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  • 8/9/2019 Benn, Alfred_The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought. 1_Mind, 7, 25_1882!65!88

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    Mind ssociation

    The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern ThoughtAuthor(s): Alfred W. BennSource: Mind, Vol. 7, No. 25 (Jan., 1882), pp. 65-88Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2246807 .Accessed: 23/02/2015 13:34

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    IV.-THE RELATION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY TOMODERN THOUGHT.

    I.ADEQUATELYto exhibit the relation of Greek philosophy o

    modern thought would require a volume. The object of thepresent iscussion s merely o show in what ways that relationhas been most clearly manifested, nd what assistance t may

    afford s in solving some important roblems onnectedwiththe development f metaphysical nd moral peculation.Historians ften peak as if philosophy ookan entirely resh

    start t different pochs of its existence. One stuch reak isvariously ssociated with Descartes, r Bacon, or some one oftheir talian predecessors. In like manner, he introduction fChristianity, oupledwith the closing of the Athenian schoolsby Justinian, s considered, s once was the suppression f theWest-Roman Csesarateby Odoacer, o mark the beginning fa new regime. But there can be no more real break n thecontinuity f intellectual than in the continuity f politicalhistory, eyond what sleep or inactivity may simulate n thelife of the organic aggregate no less than in the life of theorganic ndividual. In each instance the thread s taken upwhere it was dropped. If the rest of the world has beenadvancingmeanwhile, ew tendencies will come nto play, butonly by first ttaching hemselves o older ines of movement.Sometimes, gain,what seemsto be a revolution s, in truth, herevival or iberation f an earlier movement hrough hedecayor destruction f beliefswhich have hitherto hecked ts growth.Thus the systems of Plato and Aristotle, fter carrying llbefore them for a brief period, were found unsuitable, romtheir vast comprehension nd high spirituality, o the unde-veloped consciousness f their age, and were replaced bypopularised ersions f the sceptical r naturalistic hilosophieswhich they had endeavoured o suppress. And when thesewere at length eft behind by the forward movement f thehuman mind, speculative reformers pontaneously everted othe two great Socratic thinkers or a better olution of theproblems n debate. After many abortive fforts, teacherappearedpossessing ufficient enius o fuse their rinciples ntoa seemingly oherent nd comprehensive hole. By combiningthe Platonic nd Aristotelian piritualism with some mysticalelements borrowed rom Stoicism, lotinus did for n age ofintellectual ecadence what his modelshad done n vain for an

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    66 The Relation f Greek hilosophy o Modern hought.

    ageof ntellectual rowth. The relation n whichhe stands to

    Stoicism and Epicureanism eproduces he relation n wlhichthey toodto the variousphysical nd sophistic chools of theirtime; but the silent xperience f six centurieswon for him amuch more nduring uccess.

    Neo-Platoniism as the form under which Greekphilosophypassed into Christian eaching; and the transition was effectedwith ess difficulty ecause Christianity ad already absorbedsomeof ts most essential lements rom he original ystem ofPlato himself. Meanwhile he revival of spiritualism ad given

    an immense mpulse o the study of the classicwritings henceit was drawn; and the more hey were studied he morepro-minently did their antagonism n certain mportant uestionscome nto view. Hence no soonerdid the two systems etweenwhich Plotinus had establisbed provisional ompromise omeout victorious rom heir struggle with materialism, han' theybegan to separate and draw off nto opposing camps. Theprincipal subject of dispute was the form under which deasexist. The conflicting heories f Realismand Nominalism realready set forth with perfect learness by Porphyry n hisintroduction o the Organon; and his statement f the case, asVictor Cousinhas pointed ut, gave the signal for controversyforming he central nterest f Scholasticism uring he entireperiodof ts duration. Now, t is a remarkable act, nd one asyet not sufficiently ttended o,that a metaphysical ssue firstraised between the Platonists nd Aristotle, nd regarded, tleast by the latter, s of supreme mportance orphilosophy,should have been totally neglected t a time when abundantdocuments n both ides were open to consultation, nd takenup with passionate eagerness t a time when not more han oneor two dialogues f Plato and two or three tracts of Aristotlecontinued o be read in the western world. Various explana-tions of this singular nomalymay be offered. It may be said,for nstance, hat after Every moral and religious uestion nwhich the schools of Athens were divided -hadbeen closed bythe authoritaitive uling of Catholicism, othing remained toquarrel overbut points oo remote r too obscure or he Churchto interfere n their decision; and that these were accordinglyseized upon as the only field where human ntelligence ouldexercise tself with ny approach o freedom. The truth, ow-ever, eemsto be that to take any interest n the controversybetween Realism and Nominalism, t was first necessary hatEuropean thought s a whole should rise to a level with thecomnmontandpoint f their first upporters. This revolutionwas effected y the general adoption of a monotheistic aith.Moreover, hePlatonic deaswere something ore hanfigments

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    TheRelation f Greek 4ilosophytoModern hought. 67

    of an imaginative dialectic. They were now beginning o

    appear n their rue iglit, nd as what Plato had always under-stood them to be-no mere abstractions rom xperience, utspiritual orces y which ensuous ealitywas to be reconstitutedand reformed. The Church herself eemed something morethan a collection f individuals holding common convictionsaTnd beying common discipline; she was, like Plato's ownRepublic, he visible embodiment f an archetype aid up inHeaven. And the Church's eaching eemed lso to assume heindependent eality of abstract deas. Does not the Trinityinvolvebelief n a God distinct rom ny of the Divine Personstaken alone? Do not the Fall, the Incarnation, nd theAtonement becomemore ntelligible f we imagine an idealhumanity inning with the first dam and purified y becomingunited with he second Adam ? Such, at least, eems to havebeen the dimly conceivedmetaphysics f St. Paul, whatevermay now be the official octrine f Rome. It'was therefore norder hat, uring he first alf of the Middle Ages, rom harle-rnagne o the Crusades, ealism houldhave been the prevailin1gdoctrine; the more so because Plato's Tima3us, which wasstudied n the schools hrough hat entire period, urnishes tsreaderswith complete heory f the universe; while only theformal ide of Aristotle's hilosophy s represented y such ofhis logical treatises s were hen known o Western hristendom.

    Yet Realism concealed danger oorthodoxy hich was notlong n making tself elt. Just as the substantiality f indi-viduals disappeared n that of their containing pecies, o alsodid every ubordinate pecies tend to vanish in the sumqmumgenuts f absolute Being. Now such a conclusionwas nothingless than full-blown antheism; nd Pantheism wag, n fact, hesystemn f the first reat Schoolman, ohnScotusErigena;whileother Realistswere only prevented rom eaching he same goalby the restraint ither of Christian aith or of ecclesiasticalauthority. But if they failed o draw the ogicalconsequencesof their premisses, t was drawn for them by others; andAbelard did not fail to twit his opponents with he formidableheresy mplied n their ealistic rinciples.' As yet, owevQr, heweight f authority nclined owards lato's side; and the perse-

    cution uffered y Ab6lard himself, s comparedwith the verymild treatment ccorded to his contemporary, ilbert de laPorr6e,when each was arraigned n a charge of heresy, howsthat while the Nominalism f the one was an aggravation, heRealism of the other was an extenuation, f his offence.2

    l aureau,Histoire e a Philosophiecolastique,. 372.2 For Gilbert e la Porree eeHaurdau, ., chap.xviii.

