bluetooth - monash university
TRANSCRIPT
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 1
P. Bhagwat 1
Bluetooth
A cable replacement technology1 Mb/s symbol rateRange 10+ metersSingle chip radio + baseband
at low power & low price point ($5)
Why not use Wireless LANs?- power- cost
P. Bhagwat 2
802.11
Replacement for EthernetSupported data rates
Current: 11, 5.5, 2, 1 MbpsFuture: 20+ Mbps in 2.4 GHz and up to 54 Mbps in 5.7 GHz band
Range Indoor 20 - 25 metersOutdoor: 50 – 100 meters
Transmit power up to 100 mWCost:
Chipsets $ 35 – 50AP $200 - $1000PCMCIA cards $100 - $150
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 2
P. Bhagwat 3
Cordlessheadset
Emerging Landscape
802.11 Bluetooth
AccessPoint
802.11b for PDAsBluetooth for LAN access
New developments areblurring the distinction
Designed for cablereplacement
Designed for wiredEthernet replacement
Which option is technically superior ?What market forces are at play ?What can be said about the future ?
P. Bhagwat 4
Questions I hope to answer
What are the key design differences between Bluetooth and 802.11 ?
At PHY, MAC, and System levelHow do Bluetooth and 802.11 compare ?
Cost, Range of communication, performanceWhy is Bluetooth supposed to be low cost and low power ? Can 802.11 achieve the same price and performance target ?Is Bluetooth more secure than 802.11 ?Reality Vs. hypeCan the two systems co-exist ?
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 3
P. Bhagwat 5
Tutorial Overview
2:00 – 3:00 pm Introduction, Bluetooth applications, basic radio concepts, Bluetooth RF
3:00 - 3:45 pm Bluetooth Baseband3:45 - 4:15 pm LMP, Security, Scatternets4:15 - 4:30 pm *Break* 4:30 - 5:30 pm 802.11 specifications overview, PHY & MAC5:30 - 6:00 pm Bluetooth & 802.11 comparison, Conclusion
P. Bhagwat 6
New Applications
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 4
P. Bhagwat 7
Synchronization
User benefitsAutomatic synchronization of calendars, address books, business cardsPush button synchronizationProximity operation
P. Bhagwat 8
Cordless Headset
User benefitsMultiple device access Cordless phone benefitsHands free operation
Cordlessheadset
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 5
P. Bhagwat 9
Usage scenarios examples
Data Access PointsSynchronizationHeadsetConference TableCordless ComputerBusiness Card ExchangeInstant PostcardComputer Speakerphone
P. Bhagwat 10
Bluetooth Specifications
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 6
P. Bhagwat 11
Bluetooth Specifications
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data
SDP RFCOMMIP
Single chip with RS-232,USB, or PC card interface
A hardware/software/protocol descriptionAn application framework
HCI
Applications
P. Bhagwat 12
Interoperability & Profiles
Profiles
Prot
ocol
s
ApplicationsRepresents default solution for a usage modelVertical slice through the protocol stackBasis for interoperability and logo requirementsEach Bluetooth device supports one or more profiles
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 7
P. Bhagwat 13
Bluetooth Radio Specification
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data Cont
rolSDP RFCOMM
IP
Applications
P. Bhagwat 14
EM Spectrum
ν
Propagation characteristics are different in each frequency band
LF HF VHF UHF SHF EHFMF
AM radio
UV
S/W ra
dioFM
radio
TV TV cellu
lar
ν
1 MHz1 kHz 1 GHz 1 THz 1 PHz 1 EHz
infrared visibleX rays
Gamma rays
902 – 928 Mhz
2.4 – 2.4835 Ghz
5.725 – 5.785 Ghz
ISM band
λ30kHz 300kHz 3MHz 30MHz 300MHz 30GHz 300GHz
10km 1km 100m 10m 1m 10cm 1cm 100mm
3GHz
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 8
P. Bhagwat 15
Unlicensed Radio Spectrum
902 Mhz
928 Mhz
26 Mhz 83.5 Mhz 125 Mhz
2.4 Ghz
2.4835 Ghz5.725 Ghz
5.785 Ghz
cordless phonesbaby monitorsWireless LANs
802.11BluetoothMicrowave oven
unused
λ 33cm 12cm 5cm
P. Bhagwat 16
Bluetooth radio link
frequency hopping spread spectrum2.402 GHz + k MHz, k=0, …, 781,600 hops per second
GFSK modulation1 Mb/s symbol rate
transmit power0 dbm (up to 20dbm with power control)
. . .
