster’, September 11, 1995, pp-25.60 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, 1996; UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNOCHA, October 31, 1996.

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the Taliban were neither neutralized by the US nor lost public support in Afghanistan. US calculations proved wrong primarily for two reasons. Firstly, despite being the frontal ally of the US in war on terrorism, Pakistan deceived the US and sheltered and supported the Taliban61. Pakistan’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) convinced General Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan should keep the Taliban alive for a future settlement in Afghanistan after the US departure62. Secondly, the US had a severe limitation in their understanding about the history, culture, contemporary society and characteristics of the Afghans, which led to the prolong war with a high cost63.

The US failed to realize the fact that Afghanistan was ravaged by two decades of incessant war and the relative peace during the Taliban regime was bereft of any development or external contact. In the absence of basic facilities – the Afghan people born, grew and died under the shadow of poverty, illiteracy, war, fight, destruction and barbarism. When the US started attacks against Afghanistan the countryside people, who formed the mainstay of the Taliban, were untouched by the modern world. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Dalton Fury, who was leading US ground operation in Tora Bora admitted that when the American began bombing and when the CIA ground force reached Afghanistan, 95% of the Afghans did not know anything about 9/1164! This was because, there was no electricity in most places, rural region was bereft of any communication system, and the Sharia Radio recites Koran only.

The countryside Afghans either never heard about democracy or not in a position to understand what it exactly means. Their lives were mostly engaged in survival activities – gathering food, saving lives from war and receiving or avoiding atrocities from warring factions. During the two decades of war, no rulers ever tried to mitigate the plight of the people of Afghanistan, although the city dwellers were benefited from time to time – because of either governmental attention or because of their personal enterprising endeavors.

The US war in Afghanistan famously termed as ‘war against terrorism’ dislodged the medievalic Taliban regime and installed a new government headed by President Hamid Karzai. Many of the al Qaeda militants are either killed or captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri remained untraced and slipped into Pakistan. However, although the Taliban were defeated and dislodged from the seat of Kabul, the US failed to defeat them completely. Taliban fighters and leaders took refuge in Pakistan and continued fighting against the US and NATO forces.

By 2008, the US administration and military started a reassessment of the war in Afghanistan. Despite the periodic surge of US and NATO forces, situation in Afghanistan was far from any improvement. On the other hand coordinated Taliban attacks against NATO forces were growing as the Taliban started urban guerrilla warfare. The Taliban technique also includes

61 Saroj Kumar Rath, ‘Pakistan’s Double Game: Supporting and Opposing Terrorism’, World Affairs, Summer, 2011 (April-June), Vol. 15, No.2, pp- 92-105. 62 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin Publication, 2007, pp-78.63 Robert D. Blackwill, ‘A de facto Partition for Afghanistan’, Times of India, July 7, 2010; Robert D. Blackwill, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011.64 Dalton Fury is a code name of the CIA staff whose real name is Gary Berntsen, interview to National Geography Channel, telecast on December 21, 2011; Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, ‘Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda – A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander’, New York: Crown, 2005.

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attacking and severing the NATO supply arteries running through Pakistan. Throughout the period, Pakistan was playing with both sides of the war, which was another reason behind the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.

In 2010, it was clear to the US that it is difficult to defeat the Taliban and started negotiation65. By the end of 2010, the US was so desperate for a negotiation with the Taliban that the CIA handed over millions of dollar to a Quetta shopkeeper, who was negotiating with the US posing as a Mullah Omar confidant66. Meanwhile, in May 2011, the CIA located Osama bin Laden deep inside Pakistan in Abbottabad and US Navy Seals killed the al Qaeda leader. However, the death of bin Laden failed to stop al Qaeda attacks or dilute the terrorist network of al Qaeda. Osama was acting like a figurehead and his death did not end al Qaeda. The Taliban forces, especially the Haqqani network have been wrecking havoc on the NATO forces. Their spirit has been getting bolder after each successful attack and they are never short of recruits despite the death of thousands of their cadres.

Northern Alliance and Hamid Karzai Government

It was difficult for an occupying force to maintain peace and stability when the local does not like their forced occupation67. Contrary to that, it is easy for the indigenous leaders – like the government led by Hamid Karzai to win over the locals. However, Karzai proved to be an ineffective leader, who not only lost that chance but also was consistently accused by the Americans of corruption.68. Karzai’s corruption found an indigenous orientation. Bette Dam, a Dutch author who interviewed Mr. Karzai extensively for her book, ‘Expedition Uruzgan: Hamid Karzai’s Journey Into the Palace’, says that what the Americans saw as corruption, Mr. Karzai and his family saw as simply patronage. The Afghan governance was shaped by a series of powerful patron-client networks designed to provide political top cover for corruption that enriches the network at the citizenry’s expense. President Karzai depends on the patronage networks’ leadership to deliver political support; in exchange, he empowers them with critical appointments, protects them from prosecution, and allows them to prey on the public 69. The patronage system proved disastrous for the Karzai government and favoured the Taliban who are lurking at the door for a future comeback. The Taliban pamphlet dropped secretly at the dead of night – pleading jihad against the NATO forces was more popular than the US-sponsored pamphlet describing the misrule of Taliban70.

65 Matt Waldman, ‘Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations’, USIP Special Report 256, October 10, 2010, pp-15.66 Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, ‘Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Impostor’, New York Times, November 22, 2010. 67 Even qualified US policy analyst termed the US and NATO forces as ‘an occupying army largely ignorant of local history, tribal structures, languages, customs, politics, and values’ of Afghans. Robert D. Blackwill, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011.68 Scott Kilner, ‘Pervasive Corruption Undermining Ghazni Province’s Public Administration’, Secret Cable, US Embassy, Kabul, December 28, 2009. 69 Stephan Biddle, ‘Salvaging Governance Reform in Afghanistan’, Council of Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 16, April 2, 2012. 70 Zabihullah Ehsason, ‘Night letters warn people against voting in Balkh’, Pajhwok Afghan News, September 16, 2010.

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The once powerful United Islamic Front also known as Northern Alliance is equally eager to assert its control over Afghanistan after the departure of US troops. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami party assumed power in Kabul in 1992 and Ahmad Shah Massoud became the defence minister. Following the rise of the Taliban in 1996, Massoud returned to the role of an armed opposition leader, serving as the military commander and political leader of the Northern Alliance. Massoud had the tremendous capacity to bring together disparate groups opposed to the Taliban. The Jamiat-e-Islami had support of multi-ethnic groups mainly the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks with a small sprinkling of Pashtuns.

Two days prior to the September 11 attacks, Ahmad Shah Massoud succumbed to an al Qaeda suicide killing. Massoud was the towering leader of Northern Alliance and even during the Taliban rule; he controlled the northern provinces of Panjshir, Takhar, parts of Parwan and Badakshan. Some provinces like Kunduz, Baghlan, Nuristan and North of Kabul used to change hands in between the forces of Massoud and Taliban71. In the summer of 2001, Massoud with leaders from all ethnicities of Afghanistan addressed the European Parliament in Brussels and there was plan to invite him to the UN General Assembly the same year. Massoud disapproved of the Taliban and al Qaeda and told his European host that the Taliban had introduced ‘a very wrong perception of Islam’72. His death devastated Northern Alliance. Massoud’s closest friend Dr. Abdullah Abdullah said, ‘The days after Massoud’s death were the closest we ever came to a total debacle and defeat because morale had just plummeted and we were leaderless – everyone knew that Massoud had died73.’

When the US started war in Afghanistan in October 2001, the US stragegy was clear that, ‘provide additional conventional support to Northern Alliance forces north of Kabul for elimination of the Taliban’. But without ‘slowing down the Northern Alliance’s advance’, the US Government wanted to discuss ‘international arrangements for the administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek) tribes’74. It appears from the beginning that, the Northern Alliance, as per the US plan was supposed to play second fiddle in Afghanistan.