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    68 TheRelation f Greek hilosophy o Modern hought.

    So matters tood when he ntroduction f Aristotle's ntiresystem nto Western Europebroug t about a revolution om-parable to that effected wo cenituries ater by the completerecovery f ancient iterature. t was through atin translationsfrom he Arabic, ccompanied y Arabiccommentaries, hat hePeripatetic hilosophy as first evealed n its entirety; andeven Albertus Magnus, iving in the thirteenth entury, eemsto have derived his knowledge of the subject from theseexclusively. But in 1209, a few years after he capture ofConstantinople y the Crusaders, he Greek manuscripts fAristotle ere

    broughto

    Paris, nd towards he middle of thecentury new Latin version was made from heseunder thesupervision f St. Thomas Aquinas.' The triumph f Aristotlewas now, t least for a time, ecured. For, while in the firstperiod f the Middle Ageswe find nly single great name, hatof Ab6lard, mong the Nominalists, gainst a strong rray fRealists, n the second period the proportions re reversed, ndRealismhas only a single. orthy hampion, uns Scotus, opitagainstAlbertus, quinas, nd William of Ockham, ach of hemrepresenting ne of the principal uropean nations. Thehumanintellect, itherto onfined ithin he narrow ounds f ogic, owranged ver physics,metaphysics,' sychology, nd ethiQs; andalthough ll these subjects were studied only at second-handand with very limited opportunities or criticism, till thebenefit eceived must have been mmense. The priceless erviceof the later Schoolmen s to have appropriated nd successfullyupheld, against Platonism on the one hand and theologicalmysticism n the other, philosophy which, however uper-ficial, ook n the whole range f natural henomena, erived llknowledge rom xternal observation, nd set an exampleofadmirable recision n the systematic xposition f its results.If no positive addition was made to that vast storehouse ffacts nd ideas, heblame does not ie with Aristotle's method,but with he forcible uppression f free mental ctivity y theChurch, r ts diversion o more profitable ields y the study fRoman jurisprudence. Even as it was,Aristotle ontributedlargely o the downfall f ecclesiastical uthority n two ways;directly y accustomingmen to use their eason, nd indirectly

    by throwing ack mysticism n ts proper ffice-the estorationof a purely ersonal eligion.But before he dissolving ction of Nominalism ad become

    fully manifest, ts ascendancywas once more challenged; ndthis time, lso, the philosophical mpulse camefrom onstanti-nople. Greek cholars, eeking elp n the West, brought ith

    I Jourdain, echerchesritiquesur esTracuctionsatines 'Aristote.

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    TheRelation f Greek hilosophy o Modern Thought. 69

    them o Florence he completeworks of Plato, and these wereshortly made accessible to a wider public through he Latintranslation f Ficino. Their influence eems at first o havetold in favour of mysticism, or this was -the contemporarytendency o which they could be most readily affiliated; nd,besides, n swinging ack from Aristotle's philosophy o therival form f spiritualism, men's minds naturally everted nthe first nstance to what had once inked hem ogether-thesystem f Plotinus. Thus Platonism was studied hrough nAlexandrian medium and as the Alexandrians had looked atit, that s to say, chiefly nder ts theological nd metaphysicalaspects. As such it became, he accepted philosophy f theRenaissance, nd much of what we most dmire n the iterature

    at least the English iterature-of hat period, sdirectly race-able to Platonic nfluence. That the Utopiaof Sir ThomasMorewasinspired y the -Republicnd the Critias s, of ourse, bvious;and the great part played by the deal theory n Spenser's aeryQueen, hough ess evident, s still sufficiently lear. As Mr.Green observes n his History f the English People II. 413),

    Spenser borrows, n fact, he delicate nd refined orms of thePlatonic philosophy oexpresshis own moral nthusiasm.Justice, emperance, ruth re no mere names to him, but real'existences o which his whole nature clings with a rapturousaffection. Now it deserves bservation.,s illustrating greatrevolution n European thought, hat the relation of Plato tothe epic of the English Renaissance s precisely paralleled bythe relation f Aristotle o the epic of mediLevaltaly. Danteborrowsmnore han his cosmography rom he Stagirite. Thesuccessive circles of

    Hell,the

    spiralsof

    Purgatory,nd

    thespheres f Paradise, re a framework n which he characters fthe poemare exhibited, ot as individual ctors whomwe tracethrough life's history, ut as types of a class and repre-sentatives of a single mental quality, whether vicious orvirtuous. In other words, he historical rrangement f allprevious poems is abandoned n favour of a logical arrange-ment. For the order of contiguity n time s substituted heorder f resemblance nd difference n idea. How thoroughlyAristotelian, ndeed, were the lines within which media-walimaginationmoved s provedby the possibility f tracing hemin a work utterly different rom Dante's-the Decameron fBoccaccio. The tales constituting hiscollection re so arrangedthat each day illustrates ome one specialclass of adventures;only, omake goodAristotle's rinciple hat earthly ffairs renot subject o invariable ules, single departure rom he pre-scribed ubject is allowed in each decade; while during one

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    70 TheRelation f Greek hilosophy oModernThought.

    entire ay the story-tellers re left free to choose a subject at

    their wn discretion.Now what distinguishes penser rom ante is that, whilehealso dispQses is inventions ccording o an extremely' rtificialand abstract chematism, ith him, as with Plato, abstractionsacquirea separate ndividual existence, eing, n fact, mbodiedas so many persons; while Dante, following Aristotle, everseparateshis from he concrete ata of experience. And it maybe noted hat, n this respect t least, English iterature as notdeserted the philosophy which presided over ts second birth.

    It has ever since been more prone o realise abstraction hanany other literature, whether under the form of allegories,parables, or mere casual illustrations rawn from materialobjects. Even at this day English writers rowd heir pageswith dazzling metaphors which to Continental eaders musthave sometimes.a ather arbaric ffect.

    Another and profounder haracteristic f Plato, as dis-tinguished rom Aristotle, s his thoroughgoing pposition freality to appearance; his distrust of sensuous perception,imagination, nd opinion; his continual appeal to a hiddenworld of absolute truth nd justice. We find his profounderprinciple lso grasped nd applied to poetical purposes n ourElizabethan literature, ot only by Spenser, but by a stillgreater master-Shakespeare. It is by no means unlikely hatShakespearemayhave ooked nto translation f the Dialogues;at any rate, the intellectual tmosphere e breathed was sosaturated with heir pirit hat he couldeasily absorb nough fit to inspire him with the theory f existencewhich lone givesconsistency o his dramatic work from first olast. For theessence of his cQnedies is that they represent he ordinaryworld of sensible experience s a scene of bewilderment nddelusion, where there is nothing fixed, nothing satisfying,nothing rue; as something hich, ecauseof ts very unreality,is best represented y the drarna, hough ot without mysteriousintimations f a reality ehind heveil. In them we have the

    Fallings rom s,vani,shings,Blankmisgivilngsf creatureMoving bout n worlds ot realised;

    while in his tragedieswe have the realisation f those worlds- the workings f an eternal ustice which lone remains aith-ful to one purpose lhrough he infinite lux of passion and ofsense.

