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The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn MoreAuthor(s): Thomas BernauerSource: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 351-377Published by: The MIT Press

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The effect f nternationalenvironmentalnstitutions:howwe might earn moreThomas Bernauer

When s successful nternational ollaboration ossible?Can policymakersrother ctors n international elationsdo somethingo facilitate ooperation,and ifso, what?These questions,which re fundamentaloth to thestudy finternational olitics nd the survival fhumankind, aise twosubquestions.First, under what conditions are states able to establish some form ofcooperation?nternationalnstitutions,hich re setsof rules hatmayormaynot involve nternationalrganizations, ave receivedmost attentionn thisregard.1 econd, can internationalnstitutionsontribute o successfulnterna-

tional ollaboration,nsomespecificmeaning fsuccess, nd if o,underwhatconditions? he secondquestion s even more mportanthan hefirst ecauseit draws our attention o the form nd quality of cooperation and to thepossibilities f achievingwelfare-increasingooperation n the absence ofsupranational overnance tructures.nstitutions re choice variables. f thedegree of success in international ollaborationcan be influencedby theinstitutions e establish nd operate,we can be more successfulfwe knowhowtodesign nstitutionshatproducethe desired ffect,

The first ubquestion has been treated extensivelyn the international

Earlierversions f this rticlewerewrittenuring stay t the Centerfor nternational ffairs,Harvard University, hose support gratefullycknowledge. he researchwas supportedby agrant from he Swiss National Fund forScientificResearch (grant 8220-30628). thank thefollowing ersons for their advice and commentson various drafts:WilliamClark, RobertFriedheim, hilipp Hildebrand,Robert Keohane, Marc Levy,MartinList, Lisa Martin,RonaldMitchell,John Odell, Dieter Ruloff,Detlef Sprinz,Arild Underdal, Michael Zurn, and theanonymous eferees f ntemational rganization.also benefited rom resentations f the paperin the InternationalnstitutionseminarofHarvard'sCenter for nternational ffairs;he 1994annual meeting f the nternational tudies Association nWashington, .C.; and a round-table

discussion t theGraduate nstitute f nternational tudies nGeneva,Switzerland.1. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner,ed., Intemational egimes Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University ress, 1983); and Robert 0. Keohane, Institutionalist heory and the RealistChallenge Afterthe Cold War, working aper 92-7, Harvard University, ambridge,Mass.,Centerfor nternational ffairs,992.

Intemational rganization9, 2, Spring 995,pp. 351-77? 1995 byThe IO Foundation nd theMassachusetts nstitute f Technology





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352 International rganization

relations iterature.2 esearchon the second subquestion s still n its nfancy,not least because it involvesdaunting valuativeand analyticalproblems.3

Every analystwho has tried knows that it is difficulto conceptualize andmeasure institutionss explanatory ariables;do the same for the effect finstitutionsn behavior, he environment,r some other outcome; evaluateand measure the success or failure of institutionsn some reliable andmeaningful ay; and develop and test theories o distinguish hen and whydifferentypes f nstitutionsre more uccessful.

This article claims thatpositive theorizing, ased on rigorous mpiricalresearch, s stillthemost fruitful ay of advancing ur knowledge bouttheeffectf nstitutionsn nternationalolitics.toutlines rational-choice-based

research trategyhat may serveas a starting ointforfuture esearch.Thefocus s on internationalnvironmentalnstitutions.uchinstitutionsreheredefined as sets of international egulationsand organizations hat wereintentionallystablished y preexistingctors states)through xplicit,egallyorpolitically inding,nternationalgreementsnorder o regulate nthropo-genic sources of negativeexternalities ffectinghe natural environment.4However,many ftheargumentsre also relevant o theanalysis f nstitutionsinother reas of nternationalelations.

2. See, for example,Kenneth A. Oye, ed., CooperationUnderAnarchy Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1986); ArthurA. Stein, WhyNationsCooperate:CircumstancendChoice in Intemational elations Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1990); and Oran R.Young, The Politicsof International egime Formation:ManagingNatural Resources and theEnvironment, ntemational rganization3 (Summer1989),pp. 349-75.

3. Among themost mportant tudies are Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane, and Marc A.Levy, eds., Institutionsor the Earth: Sourcesof Effectiventemational nvironmentalrotection(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); Oran R. Young, The Effectivenessf InternationalInstitutions: ard Cases and CriticalVariables, n JamesN. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto zempiel,eds., GovemanceWithout overnment:hange nd Ordern World oliticsNewYork: CambridgeUniversity ress,1992), pp. 160-94; J0rgenWettestad nd SteinarAndresen,TheEffectivenessfIntemational esource Cooperation: ome PreliminaryindingsLysaker,Norway:The FridtjofNansen Institute, 991); Arild Underdal, The Concept of Regime Effectiveness,' ooperationand Conflict 7 (September1992), pp. 227-40; MarcA. Levy, The Effectivenessf nternationalEnvironmentalnstitutions:WhatWe ThinkWe Know,and How We MightLearn More, paperpresented t the annual convention f theInternational tudiesAssociation,Acapulco, Mexico,23-27 March 1993); Marc Levy, Gail Osherenko, and Oran R. Young, The EffectivenessfIntemational egimes: Design orLarge-ScaleCollaborative esearchHanover,N.H.: DartmouthCollege, nstituteorArctic tudies, December1991); andJ0rgenWettestad,nstitutionalesignand theEffectivenessf ntemational nvironmentalegimes: Conceptual rameworkLysaker,Norway: he Fridtjof ansen nstitute,994).

4. Somewhat roaderdefinitionsanbe found n MartinList andVolker Rittberger,RegimeTheory and InternationalEnvironmentalManagement, in Andrew Hurrell and BenedictKingsbury,ds.,The ntemationalolitics f the nvironmentOxford:ClarendonPress,1992), pp.85-109; and StephenD. Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime Consequences: RegimesasIntervening ariables, n Krasner,ntemationalRegimes,.2. Note that hemorenarrow efinitionin this articlecontrolsfor the peculiar (and poorlyunderstood) effects hat unintentionallyestablished r informalnstitutionsoftencalled social conventions)mayhave. For analysesofinformal ocial institutions,ee Jack Knight,nstitutionsnd Social ConflictCambridge:Cam-bridge University ress, 1992); and FriedrichKratochwil, Contract and Regimes: Do Issue-Specificitynd Variationsof FormalityMatter, n VolkerRittbergernd Peter Mayer, eds.,Regime heorynd Intemational elations NewYork: OxfordUniversityress,1993), pp.73-93.





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Environmentalnstitutions 353

International nvironmentalooperationhas increaseddramaticallyn thepast two decades. Governments nd their agents have respondedto the

growing rray f national nd transboundarycologicalproblems y negotiat-ing, concluding, nd modifyingnternational reaties and other typesofagreements nd by establishing nd reformingnternational rganizations.5International greements re nowin place foratmospheric zone depletion,climatechange,whaling, isheries,marinepollution, iver nd lake manage-ment, ransboundaryir pollution, ndangered pecies,trade n toxicwaste,nuclear afety, eforestation,nd many ther ssues.6

Like students fdomestic olitics, nalysts f nternationalelations nowbyintuition r practical experience that environmentalnstitutions ary enor-

mously n terms f theirperformance.ome institutionsre littlemore thangreenwindow-dressing,hereas others chieve more than their reatorshadhopedfor. o arrive tpractical ecommendationsor hedesign ndoperationof nstitutions,owever, e have tomovebeyond his onventional isdom.Wehave to assess and compare institutional erformance ystematicallyndexplainwhen and why pecific ypes f institutionsnfluence he behavior fgovernments, usinesses,and other actors in a directionthat solves theenvironmentalroblems hatmotivated heir stablishment.

