ECPR Graduate Conference

Innsbruck - July, 2014

Biodiversity conservation and climate change regimes

in Brazil: overlaps and coordination Flavia Donadelli

London School of Economics and Political Science

1

(DRAFT PAPER – PLEASE DO NOT CITE)

1. Introduction

The scientific and political overlaps between tackling climate change and

conserving biodiversity have been increasingly recognised as a crucial issue of

environmental governance. According to the last IPCC report (2014, p. 24) “Increasing

efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increasing complexity of

interactions, particularly at the intersections among water, energy, land use, and

biodiversity, but tools to understand and manage these interactions remain limited”. Since

the spread of inter-disciplinary research on “ecosystem services”, moreover, sufficient

scientific evidence has been found on biodiversity conservation’s implications to some

ecosystem regulating services such as carbon sequestration (Cardinale et al, 2012). In Brazil,

however, both issue areas are still being treated as two non-overlapping environmental

regimes. The goal of this article is to investigate why political coordination and the

recognition of overlaps among both areas, has not been happening in Brazil as it is

happening in the international realm. Two hypothesis will be presented: the first based on

the intrinsic nature of the issues, public and media attention and interest groups dynamics

(context of the regimes) and the second based on the institutional and cultural features

developed within each regime in Brazil (content of the regimes).

Although this lack of coordination does not exclusively affect Brazil the choice of

this country as a case study is justified by the high relevance that the interdependencies

among policies of Climate Change and Biodiversity have for this country. Brazil is considered

the most biodiverse country in the world, holding approximately one tenth of all species on

earth (Lambertini 2000). In terms of climate change, Brazil was the sixth largest greenhouse

gas (GHG) emitter of the world in 2005 (World Resources Institute, 2013). Even more

important is the fact that Brazil holds some of the richest ecosystems in the world (such as

the Amazon forest and the Cerrados) and that their destruction is both in the epicentre of

the country’s high contribution to climate change and to biodiversity loss. It was estimated

by the Brazilian Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Ministry of Science and Technology

2009) that at least 61% of Brazilian emissions of GHGs arise from deforestation and forest

degradation and, as observed by UN-FAO (2013), “forests are among the most important

2

repositories of terrestrial biological diversity”. In few other places of the world, therefore,

the overlaps among protecting biodiversity and tackling climate change are so explicit and

coordination so potentially relevant. Brazil was, thus, chosen as a most likely case of

negative consequences which might arise from a lack of political coordination among the

biodiversity and climate change regimes. If no conflicts had been identified in this case it

would become very unlikely that political coordination was actually needed anywhere else.

Severe conflicts were, nonetheless, identified, what testifies the relevance of this research

agenda and of this case study.

The international environmental regimes of climate change and biodiversity

officially started at the United Nations Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, when both the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations 1992) and the

Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations 1992a) were formulated as binding

agreements. More recently, the overlaps and the importance of coordination among both

regimes have been frequently acknowledged internationally in publications1 and by

organizations such as the UNEP-WCMC (United Nations Environmental Programme – World

Conservation Monitoring Centre). UNEP-WCMC is a specialist biodiversity assessment

branch of UNEP and has the goal of providing “authoritative information about biodiversity

and ecosystem services in a way that is useful to decision makers” (UNEP-WCMC website,

2014). This organisation has been noticeably active in the investigation of links among

climate change and biodiversity and institutionalised the importance of considering the

overlaps of both regimes in the international realm. In Brazil, although the importance of

coordination among biodiversity and other areas has also been recognized and a specific

project has been created to promote it (PROBIO II), Climate Change has not been one of the

areas included in the project. PROBIO II, implemented in 2008 by the Secretariat of

Biodiversity and Forests, intends, among other goals, to work with other governmental

areas to promote awareness and improve their tools for biodiversity conservation.

Curiously, however, although Climate Change and Biodiversity are treated by two distinct

governmental secretariats and have the importance of their coordination so strongly

emphasised internationally, the Climate Change Secretariat is not among the governmental

1 Such as United Nations Environment Programme UNEP ‘ Climate Change and Biodiversity’ (April 2003);

Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2009); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014).

3

areas intended to be addressed by PROBIO II2. The puzzle that justifies this analysis is, thus,

why such a limited coordination among Biodiversity and Climate Change policies still resists

in Brazil, even though there is a specific project to address the issue of inter-governmental

coordination within the biodiversity regime and even though the need of coordination

between both environmental areas is clearly incentivised internationally.

The answer provided here is that these two areas have developed competing

administrative cultures (or discourses) that have been limiting the possibility of

coordination. Before I turn to the specific arguments which will support this claim a few

empirical examples are needed in order to properly support the assumptions that, first,

coordination among these areas is desirable, and second, it has been limited in the Brazilian

case.

2. The lack of coordination and its consequences in Brazil

Institutionally, two secretariats are in charge of each regime within the Ministry of

Environment. The secretariat of Biodiversity and Forests deals with the implementation of

biodiversity policies while the secretariat of Climate Change is in charge of climate change.

One of the most important plans implemented by Climate Change Secretariat is the “Action

Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon Forest” (PPCDAm). This

plan has allegedly been one of the main policies accounting for the outstanding decrease in

Brazilian deforestation levels in the last 10 years (see figure 1). A recent external evaluation

has demonstrated, however, that despite the success of the command and control

strategies designed by the plan, the part intended at eradicating poverty, promoting

nutritional security and the conservation of biodiversity has not been effectively

implemented (IPEA-GIZ-CEPAL, 2011). This fact demonstrates that the ability of the

Secretariat of Climate Change to coordinate efforts with the Secretariat of Biodiversity and

Forests (allegedly capable of working locally to promote biodiversity conservation), was

clearly missed. Coordinating with the Secretariat of Biodiversity and Forests would,

moreover, be clearly desirable for the complete success of PPCDam.

2 The two areas which are currently working with the secretariat of Biodiversity and Forests to incorporate

biodiversity protection in their policy strategies and to improve coordination are the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAPA and its research institution EMBRAPA) and the Ministry of Health (MS) (Ministry of Environment, 2011).

4

Figure 1 - Deforestation Rates in the Brazilian Amazon (Km2/year)

Source: INPE/PRODES, 2012 (Available at: http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/Prodes_Taxa2012.pdf)

The limitations in harmonising climate oriented deforestation policies with the local

and social aspects required for biodiversity conservation are not the only issues arising from

the lack of coordination among both regimes in Brazil. Climate Change policies stimulating

the use of biofuels, for example, are another critical issue which demands coordination

among both areas. The Decree 7.390 of 2010 (that regulates the National Policy of Climate

Change) prescribes that the offer of biofuels shall be increased in the country (Art 6° § 1o –

III). The Decennial Plan of Energy Expansion (one of the Sectorial Plans for the Mitigation

and Adaptation to Climate Change), as a consequence, has been designed to increase the

production and use of biofuels. The energy plan mentions the provision of credit by the

Brazilian Bank of Development (BNDES) for the production of sugar cane and the increase in

the national mandatory percentage of biodiesel in the diesel (which was increased from 3%

to 5% in 2010 through the implementation of the Law 11.097/2005). The conflict that

emerges if these policies are not explicitly coordinated with biodiversity conservation

policies is the conversion of areas previously occupied by highly biodiverse native or non-

native vegetation to sugar cane monocultures, which are particularly negative for the

preservation of biodiversity.

Although, the current Brazilian legislation forbids the cultivation of sugar cane in

the Amazon, Pantanal and Upper Paraguay River Basin biomes (Decree 6.961 – for the agro-

ecological zoning of sugar cane), data from CONAB (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento

or the National Supply Company) demonstrates that the production of sugar cane in the

5

northern region of Brazil (which is largely covered by the Amazon forest) has increased from

46,38 thousands of hectares in 2013 to 50,01 thousands in 2014, a total increase of 7,8% in

only one year. In the central-western part of the country (a region composed by a highly

biodiverse savannah biome – Cerrado, and a fragile area of wetlands - Pantanal) there was

an increase of 7,3% of areas cultivated with sugar cane, as opposed to the overall national

increase of 3,6%. Although this rise in the sugar cane cultivated areas may also be a result of

a switch from the production of other crops to the production to sugar cane, the areas of

the Cerrado and of the Amazon Forest had a higher relative increase than the national

average (7.8% and 7.3% compared to the national average of 3.6%) which might point to the

conversion of previously non-cultivated lands to sugar cane monocultures. But whichever

the empirical reality, the point is that a close monitoring of the biodiversity losses related to

the expansion of the use of biofuels is an undeniably desirable part of the Climate Change

policies which have not, however, materialised.

