lable at ScienceDirect

Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–9

Contents lists avai

Research in Transportation Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/retrec

Battening down the hatches: How should the maritime industriesweather the financial tsunami?

Brian Slack*

Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Keywords:Financial crisisPort impactsNew trade lanesPort-government relationships

* Tel.: þ1 514 848 2053; fax: þ1 514 848 2032.E-mail address: slack@alcor.concordia.ca

0739-8859/$ – see front matter � 2009 Published bydoi:10.1016/j.retrec.2009.12.002

a b s t r a c t

This paper investigates the major impacts of the financial tsunami on the maritime industries, notablyport and shipping. The maritime industries are still reeling from market declines, with stakeholders stillattempting to weather the storm as best as they can through various strategies. However, such strategiesare not uniform, where significant diversifications have been noted between major markets and stake-holders. Looking ahead, this paper has identified four major issues, of which they are believed to play keyroles in shaping the maritime industries in the post-2008 world. They include the changing patterns ofglobal trades, the importance of being green, the changing government–industrial relations and the needfor transparency. Each of these issues has the potential to alter the future maritime industries indiversified, but significant, ways.

� 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction

The global economic crisis triggered by bankruptcy of theinvestment bank-Lehman Brothers – since September 2008 hasbeen likened to a tsunami – or so commonly called the ‘financialtsunami’. The analogy is appropriate because just as a tsunami, theeconomic depression has a geographical origin (in the suburbanhousing market in the US) but spreading geographically over vastregions of the world. In doing so, the crisis has impacted signifi-cantly on global economies. Social scientists who study naturalhazards recognize two major and distinct phases in an occurrence:one, the situation during the event, the other what comes after. Thefirst relates to the direct and immediate impacts of the event,including the scale and scope of the event and its human disloca-tions, while the second deals with the consequences and societaladjustments that are undertaken in the post event period. In thecontext of the current economic crisis, it is somewhat easier to seethe immediate effects on ports and shipping. The maritime indus-tries are reeling from market declines. As the crisis evolves it isbecoming clearer what the industry is doing to cope, and in thepaper the main features of these responses are described. Of course,predicting the medium and long term effects of the crisis mustinevitably be conjectural, especially when it still has to run itscourse. Thus, rather than detailing very specific predictions, for

Elsevier Ltd.

example, the details of the traffic rebound may be, a set of possiblebroad trends are considered.

After this introductory section, Section 2 describes and discussesthe impacts of the financial tsunami on the maritime industries,with special focus on ports and shipping. In Section 3, four majorissues, of which they are believed to play key roles in shaping thefuture maritime industries, will be investigated, including changingpatterns of global trades, the importance of being green, changinggovernment–industry relations and the need for transparency.Finally, Section 4 consists of the conclusions.

2. What is happening?

2.1. The impacts

Measures of actual economic activities and short term projec-tions during the crisis can vary considerably as they are frequentlydepended on which reporting period is being used. Despite suchvariability, there is general agreement that the intensities of currenteconomic declines are geographically diversified. For example, thedecline in China is only relative to recent stellar growth rates whilethe actual rate of growth is still positive. According to the Inter-national Monetary Fund (IMF), GDP growth among developingnations1 is predicted to be 3–4% for 2009, but for advanced,developed economies, this figure is estimated to be �3.8% overall.In the US, GDP is expected to decline by 2.8% in 2009 (Fig. 1). Other

1 Here ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ nations are referring to IMF’s own definition.

-4.1

-2.8 -3.0

-5.6

-4.4

-6.2

-1.3

-3.6

-0.4

00.4

-1.0

-0.4

0.5

1.9

0

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

UK US France Germany Italy Japan Worldeconomy

Advancedeconomy

2009 2010

Perc

ent c

hang

e

Keys:

Fig. 1. IMF’s world economic output projections. Source: The Economist (2009).

B. Slack / Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–9 5

agencies have put out slightly different estimates. For example, inMarch 2009, The Economist predicted a drop in economic activityin 2009 in the European Union’s (EU) overall of 4%, with Germany,the largest economy contracting by 5.4% (The Economist, 2009),while the IMF predicted a decline of 5.6% for Germany in 2009.Preliminary predictions for 2010 from OECD, IMF and others indi-cate some overall growths, largely accounted for by developingeconomies.