The question bouttheeffect f nstitutionss also atthecenter f a broader

debateininternational elations heory. he study f nstitutionsas made animportant omebacksince the 1970s. It has contributedignificantlyo theinternationalooperation iterature y explainingwhenand whynternationalinstitutionsmergeorchange.7 he advocates of thisresearchprogram laimthat nstitutionsan facilitate he resolution f coordinationndcollaborationproblemsninternational olitics fthey re properly esigned ndoperated.8

5. Haas, Keohane,andLevy stimate hatmorethanhalf fthe 140multilateralnvironmentaltreaties dopted since 1921 were concludedafter he 1972UnitedNations Conference n the

Human Environment.ee their nstitutionsor he arth, . 6.6. See, for xample,LyntonKeith Caldwell, ntemationalnvironmentalolicy: mergencend

Dimensions,d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University ress, 1990); AndrewHurrell nd BenedictKingsbury,ds., The ntemationalolitics fthe nvironmentOxford:ClarendonPress,1992);TheFridtjofNansen Institute, reenGlobe Yearbook 993 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity ress, 1993);Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ed., Preservinghe Global Environment: he Challengeof SharedLeadership New York: W. W. Norton,1991); JohnE. Carroll, d., Intemational nvironmentalDiplomacy:TheManagementnd Resolutionf TransfrontiernvironmentalroblemsCambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1988); and DimitrisStevis,Valerie J. Assetto,and Stephen P.Mumme, InternationalEnvironmental olitics: A Theoretical Review of the Literature, nJames . Lester, d.,Environmentalolitics ndPolicy:Theoriesnd EvidenceDurham,N.C.: DukeUniversityress,1989), pp.289-313.

7. See, forexample,Oran R. Young,Internationalooperation: uildingRegimes orNaturalResources nd the nvironmentIthaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversityress,1989); Friedrich ratochwiland JohnGerard Ruggie, International rganization:A State of theArton an Artof the State,Internationalrganization0 (Autumn1986), pp. 753-75; Krasner, ntemational egimes;Robert0. Keohane, Internationalnstitutionsnd State Power:Essays in Intemational elationsTheory(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 989); and Rittberger nd Mayer,RegimeTheory nd IntemationalRelations.

8. RobertKeohane,MichaelMcGinnis, ndElinor Ostrom, ds.,Proceedingsf ConferencenLinking ocal and Global Commons,Held at Harvard University,pril23-25, 1992 (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity,he Centerfor nternational ffairs, 993); and Haas, Keohane, and





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Thus they mply hatpolicymakersnd other ctors n the nternationalrenahave some room for maneuver, delimited by power structures, ationalinterests, nd othernonchoicevariables,fordesigning nd operating nstitu-tions hat ncrease hewelfare f their articipants.

The most basic assumption f this argument,hat nstitutionsan have anindependentmpacton behaviorand otheroutcomes,has been persistentlychallengedbycompeting xplanations foutcomes n international elationsand particularly y neorealism.9 roponents f realism rgue that the designand effect f institutionsimply eflect he existing istributionfpowerandnational nterests,ndthat ollaboration alters uicklywhentheseconditions

change; powerfulctors imply gnore r change nternationaluleswheneverthey islike hem.Anycorrelations etween nstitutionsndoutcomes hatwemay observe are spuriousbecause both variables are drivenby powerandinterests.

Empiricalresearch,guided by a coherent heory nd basic social sciencemethodology,s the mostproductivewayto assessthesecompeting laims ndarrive at insights hat are of practicalvalue to policymakers. onsiderableamounts fdata have been gathered n thedesignand operationof interna-tional environmentalnstitutions,ot least because of heightened oncern

about the environmentroundthetimeof the 1992EarthSummit. hese dataand their as yet cursory nalysis suggestthat institutionsmay have anindependent effecton progress n environmental rotectionunder somecircumstances.10ut,as thefollowingection rgues, heexistingiterature nthesubject squiteweakfrom heoretical ndmethodological tandpoints.

The subsequentsection outlines a researchstrategy ormeasuring ndexplainingheeffect f nternationalnvironmentalnstitutions ore ystemati-cally. t submits hatwe can measuretheoutcomes o be explained nterms fgoal attainment;hat s,the differencevertime r acrosscases between ctor

behavior-or the state of the natural nvironment-along imensions denti-fiedby nstitutionaloalsandendpointsdefined y nstitutionaloals.We can

Levy, nstitutionsor he arth.For a critical eview fclaims hat nstitutionsan facilitate rogressin international olitics, ee Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Limitsof International rganization:Systematic ailure n theManagement f International elations, nternationalrganization5(Spring1991),pp. 183-220.

9. See Stephen D. Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime Consequences: Regimes asIntervening ariables, nKrasner, ntemational egimes, p. 1-21; EmersonM. S. Niou andPeterC. Ordeshook, Less Filling,Tastes Great: The Realist-NeoliberalDebate, World olitics46

(January 994), pp. 209-34; Robert Powell, Anarchy n InternationalRelations Theory: TheNeorealist-Neoliberal ebate, Intemational rganization8 (Spring1994),pp. 313-44; StephenD. Krasner, Global Communicationsnd National Power: Life on the ParetoFrontier, WorldPolitics 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-66;KennethN. Waltz, The Emerging tructuref nternationalPolitics, nternationalecurity8 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; and David Baldwin, d.,Neorealism ndNeoliberalism: heContemporaryebate NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityress,1993).

10. See, for xample, he Fridtjof ansen nstitute, reenGlobe Yearbook 993; PeterH. Sand,Innovations n nternational nvironmental overnance, nvironment2 (November1990),pp.

16-44; and PeterH. Sand,ed., TheEffectivenessf nternationalnvironmentalAgreements:AurveyofExisting egal nstrumentsCambridge:Grotius ublications, 992).





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assess the effect f an institutionn terms f the extent o which t contributes,ceterisparibus, o variationngoal attainment.We use these twovariables oproduce score of nstitutionalffectiveness.his score ndicates he extent owhich an institution as contributed o the resolution f the environmentalproblem hat ed to itsestablishment. inally,we examine he mplications fvariationn institutionalesignfor he effectivenessf institutions. ecision-making ules,membershipndaccess conditions,nd thecompliance ystemfinstitutionsre among hemost mportant esigndimensions.

The research trategyroposed n this articleprovides starting oint formorerigorous nd comparable ase studies. uch studies renecessary o fine

tune the research trategynd generatenew hypothesesbout the impactofvariationn institutionalesign.The research trategyutlinedhere also canserve s a starting ointfor arger cale comparative ork.Without uchwork,we cannot rrive t comparable ssessments nd generalizable xplanations ftheeffect nd effectivenessf nternationalnstitutions.

Weaknesses fcurrent esearch

Currentresearchon the effect f international nvironmentalnstitutionssuffers romtwo types of weaknesses. The first s confusionabout thedependentvariable.Broadlyconceived, hisvariable expressesthe extent owhich nstitutionsontribute o resolvingnternational nvironmental rob-lems. Second, most authorsdefine their explanatory ariables,particularlyinternationalnstitutions,aguely.n addition, nalysts avefocusedpredomi-nantly n whether he existence roperation f nstitutionser se hasan effecton progress n environmental roblem solving.They have not produced

generalizable nswers s to whattypes f nstitutionsre more successfulhanothersunder specific onditions; hat is, whichdimensions f institutionaldesign recrucial o institutionaluccessorfailure.

The dependentvariable

The conceptof institutionalffect aises threequestions.Whichoutcomesdo institutionsffect nd whichofthese outcomes houldanalysts ocuson?How can these outcomes be evaluated in termsof institutional uccess orfailure?Whichmeasurement perations re required o assess the effectf aninstitution?