1Mhz
1 2 3 79
83.5 Mhz
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 9
P. Bhagwat 17
Design considerations
• high bandwidth• conserve battery power• cost < $10
Data signal x(t) Recovereddata signal
Goal
cost
power
spectrum
Noise, interference
P. Bhagwat 18
Bluetooth Radio
Low CostSingle chip radio (minimize external components)Today’s technologyTime division duplex
Low PowerStandby modes Sniff, Hold, ParkLow voltage RF
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 10
P. Bhagwat 19
Radio architecture: 802.11b
Analog Digital
SiGe or GaAs CMOS
P. Bhagwat 20
Radio architecture: Bluetooth
CMOS
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 11
P. Bhagwat 21
Receiver sensitivity & range of comm.
1 mW
30 mW
100 mW
BT 80
2.11
C/I > 21dB
C/I > 12 dB
P. Bhagwat 22
Radio: cost, power, range tradeoff
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 12
P. Bhagwat 23
Review of basic concepts
P. Bhagwat 24
Understanding wireless communication
• How does signal propagate ?• How much attenuation take place ?• How does signal look like at the receiver ?
Tx
Rx
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 13
P. Bhagwat 25
Radio PropagationThree basic propagation mechanisms
• At 2.4 Ghz, leaves, lamp-posts can cause scattering
Reflection
λ << D
Diffraction
λ ≈ D
Scattering
λ >> D
P. Bhagwat 26
dB (relative measure)
dB = 10 log (times)
107
1011
104
Networth
$ 10K
Grad
$ 100B
Bill Steve
$ 10M
10,000 times
1,000 times
40 dB
30 dB
10,000 * 1,000 times= 10,000,000 times
40 dB + 30 dB= 70dB
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 14
P. Bhagwat 27
Path loss in dB
1 µW
d2
10 W
source d1
1 mW10-3
101
10-6
Power
dB = 10 log (----)P1
P2
Path loss from source to d2 = 70dB
1,000 times40 dB 30 dB
10,000 times
P. Bhagwat 28
dBm ( absolute measure of power)
1 µW
d2
10 W
source d1
1 mW
+ 10,000 times
- 1,000 times
= 40 dBm
= 0 dBm10-3
101
10-6
Power
dBm = 10 log (-------)P1
1mW
= -30 dBm
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 15
P. Bhagwat 29
Radio propagation: path loss
Pt
Pr
Prnear field
path loss = 10 log (4πr2/λ) r ≤ 8m
= 58.3 + 10 log (r3.3 /8) r > 8m
r
path loss in 2.4 Ghz band
near field far fieldr2∝
r ≤ 8m r > 8m
r3.3∝
P. Bhagwat 30
Radio Propagation: Fading and multipath
Tx
Rx
Fading: rapid fluctuation of the amplitude of a radio signal over a short period of time or travel distance
• Fading• Varying doppler shifts on different multipath signals• Time dispersion (causing inter symbol interference)
Effects of multipath
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 16
P. Bhagwat 31
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data Cont
rol
Baseband
RFCOMMSDPIP
Applications
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data Cont
rolSDP RFCOMM
IP
Applications
P. Bhagwat 32
Bluetooth Physical link
Point to point linkmaster - slave relationshipradios can function as masters or slaves m s
ss
m
s
PiconetMaster can connect to 7 slavesEach piconet has max capacity (1 Mbps)hopping pattern is determined by the master
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 17
P. Bhagwat 33
Connection Setup
Inquiry - scan protocolto lean about the clock offset and device address of other nodes in proximity
P. Bhagwat 34
Inquiry on time axis
Slave1
Slave2
Master
Inquiry hoppingsequence
f1 f2
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 18
P. Bhagwat 35
Piconet formation
Master
Active Slave
Parked Slave
Standby
Page - scan protocolto establish links with nodes in proximity
P. Bhagwat 36
AddressingBluetooth device address (BD_ADDR)
48 bit IEEE MAC address
Active Member address (AM_ADDR)3 bits active slave addressall zero broadcast address
Parked Member address (PM_ADDR)8 bit parked slave address
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 19
P. Bhagwat 37
Piconet channel
m
s1
s2
625 λsec
f1 f2 f3 f4
1600 hops/sec
f5 f6
FH/TDD
P. Bhagwat 38
Multi slot packets
m
s1
s2
625 µsec
f1
FH/TDD
Data rate depends on type of packet