    Besidesthe revival of Platonism, hree causes had conspiredto overthrow he supremacy f Aristotle. The literary enais-sance with ts passionfor beauty of form' was alienatedby thebarbarous dialect, f Scholasticism; the mnystical heology f

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    IThe elation f Greek hilosophy o Mlodern ho-ught. 71

    Luther aw in it an ally both- f ecclesiastical uthority nd of

    human reason; and the new spirit f passionate evolt gainstall tradition ttacked he accepted philosophy n cominonwithevery ther ranch f the official niversity urriculum. Beforelong,however, reaction et in. The innovators discreditedthemselves by an extravagance, n ignorance, credulity, ndan intolerance orse than anything n the teachingwhich heydecried. No soonerwas the Reformation rganised s a positivedoctrine han it fell back for suipport n the only model ofsystematic hinking t that time o be found. The Humanists

    were conciliated y having, he original text of Aristotle lacedbefore hem, nd they readily believed, what was not true, hatit contained wisdom which had eluded mediaeval esearch.But the great scientific movement of the sixteenth enturycontributed, ore than any other mpulse, o bring about anAristotelian reaction. After winning mmortal riumphs nevery branch f art and literature, he Italian intellect hrewitself with equal vigour into the investigation f physicalphenomena. Here Plato could give little help, whereasAristotle upplied a methodised escription f the whole fieldto be explored, nd contributions f extraordinary alue towardsthe understanding f some at least among ts infinite etails.And we may measure he renewed opularity f his system otonly by the fact that Cesalpinus, he greatest aturalist f theage, professed imself ts adherent, ut also by the bitterness fthe criticisms irected gainst it, and the nvoluntary omageoffered y rival systems which were little more han meagreexcerpts rom he Peripatetic ntology nd logic.

    Of all testimonies o the restored upremacy fAristotelianism,there s none so remarkable s that afforded y the thinker ho,more han any other, as enjoyed the credit of its overthrow.To call Francis Bacon an Aristotelian- ill seem to most readersa paradox. Such an appellation would, however, be muchnearer he truth han were the titles formerly estowed n theauthor f the Novnum rganunm. The notion, ndeed, that hewas in any sense the father f modern science s rapidly dis-appearing friom he creed of educated persons. Its long con-tinuance was due to a coalition of literary men who knew

    nothing bout physics nd of physicists hoknewnothing bouthistory r philosophy. It is certain hat the great discoveriesmade both before nd during Bacon's ifetime ere the starting-point of all future rogress n the samedirection. It is equallycertain that Bacon himself had either not heard of those dis-caveries r that he scornfully ejectedthem. But it might tillbe contended hat he divined and formulated he only methodby which these and all other reat additions ohuman know-

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    72 TheRelation f Greek hilosophy oModern hought.

    ledgehave been made,had not the delusion een dispelled by

    recent nvestigations, ore especially those of his own editors,Messrs. Ellis and Spedding. Mr. Spedding has shown thatBacon's method never was applied to physical science at all.Mr. Ellis has shown hat t was incapableof application, eingfounded on a complete misconception f the problem o besolved. The facts ould, n truth, avehardly een other hanwhat they are. Had Bacon succeeded in laying down thelines of future nvestigation, t would have been a tellingargument gainst his own implied belief that all knowledge s

    derived from xperience. For, granting he validity of thatbelief, true heory of discovery an only be reached by aninduction from the observed facts of scientifi6 ractice. Itwouldhave been still more extraordinary ad he furnishedclue to the abyrinth f nature without ver having xplored tsmazes on his own account. Even as it is, from Bacon's ownpoint of view the contradiction emains. If ever any systemnwas constructed priori he [nstauratio Magnawas. But thereis really no such thing as a priori speculation. Apart fromobservation he keenest and boldest intellect an do no morethan rearrange he materials upplied by tradition, r give ahigher generalisation, o the, principles of other philosophers.Thiswas preciselywhat Bacon did. The wealth of aphoristicwisdom and ingenious llustration cattered hrough his writ-.ingsbelongs ntirely ohimself; but his dream f using cienceas an instrument or cquiring unlimited power over nature sinhlerited rom he astrologers, lchemists, nd magicians f theMiddle Agres; nd his philosophical ystem, with which alonewe are here concerned, s partly a modification, artly anextension, f Aristotle's. An examination f ts leading featureswill at once make this clear.

    Bacon beginsby demanding hat throughout he wholerangeof experience ew facts hould be collected n the argest cale,in order o supply materials or cientific elieralisation. Therecan be no doubt that he is here guided by the example ofAristotle, nd of Aristotle lone. Such a storehouse f materialsis still extant n the History f Animals, which evidently ug-gested he use of the word History in this sense to Bacon,and which, y the way, is imlmensely uperior oanything hathe ever attempted n the same ine. The facts on which Aris-totle's olitics s based were contained n another ast descriptivework of the samekind, now unhappily ost. Even the Stagirite'smore ystematic reatises omprise multitude f observations,cAtalogued ccording to a certain order, but not reduced toscientific rinciples. What Bacon did was to carry out, or tobid others arry ut, heplan so suggested n every departmient

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    The Relation f Greek hilosophy oModernThought. 73

    of inquiry. But if we ask by what method e was guided n

    his survey f the whole field o be explored, how he came by acomplete numeration f the ciences rranged ccording otheirlogical order, he answer s still that he borrowed it from hePeripatetic ncyclopcedia.

    One need only compare he catalogue of particular istoriessubjoined to the Parasceve,l with a table of Aristotle'sworks, to understand how closely Bacon follows in thefootsteps of his predecessor. We do indeed find sundrysubjects enumerated n which the older student had not

    touched, but they are only such as wotu-ld aturally suggestthemselves to a man of comprehensive ntelligence, omingnearly two thousand years after his original; while theyare mostly of no philosophical alue whatever. Bacon's meritwas to bring the distinction etween the descriptive ciencesand the theoretical ciences nto clearer consciousness, nd togive a view of the former orresponding n completeness o thatalready btained f the atter.