As a derived demand, it is inevitable that market declinesimpact directly and negatively on the well-being of the maritimeindustries. However, whereas international commerce had beengrowing at rates faster than the growth in the world’s economicoutputs prior to the current crisis, the demand for transportationseems to have fallen faster than the global economy in general.Indeed, the transport industries are arguably bearing dispropor-tionate hits triggered by the financial tsunami. For instance, OECDpredicts that trade will decline by 13.2% in 2009. This has impactedon container businesses differentially, where overall traffic hasfallen by 20% while charter rates have plunged. At the same time,cargo carrying capacity has declined sharply along the East-Westtrade routes. According to BRS-Alphaliner (2009), between August2008 and February 2009, container carrying capacity had declinedby 15%. The Asia-Mediterranean-Europe segment contributes to thelargest share of capacity declines with a negative growth of 22%,while the trans-Pacific route has also fallen by 9%.2

As a complement to shipping, ports have been particularlyimpacted by the financial tsunami. Again, while the actual figuresdepend on the period of reporting, it is very clear that most portsaround the world have experienced massive traffic decline over thelast 12-month period, varying between 15 and 35%. For example,between February 2008 and 2009, traffic at the Port of Los Angeleshad fallen by 33%. However, the impacts on port traffic are not yetevident to any significant extent as some ports have already put on

2 For trans-Pacific route, even prior to August 2008, a number of carriers hadalready begun to reduce their services to North America, which partly explainedthis figure.

hold expansion plans. For instance, in April 2009, Dubai PortsWorld (DPW) had announced the delay or cancellation of half theirterminal investment plans. Despite this, it seems that it is onlya matter of time before the impacts of the downturn are going togenerate significant negative consequences on terminal steve-doring business. Prior to the crisis, this business had experiencedcontinuous significant growth, with several multinational actors,e.g., Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), PSA International Pte Ltd (PSA)and DPW, etc., establishing global portfolios throughout the pastdecade (Slack & Fremont, 2004). Apart from professional terminaloperators, the perceived high returns on investments had alsodrawn non-port financial institutions, such as banks (e.g., Mac-quarie), insurance companies (e.g., AIG) and pension fundmanagers (e.g., Ontario Teachers Pension Fund), to invest andsecure positions within terminals at unsustainably high premiums.Nowadays, such investments start to appear problematic, and giventhe wider difficulties in confronting these financial players, it isincreasingly likely that there will be major re-adjustments withinthe business.

2.2. The immediate responses

Within the shipping industries, the immediate responses to thecrisis, and thus market declines, have been largely unsurprising.Container freight rates in most markets have fallen significantlyand, in the case of the Europe-Asia route, freight rates per TEU havedeclined by 60% between 2008 and 2009. Facing sharp reductionsin traffic volumes and declining rates, shipping lines, for the mostpart, have reduced capacity, with existing and new services beingcut back or postponed respectively. For instance, Maersk’s AE-5 andAE-8 services have been suspended while re-routings have beenundertaken to avoid tolls in several cases, as exemplified by Maersk,CMA-CGM and MSC’s decisions to route Europe-Asia eastboundtraffic via the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa,thereby avoiding Suez Canal’s tolls (which for a super post-pan-amax vessel amount to over USD 800,000 per transit). Such routingalso has other advantages which include: (i) avoiding the threat ofpiracy off the coast of Somalia; and (ii) longer voyages help to

B. Slack / Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–96

absorb capacities. Another strategy many carriers have adopted isoperating joint services or slot charters, such as CMA-CGM andMaersk. In some instances, cutbacks have resulted in a withdrawalof services from certain markets, such as MISC’s pulling-out of itsshared Europe-Asia services in the Grand Alliance. Despite suchdifficulties, it is interesting to note that, so far, only one majorcarrier, Senator Lines, has actually ceased operation.