f4 f5 f6
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 20
P. Bhagwat 39
Physical Link Types
m
s1
s2
SCO SCO SCO
Synchronous Connection Oriented (SCO) Link slot reservation at fixed intervals
Asynchronous Connection-less (ACL) LinkPolling access method
SCO SCO SCOACL ACL ACLACL ACL ACL
P. Bhagwat 40
Packet Types
Controlpackets
Data/voicepackets
ID*NullPollFHSDM1
Voice data
HV1HV2HV3DV
DM1DM3DM5
DH1DH3DH5
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 21
P. Bhagwat 41
Packet Format
72 bits 54 bits 0 - 2744 bitsAccess code
Header Payload
DataVoice CRC
No CRCNo retries
625 µs
master
slave
header
ARQ
FEC (optional) FEC (optional)
P. Bhagwat 42
Access Code
SynchronizationDC offset compensationIdentificationSignaling
Access code
Header Payload
72 bits
Purpose
Channel Access Code (CAC)Device Access Code (DAC)Inquiry Access Code (IAC)
Types
X
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 22
P. Bhagwat 43
Packet Header
Addressing (3)Packet type (4)Flow control (1)1-bit ARQ (1)Sequencing (1)HEC (8)
Access code
Header Payload
54 bits
Purpose
Encode with 1/3 FEC to get 54 bits
Broadcast packets are not ACKedFor filtering retransmitted packets
18 bitstotal
ss
m
s
16 packet types (some unused)
Max 7 active slaves
Verify header integrity
P. Bhagwat 44
Data Packet Types
DM1
DM3
DM5
DH1
DH3
DH5
2/3 FEC
No FEC
Symmetric Asymmetric
36.3477.8 286.7
54.4387.2258.1
108.8108.8108.8
Symmetric Asymmetric
57.6723.2 433.9
86.4585.6390.4
172.8172.8172.8
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 23
P. Bhagwat 45
Inter piconet communication
Cell phone Cordlessheadset
Cordlessheadset
Cell phone
Cordlessheadset
Cell phone
mouse
P. Bhagwat 46
Scatternet
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 24
P. Bhagwat 47
Scatternet, scenario 2
How to schedule presence in two piconets?
Forwarding delay ?
Missed traffic?
P. Bhagwat 48
Baseband: Summary
TDD, frequency hopping physical layerDevice inquiry and pagingTwo types of links SCO and ACL linksMultiple packet types (multiple data rates with and without FEC)
Baseband Baseband
L2CAPL2CAPLMPLMP
Physical
Data link
Device 2Device 1
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 25
P. Bhagwat 49
Link Manager Protocol
Setup and management of Baseband connections
• Piconet Management• Link Configuration• Security
LMP
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data Cont
rolSDP RFCOMM
IP
Applications
P. Bhagwat 50
Piconet Management
Attach and detach slavesMaster-slave switchEstablishing SCO linksHandling of low power modes ( Sniff, Hold, Park)
req
response
Paging
Master
Slavess
m
s
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 26
P. Bhagwat 51
Low power mode (hold)
Slave
Hold duration
Hold offset
Master
P. Bhagwat 52
Low power mode (Sniff)
Master
Slave
Sniff period
Sniff offset
Sniff duration
Traffic reduced to periodic sniff slots
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 27
P. Bhagwat 53
Low power mode (Park)
Master
Slave
Beacon interval
Beacon instant
Power saving + keep more than 7 slaves in a piconetGive up active member address, yet maintain synchronizationCommunication via broadcast LMP messages
P. Bhagwat 54
Link Configuration
Quality of servicePolling intervalBroadcast repetition
Power controlPacket type negotiationMulti-slot packets
LMP_quality_of_service
LMP_not_Accepted
Paging
Master
Slave
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 28
P. Bhagwat 55
Connection establishment & Security
GoalsAuthenticated access
Only accept connections from trusted devices
Privacy of communicationprevent eavesdropping
ConstraintsProcessing and memory limitations
$10 headsets, joysticksCannot rely on PKISimple user experience
LMP_host_conn_req
LMP Accepted
Security procedure
Paging
Master
Slave
LMP_setup_complete
LMP_setup_complete
P. Bhagwat 56
Authentication
Authentication is based on link key (128 bit shared secret between two devices)How can link keys be distributed securely ?
