benn, alfred_the relation of greek philosophy to modern thought. 2_mind, 7, 26_1882_231-254

7/26/2019 Benn, Alfred_The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought. 2_Mind, 7, 26_1882_231-254

1/25

Mind ssociation

The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern ThoughtAuthor(s): Alfred W. BennSource: Mind, Vol. 7, No. 26 (Apr., 1882), pp. 231-254Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association

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2/25

I. -THE RELATION OF GlPEEK PHILOSOPHY TO

MODERN

THOUGHT.

II.

THE autlhor

f

the

Leviathan

as

sometimes

een

represented

as one

who

carried

he

Baconian

Method

ntopolitics

nd

pre-

pared the

way

for ts

more

thorough

pplication

o psychology

by Locke.

But this

view,

which

regards

he

threegreat

eaders

of Englishphilosophyn the seventeenthenturys successive

links

n

a connected

eries,

s a misapprehension

fhistory hich

could

only

have

arisen hroug,h

eaving

ouit

f

account

he

con-

temporary

evelopment

f

Continental peculation,

nd

through

the nveterate

abit

f ooking

n the

modern

istinction

etween

empiricism

nd

transcendentalism

s

a fundamental

ntithesis

dividing

the philosophers

f

every

epoch

into

two opposing

schools.

The

truth

s that,

f the

threewriters

ust

mentioned

agree

n deriving

knowledge

olelyfrom xperience,hey

gree

in nothing lse;

and

thattheir

unanimity

n this

one point

does

notamount o much,will be evidentfwe considerwhateach

understood

y thenotion

n question.

With Bacon,

xperience

was

the

negation

f

mere

uthority,

hetheraking

heform

f

natural

prejudice,

f

individual

repossession,

f

hollow

phrases,

or of established

ystems.

The question

how we come

by

that

knowledge

which

all

agree

to

be the

most

ertain,

s

left

un-

touched

n

his ogic;

either

f the

current

nswers

would

have

suited

his

systemequally

well; nor

is

there

any

reason

for

believing hat

he

would have

sided

with

Mill

rather

han

with

Kant respecting he originof mathematical xioms. With

Locke, experience

meant

he

analysis

f

notions nd

judg,ments

into the

simple

data of sense

and self-consciousness;

nid

the

experientialists

f

the

present

day

arebeyond

ll doubt

his

dis-

ciples;

but the parentage

of his philosophy,

o

far as it

is

simiply

denial

of innate

ideas,

must

be

sought,

not

in

the

Novutm

Organum,

or

n any

other

modern

work,

ut

n the

old

Orgsanon

f

Aristotle,

r

n

the

comments

f

the

Schoolmen

who

followed

Aristotle

n protesting

gainst

he

Platonism

of

their

time,ust as Lockeprotestedgainst hePlatonism f Descartes

and Malebranche.

The experience

f

Hobbes

differs

oth

in

origin nd

application

from

ither

f

these.

With

him, enisible

impressions

re not

a.court

of appeal

against

traditional

udg-

ments,

or

yet

are

they

the

ultimate

lements

nto which

all

ideas

may

be

analysed;

they are the

channels

through

which

pulsating

movements

re

conveyed

nto

the

mind,

and

these

movements,

gain,

represent

he

action

of nmechanical

orces

r

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3/25

232

The Relation

f Greek hilosophy

o

Afodern

hought.

the will

ofa paramount

uthority.

Andhe

holds this

doctrine,

partly s a logical consequence f his materialism,artly s a

safeguard

against

the

theological

pretensions

which,

in his

opinion,

re

a

constant

hreat o social

order.

The authority f

the political

sovereign

s menaced

onithe one

hand

by

Papal

infallibility,

nd on

the other yrebellious

ubjects

putting

for-

warda claim

to

supernatural

nspiration.

To

the

Pope,

Hlobbes

says:

You

are

violating

he law of nature

by professing

o

derive

fromGod

what is

really

given

onlyby

the

consentof

men,

nd

can only be given by

them o

their temporal

head-

theright o impose particular eligion. To the Puritan he

says:

Your inward

lluminations a superstitious ream, nd

you

have

no

right

o use

it

as

a

pretext

for

breaking

he

king's

peace.

Religion

has reallynothing

o do withthesupernatural;

it

is only particular

way

of

nculcating

bedience

o

the

natural

coinditions

f

social

union.

Again,

Hobbes

differs

holly

from

Bacon

in

the deductive

character

f

his

method.

His

logic

s the old

syllogistic

ystemn

reorganised

n the

model

of

mathematical

nalysis. Like all

the

great

thinkers

f his

time,

he

was a

geometrician

nd a

mechanicalphysicist,easoning romgeneraltoparticular ro-

positions

nd

descending

rom

auses

to

effects.' His

famous

theory

f

a

social

contract

s

a

rational

construction,

ot a

his-

torical

narrative.

But

though

mathematician;

e shows no

traces

of

Platonic

influenCe.

He

is

therefore

ll the more

governed

y

Atomist nd

Stoic

modes

of

thought.

He treats

human

nature,

ingle

nd

associated,

s Galileo

and

Descartes

had

treated

motion

nd

space.

Like

them, oo,

he finds

imself

n

constant

ntagonism

o Aristotle. The

description

f man as a

social animal is disdainfully ejected, nd the politicalunion

resolved

nto

an

equilibrium

f

manyopposing

wills maintained

by

violent

pressure

froin

without.

In

ethics,

no less

than

in

physics,

we

find attractive

orces

replaced by

mechanical

m-

pacts.

While

th%

nalysis

of

Hobbes

goes

much

deeper

than

Aris-

totle's,

he

grasp

of his reconstructive

ynthesis

s wider

and

stronger

n at least

an

equal proportion.

Recognising

he

good

of

the

whole

as

the

supreme

ule of

conduct,

e

gives

a new

in-

terpretationotheparticular irtues,anddisposes f thetheory

which

made

them

mepn

between

wo extremes o

less

effectu-

ally

than

his

contemporaries

ad

disposed

f the

same

theory

n

its application

o

the

elementary

onstitution

f

matter.

And

just

as

they

were

ided

in

their

revolt

against

Aristotle

y

the

1

This

s well

brought

ut n

a

remarkableeries f

rticles

n

the

Philo-

sophy

f

Hobbesrecentlyublished

yT6nnies

n the

Vierte1jahrsschrift

iir

wissenschaftliche

hitosopliie.



4/25

The Relation

f Greek tilosophy

o Modern

Thought.

233

revival

of otherGreek

ystems,

o

also was he.

The

identifica-

tionof usticewithpublic nterest,hough ommonly ttributed

to

Epicurus

lone,was, ike materialism,

n

idea sharedby

him

with

Stoicism,

nd was

probably mpressed

n

modern

hought

by the weight f their

nited uthority.

Andwhenwe

find he

philosopherf Malmesbury

making

ublic happiness

consist n

orderand

tranquillity,

e cannot

but think that this

was a

generalisation

rom

the

Stoic

and

Epicurean

conceptions

of

individual

happiness;

forboth embrace he same

ideal of

pas-

sionless

repose.

On the other and, hissubstitutionf the social for he per-sonal ntegernvolves correspondinghange nthevaluation f

personal

eelingss such.