The 9/11 and subsequent US attack on Afghanistan provided fresh opportunity to the flagging morale of the Northern Alliance to rise again in Afghanistan. With the support of the US military, the Northern Alliance snatched control of most part of Afghanistan from the Taliban. General Mohammed Fahim Khan became the successor of Massoud. But he lacked the charisma and power of Massoud. The Northern Alliance was deeply divided in the aftermath of Taliban defeat. The alliance was coping with the coflicting claims of its diverse advisers like its new American advisers and old advisers from Iran, Russia and India. Gen. Fahim was unhappy with the CIA’s behavior, which was doling out of cash and weapons to warlords separately

71 Marcela Grad, ‘Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader’, London: Webster University Press, 2009.72 ----------, ‘Ahmad Shah Massoud: Lion of Afghanistan, Lion of Islam’, Youtube, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t78N6Q5VD60. 73 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-22. 74 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, Secret Cable, Department of Defence, Washington DC, October 30, 2001.

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rathen than routing through Fahim. The other warlords, who were unable to extract cash directly from the US did not trust him75.

After the US victory in Afghanistan, peace building and installation of an interim government initiated by the coalition of willing. The conference held in Bonn on November 27, 2001, four ethnic factions attended the conference. The Northern Alliance; the ‘Cypress group’, a group of exiles with ties to Iran; the ‘Rome group’, the followers of former King Mohammad Zaher Shah; and the ‘Peshawar group’, a group of mostly Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan. The Northern Alliance as a leading faction contributed 11 representatives. The Rome group also contributed an equal number of representatives while the Cypress and Peshawar groups contributed five. Younus Qanooni represented Northern Alliance as its leader Burhanuddin Rabbani refused to go to Bonn. He wanted the conference in Afghanistan. When the conference took place, half of the Afghan territory was under the control of Northern Alliance. Considering their huge influence inside Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance was preparing to lead Afghanistan once again. However, as it was the US plan to deny Northern Alliance the chance to lead and not to annoy the Pashtun population, the US promoted Southern Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai. The US arranged for Hamid Karzai to address the opening session of the conference via satellite phone from inside Afghanistan signaling its preference for the interim president76.

The Bonn conference sidelined Zahir Shah and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both of whom had hoped to reclaim former roles as head of state, and the Afghan factions represented there agreed to accept Hamid Karzai as head of an interim government until a new political order could be suitably constituted. In the meantime, the surge of Northern Alliance militias across the country was creating facts on the ground, so that the effort to create a constitutional regime had to face power relationships already forged from armed militias and patron-client bonds77. At Bonn, the Northern Alliance was torn between the former warlords, whose only aim was to regain their status, and a younger generation of Panjsheri Tajik politicians with a broader vision, who wanted to unite with Pashtuns to form a national government that would have credibility and legitimacy. The Northern Alliance was not a monolith and none of the younger Panjsheri leaders including Abdullah Abdullah, Younus Qanuni, Ahmad Zia Massoud and Ahmad Wali Massoud accepted the idea of Rabbani, the head of the Northern Alliance continuing as President of Afghanistan78. However, the younger leaders of the Northern Alliance wanted majority control over any new government.

Rabbani had fallen out of favor with the alliance, especially after his November 2001 ‘Secret meeting with in Dubai with Lt. Gen. Ehsanul Haq, the newly promoted head of ISI’79. Finally, amid worries that the Northern Alliance would pull out of the discussions, US special envoy to Afghanistan Jim Dobbins called Secretary of State Colin Powell to ask his advice. Powell asked Russia, which had an established relationship with the Northern Alliance, to

75 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-73.76 -----------, ‘Filling the Vaccum: The Bonn Conference’, Frontline, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cbonn.html. 77 Jeffrey Laurenti, ‘Afghanistan Agonistes: The Many Stakes in a Thirty Years War’, A Century Foundation Report, New York, 2011, pp-7-8. 78 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-101. 79 Rory McCarthy and Ewen MacAskill, ‘King’s Aide is favourite to be next leader’, The Guardian, December 3, 2011.

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intervene and plead with Rabbani not to break up the conference. According to Afghanistan's foreign minister Dr. Abdullah, Russia ‘passed on a message that the world expects an agreement, and that the Northern Alliance shouldn't expect that without an agreement [Russian] support ... can continue.’ Under pressure from Russia, the younger members of the Northern Alliance decided to mutiny and continue to participate in the Bonn Conference with or without the support of former President Rabbani80. The compromise reached after the Bonn Conference delegated 17 out of 30 posts to the Northern Alliance in the interim government. The Northern Alliance virtually dominated the interim government with all major portfolios including – Defence headed by Mohammad Fahim, Planning held by Mohammed Mohaqqeq, Foreign Affairs headed by Dr. Abdullah, Interior occupied by Younus Qanooni, Commerce held by Seyyed Mustafa and Mines held by Muhammad Alem Razm81.

Karzai on the other hand seen as a ‘compromise choice for the interim leader, a westernized tribal leader who was selected to satisfy the US and the country’s Pashtun Majority82.’ He had visited the US numerous times, speaking at conferences and testifying at Congressional hearings on the Taliban. He was picked up by the US for his past connection with the CIA during the Afghan war when he helped channelize American aid to the anti-Soviet Mujahieen in the 1980s83. Karzai was the deputy foreign minister during the Mujahideen government in 1992 but resigned after two years. From 1994 to 1995, he supported the Taliban, provided them ‘50,000 dollars and handed them a cache of weapons he had hidden near Kandahar’. He met Mullah Omar several times, who offered him to the Taliban envoy at the UN. But when he realized that the ‘Pakistan Foreign Office was setting up the Taliban’s diplomatic corps’ he walked out from the Taliban84. The anti-Taliban movement in the south led by Mr. Karzai and other Pashtun leaders would never have succeeded – or even come together – without the US85. When the delegates voted for an interim president to hold the post for the next six months, Karzai initially received no votes. The votes went overwhelmingly to Professor Abdul Sattar Sirat of the Rome Group86. Karzai had no power base of his own, and when he landed in Kabul to take over the interim government, Mohammad Fahim, the leader of Northern Alliance was surprised to see him coming alone. When Fahim, who expected him to be escorted by hundreds of his armed supporters, asked where are his men, Karzai told him ‘you all are my men’. Karzai was largely a US sponsored candidate supported by the Northern Alliance.

On June 13, 2002, the Loya Jirga, the traditional tribal elders organization appointed Karzai as Interim President of the new position as President of the Afghan Transitional

80 -----------, ‘Filling the Vaccum: The Bonn Conference’, Frontline, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cbonn.html.81 United Nations, ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, Annexure IV Composition of the Interim Administration, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm; ---------, ‘Filling the Vaccum: The Bonn Conference’, Frontline, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cbonn.html82 Mark Landler, ‘Hailed Abroad, Karzai is Ignored at Home’, New York Times, February 2, 2002, 83 Norimitsu Onishi, ‘GI’s had Crucial Role in Battle for Kandahar’, New York Times, December 15, 2001. 84 Hamid Karzai’s Interview to Ahmad Rashid; Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-13-14. 85 Norimitsu Onishi, ‘GI’s had Crucial Role in Battle for Kandahar’, New York Times, December 15, 2001.86 Rory McCarthy and Ewen MacAskill, ‘King’s Aide is favourite to be next leader’, The Guardian, December 3, 2011.

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Administration87. Karzai was installed into power but his actual writ and authority outside Kabul was disputed. His authority outside the capital was so limited that he was often derided as the ‘Mayor of Kabul’88. The interim government and after the 2004 general election, which elected Hamid Karzai again as president, Northern Alliance was virtually running Afghanistan. However, as it is said, the Northern Alliance is not a monolith and various groups inside the alliance had their own agenda. Regional warlords like Ismail Khan of Herat and Mohammat Atta of Mazar-e-Sharif had their own agenda, preference and style of governance in their respective province. The main faction of Northern Alliance Jamiat-I-Islami was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani till his death in 2012. After his death the group is led by Massoud’s successor General Mohammed Fahim. The second largest tribal supporter of the Northern Alliance is the Uzbek faction, which is headed by Abdul Rashid Dostum of Jombesh-e-Melli Islami or National Islamic Party. Karim Khalili of Hezb-i-Wahdat or Unity Party dominates the third largest group composed of ethnic Hazara. Anti-Taliban commander and head of Jalalabad Shura Haji Abdul Qadir and another commander Abdul Haq led the Pashtun forces of the Northern Alliance. After a brief and relative calm in Afghanistan which lasted from 2002 to 2004, Afghanistan returned to war. The Taliban became active in 2004-05.