Reduction in capacity has mostly been achieved through layingup ships. By February 2009, 392 ships of 1.1 million TEUs, or 8.8% ofthe total container fleet, had been laid up (BRS-Alphaliner, 2009).Nevertheless, it may be noted that this is a far lower percentagethan the actual decline in container traffic, where major carriersappear to be maintaining services as long as possible while retiringor laying up smaller (and usually less profitable) ships. On the otherhand, there are marked diversifications between carriers in termsof proportion of ship capacity idled. As illustrated in Table 1, forsome carriers, like Maersk and APL, the proportion and actual totalswithdrawn are significant, while others, such as Evergreen, theidled ships represent only a very small component. On the contrary,MSC has actually even added capacity to its fleet during this periodand is rapidly gaining on Maersk as the leading carrier in terms offleet capacity.

New builds is a significant problem for major carriers, with neworders being placed at the run-up to the boom representinga ‘ticking bomb’ in the present climate of overcapacity. This can beexemplified by the fact that, in June 2008, the order book for newcontainerships represented about 53% of existing fleet capacity.Hence, with the sudden, substantial declines in container traffic,this figure is actually hanging like a ‘Sword of Damocles’ over thecarriers. In tackling this challenge, many carriers have, with limitedsuccess, tried to defer new builds with shipyards and, wherepossible, contracts. In this respect the difficulty is that, orders fromprevious years are coming on stream, with an estimated addition of5000 TEUs per day for 2009. As demonstrated by BRS-Alphaliner(2009), the addition of new builds will represent a medium or evenlong term problem for major carriers, of which global trade needsto grow at a continuous annual rate of 15% for the next three years,should such excess capacity be satisfactorily absorbed. With lessergrowth rates, the load factor, and thus full utilization, of the fleetwould likely be put off for many more years. On the other hand, atpresent, excess capacity has been used to reposition empties, to thedegree that empty boxes are now piled up within Asian ports, whiledecommissioned ships are being used to store containers. Majorcarriers seem to be hoping to ride out the storm by, as much aspossible, maintaining their market presence and retaining inservice ships with the largest capacities, so as to enable them torespond immediately to any possible market rebounds.

Table 1Changes in fleet capacity of selected major container liners, September 2008–April2009.

Shipping line Percent change in fleet capacity

APL �19.9CMA-CGM �2.1CSCL �12.0Evergreen �2.4Hyundai �11.9K Line �21.9Maersk �8.0MISC �27.2MOL �15.1MSC þ11.6NYK �11.6OOCL �14.9Wan Hai �15.9Zim �30.2

Source: BRS-Alphaliner (2009).

3. What comes next?

If anything can be learnt from past major economic disruptions,e.g., Great Depression (1929), WWII (1939–1945), the Oil Crises(1973 and 1979), etc., it is certain that the world thereafter willnever be the same as before, as economic and political crises oftenact as watersheds which mark the end of particular eras, and anyattempts to turn the clock back and carry on business as usual areusually nothing more than wishful thinking. Indeed, virtually eachof these disruptions had triggered and accelerated economicrestructuring, further technological innovation and managementre-organization, which proved to have profound effects on thenature, structure, operation and governance of the business con-cerned. The financial tsunami should be no exception and, hence,one should be expecting similar things to take place.

Of course, what the future of the port and shipping industrieswill be dependent, in part, on how long the recovery takes. Whilesome may be foreseeing recovery beginning since 2009, at thesame time, this may just be wishful thinking. Indeed, whether thefinancial tsunami appears as a temporary blip on the recenttrajectory of the world economic growth chart, or whether growthwill be more muted, resulting in a delay of years for the worldeconomy to regain its 2007 levels of activity, is currently difficult toanswer. Thus, this paper does not intend to speculate on when therecovery does take place, as it will, but rather to consider four keyissues that are likely to help shape future port and shippingindustries during this recovery period, including the changingpatterns of global trades, the importance of being green, thechanging government–industrial relations and the need fortransparency.