What the

passions-

ad

been

to

later

Greekphilosophy,hat

the

ndividual

soul

becamie o

Hobbes,

something,ssentially

nfinitend insatiable,

whose

desires row

as

they

re

gratified,

hosehappiness,

f

such

t can

be called,

s

not a condition

f stablereposebut

of perpetual

movementnd

unrest. Here, again,

he analogy

betweenphysics

and ethics

obtains. In boththere

was an

originalopposition

etweenihe

idea of a

limit nd the dea of

infinite xpansion.

In

both

the

conflict as bequeathed y ancientto modern hought. Those

who embraced

oth tudieshave

always

had a

certain endency

to

take the

same side

in each;

but this tendency

as been more

distinctly

marked

n modern

han

n

ancient

ystems.

The suc-

cessors f

Aristotle,

hile

fallingback

on an older

cosmology,

had retained

is

limitingmethod

n their

speculations

n

man.

If he and Plato before

him

had

imprisoned

he

formless

nd

turbulent

errestrial lements

within

a uniform

nd eternal

sphere

f

crystal,

hey mposed

similar estraint

n the desires

and emotions, onfininghemwithin barrier f reasonwhich,

when onceerected, ould

never

be broken hrough.

And

if,

be-

fore he Athenian chool rose,

here

had

been

a

physicalphilo-

sophy

of the nfinite r, s

its

impugners

alled

it,

he

ndefinite,

therewas, corresponding

o

it,

a

philosophy

f

the

infinite r

indefinite

n

ethics,

represented, ot indeed

by professional

mioralists,

ut

by

rhetoricians

nd

men

of the world. Their

ideal was

not the contentedman,

but the popular

orator r

the

despot

who revels n the consciousness

f

power-the

ability

o

satisfy isdesires,whateverheymaybe. And theextreme on-

sequence

of this

principle

s drawn

by

Plato's

Callicles

when

he

declares hat

true

happiness

onsists

n

nursing

ne's

desires

up

to the

highest oint

t

which

hey

an be

freely

ndulged;

while

his ideal

of character s

the

superior

ndividual

who

sets

at

naught

whateverrestraints

ave

been

devised by

a

weak

and

timid

majority

o

protect

hemselves

gainst

him.

The Greek

love

of

balanced

antithesis

nd

circumscribing



5/25

234

TheRelation

fGreek hilosophy

o Modern

T7hought.

form riumphed

ver

the

infinite

n bothfields; and

altlhoug,h

thegroundwon n physicswas lost againfor time throtugh

revival

ofold

theories,

his

was

because

true

Hellenisin

found

its

only

congenial

phere

n

ethics,

nd there

the

philosophy

f

P'lato

continued

o

reigil

supreme.

With Christianity,

here

camea

certain

nversion

fparts.

The

external

universe

gain

becamle

ubjected

to narrow imitations,

nd

the

flammantia

menia

mundi

beyond

which

Epicurus

had

dared

to

penetrate,

were

raised

up once

more nd

guiarded

y

new

terrors

s an

inm-

passable barriero thought.

But infinity

ook

refuge

itlhin

he

soul; and,while

n

this ife

a

sterner

elf-control

han even

that

of Stoicismwas

enjoined,

perspectives f illimitable elight n

another

ife

were

disclosed.

Finally,

at

theRenaissance

every

barrier

was

sihmultaneously

verthrown,

nd

the

accumulated

,energies

fwestern

ivilisation

xpatiated'

ver

fieldwhich,

f

it

was vast

n

reality,

was

absolutely

nbounded n

imaginiation.

Great

as were

the

achievements

f

that

age,

ts

dreams

were

greater

till;

andwhat

most xeites

our wondern the

works

f

its

heroes

is

but

the

fragment

f

an

unfinished

hole.

The

ideal

of ife

set

up by

Aristotle

was,

like

his conception

f

the

world, ontradicted,n every articular; nd the relativeposi-

tions ssigned

byhim

to

act and

power

were

precisely

eversed.

It

has been

shown

how

Shakespeare

reflected

he Platonism

f

his

contemporaries:

e

reflected'also

he

fierce

utburst

f

their

ambition,

nd in

describing

what

they

would

dare,

o possess

solely

overeigni

ower

nd

rnasterdom

rwear

without

orrival

all

the

dignities

f honour,

e

borrowed

lmost

he

very

words

nised

byEuripides

of

xpress

the feelinigs

ncouraged

y some

teachers

f

his time.

The

same

spirit

s exhibited

generation

later in the diamas of Calderon and Corneille, eforetheir

tlioughts

wereforced'

nto

a different

hannel

by

the stress

of

the Catholic

reaction;

while its

last

and

highest

manifestation

is

the

sentiment

f

Milton's

ruined'

rchangel

hat' o reign

n

liell

is better

han

to serve

in heaven.

Thus,

w-hen

Hobbes

reduces

ll

the

passions

to modes

of'the fundamental

esire

for

power,

e does

butgive

the scientific

heory

f that

which

tands

proclaimied

n

more

hrilliing

ccents

by

the

noblest

oetry

f

his

age.

Whereno danger oulddeterfrom he pursuitof power, o

balancing

f

pain

with

pleasure

vailed'

to quench

the

ardour

f

desire.

With

full

knowledge

hat

violenit elights

have

violent

ends

and

in

their

riumph

ie,

hefateful

ondition as

accepted.

Not

only

did Giordano

Bruno,

n conscious

arallelism

with

his

theory

f matter,

eclare

that

without

mutation,

ariety

nd

vicissitude

nothingwould

be agreeable,

nothinggood,

nothing

delightful,

hat enjoyment

onsists

solely

in

transition nd



6/25

She

Relation

f

Greek

hilosophy

o

Modern

hought.

235

movement, nd that all pleasure lies midway between the

painful onging f fresh ppetite nd the sadnessof its satiation

and extinction; but the sedaterwisdomof Bacon,

n

touching

on

the controversy etween Callicles and Socrates,

eems to

incline owards he side of the former; nd in all

cases

warns

men not o make too muchof the

inconvenieinces

ttendanit

n

pleasure,

ut so to

proGure

erenity s they destroy

ot

mag-

nanimity .2

These, hen,were the principal lements f the philosophical

Reniaissance. First, herewas a certain urvival

f

Aristotelian-

ism as a method of comprehensivend logical arrangement.Then therewas the new Platonism,

ringing.

longwithit a

revival of either Alexandrian

or

mediaeval pantheism,

nd

closely ssociatedwith

geomnetrical

tudies; Thirdly,

here

was

the old GreekAtomism,s originally et forth yDemocritus

r

as re-editedcy Epicurus, raditionallynfavourable

o

theologry,

potent like fordecompositionnld econstruction,

onfirmed

y

the new astronomy,nd lendino ts method o the reformation

of

matlhematics; ext the later Greek ethical systems;

and

finally he formless dea of infinite owerwhich ll

Greek

ys-

temiisad, ss uch, onspired o suppress, ut which, evertheless,

bad

played a greatpart n theearlier tages f Greek peculation

both

physical nd moral.

On

thesefoundations

he

ofty difice

f

Spinozism

was

reared;

ouitof

these materials ts composite tructurewas built;

and

without

previous tudy fthem t cannotbe understood.