The Northern Alliance retained their positions in the new government. But once Karzai took office, he began to come under pressure from his Pashtun constituency to diminish a perceived ethnic Tajik stranglehold on the government's power ministries. Since Northern Alliance was historically close to India, Iran and Russia; Pakistan— the patron of Taliban was unhappy with the upper hand of Northern Alliance in the Karzai government. With each election, first by the Loya Jirga of June 13, 2002 and then by being popularly elected to the presidency in 2004— Karzai used to reduced his dependency on the Northern Alliance, who had brought him to power. Karzai first let go of Qanooni, who was first demoted to minister of education from his coveted interior ministry. Qanooni then left government to run against Karzai in the 2004 presidential election. The October 9, 2004 election placed Qanooni second to Karzai. Fahim served as Karzai’s vice president and defense minister but was disappointed not to be chosen as Karzai’s running mate in 2004. Buoyand by his victory, on December 23, 2004, Karzai dropped Fahim from his Ministerial post. Then, in 2006, Karzai unceremoniously dropped Dr. Abdullah from the cabinet89. However, despite the droppings, till the 2009 election, the Northern Alliance had a greater share in the Afghan government, which Karzai started purging after 200990.

Relations in between Karzai and Northern Alliance leaders deteriorated during the end of first term of Karzai administration. To repair his links with the Tajik population, Karzai rehabilited Fahim by selecting him as his running mate. In the 2009 election, Dr. Abdullah received more than 30 percent of the vote in the first round but chose not to contest the second round, most likely because he recognized the difficulty in closing Karzai’s substantial lead of 17 percentage points, even after nearly a third of Karzai’s original vote count had been disallowed for fraud. Karzai has brought at least two of the former northern warlords to his side—Fahim and Abdul Rashid Dostum—but the strength and geographic distribution of Abdullah's first round vote suggests that he, not Karzai and Fahim, received the majority of the country’s northern vote. 87 Carlotta Gall, ‘A Buoyant Karzai is Sworn in as Afghanistan’s Leader’, The New York Times, June 20, 2002.88 Peter Pigott, ‘Canada in Afghanistan: The War So Far’, Dundurn Press, 2007, pp-68. 89 James Dobbins, ‘Our Man in Kabul’, Foreign Affairs, November 4, 2009. 90 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance’, Congressional Research Service, December 12, 2011.

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In 2010, Karzai started appeasing the Taliban. The splintered and divided Northern Alliance leaders opposed Karzai’s appeasement policy. The exclusion of Northern Alliance leaders from secret talks with the Taliban and Karzai’s political rhetoric, which was increasingly adjusted to Taliban demands, enraged the Northern Alliance leaders. Karzai tried to control the situation by appointing Burhanuddin Rabbani as the Chairman of the High-Peace Council. But the damage had already been done and the death of Rabbani exasperated the Northern Alliance leaders.

The Northern Alliance is presently a group in disarray. Northern Alliance leaders like Yunus Qanuni, Mohammed Fahim, and Abdul Rashid Dostum have positioned themselves along with United National Front (led by Rabbani till his death). The United National Front has positioned itself as a ‘loyal’ opposition to Karzai. Karzai is trying to buy their loyalty by way of providing booty and position. After the death of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Karzai has appointed his son Salabuddin Rabbani as the Chairman of High Peace Council.

Other Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Zia Massoud, formed the National Front of Afghanistan along with Abdul Rashid Dostum and Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq in late 2011 to oppose a return of the Taliban to power. This front is generally considered as a reformation of the military wing of the Northern Alliance. The National Front of Afghanistan made a plea to the US to end the peace negotiation with the Taliban and end the centralized rule of Karzai91. Meanwhile, much of the political wing of the Northern Alliance has reunited under the National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah becoming the main democratic opposition movement in the Afghan parliament.

The Haqqani NetworkIn 2011, American intelligence and military officials named the ‘Haqqani network the

most deadly insurgent group in Afghanistan’, which is ‘responsible for hundreds of American deaths’. The transnational capability of the Haqqani network, which operates simultaneously from Afghanistan and Pakistan, makes it difficult for the US and NATO forces to locate, fight, dilute or defeat. The Haqqani network is aided by three broad groups at three levels: the local, regional and global. Locally, the Haqqani network is supported by the Afghan Taliban, tribal Afghan populations and leaders, and the Pakistani Taliban. Regionally, the group is aided by the Pakistani military and Pakistan’s ISI. The support of the ISI has made the Haqqani network a formidable threat, resistant to foreign penetration. Globally, the Haqqani network is supported by al Qaeda, the Islamic Jihad Union, the LeT and other Middle East sympathizers92. Collectively, all these supports have made the Haqqani network a robust and powerful threat.

The Taliban’s support of the Haqqani network has not only provided religious sanctity to the group but has also aided in contributing manpower for its militant activities. Hence, the only substantial challenge the Haqqani network has faced since 2001 is from US and NATO forces. Ultimately, the Haqqanis want power, wealth, money and a seat at the table when the coalition troops pull out. However, their goal is no longer limited to gaining a mere ministry, as was the 91 Louie Gohmert, Press Releases, ‘Afghan Northern Alliance Allies Betrayed by Obama Administration; Meet with US Congressmen in Berlin’, January 9, 2012. 92 Saroj Kumar Rath, ‘The Haqqani Network and Afghanistan’s Future’, Asian Conflict Report, Issue 20, November-December 2011.

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case during Taliban rule. The actions and outlook of their leaders are no longer confined to the Afghan theatre. Instead, the group is currently positioning itself as the most deserving claimant of the seat of power in Kabul. The growth of the Haqqani network has been due in part to ISI support. The ISI has the habit of changing its ally in Kabul as circumstances dictate. In 1994, the ISI did not hesitate to shift its support from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami to Mullah Omar’s Taliban. Similarly, if the need arises, the agency may not think twice about changing its support from the Taliban to the Haqqani93.

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, circumstance demanded the alliance of the Taliban and Haqqani. Together they fought the US and NATO forces, but not from the same camps or bases. While the Taliban camped in Quetta, the Haqqani opted for North Waziristan. As the US was a common enemy, the Taliban and the Haqqani did not see any reason not to channel their energies against the coalition troops. Both are equally supported by the ISI. The Haqqani network is more pliable, but many ISI officers and army personnel are inextricably connected with the Taliban and their leadership. It is possible that if the strength of the Taliban and Haqqani remains constant, the ISI will work for a similar compromise to that which was done in 199594.

The future stake of Haqqani Network in Afghanistan is enormous but the network is influential in the Loya Paktia area and not beyond that95. Villagers from and around Herat and Mazar had never heard of Haqqani Network96. However, this is not surprising considering the absence of basic facilities in vast regions of Afghanistan. The village folks of Afghanistan were even unaware of bin Laden’s death when the US attacks Afghanistan in 2001, 90% Afghans were unaware about 9/1197. It is a known irony in Afghanistan that the countrymen remained unaware about events, which bring consequences to their lives.

The Likely Scenario after 2014

A decade long war has almost exhausted the US and it is no more interested in fighting terror in Afghanistan. NATO leaders agreed to an ‘irreversible’ plan to end the war in Afghanistan responsibly, pulling almost all troops out of the country by the end of 2014, but President Barack Obama warned that the danger of Afghanistan sliding into civil war or Taliban control still exists98. The financial stress on the US exchequer, the loss of manpower, Pakistan’s obstinacy to play double game and a bleak future is making the US desperate for an early exit99. The killing of Osama bin Laden by the Navy SEAL had provided the US a reason for an honourable exit.

93 Marvin Weinbaum, Analyst for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Interview to the 9/11 Commission, August 12, 2003, pp-2. 94 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Macmillan Publication, 2001, pp-60.95 Loya Paktia is comprising Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar and Ghazni; Seth G. Jones, ‘Why Haqqani Network is wrong target’, Foreign Affairs, November 6, 2011. 96 Author’s interview in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, March 15-25, 2012. 97 Anna Badkhen, ‘Afghanistan by Donkey’, New York: Foreign Policy Magazine, 2012; Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, ‘Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda – A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander’, New York: Crown, 2005. 98------------, ‘Wrapup 8-NATO endorses strategy to end Afghan war but risks remain’, Reuters, May 21, 2012. 99 Alissa J Rubin, ‘Asking a Skeptical Europe to Open its wallet for Afghanistan’, New York Times, May 1, 2012.