3.1. The changing patterns of global trades

As discussed earlier, it is becoming clear that the future distri-bution of economic power, and patterns of international trade, willnot return to the market and trade dominance of the US andEurope. The economic strengths of East and South Asia, alreadyemerging before the financial tsunami, will continue to increaseabsolutely and relatively. Economies within this region havedisproportionately been sheltered from the crisis and, albeit atreduced rates, have continued to grow. No doubt, these economieshave been severely impacted by import declines from the US andEurope, but their huge markets, complemented by growingconsumption and financial stimuli, are likely to lead to their earlyrecovery and subsequent growth. Based on this logic, it appearsinevitable that intra-Asia trade is likely to become THE mostimportant trade nexus in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, the US economy has suffered greatly, andfundamentally, from the crisis, which has accounted for much ofthe growth in international trade over the last decade. However, theUS population has suffered losses of wealth from which anyrecovery will be slow. The US consumer, who accounts for 70% ofthe country’s GDP, has been immeasurably impacted by the declinein personal wealth, and by the burden of personal debt accumu-lated in the boom years. Just as the previous generation exhibitedfrugality due to the Great Depression dating back to the 1930s, sotheir grandchildren and great grand children are now having toadjust to uncertainties and debt loads which will be difficult toerase. When the future strength of the US currency is factored in,their purchasing powers are likely to be diminished. Indeed, thiscan even be seen as a comparable shift in consumption in the US, asoccurred in Japan a decade ago.

No doubt, the US will recover with its economy growing again,but here is argued that the former imbalanced and massive trans-Pacific trade will not return to its previous relative strengths

B. Slack / Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–9 7

because of the factors as discussed earlier. This prediction may beaccentuated by a trend that had begun prior to the financialtsunami. As a consequence of congestions of ports along the USwest coast in the mid-2000s, certain distributors and manufac-turers began to re-think their supply chains that were beingstretched half-way around the world, becoming prone to disrup-tions, while also facing higher costs because of fuel prices. Therewere moves to extend and develop new production facilities inLatin America where labor costs were somewhat higher than inAsia, but where transport times were shorter and allowed a widerrange of American entry ports to be accessed. This is referred to asnearshoring – a strategy re-visited by many firms nowadays seekingways to cut costs in the present economic climate. In the US, therehave been reports in the trade journals of firms re-locating to lowcost areas within the country, such as Arkansas. A similar trend hasalso taken place within Europe where, since the accession of newEastern European members to the EU in 2004, new productionfacilities have been re-established within these regions, especiallyfor time-sensitive cargoes. While trade volumes in these areas stillcannot match those with East Asia, the rise in production costs inChina and values of the RMB, resulting in higher transport costs,possess potentials to represent important trade diversions.

Such developments will have significant impacts on shipping.Not only will the relative market shares of the major East-Westtrade routes may change, but they imply an important relativedecline in average voyage length and long haul routes can bedifferentially impacted. This has to be qualified by the extent towhich the Suez Canal is by-passed on the Asia-Europe routes.However, it is likely that an era characterized by an inexorable risein the size and capacity of containerships is reaching the end of theroad. Although the Malacca-max (which are technically possible)behemoths that were on the drawing boards of naval architects willremain, just like the ULCCs of the liquid bulk trades, they may provetoo much in meeting foreseeable future market conditions.

Thus, it appears likely, therefore, that ship services and portinfrastructure development will have to focus even more on Asia,and perhaps some emerging markets in Latin America. Already,MISC has decided to concentrate its business on Asia, by with-drawing from the Grand Alliance. The issue of port capacity, whichhad been a major issue on the West Coast of North America andEurope before the financial tsunami, may be somewhat relievedwith the future changing patterns of trade and the diversions oftraffic to Gulf and East Coast ports, and the terminal expansionsalready in place in Europe. The focus of port development is goingto be more on emerging Asian and Latin American markets, espe-cially India and Brazil, where congestion is already a pressing issue.

3.2. The importance of being green

Environmental factors are likely to play an enormous role inports and shipping over the next decades. To a certain degree,environmental concerns became apparent within the maritimeindustries prior to the economic crisis, although they are likely toassume an even greater importance in the post-2008 world. Itmay be noted that environmental awareness is cumulative. Oncea company begins to address environmental matters in one area,the interdependent nature of ecological and physical elementsinevitably lead towards ever broader responses. In many cases, theythen seek green suppliers and transporters, so that supply chainsbecome greener. Governments and international organizationsmay too have begun addressing environmental issues as a result ofcatastrophes, such as oil spills, but finding feedback mechanismsrequire ever broader policy actions.

