bnamericas project risk analytics - june 2015 inaugural report

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Project Risk Analytics: Tracking performance in Latin America’s top projects

US$133bn 51% 58% 715Total increase in cost

estimates for top 100 current projects in Latin America

of projects have experienced increases to

original timing estimates

Number of projects in the tendering stage in the

BNamericas project database

of projects have experienced increases

in cost estimates

TRACKING PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA´S TOP PROJECTSinaugural rEPOrT - JunE 2015

PROJECT

RISK ANALYTICS

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BNAMERICAS PROJECT RISK ANALYTICSTracking performance in LaTin america’s Top projecTs

BNamericas Project Risk Analytics tracks changes to estimates of completion dates and overall costs in Latin American projects during their implementation phase.

The information herein is designed to be used by governments, insurers, reinsurers, project financiers, risk officers, asset managers and advisers, to analyze upcoming risk to schedules and financing costs, and track the progress of existing projects.

By providing a top-down analysis of the timeliness and costs of current Latin American projects, BNamericas provides a new tool to the industry allowing it to learn from past events and improve planning for future projects.

SUBSCRIBE TODAYPROJECT RISK ANALYTICS

Natan LevyHead of Project Risk [email protected] +56 (2) 2941-0386

Arvinder LudhiarichCommercial [email protected] +56 (2) 2941-0300

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CONTENT

FOREWORD...............................................................................4

SUMMARY.................................................................................5

RESULTS & DISCUSSION.............................................................7

INTRODUCING THE MATURITY PROFILE.................................................8

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR COST OVERRUNS....................................10

CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................12

APPENDIX I - SECTOR AVERAGES..........................................................................................14

APPENDIX II - THE BNAMERICAS PROJECT DATABASE PIPELINE................................................15

METHODOLOGY & PROCEDURES..........................................................................................17

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This inaugural report by the BNamericas Project Risk Analytics team marks the beginning of a new approach undertaken by BNamericas to enhance the information on project performance in Latin America.

In collating the data, BNamericas aims to track the progress of the largest Latin American projects - in electric power, mining, oil & gas (excluding upstream) and petrochemical - from the start of construction to final completion, highlighting changes to estimates for project completion and costs throughout the execution/implementation phase of a project.

Just as fiscal discipline at the start of the 21st century encouraged investment aimed at closing the significant gap in infrastructure investment in the region, the current economic and fiscal deterioration in the region, the withdrawal of quantitative easing in the USA and the hit to investor confidence brought about by cases of corruption in Brazil, threaten to put a dent in the long term plans for investment in the region’s infrastructure.

As previously noted by various public bodies, most notably the OECD, high financing costs due to weak fiscal sustainability have contributed significantly in the past to low levels of infrastructure investment in many parts of Latin America. Should yields rise and financing become scarcer, the past may well inform future expectations once again.

In the midst of the unveiling of what is potentially the largest ever corruption scandal in Brazil, in Latin America and possibly in the world, the BNamericas

FOREWORDProject Risk Analytics initiative aims to shed a light on some of the darkest corners of project management in the region and improve the level of information available, thereby enabling benchmarking to take place for public bodies, financiers, insurers, contractors and other interested parties.

While there have been a limited number of studies into delays and cost overruns of projects around the world, they have tended to be carried out on a global basis using historic data.

This initiative, targeted solely at Latin America, aims to track performance until completion - starting with the largest 100 projects - thereby introducing a time dimension to the data.As the months and years progress, the growth in the data is designed to lead to a continuous evolution and thus to greater accuracy around the probability and magnitude of estimates along the life of a project.

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FOREWORDThe first study by BNamericas’ Project Risk Analytics covers the 100 largest private and state-owned projects in Latin America (as defined by investment size), during their implementation phase, that were initially estimated to cost US$242bn.

The results, when updated for current estimates up to the end of March, indicate that the largest 100 projects have exceeded their original cost estimates by over US$133bn to reach a total of US$375bn, with delays occurring on close to 60% of projects.

When considering the global picture and comparing to a global sample through collaboration with academics at the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School, the research has established that while a typical project performs in line with the global sample, the tail of the distribution in Latin America is much fatter; implying that very large cost and or schedule overruns are more pronounced, thereby

SUMMARYtranslating to a higher risk for Latin American projects.