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When the coalition forces leave Kabul for good or bad in 2014, Afghanistan will be leaderless. The term of the present government would end in October 2014 and Karzai would not be contesting the next election as the Afghan Constitution prohibits for a third term. Certainly the 2014 election will be held without or limited protection and guardianship of the coalition forces. Election would be possible in 2014 because, the security infrastructure established by the coalition forces in Afghanistan would be fresh and likely to resist an immediate Taliban/Haqqani comback, while the Northern Alliance would be a participant in the election. However, if the warlords allowed elections in their provinces, the most likely election outcome would be a fractured mandate. This is because, even the 2009 election despite large scale forgery had almost produced a fractured mandate and the 2014 would hardly produce any single favorite. The Pashtun dominated Southern Afghanistan would never take part in the 2014 election fearing a Taliban onslaught, which would cause the fractured mandate as rest of the provinces pick up their candidates.

There is every possibility that the next government would never come up at all and internal strife would swept Afghanistan. Even now when the coalition forces are protecting the incumbent president, the reach of the writ of Karzai government inside Afghanistan is disputed. Certainly with the absence of the coalition forces, a nascent Afghan security force would never defend the Afghan government. This is especially true because, there is no uniformity in the composition of the present government and most of the Northern Alliance leaders, who brought Karzai to power, are now opposing him and the Afghan government. The leaders of Northern Alliance want higher stake in the Afghan government but the Northen Alliance itself is a divided house.

Mohammad Fahim is playing as the friendly opposition to Karzai. Dr. Abdullah is fiercely against Karzai. The regional military commanders of the Northern Alliance like Abdul Qadir of Eastern Shura, Hussain Anwari of Hazara dominated Harkat-e-Islami, Mohammad Mohaqiq and Karim Khalili of Hezb-e-Wahadat, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Balkh Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, former Herat governor Ismail Khan and numerous other commanders are only concerned about their seat of power – election or no election.

However, the Taliban have Mullah Omar as their unanimous and acceptable leader. Rest of the stake holders are either incapable or divided amongst themselves. The Taliban have never shown real interest in a shared government at Kabul. Pakistan is keeping Mullah Omar protected and alive inside Pakistan to bring him for a full throttle war once the coalition forces vacate Afghanistan. Added to this NATO’s peace talk with the Taliban have not only recognized the strength of the Taliban but also it offered legitimacy of the Taliban as a potential rulers, who would probably be accepted to the international community. Taliban’s return would lead to the emergence of a renewed northern alliance of disaffected Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras100. Together, these ethnic blocs represent at least half the Afghan population and they would pose a formidable opposition to the ambition of the Taliban.

100 James Dobbins, ‘Our Man in Kabul’, Foreign Affairs, November 4, 2009.

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All the external stakeholders of Afghanistan are busy preparing permutations and combinations on the prospect of future of Afghanistan101. They are guiding and equipping their favorite from a pool of claimants starting from Taliban, Haqqani Network, Northern Alliance, Karzai-led faction to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group. It is highly likely that immediately after the departure of coalition troops, Afghanistan would plunge into chaos and civil war. However, it would take sometime before the Taliban, with the active support of Pakistan control large part of Afghanistan. President Karzai and President Obama, both are suspecting the onset of civil war immediately after the departure of coalition troops102.

Under such a circumstance there is no answer to who would lead Afghanistan after 2014. The absence of a viable answer to this question, inside and outside Afghanistan, make the possibility of internal strive strong. It is unlikely that someone would descend from heaven to lead Afghanistan. Even if the 50 nations involved in the war managed to provide $4.1 billion annual security aid for a peak of 352,000 indigenous Afghan security force, who would manage the money and men103.

Civil war in Afghanistan after 2014 would testify to the hypothesis that external formula or forced fixation would never work in Afghanistan. In that case, the US and the world have not only to lived with unfriendly and medievalic regime but also they have to recognize and tolorate regimes opposed to their scheme of thinking.

Afghanistan as Launching pad of international terror attacks

In the contemporary scenario, there are four strong groups of claimants for the future Afghan government, which includes the Taliban, Northern Alliance, Haqqani Network and the western backed and democratically elected Hamid Karzai led democratic faction. The strength of another claimant, Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is disputed and despite his capacity to carry out several devastating attacks against Hamid Karzai government, his ability to capture Kabul is distant104. Out of the above five factions, the Hamid Karzai-led democratic set up is ruling Afghanistan since 2001. The Northern Alliance is either participating or supporting the Karzai led government. But the rest of the three groups, which are three distinct Pashtun groups are leading the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Curiously, none of the three insurgent groups have been placed on the US State Department’s official list of foreign terrorist organizations and even as US-led coalition forces took the fight to these three insurgent groups, the Obama administration worked to encourage dialogue with insurgent leaders. Washington has a historical policy of denying aid and support to the Northern Alliance105 and except for a brief spell during the October-November 2001, the US policy has

101 Deepak Kapoor, ‘Shared Stakes in Safety’, Times of India, February 7, 2012.102 ------------, ‘Wrapup 8-NATO endorses strategy to end Afghan war but risks remain’, Reuters, May 21, 2012; Rob Taylor and Jack Kimball, ‘Afghanistan’s Karzai considers early presidential polls’, Reuters, April 12, 2012. 103 James Kirkup, ‘NATO sets ‘irreversible’ roadmap to withdrawing troops from Afghanistan’, Telegraph, May 22, 2012. 104 Candace Rondeaux, ‘Afghan Rebel Positioned for Key Role’, Washington Post, November 5, 2008. 105 Ms. Miller, ‘A Nation Challenged: The Response, Planning for Terror but Failing to Act’, New York Times, December 30, 2001.

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largely remained the same106. Consequentially, the US has never involved Northern Alliance in any of the future settlement decision and talk on Afghanistan. The Karzai government is only counting its days as the Afghan constitution restrict presidentship to two terms. So the next democratically elected or US imposed president, if any, would remain faceless for the time. This has left the three insurgent factions to press their claim on Kabul after 2014. Despite the US troop surge, Taliban possesses the capacity to strike any place at will. Not only this, the Taliban had established shadow governments in many provinces of Afghanistan and despensing official duty on regular basis107. With a political settlement nowhere in sight and Pakistani support for armed extremists unabated, Washington’s options for preventing a Taliban takeover have narrowed. The US is also not blind to the Taliban strength and power and negotiating with the group for a future settlement. The prospect that Afghanistan could fall back into the hands of the Taliban was never greater.

If the Taliban manage to control Afghanistan again, the next concern is whether Afghanistan will become the launching pad of international terrorism. This paper asserts that the Taliban will have no interest either to harbour international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda or to launch terrorist attacks beyond national boundaries by themselves. The article also argues that under the civil war situation Afghanistan will inevitably become the launching pad of international terror attacks. In addition, even under prevailing Taliban regime in future, there will also be high possibility that international terrorists will nest in Afghanistan against the will, approval and discouragement of Taliban.

For the outsiders the perception about the Taliban is one of the ‘ardent supporters of terrorism108’. The impression of the world is based on the assertion that the Taliban ‘have invited terrorist groups to set their base in Afghanistan and allowed to operate from there’109. It is perceived by the world that during the brief Taliban rule in Afghanistan, ‘it was as a matter of policy that the Taliban made Afghanistan a launching pad of international terrorism’. Before delving into the details, it is pertinent to understand some prevailing internal as well as external dynamics of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

The Taliban are illiterate or at best madrassa educated introverts. They formed and run the self centric Taliban movement on puritanical line, where Sharia is paramount.110 The Taliban interpretation of Sharia is dictated not by Islamic discourse but by their own parochial

106 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘US Strategy in Afghanistan’, Secret Cable, Department of Defence, Washington DC, October 30, 2001. The cable was sent to Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet.107 Griff Witte, ‘Taliban establishes elaborate shadow government in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, December 8, 2009. 108 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001; Ahmed Rashid, ‘Descent Into Chaos’, London: Penguin Publication, 2007; Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘Inside the al Qaeda and the Taliban’, London: MacMillan Publication, 2011; Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier, New York: Viking, 2010; Jason Burke, ‘Al Qaeda’, London: Penguin publication, 2004. 109 The Taliban were aided by Pakistani madrassa students, militants and ISI in their bit to rule Kabul. Many Pakistani militant organizations had been rewarded with ministry and other position during the Taliban rule. Pakistan based Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami had three Taliban ministers 22 judges inside the Taliban government; Amir Mir, ‘Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11 and Beyond’, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010, pp-312. 110 Mullah Omar is an illiterate person. In March 1998 ISI chief Ahmed Mahmood visited Kandahar to personally read a four-page letter in Pashtu to the illiterate Mullah pleading not to destroy Bamiyan Buddhas; Ahmed Rashid, ‘Descent Into Chaos’, London: Penguin Publication, 2007, pp-409.