Verifier
Claimant
challenge
response
accepted
Link key Link key
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 29
P. Bhagwat 57
Pairing (key distribution)
Pairing is a process of establishing a trusted secret channel between two devices (construction of initialization key Kinit)Kinit is then used to distribute unit keys or combination keys
Random number
Kinit
PIN + Claimant address
Randomnumber
PIN + Claimantaddress
Randomnumber
Verifier Claimant
Kinit
challenge
response
accepted
P. Bhagwat 58
Encryption
Encryption Key ( 8 – 128 bits)Derived from the Link key
Stop encryption
Encrypted traffic
Key size
Encryption mode
Start encryption
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 30
P. Bhagwat 59
Link Manager Protocol Summary
Piconet managementLink configuration
Low power modesQoSPacket type selection
Security: authentication and encryption
Baseband Baseband
L2CAPL2CAPLMPLMP
Physical
Data link
Device 2Device 1
P. Bhagwat 60
L2CAP
Logical Link Control andAdaptation Protocol
L2CAP provides• Protocol multiplexing• Segmentation and Re-assembly• Quality of service negotiation
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data
SDP RFCOMMIP
Applications
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 31
P. Bhagwat 61
Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data
SDP RFCOMMIP
Applications
P. Bhagwat 62
Serial Port Emulation using RFCOMM
Serial Port emulation on top of a packet oriented link• Similar to HDLC• For supporting legacy apps
RFBaseband
AudioLink ManagerL2CAP
Data
SDP RFCOMMIP
Applications
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 32
P. Bhagwat 63
LAN access point profile
SecurityAuthenticationAccess control
Efficiencyheader and data compression
Auto-configurationLower barrier for deployment
Why use PPP?
Access Point
Baseband
L2CAP
RFCOMM
PPP
IP
P. Bhagwat 64
IP over Bluetooth v 1.1: BNEP
• BNEP defines • a frame format which includes IEEE
48 bit MAC addresses• A method for encapsulating BNEP
frames using L2CAP• Option to compress header fields to
conserve space • Control messages to activate filtering of
messages at Access Point
Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol (BNEP) provides emulation of Ethernet over L2CAP
Access Point
Baseband
L2CAP
BNEP
IP
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 33
P. Bhagwat 65
802.11 specificationsoverview
P. Bhagwat 66
802.11 Specifications
MAC
Specification of layers below LLCAssociated management/control interfaces
MIB
Cont
rol
Applications
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
WEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 34
P. Bhagwat 67
802.11 Specifications
PLCP SublayerPHY layer ManagementPMD Sublayer
MAC sublayer
MAC LayerManagement
PHY ServiceInterface
PHY Mgmt ServiceInterface
LLCMAC ServiceInterface
MAC Mgmt ServiceInterface
LLC
MIB
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
MACWEP MAC
Mgmt
P. Bhagwat 68
802.11 Specifications
PHY Layer PHY Management
MAC sublayer MAC Management
PHY ServiceInterface (clause 12)
PHY Mgmt ServiceInterface (clause 13)
LLCMAC ServiceInterface (clause 6)
MAC framing (clause 7)MAC operation (clause 9)WEP (clause 8)State Machines (Annex C)
Protocols (clause 11)State Machines (Annex C)MIBs (Annex D)
FH (clause 14)DSSS (clause 15)Infrared (clause 16)OFDM (clause 17)High rate DSSS (clause 18)
MAC Mgmt ServiceInterface (clause 10)
MIBs (Annex D)
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 35
P. Bhagwat 69
802.11 System ArchitectureBasic Service Set (BSS): a set of stations which communicate
with one another
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS)
• only direct communication possible
• no relay function
Infrastructure Basic Service Set (BSS)
• AP provides • connection to wired network• relay function
• stations not allowed to communicate directly
P. Bhagwat 70
Extended Service Set
• ESS and all of its stations appear to be a single MAC layer• AP communicate among themselves to forward traffic • Station mobility within an ESS is invisible to the higher layers
ESS: a set of BSSs interconnected by a distribution system (DS)
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 36