This chimes with previous research by the OECD1 which found that contract renegotiations for PPPs in Latin America have been larger and more frequent than what theory and international experience suggest.

The data however, suggests that the brunt of the delays experienced and of the increases in cost estimates have been concentrated on the largest and most complex of the projects in the region and in particular on refineries and large hydroelectric projects, lending weight to previous research associating the complexity and scale of a project with greater cost overruns.

Notably, the results suggest that - as Bent Flyvbjerg et al2 found with overwhelming statistical significance - when looking at transportation infrastructure projects globally - cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are “highly and systematically misleading,” and should not be trusted.

With that in mind and given the current developments in the region, and in Brazil in particular, the results are placed in greater focus given early evidence suggesting that the resultant hit to confidence has led to a significant drop in project finance volumes in the first quarter of 2015, thereby raising questions over the ongoing push to increase spending on infrastructure projects in the region.

Finally, the results call into question the traditional concept of the Cone of Uncertainty whereby uncertainty around project costs is expected to diminish in line with the advance of a project from the drawing board, through to implementation.

Changes from original estimates

Latest estimates of increase

22

Original project duration

52

Latest estimates of Increase

133

Original project cost 242

70

80

60

50

20

40

10

30

0

350

400

300

250

100

200

50

150

0Timing (average, months)

Tim

ing

US$

bn

Total Costs US$bn

1 Bitran, E., S. Nieto-Parra y J.S. Robledo (2013), “Opening the black box of contract renegotiations: An analysis of road concessions in Chile, Colombia and Peru”, OECD Development Centre Working Papers, No. 317, OECD Publishing, Paris.

2Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. K. S., & Buhl, S. L. (2002). Cost underestimation in public works projects: Error or lie? Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), 279-295.

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inTroducTion To meThodoLogy

The methodology used in the research is described at the back of the report. It has followed a consistent approach, using the latest available estimates from public sources and from discussions with companies. Initial cost estimates are defined as budgeted or forecasted costs at the time of the decision to build, in line with the international standard for measuring the inaccuracy of cost estimates as noted by Flyvbjerg et al, in the case of private projects.

For state-owned projects, initial costs are taken from the contracts or news of contracts signed with winning bidders following tender processes. All costs are calculated in the individual project’s reported currency and converted to US dollars as at the date of announcement. Due to a reliance on publically available official information the study, by design portrays a conservative bias in its measurements.

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march resuLTs-Top 100 projecTs

• On aggregate current cost estimates for the top 100 projects in the region amounted to US$375bn as of March 2015, representing an increase of US$133bn to original estimates.

• 58% of projects registered an increase from their original estimate for completion (delay), with 39% on time and 3 projects running ahead of schedule.

• 51% of projects showed an increase from their original cost estimate, with 43% of projects running in line with their original budget estimates and 6 projects running below initial estimates in US dollars.

severiTy of changes To Timing esTimaTes

• The average length of delay for the top 100 is 21.8 months or 45,3% greater than initially estimated.The median length of delay in contrast is just 6.5 months or 15.5% greater than originally estimated.

• Of the 58 delayed projects, 28 are experiencing major changes of over 60% from the original estimates.

• 19 of the 58 projects are showing medium increases of 20% to 60% from original estimates and 11 projects are showing minor increases of between 5% and 20% from original estimates.

severiTy of changes To cosT esTimaTes

• The average increase in cost estimates for the top 100 is 64.0% of the initial estimates.The median increase in cost estimates in contrast is 10.1% of the initial esti-mates.

• Of the 51 projects with an increase in cost estimates, 31 projects are experiencing major changes of over 40% from original estimates.

• 17 of the 51 projects are experiencing medium cost increases of 20% to 40% and 3 project are experiencing minor increases of 5% to 20% from original estimates.

Number of projects delayed and over budget70

60

50

40

20

3 6

43

51

39

58

30

10

0Delayed On Time Ahead of

ScheduleOver budget To Budget Ahead of

Budget

Average delays and cost overruns

Average delay Average costoverrun

Median delay Median costoverrun

70%

30%

50%

10%

60%

20%

40%

0%

45.3%

15.5%

64.0%

10.1%

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correLaTion

• A deeper look at the data illustrates a close relationship between changes in costs and changes in timing estimates with their correlation coefficient standing at 0.68, with statistical significance to p<0.001.