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understanding111. Their world view is limited to a few Islamic countries and not beyond. Their interaction with the US is at the insistence of the latter. Their opposition to the US, before 9/11 was only because of the presence of US troops in the gulf region and because of the imposition of sanction by the US.112 Since 2001, the Taliban are opposing the presence of US troops in Afghanistan. However, the Afghan Taliban’s retaliation or resentment against the US is limited within the Afghanistan’s soil and they never sent terrorist to the US homeland during the decade after 9/11 or before despite the presence of US troops in Afghanistan since 2001113. Some fringe freelancers had gone to the US with the purpose of attacking the country.

Harboring militants in Afghanistan was not the principal policy of the Taliban but a byproduct of their government114. Contrary to the popular believe, it is asserted in this article that, in prevailing condition and as per the historical thinking, the Taliban are not going to pose any threat to the US or West outside Afghanistan115. Outside Afghanistan, they are only linked with their Pakistani counterpart Tehrih-i-Taliban Pakistan, a group formed in 2007. However, other than their common interpretation of Islam and common Pashtun background, the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban differ greatly from each other in their history, leadership and goal116. Although the Pakistani Taliban repeatedly claim allegiance with their Afghan counterpart, the Afghan Taliban routinely deny any connection and categorical in their refusal for any association with the Pakistan Taliban117.

However, the Taliban would not tolerate the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. In the case of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban were not appreciative of his activities in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban had three compulsions to shelter him – first, the Pashtunwali custom of sheltering a guest; second, his impressive role during Afghan war and support to common Afghans. As per the Taliban assessment the Afghans likes him very much as well. And third, the likeness of bin Laden by the extremist elements in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan 118. The other reason of flourishing of militant organizations in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule was that the Taliban did not had a complete hold on all provinces of Afghanistan. Only 75% of

111 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001, pp-33 and 107. 112 Ambassador William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Ladin With A Couple of Nuances, In October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, Islamabad, October 11, 1998. 113 Proposed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad is a person of Pakistani descent and trained by the Pakistani Taliban; United States of America Vs. Faisal Shahzad, 10 MAG 928, Southern District of New York, 2010, pp-9. 114 Osama bin Laden was neither invited nor sheltered by the Taliban after the former’s departure from Sudan; Ambassador William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Ladin With A Couple of Nuances, In October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, Islamabad, October 11, 1998; Jason Burke, ‘Al Qaeda’, Penguin Publication, 2004, pp- 160-68.115 Taliban are an introvert and at times self-destructive force. Till 2012, no Taliban fighter ever venture outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to target western interest; ------------, ‘Timeline: Taliban in Afghanistan’, Al Jazeera, July 4, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html, -------------, ‘Timeline – Attacks in Afghan capital target foreigners’, Reuters, February 26, 2010. 116 Scott Shane, ‘Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals’, The New York Times, October 22, 2009. 117 ‘We don't like to be involved with them, as we have rejected all affiliation with Pakistani Taliban fighters. We have sympathy for them as Muslims, but beside that, there is nothing else between us’; Carlotta Gall, Ismail Khan, Pir Zubair Shah and Taimoor Shah, ‘Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of US Influx’, New York Times, March 26, 2009.118 Ambassador William B. Milam, ‘High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Ladin With A Couple of Nuances, In October 11 Meeting with Ambassador’, Secret Section, Islamabad, October 11, 1998.

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Afghanistan was under Taliban control and even in this 75%, the Taliban never established strict Sharia or their full control.

The charge that Afghanistan became the launching pad of international terrorism once the Taliban came to power does not stand careful scrutiny. Leading terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami (HuJI), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Haqqani Network were neither formed nor established their bases during the Taliban rule119. All these above groups had acquired land, constructed training camps for their followers and operated from there during the Afghan war. Some of these training camps were constructed with US tax payers money120. Many of these camps were abandoned after the Afghan war but some of them were functioning when the Taliban came to power in September 1996. In 1992-93, much before the arrival of the Taliban, when the US administration come close to declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, ISI asked Kashmiri militants to shift their base from Pakistan to Afghanistan121. The ISI prayed and paid the Jalalabad Shura to take the Kashmiri based militants under their protection122. Before the arrival of the Taliban, Osama bin Laden was requested by the ISI to train the Kashmiri militants in Afghanistan123. Even when the Taliban overwhelmed Afghanistan, Mullah Omar clarified that the Taliban ‘have no intention of exporting jihad. He further clarified that, ‘Afghans are fighting against the Indian occupation forces in Kashmir but these Afghans have gone on their own124’.

As the Taliban emerged as a major force in Afghanistan, number of officials in the US Department of State such as Lee Coldren and Robin Raphel were willing to ‘give the Taliban a chance’125. ‘The movement’, the American thought was, ‘less anti-American than other Afghan groups’. This is an admission of the US that Afghanistan during the Taliban rule was not a launching pad of international terrorism. Neither the US nor the West was worried of Afghanistan’s potential to become a launching pad for international terrorism. In fact, the state department opined that, the ‘Taliban brought order to a chaotic region, vowed to tighten down on opium production and they might expel Kashmiri militants training in the country’126. This is a testimony of Taliban’s past policy and this policy would hold meaning for their future policy, if ever they return to rule Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the Taliban are gullible and erratic. There is every possibility that their rigid interpretation of Islam could be exploited in future. This has already happened in the past. In 1999, Mullah Omar agreed to ban opium in exchange of UN recognition but instead of giving

119 Steve Coll, ‘Ghose War’, London: Penguin Publication, 2004; Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, ‘Afghanistan: The Bear Trap’, New York: Casemate Publication, 2001. 120 George Crile, ‘Charlie Wilson’s War’, Washington DC: Grove Press, 2007, pp-473; Steve Coll, ‘Ghose War’, London: Penguin Publication, 2004; Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, ‘Afghanistan: The Bear Trap’, New York: Casemate Publication, 2001. 121 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993, United States Department of State, Washington-DC, 1994, p.4. 122 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001, pp-186. 123 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001, pp-186.124 Yousufzai Rahimullah, ‘We have no intention of Exporting Jihad’, The News, August 19, 1998 cited in Ahmad Rashid, ‘Taliban’, London: Pan Book, 2001, pp-186. 125 Marvin Weinbaum, Analyst for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Interview to the 9/11 Commission, August 12, 2003, pp-2.126 Marvin Weinbaum served from 1999-2003 as a State Department Analyst for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Interview to the 9/11 Commission, August 12, 2003, pp-1.

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recognition; the UN imposed its own sanction in addition to the already existed US sanction. The sanctions acted as a bridge in between Mullah Omar and bin Laden. Mullah Omar was highly annoyed with the behavior of international community and thought that it is useless to deal with the kafir and still un-Islamic to handover a mujahid. Taking advantage of this circumstance, bin Laden exerted his influence inside the Taliban leadership. Once their relationship was cemented, bin Laden started buying large numbers of AK-47s and other weapons for the Taliban from Pakistani arms dealers with the consent of ISI. This was a favor, the Taliban could not resist 127. Once his position was consolidated inside the Taliban fraternity, Bin Laden was planning, funding and executing spectacular terror plots including the 9/11 from his Afghanistan base while dealing with an unconvincing Taliban regime with magical dexterity. By 2001, the Taliban was entirely under the control of bin Laden and he wanted to send a message to the world that the al Qaeda controls the Taliban. He devised an idea to send the message and convinced Mullah Omar to destroy the two looming huge Buddha statues in the valley of Bamiyan, which he called as sign of idoltry. He encouraged Mullah Omar to prove Taliban credential that no other religion is allowed under the rule of pious Taliban.