A third area of overlap among the regimes of Climate Change and Biodiversity in

Brazil is the payment for reforestation3 and afforestation4 under the ‘Clean Development

Mechanism’ (CDM). In what concerns the CDM, there are two biodiversity related risks. The

first is the stimulus of the plantation of monocultures of exotic species of trees for

reforestation or afforestation (which is negative for biodiversity conservation5) and the

second is the stimulus of deforestation of native areas and their substitution by plantations

(which might allow for the obtainment of credits under the CDM). Although this latter

negative incentive is avoided through the establishment of time limits in the definitions of

afforestation and reforestation within the CDM, according to Sagemuller (2006), the

concept of “forest management”, advanced by the same mechanism, still allows the

continuous conversion of natural forests into plantations. In relation to the former negative

3 “The direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through planting, seeding

and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was forested but has been converted to non-forested land” (UNFCCC, CDM Glossary of terms, available at: https://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/glos_CDM.pdf Accessed: June, 2014). 4 “The direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or human-induced promotion of natural seed sources” (UNFCCC, CDM Glossary of terms, available at: https://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/glos_CDM.pdf Accessed: June, 2014). 5 It is frequently acknowledged that the use of exotic species (such as eucalyptus, pine, acacias or oil palms)

may be damaging for the original flora and fauna of degraded forests or grasslands. Additionally the use of pesticides and fertilizers that plantations often imply can cause additional damage to biodiversity (World Rainforest Movement, 2003).

6

side-effect, moreover, no safeguards are established by the mechanism. Although the CDM

rules do require that projects of reforestation and afforestation do not cause social and

environmental harm, it is commonly alleged that the standards on which this assessment

should be based are not clear enough and are only based on the scrutiny and legislation of

those countries directly involved in the carbon credit transaction (Sagemuller, 2006).

In the specific case of Brazil, these gaps of the CDM can be particularly dangerous.

Regulations concerning the reforestation of previously forested lands have recently been

changed, in 2012, under intense protests from civil society groups. The new Forest Code

(Law Nº 12.651, of 25 of May of 2012) authorizes the use of 50% of exotic tree species for

the recovering of degraded forest areas (Brazilian Forest Code, 2012 – Art 61-A13 and 66,

3rd Paragraph). Some Brazilian CDM projects, moreover, have actually reportedly caused

negative side-effects for biodiversity. Plantar Siderurgica S.A., for example, obtained carbon

credits in 2009 for the use of charcoal from planted renewable biomass in the iron ore

reduction process. It has been argued, however, that although the Project Design Document

admits the use of multiple sources of “sustainable charcoal”, no assessment has actually

been pursued on the plantations that would be used in addition to those of Plantar itself

(Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). This fact opened up the possibility that the other sources of

wood used by Plantar came from unsustainable plantations or even from the deforestation

of native forests. A closer coordination between the Climate Change and the Biodiversity

secretariats in the implementation of the CDM would, therefore, be desirable for the

prevention of the potential negative side-effects that this mechanisms has for biodiversity.

Once again, however, it has not been observed in Brazil.

Finally, although no empirical examples of the consequences the lack of

coordination in relation to the implementation of the ‘Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries’ (REDD) mechanism could be

found, potential risks in this area are not being addressed. According to Savaresi (2013),

REDD mechanisms are mainly concerned with avoiding the deforestation of native forests,

however, the use of some sustainable management techniques allowed by REDD could also

be negative for biodiversity. The prescription of the mechanism to avoid fires, for example,

could actually harm fire-adapted ecosystems (such as tropical woodlands and savannahs)

where some plants and animals essentially depend upon periodic burning. More seriously

and more directly related to the Brazilian case warnings have been raised that the

7

protection of native forests, such as the Amazon, could cause a shift of the agricultural and

pasture frontier from the forest to lower-biomass (but highly biodiverse) areas such as the

Cerrados. In this case REDD would protect the forest but not the overall biodiversity of the

country.

3. Why is there no coordination?

Last section has provided evidence to support two crucial statements on which this

paper is based: firstly, that coordination between the regimes of Biodiversity and Climate

Change is desirable and second, that it is not effectively happening in Brazil. We will now

move to the consideration of the central puzzle of this paper: why there has been no

coordination among both areas? Two hypotheses have been formulated to address this

question, one dealing with the context of the regimes and another with their content:

H1 Context – The lack of coordination is a result of the context and of the intrinsic

nature of each environmental issue (functionalist explanation).

H2 Content - The lack of coordination is a result of different and competing

administrative cultures or discourses developed in each area (institutionalist/culturalist

explanation)

These two hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive. It will be supported,

however, that their explanatory potential has varied throughout the chronological evolution

of the regimes and that the second hypothesis is currently more relevant. They have,

however, a common assumption that differences between the context or the content of

different regimes leads to difficulty of coordination. In the first case this difficulty of

coordination arises from the different organization of interests groups within each issue

area (and as a consequence, different goals of the actors involved). In the second case,

however, the lack of coordination has cultural origins. The association between cultural

differences and lack of coordination has been underscored by Dryzek (2005). This author

argues that the emergence of different “discourses” or administrative cultures in different

environmental areas may generate incompatibilities which may hinder coordination.

According to the author “the way a discourse views the world is not always easily

comprehended by those who subscribe to different discourses”. Different environmental

discourses may, as a consequence, complement each other but they often compete if lack

8

of comprehension and communication arises. Based on the empirical evidence of

unsuccessful coordination among both issue areas in Brazil, therefore, I assume that

competition is more likely to be happening in this case. Following the logic proposed by

Dryzek, as a consequence, in order to understand the causes for competition (and,

consequently, lack of coordination) one needs to dedicate attention to the types of

discourses or administrative cultures being advanced in each regime.

These hypotheses were both inspired by the literature on risk governance which

draws a differentiation among regime content and regime context. As observed by Hood,

Rothstein and Baldwin (2001 p. 28) “regime context denotes the backdrop of regulation,

comprising, for example, the intrinsic characteristics of the problem it addresses, public and

media attitudes about it, and the way power or influence is concentrated in organised

groups”. These three variables are certainly not exhaustive of the possible influence of the

context on policy regimes but they do seem to embody the most common contextual

factors usually addressed by the literature on environmental governance.

First, in relation to the intrinsic characteristics of each issue, Godard (2005, cited by

Herve-Fournereau & Langlais, 2013, p.87) points out that biodiversity, because of its

intrinsic characteristics, is not susceptible to the application of a homogeneous international

regulatory system. Because the links between local actions and global issues are not so clear

in biodiversity as they are in climate change, the effects of biodiversity degradation tend to

be more localised. These features and the different public perceptions they imply would

also contribute to the different media attitudes towards both issues6. Whereas climate

change is often described in the media as a globally diffused risk, biodiversity tends to be

associated with local concerns and raise, as a consequence, less public attention. Finally, the

role of power and interests of organised groups would also matter for the differences and

lack of coordination arising between both regimes. It is argued that the degree of diffusion

or concentration of costs and benefits associated with political action in each area would

justify the development of different types of politics (Wilson, 1980). While climate change is

commonly perceived as generating diffused costs and benefits, biodiversity conservation

6 On the importance of media attention in relation to Climate Change, see Carpenter (2002) and Boykoff and

Roberts (2007).

9

denotes, more frequently, concentrated costs and diffuse benefits.7 It can be argued,

therefore, that different regulatory structures would be more feasible and effective in each

regime. Whereas local consensus and local participation is potentially effective when

concentrated costs are at stake they are not so well suited in relation to problems with costs

as diffused as those of climate change.

These three variables, as a consequence, are theoretically plausible and have been

commonly pointed out as possible explanations for the different features of each regime.