P. Bhagwat 71
802.11 PHY
MIB
Cont
rol
Applications
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
MACWEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
P. Bhagwat 72
802.11 PHY
MAC Protcol Data Unit (MPDU)
MAC Protcol Data Unit (MPDU)
PLCP header MAC Protcol Data
Unit (MPDU)PLCP header
MAC Protcol Data Unit (MPDU)
Sender Receiver
Physical Media Dependent (PMD) layer PMD layer
MACPHY
High rate (DSSS) PHY11, 5.5 Mbps802.11b
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) PHY1,2 Mbps
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) PHY1, 2 Mbps
Infrared (IR) PHY1,2 Mbps
Higher rate (DSSS) PHY20+ Mbps802.11g
2.4 GHz
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) PHY6,9,12,18,24,36,48,54 Mbps802.11a
5.7 GHz
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 37
P. Bhagwat 73
DSSS PHY
Baseband signal is spread using Barker word (10 dB processing gain)Spread signal occupies approximately 22 Mhz bandwidthReceiver recovers the signal by applying the same Barker wordDSSS provides good immunity against narrowband interfererCDMA (multiple access) capability is not possible
MPDUPreamble Header
1 Mbps 1, 2 Mbps
DPSKmodulation
Transmitterbaseband signal
MPDUPreamble Header
1 Mbps 1, 2 Mbps
Received signal after despreading
DPSKde-modulationSpread the signal using Barker word (11 bits)
+1, -1, +1, +1, -1, +1, +1, +1, -1, -1, -1
Transmitted signal after spreading
P. Bhagwat 74
DSSS PHY
Direct sequence spread spectrumEach channel is 22 Mhz wide
Symbol rate1 Mb/s with DBPSK modulatio2 Mbps with DQPSK modulation11, 5.5 Mb/ps with CCK modulation
Max transmit power100 Mw
. . .
22 Mhz
83.5 Mhz
Ch 1 Ch 6 Ch 11
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 38
P. Bhagwat 75
802.11 MAC
MIB
Cont
rol
Applications
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
MACWEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
P. Bhagwat 76
802.11 MAC
Carrier sensing (CSMA)Rules:
carrier ==> do not transmitno carrier ==> OK to transmit
But the above rules do not always apply to wireless.Solution: RTS/CTS
Collision detection (CD)Does not work over wirelessTherefore, use collision avoidance (CA)
random backoffpriority ack protocol
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 39
P. Bhagwat 77
802.11 MAC protocol: CSMA/CA
Use CSMA with collision AvoidanceBased on carrier sense function in PHY called Clear Channel Assessment (CCA)
Reduce collision probability where mostly neededEfficient backoff algorithm stable at high loadsPossible to implement different fixed priority levels
Busy medium
Defer access
DIFS
contentionwindow
slot timeNext Frame
P. Bhagwat 78
802.11 MAC : Contention window
63127
255
511
1023
CW min
CW max
Initial attemptFirst retransmission
Second retransmissionThird retransmission
Fourth retransmissionFifth retransmission
31
For DSSS PHYSlot time = 20 µs
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 40
P. Bhagwat 79
CSMA/CA + ACK protocol
Defer access based on carrier senseDirect access when medium is sensed free longer than DIFSReceiver of directed frames to return an ACK immediately when CRC is correct
When no ACK received then retransmit frame after a random backoff
SIFSSrc
DIFS
ACK
Data
Dest
Next Frame
contentionwindow
Other
DIFS
P. Bhagwat 80
Problems with carrier sensing
Z
W
YX
Exposed terminal problem
Z is transmittingto W
Y will not transmit to Xeven though it cannot interfere
Presence of carrier ===> hold off transmission/
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 41
P. Bhagwat 81
Problems with carrier sensing
Y
Z
W
Hidden terminal problem
W finds that medium is freeand it transmits a packet to Z
no carrier ===> OK to transmit/
P. Bhagwat 82
Solving Hidden Node problem with RTS/CTS
Y
ZX
W
RTS CTS
listen RTS ==> transmitter is close to melisten CTS ==> receiver is close to me
- listen RTS- wait long enough
for the requestedstation to respondwith CTS
- if (timeout) thenready to transmit
- listen CTS- wait long enough
for the transmitter to send its data
Note: RTS/CTS does not solve exposed terminal problem. In the example above, X can send RTS, but CTS from the responder will collide with Y’s data.