WhetherSpinoza ever read Plato is doubtful. One hardly

sees

whyhe

should

have

neglected

writerwhose

works were

easily accessible,

nd at that time

verypopular

with thinkingu

minds. Butwhether e was acquaintedwiththe Dialogues at

first

hand

or not,Plato will help us to understand pinoza,for

it

was through he doorof

geometry

hathe entered hilosophy,

and

under

the

guidance of one who

was

saturatedwith the

Platonic

spirit; so far as Christianitynfluenced im, t was

throug,h lementsderivedfroinPlato; and hlis metaphysIical

methodwas one

which,

more than any other,would

lhave

been

welcomedwith elight ythe uthor f heJenoand the

Bepublic,

as

an

attempt

o

realisehis own dialectical deal. For Spinozism

is,onthe faceof it, an application f geometrical easoning o

philosophy,

nd especially o ethics. It is also an attempt o

prove transcendentally hat geometricians nly assume-the

necessity

f

space. Now, Plato looked on geomietricalemon-

stration s

the

great typeof certainty,he scientificompletion

1'

Spaccio

della

Bestica rionfante,

ub in.

2

Jdvancermentf

Learning, llis &

Spedding,

II.,

428.



7/25

236

The

Reltation

f

Greek

hilosophyo

Modern

Thought.

of

what

Socrateshad

begunby

his

interrogative

ethod,he

one

means ofcarryingrrefragableonvictionntoeverydepartment

of

knowledge,nd

more

articularly

nto

the

study f

our

highest

good.

On

the

other

hand

he

saw that

geometricians

ssume

what

tself

requires o be

demonstrated;

nd

he

confidently

x-

pected hat

he

deficiency

ould

be

supplied

by

his

own

projected

method f

transcenidentalialectics.

Such

at

least

seems

to

be

the

drift f

the

following

assage:

CC

When

speak of

the

divi-

sion of

the

nitellectual,

olu

will also

understand

me to

speak of

that

knowledge

which

reason herself

ttains

by the

powerof

dialectic,

singthe

hypotheses

ot as

first rinciples,ut onlyas hypotheses-that s to say as steps and pointsof departure

into a-

egion

which s

above

hypotheses,

n

orderthat

she

may

soar

beyond

hem o

the

first

rinciple

f the

whole;

and

clinging

to

this

and then

to

that

which

dependson

this,

by

successive

stepsshe

descends

again

without he

aid

ofany

sensible

object,

beginning

nd

ending

n

ideas .

The

problem,

hen,

which

Spinoza set

himself

was,

first,

o

account

or he

fundamental

ssumptionsf all

science, nd

more

particularly

f

geometry,

y

deducing hemfrom

single self-

evident rinciple; nd thentousethatprinciple or he solution

of

whatever

roblems

eemed

o

stand

most n

need of

ts

appli-

cation.

And,

s

usually

happensn

such adventurous

nterprises,

the

supposed

nswer f

pure

reason

was

obtainedby

combining

or

expanding

onceptions

orrowed

ithout

riticism

rom

pre-

existing

ystems f

philosophy.

Descarteshad

already

ccomplished great

simplification

f

the

speculative

roblem

y

summing p

all

existence

nder the

two

heads of

extension

nd

thought.

t

remained

o

account

for

these, nd to reducetheni o a single dea. As we have seen,

theywere

derived

rom

Greek

philosophy,

nd

the bondwhich

was to

unite

hem

mustbe

sought

or n

the same direction.

It

will

be

rememberedhat

the

systems

f

Plato

andAristotle ere

bounded t

either

extremity

y a

determinate

nd

by

an

inde-

terminate

rinciple.

With

the

one,

existence

ranged

between

the

Idea of

Good

at the

upper

ndof

the

scale and

empty

pace

at

the

lower;

with

the

other, etween absolute

Thought

nd

First

Matter.

It

was

by

combining

he two definite

erms,pace

and thouight,hatDescarteshad constructed is system;and

after

ubtracting

hese

the two

ndefinite

erms

remained.

In

one

respect hey

were

even more

opposed to each

other

than

were

the terms

with

which

heyhad

been

respectively

ssociated.

The

Idea

of

Good

represented

nity,

dentity,

nd

constancy,

s

against

lurality,

ifference,

nd

change;

whileAristotle's

atter

1

Republic I. 511, n Jowett's rans. II. 398.



8/25

The Relationof Greek hilosophy

o

Modern

Thought. 237

was

by

its

very

definition

multiform,

luctuating,

nd

indeter-

minate. Nevertheless,herewere equally important nalogies

traceable etween hem. No

very lear account

ould be given

of either, nd

bothwerecustomarily

escribed y negatives. If

Matterfell hort

f

complete xistence,

he Good transcendedll

existence.

If the

one

was a universalcapacity

for assuming

Forms,

he

otherwas the source

whence all Forms proceeded.

Whenthe

distinctiveharacteristics

f n

individualwere hought

away,

the

question

might

wellbe mooted

nto

which

principle

it

would

return. The ambiguous

se

of

the word Powercontri-

buted still further o their identification,or it was not less

applicable

o

the receptive

han

o

the

productive

aculty. Now,

we have

ust

seen nto what

mportancehe dea of Power sud-

denly prang t the Renaissance:

with Bruno it was

the only

abiding reality f nature; with

Hobbes it

was the only object

of human

desire.

Another

erm ccuipyingveryargeplace

n

Aristotle's hilo-

sophy

was well

adapted

to

mediate

between

and

eventually

o

unite

the

two speculative xtremes. This

was Substance;

in

logic

the

subject

of

predication,

n metaphysics

he substratum

of qualities, he

ovicoia

or Being of the Ten Categories. Now,

First

Matter

might airly laim the position

f

a

universal

ub-

ject

or

ubstance,ince

t

was

investedwith very

ensible uality

in

turn;

nd

even,

s

the common

lement

f all Forms,with

every

hinkable

uality

s

well.

Aristotle

himselfhad

finally

pronounced

or he ndividual

ompound f Form

and Matter s

the

true

ubstance. Yet he also speaks s

if the essential

efini-

tion

of a

thing onstitutedhe

thing tself;

in

which

case Forrm

alone

could be the true subject; and a similar

laim

mightbe

put forwardn behalf f the PlotinianOne.

Such

werethe

a

priori

elements

which

historical

ynthesis

had

prepared

o

satisfy

he want

of a

metaphysical

Absolute.

Let

us now

see what

result

would

follow

wlhen he

newly-

recovered

dea

of space

was

subjected

o

a metaphysicalnalysis.

Extension

s both

one

and

infinite.

No

particular

rea can be

conceived

part

from

he

wholewhich

both ontains

nd

explains

it.

Again,

extension

s

absolutelyhomogeneous;

o

whatever

distance

we

may

ravel

n

imaginationhere

will

still

be

the ame

repetitionfsimilar arts. But space,with he Cartesians, eant

more

han a

simple uxtaposition

f parts; having

een made

the

essence

of

matter,

t

*as

invested

with

mechanical

s

well

as

with

geometrical

roperties.