However, although these three contextual explanatory factors might have had historical

relevance, more recent research on ecosystem services are providing a new perspective on

the intrinsic characteristics of the two problems and are also, as a consequence, influencing

the public and media attitude and the expected organisation of interest groups. As observed

in the introduction to this chapter, the literature on ecosystem services strongly emphasises

the interconnections between the regimes of climate change and biodiversity. Conserving

biodiversity has been correlated with higher levels of carbon sequestration and superior

climate regulation (Cardinale et al, 2012) and several international reports and organisations

have stressed the importance of considering these overlaps in the design of tools of

environmental governance. Finally, the acknowledgement of the genetic heritage of highly

biodiverse ecosystems as a global good has recently motivated an intense public and media

scrutiny about “biopiracy”, which demonstrates that perceptions on the costs of biodiversity

loss are not as localised as it once have been. These evolutions concerning the

understanding of the value of biodiversity demonstrate that the costs of degrading

biodiversity might not be so concentrated as previously assumed and the intrinsic

differences among the regimes of climate change and biodiversity might not be so clearly

justified by their contexts anymore. This hypothesis, as a consequence, is believed to be no

longer sufficient and perhaps not even necessary to account for the divergent and

uncoordinated paths of both issue areas.

Currently, therefore, the national institutional features that characterise each

regime seem to be a better suited explanation for the difficulties of coordination amongst

both regimes. This second hypothesis evokes the theoretical contributions of

7 For example, everyone can help to cut CO2 emissions and everyone is potentially benefited by not having a

warmer world. On the other hand, protecting birds in the Amazon forest may be extremely costly for those who depend on their feather for the production of Carnival clothes but the benefits of a healthier Amazon ecosystem in rain regulation is widespread.

10

institutionalists who stress the importance of institutions in shaping policy outputs.

Institutions, in this tradition, are commonly associated with path dependency, a process

through which previously established, implicit and explicit, social norms or behaviours affect

the development of new ones. According to this perspective, policy makers still have the

ability to choose, however, they are “heirs before they are choosers” and the content of

their inheritance is “not negotiable” (Rose 1990). Adopting a very broad understanding of

institutions as the overall cultures, administrative discourses or ‘logics of appropriateness’

being advanced within each regime (Hood, 1998; Dryzec, 2005; March & Olsen, 2008), the

final section of this paper will be dedicated to supporting the hypothesis that the current

difficulties of coordination arising between these two regulatory regimes in Brazil is a

consequence of the different administrative cultures which have been predominant within

each of them. Before the final section, however, the next section will expose the proxies

that will be used in the empirical analysis and how do they relate to the theory on

administrative cultures.

4. An analytical framework of administrative cultures

The goal of this section is to present an analytical framework through which it will

be demonstrated that Biodiversity and Climate Change have developed different

administrative styles in Brazil. The analytical framework provided here will, thus, be used to

assess the types of administrative cultures or discourses developed in each regime. By

“regimes” I understand the “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-

making procedures around which actors expectations converge” (Keohane 1982) and in

order to analyse how these two regimes evolved in Brazil I will use the theoretical

framework of “grid-group cultural theory”. This theoretical framework was chosen because

it allows the analysis to go beyond the simple consideration of explicit principles, norms,

rules and decision-making procedures and also consider policy-makers’ views of the world in

terms of what appropriate environmental policies are.

Cultural theory, when applied to public policies, captures much of the different

views and traditions about how to organize governments and public services. Scholars using

this perspective assume that the plurality of strategies used by policy makers are ultimately

based on perceptions about two essential dimensions of human organization: “grid”, or the

11

levels to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed rules, and “group”

which is associated with the strength of an allegiance or loyalty to the group. Following the

levels of these two variables four cultures or administrative styles emerge (which according

to the theory are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive administrative traditions): (1)

hierarchists, high grid and high group, (2) individualists, low grid and low group, (3)

egalitarians, low grid and high group; and, (4) fatalists, high in grid and low in group (see

figure 2, below, for a graphic representation).

Figure 2 - Cultural types

Source: produced by the author based on Hood, 1998

According to the theory, each of these four perceptions of human organisation are

associated with a specific management style, or in other words, a view of what is considered

‘appropriate’ in terms public policies. These perceptions could be related to several aspects

of public policies and although the proxies used in the literature for the identification of

cultural styles have been extremely varied and abstract (addressing, for example, the level

of consensus in terms of values and knowledge8, the visions of human nature9 or even the

vision of environmental stability or fragility held by policy makers10), this analysis will be

restricted to the observation of three more easily observable proxies: ‘how’ policies are

8 Hoppe (2002, 2011)

9 Bevan & Hood (2006); Lodge & Wegrich (2012); Verweij et al. (2006)

10 Thompson et al. (1990); Forsyth (2003)

12

formulated and implemented, ‘who’ are the actors involved in this process and ‘for whose

benefit’ policies are actually working.

For the interpretation of these proxies and their association with specific cultural

styles the literature indicates that hierarchists tend to value highly cohesive and hierarchical

types of social institutions based on a strong observance of rules and social roles. As a

consequence, this management style is often associated with a centralist, top-down and

expertise-based approach to public management. Consequently, policies shall be

formulated by the central authority (who), based on the authoritative advice of experts

(how) and for the benefit of the group, here understood as the government itself (for

whom). Egalitarians, on the other hand, tend to be highly critical of hierarchical

organisations and value a “management without managers” approach to public

administration. Consequently, for the adepts of this views of the world policies shall be

based in extensive dialogue and consensus (how), community actors and those less able to

participate should be given priority both in the process of formulation and in the benefits

that come from these policies (who and for whom). Fairness, consensus and communication

are thus the mottoes of this management style. The individualist style, on its turn, is usually

associated with market mechanisms. This kind of administrative culture demonstrates

antipathy to collectivism and rules, focusing mainly on the use of market-based/competitive

controls (how) and on the self-interested behaviors and benefits of market actors such as

consumers and firms (who and for whom)11 (Hood, 1998; Hoppe, 2002). Lastly, the fatalist

administrative orientation departs from a view of the world which sees every regulatee as a

possible “gambler of the system”. It, therefore, suggests a public management style based

on “contrived randomness” or the “use of planned chance” (how). Although several

discussions exist on the passivity of this cultural type and on its consequent incapacity to

motivate any specific kind of management style (Verweij et al. 2006); Hood (1998) argues

that “the use of planned chance for control is a recipe that is seldom completely absent

from public management”. For the supporters of this management type, therefore,

technical bureaucrats shall have an important role in the formulation of policies (who) and

the efficiency of the system itself, or the avoidance of gambling by regulatees, shall be

11

In all cultural styles the public good is often mentioned as a motivator of policies. It might become difficult to discern among different intentions, therefore public good was also included in the table as a possible motivation of all cultural styles.

13

promoted as a final goal which points to no specific beneficiary, but to a conception of

public good (for whom).

The analytical categories used and the coding frame based on the grid-group

cultural theory are summarised below in tables A and B. Additionally, the three main

functions which are commonly attributed to regulatory regimes (standard setting, behaviour

modification and information gathering) will also be used to improve the applicability of the

coding frame. (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001; Black, 2002; Lodge & Stirton, 2010).

The predominance of each of these characteristics in the way policies are

formulated and implemented in different areas can, thus, according to cultural theory,

indicate the predominant cultural style of each regime. Although hybrids are frequently

found in the empirical application of these theoretical predictions, if any of these

administrative cultures clearly prevail in a regime they might also result in path dependency

and underscore institutional competition. We will now assess whether this is the case in

Brazil and check if the differences in administrative cultures are sufficiently discernible to be

associated with the lack of coordination of both regimes.

Table A – Analytical categories

Standard-setting Who?

Who is involved in the definition of standards?

How?

How are standards defined?

For whom?

For whose benefit are standards set?

Behaviour modification Who?

Who enforces behaviour modification?

How?

How is behaviour modified?

For whom?

For whose benefit is behaviour modified?

Information-gathering Who?

Who obtains information?

How?

How is information obtained?

For whom?

For whose benefit is information obtained?

Source: produced by the author

14

Table B – Coding frame

Standard-Setting Behavior-modification Information-gathering

Fatalists Who?

Bureaucrats and politicians Bureaucrats Bureaucrats

How?