    The methodical istinction etween he materials or eneralis-ation and generalisation tself, s derived rom he metaphysicaldistinction etween Matter and Form in nature.2 This dis-tinction s the next great feature f Bacon's philosophy, ndit is taken, still more obviously han the first, romAristotle,the most manifest lots of the original being faithfully epro-duced n the copy. The Forms f simple ubstances were, ccord-ing to the Stagirite, heir sensible qualities. The Forms ofaggregates ere the vwholeomplex f their ifferential haracter-istics. And although he formal ause or idea of a thing wascarefully iscriminated rom ts efficient nd final auses, t wasfound mpossible n practice to keep the three from runninginto one. Again, the distinction etween single concepts ndthe udgments reated y putting wo concepts ogether, lthoughclearly onveyed by the logical distinction etween terms ndpropositions as no sooner perceived han lost sight f, hanksto the unfortunate heory f essential predicatioii. For it wasthought hat the import of universal propositions onsistedeither n stating he total concept to which a given mark be-longed, r n annexing new mark o a given concept. Hencein Aristotle's ystem he study of natural aw means nothingbut the definition nd classification f natural types; and thewhole universe s conceived s an arrangement f concentricspheres, ach receiving ts impulsefrom hat mmediately bove

    1 Works. 405 n Ellis &Spedding's d.2 iistoria naturalis . . . materia rima philosophiwe. e Agq.

    II. iii.

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    74 TheBelation f Greek hilosophy o ModernThought.

    it. Precisely the same confusion f Form, Cause, and Law

    reigns hroughout Bacon~stheory f nature. We do, indeed,find mention made of axiomata or general propositions o agreater xtent han in the O?qanon, ut they re never learlydistinguished rom Forms, nor Forms from functions.' Andalthough efficient nd material' 4uses re assigned to physics,while formal nd final causes ate reserved for metaphysics-an apparent recognition f the wide difference etween theforces which bring' thing into existence and the actualconditions of its stability,-this arrangement s a departurefrom the letter rather than from the spirit of Aristotle'sphilosophy. For the efficient ausesof he De Auxgmentisnswerroughly o the various kinds of motion discussed n the Physic.sand in the treatise OnsGenewationnd Corruption; while itsForms re, as we have seen, dentified ith natural causes orlaws in the most general ense.

    According o Bacon, the object of science s to analysethecomplex f Forms making up an individual ggregate nto itsseparate constituents, he object of art to superinduce ne ormore such Forms on a given material. Hence his manner fregarding hemdiffers n one important espect rom Aristotle's.The Greek naturalist was before, ll things a biologist. Hisinterest ay with the distinguishing haracteristics f animalspecies. Theseare easily discovered y the unassisted' ye; butwhile they re comparatively uperficial, hey re also compara-fivelv unalterable. The English experimenter, eingprimarilyconcernedwith norganic odies, whose properties e desired outilise for ndustrial urposes,was led to consider he attributesof an object as at once penetrating ts inmost exture, nd yetcapable of being separated from t. But, like every otherthinker f the age, f he escapes from he control f Aristotle tis only to fall under he dominiion f another Greekmaster-inthis nstance Democritus. Baconhad a great dmiration or haAtomists, nd although his inveterate eripatetib roclivitiesprevented him from embracing heir theory as a whole,hewent along with it so far as to admit the dependence f thesecondary n the primary ualities of matter.

    The next step was to create a method for determining he

    particular onfiguration n which any given property f miatterdepends. If such a problem ould be solvedat all, it would beby some new system f.practical analysis. Bacon did not seethis because he was a Schoolman, mancipated, ndeed, from

    ',The notions and conceptions f the Advancement f Learning(Works, II. 356)is rendered y axiomata in the De AugmentisI. 567),where n both nstances hequestion s entirely bout Forims. Cp. ? 8 ofProfessor owler's ntroduction othe NovumOgcanum.

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    TheBelation f Greek hilosophy o MWodern,hought. 75

    ecclesiastical uthority ut retaining blind faith n the power

    of ogic. Aristotle's rganon ad been the great torehouse faids to verbal disputation; t should now be turned nto aninstrument or the more successful prosecution f physicalresearches. What definitions ere o the one, hatForms houldbe to the other; therefore oth could be determined y muchthe same process. Now Aristotle himself had emphaticallydeclared hat tlne oncepts ut of which propositions re con-structed were discoverable y indaLctionnd by induction lone.With himr, nduction meant comparing number f instancesand abstracting he one

    circumstance, f any, in which theyagreed. When the object is to establish a proposition nduc-tively, e has recourse o a method f elimination, nd bids ussearchfor nstanceswhich, iffering n everything lse, agree nthe association f woparticularmarks. (Prior Analyt. I. xxx.)In the Topicshe goesstill further nd suppliesus with varietyof tests for scertainiing he relation between givenpredicateand a,given ubject. Among heseMill'sMethods f Difference,Residues, nd Concomitant ariations re very clearly tated.'But he doesnot call such modesof reasoning nduction. So faras he has any generalname for hem t all, it is Dialectic, hat sSyllogism f which he premisses re not absolutely ertain; ndas a matter f nomenclature e seems to be right. There s un-doubtedly process by which we arrive t general onclusionsfrom hecomparison f particular nstances; but this process nits purity s nothing more nor less than induction y simpleenumeration. All other reasoning eqqires he aid of universalpropositions, nd is therefore, o that extent, deductive. Themethods of elimination r, as they are now called, of experi-ment, nvolve t every tep the assumption f general rinciples.'duly specified n that chapter of Mill's Logicwhere they areanalysed. And wherever e can rise mmediately rom singleinstance to a general law, it is because the examination f'that single instance has been preceded y a chain of deductive*reasoiiing.

    The confusion f nduction roperly ocalledand Elimination'under single name is largely due to the bad example set byBacon. He found t stated n the Analytics hat all conceptsand generalpropositions re established ither by syllogism rby induction; and he found sorne very useful rules aid downin the Topics not answering to what he understood y the

    I Professor Bain after mentioning that the second book of the Topiocsets forth n a crule condition he principal canons of inductive og,ic,

    goes on to say that, these statements canno.t be called germs for theynever germinated (Grote's Minor Works, p. 14). May they not havegerminated n the Novum Organun ?

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    -76 lhe Relation of Greek hilosophy oModern hought.

    former method; he therefore ummarily ubbed hem with the

    namne f nduction which hey havekept ever since to the ncal-eculable onfusion f thought.In working ut h'is heory f logic, he point on which Bacon

    lays most tress s the use of negative nstances. He seems othink hat their pplication o reasoning s an original iscoveryof his own. But on examination o more eems- o be meant byit than that, efore cceptinig ny particular heory, e shouldconsiderwhat other explanations f the same fact might on-ceivably be offered. n other words, we should follow the

    example lready et by Aristotle nd nearly very ther Greekphilosopher fter ocrates. But this s not nduction; t is rea-.soning own from disjunctive roposition, enerally ssumedwithout ny close scrutiny, ith the help of sundry onditionalpropositions, ntil we reach our conclusion y a sort of exhaus-tive process. Either his, hat, or the other s the explanationof something. But if t were either hat or the other, o and sowould follow, which is impossible; therefore t must be this.No other ogic is possible n the nfancy of inquiry; but onegreat dvantage of experiment nd matheinatical nalysis s torelieveus from he necessity f employina t.