In principle,nternationalnvironmentalnstitutionsan be saidto have aneffectfthey nfluenceny type f outcome.We may rguethat nternationalregulations n atmospheric zone depletionhave an effectf a singlefirmreduces tsproductionf chlorofluorocarbonsCFCs), substances hat ontrib-ute to the destruction f the ozone layer.The same regulationsmay also





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decrease, ay, government'sncentive o promote hedomestic roduction fCFCs. In thefirst ase, the outcome o explain s the behavior f firms.n thesecondcase, it s the nterests rbehavior fgovernments.he listofpossibleoutcomes is long. Michael Zurn, forexample, distinguishes mongfifteengroups fvariables hat nstitutions ay ffect. his typologys defined y evelofanalysis government,ociety/domesticolitics,ssue area) and thebehav-ior, apabilities, ognition, alues and interests,ndconstitutionf theunits tthedifferentevelsofanalysis.12

Because the chances of finding ignificant ausal relationshipsdeclinerapidlywith henumber fdependentvariables, nyresearchdesignwill have

tofocus na single rvery ew utcomes hat an be measured eliablynd thatare validin thesense ofcapturinghe true meaning finstitutionalffect.But analysts isagree bout which utcomes re relevant rom theoretical rnormative erspectivend which utcomes an be analyzed rom methodologi-cal standpointe.g., is thereenoughvarianceto explain,are sufficientataavailable in accessibleform, an outcomesbe aggregated).To make mattersworse,moststudiesdefinetheirdependentvariable(s) vaguely.As a result,theyoperate with ll-definednalyticalframeworks, hichproduces resultsthat do not systematicallylow from the empiricaldata and are rarely

comparable.The authors f nstitutionsor he arth, ne ofthemost nfluentialtudies ntheeffectf nternationalnvironmentalnstitutions,efer lmost nterchange-ablyto institutionalffect, mpact, ffectiveness,nstitutional oles or func-tions, uccessor failure, nd compliance, s well as to actorbehavior nd thestateof the natural environments the outcometo be explained.At otherpoints, hey rguethat hey xplain he mpact f nstitutionsnenvironmentalconcern,on the international ontractualenvironment,nd on domesticcapacityforenvironmentalrotection t threestages in the environmental

protection rocess: genda setting, argainingndcontracting,ndimplemen-tation.13 he place of thesevariables,or ratherconcepts, n the analyticalframeworkftheprojectremainsunclear.They appear both as explanationsfor the success or failureof environmental rotection nd as dependentvariablesthat are influenced y nstitutionsnd exogenousvariables uchaspower nd interests. ence,itseems that hey reregarded oth s causes andconsequences of international nstitutions. n addition, the relationshipsamongthese conceptsand behavioral and environmental utcomesremainlargely ypothetical.

11. Foran analysis f thestratosphericzone case, see RichardE. Benedick,Ozone Diplomacy:NewDirectionsnSafeguardinghe lanet Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityress,1991).

12. Michael Zurn, Consequences of Regime Definitions nd Definitions f Regime Conse-quences: Proposalsfor Data Bank on International egimes, working aper, presented t ameeting ntitled Regimes Summit, nstitute f ArcticStudies,DartmouthCollege,Hanover,NewHampshire, ctober 1991.

13. Haas, Keohane,andLevy, nstitutionsor he arth, p. 3-24and 397-426.





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Harold Jacobson nd David Kay, in one of the pioneering tudieson theeffect f nternationalnvironmentalrganizations,se multiple ndicators: orexample, participant nd observerattitudes toward accomplishedresults,procedural nd substantial oal attainment,nd the mpact fa programn theenvironment.14research esignwith o many ependent ariables,which redifficulto aggregate, nd thatcomparesonly elevencases does not permitgeneralizablecausal claimsabout the effect f internationalnvironmentalorganizations.n a study n international radein textiles,Vinod Aggarwalexplainsregime trength,efined s the stringency ithwhichrulesregulatethe behavior of countries. 15 he validity f thisvariable is based on the

assumptionhatmoreconcrete nd binding egulationsremore ikely o havean impact on actor behavior. This assumptionblurs the distinction finstitutionss explanatory nd actorbehavior as dependentvariables andrenders he analysisof institutionalffect erydifficult.linor Ostrom,whoexamines he management f commonpool resources t the domestic evel,explains mixture fregulatoryutput nd implementationfregulations.hedefines hefailure f nstitutionss not beingable toputa regimenplace orhaving setof rulesthat re not enforced.16his definitionumps ogether heexplanationof cooperation as such and the explanation of institutional

performance. n a more abstract evel,authors uchas Marc Levyand ArildUnderdal seem to disagree over whether social scientists hould explainbehavior rchanges n the natural nvironment.17

The nextpoint to clarify oncerns evaluative criteria.Such criteriaarerequired o measureand comparethe extent nd direction f an institutionaleffectn a given utcome.We are interestednwhether,nd to whatdegree,institutionsrive utcomes n a good or bad direction. or example,Levynotesthatbecause the InternationalWhalingCommission stablishedglobalbut not national quotas, it generateda whalingolympic.National fishing

industriescquired argefishing leets hatwere economicallyfficientnly ftheykilled whales at an ecologicallyunsustainablerate.18n this case, the

14. Harold K. Jacobson nd David A. Kay, eds., Environmentalrotection: heIntemationalDimension Totowa, N.J.:Allanheld/Osmun, 983).

15. Vinod K. Aggarwal, iberal rotectionism:he ntemationalolitics fOrganized extile rade(Berkeley:UniversityfCalifornia ress, 1985), p. 20. Similar oncepts an be found nMarkV.Zacker, Trade Gaps, AnalyticalGaps: RegimeAnalysis nd International ommodity radeRegulation, nternationalrganization1 (Spring1987), p. 117; and Abram Chayesand AntoniaHandlerChayes, ComplianceWithout nforcement: tateBehaviorUnder Regulatory reaties,

NegotiationournalJuly 991), pp. 311-30.16. Elinor Ostrom,Governinghe Commons:TheEvolution f nstitutionsorCollective ction(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1990), pp.55-56.

17. See Levy,The Effectivenessf nternationalnvironmentalnstitutions;ndUnderdal, TheConceptof Regime Effectiveness.'

18. Levy,TheEffectivenessf nternationalnvironmentalnstitutions,. 4. On the whaling ase,see M. J. Peterson, Whalers,Cetologists, nvironmentalists,nd the nternationalManagementofWhaling, nternational rganization 6 (Winter1992), pp. 147-86; and Halldor Asgrimsson,Developments eadingto the 1982 Decision ofthe nternationalWhalingCommission or Zero

CatchQuota 1986-90, in SteinarAndresenand Willy0streng, nternational esourceManage-





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whaling nstitution ouldbe successfulo thedegree hat t succeeds nkeepingwhale stocks t a sustainable evel.

Besides disagreeing ver heoutcomes o be explained, nalysts lso disagreeabout the standardsagainstwhich these outcomes should be evaluated.Successful nstitutions,na very omprehensiveenseofsuccess, re thosethat(1) changethe behavior f states nd other ctors n the direction ntended ythe cooperating parties, (2) solve the environmental roblems they aresupposed to solve,and (3) do so in an efficientnd equitable manner.19 ostudyhas tried to evaluate outcomes,howeverdefined,against all threecriteria,ndany ffortodo so is bound to faildue totheextremeomplexityf

thetask.Even theevaluation gainstmorenarrowlyefined tandardsposesgreatdifficulties.Elsewhere, have tried to assess the efficiencyf regulations oncerning

pollutionof the riverRhine.20 argue that the hightransaction osts ofnegotiatingnd implementinghloridereductions long the Rhine throughinternational inancing f such reductions t a potash mine nFrance haveallbut eliminated the efficiency ains of this approach as compared withalternativepproaches.The evaluation fefficiencynvolves ssessing hecostsand benefits f establishingnd operating n environmentalnstitutionnd

thencomparing hese costs and benefits o those of alternative ehavioraloptions.The standard or fficiencysusually he Paretofrontier. tthispoint,no actorcan achievea greater enefitwithoutmaking t least one other ctorworse off.Efficiencyends to be a more attractive oncept for abstractreasoning han forempirical esearch.21 osts and benefitsn environmentalpolitics,whichdetermine heutilityunctions f theactors, re oftennonmon-etary nddifficultomeasureunlesswe taketheproblematic tepof nferringex antepreferences rom bservedbehavior.22n addition, s Underdalnotes,theParetofrontiersvery ensitiveochanges nthe set ofactors, references,

and issues.23 omparing fficiencycrosscases and time s thusverydifficult,and mostefficiencyssessments,uchas in the Rhinecase, remain xtremelycrude.

Zurnexamines heconditions nderwhich nstitutionshat re ust emerge.24

ment: heRoleofScience ndPoliticsLondon: BelhavenPress,1989),pp.221-31.Negative ffectsof internationalnstitutionsre discussedby Gallarotti, The Limitsof International rganiza-tion.

19. For a discussion of various evaluative standards, see Young, The Effectiveness f

Internationalnstitutions ;ndUnderdal, The ConceptofRegime Effectiveness.'20. Thomas Bernauer, International inancingof Environmental rotection: essons fromEffortsoProtect he RiverRhine AgainstChloridePollution, nvironmentalolitics, orthcom-ing.