The bodies into

which

t

resolved

itself

were

conceived s moving, nd as communicating

heir

movement

o

one another hrouglh

n

unbroken

hain of

causa-

tion in

which each constituted single link,

determining

nd

determined

y

the

rest; so that,

ere

lso,

ach

part

was

explained



9/25

238 The Relation

f Greek hilosophy

o

Modern

ThougAt.

by

reference

o an infinite hole,

epro(lucingT

ts essence,

while

exempt romhe condition f circumscribedxistence. We can

understand,

hen, that when'

the necessity

of accounting

for

extension tself

nce becamefelt,

he

natural olution

would

be

to conceive t

as holding he

samne

elation

o

somegreater

hole

which its own

subdivisions

eld

to their

sum total; in

other

words

t shouldbe

at once

a part, n

emnianation,

nd an image

oftheultimate

eality,

hich

n

turn ould

be only conceived

s

its

inultiplicationi

d

infinitum.

The

direction

n which

a method

for

explaining

Thought

would mostreadily uggesttself,was givenbothin the properformfthinlking,nd in its presumed arallelisin ith xtension.

Speakinaphilosophically,

o

think

was

to

reason,

nd to

reason

was to

subsume

lower

under

higheror

more ulniversal

on-

cept,

o

resolve

ll

subjectsnto

a

single

predicate,

r

to

connect

all

predicates

with

a

single

subject;

and owing

o

Aristotle's

confusion

f

formalwith efficient

auses,

his process

was

con-

sidered

denitical

ith

hat

by

which

we rise

to

the knowledge

of

determininig

ntecedents

n the

external

world.

Spinoza

gathered

p

all

the

threads

f speculation

husmade

readyforhis grasp,whenhe defined od as a substancecon-

sisting

f

nfinite

ttributes,

ach

of which

xpresses

iis

nfinite

and

eternal

ssence;

subsequently

dding

hat

the essence

here

spokeni

f

s

Power,

nd

that two of the

infinite ttributes

re

.Extension

nd

Thought,

hereof

he

particular

hings

known o

us are nodes. If, now,

we

ask why

there

should be

such

an

existence

s

space,

he

answer

s

because existence,

eing

in-

finite,

must

niecessarily

nclude

every

conceivable

hing.

The

argument

s

strikingly

ike

a

principle

f

the

Epicurean

philo-

sophy, ndmaywellhave beensuggested y t. Accordinigo

Lucretius,

he

appearance

f

design

n our world

need not

be

attributed

o

creative

ntelligence,

ecause

nfinite

toms

moving

in

infinitemanners

hrough

nfilnite

ime,

must

at

length

rrive,

after comprehensive

eries f

experiments,

t the

present

rame

of

things';

and the same

principle

s

invoked

n

a

smaller

cale

to

accountfor he

origin

f

organised

eings,

f

memory,

nd

of

civil

society.2

In both

systems

nfinite

pace

is the

root-con-

ception;

but

what

Lucretius

had

legitimately

sed to

explain

becoming, pinoza illegitimatelypplies to the elucidationof

beinig.

At one stroke

ll

empirical

knowledge

s

placed

on

an

-

Quia

multimodis,

uLltis,mutata,

er

omne

Ex infinito

exantur

ercita

lagis,

Omne

genus

motus,

t cetus

experiundo,

Tandemdeveniunt

n

taleis

disposituras,

QualibuLs

aec

rebus onsistit

uiuma

reata.-I.,

1023-7.

2

V.

853,

V. 780-800,

. 1025.



10/25

The

Relationof

Greek

hilosophy

o Modern

Thotught. 39

a

priori founldation.

By assuming nlimited redit t the bank

of the universewe entitle urselves o draw a cheque foraniy

particular mount. Thus the idea

of

infinite

ttributes s no

nmereollateral

peculation,

ut

forms

n

essenltial lement of

Spinozism. The knownvarieties f existence

re,

o

to speak,

surrounded,upported,

nd

fixed

n

their places by the endless

multitude

f

the

unknown. And this

conceptioni

f

being as

absolutely lifinite,s another

proof

of

Spinoza's Platonic teii-

dencies,

or t involves he realisation

f an

abstract

dea, hat s

to

say,

of

Being,,

which the

philosopher reats

as

something

more comprehensive

han

the facts

of

consciousness hence tis derived.

The

relation

f

Spinoza's

Substance to its

attributes s am-

biguous.

It is at once their

cause,

their

totality,

nd

their

unity. The highly

elastic

and

indefinite

erm Power

helped

these various

aspects

to

play

inlto

and

replace

one

another

according o the

requirements

f

the

system.

It is

associated

withthe subjective

possibility

f

multiplyingmaginary xist-

ences

to

any amount;

with the- ausal

energy

n

which

exis-

tenceoriginates;

nd

with

he

expansiveness haracteristiclike

of Extension nd of Thought. For the two knownattributes

of

the

universal

substalice are not

simply related

to it

as

co-predicates

f a

common

ubject; they everally xpress

ts

essential

Power,

and

are,

to

that

extent,

dentical

with

one

another. But

whenwe

ask,

How do

they

xpress

Power? the

same

ambiguity

ecurs.

Substance

s

revealed hrougLhts attri-

butes as

a cause through

ts

effects;

s an

aggregate

hrough

ts

constituents;

nd as an

abstractnotion

throug,h

ts

concrete

embodiments.

Thus

Extension and

Thought

are

identical

through-theirerydifferences,ilnce heseillustrate he versa-

tility

f their

ommon

ource. nd

at the

same

time

ointly

on-

tribute

o the

realisation

f

ts

perfection. But,

for

ll

practical

purposes, pinoza

deals

only

with

the

parallelism

nd

resem-

blance

ofthe

attributes.

We have

to

see

how

he establishes

t,

anldhow

far he was

helped

in

so

doing by

the traditions

f

Greek

philosophy.

It has

been

already

shown how

Extension,having

become

identified

itlhmatter,

ook on

its mechanical

ualities,

nd

was

conceived s a connected eriesof causes or lodes of motion.

The

parallel

found

by Spinoza

for

this series

is the chain of

reasons

and

conseque-nts

orming

demonstrative

rgument;

and

here he

is

obviously

following

Aristotle,

who

although

ostensibly

istinauishing

etween formal nd efficient

auses,

hopelessly

onfouiids hem

n

the

second book

of

his

Posterior

Analytics.

We

are said to understand thing

when

we

bring

it

under general

rule,

and

when we

discoverthe mechanical



11/25

240

TheBelation

f

Greek

hilosophy

o

ModernThought.

agency

which

produces

t. For

instance,

we may know

that

a

particularman will die,eitherfrom he fact that all men are

mortal,

r from he

fact that he has

received

a

fatal

wound.

The general

ule,

however,

s

not the cause

of whatwill

happen,

but

only

the

cause

of our knowing

hat

it

will

happen;

and

knowledge

f

the rule by

no means carries

with it

a

knowledge

of the efficient

ause,

s we see

in the

case of

gravitation

nd

other

natural

forceswhose

modus

perandi

s

still

a complete

mystery.

What

deceived

Aristotle

was

partly

his

false

analysis

of the syllogism

which

he

interpreted

s the connexion

of two

terms y the nterpositionfa middle answering

o the

causal

nexusoftwophenomena; ndpartlyhis conceptionf the uni-

verse s a series

of concentric

pheres

through

which

movement

is

transmitted

rom

without,

hus

combining he two

ideas of

notional

omprehension

nd

inechanical

ausation. Be this

as

it

may, pinoza

takesup

the

Aristotelian

dentification

f ogical

with

dynamical

onnexion,

nd

gives

it

the widest possible

de-

velopment.