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 42
P. Bhagwat 83
802.11 MAC sublayer Management
MIB
Cont
rol
Applications
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
MACWEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
P. Bhagwat 84
MAC Management: Beacon & ProbesA station can first scan the network and discover the presence of BSS in a given areaScanning
Passivelisten for beacons on each
channelActive
send probe and wait for response on each channel
Beacon and probe response packets contain:
AP timing information, Beacon period, AP capability information, SSID, PHY parameter set,Traffic Indication Map (TIM)
SSID (Service set identifier)identifies an ESS or IBSS
Access Point
Access Point
Access Point
Probe RequestProbe Response
Station
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 43
P. Bhagwat 85
UnauthenticatedUnassociated
MAC Mgmt : Authentication & Association
With respect to an access point, a station can be in one of the following three states
Unauthenticated/UnassociatedAuthenticated/UnassociatedAuthenticated/Associated
A station can pre-authenticate with several access points in advance to speedup roamingA station can be associated with only one AP at a given timeAssociation state is used by the distribution system to figure out the current location of the station within the ESS.
StationAccess Point 1
1) Auth exchg
2) Association exchg
3) Data exchg
AP2AP3
AuthenticatedUnassociated
AuthenticatedAssociated
To DS
AP2
P. Bhagwat 86
MAC Mgmt : Power Management
A station which is synchronized with an AP clock can wake up periodically to listen for beaconsBeacon packets contain Traffic Indication Map (TIM), a bit vector, which indicates whether a station has a packet buffered at APThe station sends a PS-Poll message to the AP asking the AP to release buffered packets for the stationAll broadcast and multicast frames are transmitted following beacons with DTIM flag set
Beacon interval
AP
Station
Listen interval
TIM TIM DTIM TIM
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 44
P. Bhagwat 87
802.11 Frame Format
802.11 frame has more fields than other media type frames30 bytes frame header appears too long!All fields are not present in all frames
802.11 MAC header (30 bytes)
2 0 - 2312
DurationID
Framecontrol
Addr 1 Addr 2 Addr 3 Seqctrl
Addr 4 CRC
2 6 6 6 2 6 4
Frame body
bytes
P. Bhagwat 88
Frame Control Field
2Frame
control
2ProtVer
Type SubtypeToDS
FromDS
MoreFrag
Order
2 4 1 1 1 1
RetryPwrMgmt
MoreData
1
WEP
1 1 1bitsbytes
01Control
00Mgmt
10Data
11Reserved
Association reqAssociation respRe-association reqRe-association respProbe reqProbe respBeaconAnnouncement Traffic
Indication Request (ATIM)DisassociationAuthenticationDe-authentication
Power save (PS)-pollRequest to Send (RTS)Clear to send (CTS)Acknowledgement (ACK)Contention free (CF)-ENDCF-END + CF-ACK
DataData + CF+ACKData + CF-PollData + CF-ACK + CF-PollNullCF-ACKCF-PollCF-ACK + CF-Poll
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 45
P. Bhagwat 89
802.11 Privacy and Authentication
MIB
Cont
rol
Applications
DSSS FH IR OFDMPHY
MACWEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
P. Bhagwat 90
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
Design ObjectivesConfidentiality
Prevent others from eavesdropping trafficData Integrity
Prevent others from modifying traffic Access Control
Prevent unauthorized network access
Provide same level of security as a physical wire
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
T3: Bluetooth Vs. 802.11 46
P. Bhagwat 91
802.11 security design goalsAuthentication Access Control Accounting
Anonymity Confidentiality Audit trails
User concerns
No red tape No queues No fraud
ScalabilityEfficiencyLow cost
Equipment vendor’s concerns
Prevent masquerading,modification, and unauthorized access
Protect identity theft Accurate usage monitoring
Service Provider’sconcerns
Unfortunately, WEP fails on all three counts
P. Bhagwat 92
WEP design: adding privacy