• Further, what stands out clearly is the incidence of a number of projects that have only recently entered their implementation phase, and have thus not yet recorded an increase in cost or timing estimates.

• As a consequence, it can be argued that the sample exhibits statistical outliers that begin from a lower level than would be expected of a sample of completed projects, thereby calling for a consideration of the maturity profile of the sample.

maTuriTy profiLe

• Measured by the current average advance of projects as a percentage of the average initial duration expected – the overall maturity of the sample stood at 71% at the end of March 2015.

• The maturity of those projects which have experienced increases to their timing estimates meanwhile stood at 79%, compared to 55% for those projects which were estimated to finish on time.

• In the same way, when looking at those projects which experienced increases to their cost schedules, the maturity of the sample stood at 79%, compared to 58% for projects which experienced no increase in estimates.

• The results thereby illustrate that projects which are further advanced have experienced a change to estimates.

Changes from original estimates - Scatter

750%

350%

550%

150%

-50%

650%

250%

450%

50%

50%-50%C

han

ges

to C

ost

Sch

edule

Changes to Timing Schedule

250% 350% 450%

Overall project

maturity

On time

Delayed

On budget

Over budget

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Effect of Project Maturity on changes to estimates

150%

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cone of uncerTainTy

• Readers will be familiar with the Cone of Uncertainty (a term first used for software projects), which introduced the idea that the uncertainty around project cost estimates decreases as projects advance towards their implementation.

• The Project Management Institute, in its Body of Knowledge guide notes that “the accuracy of a project estimate will increase as the project progresses through the project life cycle”, where, “Later in the project, as more information is known, definitive estimates could narrow the range of accuracy to -5% to +10%.”

• The results suggest that such a theory which considers the potential of estimate changes to diminish as a project moves towards execution may not apply to the current sample, possibly due to the influence of mega projects in the sample which differ in size and complexity to the average project.

BuiLding a TimeLine for cosT overruns

• Indeed the data in this study calls into question the validity of such a theory given the large cost increases experienced during the implementation period. Notably, it shows that during a project’s implementation phase, uncertainty is confined almost exclusively to cost increases.

• By introducing a third dimension, that of the sample’s duration (or project maturity), the research aims to map the predicted path of cost overruns over the implementation phase and through to completion.

• As further data is added over time, the accuracy of the results will increase and allow for improved prediction of the timing and scale of cost increases.

+20

-20

+15

-15

+10

-10

+5

-5

Estimateat final design

Estimateat start of

construction

Estimate at conceptual

design

Mar

gin

of

erro

r

Cost uncertainty along the lifetime of a project

800%

700%

600%

500%

400%

200%

300%

100%

-100%

0%20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 200%0%

Cost

chan

ges

Maturity

Project maturity to changes in costs

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QuaLiTaTive anaLysis - facTors causing cosT overruns

The analysis used follows the methodology introduced by a paper in the Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology in 20133.

An analysis of the main factors cited by company contacts, public bodies and press reports for increases in timing and cost estimates on the affected projects uncovered the main factors to be as follows:

• Of the 100 projects in the sample, the analysis established sufficient information for 44 of the 51 projects that have exceeded their costs estimates, where one or more factors were cited for their contributions to cost increases.

• Financial management was the most-often-cited factor

for cost increases in 23 of the projects and included cases where cost inflation and failures in budgeting were cited as the causes as well as those which experienced difficulties in receiving timely funding.

• Design factors were cited on 15 occasions as having led to an increase in costs and involved cases of changes in scope and redesign throughout the implementation phase.

• Labor factors were the third most common reason cited for cost increases on 14 occasions and included labor disputes resulting in strikes as well as difficulties in finding skilled staff.

• External factors, including changes in commodity prices, in ownership and political decisions which impacted

costs, were cited in 10 cases as having contributed to cost increases.

• Project management failures were cited in eight cases while environmental and community factors were the least cited reasons for cost increases in the sample.

3Ade Asmi Abdul Azis,AftabHameedMemon, Ismail Abdul Rahman and Ahmad TarmiziAbd.Karim. (2013) Controlling Cost Overrun Factors in Construction Projects in Malaysia.Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology 5(8): 2621-2629.