    The value of experimentation s such had, however, carcelydawned on Bacon. His famous rerogative nstances re n themain a guide to simple observation, upplemented ather hanreplaced by direct interference ith the phenomena underexamination, omparable o that noderate se of the rack whichlhewouldhave countenanced-in riminal rocedure. There wasperhaps deepermeaning n Harvey's emark hat Bacon wroteabout nature ike a Lord Chancellor han the great physiologisthimself uspected. To Bacon the statesmall, ciencewas some-thing o be largely endowed out of the public treasury n thesure hope that it would far more than repay the expenditureincurred y nventions f priceless dvantage o human ife. ToBacon the awyer, ature was a person n possession f mportantsecrets o be wrested rom er by employing very rtifice f thespy, he detective, he cross-examiner, nd the nquisitorial udge;to Bacon the courtier, he was a sovereign hose policymight e,discovered,nd, f need be, controlled, y paying udicious atten-tion to her humours nd caprices. And for his very reasonhewould feel drawn by a secret ffinity o the Aristotelian ialectic,,derived s it was through ocrates nd Plato from hepracticeof the Athenian aw-courts nd the debates of the Athenianassembly. No doubt the Topicswas intended rimarily ormanual of debate rather than of sQientific nquiry; and theEnglish Chancellor showed true philosophic genius in hisattempt to utilise it for the latter purpose. Nevertheless he

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    TheRelation f Creek hilosophy oMiodern hought. 77Z

    adaptation proved a mistake. The Socratic dialectic was re-

    served exclusively y its great founder, nd almost xclusivelyby his successors, or hosehuman interests rom he discussionof which it was first erived. And the discoverers, ho inBacon's *ownifetime were laying the foundations f physicalscience, mployed method otally ifferent romhis, becausethey tarted with totally ifferent onceptlon f the universe.To them t was not a living whole, Form of Forms, ut a sumof forces obe analysed, solated and recombined, n fact or nidea, with a sublime disregard or the conditions nder which

    they were presented o ordinary xperience.That

    veryxten--

    sion of human power nticipated y Bacon came n a manner fwhich he had never dreamed. It was gained by studying, otthe Forms o which he attached o much importance, uit hemodesof motion which he had relegated oa subordinate lacein his classification f natural auses.1

    It has been said that, whatevermay be the value of his logic,

    1 Descartes howed much deeper nsight nto he scientific onditionsof ndulstrial rogress han Bacon. His words re, On peut rouver nephilosophie ratique ar aquelle connoissantaforce t es actions u feu,de l'eau, de l'air, es astres, escieux, t de tous es autres orps ui nousenvironnent, ussi distinctement ue nous connoissonsesdiversmestiersde nos rtisans, ous es pouvrions mployer n menme agon tous esusagesauxquels ls sont propres, t ainsi nous rendre ommemaistres t pos--sesseurs e la Nature. Discours e la Methode SixiemePartie. Thispassagehas been recently uoted y Dr. Bridges Coomte'sefinition fLife, Fortnightly eview orJune 881, . 684) to illustrate hat eemsvery questionable osition. lie says that the Copernican stronomy,by revealing he infinitude f the universe, made mendespair f ompre-hending ature n-her otality, nd thus threw hem ack on inquiries f

    more directly uman nterest nd practical pplicability; particularlyspecifying the lofty tilitarianism f the Novum Organum nd of theDiscours e a Me'thode, s one of he first oncomitants of his ntel-lectual evolution. There seems o be a doublemisconception ere: for,in the first lace,Bacon could hardly have been nfluenced y a theorywhich he persistently ejected; nd in the next placeneithe& aconnorDescartes howed trace of the Positivist endency odespair f ttainingabsolute nd universal nowledge. Bothof theni xpected o discover heinmost ssen&s f hings and neither f them magined hat differentset of onditions ight ome nto layoutside heboundaries f he visibleuniverse. In fact they believed hemselves o be enlarging nstead of

    restricting hefieldfmental

    vision;and it was from his very nlarge-

    ment hat hey nticipated hemost momentous ractical esults. It waswith Locke, s we shall ee hereafter, hat he sceptical r agnosticmove-ment egan. In this ame rticle r. Bridges epeats, robably n Comte'sauthority, he ncredible tatement hat Thales aught heEgyptian rieststhose wo or three lementary ruths s to the laws of triangles, hichenabled hem o tell the height f the pyramid ymeasuring ts shadow.Comte's gnorance r carelessness n relating his tory s a well-attestedfact was long ago noticedwith stonishment y Grote. (Life of GeorgeGrote, . 204.)

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    78 TheRelation f Greek hlilosopAy o loderml hougAt.

    Baconrecalledmen from he construction f baseless theories othe study f facts. But here also he merely choesAristotle,who said the same thing ong,before hirm, ithrmuch greaterterseness, nd with he superior uthority f one who teachesby,example s well as by precept; while the merit of revivinoAristotle's dvice when it had falleni nto oblivion belongs toanother Bacon, the author of the Oputs lajzts; the merit ofacting on it, to the savants of the Renaissance, o such men asVesalius, Cesalpinus; nd Tycho Brahe.

    But towards he close of the sixteenth entury he time for

    amassing observations as past, no further rogress eingpos-sible until the observations lready recorded were interpretedaright. The just instinct f science perceived this; and fornearly century fter Cesalpinusno addition f any magnitudewas made to what Bacon called History, while,men's con-ceptions f natural aw were undergoing radical transforma-tion.1 To choose such a time for developing he Aiistotelianphilosophywaspeculiarly nfortunate; or hat philosophy adbecome,both on its good and on its bad side, n obstacle o

    progress, y encouragingtudieswhichwerenot wanted, nd by

    fostering spirit f opposition o the Copernican stronomy.The mere act hat Aristotle imself ad pronounced n favour

    of the geocentric ystem did not count for much. Themisfor-tune was that he had constructed n entire hysical hilosophyin harmony ith t; that he had inked this o his metaphysics;.and that the sensible experience n whose uthority e laid somuch stress, eemed o testify n its favour. The consequencewas that those thinkers who, without being professed Aris-totelian partisans, till remained profoundly ffected y thePeripatetic pirit ould not see their way to accepting theorywith which all the hopesof ntellectual rogress ereboundup.Theseconsiderations ill enableus to understand he attitude fBacon towards he new stronomy; while, onversely, ispositionin this respect will serve to confirm he view of his characterset forth n the preceding ages. The theory, hared by himwith Aristotle, hat nature s throughout omposed f Form ndMatter reached its clinmaxn the supposition hat the greatelementary odies re massed together n a series f concentricspheres disposed according to some principle of graduation,symmetry, r contrast; nd this seemed ncompatible ith nybut a geocentric rrangement. t is true that Bacon quarrelledwith the particular ystem maintained y Aristotle, nd, under

    1This Stationary nterval s noticed y Whewell History f theInductive ciences, k. XVI., chapter ii., sect. ), but without etermining,either ts ust imits r ts real cause.

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    The Relation f Greek hilosophy o ModernThought. 79

    the guidance f Telesius, ell back on a much cruder form f

    cosmography; but his mind still remained ominated y thefanciednecessity f conceiving he universe under he form fa stratified phere; and those who persist n looking n him asthe apostle of experience ill be surprised o find hat he treatedthe subject ntirely rom n a_priori oint f view. The truth sthat Bacon exemplified, n his own ntellectual haracter, veryone of' he fundamental allacies which he has so picturesquelydescribed. The unwillingness o analyse sensible appearancesinto their deal elements was his Idol of the Tribe; the thirst

    for material utilities was his Idol of the Cave; the uncriticalacceptanceof Aristotle's metaphysics, is Idol of the Theatre;and the undefined otions ssociated with nduction, is Idol ofthe Market.