21. For an abstract omparison f fiveglobal regimesforgreenhousegas reductions gainsteconomicefficiencyriteria, ee JoshuaM. Epsteinand Raj Gupta, ControllingheGreenhouseEffect:iveGlobalRegimes omparedWashington, .C.: Brookingsnstitution,990).

22. FrancesCairncross, osting he arth London:EconomistBooks, 1991).23. Underdal, The Conceptof Regime Effectiveness,' pp. 230-34.24. Michael Zurn, Gerechte InternationaleRegime: Bedingungenund Restriktionen er





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Environmentalnstitutions359

The assessment f ustice,whichnthis ase isclosely elated oequity,nvolvesthe evaluation of the distribution f costs and benefitsthat flow frominternationalnteractionnd a comparison f thisdistributiongainstsomenormatively referred istribution. his evaluativecriterion s even moreproblematic han theefficiencytandard.Besides theproblemofmeasuringcosts and benefits, ny assessment f equityor justicehas to be based on atheoryffairness;ndvirtuallyll theories fequity rfairnessre controver-sial.25

Severalauthors aveproposed impler valuative riteria.Manyofthem, orexample Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Ronald Mitchell,

examine ompliance.Compliancemaybe defined s thedegreeto which ctorbehavior onformsothe njunctionset by herulesofan institution.26he useofthis riterion reates nendogeneityroblem: heevaluative tandard hat sused in the measurement f the dependentvariable (behavioris assessedagainstrules) is also part of theexplanatoryoncept institutionsncludethesame rules). This problemrenderscausal inference egarding he effect finstitutionsn outcomesvery ifficult. ithfew xceptions,uchas Mitchell'sstudyon oil pollution, ompliancewith nstitutional ules rarelyhas beentraced back to institutionsn a systematicmanner.27n addition, ompliance

may not tell us much about the success of an institutionn solvingtheenvironmentalroblemthat motivatedts establishment.nternational ulescanbe designed o that ven theworst olluters asily omplywithout aving ochange heir ehavior ignificantly.

J0rgenWettestad nd SteinarAndresenproposethree evaluative riteria,twoofwhich void thepitfalls fthecompliance oncept: hedegreetowhichthepartieshave reached the institutionaloals; the degreeto whichexpertadvice and actualdecisions orrelate; nd thedegreetowhich he stateoftheenvironmentas improveds comparedwithwhatwouldhavehappened nthe

absenceofthe nstitution.28he first riterionsbroaderthancompliancebutalso creates the same endogeneity roblem.The second criterion eflectsn

Entstehung icht-hegemonialernternationaleregimeuntersuchtmBeispiel der Weltkommu-nikationsordnungJust nternationalegimes:Conditions nd restrictionsorthe emergence fnonhegemonic nternational egimes, nalyzed on the basis of theworldcommunicationrder)(Frankfurt.M: Haag undHerchen,1987).

25. For a rational-choice-basednalysisof equity nd fairness ssues, see PeytonH. Young,

EquitynTheoryndPracticePrinceton, .J.:Princeton niversityress,1994).26. See AbramChayes ndAntoniaHandlerChayes, On Compliance, ntemational rganiza-tion 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205; Ronald B. Mitchell, ntentionalOil Pollutionat Sea:Environmentalolicy nd Treaty omplianceCambridge,Mass.: MIT Press,1994); and Oran R.Young,Compliancend PublicAuthority:A heory ithntemationalpplicationsBaltimore,Md.:JohnsHopkinsUniversityress,1979); and StephenHaggard ndBethA. Simmons,Theories ofInternational egimes, ntemational rganization 1 (Summer1987),pp. 491-517 and p. 496 inparticular.

27. Mitchell, ntentional il Pollution tSea.28. Wettestad ndAndresen,TheEffectivenessf ntemational esource ooperation.





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attempto control orwhethernstitutionaloals areconducive o environmen-tal protection. ence it s morevalidthan ompliancenterms f capturinghetrue meaning f nstitutionaluccess. tsprincipal roblem s that cientists

oftendisagreeor theiradvice maybe wrong.The third riterion valuatesrelativeprogressn environmental rotection gainst hebaseline ofa worldwithout he institution. his criterion ncludesa counterfactualomponentthat introduces n element of more or less informed peculation nto themeasurementf the dependent ariable.

Marc Levy,Gail Osherenko,and Oran Young focus on the behaviorofmembersof an institutionn accordance with the broader objectivesthe

institution as establishedto achieve.29 his conceptis attractive rom hevalidity iewpointbecause it relates to problemsolving.The endogeneityproblem s smallerbecause broadinstitutionaloals are usuallynotas closelyrelated o institutionalesign ndoperation s specific ulesor morenarrowlydefinedgoals. In addition, his criterion oes not requirethe agreement fscientists r counterfactualssessment.The institution egulating hloridepollution f the Rhinecan,for xample, e evaluated nterms f theevolutionof chloride oncentrations ithregard o thegoal ofeliminatinghedamagethat hloride ollutionnflictsn Dutch farmersnd waterworks.

Two problems, owever,with hecriterion fproblem olving emain.First,it sdifficulto weigh heobserved utcome gainst he environmentalroblemandtocompare his ssessment cross cases. Largechangesof behavior nthedesireddirection or he area of stratosphericzone depletionmay onstitutea much smaller success than small changesof behavioron a muchbiggerproblem,uch as globalwarming.30econd, f n institutionas more hanonegoal,we faceproblems faggregation.n the case of nternationalegulationson whalingbefore1982, it will be difficulto aggregate he welfareof thewhaling ndustry ith ome notionof sustainablewhale stocks.The interna-

tional institutionverseeing hemicalpollutionof the Rhine has had moresuccess in establishingn earlywarning ystem oraccidentalspillsthaninactually leaning p the Rhine.

The third roblem ndefiningnd measuringhedependentvariable temsfrom he causal element nherent n theconceptof institutionalffect.Moststudies gnore his ausal element. hey ssesschanges fbehavior, henaturalenvironment,r otheroutcomes nthe ssue-areacoveredbyan institution.fchange s observed, t is attributed o the institution,ased on some sketchytheoretical r empirical rgument. harlotteKu, for xample, rguesthat he

law of the sea conventionhas had the effect f spurring he settlement fboundary isputes. he notesthat fthe morethan130 ocean boundaries hatwereregarded s settled n 1989,60-65 percentweresettled fter t became

29. Levy,Osherenko, nd Young,TheEffectivenessf nternationalegimes.30. Underdal, The ConceptofRegime Effectiveness,' p. 229.





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evident hat heThirdUnitedNationsConference ntheLaw oftheSea would

formallyecognizemultiple andsof coastalstate urisdiction.31

Such assessments f institutionalffect re deficient ecause theydo notcontrol he mpact fexogenous ariables n the observed orrelation etweeninstitutionsnd outcomes.The increase nthesettlementfboundary isputesinthe awof the sea case might,or xample,have been caused bythegeneralgrowth n maritime raffic r other uses of the sea, irrespective f theinternationalegulatoryffort. onversely, e maymisinterprets a failurecase wheremarinepollutiondid not mprove ollowinghe creation fa newinstitutionecause a noninstitutionalactorneutralized he positive ffect f

the nstitution.n increasedpollutionnputfrom nonregulated ource, uchas a tributaryiver,mayhave suchan effect.Some authors ry o control xogenousvariablesbutfailto do so rigorously

because they do not distinguish etween institutionalnd noninstitutionalvariables clearlyenough.Peter Haas, in his studyof institutionso protectregional eas, employs xogenous xplanatoryactors hat re largelydenticalto the United Nations Environment rogram's institutional bjectives.32Wettestad and Andresen distinguish wo types of explanatory ariables:problemsolvingand capacityof a regime. It seems, however,that both

categories nclude institutionals well as power-and interest-relatedari-ables.33The theoretical alue of studiesthat do not sufficientlyontrol xogenous

variables s small because they gnorecriticswho arguethat nstitutionsremerely rozen nterestsnd power tructuresnd do nothave an independenteffect n outcomes n international ffairs. hese critics laim thatwhen weobserve hat tatesbehave naccordancewithnstitutionalulesorgoals,thesestates do not complybecause the designersof the institutionmade smartchoices.Theycomply ecausepowerfultates hreaten otential iolatorswith

economic sanctions r because compliance s so beneficial hatstateswouldcomplyrrespectivefwhatother ctorsdo.