Earlier in July 1999, Mullah Omar issued a decree that said ‘The government considers the Bamiyan statues as an example of a potential major source of income for Afghanistan from international visitors. The Taliban states that Bamiyan shall not be destroyed but protected128.’ But a UN Security Council resolution passed in December 2000 demanding the extradition of bin Laden and toughening of sanctions against the Taliban regime seems to have inspired a reversal of that hands-off policy toward the Buddhas, not only in Bamiyan but nationwide. A few weeks after the resolution was passed, the Taliban issued a new decree ordering the destruction of all statues across Afghanistan because they ‘may be turned into idols in future’. The change in policy appears to be due to bin Laden’s growing influence. The significance of the giant statues never lost even in the mind of Pakistani dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf. On March 1, 2001, Gen. Pervez Musharraf had written a four-page letter in Pashto to Mullah Omar, asking him not to blow up the statues. ISI director Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed had secretly visited Kandahar and personally read the letter to the illiterate Mullah Omar, but to no avail129. On March 2, 2001 the destruction started.

Increasingly isolated and reviled by the international community, the Taliban became more confrontational. At the encouragement of bin Laden, Mullah Omar ordered his troops to destroy the two giant eighteen-hundred-year-old-statues of Buddha that dominated the Bamiyan Valley, homeland to the Shia Hazaras. Despite international condemnation and demonstrations by Buddhists around the world, on March 10, 2001, the statues were blown up130. The destruction of the two Bamiyan Buddhas allowed al Qaeda to drive the Taliban to a point of no return with the international community as ‘bin Laden’s hardliner rhetoric set the policy and he campaigned vigorously for the destruction of the statues131.’

127 Jason Burke, ‘War on Terrorism – The Afghan Connection’, The Observer, September 23, 2001. 128 Luke Harding, ‘How the Buddha got his wounds’, March 3, 2001, The Guardian.129 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos, London: Penguin, 2007, pp-409. 130 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent Into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-18-19.131 Cathy Gannon, ‘I for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror in Afghanistan’, Washington DC: Public Affairs, 2005, pp-79-81.

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Swiss Film maker Christian Frei made a stunning inquiry into the factors, which led to the destruction of the giant Buddhas. He said, the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan were destroyed on the orders of Osama Bin Laden, both as an act of provocation and as a ‘rehearsal’ for 9/11. Frei emphasized that there was documentary evidence that Mullah Omar and the Afghans who lived in Bamiyan had been opposed to the demolition of the historic figures132. Saudi and Pakistani engineers ultimately demolished the giant Buddhas133. Bin Laden had a clear strategy in mind: to isolate the Taliban from the outside world so that it would become even more dependent on al Qaeda. The Taliban leadership would then have no choice but to defend al Qaeda when greater US pressure was exerted once the attacks on American soil had taken place.

The Taliban run their government and policies as per their understanding of Islamic tradition and not as per diplomacy and realpolitik. They never hesitated to sacrifice their seat of power for a foreign guest. However, the Taliban had forfeited the seat of power in Kabul for three reasons: a) to protect bin Laden, b) to follow their Islamic tradition, and c) because of the encouragement and insistence of ISI, which convinced the Taliban leadership that the might of the US must be resisted134.

Everytime they supported terrorism, they were either mislead by outsiders or they were the victim of their puritanical Islamic tradition. During the decade long struggle in between the NATO and Taliban, there are few reports of Taliban-al Qaeda collaboration135. Al Qaeda claims responsibilities of many individual attacks of the Taliban and the organization is always a step ahead to make statement or issue fatwa, which are in consonant with the Taliban’s viewpoint. Since both the groups are homeless and beaten in Afghanistan, acting together if not working together is inevitable. However, the periodic drone strikes, death and detention of many al Qaeda leaders who used to organize collaborative attacks along with the Taliban had diminished scope for such cooperation136. There was no efforts on the part of Mullah Omar, as evident from the numerous messages issued since 2001, to work with al Qaeda in Afghanistan neither the Taliban leader claimed that it would house al Qaeda when it return to power. Rather contrary to the al Qaeda’s call to wage war against the Pakistan government for its support to the US, the Taliban leader is pushing Pakistani militants based in Pakistan’s tribal areas to strike a peace deal with the government and has advised the chief of the Haqqani Network to mediate between them137.

132 Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, March 31, 2004; 9/11 Commission Report, pp-527. 133 Christian Frei's 2005 documentary, ‘The Giant Buddhas’.134 On September 28, 2001, Maulana Nizamuddin Shamzai, the mentor of Mullah Omar who was also the head of Binory Mosque of Karachi met Mullah Omar along with ISI chief Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed’s official delegation calling for the extradition of bin Laden. ‘But in fact Maulana Shamzai and Lt. Gen. Ahmed privately encouraged Mullah Omar not to give in. Ultimately Mullah Omar did not abandon bin Laden; Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp-77; L. Wright, The Looming Tower, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.135 Slained Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad chronicled in detail how the al Qaeda is aligning with Taliban and attacking NATO troops. However, the four Taliban Shuras (Quetta Shura, Miramshah Shura, Peshawar Shura and Gerdi Jangal Shura) do not have al Qaeda members; Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘Inside the al Qaeda and the Taliban’, London: Pluto Press, 2011, pp-77-120; Bill Roggio, ‘The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders’, Long War Journal, February 23, 2010. 136 Mark H. Buzby, ‘Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control for Guantanamo Detainee’, US Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172, April 23, 2008; Tim Lister and Elise Labott, ‘US 99 % sure top terrorist was killed last month’, CNN, 7 July 2011).137 Zia Khan, ‘Mullah Omar is Pushing TTP to reconcile with Govt’, Express Tribune, November 26, 2011.

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Nonetheless, documents seized from the bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound revealed that there was a three-way communications between bin Laden, his deputy Ayman Zawahiri and Mullah Omar138. The new discovery has undermined the Taliban’s Afghan nationalist agenda as there is impending fear of Taliban’s policy of once again offering a safe haven to al Qaida or like-minded militants. But the document is also embedded with silverlines. ‘They don't see eye to eye on everything but it's clear they understand they have an interest in co-operating on attacks against NATO, Afghan government and Pakistani targets’139. The cooperation is only tactical. While out of power, the Taliban do not see any reason not to solicit support from al Qaeda or any other group, who are facilitating their return to the seat of power at Kabul.

In any case, Taliban are not one entity as Taliban Ambassador Mujahid said, there are at least 10 Taliban factions operating in Afghanistan. Prominent factions are the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar and the Miramshah Shura led by Jalaluddin Haqqani. It is not clear even whether Mullah Omar can deliver all of the Taliban that he nominally controls in southern Afghanistan, because they are often fissured into purely local groups. In Afghanistan, ‘There’s no Ho Chi Minh. There’s no Slobodan Milosevic. There’s no Palestinian Authority140’. The Haqqani Network over the time became the conduit organization to maintain link in between the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Haqqani Network sheltered most of the al Qaeda leaders and cadres and in return receives al Qaeda funding, which the network has been distributing amongst the many militant factions141. The leader of 2006 spring offensive and Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah said, ‘Osama bin Laden, thank God, is alive and in good health. We are in contact with his top aides and sharing plans and operations with each other142’. Mullah Dadullah was killed in 2007 and bin Laden in 2011 and since then many top al Qaeda leaders are killed. Therefore, the cooperation between the two groups is diminishing considerably.

On the issue of supporting international terrorism, the Taliban do not have a fixed policy and guided by the spar of the movement. On most of the subjects – like the economic policy, livelihood of Afghans, and growth and development of Afghanistan, the Taliban did not have a policy and they used to believe that Allah would take care of those subjects. However, on certain subjects like interpretation and implementation of their version of Sharia, adherence to Pashtunwali code, making Afghanistan a pious land and decimate all those who oppose them, they are firm and unalterable143. The Taliban are very vulnerable on religion. As demonstrated from their past policies, prima facie they are opposed to international terrorism. However, if they would return to Afghanistan there is every possibility that the same lose control over many provinces would return, as during their previous rule. And because of their lose control (when

138 Jason Burke, ‘Bin Laden files show al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in close contact’, The Guardian, April 29, 2012. 139 Jason Burke, ‘Bin Laden files show al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in close contact’, The Guardian, April 29, 2012.140 Joe Sterling, ‘Richard Holbrooke, noted diplomat, is dead at 69,’December 13, 2010,http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-11/us/richard.holbrooke.obit_1_richard-c-holbrooke-diplomat-bosnianwar/4?_s=PM:US. 141 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, ‘CIA Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants’, New York Times, 30 July 2008;Ahmed Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, London: Penguin publication, 2008, pp- 99 and 268.142 Lara Logan, ‘Taliban Leader Vows to force US out’, CBS News, December 29, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/29/eveningnews/main2313745.shtml. 143 Houriya Ahmed, ‘The Taliban’s Perversion of Sharia Law’, The Guardian, May 3, 2009.