By evaluating the functioning of the system

Through randomness and surprise

Through random and surprise monitoring

For whom?

Allegedly for the public good Allegedly for the public good For the system to work properly

Individualists Who?

Market actors and politicians

Market actors Administrative bureaucrats and market

actors

How?

By considering private interests

Through competition Through the use of market incentives

For whom?

For the self-benefit of market actors but allegedly

also for the public good

For the self-benefit of market actors but allegedly

also for the public good

For market actors

Hierarchists Who?

Politicians (decision makers) Technicians Experts and technicians

How?

By considering formal rules and procedures

Through legal punishment

Through expert advice and obligatory

information reporting

For whom?

For politicians but allegedly also for public good

For politicians but allegedly also for public good

For politicians (to inform decision-making)

Egalitarians Who?

Community groups and politicians

Community groups Community groups

How?

Through dialogue and consensus

Through dialogue and persuasion based on

communitarian bonds

Through dialogue, mutual learning and

trust

For whom?

For the community but allegedly also for the public

good

For the community but allegedly also for the public

good

For the community

Source: produced by the author

5. Biodiversity and Climate Change Regimes in Brazil

The issue of Biodiversity conservation started to be addressed in Brazil in the

beginning of the 90s. In the period from 1990 until today (2014), three broad programmes

were implemented in this area: PPG 7, PRONABIO (which includes PROBIO I and PROBIO II)

and PANBIO. Although there is no space here for the presentation of a detailed description

of each of the policies of these programmes their overall analysis demonstrated a

predominantly egalitarian bias. Some important examples will be described here to support

this claim and tables C, D and E can be consulted for a comprehensive list of all the policies

analysed. As the tables demonstrate, although policies have been slightly changed in more

recent programmes (such as PROBIO I and II) towards a more hierarchic and individualist

approach, policies still conserve some crucial egalitarian features which are not present, as

15

it will be demonstrated, in the majority of policies designed within the climate change

regime (For a chronological overview of this regime see figure 3 below)

Figure 3 - Brazilian Biodiversity Regime Timeline

Source: produced by the author

PPG-7 (the Pilot Programme for the Protection of Brazilian Tropical Forests) was

the first political project in Brazil to put in place biodiversity conservation policies. It started

to be planned in 1990 but was officially launched only in 1992, during the UN Rio

Environmental Conference. It was financed by the eight members of the G-7 (Germany, US,

France, Italy, UK, Japan, Canada and Russia, which was included in 1997); in addition to

Brazil and it was administrated by the World Bank. Although its main goal was to tackle the

deforestation of the Amazon, the promotion of strategies of management and conservation

of biodiversity were also central parts of the programme. ProManejo, ProVarzea and

Proteger II, for example, were behaviour-modification projects of the PPG-7 intended

respectively at promoting sustainable management of the Amazon Forest, promoting the

management of natural resources in the Amazon and Solimões Rivers Low-Lands areas and

at preventing fires in the Amazon. The three of them consistently relied on communitarian

bounds and trust as their enforcement mechanisms (Santos, 2005; Verissimo, 2005; Sauer,

2005). In the ProVarzea project, for instance, fishermen informal agreements were the only

mechanism of protection of fish stocks and there was no formalised type of enforcement in

place. In the Proteger II, small farmers, extrativists and indigenous communities (who) were

trained and capacitated to avoid fires. Their organisation followed a local traditional type of

organization called “puxiruns ambientais”, in which each member of the community

16

received one specific task to be accomplished during the whole working day, which was

later followed by a large communitarian party (how)12 (Sauer, 2005). ProManejo, on its turn,

has created, in 2001, a consultation council for the conservation unit of Tapajos, one of the

focuses of the project. This consultation council involved members of the community, the

rural workers union, universities, governmental agencies and NGO’s (who). It has been

described as a “laboratory of participatory management” which could also intensely

contribute to the management of other conservation units in the country (how) (Verissimo,

2005). The main beneficiaries of all these strategies can be clearly identified as the

communities themselves, which managed to solve local problems through their own

methods and participation (for whom).

Many other PPG7 projects also had a very egalitarian features such as the

“demonstration projects”, which specifically required the engagement and participation of

local communities in their development, and the co-management of four extractive

reserves, which as the name suggests, were designed to develop co-management between

local communities and government authorities (who and how). Finally, a very inclusive

project, which was designed specifically to tackle the needs of a traditionally less-favoured

community, was the Integrated Project of Protection to the Indigenous Population and

Lands of the Legal Amazon (PPTAL). Its general aims were to conserve natural resources in

indigenous lands and to promote the well-being of indigenous populations (for whom).

Because indigenous communities were included in the gathering of information and

behaviour modification strategies of this project, and because the processes of

implementation were centred on education and participative deliberation of indigenous

communities this project can also be characterised as demonstrating predominantly

egalitarian characteristics (who and how).

The National Programme for Biological Diversity (PRONABIO), in its turn, was

established in 1994 already as a direct response to the negotiations of the CDB. The actions

of PRONABIO at its initial stage were intended at information-gathering and comprised,

among other projects, the design of ten workshops run between 1994 and 1998. The

analysis of official governmental documents describing this phase reveals that these

12

This is a way in which farmers of the amazon region traditionally organise a working day. It respects, therefore, local traditions.

17

workshops were mainly organised by NGO’s or academic groups (who) (Environmental

Ministry, 1998 p. 197). The workshops had varied purposes such as to catalogue information

already available about aspects of ecosystem conservation, to build networks among

different groups working on biodiversity conservation, to create new monitoring systems for

specific biomes or simply to discuss the implementation of biodiversity conservation in

Brazil in very general terms. Overall, however, their main goal was always to promote

dialogue and exchange of information among several sectors of the society. The process

through which information was obtained in almost all of these workshops (apart from one,

which was coordinated by EMBRAPA, a state research organization, and had a more

technical orientation), was, thus, mutual learning and dialogue among several social sectors

(how). The information produced was always made available to the public and could be

used by any organisation interested in using it (for whom). Therefore, the analysis both of

the process of information collection, who was involved in it and of the actors who were

allowed and motivated to use the information collected point to an egalitarian approach to

information-gathering.

In 1996, moreover, the Brazilian government and the GEF (Global Environmental

Facility) signed an agreement for the launch of PROBIO I – Project of Conservation and

Sustainable Use of the Brazilian Biological Diversity, as part of the PRONABIO. This project

was scheduled to last until 2001 and had information-gathering as a main goal. The analysis

of the elaboration of the “Manual of Economic Valuation of Environmental Resources”, one

of the information-gathering projects of this programme, revealed that this project intensely

relied on the expertise of academics to collect information and that the information

obtained was mainly designated to help decision-makers to formulate policies. This specific

project assumed, therefore, a strong hierarchic orientation. The overall analysis of the

projects of PROBIO I, however, still demonstrated a strong egalitarian bias. The projects

designed within the context of this programme to deal with the evaluation of genetic

resources and ecosystem management, for example, were developed and implemented by

NGO’s and research institutions (who) and all but one of them had a particular focus on

engaging and informing local communities as a strategy of behaviour-modification (how).

The main beneficiaries of the projects appear to have been, therefore, the communities

which were engaged in ecosystem management (for whom). Thus, also in this case, the

18

analysis of ‘how’ behaviour modification was promoted, ‘who’ promoted it and ‘for whom’

it was promoted, point to a marked egalitarian bias.