For

the

Stagirite

would

not,

at any rate,

have

dreamed f

attributing

ny

but

a

subjective

xistence

o

the

de-

monstrative

eries,

or of extending

t

beyond

the

limits f our

actual knowledge. Spinoza,on the otherhand,assumes that

the

whole

nfinite

hain

of

materialcauses

is

represented

y

a

corresponding

hain

of eternal deas;

and this chain he calls

the

nfinite ntellect

of God. Here,

besides

the

necessities

f

;systematisation,

he

influence

f

mediaeval

realislm

s

plainly

evident. For,

when

the absolute elf-existence

f Plato's

Ideas

had been

surrendered

n deference

o

Aristotle's riticism,

home

was still

found or

hem

by

Plotinus

n

the

eternal

Nous,

and

by

the Christian

choolmen

n the mindof

God;

nor

did

sucha belief resent nydifficultieso long as the divineper-

sonality

was respected.

The

pantheism,

f

Spinoza,

however,

was absolute,

nd excluded

he

notion

of any

but

a finite

ub-

jectivity.

Thus the

nfinite

ntellect

f

God

is

an

unsupported

chain

of ideas recalling

he

theory

t one

time

imaginedby

Plato.'

Or its existence

may be

merelywhat

Aristotle

would

have called

potential;

n

other

words,

pinoza

may

mean that

reasons

will

go

on evolving

hemselves

o

long

as

we

choose o

study

he dialectic

f

existence,

lways

n strict

arallelism

with

thenatural eriesofmaterialmovements onstitutinghe ex-

ternal

universe;

and ust

as

this

is determinedhrough

ll

its

parts

by

the totality

-f

xtension,

r

of all

matter

whether

moving

r

motionless)

akentogether,

o

also at

the

sulmimit

f

the

ogical

series

tands he

dea

of

God,

fromwhose

definition

the demonstration

f

every

esser

idea necessarily

ollows.

It

1

See

the

assage

rom

he

Republic

uoted

bove.



12/25

T[he

Relationof

Greek

hilosophy

o

Modern

Thought.

241

is true

hat n a

chain

of connected

nergies

he antecedent,s

such, muist e

always

precisely

qual

to the

consequent;but

apparently hisdifficultyid not present tselfto Spinoza, nor

ineedwe be

surprised;

or

Kant,

comincg

centuryater,

was

still

so

imbuedwith

Aristotelian

raditionss,

similarly,o

derive he

category

fCause and

Effect

rom he relation

between

Reason

and

Consequent

n

hypothetical

ropositions.'

Meanwhilethe

parallelism

betweenThought

nd

Extension

was not

exhausted y the

dentification

ust

analysed. Exten-

sion

was

not

only a seriesof

movements; t still remained n

expressionfor

coexistence nd

adjacency.

Spinoza,

therefore,

felthimself bliged o supplyThoughtwith a correspondingly

continuous

uality. It

is here

that his chief

origirnalityies,

here that he has

been

most losely

followedby

the philosophy

of our own time.

Mind,

he

declai'es, s an

attribute

verywhere

accompanying

matter,

o-extensive nd co-infinite ith

space.

Our own

animation s the sum or the

resultant

f an

animation

clinging

o

everyparticle hat

enters

nto thecomposition

f our

bodies. When

our

thoughts re

affectedy an

external

mpulse,

to suppose hat

this

inpulseproceeds roni

nything

mnaterials

a delusion; it is producedbythe mindbelonging o the body

which

acts on

our body; or

rather he

twoactions are

onlydif-

ferent

spectsof

a singleprocess.

Spinoza

has clearly

xplained

the

doctrine fanimal

automatisin,nd shown t to

be

perfectly

conceivable; but

he has

entirely mitted

to

explain

how

the

parallel

nfluence f one

thoughtor

feeling)

n another s to

be

understood;for

lthough

his

too s spokenof as a causal

rela-

tion, t

seemsto

be quite

differentrom

he ogicalconcatenation

described s the

infinite

ntellect f God; and to

suppose

that

idea followsfrom dea like movement rommovementwould

amount

o

a

completematerialisation

f

inind;

while

our

philo-

sopher

would

ertainly

ave repudiated

Mr.

Shadworth

odgson's

theory hat

statesof

consciousness re

only

connected

hrough

their

xtended

ubstratums the

segments f a mosaic

picture

are

heldtogether

y the

underlying

urface f

masonry.

The

analogy

between

Thought nd

Extension under the two

aspectsof

necessary

onnexion

nd

mere

contingent

elation

n

coexistence r succession

was,

n

truth,more

nteresting

o its

authoras a basis

for his

etlhical

han as a

development

f his

metaphysicalpeculation.Thetwo orders frelations epresenlt,

in

their

istinction,he

opposition

f science o

opinion

r

magi-

nation,

he opposition f

dutiful

onviction o blind

or

selfish

I

The

tendency

f

ogicians

s

now,

ontrariwise,

o

force

easoning

nto

parallelisnm

ith

mathenmatical

hysics

by

ilnterpreting

he

proposition

s

an

equation

etween

ubject

nd

predicate.

16



13/25

242 The

Relation,f Greek

hilosophy

o Modern

Thought.

impulse.

Spinoza borrows rom

he Stoics their

dentification

of volitioni ithbelief;but n working ut the consequences f

this principle

t

is

of Plato

rather

han of the Stoics

that

he

reminds s.

The passions

re

in his

system

what

ense, magina-

tion and opinionwere

n

that of the Athenian

dealist;

and his

ethics may almost be

called the

metaphysics

f

the

Republic

turned utside

n. Joy,

rief nd

desire are more

or less

im-

perfect

orceptions

f reality-a realitynot belonging

o the

external

world but

to

the

conscious

subject

itself.

When

Spinoza

traces hem o

a consciousness

r

expectation

f

raised

or loweredpower,we recognise he influence f Hobbes; but

when,hereas elsewhere,

e identifies

owerwithexistence,we

detect return

o Greekforms f thought.

The

great

conflict

between

llusion nd

reality

s fought ut once more; only

this

time

t

is about our own

essence hatwe are

first

eceived

nd

thenenlightened.

If the nature

and

origin

f

outward hings

are

half

revealed,

alf concealed by sense

and

imagination,

ur

emotions

re

n

like manner he

obscuring

nd

distorting

edium

through hich

we apprehend ur

inmost selves, and

whatever

adds to

or

takes away

from he plenitude

f

our

existence;

and

whatscience s to theone,moralityndreligion re tothe other.

It

is remarkable

hat

while Spinoza

was giving new appli-

cationto the

Platonic

method, nother

Cartesian,Malebranche,

was

working

t out

more

trictly

n

theold lines

of speculative

research. The Becherche

e

la/VJrite

f

this unjustlyneglected

thinker s

a

methodical

ccount

of the various subjectiveob-

stacles

which mpedeour apprehension

f

things

as

they

really

exist, nd

of

the means

by which

it

may be facilitated.Here

also, attention

s concentrated

n the subjective side

of philo-

sophy; and if the mentalprocesses electedforstudyare of

theoretical ather han

practical nterest,

e may probably t-

tribute

his to

the

circumstancehat

every thicalquestionwas

alreadydecided

forMalebranche y the

Churchwhose

orders e

had assumed. But it was

notmerelyn

thewritings fprofessed

philosopher?

hat

the

new aspect

of Platonismfound expres-

sion.