Institutionaldesign

Analysts ave focusedon whether he existence roperation f nstitutionsperse has an effectnparticular utcomes ather hanon specificnstitutionalfeatures hatmayaccountforvariationn institutionalffect. rojects ed byHaas, Keohane, and Levy, ndby Levy,Osherenko, nd Young,for xample,are based on the nductivenalysis f the functions hrough hich nstitutions

31. CharlotteKu, Ocean Boundaries:Does the 1982 Law of theSea ConventionMatter?paper preparedforthe annualconvention f the nternational tudiesAssociation n Acapulco,Mexico,23-27March1993.

32. Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: he Politics of Intemational nvironmentalCooperationNewYork:ColumbiaUniversityress,1990).

33. Wettestad ndAndresen,TheEffectivenessf ntemational esource ooperation.





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may contribute o progress in environmental rotection.The suggestedfunctionsreroughlyompatiblewith hebehavioralmodels hat an be foundin the sociologicallyriented nd rational-choiceiterature.34

This approach tellsus howinstitutions ay nfluence utcomesby shapingbehaviorna variety f ways. t also makesan attempt o control he nfluenceofnoninstitutionalariables.But itdoes notexplain na generalizablewaythedegreeof nstitutionaluccessor failurenterms fvariationn the features finstitutions. ot surprisingly,herefore, he advice that policymakersmayderive from these studies remains vague or idiosyncratic.t consistsofinformationn how policymakers ave, in the cases examined, dealt with

environmental roblemsthrough nternationalnstitutions nd how theseinstitutionsave contributed,ach one in tspeculiarway, osuccessorfailureinenvironmental anagement.35t isup to individual olicymakerso evaluatewhetherhe nsightsrom given ase areapplicabletoother ases.

There is no shortage fsuggestionss to whichdimensions f institutionaldesign re potentiallyelevant o theperformancef nternationalnvironmen-tal nstitutions.I henceforthse theterm institutionalesign na sense thatincludes constitutional esign variables and operational factors.)Younghighlightsransparencyrocedures,ollective hoicemechanisms,ndtransfor-

mationrules.36 he Chayesesand Mitchell tress heimportance fmonitor-ing.37 eter Sand arguesthatthefollowingnstitutionalesignfeaturesmakeinternationalnvironmental rotectionmore effective:nterim perationofenvironmentalreatiesbeforeentryntoforce;utilization f soft aw; regula-tionsapplied to the regionalrather hanglobal level; differentialnstead ofuniversallypplicableobligations; elegation fdecision-makinguthorityospecializedorgans;regular eviews f theoperationoftreaties; nd selectiveincentives.38ndresen ndWettestad mphasize he number f actors nd the

34. For examples of the former, ee JamesN. Rosenau, Before Cooperation: Hegemons,Regimes,and Habit-DrivenActors n World Politics, ntemational rganization0 (Autumn1986), pp. 849-94; FriedrichV. Kratochwil,The Forceof Prescriptions, ntemational rganiza-tion 8 (Autumn1984), pp. 685-708;Friedrich . Kratochwil, ules,Norms, nd Decisions:On theConditions f Practical and Legal Reasoning n IntemationalRelationsand DomesticAffairs(Cambridge: ambridgeUniversityress,1991);AlexanderWendt, Anarchys WhatStatesMakeof t:The Social Constructionf PowerPolitics, ntemational rganization6 (Spring1992), pp.391-425;and AlexanderWendt and RaymondDuvall, Institutions nd International rder, nErnst-OttoCzempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes nd Theoretical hallenges:Approaches o World olitics orthe1990s Lexington,Mass.: Lexington ooks, 1989),pp. 51-73.For examplesof the latter, ee Knight,nstitutionsnd Social Conflict; eth V. Yarbrough nd

RobertM. Yarbrough, Internationalnstitutionsnd the New Economics of Organization,Intemational rganization 4 (Spring1990), pp. 235-59; Oliver E. Williamson,The EconomicInstitutionsf Capitalism: irms,Markets, elationalContractingNew York: Free Press, 1985);Robert0. Keohane, The Demandfor nternational egimes, n Krasner, ntemational egimes,pp. 141-71;and Robert0. Keohane,After egemony: ooperationnd Discord n theWorld oliticalEconomy Princeton, .J.:Princeton niversityress,1984).

35. See inparticular aas, Keohane,and Levy,nstitutionsor he arth, p. 408-15.36. Young, The Effectivenessf nternationalnstitutions.37. See Chayesand Chayes, On Compliance ;andMitchell,ntentional il Pollutiont Sea.38. See PeterH. Sand,LessonsLeamedin GlobalEnvironmentalovemanceWashington, .C.:





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scope of the institutional genda.39Wettestadstresses the importanceofparticipatorycope and access to an institution,ecision-makingules, heroleof secretariats, he scope of the institutionalgenda, the organization fscientific r technical nput, nd verificationnd compliancemechanisms.40Most of these propositions re not embedded in a coherent theoreticalargument.They are ad hoc hypothesesderived from ntuition, nductivestudies, large pectrumf social sciencetheories, nd practical nowledge nthe conduct of internationalnvironmental olitics.Further, heyhave notbeen systematicallyested nd compared n terms f their elative xplanatoryweight.

The mostrigorous esearch n the mplicationsf variation n institutionaldesignhas been carried ut by students f nstitutionst the domestic evel. thas examined eneraldesignprinciples hatunderlie uccessful, elf-organizedinstitutionsor he management f commonpool resources, uch as fisheries,communal orestsndgrazing reas,groundwaterasins, ilfields, r rrigationsystems.41ichael McGinnisand ElinorOstrom, or xample, rguethatthefollowing esignprinciplesmake ocal common ool resource nstitutions oresuccessful nd project hese nsightso the nternationalevel:clearly efinedboundaries f a resource nd the right ouse the resource; ongruence mong

rulesand local conditions; nvolvementf individuals ffected ythe rules nrule modification;monitoring y the users of the resource or by agentsaccountable o theusers;thesamefor anctions,which hould be graduated;access to low-cost onflict esolutionmechanisms; certain utonomy f ocalinstitutions romhigher uthorities; nd the organization f institutionsnnested ayers.42

The extent to which these propositions re relevant to environmentalinstitutions t the international evel is largelyan open question. Somepropositionsmight e irrelevant. aas, Keohane,andLevy, heChayeses, nd

WorldResources nstitute, 990); andPeterH. Sand, Innovationsn nternational nvironmen-tal Governance.

39. Wettestad ndAndresen,TheEffectivenessf nternationalesource ooperation.40. See also Wettestad, nstitutionalesign nd theEffectivenessf ntemationalnvironmental

Regimes. or an analysis f the cience nd politics nterfacen nternationalnvironmentalffairs,see Andresen nd 0streng, ntemational esourceManagement;ora Skodvin nd ArildUnderdal,The Science-Politics nterface: ransforming nowledge ntoDecision Inputsfor nternational

Environmental egimes, paper presented t the annual meeting f the International tudiesAssociation,Washington, .C., 29 March-1 April 1994; and Michael E. Kowalok, Research

Lessons fromAcid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Global Warming, nvironment5 (July/August1993),pp. 12-38.41. Keohane, McGinnis,dnd Ostrom, roceedingsfa Conferencen Linking ocal and Global

Commons; nd Ostrom,GovemingheCommons.Another rea of research n institutionst thedomestic evel deals with legislatures. ee, forexample,Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R.Weingast,The Institutional oundations fCommittee ower, American olitical cienceReview81 (March 1987),pp. 85-104.

42. See Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom, Design Principles for Local and GlobalCommons, nKeohane, McGinnis, ndOstrom, roceedingsf Conferencen Linking ocal andGlobal Commons, p. 16-65;andOstrom,Goveming heCommons, . 90.