Port and shipping industries, for a long time off the environ-mental radar screen, have already become targets for public policy

regulations regarding ship safety and certain environmentalhazards, such as anti-fouling paints, ballast water treatment anddredging (Talley, 2003). The international nature of containershipping and terminal management implies that policies adoptedin one jurisdiction may spread through many more. One canalready witness the American and Canadian governmentsannouncing a 200 km zone around their coastlines where shipsmust burn low-sulfur fuels, while ports along the western coast ofthe US have imposed restrictions on emissions from trucksaccessing the container terminals. Cold ironing is becominga feature in many ports, while gantry cranes and yard equipmentbeing converted from diesel to electrical power.

The above are only a few examples presently being imple-mented representing the tip of an environmental response icebergthat is likely to become ever more widespread in the future,especially noting that smaller scale, relatively implicit pollutantsgenerated by routine shipping operations are still rather beingoverlooked (Song & Ng, 2008). Not only will ports and the shippingindustry move increasingly to the adoption of environmentalmanagement, but they will have to consider such developments asextended producer responsibility, where the manufacturers andusers have to consider product life cycles, that port equipment andships will ultimately be scrapped. This concept will be an importantconsideration for ships in particular, since the question of disposalis already generating significant environmental problems.

Such developments represent considerable challenges forshipping and ports. Unlike trucking, where new technologies candiffuse in a relatively short time span, ships and port infrastructureshave longer life expectancies (can be in excess of 50 and 20 years forport infrastructures and ships respectively), thus causing techno-logical changes slower to diffuse. Given the capital-intensive natureof port and shipping industries, their assets are relatively slow to bereplaced. However, what is appearing as a threat on the horizonwill become a necessity tomorrow, and successful companies arethose that are already making the adjustments. One example is theport of Montreal which has taken the Boucherville Islands (whichare under its jurisdiction), but which for technical and environ-mental reasons, cannot be developed, and has been improving theecological conditions on the islands, e.g., extending wetlands,preserving habitats, etc. The objective is to establish an environ-mental bank which can be used to offset future expansion of theport on other sites.

Under the current economic climate, it may be difficult toconsider environmental issues, but the ports that prosper in thepost-financial tsunami should be those which have embarkedalready, like Montreal, on sustainable commercial practices.

3.3. The changing government–industrial relations

It is highly likely that there will be a changed relationshipbetween government and the private sector as one of the conse-quences of the current economic crisis. Over the past 30 years,deregulation and privatization of the economy had been a commonfeature around the world and various inter-governmental organi-zations, like the World Bank, had endorsed liberalization and freemarket, albeit subject to debate, being the guarantor of economicgrowth. Within transportation, a typical example was the portindustries which have become increasingly privatized, wheregovernments have generally been content to stand away from port/terminal operation and management, as multinational companieshave been granted long term leases (cf. Wang, Ng, & Olivier, 2004).However, this situation is changing. The financial tsunami has led togovernment (re-)nationalizations or financial involvement inbanks, automobile companies and shipping lines, which serves as

3 For further information on terminal concessions, see the paper of Theys et al.(2010).

B. Slack / Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–98

the harbinger of a new, rising relationship between public andprivate sectors.

There are already signs within the port industries indicating thatthe liberalization pendulum is swinging back. A number ofgovernments, such as those in Canada and the US, are stepping in toprovide financial assistance to ports under the so-called ‘nationalstimulus packages’, in particular to those oriented towards infra-structure development. On the other hand, the South Koreangovernment has established a fund helping shipping lines to retireships through purchasing them at commercial prices. Once again,governments start to realize the vital national functions of portsand shipping being keys to international and regional trade andeconomic development. In this regard, short sea shipping and portgateway policies are the two areas of re-awakened interests bysome governments in the maritime industries, as exemplified bythe EU’s initiative in promoting these areas (A.K.Y.Ng, 2009). Whenthese are added to the already strong public involvements inmaritime security and growing interests in environmental regula-tions, it appears inevitable that the maritime industries should beprepared for a re-balancing of relationships between differentsectors.