Other projects of PROBIO-I, such as the Brazilian Network Information about

Biodiversity, the project for the conservation and sustainable use of pollinators and the

Project of Special Studies about Biodiversity and Traditional Communities in Brazil (all

described in table D) relied strongly on academic experts for the obtainment of information

(who). However, their final goals cannot be directly associated with a strategy to inform

politicians’ decision making as it would be the case in strictly hierarchical strategies of

information-gathering (for whom). The Project of Special Studies on Biodiversity and

Traditional Communities, for example, was intended to catalogue and organise in an easily

accessible database all the nationally available bibliographic material related to the use of

biodiversity by traditional communities. The reliance on the expertise of researchers to

conduct this compilation does not clearly show a hierarchical bias because the information

collected was not necessarily produced by the scientific community and their “compilation

expertise“ was merely instrumental to make this knowledge accessible to the general public

(who and how). Ultimately, therefore, this project was a strategy to value and protect the

knowledge of usually less-favoured groups of traditional people (for whom). This intention

goes against a strictly hierarchical logic and valorises the appropriation of information by all

the sectors of society for the benefit of the community of traditional people. Similarly, the

scientific information produced in the project "Conservation and Sustainable Use of

Pollinators in the Agriculture, with emphasis on bees" was intended to be used by an NGO

(Instituto de Estudos Ambientais do Sul da Bahia) working on the protection of pollinators

(for whom) (Brazil, Environmental Ministry, 1998). Finally, the Brazilian Network of

Information about Biodiversity, was a public website in which scientific information about

species was made available. Although the target of the project was the scientific

community, scientific knowledge has not been used or meant to justify political decision-

making (for whom). It was simply a tool to make information available for the benefit of the

general scientific community and potentially for the benefit of local communities where

species occur (promoting awareness of the need to protect species). Additionally, this

project also developed an educational programme among school teachers for the tool to be

used in class and a study of socio-environmental conflicts related to species was also

19

developed for educational purposes (for whom). It was therefore, based on information

gathered by scientists (who) but the use of information was not intended at decision-making

and strongly benefited the community. All these projects, therefore, have in common the

fact that scientific knowledge is used instrumentally not to underscore political decision-

making but to benefit and protect traditional and more general communities. It is

concluded, therefore, that although presenting some elements of a hierarchical orientation

in the actors involved (who) and, sometimes, scientific methods (how) the goals (for whom)

of these projects are also biased towards an egalitarian view of the world. These projects

were characterised, therefore, as hybrids of egalitarian and hierarchic administrative

cultures.

In terms of standard-setting, moreover, while PROBIO I was being implemented,

the government promoted a one-year consultation period (between 2000-2001) during

which NGO’s, academics, indigenous communities, the private sector and the government

itself were asked to provide inputs for the formulation of a proposal of the National Policy of

Biodiversity (NPB). On March of 2002, based on this consultation period and on the other

information gathering projects developed up to that time, the government launched the

first draft of the NPB, which was further discussed in four meetings with varied members of

the society in different state capitals of the country (who and how). This open and long

consultation period was remarkable and did not happen, as it will be shown below, in the

case of the elaboration of the National Policy of Climate Change. In terms of the actors

involved and procedures for the definition of the National Policy of Biodiversity, therefore,

the approach adopted was, once again, considerably egalitarian, with a strong focus on

social participation and inclusive dialogue. It can be assumed therefore, that the community

as a whole strongly benefited from the writing of this policy (‘for whom’) and that this was a

strongly egalitarian standard-setting process.

Similarly, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Policy of

Biodiversity (PANBio), which was approved in 2006, was found to follow a considerably

egalitarian process of standard setting. The formulation of the programme involved an

online public consultation during 2005 and a face to face debate including members of

NGOs, academia, private sector and government during which the ideas from the online

public consultation were further discussed. During this debate the participants were divided

20

in seven groups which proposed actions for the conservation of biodiversity. After a new

round of online consultation and the consolidation of the proposed actions by the

Environmental Ministry (in order to eliminate duplicity, non-specific actions and actions

which had no operational and financial viability), a resulting document was submitted to the

CONABIO (the National Commission of Biodiversity) for approval. In 2006, 142 actions were

approved and a technical chamber13 was established by CONABIO to monitor the

implementation of the actions. Once again both the actors involved in the process of

standard setting and the process itself was markedly egalitarian and followed by broadly

participatory discussion within CONABIO (decisions in CONABIO are taken through the

simple majority rule, but the composition of the commission is markedly inclusive of many

sectors of the society) (how and who). Moreover, the actions proposed generated

obligations to all sorts of social actors (communities, government, researchers, NGO’s) and

were allegedly intended to benefit them (Brasil – Environmental Ministry, 2006) (for whom).

Lastly, although little data exists on the actual implementation of PROBIO II, a

brief analysis of some of its projects reveals the intention to use market incentives such as

the concession of credit to private actors that work for the conservation of biodiversity.

Other components of this project, however, still seem to strongly rely on egalitarian

strategies, such as, for example the use of communitarian monitoring system for the

promotion of organic agriculture. A more conclusive analysis of the cultural style of this

more recent project will therefore be postponed until the fieldwork, when more data will be

obtained on the actual implementation of the project. By now, however, it can already be

noticed that the policies implemented by the regime of biodiversity reveals a predominant

egalitarian bias, which although sometimes mixed with hierarchical or individualist

strategies, still markedly prevails. This evidence will now be contrasted with the

predominant hierarchical features of the Climate Change Regime.

Table C - Standard-setting in the biodiversity regime

Year Programme Standards Who are the actors involved in the definition of the standard?

How were standards defined?

For whose benefit are standards set?

Predominant Cultural Orientation

1994 PRONABIO 1. PRONABIO - Decree n° 1.354

To be answered after fieldwork

To be answered after fieldwork

To be answered after fieldwork

To be answered after fieldwork

2000- - 2. Principles and Directives Community groups (civil Through dialogue For the public good Egalitarian

13

Following the pluralistic composition of CONABIO, this technical chamber was also inclusive of different sectors of the society.

21

2002 for the Implementation of the National Policy of Biodiversity

society), politicians and private actors

and consensus

2001 - 3. Provisional Measure N° 2.186-16 of 23 of august of 2001 - regulating the access to genetic material, the protection and access to genetic traditional knowledge, the access and transference of technology

Politicians Through formal rules and procedures

To protect politicians from criticisms and also, allegedly for the public good.

Hierarchical

2003 - 2004

PRONABIO 4. CONABIO – Decree N° 4.703, of 21 of May of 2003 and Decree N° 5.312, of 15th of December of 2004

Initially restricted to the politicians but have progressively expanded to include the community.

Initially through formal procedures, but changed to allow for dialogue and consensus

For the public good

Initially hierarchical but adjusted to a more egalitarian approach.

2004 PROBIO I 5. Definition of the Standards for the identification of priority areas for conservation and identification of the areas ( Decree N° 5.092, of 21 of May of 2004 and Ministerial Decree N° 126, of 27th of May of 2004)

Actors from the governments, civil society and private sector

Through dialogue and consensus (workshops)

For the public good Egalitarian

2006 PANBio 6. Directives and Priorities of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Policy of Biodiversity (PANBio) were approved on the 7th of February of 2006

Actors from the governments, civil society and private sector

Through dialogue (deliberation of CONABIO)

For the public good Egalitarian

Source: Produced by the author

Table D - Information-gathering in the biodiversity regime

Year Programme Project

Who obtains information? How is information obtained? For whose benefit is

information obtained?

Predominant Cultural Orientation

1992 - 1998 PPG-7

Testing of social, environmental and economic co-management models in four extractive reserves.

Community and decision makers

Through dialogue and mutual learning

For the community Egalitarian

Project of Protection to the Indigenous Population and Lands of the Legal Amazon (PPTAL)

Community and decision makers

Through dialogue and mutual learning

For the community Egalitarian

97 Demonstration Projects" The majority aims to stimulate the production and commercialisation of forest products in a sustainable manner.

Community, decision makers and academics.

Through dialogue and mutual learning

For the community Egalitarian

1994 - 1998

PRONABIO

Workshops

Community (mainly NGO’s and academic groups)

Through dialogue and mutual learning For the community Egalitarian

Elaboration of the “Manual of Economic Valuation of Environmental Resources”

Experts and technicians Through expert advice

For politicians (to inform decision making) Hierarchic

PROBIO I

Brazilian Network of Information about Biodiversity

Experts Compilation of existing information

For scientists, the communities where species occur and

Hybrid – egalitarian/hierarchic

22

1996 - 2001

school children.

Conservation and Sustainable Use of Pollinators in the Agriculture, with emphasis on bees

Experts Scientific research By the NGO Instituto de Estudos Ambientais do Sul da Bahia

Hybrid – egalitarian/hierarchic

Project of Special Studies about Biodiversity and Traditional Communities in Brazil

Experts Compilation of existing information

For the community (the database was purposefully organised in an accessible way to facilitate its use by the general public and the goal of the project itself was to value the knowledge of traditional communities)

Hybrid – egalitarian/hierarchic

Virtual Brazilian Institute of Biodiversity and Brazilian Centre for the Monitoring and Prognosis of Biodiversity

No information available

No information available

No information available

No information available

Source: Produced by the author

Table E - Behavior Modification in the biodiversity regime

Year Programme Project

Who enforces behaviour modification

How is the new behaviour enforced?