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others laimthat anctions lay only minor ole in affectinghebehavior factors n international nvironmentalolitics.43he proposition oncerningtheautonomy f ocal institutionsrom igheruthoritiess rarelypplicable ninternationalffairs.With he exception f theEuropeanUnion EU), there sno higheruthority.n addition, heexplanatoryalue ofthesepropositionsordomestic-levelnstitutionsemainscontested.Michael Taylor,for example,notesthat hey re not inked o a coherent xplanatoryheory nd are basedon a very nformalnalytical ramework. e also arguesthatthe proposeddesign principlesappear to be featuresor resultsrather than causes ofsuccessful esolution f common ool resource roblems.44

How we mightearnmore

The remainder f this article outlinesa research strategyn threesteps toevaluate the effect f institutions er se and to explainvariation n theeffectivenessf institutionsn terms f theirdesign.First, heoutcometo beexplained s measured nterms fgoal attainment. oal attainments defined

as the difference,ver ime r acrosscases,between ctorbehavior r thestateof thenatural nvironmentlongdimensions dentified y nstitutionaloals,on the one hand,and certain ndpoints efined y nstitutionaloals,on theother. econd,the effectf an institutions measured nterms f the extent owhich he existence roperation fthe nstitutionontributes,eteris aribus,to variation n goal attainment. hese two variables are transformednto ascoreof nstitutionalffectiveness.his score ndicates hedegreetowhich ninstitutionas contributedo the resolution f the environmentalroblem hatmotivated ts establishment. hird, the effectof variationalong specific

dimensions f nstitutionalesign suchas decision-makingules,membershipandaccessconditions,nd thecompliance ystem)s analyzed.

The basic assumptions nderlyingheproposedresearch trategyre thoseof rational-choiceheory. assume states o be unitaryndboundedly ationalactors.Cooperationbetween theseactors s oftendifficultecause the costsand benefits f behavioral ptions s well as thepreferencesnd behavior fotheractors are uncertain, he actorsare opportunistic,nd enforcementsimperfectnd costly.Under these circumstances,nternational nstitutionsfacilitate ooperationby signaling he parties' commitmento an ongoing

relationship, ence lengtheninghe shadow of the future.They generateinformation,hus ncreasing ransparency,educing ncertainty,nd facilitat-

43. See Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutionsor the Earth; and Chayes and Chayes,ComplianceWithout nforcement.44. Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of PropertyRights and Common Pool

Resources, NaturalResources ournal 2 (Summer 992),p. 640 n particular.





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ing strategies f reciprocity. hey help to mediate disputes and provide

procedures or ggregatingndividual hoicesat lower transaction) ost.45

Some versions f this rgumentlaimthat nstitutionsre efficientolutionsto collective ction problems.nstitutionsxistbecause they re instrumentalinmaximizingtates'utility.f they o notperform ell, heywilldisappear. nthisDarwinist iewof nstitutions,he study f nstitutionalffectsuninterest-ing.There will be littlevariation n the performancef existing nstitutions,which are those thathave survived he selectionprocessbecause they areefficient.

To escape this autological rgument, onElster has demandeda stringent

assessment ffunctionalheories.Analystsmust how hat n institutionervesan unintended nd unrecognized unction or groupof actorsand thatthisfunction eedsback tomaintain r reproduce he nstitution.46erbert imonhas suggested less demanding equirement. e statesthat Institutionsrefunctionalfreasonablemenmight reateand maintain hem norder o meetsocial needs or achieve social goals. 47This argumentdoes not requiredemonstrationfunintended runrecognized unctions. or does it mply hatonly fficientnstitutionsurvive.t allowsforvariationnthe performancefexistingnstitutions.

Analysts ave used two research trategieso demonstratehat nstitutions,through he functions hey perform,re responsiblefor some variation ncollectiveoutcomes.The first trategy,xemplified yHaas, Keohane, andLevy, and by Levy,Osherenko,and Young, constructs etailed narrativeaccounts hat racecausal pathways rom nstitutionso outcomes.48t seeks todemonstrate hat institutions ffect ollectiveoutcomesby performinghefunctionsroposedbyrational-choice heory rsome otherbehavioralmodel.The secondapproach,used byMcGinnis and Ostrom, nd by Wettestad ndAndresen,developshypotheses hatlinkexplanatory ariablesto collective

outcomes.49t then identifies nd measuresvariation n the existenceandoperation f nstitutions,pecific imensions f nstitutionalesign, ollectiveoutcomes, ndinstitutionalerformancend examineswhether hesevariablescorrelate vertime racrosscases. Controllingxogenous ariables, dvancingtheoretical rguments bout the relevanceof explanatory ariablesto the

45. See Yarbroughand Yarbrough, International nstitutionsnd the New EconomicsofOrganization ; ndAndrewKydd ndDuncan Snidal, Progress nGame-Theoretical nalysis fInternational egimes, n Rittbergernd Mayer,RegimeTheory nd Intemational elations, p.

112-35.46. Jon Elster, ExplainingTechnical Change:A Case Study n the Philosophy f Science(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1983).

47. HerbertSimon, Rationality s Process and as Productof Thought, American conomicReview apers nd Proceedings8 (May1978), p. 3.

48. See Haas, Keohane,and Levy,nstitutionsor heEarth; and Levy,Osherenko, nd Young,TheEffectivenessf nternationalegimes.

49. See McGinnis ndOstrom, Design Principles or ocal and GlobalCommons ;Wettestadand Andresen,TheEffectivenessf ntemational esource ooperation;nd Wettestad,nstitutionalDesign nd the ffectivenessf ntemationalnvironmentalegimes.





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performance f institutional unctions,nd the (usuallysketchy) mpiricaltracing of causal pathwaysbolster claims that correlationsreflect ausalrelationships.

The research trategy roposedbelow reflects he second approach.Thisapproach is preferable ecause it facilitates omparative esearch,which sindispensable or rrivingt moregeneralizablepropositionsbout necessaryor sufficientonditions or he effect r effectivenessf nstitutions.s notedearlier, he firstpproachalone cannotgenerate uchknowledge. willargue,however, hat hefirst esearch trategyan support he second.

MeasuringoutcomesOutcomes obe explained hould, irst,e closely elated oproblem olving

and second,reliablymeasured.As Yarbrough nd Yarbroughnote, problemsolving s the dominantdea in rational-choice-basednstitutionalism,hichemphasizesthe purposive, ntentional,nd instrumentalharacter f socialinstitutions.50e are ultimatelyoncernedmoreabout cleaner rivers,ustain-able fisheries, r lower greenhousegas emissionsand less about politicalpopularity unctions r treaty atifications. utcomes associatedmore indi-

rectly ith nstitutions ay,nonetheless, e important.nstitutionsanhave apositive pillover ffectn cooperative ffortsnother ssue-areas, rtheymayhave a generaleffect n confidence nd conflict esolutionas in the case ofsome East-West environmentalnstitutions-for xample,the one fortheBarents Sea).51 But such outcomesare harderto trace back to institutionsbecause causal chainsare likely o be longer. n addition, he more outcomeswe seekto explain, hegreater heproblems faggregatinghose outcomes-and aggregation illbe necessary oarrive tsignificantausal claims.

A straightforwardayofselecting he outcometo explain s to identifyhe

principal oals of an institutionnd to define hosegoals as dimensions verwhichbehavioralor environmental utcomesvary.Such goals should bedefinednterms f environmentalroblems hat he nstitutions supposedtosolve.Thistype f outcome srelativelyasytomeasure; t s closely elated oproblem olving; nd itfacilitates he analysisbecause an institutions morelikely o have an observable nd explainableeffectn thearea(s) it explicitlytargets.

The principal oal ofthe nstitutionoprotect hestratosphericzone layeris to reduce anthropogenicmissionsof ozone depleting hemicals, uch as

CFCs. To achieve thisgoal,the nstitutionims at reducing heproduction fsuch chemicals.The dimension of variation is the productionof ozonedepleting hemicals.The outcome to be explained s variationntheproduc-

50. YarbroughndYarbrough,Internationalnstitutionsnd theNew Economic ofOrganiza-tion, p. 253.

51. Geir Ulfstein, The Barents Sea Afterthe Cold War, paper presented at the annualmeeting fthe nternationaltudiesAssociation,Washington, .C., 28 March-1April1994.





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tionofspecific zonedepletinghemicals, r theentire lass of suchchemicals,overtime,across countries, r otherunitsof analysis.52n

measuringhese

outcomes,we need to be sensitive o the possibilityhat nstitutionaloalschange over time. The goal of the internationalwhalinginstitution, orexample,changed in 1982 from ustainablemanagement f whales to theprotectionfwhales zerocatches).