All great rt embodies

n

one

form r another he

eading

conceptions

f its

age;

and the latter half of the seventeenth

century ound

uch a manifestationn the

comedies f

Moli6re.

If theseworks tand at thehead of French iterature,heyowe

their ositionnot more o

their uthor's

rilliantwit thanto his

profound hilosophy

f

ife;

or

rather

we should say

that with

him wit and philosophy

re one. The comic power

of Shake-

speare

was

shown

by

resolving heoutward ppearances

of this

world

into

a

series of dissolving

llusions.

Like Spinoza and

Malebranche,Moli6re

urns

the illusion

in, showingwhat per-

verted

opinions

men

formof thenmselves

nd others,hrough



14/25

The

Relation f

Greek

hilosophy o Modern

Thought.

243

misconceptionsnd passions ither f spontaneous rowth r se-

dulously ostered y designing ands. Society,withhim, eems

almost entirelymade up of pretenders nd their dupes, both

characters eingnot unfrequentlyombined n the same person,

who s made a victim hrough is desire o pass forwhathe is not

and cannotbe. And this s what essentially istinguishes he

art of

Moli6re

rom he New Comedy f Athens,whichhe,. ike

other moderns, ad at first elt nclined to imitate until the

success of

the Pre'cieuses

idicules

showed him

where

his

true

opportunitiesay. For the New Comedywas Aristotelian

lhere

it was not simplyhumanist; that s tosav, t was an exhibitionoftypes ike those ketched y Aristotle's isciple, heophrastus,

and alreadyprefiguredn the master's wn Ethics. These were

the perennialforms n a world

of

infinite

nd

perishing

n-

dividualexistences, ot concealedbehindphenomena, ut ncor-

porated

n

them nd constitutingheir ssential ruth. The Old

Comedy s something ifferentgain;

it is

prae-philosophic,

nd

may be characteriseds

an

attempt o describegreat political

interests nd tendencies hrough he medium of myths and

fables and familiardomesticities,ust as the old theoriesof

nature, he old lessons of practicalwisdom, nd the firstgreat

national chronicleshad been thrown nto the same homely

form.'

The

purely ntellectual

iew of human

nature,

he

definiition

of mind n termsof

cognition,

s one more

fallacy

from

which

Aristotle's eaching, ad it

not fallen

ntoneglect

or

contempt,

mighthave guardedSpinoza. Nevertheless,

is

parallelism

e-

tween

passion

nd

sensuous

perception

aves him

from

heworst

extravagances

f

his

Greek

predecessors.

For the

senses,

how-

ever muchtheymightbe maligned, ever were nor could be

altogether

ejected;

while

the

passions

met with

little

mercy

from lato and withnone

from he

Stoics,

who considered

hem

not

onlyunnecessary

ut

even

unnatural.

Spinoza

more

wisely

sees

in

them ssertions,

owever

obscure

and

confused,

f the

will to be and

grow

which constitutes

ndividual

existence.

And he sees

that

they

an no morebe

removed

by pointing

ut

their

vil

consequences

han

sense-impressions

an be

abolished

by proving

their fallaciousness.

On the other

hand,

when

Spinoza speaksas if one emotion ould onlybe conqueredor

expelled by

another

motion,

e must not

allow

his

peculiar

phraseology

o conceal

from

s the

purely

ntellectual

haracter

of his whole ethical

system.

What

he

really

holds

is

that

emotion an

be overcome

by

reason or better

knowledge,

e-

1

Greek

ragedy

s

ust

the

reverse-an

expansion

f he old

patriarchal

relationsnto

mould

itted

o receive he

highest hought

nd

feeling

f

civilised

ge.



15/25

244 TheRelation f

Greek

hilosophyoModerinhought.

cause it is itself

an

imperfect ognition.

Point

by

point, n

analogy-or somethingmiorehanan analogy--is made out be-

tweenthe errors

f

sensuous perceptionoined to

imagination,

and the errors f our spont,aneousffortsfter appiness r self-

realisation. Bothare iinposed n us fromwithout, nd

neither

can be

got

rid

of

by

a

simple

ct of

volition.

Both are affected

by illusions f perspective:

he

nearer objectof desire,ike the

nearer bjectof perception,ssuming disproportionate

lace in

the

field

of

view.

In

both,

ccidental

ontiguity

s habitually

confounded ith causation;

while

in

both the assignment

f

causes to effects,nstead fbeingtracedbackthroughn infinite

series

of

antecedents,tops

hortwiththe

antecedent earest

o

ourselves. If objects

re

classified

ccording

o

their uperficial

resemblancesr the

usages

of common

anguage, o also are

the

-desires ustained

nd

intensified y imitation

nd

rivalry. By

parity

f

reasoniing,

oral

ducation

must be

conducted n

the

same

lines

as

intellectual

ducation.

First,

t

is

shownhow

our

individual existence, epending

s

it

does

on

forces nfinitely

exceeding

ur

own,

s

to be

maintained. This s

chiefly

one

by

cultivatingfriendly

elations

with other

men; probably,

l-

thoug,hpinozadoes not hiinselfmake the comparison,n the

same

principle

s that observed

n

the mutual

assistance

and

rectificationf the senses, ogether ith their preservation

y

means

of

verbal igns.

The

misleading assions

re to

be

over-

iome

y discovering

heir

rigin; by referring

he

pleasures

nd

pains

which

produce

them to the

rightcauses; -by

alling

in

thought

o

redress

he

balance

of

imagination; y

dividing

he

attention

mong an infinite

umber

of

causes; finally,y

de-

monstratinghe

absolute

necessity f whatever ctions

excite

them, nd classifying,hem according o their relations,n the

same

way

thatthe

phenomena

f

the materialworld are dealt

withwhen

subjected

o scientific

nalysis.-

So far

Spinoza,following

he

example

of

Stoicism,

as only

studied

the means

by

which

reason

conquers passion.

He

now

proceed5

o

show,

in

the

spirit

of Plato or

of

Platonic

Christianity,

ow

far

superior

o

the

pleasures

of sense and

opinion

re

those

fforded

y

true

religion-by

the love of God

and the

possession

of

eternal ife.

But,

here

also,

as

in

the

Greek ystem,ogic does dutyfor emotion. The love of God

means

no more han

viewingourselves s filling place

in

the

infinite

rameworkf

existence, nd as determined

o be what

we are

by

the

totality

f

forces omposingt.

And eternal ife

is

merely

he

adjustment

f

our thoughts

o

the

ogical order

y

which

all

modes

of

existence re

deducible

from

he idea of

infinite

ower.

Thus,

while

Spinoza draws

to

a head all

the

tendencies

n-



16/25

tEhe

elation

f

Greek

hilosophy

o

Modern

Thought.