For whose benefit is behaviour modified?

Predominant Cultural Orientation

1999 - 2006

PPG 7

Promanejo – Project of Support to Forest Management The community (volunteers)

Communitarian bonds, persuasion (training) but also financial incentives

Community Egalitarian with an individualist component

Proteger II – Project of Mobilization and capacitation of small farmers, extrativists and indigenous for the prevention of forest fires in the Amazon The community (volunteers)

Persuasion (educational projects) and communitarian bounds

Community

Egalitarian

Pro-varzea - Project of Management of Natural Resources in River Low-Lands The community (volunteers)

Communitarian bounds (Fishermen agreements are designed and is enforced through trust)

Community

Egalitarian

1997 - 2000 PROBIO I Demonstrative Projects

Groups of NGO’s, members of the government and research organisations

Persuasion (Information provision) and debate

Community

Egalitarian

2006 PANBio Directives I was not enforced It was not enforced

I was originally designed for the benefit of the community

Egalitarian intentions (not accomplished)

2008 - 2014

PROBIO II

Consideration of Biodiversity by other Governmental Sectors -Promotion of organic agriculture

Communitarian enforcers and private certification

Mainly through communitarian systems of evaluation to conformity and

The community

Egalitarian-individualist

23

through private certification.

Prioritization of Biodiversity by the Private Sector - Funding private projects that take biodiversity in consideration. Market actors

Through financial incentives

Private actors and also for the public good

Individualist

Source: Produced by the author

In what refers to the Climate Change regime, the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed by the Brazilian government in 1992,

but the first law internalising the Convention was only enacted in 2009. The Law n° 12.187

which instituted the “National Policy on Climate Change” was preceded by the Decree n°

6.263 (2007) which was intended to guide the elaboration of the National Policy. This

decree predicted that both the executive power and the civil society should participate in

the elaboration of the National Policy through the formation of the Executive Group of

Climate Change. With a brief process-tracing of the actual events that preceded the

elaboration of the Policy, however, it becomes evident that the executive power (decision-

makers) had a dominant role. The attendance lists from the meetings of the Executive

Group of Climate Change between November of 2007, when the group was established, and

December of 2009, when the National Policy of Climate Change was published, are not

available online, however, more recent lists (22/01/2014; 05/12/2013 and 06/11/2013)

indicate that no representative from the Brazilian Forum of Climate Change (composed by

the civil society and described by Decree n° 6.263 as one of the members of the Executive

Group) were actually present (attendance lists available at:

http://www.mma.gov.br/clima/grupo-executivo-sobre-mudanca-do-clima/grupo-executivo-

sobre-mudanças-climáticas/item/326). As observed by Pietrafesa (2013), moreover, during

the elaboration of the National Policy of Climate Change the centralization by the executive

power was high and even members of the Congress were given little space in the

negotiations. A transcribed excerpt of an interview with Thelma Krug (May, 2011) - the

former Secretary of Climate Change and Environmental Quality gives support to this point

by illustrating how the elaboration of the bill has first been proposed:

“Everything [the national policy of climate change] actually started from a conversation between the president Lula and the [environmental] minister Marina Silva about the idea that Brazil needed a more pro-active and transparent attitude in

24

its contribution to the climate issue. The minister, after this conversation with Lula, established this secretariat [Secretariat of Climate Change and Environmental Quality]. The minister invited me to assume the Secretariat and we started a discussion about a National Policy of Climate Change” (Krug, 2011 transcribed by Pietrafesa, 2013, p.100)

Additionally, although the former Secretary Krug alleges, during this same

interview, that the executive power considered all the opinions received from the Brazilian

Forum of Climate Change and other groups of the Civil Society for the elaboration of the

Law, textual analysis of the Law and of the contributions from civil society demonstrate that

the executive power actively vetoed such inputs. One of the documents sent to the

Executive by a civil society group was the “Elements for the formulation of Climate Change

Regulations in Brazil: Contributions from the Civil Society” sent by the Climate Observatory, a

group of research institutions and NGOs. The other was the “Climate Change and Brazil:

Contributions and directives for the incorporation of climate change matters in public

policy”. The production of this last document was coordinated by Vitae Civilis and

Greenpeace, and included the participation of a network of more than 600 civil society

organisations. Interestingly, in relation to the document sent by the Climate Observatory,

the few suggested provisions which were actually included in the final bill (such as the

promotion of renewable energies and the gradual substitution of fossil fuels by renewable

energy); were later vetoed by the executive power, through the Presidential Message N°

1.123, of 29 of December of 200914. Also particularly interesting for this research is the fact

that the document produced by the Climate Observatory had a passage that clearly and

explicitly mentioned the need for conciliation between the climate change and the

biodiversity agendas which was not included by the executive government in the final draft

of the bill.

It is observed, therefore, that almost no contribution of the civil society was

considered by the executive government in the formulation of the National Policy of Climate

Change and that politicians (decision makers) strongly dominated this standard-setting

process which was mainly based on the formal rules regulating the legislative processes in

Brazil (‘who’ and ‘how’). Additionally, although more will need to be investigated in this

regard during fieldwork, recent informal conversations with a member of the executive

government revealed that the foreign affairs ministry has been strongly relying on Climate

Change policies as a demonstration of Brazilian development and maturity as a country. 14

The executive power argued that those parts of the Law were being vetoed for “energy security” reasons.

25

Bold climate standards would, thus, be set for the benefit of the international image of the

country (soft-power), for the benefit of the government in other international forums of

negotiation (‘for whom’). Thus, the analysis of the standard-setting process of the National

Policy of Climate Change in terms of ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘for whom’ consistently points

towards a hierarchical bias. It is important to remark, in conclusion, that this fact markedly

diverges from the strongly participatory process that actually characterised the formulation

and implementation of the National Policy of Biodiversity, which had a formal consultation

period with several sectors, contributions of the civil society actually included in the final bill

and an inclusive technical committee to work on its implementation.

In relation to information-gathering, moreover, the Decree N° 7.390, of 9th of

December of 2010 determines (4th article - III) that sectorial plans of mitigation and

adaptation (which shall be developed by several ministries) shall define their own

instruments of information-gathering. It is established, in addition, that the Ministry of

Science and Technology shall coordinate a Monitoring Working Group which should be in

charge of the elaboration of annual estimates of emissions and of improving the

methodology for the projection of future emissions. This working group was also intended

to suggest, when necessary the review of the Decree itself. The analysis of the regulation,

therefore, suggested that in order to observe how information is gathered, by whom and for

whose benefit it was necessary to investigate the composition and functioning of the each

of the sectorial plans, as well as of the Monitoring Working Group.

The empirical analysis of the monitoring group revealed that it is not actually a

well-structured institution yet and the decisions about information-gathering in this regime

have been left to the coordinators of the sectorial plans. The analysis of each of the sectorial

plans, in its turn, demonstrates that six out of the nine plans of mitigation and adaption

implemented so far are completely or predominantly hierarchical, two have their cultural

styles still underspecified at this initial point of implementation and one mixes both

hierarchical and individualist approaches (see table G for more detailed information).

Although space constraints do not allow for a detailed description of each of these sectorial

plans here, the Plan of Low Carbon Agriculture – ABC Plan will be used as example of the

hierarchical orientation of information-gathering in this regime. This plan is based on

obligatory reporting of information (data is collected by satellite monitoring, banking system

26

and commercial transactions) (‘how’). Technicians from the “Virtual Multi-Institutional

Laboratory of Climate Change and Agriculture” are in charge of consolidating information

for the formulation of new policies by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Agrarian

Development (‘who’ and ‘for whom’). This process, therefore, although potentially

promoting the public good have the primary and explicit goal of informing the decision-

making processes within these two ministries. Similar stories, as observed above, can be

told about six out of nine sectoral plans. Thus, although more data will still be collected

through interviews, the documentary analysis of these plans already suggests a rather clear

hierarchical bias in the information-gathering policies of the climate change regime.