The identificationnd measurement foutcomes, s defined bove, posesthe following roblems.First,dimensionsof variationmaybe difficultoidentifyecause thegoals of an institutionre ambiguous.This problem anonlybe resolvedthrough areful tudy f treaty exts nd otherdocuments,

interviews, nd possiblydisaggregation f ambiguous goals into severaldimensionsfvariation.Second, internationalnvironmentalnstitutionsan have more thanone

goal. In thiscase, theanalystmay selectthe goal that s considered hemostimportantccording oenvironmentalriteria rtheperceptions fpolicymak-ers. Standardizednterviews ith xperts rpolicymakers ight upport uch aselection.Alternatively,heanalyst an select several or all of thegoals andaggregateheresultingariables nto ne or moredependent ariables. fgoalsare contradictory,ggregationwill of course be difficult.he International

TropicalTimberAgreement ims at enhancing rade in tropical imber ndimproving ustainableforestmanagement.53 efore 1982,the InternationalWhalingCommissionought oregulate he utilizationfwhaleresources ndto conserve heseresources. n bothcases, the twogoals have differentndpoints. n thetimber ase,for xample, ptimal ustainable orestmanagementis likely o be associatedwith differentxtent f timber arvestinghantheoptimal level of timbertrade. In such cases, each dimensionshould bemeasured and explainedseparately. he advantageofnot aggregatingheseoutcomesmaybe that tproducesmorecases for omparison. he analyst an

investigate hether nd why n institution as been moreor less successfulwith egard o one goal than nother.

Third, nstitutional oals are criticalforidentifyinghe institutions anenvironmentalne. The boundarynthisregard s often nclear.The goalsoftheSenegal River-basinnstitution,orexample, re to expandhydroelectricpowerproduction nd irrigationnd to facilitatenavigation hrough loodcontrol.54 hey have little to do with environmentalonservation n thetraditional ense and moreto do withresourcemanagement.n thecase offisheries,nstitutionsre often egarded s environmentalnlywhenfish tocks

52. For an analysis of institutionalffect n the ozone layercase, see Edward A. Parson,Protecting heOzone Layer, nHaas, Keohane, and Levy,nstitutionsor he arth, p. 27-73.53. Kenton R. Miller,Walter V. Reid, and CharlesV. Barber, Deforestation nd Species

Loss, inMathews, reservingheGlobalEnvironment,p. 78-111.54. C. 0. Okidi, Environmental tress and Conflicts n Africa: Case Studies of African

International rainage Basins, manuscript,chool of Environmentaltudies, Moi University,Eldoret,Kenya,1992.





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crash.However, he problemhere s one of explanation ather handefinitionand measurement f outcomes. hould we consider nvironmentalnstitutionsas a separate classof nternationalnstitutions? oing so is analyticallysefulonly o the extent hat tfacilitateshe comparison f differentnstitutionsf agiven class by holding class-specific ariables constant.Whetherthere areclass-specificariables, or xamplehighuncertainty,hatmake environmentalinstitutionsifferentrom ther nstitutionss an open question.Focusingonenvironmentalnstitutionss usuallydone fornormative r pragmatic atherthananalytical easons.55 rom an analytical iewpoint,tmightmake moresense to comparethe SenegalRiver nstitution ith he Rhine regulations n

chloridepollutionratherthan comparing he Rhine case withthe ozoneinstitution.he distinctionlongthe inesofpureversus mpure ublicgoods,the number f actors nvolved, r the ncomeof the actorsmightwellturn utto be morefruitfulhan hedistinctionfenvironmentalersusnonenvironmen-tal nstitutions.

The above definition f outcomes s sufficiento conduct ndividual asestudies.The effect f nternationalnstitutionsxplains elative hange gainstspecific aselinestoward rawayfrom nstitutionaloals.But for omparativeresearch we need evaluative criteria that make changes in behavior or

environmentalutcomes omparable crosscases. Ifwe compareoutcomes ntheozone case with utcomes n the area of nternationalrade ntoxicwaste,we may, s a fictitiousxample, bserve worldwide ecline by50 percent nthe production f CFCs and a 30 percentdecline in illegal trade in toxicwaste.56 n which case is there more environmentalrogress?The answerdependson the standards gainstwhich heoutcome s assessed.

The mostwidely sed standards re some notion fcollective ptimumforexample,the Paretofrontier),ompliance, nd thegoal(s) of an institution.The third tandard s (arguably)preferable o the othertwo. t is simpler o

identifyhana collective ptimum,which scientistsmay disagreeabout andeconomistsmayfind ifficulto determine ecause costsandbenefitsre hardtomeasure. t s lesssusceptible o theendogeneityroblem fcompliance hatwas notedearlier.Broadergoals determine he features f an institutiono alesser extent than specific nstitutional ules. In addition,when states setbroader institutionaloals, thesegoals are less likely o be lowest commondenominator olutionsthan concrete international ules that have to beimplementedwithinspecifictime frames. The principalweakness of thisstandard, romwhichthe collective ptimum nd compliance tandards lso

55. For an attempt o distinguishooperationon securitynd economic ssues,which raisessimilarproblems, ee Charles Lipson, InternationalCooperation in Economic and SecurityAffairs, World olitics 7 (October 1984),pp. 1-23.

56. For an analysis f nternational egulationsn trade n toxicwaste, ee Christoph ilz andJohnR. Ehrenfeld,Transboundary ovements fHazardousWastes:A ComparativeAnalysis fPolicy Optionsto Controlthe nternationalWasteTrade, Internationalnvironmentalffairs(Winter 991), pp. 26-63.





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suffer,s that t doesnottake nto ccount herelative mportance f ndividualinstitutions. 50 percent hangetoward he goalsspecifiedntheFrameworkConvention n Global ClimateChangemaybe vastlymore mportantrom noverall nvironmentalerspective hanmaking heRhinehabitable or almonbytheyear2000-the goal of theRhine ActionProgram.

In summary, he outcome to be explained in terms of the effectofinternational nstitutionsan be defined as goal attainment: hat is, thedifferenceovertime r acrosscases) between ctorbehavior r thestateofthenatural nvironmentlong dimensions efined y nstitutional oals and endpointsdefined y nstitutionaloals.The validityfthisvariablederivesfrom

its close relation o the notionof problem olving.Due to themeasurementproblems iscussed bove,the reliabilityf thecollecteddata willnormallyeless thanperfect, ut it can be enhancedbyusingordinal-scaled coreswithonly few ategoriese.g., ow,medium, ndhighgoal attainment).

Measuringtheeffectnd effectiveness f institutions

The extent o whichthe existenceor operationof the institutioner seaccountsforvariation ngoal attainmentrovides hemeasureof theeffectf

an institutionn goal attainment. he measurement f institutionalffect smoredifficulthanthemeasurementfgoal attainmentecause it nvolves nelementofcausal analysis.An institutionas an effect o thedegreethatwecan reject he nullhypothesis, hichholds thatgoal attainment ould,ceterisparibus,notbe differentn the absenceofthe nstitution.

To give a simple example, ssume thatwe observe a 25 percentreductionacross theboard n themajorpollution arameters f theRhine,whereas 50percentreduction s the goal of the institutionegulating ollutionof theRhine. Hence the degree of goal attainments 50 percent or medium).To

whatdegreecan thisprogress e attributedothe existence roperation f theRhine nstitution?et us assumethat, ased on thestudy fvarious ompetingexplanations orthisprogress,we find hat nternationalegulations ccountforhalf f theprogress.n this ase,wemay oncludethat heRhineriparianscan rightly laim a mediumdegree of success in termsof achievingtheenvironmentaloal and that nternationalegulationsccountforhalfof thisprogress.The other halfmaybe explained,forexample,by changes n theproduction echnology f chemical firms long the Rhine that would haveoccurredrrespectivef nternationalegulations.