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they would return) on many parts of Afghanistan, there is every possibility that terrorist organizations would again tempted to set their training camps and base in Afghanistan.

Despite the flux in Taliban’s trajectory and despite the Taliban’s erratic behavior, if they managed to return to Afghanistan, they would never make it the launching pad of international terror attacks. Mullah Omar has been opposing the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and not showing interest in the ongoing negotiation. During her India visit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that al Qaeda chief al-Zawahiri is in Pakistan144. Hillary did not say anything about Mullah Omar but it is near certain that the Pakistani military is keeping him alive and in hibernation for future use in Afghanistan145. After a decade of war in the trenches of Afghanistan, the US government developed fatigue. On December 1, 2009, President Obama set July 2011 as the deadline to vacate Afghanistan146. However, in one of the subsequent speeches, Obama extended the deadline to 2014147. In a sudden shift of strategy in 2010, US chief commander in Afghanistan Gen. David Petraeus not only initiated high-level contacts with the Taliban but also facilitated reconciliation in between the insurgents and the Kabul government, ostensibly indicating acceleration toward a political solution in Afghanistan148.

Neighbouring countries jumped into the fray to safeguard their interests. India signed a strategic deal with Afghanistan and started training for Afghan security forces149. Pakistan paranoid with the development started playing its own dubious double game by way of arresting the Taliban leaders based in Pakistan and restraining them from taking part in any future settlement talk on Afghanistan150. The US’ desperation to arrive at an agreement on Afghanistan’s future was real. Enterprising Taliban supporters took full advantage of this desperation and a Quetta shopkeeper posing himself as Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, a close associate of Mullah Omar, duped Gen. David Patreaus and extracted a hefty sum before vanishing into oblivion151.

144 Hillary Clinton, ‘Interview to NDTV’, May 8, 2012, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/ndtv-exclusive-hillary-clinton-on-fdi-mamata-outsourcing-and-hafiz-saeed-full-transcript-207593. 145 Document ceased from bin Laden’s abode reveal his contact with outside world. Mullah Omar must be following a similar pattern of life. A 2007 BBC report claimed that ‘Mullah Omar is living in Pakistan under the protection of its ISI intelligence agency’; ---------------, ‘Mullah Omar is hiding in Pakistan’, BBC News, January 17, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6272359.stm, accessed on May 8, 2012.146

Barack Hussain Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’ Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point’, New York, Office of The Press Secretary, White House, December 1, 2009. 147 Barack Hussain Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan’, East Room, Office of The Press Secretary, White House, June 22, 2011. 148 Zeina Khodr, ‘Karzai ‘holds talks’ with Haqqani’, al-Jazeera, June 27, 2010; Carlotta Gall, ‘Afghanistan Tests Waters for Overture to Taliban’, New York Times, October 30, 2008; Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Karzai, in Saudi Arabia, Pursues Taliban Talks’, Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2010.149 Manmohan Singh and Hamid Karzai, ‘Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 04, 2011.150 Anand Gopal, ‘Half of Afghanistan Taliban leadership arrested in Pakistan’, Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2010.151 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The U.K.’s foreign policy approachto Afghanistan and Pakistan’, March 2, 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmfaff/514/514.pdf.

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Nevertheless, it is still unclear if Mullah Omar himself is willing for any reconciliation or not. On January 3, 2012, Taliban announced the establishment of a political office in Qatar to come to an understanding with the US. In this announcement the Taliban refutes all other news about the alleged talk of the Taliban152. However, soon they refused to sit down with the ‘puppet’ Afghan government and insisted on dealing mainly with NATO153. The disconnect amongst the stake holders on talk with the Taliban is understood from the fact that on January 29, 2012, President Karzai unilaterally announced talk venue in Saudi Arabia for Kabul’s negotiations with the Taliban154. Within two days of Karzai’s announcement, the Taliban’s Quetta Shura denied plan for any such talk155. On the other hand, both the US and Taliban admitted secret dealing in Qatar in early January 2012, which ended abrutly during mid-March 2012 due to the ‘ever changing position’ of the US156. Strangely enough, even after the suspension of talk with the Taliban, reliable news report appeared in the US in May 2012 claiming the release of high-value Taliban prisoners from Parwan detention centre in North of Kabul157. Unlike at Guantanamo, releasing prisoners from the Parwan detention center, the only American military prison in Afghanistan, does not require congressional approval and can be done clandestinely. Surprisingly, the US is delinking the release of the prisoners from its official stalled negotiations with top insurgent leaders and consider the release as ‘strategic’ and ‘to quell violence in concentrated areas where NATO is unable to ensure security, particularly as troops continue to withdraw’158. Hence the entire affair of peace negotiation with the Taliban is opaque and murky without the slightest trace of transparency available from any quarter.

It is possible that the Taliban policy would not be the same as it were in 1990s. Now bin Laden is no more and the Taliban would not like to lengthen their fight with the US. Rather Pakistan would encourage the Taliban to align with the US as the presence of al Qaeda is diminishing. In that scenario, Pakistan would motivate the Taliban, and the US would not oppose, to house India centric militant in Afghanistan. However, considering the lose control of the Taliban on all parts of Afghanistan and the varying policies of different Taliban factions; it would possible to house other militant groups of international stature without the approval of Mullah Omar. The US is supporting Karzai as it is under the full control of the US. In future also, the US would like to have a similar government at Kabul. If the US want a strong foothold and want to control the region by way of housing US troops and establishing military base – the conflict would drag for a longer time159. That would bring disastrous consequence to Afghanistan and its neighbouring region.

152 ---------------, ‘Statement of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding Negotiations’, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, January 3, 2012, http://shahamat-english.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14202:statement, accessed on May 11, 2012. 153 David H. Young, ‘Divide and Conquer negotiations’, Foreign Policy, February 14, 2012. 154 Quentin Sommerville and Bilal Sarwary, ‘Afghan President Hamid Karzai Plans Talks with Taliban’, BBC News, January 29, 2012. 155 -------------, ‘Afghan Taliban deny Plans for peace talks in Saudi Arabia’, February 1, 2012. 156 Editorial, ‘Talking with the Taliban’, New York Times, January 4, 2012; -----------, ‘Afghanistan’s Taliban suspend peace talks with US’, BBC News, March 15, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17379163, accessed on May 7, 2012. 157 Kevin Sieff, ‘Secret US Program releases high-level insurgents in exchange for pledges of peace’, Washington Post, May 7, 2012. 158 Kevin Sieff, ‘Secret US Program releases high-level insurgents in exchange for pledges of peace’, Washington Post, May 7, 2012. 159 Alissa J. Rubin, ‘With Pact, US Agrees to Help Afghans for years to come’, New York Times, April 22, 2012.

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The Taliban do not want international forces in Afghanistan. But other than their blanket demand for the rule of sharia law, the Taliban have not articulated their vision for the future of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Haqqanis are probably irreconcilable as they are too close to al-Qaeda’160. Pakistan, which is harboring Mullah Omar and shed a large pool of the country’s blood161, would also play a significant role to influence the Taliban policy on international terrorism. Pakistan’s stake in Afghanistan is high for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Pakistan wants a pliant government in Afghanistan to achieve ‘strategic depth’ and to settle score against India162. Secondly, Pakistan army is not only guided by religiosity but also houses a large pool of extremists, who consider it an Islamic obligation to protect and support the Taliban163. Thirdly, the foreign policy of Pakistan is controlled by the ISI, which want certain goals to be achieved164. Finally, Pakistan wants US money for running the country and at the same time, they know how to deceive the US and not let the country to fall in the company of India165.

The above explanations have proved the hypothesis that the Taliban had never been the habitual host of international terrorism and their support to terrorism was circumstantial, an example of their vulnerability and because of their rigid interpretation as well as implementation of Sharia. Taking cue and clue from the past, it is safely concluded that even if the Taliban would return and dominate large part of Afghanistan, as a matter of policy, they would never support international terror attacks.