The analysis of the strategies of behaviour-modification of the Sectorial Plans

reveal, on the other hand, a much more complex picture. If the analysis is based on the

normative goals advanced by each plan, four of the plans can be considered hybrids with no

clearly identifiable cultural predominance and two of the plans display a primarily

individualist approach. A crucial point, however, emerged when the actual implementation

of these Plans was analysed: the only two plans which have already been implemented and

have available data about it (Energy and Amazon Plans) have been implemented

predominantly hierarchically, even if their original projects intended them to be hybrids.

The Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAm),

for example, although displaying hybrid egalitarian and hierarchical intentions has

demonstrated specific difficulties, as already mentioned, in promoting the conservation of

biodiversity through local coordination with communities (its more egalitarian component)

(IPEA-GIZ-CEPAL, 2011). Similarly, the Decennial plan of energy expansion has been

achieving its objectives through the legal requirement of increasing the percentage of

biodiesel in the diesel (which was increased from 3% to 5% in 2010 through the

implementation of the Law 11.097/2005) and governmental investment in new sugar cane

plants through the provision of credit by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). Thus,

although more data is needed in order to better evaluate the actual biases of the

implementation of this plan, a preliminary analysis concluded that the implementation of

this plan has been a hybrid of individualist and hierarchical strategies. In any case, what is

clear is that behaviour modification strategies of the Climate Change Regime as a whole

27

have majorly tended towards hierarchical strategies, which contrasts with the

predominantly egalitarian choices made within the biodiversity regime.

Therefore, our second hypothesis about the different administrative cultures of

each regime acting as impediments for coordination found empirical support in the

differences found in the processes of standard-setting, information-gathering and

behaviour-modification of each regime. If the assumption that differences in administrative

cultures generates competition and hinders coordination among government areas is

correct, this analysis can be of some potential use for the understanding of the lack of

coordination among both areas. Tables F, G and H, below, summarise the policies analysed

in this regime.

Table F - Standard-Setting Activities in the Climate Change Regime

Year Standards ‘HOW’ are standards defined? ‘WHO’ is involved in the definition of standards?

‘FOR WHOM’ are standards set?

Predominant cultural

orientation

2009 Elaboration of the National Policy of Climate Change

Formal rules and procedures (Initial bill produced by the Executive Group of Climate

Change - mainly composed by the executive power; voted by the

Congress with insignificant changes and partially vetoed by

the president through a “presidential message”. Some of

the vetoed clauses were suggested by the civil society.

Politicians Apparently to benefit politicians

in international negotiations (strategic –

policies are not an end in itself)

Hierarchical

Source: Produced by the author

Table G - Information gathering in the climate change regime

Year Project ‘HOW’ is information obtained? ‘WHO’ obtains information

‘FOR WHOM’ is information obtained?

Prevalent Cultural Type

2012 - now Monitoring Working Group

Still not defined. The suggestion of a mandatory Federal Technical Register seems to have been well

received by the group.

To be defined by the Sectorial Plans’

coordinators

By the Sectorial Plans’ coordinators

Impossible to determine with the available data

2012 - now Plan of Low Carbon

Agriculture – ABC Plan

Obligatory information reporting (Satellite information,

information from the banking system, from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic -IBGE and from the

National Company of Supply – CONAB)

Technicians (“Virtual Multi-Institutional

Laboratory of Climate Change and Agriculture” composed by the Climate

Network -a group of research institutions)

Decision makers (Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Agrarian Development)

Hierarchical

2013 - now Mining Plan of Low Carbon

Emission

Not specified Ministry of Mining and Energy

Decision makers (Ministry of Mining and Energy)

Impossible to determine with the available data

2010 - now Plan for the reduction of

emissions in the steel industry

Not specified Mixed actors (Steel Industry Competition Forum and Brazilian Forum of Climate Change)

Decision makers (Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce)

Impossible to determine with the available data

2013 - now Sectorial plan for an Economy of

Low Carbon

Obligatory information reporting by large firms (through annual reports of emissions)

Technicians (Technical Commission of the

Industrial Plan)

Decision makers (in this case the

Technical

Hierarchical

28

Emission in the Transformation

Industry - Industry Plan

Commission of the Industrial Plan)

2010 - now Decennial Plan of Energy Expansion

Obligatory information reporting (by energy production companies)

Technicians (Energetic Research Company and National Operator of the Electrical System )

Decision makers (Ministry of Mining and Energy)

Hierarchical

2013 - now Sectorial Plan of Health for the Mitigation and Adaptation to

Climate Change

Obligatory information reporting (from health professionals of the public sector)

Technicians (Health professionals)

Decision makers (Ministry of Environment)

Hierarchical

2013 - now Sectorial Plan of the

Transportation and Urban

Mobility for Climate Change

Mitigation

Obligatory information reporting (Technical visits to the building sites, document analysis )

Technicians (Technical Group of Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change in Public Urban Transportation and Ministry of Transportation)

Decision makers (Ministry of Cities and Ministry of Transportation)

Hierarchical

2010 - now Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of

Deforestation and Fires in the

Cerrado

Obligatory information reporting (satellite information, land tenure regularisation requirements and direct monitoring by public agents)

Technicians and bureaucrats

Decision makers (IBAMA, Ministry of Environment, Federal State Environmental Agencies, ICMBio) and community (Public consultation of the national database of fires is allowed by the IBAMA).

Predominantly Hierarchical (elements of fatalism and egalitarianism)

2004 - now Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of

Deforestation in the Amazon

Obligatory information reporting (Satellites, radars and external evaluators)

Technicians (National Institute of Spatial Researches - INPE)

Decision makers and community (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, Brazilian Intelligence System - SISBIN; Inter-ministerial Commission against Criminal and Unlawful Environmental Acts, the Brazilian Institute of Environmental and Natural Resources - IBAMA, representatives of the Brazilian Forum of Climate Change)

Predominantly hierarchical (with elements of egalitarianism)

Source: Produced by the author

Table H - Behaviour-modification in the climate change regime Year Programme of

Behaviour Modification of the Climate Change Regime

‘HOW’ is the new behaviour enforced?

‘WHO’ enforces behaviour modification?

‘FOR WHOSE’ benefit is behaviour modified?

Prevalent Cultural Type

2012 - now Plan of Low Carbon

Agriculture – ABC Plan

Persuasion (Provision of information and capacitation of rural producers) Competition ( Financial Incentives to the industry for the production of biogas)

In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet:

- Technicians - Community groups - Private actors

Communities and market actors

The plan is hybrid among egalitarian and individualist strategies. (research on the actual implementation is needed)

29

2013 - now Mining Plan of Low Carbon

Emission

Persuasion (Provision of resources by the government; Competition (Fiscal incentives)

In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet: - Technicians and experts- - Market actors

Market actors individualist

2010 - now Plan for the reduction of

emissions in the steel industry

Competition (Increment of credit provision, stimulus of win-win cooperation between large and small companies, elaboration of voluntary norms of best practice for the industry)

In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet: - Technicians - Private actors

Market actors Individualist

2013 - now Sectorial plan for an Economy of

Low Carbon Emission in the Transformation

Industry - Industry Plan

Competition (Market/fiscal incentives to the industry; - differential fiscal/credit treatment for companies with recycling programmes or low emission levels; efficiency labels; voluntary programmes; public-private partnerships for emission reduction; fast-track system for the concession of patents for sustainable products) Legal punishment after obligatory Information Reporting (Legal/formal enforcement of mandatory reporting of emissions by companies)

In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet: - Technicians - Market actors

Market actors Individualist with one hierarchical element

2010 - now Decennial Plan of Energy Expansion

Legal punishment (Mandatory inclusion of biodiesel in the diesel; minimum obligatory energy efficiency levels) Competition (Voluntary label for the products with best performance levels in a category; public and public-private investments in hydroelectric energy plants; integration of alternative sourced energy in the national network)

In practice (already implemented): - Technicians - Market actors

Market actors, politicians (high visibility and electoral stakes involved)

Hybrid of individualist, egalitarian and hierarchic strategies.