Factors responsible for cost overruns

Financial Management 23

Design 15

Labor 14

External 10

Project Management 8

Environmental 7

Social & Community 4

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furTher oBservaTions

The research undertaken by BNamericas’ Project Risk Analytics team has come up against the obvious obstacle of lack of transparency. This has been brought on, not only by a systemic lack of information but also by the lack of cooperation when it came to more politically sensitive projects such as those forming part of Brazil’s plans for the Olympics.

While the incentives for keeping the information out of the public eye are understandable if an interested party has something to lose, they are not justifiable. As the data shows, bringing the information into the open is clearly in the public interest and should lead to better future estimates and greater scrutiny on returns and on project and bidder selection.

Researchers also came across a myriad of regulatory agencies, authorities, bidding procedures and monitoring standards, at times within one state in one country and even on single roads where different phases were tendered by different bodies. When multiplied by the number of states and countries in the region, the overriding observation is one of inconsistency in applying

best practices across the region.The result has at times been utter chaos, where projects involving several government agencies have resulted in complete paralysis and failure over a number of years to even tender a contract. When such a situation relates to a project for the Olympics, due to be completed in less than a year’s time, the outcome can only be greater uncertainty.

Of all the projects however, Comperj, a refinery complex in the state of Rio de Janeiro deserves its own section and perhaps even a book. With the federal auditors estimating costs for the entire project to reach US$48bn, this project is not only the biggest outlier in the data sample but is also greater in value than the 2013 GDP of over 100 countries in the world. Compared to the initial estimated cost of US$6.5bn in 2006, this project has experienced an increase of 634% in its estimated cost.

Having been scheduled at the outset to be completed within a period of 5.5 years, the latest estimate suggests the project will not be finished before May 2021, nearly 10 years longer than planned, raising questions as to its viability in its current form. With the owner, Petrobras, keeping silent while under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US over its disclosure to shareholders, the project is the best advertisement for the need for improved disclosure in the region.

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When considering that Latin America’s annual infrastructure spending is required to reach US$250bn - from current spending of US$150bn according to the IADB - in order to close the investment gap which has been talked about so often over the years, it becomes clear that greater and better information is required by all parties to gain an understanding of the returns, value for money and track record of investments in the region.

The results from the largest 100 projects representing an estimated US$375bn support the conclusion that costs in Latin American projects are not only expanding during the implementation phase but crucially - from collaboration with the University of Oxford’s Said School of Business - it is clear that the tail of the distribution is fatter than the global benchmark, thus translating into higher risk for the sample used in this study.

In their seminal work on cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects globally, Bent Flyvbjerg et al, found with overwhelming statistical significance - when looking at the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built - that they are “highly and systematically misleading,” ruling out error and pointing the finger squarely at dishonesty.

Other studies56789 have been just as clear that project forecasts are underestimated and benefits exaggerated by project promoters in order to make projects saleable. The results of this study on Latin American projects across a range of industries from infrastructure, to electric power, to mining, oil & gas (excluding upstream) and petrochemical projects, while not ascribing blame, support the conclusion of Flyvbjerg et al, by virtue of their magnitude, that interested parties “should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit

CONCLUSIONSanalyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.”

The data also suggests that rather than decreasing as a project enters its implementation phase, uncertainty around cost estimates in fact rises, but only when it comes to cost increases. Decreases in cost estimates seem almost non-existent.

That financial, labor and design factors were the most commonly cited factors for cost increases by project sponsors and contractors, highlights the rise in cost inflation in the region in recent years which has been talked about so often, and the impact of labor disputes which continue to hamper the execution of projects as they squeeze returns. When combined with a shortage of skilled manpower and design failures, the challenges become clear.

If countries in the region are serious about increasing infrastructure spending as a percentage of their GDP, many other aspects will need to be addressed, from education, to workers’ rights, to tackling design issues and clearing up funding and investment bottlenecks.

This inaugural report sets out the basis for future analysis by the Project Risk Analytics team at BNamericas, enabling interested parties to track changes to estimates of completion dates and overall costs in Latin American projects during their implementation phase, with a greater understanding of their future path.

4Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. K. S., & Buhl, S. L. (2002). Cost underestimation in public works projects: Error or lie? Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), 279-295.5Wachs, M. (1989). “When planners lie with numbers,” Journal of the American Planning Association, 55(4), 476–4796Kain, J. F. (1990), “Deception in Dallas: Strategic misrepresentation in rail transit promotion and evaluation”, Journal of the American Planning Association, 56(2), 184–1967Pickrell, D. H. (1990) Urban rail transit projects: Forecast versus actual ridership and cost. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.8Morris, P. W. G., & Hough, G. H. (1987). The anatomy of major projects:A study of the reality of project management. New York: John Wiley and Sons.9Morris, Sebastian (1990), “Cost and Time Overruns in Public Sector Projects”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXV, No.47, pp.M-154-M-168.

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The nexT sTeps

The next report in September 2015, which will include the results of at least 200 projects where construction is on-going, will be key to the progress of the analysis. With the largest projects in the region now covered, moving to the next tier could provide further evidence as to whether the most severe increases in costs are associated with the largest and most complex projects.

By the time of the December report, the sample should grow to cover the vast majority of suitable projects in the region, thus allowing for more results to be broken down further, by sector and by type of project.

The introduction of the maturity profile of the sample will also help to determine whether the cone of uncertainty theorem is indeed debunked as greater data is added, allowing the tracking of delays along the life span of a project’s execution.

Crucially, the research has been dependent on the cooperation of public bodies and private companies and in particular, in cases where information has not been as readily available - for a myriad of reasons - time and great-er cooperation will lead to greater precision in the results.

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APPENDIX I - SECTOR AVERAGES

140%

100%

120%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

Breakdown of results

0

Number of projects Average delay Average cost overrun

Total over budget US$bn

Electric Power 18 62% 87% 26.9

Mining 18 37% 74% 25.1

Oil & Gas 16 55% 41% 21.5

Infrastructure 30 36% 51% 11.4

Water & Waste 11 44% 36% 3.6

Petrochem 7 37% 115% 44.4

Grand Total 100 45% 63% 132.9

Petrochem Mining Oil & Gas InfrastructureElectric Power

Water & Waste

Total overbudget US$bn 44.4 26.9 25.1 21.5 11.4 3.6

Average delay 37% 62% 37% 55% 36% 44%

Average cost overrun 115% 87% 74% 41% 51% 36%

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BNamericas’ entire database of over 2800 projects in-cludes projects from their initial early works through to construction and completion.

By comparing the number of projects in construction and in the tendering stage across sectors a more accurate picture can be obtained of the project pipeline for the region.

APPENDIX II - BNAMERICAS´ PROJECT PIPELINE

Sector breakdown

300

0

88

281

197

58

166

77

168160

57 60

Energy MiningInfra O&GWater

400

100

500

200

PipelineConstruction

800

400

600

200

700

300

500

100

0PipelineConstruction

Number of projects by stage

522

Tender/inv.decision

488

EIA

302

• Of the 2800, 522 are currently In construction while 488 projects are in the process of being tendered and 302 are undergoing an environmental impact assessment (EIA).

• The pipeline which includes both projects under tender and those undergoing an EIA can be seen to include the greatest number of projects in the energy and infrastruc-ture sector.

• A breakdown of the figures is included overleaf.

Number of projects by stage

Construction 522

Tender/ Investment decision 488

EIA 302

Total 1,312

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Sector Country In construction Pipeline

Energy

Argentina 7 11

Brazil 37 9

Chile 31 164

Colombia 8 8

Mexico 19 20

Peru 9 30

Infra

Argentina 8 10

Brazil 36 50

Chile 15 29

Colombia 18 29

Mexico 21 15

Peru 14 17

Oil & Gas

Argentina 4 1

Brazil 11 3

Chile 1 4

Colombia 3 94

Mexico 11 21

Peru 4 22

Water

Argentina 8 9

Brazil 6 26

Chile 7 9

Colombia 7 8

Mexico 13 6

Peru 11 13

Mining

Argentina 4 2

Brazil 9 5

Chile 13 30

Colombia 3 1

Mexico 14 4

Peru 7 13

Projects in construction and in the pipeline for LAC6

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definiTions

Projects covered include state-owned and private projects in the Infrastructure, Electric Power, Oil & Gas (excluding upstream), Water and Waste, and Mining sectors.

Where applicable, a project is considered as such until the end of construction and ramp-up to full capacity (with the exception of mining projects, where the date of commissioning signifies the end of the project). Projects must have a:

• Start date• Estimate for completion• Initial investment estimate

daTa

For state-owned projects, initial information about the start date and estimates for completion and investment are taken from original signed con-tracts, along with addendums and annexes.