The US on the other hand understand very well that the Taliban does not pose danger to the US homeland security. The US also subscribe to the fact that ‘even if the Taliban return to power, Afghanistan would not turn into a launching pad of international terrorism’. For example, the end of Clinton’s presidency did not bring major change in the US’ Taliban policy and throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, President Bush followed Clinton’s footstep — ‘applying economic and political pressure on the Taliban while retaining some dialogue with it, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance’166. The Bush administration like its predecessor understood well that housing bin Laden was an erratic and not a thoughtful decision of the Taliban. However, the spectacular September 11 attacks changed everything and the US patience with the Taliban run out. Even after the September 11 attacks, the US was willing to tolerate the Taliban regime, had it cooperated with the US. A day prior to the US attack on Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell send a message through the ISI

160 Peter Bergen, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, May 24, 2011.161 Hina Rabbani Khar claimed that 30,000 innocent Pakistanis have been killed; Hina Rabbani Khar, ‘Address at the UN General Assembly’, New York, September 27, 2011. 162 Benazir Bhutto, ‘Reconciliation’, London: Pocket Books, 2008, pp-194; Kamran Shafi, ‘Defining ‘strategic depth’, Dawn, January 9, 2010. 163 Ayesha Jalal, ‘The State of Martial Rule’, Lahore: Sang-E-Mil publication, 1999, pp-94; Kathy Gannon, ‘I is for Infidel’, Washington: Public Affairs Publication, 2005, pp-142. 164 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ‘If I am Assassinated’, New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1979, pp-195; Altaf Gauhar, ‘How Intelligence Run Our Politics’, The Nation, August 17, 1997, pp-4; Sean P. Winchell, ‘Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol. 16, No.3, 2003, pp-375.165 S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘Who Benefits from US Aid to Pakistan?’, Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook, September 21, 2011. 166 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy’, Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2012, pp-7.

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Chief General Mahmood to Mullah Omar saying, ‘It is in your interest and in the interest of our survival to hand over all al Qaeda leaders, to close the terrorists’ camps and allow the US access to terrorist facilities.’167 Failure to which, Powell warned, would led to the US action and ‘Every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed’. The initial US demand from the Taliban were included handing over of bin Laden to the US and if the demand is met, they would refrain from attacking Afghanistan.

The US targeted the Taliban – not because of the connivance of the Taliban with al Qaeda and bin Laden but because of their refusal to hand over the al Qaeda leader. More than a decade later in December 2011, US Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the US stand. He said, ‘The Taliban per se is not our enemy’ and ‘there is not a single statement that the president has ever made in any of our policy assertions that the Taliban is our enemy because it threatens US interests’168.

Now the questions are why the US is fighting with the Taliban and why it is still in Afghanistan with such a huge cost. Countless US commanders worked in Afghanistan and numerous reports accused America of going to Afghanistan without a vision and a Marshal Plan. Consequentially, America’s fight in Afghanistan became a ‘spiralling eruption of war due to its directionless entry into Afghanistan’. As time passed, the US tussle in Afghanistan against the Taliban was justified and contiued for the purpose of maintaining influence/control in Afghanistan in future. The other reasons are, the Taliban in its bid to return to Kabul disturbing the Afghan forces and killing the Afghan leaders, whom the US has nourished and reposed faith on. In fact, although the US is not opposed to the Taliban per se, the same is not true with the Taliban. The Taliban is not hesitating to attack US interest inside Afghanistan. The US strategists fear that if the Taliban would able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with the US in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage the US, then that becomes a problem for the US. For this reason precisely the US is fighting with the Taliban. The US is not willing to let the Taliban rule Afghanistan as conceeding to the Taliban would seen as a defeat of the superpower. The other reason of the US fight in Afghanistan is ‘to deal with, curtail, begin to dismantle, and eventually eliminate al Qaeda’. The US would be in Afghanistan till the time when ‘Afghanistan ceased and desisted from being a haven for people who do damage and have as a target the US and their allies’169.

Conclusion

All around the world, whether it is Bonn, Tokyo, London, Istanbul or Chicago, leaders from great many nations have been talking and discussing about the stabilization and future situation of Afghanistan. Despite their best of efforts and despite the application of the best of military minds, the situation in Afghanistan is far from satisfactory. There is an underlying reason for the failure of international community to bring peace, prosperity and stability into Afghanistan. As Robert Blackwill would say, the Afghans view the US and its partners who are involved in Afghanistan’s rebuilding as an ‘occupying’ force who are ‘largely ignorant of local 167 Colin Powell, ‘Message to Taliban’, Department of State, Government of USA, Washington DC, October 6, 2001.168 Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Joe Biden On Iraq, Iran, China and the Taliban’, Newsweek, December 19, 2011.169 Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Joe Biden On Iraq, Iran, China and the Taliban’, Newsweek, December 19, 2011.

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history, tribal structures, languages, customs, politics, and values’ of Afghanistan. Such ignorance cater to the believe that peace and stabilization is enforceable from outside. Their ignorance blurs their vision to see the truth and accept the reality.

For example, the US neither considers the Taliban as their enemy nor places it on its list of terrorist organization. Still its forces are fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Similarly, the US is historically not comfortable with the Northern Alliance and always refrained from letting the alliance to dominate Afghanistan. However, since 2001 the US strategists are working with them and supported their participation in the Karzai government. The policy confusion of the US is palpable – where they do not want the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek minorities to dominate Afghanistan but still they are not considering giving the seat of power to the Pashtun Taliban. After the Chicago summit, the US had made the 2014 deadline to withdraw troops from Afghanistan irreversible. It is in the interest of the US foreign policy to admit the fact that the Taliban are the most powerful group in Afghanistan and despite the dislikeness of the world, they have withstood all vagaries and losses to press their claim at Kabul. If they manage a comeback, the Taliban will have no interest either to harbour international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda or to launch terrorist attacks beyond national boundaries by themselves. Rather than sticking to the directionless policy in Afghanistan and rather than refusing to accept their strict religious dynamics, the US should help building Afghanistan by letting the Afghans to do the job.

After the successful battle against the Soviet, the US walked out of Afghanistan in 1989. The walk become run subsequently when Afghanistan required assistance the most. Consequentially, the country returned to the civil war, which contributed to make Afghanistan as the breeding ground of terrorism. It is in the interest of the US to avoid repetition of its past follies. Both the US policies – to remain aloof from Afghanistan and to occupy the country – failed. There is an urgent need to device a third policy.

The strength of Northern Alliance is historically limited to the Northern part of Afghanistan. However, the Pashtuns of the South, which include the Taliban and their affiliates like the Haqqani or other warlords, exert their influence to a greater portion of Afghanistan barring few Northern provinces. Various communities of Afghanistan have to device some power sharing formula if they decide to stay together. Since the Taliban are not the enemy of the US, it is better for US and for the world to help Taliban for its future domination of Afghanistan rather than fighting against them. However, considering their vulnerability, even under prevailing Taliban regime in future, there will also be high possibility that international terrorists will nest in Afghanistan against the will of Taliban. That is when the international community led by the US must walk into Afghanistan to help the incumbent ruler to bail them out from the impending danger. There is a high possibility of internal civil war among the Northern Alliance, Taliban, Haqqani, and others. The fear of Afghanistan slipping into civil war once coalition troops left was also shared by world leaders at the NATO summit at Chicago. And under the civil war situation Afghanistan will inevitably become the launching pad of international terror attacks. The US must avoid such a disastrous outcome. As the leader of Afghanistan has been demanding money at conference after conference to run the country and to handle the security of the country, merely providing money would never help. An imposed leader can only manage corruption and his corrupts followers, nothing beyond that. The US decision to field and support

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such Afghan leader, who would remain loyal to the US would serve neither the US interest nor the interest of Afghanistan, as was the case of Karzai. While it is significant to offer financial packages, it is equally significant that leadership must evolve from inside. While ignorance of the local culture and tradition is acceptable, disregarding those age old practices never bring stability and peace in the region. It is essential for the US to understand the hard reality and take hard but some time unpopular decision.

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barack hussain obama, ‘remarks by the president in web viewsince time immemorial, peace in...

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