245

herited from Greek philosophy, orrowing rom the early

physicists heirnecessarianism; rom he Atomists, heirexclu-

sion

of

finalcauses, heir denial of the supernatural,nd their

infinite orlds; from he Athenian chool, heir distinction e-

tween mind and body, nd between reason and sense; from

Aristotle, is

parallelism etween ausation nd syllogism; rom

the Epicureans,heir indication fpleasure; nd from heStoics,

their dentificationfbeliefwith ction, heir onquest f passion

and their

devotion o humanity;-it is to the dominant la-

tonism

of

the seventeenth entury hat his systemowes its

foundation,ts development,nd its crown; for he begins byrealising he abstract onception f being, nd infersts absolute

infinity rom he nlisleading nalogy f space which s not an

'abstraction

t

all; deduceshis conclusions ccording o the geo-

metricalmethodrecommended y Plato; and ends like Plato,

by translating ialecticformulas nto the emotionalanguage

f

religious aith.

From this grand synthesis, owever, single element was

omitted; and, like the uninvitedguest of fairy tradition,

t

proved strongenough singlyto destroywhat had been con-

structedbythe united efforts f all the rest. This was the

sceptical

principle,

he critical analysis of ideas,first xercised

by Protagoras,made

a new

starting-pointy Socrates, arried

o

perfection y Plato, supplementingxperiencewith Aristotle,

and

finally roclaimed

n

its purity s the sole function f philo-

sophyby

an

entire

chool

of

Greek hougllt.

Notwithstanding

he

sterility ommonlyssociated

with

mere

negation,

t

was

this which, f all the later Greek schools, os-

sessed

the

greatest owers

f

growth. Besides passing through

more hanonestageofdevelopment n its own account, cep-

ticism

mposed

erious

modificationsn Stoicism, ave

birth

o

Eclecticism,

nd

contribuited

o the establishmentf

Neo-Pla-

tonism.

The

explanation

s not' ar

o seek.

The

more

highly

organised system s, the moreresistance oes t offero change,

the

moredoes its

transmission

end o assume rigidly

cholastic

form.

To

'such

dogmatism

he Sceptics were.

on

principle,

opposed;

and

by keeping he problems

f

philosophy

pen,

hey

facilitated he

task of

all

who had a

new

solution

o

offer;

while

mindand its activities eing, o someextent,afefromheuni-

versal doubt,

he

scepticalprinciple pontaneously

hrew

back

thought

n a

subjective

nstead of

an

objective ynthesis

f

knowledge-in

other

words,

n

that psychological

dealism

he

pregnancy

nd

comprehensivenessf

which are

every day

be-

coming

more

clearly ecognised.

And

we

shall

now see how

the

same

fertilising owerof criticism as been

manifested

n

modern

itnes

s

well.



17/25

246 The

Relation f Greec hilosophy o

ModernThought.

The sceptical

philosophy, lready

advocated

n

the

Middle

Ages by John f Salisbury, as, ike every ther orm f ancient

thought,

evived at the Renaissance, ut

onlyunder the very

superficial orm

which nfers rom he coexistence fmany

di-

vergent

opinions that none of them can

be true. Even so,

however,t led

Montaigne o soundernotionsof tolerationnd

humanity han

were entertained y any of

his contemporaries.

With

Bacon,

nd

still morewithDescartes, t also

appears

s the

necessary

reparation or a remodelling f all

belief; but.the

greatdogmatic ystems till exercised uch

a potent

nfluence

on boththosethinkers hat their professed emandfor

new

methodmerely eadsup to an alteredstatementf the oldun-

proved

ssumptioins.

Meanwhile

the

old

principle

of universal

doubt could

no

longer e maintainedn presence f the certainties

lreadywon

by modern

cience. Man,

n

the time

of

Newton, ad,

as

Pope

tersely uts t, toomuchknowledge or he

sceptic

ide .

The

problemwas not

howto establish hereality,

ut howto ascertain

the origin nd

possible xtent

f

that

knowledge.

The first

o

perceive his, he

first

o evolve criticism ut of

scepticism,nd

thereforehe real founder f modernphilosQphy,as Locke.

Nevertheless, ven with

him,

the advantage of

studying he

more

recent

n

close connexion

with he earlier

evelopments

f

thought

oes not

cease;

it

onlyenters

on a new

phase.

If he

cannot, ike

his

predecessors,

e

directly

ffiliated o

one or

moreof

the

Greek chools,

is

position

can

be

illustrated

y

a

parallel derivedfrom the historyof those

schools.

What

Arcesilaus and

Carneades had been

to

Socrates

and his

suc-

cessors,

hat

Locke was

in a

large

measure

to

Bacon

and the

Cartesians. He wentbacktothe nitialdoubtwhichwiththem

had

been

overborne y the dogmatic eaction,

nd

insistedon

making t a

reality. The spiritof the

Apologia

s

absent

from

Plato's

later

dialogues, nly

to

reappear

witheven more han ts

original ower

n

the

teaching

of the

New

Academy. And,

n

like

manner,

escartes' ntrospective ethod,

ith ts demand

or

clear

deas;

becomes,

n

theEssay

concerning

wbman nderstand-

ing, n

irresistibleolvent or he psychology

nd

physics

f

its

first ropounder.The doctrine f nnate

deas, hedoctrine hat

extensions theessence fmatter,hedoctrine hat houghtsthe

essenceof

mind,

he

moregeneraldoctrine,

eld also

by Bacon,

that

hings ave

a

diseoverable ssence

whence

ll

their

roperties

may

be

deduced

by

a

process nalogous

o

mathematical eason-

ing,-all collapsed whenbrought

o

the

test of definite

nd

concrete

experience.

We have

here,

ndeed, something

om-

parable

not

only

to

the

scepticism

f the New

Academy,

ut

also to the

Aristotelian riticism

f

Plato's

metaphysics;

nd at



18/25

-The elation

f Greek

hilosophy

o

Modern

Thought.

247

first

ight

t might seem

as if

the Peripatetic

philosophy

was

destined ncemore o regain he positiontaken from tby the

resuscitation

f ts

ancient

foe. But

Locke

was not nclined

o

substitute

ne form

f

scholasticisin

or another.

By applying

the

analytical

method of Atomism

to knowledge

itself,

he

created weapon

equally

fatal to the

two

competing

ystems.

Under his

dissection he

concrete

ndividual

substance

of the

one

vanished

no

less completely

han

the universal

deas

of the

other. Nothingr

emained

but

a bundle of

qualities

held to-

gether

y

a subjective ond.

Similarly,n political cience he analyticalmethod f assum-ino civilgovernmentoresultfrom concurrencef individual

Wills,

which

with

Hobbes had

served

onlyto destroy-

cclesi-

astical

authority,

hile

leaving intact

and

even strengthening

the

authority f

secular

rulers,was reinterpreted

yLocke

as a

negation

f all absolutism

whatever.

It is interesting

o observe

how,

here also,

he positive

cience

of

the age

had

a large share

in determining

ts

philosophic

character.

Founded

on

the discovery

f the

earth'strue

shape,

Aristotle's

metaphysics

ad been

overthrown

y the

discovery

ofthe earth'smotion. And nowthe claimsof Cartesianismo

havefurnished

n

exact

knowledge f

matter

nd a definition

f

it

whence

ll the

facts f observation

ouldbe deduced

priori,

were

summarily efutedl

y the

discovery

f universal

gravita-

tion. The Cartesians

complained

hat

Newton

was bringingr

back

the

occultqualitiesof the

Schoolmen;

but

the tendency f

bodies

to

move towards

ne

another roved

s certain

as it

was

iniexplicably

ysterious.