    We may consider t a fortunate ircumstance hat the philo-sophy of Form, hat s to say, of description, efinition, lassifi-cation, nd sensuous perception, s distinguished rommathe-matical analysis nd deductive easoning, as associated withdemonstrably alse cosmology, s it thus became much morethoroughly iscredited han wouldotherwise ave been possible.At this uncture the first o perceive nd point out how pto-foundly n acceptance f he Copernican heory must ffect en'sbeliefs about nature and the whole universe, was GiordanoBruno; and this alone would entitle him to a great place in thehistory f philosophy. The conception f a single finite worldsurrounded y a series of eternal and unchangeable rystalspheres must, he said, be exchanged for the conception ofinfinite orlds ispersed hrough llimitable pace. Once grantthat the earth has a double movement ound ts own axis andround he sun, and Aristotle's whole system f finite xistencecollapses at once, leaving the ground clear for an entirelydifferent rder of ideas.' But in this respect whatever wasbstablished y the new science had, alreadybeen divined by astill olderphilosophy han Aristotle's, s Bruno himself ladlyacknowledged,2nd the mmediate ffect f his reasoning astorevive- he Atomic theory. The assumption f infinite pace,formerly bnsidered n insuperable bjection othat theory, owbecame one of its chief recommendations; he arguments fLucretius egained heir full force, hile his fallacies were letdrop; Atomism eemed not only possible but necessary; andthe materialism nceassociatedwith t wasequallyrevived. But

    1 Compreso he sara il mioto i quest' astro mondano n cui siamo. . . . s'aprirA a porta de l'intelligenza e Ii principj veri di cose'naturali. De l'Inftnito niverso Mondi, . 51,Wagner's d.

    2 1Sono amputate adiciche germogliano, on cose antiche heriveg-nono. lb., p. 82.

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    80 The Relation f Greek hilosophy oModernThought.

    Aristotelianism, s we have seen, was not alone n the field, nd

    on the first ymptoms f a successful evolt ts old rival stood nreadiness o seize the vacant throne. The question was how farits claim would be supported, nd how far disputed y the newinvaders. It might e supposed that the older forms f Greekphilosophy, husrestored o light after n eclipse of more hana thousandyears,wouldbe not ess hostile o the poetic Platon-ism than to the scientific ristotelianism f the Renaissance.Such, however, was not the case; and we have to show howan alliance was established between these apparently pposite

    lines of thought, ventually iving birth to the highest pecu-lation of the following entury.Bruno himself cted as a mediator etween the two philoso-

    phies. H-is sympathies with Platonism were strongly pro-nounced, e looked with admiration n its mediaeval upporters,especially David of Dinan; and regretted he time whenOxfordwas a focus of realistic eaching, nstead of being whathe found her, devoted o the pedantichumanism f the Renais-sance.' He fully accepted the pantheistic onclusions owardswhich Platonism lwaystended; but in proclaiming n absoluteprinciple whence ll specific ifferences re evolved, eis carefulto show that, while t is neither orm nor Matter n the ordinarysense, t may be calledMatter n the more refined ignificationattached o that term by Plotinus nd indeed by Aristotle im-self. There is a common substance underlying ll abstractessences,ust as there s a common ubstance eft behindwhenthe sensible qualities of different odies are stripped ff; andboth are at bottom he same. Thus Monism became he bannerround which the older forms f Greek speculation rallied intheir assault on Aristotle's hilosophy, hough what it meantwas as yet very mperfectly nderstood.

    Meanwhile new and powerful gency was about to interposewith decisive effect n the doubtful truggle. This was thestudy of mathematics. Revived by the Arabians and neverwholly neglected uring he MiddleAges, t had profited y thegeneral movement f the Renaissance, nd was finally pplied tothe cosmical problem y Galileo. In this connexion wopoints.of profound hilosophical nterest must be noted. The first sthat, ven n its fall, he Aristotelian nfluence urvived, osomeextent, oth for good and for evil. To Aristotle belongs themerit of having been the first o base astronomy n physics.He maintains he earth's mmobility n experimental o lessthan on speculative grounds. A stone lhrown traight p in

    1 Principio ctuscat Uno, . 225. For David of Dinan, whose pinions.are known nly hrough hereports f Albertus-nd Aquinas, ee Iaureau,II., iv.

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    ITheRelation f Greek hilosoOhy o ModernThought. 81

    the air returns o its starting oint instead of falling to thewest of it; and the absence of stellar parallax seemsto showthat there s no change n our position elatively o the heavenlybodies. After satisfying imself n empirical considerationsthat the popular stronomy s true, e proceeds o show that tmust be true by considerations n the nature of matter ndmotion,which, lthough mistaken, re conceived n a genuinelyscientific pirit. Now Galileo saw that, to establish theCopernican ystem) e must first rapple with the Peripateticmetaphysics, nd replace them by a new dynamical heory.This, which he could hardly have effected y the ordinarymathematical methods, he did by borrowing he analyticalmethod of Atomism nd applying t to the measurement fmotion. The law of falling odieswas ascertained y resolvingtheir descent nto a series of moments, nd determining ts rateof velocity at successive intervals; and curvilinear motionswere similarly esolved nto the comnbination f an impulsivewith n accelerating orce, method diametrically pposed tothat of Baconwho wouldnot even accept the rough nalysis ofthe apparent elestialmotions roposed y Greek stronomers.

    It seems strange that Galileo, having gone so far, id notgo a step further nd perceive that the planetary rbits, eingcurvilinear, must result from he combination f a centripetalwith a tangential orce. But the truth s that he neyer eemsto have grasped his own law of inertia n its full generality.He understood hat the planets could not have been set inmotionwithout rectilinear mpulse; but his idea was that tcontinued nly o long,aswas necessary, n order to give themtheir present elocity nstead of acting n them for ever as a

    tangential orce. The explanation f this trange nconsequencemust be sought n a survival f Aristotelian onceptions, n thepersistent elief that rectilinear motion was necessarily imitedand temporary, hile circular movement was natural, erfectand eternal.' Now such conceptions s nature, erfection, ndeternity lways rebel against an analysis of the phenomenawherein hey re supposed o reside. The same prejudicewillexplain why Galileo houldhave so persistently gnoredKepler'sLaws,for we can hardly magine that they were not brought

    under his notice.The philosophical ffinities f the, new science were notexhausted by the atomistic analysis of Democritus nd theregulative method f Aristotle. Platonism ould hardly ail to

    1 Galileo'swords re:- II moto irculare naturale el tutto delleparti mentre ono n ottima isposizione. Dialoghi ui Massimi istemi.Opere, ol I. p. 265; see also p. 38.