3.4. The need for transparency

One outcome of the trend discussed above is that, the moreinvolved governments have become in the regulatory arenas withinthe transport industries, the greater the need for more trans-parency among stakeholders. The public sector will begin todemand greater accountability of the results of its investments. Arecent example is the Stress Test issued by the US government onthe financial health of banks. Of course, greater requirements foraccountability by governments on the transport industries will notonly be restricted to financial matters, but also to maritime securityand environmental performances. Here transparency is not limitedto government-derived demands and perhaps stronger are thepressures from within the private sector. Firms are finding itessential to measure their own activities to improve performanceand make rational choices between investment alternatives.Transparency is particularly evident between customers and part-ners in logistics chains requiring better information on theperformance of their transport suppliers (Caplice & Sheffi, 1994).Thus, intra-firm and inter-firm performance indicators are neces-sary. So far, few governments have sought to measure portperformance, with the Australian government’s assessment ofcontainer port activities serving as the major exception (Govern-ment of Australia, 2008). On the other hand, the Canadiangovernment is now pursuing a strategy of developing indicators ofcontainer and bulk cargo activity, while the European Sea PortsOrganization (ESPO) is extending its preliminary steps. These arethe precursors of an inevitable trend.

Nevertheless, extensive care must be taken in the selection ofperformance indicators. Substantial studies have used outputmetrics such as container throughputs (like Cullinane, Wang, Song,& Ping, 2006; Tongzon & Heng, 2005) and customer surveys (likeMurphy, Dalenberg, & Daley, 1988; Ng, 2006; Slack, 1985) as indi-cators. Such indicators are not always perfect, however, as theysometimes reflect more regional economic activities rather thanactual performances. Hence, two types of measures should beemployed: inputs, which represent what port starts with, e.g.,physical infrastructures, manpower, etc.; and outputs, includingthroughputs, revenues and service effects of port activities oncustomers, e.g., costs, supplies, on-time deliveries, incomes, etc.Indeed, the dissemination of meaningful indicators would go a longway towards the demonstration of real public accountabilities. Bymaking their missions explicit, measuring the extent to which they

have achieved initial goals and objectives, sharing data onsuccesses and obstacles, what is being done to remedy defficiences,the general public trust and confidence in port administration canbe significantly enhanced. Indeed, this would be an important stepfor ports to regain the support of local communities, as they soughtto carry out activities that are poorly understood, thus increasingthe chances of arousing conflicts (McCalla, 1999). Moreover, it is notthe public sector alone which benefits, where the Australianexample demonstrates that industrial groups are actually amongthe biggest beneficiaries (Hamilton, 1999). Customers and chainpartners can obtain better understandings on how the portindustries and carriers are performing, and how they respond tothe problems identified.

4. Conclusions

To conclude, once again, it is reiterated that the future maritimeindustries will not be a return to the pre-2008 status quo. Majorchanges should be anticipated, many of which are impossible todiscern at this time. The depth, scope and extent of the financialtsunami suggest that its long term impacts will be considerable. Inthis paper, several practical survival prescriptions for the maritimeindustries, especially port and shipping, have been suggested.Rather, it has sought to describe some features that are likely toemerge in the post-2008 world which have the potentials to impacton the future maritime industries.

Of fundamental importance will be the future patterns ofinternational trade. It is suggested that the dominance of the East-West trades may be diluted, as emerging economies are likely tosurvive the crisis in better health than some of the present majoreconomies. Recoveries within the developed world can be slow,and in the short to medium terms at least, cross-border trades canbe more focused on East and South Asia, thus causing some supplychains comprising the East-West trades being diverted to North–South axis (such as Brazil-US). In an overall, the average voyagelengths may shorten which stimulate the question about re-assessing the optimal ship sizes, given that industrial players arelargely sensitive to changing market environments (Ng & Kee,2008).

Also, the slowdown in international trade will have long termeffects on ports. They may be able better to cope with congestionproblems but, given the intensity of inter-port competition sincethe establishment of hub-and-spoke shipping networks datingback towards the end of the last century (A. Ng, 2009), possibly themost serious long term challenges will be for the (often multina-tional) terminal operators, many of whom paid unsustainablepremiums to obtain concessions.3 Indeed, firms that were temptedto enter the terminal stevedoring business by perceived highinvestment returns are likely to have their fingers burned. In thissense, it may be that the terminals may again be led by companiesthat, to the very least, understand the business.

Furthermore, it is suggested that the environment is increas-ingly becoming a significant factor within the maritime industries,of which it likely to grow significantly as the world recovers fromthe economic crisis. First, legislation at all levels is likely to increase,and also there are growing demands within the shipping industriesand their customers for more sustainable actions. The presenthiatus provides an opportunity for carriers and ports to prepare forand anticipate the environmental challenges ahead. In this regard,a dynamic, changing relationship between governments and theport and shipping industries is likely to take place. In the post-2008

B. Slack / Research in Transportation Economics 27 (2010) 4–9 9

world, not only will maritime security be maintained as an interestof governments, but environment and financial involvements4 arealso likely to lead to further regulation and oversight.