If original contracts cannot be obtained, information is taken from public documents, presentations, news articles from BNamericas archives, and external sources.

In cases where contracts are subject to approval by legislators, the start date is the date of the law or legislative approval.

In the case of private projects, information is taken from public sources, such as stock exchange filings, annual reports, company presentations, third party research and press releases.

In judging the timing of investment decisions for private projects, great care was taken to differentiate between large projects receiving environmental approval and proceeding directly to construction, and smaller projects where the investment decision hinges on securing financing.

Recorded data is correct at the time of entry and all efforts were made to ensure that each entry is backed with a relevant source.

The greatest care possible was taken to ensure consistency of information in order make a like-for-like comparison in project costs. Insofar as the figures rely on disclosure by the organization or company responsible, the figures can be considered to be conservative in nature.

No attempt was made to adjust figures for inflation during the course of research or for consideration of the time value of money.

vaLidaTion

In the case of state-owned projects, validation is carried out where possible with either a member of the consortium, EPC contractor, a relevant state agency or advisors to either party.

METHODOLOGY & PROCEDURES

18


Timing BudgeT

Language definiTions

Where guidance is non-specific as to dates for completion, the following is used.Project to be completed by 2018 = December 31, 2017Project to be completed in 2018 = December 31, 2018

currency

Project costs are measured in US dollars.Where project costs are measured in a local currency, amounts are converted to US dollars at the date of the relevant announcement, signature or report.

severiTy of deviaTion from originaL esTimaTes

The severity of deviation from original estimates is defined according to set criteria.

changes in scope

Changes in scope beyond the start date are not accounted for.

Status StatusCondition Condition

Ahead of time

On time

Minor changes

Medium changes

Major changes

Ahead of budget

On budget

Minor changes

Medium changes

Major changes

95% of original estimate or below (measured in months)

95% of original budget estimate or below

95% to 105% of original estimate 95% to 105% of original estimate

105% to 120% of original estimate 105% to 120% of original budget estimate

20% to 160% of original estimate 120% to 140% of original budget estimate

Over 160% of original estimate Over 140% of original budget estimate

discLaimers

• Figures and dates correspond to the latest publicly available information, as well as information gathered by BNamericas reporters and analysts, and are subject to change.

• Changes to original budget estimates are shown as the total figure available and may include interest, working capital, inflation adjustments and other contingencies in addition to capital expenditure.

• Amounts and overall results are shown in US dollars unless otherwise stated.

• BNamericas does not guarantee the sequence, accuracy, adequacy, completeness or availability of any information and is not responsible for any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from the use of such information. There are no express or implied warranties. In no event shall BNamericas, its agents, directors, officers, employees, representatives, successors, and assigns be liable for any damages of any nature in connection with the BNamericas content.

19


BudgeT

About BNamericas Project Risk Analytics

BNamericas’ Project Risk Analytics tracks changes to estimates

of project completions dates and overall costs, in Latin

American infrastructure, energy and mining projects.

Governments, insurers, reinsurers, project financiers, risk

officers, asset managers and advisers can use this information

to analyze upcoming risk to schedules and financing costs,

and track the progress of existing projects for risk management

purposes.

By providing a top-down analysis of the timeliness and costs

of current Latin American projects, BNamericas provides a new

tool to the industry, allowing it to learn from past events and

improve planning for future projects.

In collaborating with the Major Projects research group at the

University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School, BNamericas

utilized the expertise of leading practitioners. The research

group is world-leading in its field with the most cited articles

in the field of major projects, programs and megaprojects in a

wide area of industries, such as transport infrastructure, energy,

civil engineering, IT and mega events.

Researchers advised and reviewed the methodology used by

the team and offered advice on structuring the data analysis to

make sense of the results. This collaboration ensured that the

data and the results are highly robust following international best

practice in terms of data collection and analysis.

About BNamericas

BNamericas delivers on-the-ground insight and trusted

business intelligence to companies and investors in Latin

America. BNamericas analyzes macro movements that

affect everyday business and future developments, including

social, political, economic, regulatory, technological, financial

and labor-related coverage. Connecting our clients with

trustworthy and timely insights, focused on 12 industry sectors,

BNamericas has been shaping the development of Latin

America for 19 years.

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Arvinder LudhiarichCommercial [email protected] +56 (2) 2941-0300

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