    6

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    82 The Relation f Creek hilosophy oModern hought.

    benefit y the great mpulse given o mathematical tudies n

    the latter half of the sixteenth entury. The passionate oveof its founder or geometry must have recommended im asmuch to the most dvanced minds f the period s his religiousmysticism had recommended im to the theologians f theearlier Renaissance. And the increasing scendancy of theheliocentric stronomy ith ts splendid defiance f sense andopinion was indirectly triumph or the philosophy which,more than any other, had asserted he claims of pure reasonagainst both. We see this distinctly n Galileo. In expressadhesion o

    Platonism, e throws is teaching nto a conversa-tional form, ndeavouring o extract he truth rom is opponentsfather than convey t into their minds from without; and thetheory f reminiscence s the source of demonstrative now-ledge seems to meet with his approval.' He is always readywith proofs drawn from observation nd *experiment; butnothing an be more in Plato's spirit, nothing more unlikeAristotle nd Bacon, than his encomium n the sublime eniusof Aristarchus nd Copernicus orhavingmaintained rationalhypothesis gainst what seemed to be the evidence of theirsenses.2 And he elsewhere bserves ow much ess would havebeen the glory f Copernicushad he known the experimentalverification f his theory.3

    The Platonic influence told even' more efficaciously nGalileo's still greater ontemporary epler. With him, s withthe author of the Republic,mysticism ook the direction ofseeking everywhere or evidenceof mathematical roportions.With what brilliant success the search was attended, t isneedless o relate. What interests s.here is the fact vouchedfor by Arago, hat the German stronomer as guidedby an ideaof Plato's, hat the world must have been created n geometricalprinciples.4 Had Bacon known anything bout the work onwhich his adventurous ontemporary as engaged,we may besure that t would have afforded im another llustration or hisidOla,the only difficulty eing whether t should be referred othe llusions f the Tribe, he Den, or the Theatre.

    Meanwhile Atomism ontinued o exercise a powerful nfln-1

    Dialoghi, . 211.2 Non possotrovar ermine ll' ammirazione iacome bbia possutoin Aristarco nel Copernico ar a ragione anta violenza l senso checontro questo ella si sia fatta adrona della loro redulitA. ialoghi,p. 358.

    3 b., p. 370.4 Kepler etait persuade de P'existence e ces lois en suivant cette

    pensee de Platon: que Dieu, en creant e monde, vait dc faire de lageometrie. Arago, EuvresII., 212.

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    TheRelation f Greek Ailosophy o ModernThoug7t. 83

    ence on the,method ven more han on the doctrines f science.

    The analytical mode of treatment, pplied by Galileo to.dynamics, was applied, with equal success, by other mathe-maticians, o the study of discrete nd continuous uantity.It is to the division of numbers nd figures nto infinitesimalparts-a direct ontravention f Aristotle's eaching,--that eowe logarithms, lgebraic eometry, nd the differential alculus.Thus was established a coninexion etween spiritualism ndmaterialism, he philosophy f Plato and the philosophy fDemocritus. Out of these elements together with what still

    survived of Aristotelianism was constructed he system ofDescartes.To understand Descartes aright we must provisionally

    disregard he account given in his work on Method of theprocessby which he arrived t a inew heory f the world; for,in truth, here was nothing new about it except the proportionin which fragments aken from lder ystems were selected ndrecombined. As we have already noticed, here is no suchthing s spinning hilosophies ut of one'sown head; and inDescartes' case even the belief that he was so doing came tohim from Plato; for lono with Aristotle's ogmatic rrors issound teaching with regard o the derivation f knowledge adfallen into oblivion. The initial doubt of the DiscourseonMethod nd the Meditations s also Platonic; only it is mani-fested nder n individual nd subjective, nstead of a universaland objective form. But to find the real starting-point fDescartes' inquiries we must look for t in his mathematicalstudies. A geometrician aturally onceives the visible world'under the aspect of figured xtension; and if he thinks the.figures way, nothing will remain ut extension s the ualtimatematerial ut of which ll determinate odies are shaped. Suchwas the result eached by Plato in his Tlimceus.He identifiedcmatter with pice, viewing this as the receptacle for his eternaland self-existent deas, or rather he plastic medium on whichtheir mages re impressed. The simplest patial elements retriangles; accordingly t is with these that he constructs hissolid bodies. The theory f triangular lements was probablysuggested y Atomism; t is, n fact, compromise etween he

    purely mathematical nd the materialistic methods. Like allPlato's fancies, his theory f matter was attacked with suchconvincing rguments y Aristotle hat, o long as his physicsremained n the ascendant, t did not find a single supporter.Even now, t the moment of his fall, t might have failed toattract attention ad not the conditions nder which it firstarosebeen almost xactly epeated. Geometrical emonstrationhad again become he type of all reasoning; here was again a

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    84 TheBelation f Greek hilosophy oModernThought.

    sceptical spirit abroad forcing men to fall back on the most

    elementary nd universal onceptions; n atomisticmaterialismagain threatened o claim at least the whole field of physicalinquiry for ts own. That Descartes followed he Timcvus nidentifying atter with extension annot be doubted; especiallywhen we see that he adopts Plato's analysis of body intoelementary riangles; but the theory greed so well with hisintellectual predispositions hat he may easily have imaginedit to be a necessary deduction from his own a priori ideas.Moreover, fter the first two steps, he parts company with

    Plato, and gives himself p, so far s his rejection f a vacuumwill permit, o the mechanical physics of Democritus. Muchpraise has recently een bestowed n his attempt o interpretall physical phenomena n terms f matter nd motion, nd to

    .deducethem rom he unaidedoperation f 'natural causes;butthis s no more han had been doneby the early Greek hinkers,from whom, we may observe, his hypothesis of an initialvortex was also derived. His cosmogonys better han theirs,only in so far as it is adapted to scientific iscoveries nastronomy nd physiology not made by Descartes himself;for where his conjectures o beyond these they re entirely tfault.

    Descartes' heory f the universe ncluded, owever, omethingmore han extension or matter) nd motion. If weask whencethis something more came,our philosopher will answer hat twas obtained y ooking nto himself. It was, n reality, btainedby looking nto Aristotle. To understand his, we must oncemore turn to the Tluim6us. lato made up his universe fromspace and Ideas. But the deas were too vagueor too unin-telligible or scientific urposes. Even mediaevalRealists werecontent o replace hemby Aristotle's much clearer doctrine fForms. On the other hand, Aristotle's irst Matter was any-thing but a satisfactory onception. It was a mere bstraction;the unknowable esiduum eft behindwhen bodieswere tripped,in imagination, f all their ensible and cogitable ualities. Inother words, there was no matter actually existing withoutform; whereas orm as never o truly tself, ever o absolutelyexistent, s when completely eparated- rommatter: t thenbecame simple self-consciousness,s in God,or the reasonablepart of the human soul The revolution wrought y sub-stituting pace for Aristotle's First Matter will now becomeapparent. Corporeal ubstance could at once be conceived sexisting witho{ut he co-operation f Form; and at the samestroke, orm, iberated from ts material bonds, prang backinto the subjective phere to live henceforward nly as pureself-conscioushought.