For

a time, he study

of causes was

superseded

by the study

of laws;

and

the new

method

of

physical science moved in perfectharmonywith the phe-

nomenism

f

Locke.

One

most mportant

onsequence

of this

revolution

was to

place

the

new Critical hilosophy

n

a

footing

quite

differentrom

hat occupied

bythe ancient

ceptics.

Both

restricted

ertainknowledge

o

our own states

of consciousness;

but

it now

appeared

hat his

might e

done

without

mpeaching

the

value

of

accepted

scientific onclusions,

which

was

more

than the

Academic

philosophy

would

have

admitted.

In other

words,

granting hat

we

were

limited

to

phenomena,

t

was

shown that science consisted n ascertaining he relations f

these

phenomena

to one another nstead

of to

a

problematic

reality

ying

behind hem;

while,

hat

uchrelations

xisted nd

were,

n

fact, art

of

the

phenomena

hemselves,

as

what

no

sceptic

ould

easily

deny.

Nevertheless

n

each case subjective

dealism

had theeffect

f

concentrating

peculation,

properly

o

called,

on

ethical and

practical

interests.

Locke

struck

the

keynote

of

eighteenth



19/25

248

The Relation

f GPeek

hilosophyo Modern

Thoutght.

century hilosophy

when he pronounced

mnorality

o be

the

proper cience nd business f mankind n

general ''

And no

soonerhad morality ometo

the front

han

the significance

f

ancient

hought

gain made itself pparent.

Whether

hrough

conscious mitation,r because the same

causes brought bout

the same effects,thical

inquiries

moved

along

the lines orioi-

nally laid down in the schools of Athens.

When

rules

of

conduct were not directlyreferred

o

a

divine

revelation,

theywerebased eitheron a supposed

aw

of

nature,

r

on

the

necessities f human

happiness,

r on some

combination

f the

-two. Nothing s more haracteristicf the eighteenth entuirythan ts worship f nature. Even the theology f the age is

deeplycoloured y it; and with the majority

f thosewho re-

jected theologyt became a new religion. But

this

sentiment

is demonstrablyf Greek

origin, nd found ts

most elaborate,

thoughnot ts most bsolute xpressionn

Stoicism.

The

Stoics

had

inheritedt from he

Cynics,who held the

faith n

greater

purity; and these, gain, o far s we can judge,

from

certain

Sophistic chool, omefragmentsf whose teaching

have

been

preservedby Xenophon

and Plato; while the

firstwho gave

wide currencyo thisfamous bstraction as, n all probability,

Heracleitus. To the Stoics,however,

s

due

that intimBate

sso-

ciation

of

naturalism

ithteleology

hich- eets

s

again

n the

philosophy f the ast century,nd even

now wherever he

doc-

trine of

evolutionhas

not been thoroughlyccepted. It

was

assumed,

n

the teeth

of

all evidence,

hat

nature

bears the

marks f a uniformlyeneficentesign, hat evil

is exclusively

of

humanorigin,nd that

ven humannature s essentially ood

when unspoiled y artificial

estrictions.

Yet if teleologywas, n some respects, falling-offrom he

rigidmechanicism irst

aught y the prae-Socratic chools nd

thenagain

by the Cartesian

chool, n at least

one respect t

marked

comparative

rogress. For the first ttempts

made

both

by ancient nd modernphilosophy o explain

vital

phe-

nomenaon purelymechanical rincipleswerealtogether

rema-

ture; and tfhemmense xtension

f

biological

knowledge

hich

took

place subsequently

o both, ould

not but bring

about

an

irresistiblemovement

n the opposite direction.

The first

o

revive teleologywas Leibniz,who furnished transition rom

the

seventeentho the

eighteenth entury y his

monadology.

In

this,Atomism s combined

withAristotelian

deas just as it

had

previously een combined

withPlatonic deas by Descartes.

The

movement f the atoms is explained by their

aspiration

after more perfect tate instead

of

by mechanical

pressure.

1

Essay,

Bk. iv. ch.

12.



20/25

The

JRelation

f Greek hilosophy

o

MIodern hought.

249

But while Leibniz

still relies on the ontological rgument

f

Descartesto prove he existenceof God, this was soon aban-

doned, long with

the cosmological rgument,

or the argument

from esign,whichwas also that used

by the Stoics; while

n

ethics he fitness

f thingswas substituted or the

more me-

chanical law of

self-preservation,s the

rule of conduct; and

the subjection

of

all impulse to reason

was

replaced by the

milderprinciple

f a control xercisedby the benievolent

ver

the malevolent nstincts. This was

a verydistinctdeparture

from he Stoic method, et thosewho made

t were mnore

aithful

to teleologyhau Stoicismhad been; forto condemnhuman

feeling ltogether

as

immplicitly

o

condemn he work

f

nature

or of

God.

The other reat thicalmethod f the

eighteenth entury,

ts

hedonism,

as

closely

onnected

with

the

sceptical

movement

in

speculative hilosophy,nd like that

received n

entirely

ew

significancey becoming

ssociatedwith he

dea

of aw. Those

who isolate

man from

he universe re

necessarily

ed to seek in

his interests s

such the sole regulator

fhis actions,nd

their

sole

sanction

n

the opinion

of

his fellows. Protagoras

went

already o far,notwithstandingis unwillingness o recognise

pleasure s

the

supreme

nd; and

in the system

f

his

true

uc-

cessor,

Aristippus,

he nmost xtremehedonism

went

hand in

hand

with the

most

extrenmedealism;

while

with

Epicurus,

again,

both re

tempered y

the

nfluence

f naturalism

mpos-

ing on him ts

conceptions fobjective aw alike

in

science

nd

in

practice.

Still his system eaned heavily o

the

side

of self-

gratificationure

and

simple; and

it

was

reserved or

modern

thought o establish

complete equilibriumbetween

the two

competingendencies f Greek ethics. This has been effected

in

Utilitarianism;

nd those critics re entirelymistakenl

ho,

like M.

Guyau,

egard t as a mere eproductionf Epicureanismii.

It

mightwith

full

as

muchreason

be called

a modern ersion

f

Stoicism.

The

idea

of

humanity

s

essentially toic;

to

work

for

he good

of humanitywas

a

Stoic precept; and

to

sacrifice

one'sown pleasure

for

hathigher ood

s

a

virtue

which would

have

satistied he

most

rigorousdemands

of

a

Cleanthes,

n

Epictetus,

r an

Aurelius.

Utilitarianismgreeswitlh he ancient hedonism n holding

pleasure

o

be

the sole good

and

pain the sole evil. Its

ad-

herents

lso,

for

he7most art,

dmit hat

the

desire

of the one

and

the

dread

of

the

other

re

the

sole motives

o action;

but,

while

making

he

end

absolutely

niversal nd

impersonal,

hey

make

the

motive

nto

a

momentary

mpulse

without

any

ne-

cessary

elation

o the

future

happiness

of the

agent

himself.

The

good

man

does

his

duty

because

doing

t

gives

him

pleasure,



21/25

250

The

Relation

f

Greek

hilosophy

o ModernThought.

or

because the

failure to

do it would

give

him pain, at the

moment;although e knows that a contraryoursewould

benn, alfred_the relation of greek philosophy to modern thought. 2_mind, 7, 26_1882_231-254

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