A secret key is shared between a sender and a receiverUsing the secret key the sender generates a random key streamXOR plain text with the random key streamXOR the cipher text with the same random key stream to recovers the plain textAn eavesdropper cannot compute the plain text by inspecting the cipher text New key streams are refreshed periodically
Use initialization vector (IV) in conjunction with shared keytransmit IV in clear text along with the cipher text
Sender
KRandom
key stream
Plain text ⊕
KRandom
key stream
Plain text⊕Cipher text,
Receiver
IV
IV
IV
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WEP design: adding data integrity
The problem is that cipher text can be modified without any knowledge of the keyJust flip some bits in the cipher textAfter decrypting the cipher text, receiver will not know that the plain text has
been corruptedSolution:
Computer 32 bit CRC of plain text and append it with plain text before generating the cipher textIf cipher text is modified, CRC check will fail and the frame will be discarded
Sender
K, IVRandom
key stream
Plain text ⊕
K, IVRandom
key stream
Plain text⊕Cipher text, IV
Receiver
ICV ICV
P. Bhagwat 94
WEP design: adding Authentication
SummaryShared secret keys are distributed out of bandAP sends a challenge to the stationStation responds with a WEP encrypted packetAP verifies station’s response
Sender AP
K Kshared key
Distributed out of band
Challenge (Nonce)
Response (Nonce encrypted with secret key)
Decrypted response OK?
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Where is the problem ?
Two messages should never be encrypted using the same key streamsSuppose P1 and P2 are encrypted using the same key stream
C1 = P1 XOR bC2 = P2 XOR b
Adversary can compute C1 + C2 = P1 + b + P2 + b= P1 + P2
Usually XOR of two plain texts is enough to recover both plain textsMoreover, if one plain text is known other can be computed trivially
P1P2 ⊕ ⊕Cipher text, IV
C1C2
Problem #1: improper use of stream ciphers
key streamb
key streamb
K, IV K, IV
P. Bhagwat 96
Key stream reuse in WEP
Key stream is a function of secret key and initialization vectorIV vector is only 24 bits long; since there are only 16 million combinations, eventually key streams will be recycledSince IV vector is transmitted in clear text, Key stream reuse is easy detect by passive eavesdroppingAn eavesdropper can record all instances of key stream reuse
Require 1K * 16 million = 16 GB spaceWorse yet, most 802.11 cards when reset start counting IV from 0
so, key streams are recycled more frequently
K, IV224 possiblekey streams
b
P1P2 ⊕
K, IVb
⊕Cipher text, IV
C1C2
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Possible attack: Message decryption
Inject known plain text in the network by e-mail spamming, or pingPassively record encrypted packetsBy computing XOR of known plain text with encrypted packet, it is possible to compute the RC4 key stream that was used to encrypt the known plain textBuild a dictionary of key streams
Map each value to IV to its associated key streamOnce this dictionary is built, any packet can be decrypted
Record the packetInspect the IVPull out the key stream associated with the observed IV from thedictionaryXOR the key stream with the encrypted packet and obtain the plain text
The same dictionary can also be used to inject any message in the network
P. Bhagwat 98
Possible attack: Breaking Authentication
The previous attack relies on finding a known plain text and itsencrypted version to compute the key stream By snooping 802.11 Authentication protocol, this pair can be collected for freeUsing this key stream, an adversary station can respond to any new challenge from the AP !
Station
K Kshared key
Distributed out of band
Challenge (Nonce)
Response (Nonce encrypted with secret key)
Decrypted response OK?
AP
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More problems
Integrity check value (ICV) is good at detecting random bit errors, not intentional modifications to the packetAn adversary can modify an encrypted packet such that those changes cannot be detected by CRC test at the receiverThis is possible because encryption function (XOR) as well as CRC are both linear operations
(M, c(M)) XOR (R, c(R)) = (M XOR R, c(M XOR R))The modified message after decryption will pass the CRC test !