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    TheBelationof Greek hilosophy oModern hought. 85

    This absolute eparation f Form and Matter, nder heir new

    names of Thought nd Extension, nce grasped, arious princi-ples of Cartesiainism ill follow from t by logical necessity.First comes the exclusion of final causes from philosophy, rrather from nature. There was not, as with Epicurus, nyanti-theological eeling concerned n their rejection. WithAristotle, gainst whomDescartes s always protesting, he finalcause was not a mark of designing ntelligence mposed onmatter rom without; t was only a particular spect of Form,the realisation of what Matter was always striving fter by

    virtue f its inherent otentiality. When Form was coinceivedonly as pure thought here could be no question of such aprocess; the most highly rganised odiesbeing only modes offigured xtension. The revival of Atomism had, no doubt,great deal to do with this result. Aristotle ad himself hownwith masterly clearness the difference etween his view ofnature nd that taken by Democritus; thus indicating efore-hand the direction n which an alternative o his own teachingmight e sought; and Baconhad, n fact, lready eferred ithapproval to the example set by Democritus n dealing withteleological inquiries. Nevertheless Bacon's own attitudetowards final causes differs ssentially, romDescartes'. TheFrench mathematician, ad he spoken his whole mind,wouldprobably ave denied heir existence ltogether. The Englishreformer ully admits their reality, s, with his Aristoteliantheory f Forms, e could hardly voiddoing; and we find hathe actually associates the study f final with that of formalcauses,assigning both to metaphysics s its peculiar province.This being so, his comparative neglect of the former s mosteasily explained by the famous comparison f teleologicalinquiries to vestal virgins, edicated o the service f God andbearing no offspring; or Mr. Ellis has made it perfectly learthat the barrenness lluded to is not scientific ut industrial.Our knowledge s extended when we trace the workings f adivine purpose n nature; but it is not a kind of knowledgewhich bears fruit n useful mechanical nventions.' Baconpro-bablv felt that men would not be very forward oimprove onnature f they believed n the perfection f her works nd intheir beneficent daptation o our wants. The teleological piritwas as strong with him as with Aristotle, ut t took a differentdirection. Instead of studying he adaptation f means to endswhere t already xisted, ewishedmen o create t for hemselves.But the utilitarian endency, hich redominated ith Bacon,wasquite exceptional with Descartes. Speakinggenerally, e desired

    1De Aug. II. v. Works . 571.

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    86 The Jelcattion f Greek hilosophy oModernThbought.

    knowledge for its own sake, not as an instrument or thegratification f other wants; and this intellectual isinterested-ness was perhaps nother spect f the everanceeffected etweenthought nd matter.

    The celebrated Cartesian paradox that animals are uncon-scious automata s another onsequence f the same principle.In Aristotle's hilosophy, he'doctrine f potentiality evelopingitself into act through series of ascending manifestations,supplied link connecting hehighest ational with the owestvegetal ife. The identification f Form with pure thought ut

    an end to the conception f aniy uch. ntermediate radations.Brutes must either have a mind ike ours or none at all. Theformer lternative was not even taken nto consideration; ro-bably, among other reasons,because it was not easily recon-cilablewith Christianity; o that nothing emained ut to denysensibility here hought was believednot to exist.

    Finally, n man himself hought s not distinguished romfeeling; t is, n fact, he essenceof mind, ust as extension sthe essenceof body; and all spiritual henomena re modesofthought n the same sense that all physical phenomena remodes of space. It was then rather a happy chance thangenuinephysiological nsight which ed Descartes omakebrainthe organ of feeling no less than of intellection; view, asProfessor Huxley has observed,much in advanceof that, heldby Bichat a hundred and fifty years later. For whoeverdeduced ll the mental manifestations rom common ssencewas bound in consistency o locate them n the same bodilyorgan; what the metaphysician ad joined the physiologistcould not possibly ut asunder.

    We are now in a position to understand he full force ofDescartes' Cogito rdo tum. It expresses he substantiality fself-conscious orm, he equal claim of thought with extensionto be recognised s an element f the universe. This recogni-tion of self-consciousness s the surest reality was, ndeed, ar,from being new. The G$reek ceptics had never gone to thelength of daubting their own personal existence. On thecontrary, heyprofessed sort of subjective dealism. Refusingto go beyond their wn consciousness,hey found n its undis-turbed self-possession he only absolute satisfaction hat lifecould afford. But knowledge and reality had become sointimately ssociated with omething ndependent f mind, ndrmind tself with a mere reflection f reality, hat the denial ofan external world seemed to the vulgar a denial of existenceitself. And although Aristotle ad found hehighest, f not thesole absolute, ctuality n self-thinking hougght,e projected tto such a distance romhuman personality hat its bearing on

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    The Relation f Greek hilosophy o ModernThotught. 87

    the sceptical controversy ad passed unperceived. Descartesbegan his demonstration t the point where all the ancientsystems ad converged, ut failed to discover n what directionthe coliditions f the problem required that they should beprolonged. No mistake an be greater han to regard im as theprecursor f German philosophy. The latter originated uiteindependently fhis teaching, hough ot perhaps f his example,in the combination f a much profounder cepticismwith amuch wider knowledge f dogmaticmetaphysics. His methodis the very reverse of true dealism. The Cogito rgo umns

    not a taking up of existence nto thought, ut rather con-version f thought nto one particular ype of existence. Now,as we have seen, ll other xistence was conceived s extension,and however carefully hought might be distinguished romthis as absolutely ndivisible, t was speedily reduced to thesame general pattern of inclusion, imitation, nd expansion.Whereas Kant, Fichte, nd Hegel afterwards welt oln he formof thought, escartes ttended nly to its content r to that nwhich t was contained. In other words, e beganby consider-ing not how he thought but what he thought nd whence tcanme-his deas and their supposed derivation rom highersphere. Here again the Platonic endency s apparent. Havingrejected he later Schoolmen, nstead f making n advanceontheir eaching, e fell back on the realistic ancies f the earlierSchoolmen, specially St. Anselrn. The mediaeval doctor hadinferred he existence of a supreme being (quo nihil majuscogitari potest) from the idea of such a being, throughquantitative omparison f the two, han which nothing, orefrankly materialistic an be conceived. Descartes, ollowing n,the same track, eeks, with still blinder confusion, o inferexistence rom he dea of perfection,ust as the properties f atriangle re nferred rom ts definition, r againby assuming hatthe dynamical quivalence of a mechanical effect o its causemust obtain in a world where spatial relations nd thereforemeasurement re presurnably nknown. Such fallacies wereimpossible o long as Aristotle's ogic continued o be carefullystudied, and they gradually disappeared with its revival.Meanwhile the cat was away and the mice used theiropportunity.That the absolute disjunction of thought from matter n-volvedthe impossibility f their nteraction was a consequencenot drawn by Descarteshimself ut by his immediate ollowers.Here also Greek philosophy layed its part in hastening hedevelopment f modern ideas. The fall of Aristotle hadincidentally he effect f reviving not only the systems whichpreceded, but also those which followed his. Chief amorng

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    88 The Relation f Greek hilosophy oModern hought.

    these were Stoicism and Epicureanism. Differing idely inmost other respects, hey greed n teaching hat body s actedon abybody alone. The Cartesians ccepted this principle othe fullest extent so far as human perceptions nd volitionswere concerned; nd to a great extent in dealing with theproblems f physical science. But instead f arguing rom helaws of mechaniical ausation to the materiality f mind, heyargued from ts immateriality o the total absence of com-munication between consciousness nd motion. There was,however, ne thinker f that agewho went all lengths with thelater Greek materialists. This was ThomasHobbes. But theinfluence f ancient deason his theories nd on those of hissuccessors, own to the time when it becomes ndistinguishablymingledwith other lements,must be reserved or second ndconcluding aper.

    ALFREDW. BENN.