2013 - now Sectorial Plan of Health for the Mitigation and Adaptation to

Climate Change

Persuasion (Through educational programmes)

In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet:

Technicians (Public health professionals)

Impossible to determine with available data

Impossible to determine with available data

2013 - now Sectorial Plan of the

Transportation and Urban

Mobility for Climate Change

Mitigation

Not specified in the plan In theory(not implemented/evaluated yet:

Politicians (Municipal governments)

Impossible to determine with available data

Impossible to determine with available data

2010 - now Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of

Deforestation and Fires in the

Cerrado

Legal punishment Persuasion (Educational programmes and capacitation of communitarian volunteers)

In theory (not implemented or evaluated yet): - Technicians - The market - Community volunteers

Impossible to determine with available data

Hierarchical, Individualist and egalitarian elements present in the plan

2004 - now Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of

Deforestation in the Amazon

- Legal punishment (Criminal charges, Seizure of equipment)

In practice (already implemented and evaluated): - Governmental agencies, - Police officers

Politicians (high international visibility, main argument to defend Brazilian success in climate change negotiations)

Hierarchical

Source: produced by the author

30

6. Conclusion

This paper intended, firstly, to raise attention to the importance of the overlaps

and the need of coordination between the regimes of biodiversity and climate change in

Brazil. As observed, the objectives of both regimes are highly connected and several

negative side effects might emerge and are actually emerging from the absence of

coordination between these areas in Brazil. Secondly, this paper presented two potential

hypotheses explaining why coordination is not taking place in that country. The first, which

was based on the characteristics of the problems themselves (and on the consequent

interest group dynamics and media attitudes emerging from it), was briefly demonstrated to

have lost its relevance in face of recent developments in ecosystem services research and

public attitudes towards both environmental issues. The second explanation, based on the

importance of administrative cultures acting as impediments to coordination, has, however,

been shown to be potentially relevant. Building on an analytical framework derived from

“grid-group cultural theory”, it has been demonstrated that the regimes of climate change

and biodiversity in Brazil have been developing quite different administrative styles with a

more egalitarian bias prevailing in biodiversity and a more hierarchical one dominating

climate change.

This paper is, thus, a contribution to the issue of political coordination and

environmental governance. There is little doubt that the need of coordination among both

regimes is vital. There is also little doubt that views of the world and institutional path-

dependency are strong determinants of policy choices. It remains to be seen, however, to

which extent understanding the sources of the difficulties of administrative coordination

can actually lead to its avoidance.

References

Bevan, G. & Hood, C., (2006) What’s Measured is what matters: target and gaming in the English Public Health Care System. Public Administration, 84(3), pp.517–538.

Black, J. (2002) Critical Reflections on Regulation. Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics. London UK. Boykoff M. T.; Roberts, J. T. (2007) Human Development Report 2007 - Media coverage of climate change: current trends, strengths, weaknesses. United Nations Development Programme – UNEP [Online] Available at:

31

https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/boykoff_maxwell_and_roberts_j._timmons.pdf] [Accessed: June, 2014] Brazil, Brazilian Forest Code, Law Nº 12.651 of 25th of May of 2012 [online] [Available at: http://www.ima.al.gov.br/servicos/gestao-florestal/car/Codigo%20Florestal_2012.pdf] [Accessed June, 2013] Brazil, Environmental Ministry – Secretariat of Biodiversity and Forests (2011) Projeto Nacional de Ações Integradas Público-Privadas para Biodiversidade – PROBIO II RELATÓRIO de PROGRESSO (julho a dezembro de 2010). [online] [Available at: http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/221/_arquivos/relatorio_semestral_dez_2010_221.pdf ] [Accessed: June 2014]. Brazil. Environmental Ministry (1998). Primeiro relatório nacional para a Convenção sobre Diversidade Biológica. Brasília, Brazil. Cardinale, B. J. et al. (2012) ‘Biodiversity loss and its impact on humanity’ Nature 486(7401):59–67 Carpenter, C. (2001), Businesses, Green Groups and The Media: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate. International Affairs, 77: 313–328 Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento - CONAB (2014) Acompanhamento da safra brasileira de cana de acucar. V.1 Safra 2014/2015. [Online] [Available at: http://www.conab.gov.br/OlalaCMS/uploads/arquivos/14_04_15_15_44_37_boletim_cana_portugues_-_1o_lev_-_14.pdf] [Accessed: June, 2014].

Dryzek, J.S., (2005) The Politics of the Earth Second Edi., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Forsyth, T., (2003) Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science, Routledge, London and New York.

Herve-Fournereau, N; Langlais, A. (2013) Does the concept of ecosystem services promote synergies between European strategies for climate change and biodiversity? In Maes, F. et al (Eds.) Biodiversity and Climate Change: Linkages at the International, National and Local Levels. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton.

Hood, C., (1998) The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.

Hood, C.; Rothstein, H.; Baldwin, R. (2001) The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.

Hoppe, R., (2002) Cultures of Public Policy Problems. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 4(3), pp.305–326.

32

Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada(IPEA); Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); Comissao Economica para a América Latina e o Caribe (CEPAL) (2011) Avaliação do Plano de Ação para a Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazonia Legal. [Online] [Available at: http://www.cepal.org/dmaah/publicaciones/sinsigla/xml/7/45887/IPEA_GIZ_Cepal_2011_Avaliacao_PPCDAm_2007-2011_web.pdf ] [Accessed June, 2014] IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, In: Climate Change 2014, Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O. et al (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

Keohane, R., (1982) The demand for international regimes. International Organization, 36(2), pp.325–355.

Lodge, M. & Wegrich, K., (2012) Managing Regulation: Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy First Edi., London and Berlin.

Lodge, M.; Stirton, L. (2010) Accountability in the regulatory state. In: Baldwin, R.; Cave, M.;Lodge, M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Regulation. Oxford handbooks in business and management. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. March, J. G; Olsen, J. P. (2006) The Logic of Appropriateness. In Moran, M., Rein, M., and Goodin, R. E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford UK: 689–708 Rose, R. (1990) Inheritance Before Choice in Public policy. Journal of Theoretical Politics, July, 2: 263-291 Sagemuller, I. (2006) Forest Sinks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol:Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity? Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 31:2 Santos, M. T. (2005) Aprendizado do Projeto de Manejo dos Recursos Naturais da Varzea –

ProVarzea. Ministerio do Meio Ambiente. Brasilia, Brazil.

Sauer, S. (2005) Prevencao de Incendios florestais na Amazonia: Licoes aprendidas no

Projeto Proteger. Ministerio do Meio Ambiente: Brasilia, Brazil.

Savaresi, A. (2013) Reducing emmissions in the forest sector under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: a new opportunity for biodiversity conversation? In Maes, F. et al (Eds.) Biodiversity and Climate Change: Linkages at the International, National and Local Levels. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2009) Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert

33

Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change, Montreal, Technical Series No. 41 in CDB Technical Series.

Thompson, M., Ellis, R. & Wildavsky, A., (1990) Cultural Theory, Boulder, Westview Press, CO.

United Nations Environment Programme – UNEP. Issue papers ‘Climate Change and Biodiversity’. [Online] [Available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/IssuePapers] [Accessed: June, 2014]

United Nations, (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. [Online] [Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf] [Accessed 03 August 2013]

United Nations, (1992a) Convention on biological diversity [online] [Available at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf] [Accessed 03 August 2013]

Verissimo, A. (2005) Influencia do Promanejo sobre Politicas Publicas de Manejo Florestal

Sustentavel na Amazonia. Ministerio do Meio Ambiente: Brasilia.

Verweij, M. et al., (2006) Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: the Case of Climate Change. Public Administration, 84(4), pp.817–843

Viergever, M. (2005) Projeto Integrado de Protecao as Populacoes e Terras Indigenas da Amazonia Legal – Versao Final. [online] [Available at: http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CDwQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Ferc.undp.org%2Fevaluationadmin%2Fdownloaddocument.html%3Fdocid%3D3788&ei=a2CHU6vXJs6a0QX3woGADQ&usg=AFQjCNEDYKPp9ZqAxxF_kmewr9_NVja5xQ&bvm=bv.68114441,d.d2k] [Accessed: May, 2014].

World Resources Institute, (2013) World Resources Institute.[online] Available at: http://www.wri.org/ [Accessed 16 August 2013].