Last but not least, the issue of accountability is raised, not onlydue to the substantial financial amounts obliged within the portindustries, environmental, safety and security concerns, but alsothe growing demands by supply chain customers for betterperformance-related information. Ports and shipping lines aregoing to be held to higher levels of performance, which will requirethe collection and dissemination of reliable, quality indicators.Actors who manage to meet these new, rising demands areexpected to gain competitive advantages. In long term, each ofthese issues has the potentials to alter the maritime industries inhighly significant ways, as well as battening down the hatchesstimulated by the financial tsunami.

References

BRS-Alphaliner. (2009). The containership market in 2008. Paris: Barry RoglianoSalles.

Caplice, C., & Sheffi, Y. (1994). A review and evaluation of logistics metrics. TheInternational Journal of Logistics Management, 5(2), 11–28.

Cullinane, K., Wang, T. F., Song, D. W., & Ping, J. (2006). The technical efficiency ofcontainer ports: comparing data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontieranalysis. Transportation Research A: Policy and Practice, 40(4), 354–374.

Government of Australia. (2008). Waterline, department of infrastructure, transportand regional economics. Canberra: Government of Australia.

Hamilton, C. (1999). Measuring container port productivity: The Australian experience.The Australia Institute Background paper no. 17. Canberra: The Australia Insti-tute, Australian National University.

4 For further information on maritime security, see the paper of Ng and Liu(2010).

McCalla, R. J. (1999). Global change, local pain: intermodal seaport terminals andtheir service areas. Journal of Transport Geography, 7(4), 247–254.

Murphy, P., Dalenberg, D., & Daley, J. (1988). A contemporary perspective oninternational port operations. Transportation Journal, 28(1), 23–32.

Ng, A. (2009). Port competition: The case of North Europe. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag.Ng, A. K. Y. (2009). Competitiveness of short sea shipping and the role of port: the

case of North Europe. Maritime Policy and Management, 36(4), 337–352.Ng, K. Y. A. (2006). Assessing the attractiveness of ports in the North European

container transhipment market: an agenda for future research in port compe-tition. Maritime Economics and Logistics, 8(3), 234–250.

Ng, A. K. Y., & Kee, J. K. Y. (2008). The optimal ship sizes of container liner feederservices in southeast Asia: a ship operator’s perspective. Maritime Policy andManagement, 35(4), 353–376.

Ng, A. K. Y., & Liu, J. J. (2010). The port and maritime industries in the post-2008world: Challenges and opportunities. Research in Transportation Economics,27(1), 1–3.

Slack, B. (1985). Containerization: inter-port competition and port selection.Maritime Policy and Management, 12(4), 293–303.

Slack, B., & Fremont, A. (2004). The transformation of port terminal operations:from the local to the global. Transport Reviews, 25, 117–130.

Song, S., & Ng, K. Y. A., (25–28 May 2008). Assessing the natural and socio-economicenvironments caused by routine maritime activities: A new perspective and itsapplications to North Europe. Proceedings of IFSPA 2008 (pp. 345–357), HongKong, China.

Talley, W. K. (2003). Environmental impacts of shipping. In D. A. Hensher, &K. J. Button (Eds.), Handbook of transport and the environment (pp. 279–290).Oxford: Elsevier.

The Economist, 13 March 2009.Theys, C., Theo, E. N., Pallis, A. A., & De Langen, P. W. (2010). The economics behind

the awarding of terminals in seaports: Towards a research agenda. Research inTransportation Economics, 27(1), 37–50.

Tongzon, J. L., & Heng, W. (2005). Port privatization, efficiency and competitiveness:some empirical evidence from container ports (terminals). TransportationResearch Part A: Policy and Practice, 39(5), 405–424.

Wang, J. J., Ng, K. Y. A., & Olivier, D. (2004). Port governance in China: a review ofpolicies in an era of internationalising port management practices. TransportPolicy, 11(3), 237–250.