Problem #2: improper use of CRC
Frame body ICV Frame body ICV
encrypt decrypt
Sender Receiver
If CRC OKthen accept.
P. Bhagwat 100
WEP current statusNote that attacks don’t try to deduce the key. Knowledge of key stream is enough to launch all sorts of attacksPossible Solutions
Long IV’s which never repeat for the lifetime of the shared secretReplace CRC by a strong message authentication code which depends on the key and IV
WEP2 addresses the first problem, but not the otherA recent paper by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir has discovered many inherent weaknesses in RC4 stream cipher. They have shown that RC4 is completely insecure when used used in a way prescribed by WEP, in which a fixed secret key is concatenated with known IV modifiers.802.11i working group is now looking into using AES instead of WEP. AES will fix both problems of WEP
AES is a block cipherAES includes a strong keyed message authentication code
Bill Arbaugh’s web-page (http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.html ) is good source of info on this topic.
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
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802.11 current status
MAC
MIB
DSSS FH IRPHY
WEP
LLC
MAC Mgmt
802.11b5,11 Mbps
802.11g20+ Mbps
802.11a6,9,12,18,24
36,48,54 Mbps
OFDM
802.11isecurity
802.11fInter Access Point Protocol
802.11eQoS enhancements
P. Bhagwat 102
Bluetooth Vs. 802.11
RFBaseband
Audio Link Manager
Bluetooth is a (top down) market driven consortiumBusiness interests take precedence over technical considerationsDesigned primarily for voice; data an afterthought
802.11 is a (bottom up) open standard effortGood piece of engineering except for WEPDesigned primarily for data; voice an afterthought
MIB
DSSS FH IR OFDM
PHY
MACWEP MAC
MgmtL2CAP
Data
SDP RFCOMMIP
HCI
Applications Profiles
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Bluetooth Vs. 802.11: Radio issuesRadio is typically the most costly component in a wireless network
interfaceBluetooth radio is (will be) inexpensive because
It is a frequency hopper (which is relatively easy to build)Its sensitivity is poorIt uses very simple modulation technique (GFSK) (requires less silicon)It is possible to package both baseband and radio in a single chipPotentially market for Bluetooth radios is (will be?) large if every mobile phone vendors decide to embed Bluetooth in their products
802.11 DSSS radios are costly today, butif market for 802.11 continues to grow, their price may become competitive to BluetoothDSSS radios are superior to Bluetooth in terms of range, speed, BER performanceDue to better range, it may be cheaper to cover an area with 802.11802.11 can be operated at 0 dBm to reduce power consumption
P. Bhagwat 104
802.11 Market drivers: Business Users
Inside office
Traveling
Trend #2: Growth of Wireless LAN access in hotels, airports, etc.
Trend #1: Need for wireless access inside office building
Trend #3: Replacement of wired phones with VOIP over wireless phones
X
Trend #4: dual mode phones
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Bluetooth Value chain
Radio
Silicon
Stackproviders
SoftwarevendorsIntegrators
WirelessCarriers
Conspicuously
missing
P. Bhagwat 106
Bluetooth Vs. 802.11: Market issues
TCP/IPStill looking for a killer app.Applications
802.11 is a more mature technology
The biggest problem of Bluetooth at present
Interoperability
Will reduce in the futureLower due to low power transmitter and tight integration
Power consumption
Multi chip solutionSmaller due to single chip integration
Form factor
It is unlikely that 802.11 will penetrate the cosumerelectronic device market in the near future
Potentially huge if every consumer electronic device is Bluetooth enabled
Market size
Technology advances and market growth can reduce cost, even if tight single integration is not achieved in the near term
Potential for low cost implementation exists but the market size will eventually determine the price point
Cost
802.11Bluetooth
Supercomputing 2002 June 22, 2002
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Concluding remarksWill Bluetooth survive?
Bluetooth is ideal for cable replacementInitial applications of Bluetooth will exploit its point-to-point or point-to-multipoint connectivity featureAttempts to turn it into a LAN technology will face a tough competition from 802.11Scatternet is still a difficult technical problemHigher chance of success in Europe and Asia
802.11Will continue to grow in
Public spaces, home, industry vertical, and enterprise market802.11 will provide a viable alternative to 3G in public places
P. Bhagwat 108
Thank you