How can we atrive t such a result?As the boveexample uggests,hekey sto sort out the effects f exogenous (noninstitutional) nd endogenous(institutional) ariableson goal attainment. he cause of variation n goalattainmentmaynot be environmentalnstitutionsut nsteadthe variation fpreferencesndpower tructures,hich an result rom olitical nd economicchanges, hanges n thenatural nvironment,echnologicalnnovation, opula-tiongrowth, ositive rnegative pillovers rom ther nternationalrnational





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institutions,nd othervariables.Controlling or heeffect fpreferences ndpower tructuresn therelationship etween nstitutionsndgoal attainmentis crucialnot onlyforobtaining alid and reliabledata on institutionalffectbut also because it addresses thewidertheoretical ebate about the role ofinstitutionsn nternational olitics.

The taskwillbe comparativelyasy fwe conduct case studywherepowerstructuresndpreferences emain onstant vertime nd an institutionomesintobeing longthewayorchanges tsfeatures.n this ase,we can arguethatthe nstitutions largely hecause of the variation ngoal attainment e mayobserve.Mitchell,for example, shows that compliancewith international

regulationson intentional il pollutionof the sea increased aftertheseregulationshanged.Earlierregulations adrequired anker perators o imittheir il discharges,whereas the newregulations equiredthe installation fspecificpollutionreduction quipmenton tankers.Mitchell notes that theactors nd types factivitynvolved,he concentrationf costs and benefits fregulations cross actors, and the bindingnature and legitimacy f theagreements emained onstant vertime. Because the newregulationsweremore xpensive or anker perators han heoldregulations,ne wouldexpectlower levels of compliance.The observation hat the opposite occurred s

attributedo the fact that thenewregulations ave increasedtransparency,reducedthe mplementationostsofgovernments,ndchanged he ncentivesofshipping ompanies ndcrewsby nabling etter nforcementf therules.57

In caseswherepreferencesndpower tructureshangeovertime racrosscases, themeasurement f nstitutionalffect illbe moredifficult.owever,we can control or he nfluence fpreferencesnd power tructures ithingame-theoreticramework. his approach suffersromwell-knownroblems,such as identifyingx antepreferences.58o avoidthisproblem,we can inferpreferencesfrom data on environmental ulnerabilitynd the costs of

particularnvironmentalegulations.59ven essthanperfect esults andirectourattention o critical ituations here nstitutionsouldmake a differencerwhere hey relikely o have ittle ffect.

In assurancegames,for xample, wo ormoreequilibria re possible.As aresult, overnments ayencounter reatdifficultiesn tryingo settleon oneequilibrium. ut once an equilibrium s reached,no actorhas an incentive omake a change in behavior. n this case, successful ooperationdoes notrequire nstitutionshat have a largemonitoring nd enforcementapacity.The principal roblem s to achievecooperation, ottosustain t.This mplies

57. Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: IntentionalOil Pollution and TreatyCompliance, nternationalrganization8 (Summer1994),pp. 425-58.

58. See, for xample,James . Altand KennethA. Shepsle, ds.,PerspectivesnPositiveoliticalEconomyCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1990).

59. For an innovativepproach omeasuring x ntepreferences, hich sbased on indicators fenvironmentalulnerabilitynd costs of environmentalegulation,ee DetlefSprinz and TapaiVaahtoranta, The Interest-based xplanationof International nvironmentalolicy, nterna-tionalOrganization8 (Winter 994),pp.77-105.





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that, ven fwe observe correlation etween he existence roperation faninstitutionndgoal attainment,hecausal effectfthe nstitutionslikely o besmall, providedthat the structure f the game has remainedconstant.Themorerecent haseoftheozone casemaybe regarded s an assurancegame.Asit became clear thatan international an on CFCs would be adopted,theprincipalCFC producersbegan to considerthe ban as beneficial ecause itwould createa largemarket ormoreprofitable FC substitutes. ence, theylostany ncentiveocheaton sucha ban.

In prisoners'dilemma games, actors have a strong ncentive o defectclandestinely. nderthesecircumstances,nstitutionshat nstall trategies f

strictreciprocity nd have monitoring nd enforcement rocedureswillfacilitate ooperation.60f, underthese conditions,we observea correlationbetween hanges nthe monitoring,nforcement,rreciprocity echanisms fan institutionnd goal attainment,we have reason to suspect a causalrelationshipetween he nstitutionndgoalattainment.he oilpollution asediscussed bove s suchan example.The technical quipment o be installed ntankers sexpensive. onsequently,hose ctorswhomanageto circumventheregulationsangaina competitivedvantage.

In zero-sum amesand situationsf harmony,nstitutionsrelikely o play

marginal oleor will not be establishednthefirst lace. In zero-sum ames,cooperation chievesno jointgains.A stablecooperative quilibrium efinessituations fharmony: o actorhas an incentive odefect, o matterwhattheother actors do. For example, the Dutch cityof Rotterdam concludedagreementswithvarious chemical firms long the Rhine in Germany ndSwitzerland. he Dutch hailed theensuing mission eductions ythese firmsas a success. But criticshave argued thatthechemicalcompaniesconcernedwere planning o cut theirpollutionanyhow nd that the agreementswithRotterdamwere concludedmerely orpublicrelations urposes.61

Incontrollinghe mpact fpower tructures,ehave to assessthedegreetowhichwe shouldattribute ariation n goal attainment o thewillingness fpowerfultates o deploypositive rnegativencentives o modifyhebehaviorofother ctors na particular irection.cholarshave often xplained ariationof collective utcomes n international rade and finance n these terms.62nenvironmentalolitics,t has beenwidely rguedthat heblanketmoratoriumadoptedby he nternationalWhalingCommissionn1982has achieved tsgoallargely ecause theUnitedStates threatened anctions gainst iolators f themoratorium.63

60. Duncan Snidal, CoordinationVersus Prisoner'sDilemma: Implications or nternationalCooperation ndRegimes, Americanolitical cienceReview 4 (December 1985), pp.923-42.

61. Personal nterview ithWalterJuilich,nternationale rbeitsgemeinschafterWasserwerkeim RheineinzugsgebietInternationalAssociationof Waterworksn the Rhine Basin), Amster-dam,December 1993.

62. Keohane,AfterHegemony.63. Steinar Andresen, Science and Politics n the InternationalManagement of Whales,

Marine olicy 3 April1989), pp.99-117.





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The methodwe use to assess the effect f nstitutionss a secondary ssue. twilldepend argely n the available data. Ifvalid andreliableharddata on goalattainment,nstitutions,nd controlvariablesare available and if we haveenough observations,we can use statistical nalysis.We may,for example,define nstitutionsr theirfeatures s a dummy ariable an institutionr afeature xists rdoes notexist) ndusemultivariatenalysis o assess theeffectof institutionsn goal attainment.n suchan analysis,we control xogenousvariables by includingthem in multipleregressionmodels or time-seriesanalysis. homas Widmer, or xample, ses the Box-Tiao method o examinethe effect f Swiss governmental egulations n sulfurdioxide emissions.64

Christopher enhardt valuates heeffectfthe GeneralAgreement n Tariffsand Trade (GATT) on developing ountry rade, employing more simplestatistical echnique.65 ieter Ruloff nd Gerald Schneider use time-seriesanalysis to assess the effectof various political events on conflict ndcooperation etween hetwo uperpowers.66lenn Stevenson pplies sophisti-cated econometricmethods oexaminewhether wissalpine grazing andsaremore uccessfully anagedundercommonpropertyr underprivate ropertyregimes.67

Analystshave rarely sed statisticalmethods o study heeffect f institu-

tions n international nvironmental olitics.These methods equirea largernumber fobservations, hich imits hecases towhich heymaybe applied.Even Stevenson's nalysis,which ompares 45 grazing reas, quickly roducesinsignificantesults s he increases henumber fcontrol ariables. n theend,he is unable to offer ven simple advice to Swiss farmers n whatform fproperty ightswould be more beneficial o them.68 he number f interna-tional regulations ver timeand acrosscases tendsto be small, ndvalidandreliabledata are oftendifficultofind. t wouldseem, however,hatwe couldapply tatisticalmethodsncases where nvironmentalegulations avea long

history. ased on a qualitative nalysis, argueelsewhere hat he cause of themodestchloridereductions f theRhineriparians incethe late 1980s s thedeclineofpotashand coal mines and ofsoda factories longtheriver, atherthan he nternationalegulation f chloride missions. ime-series nalysis f

64. Thomas Widmer,Evaluation von Massnahmenzur Luftreinhaltepolitikn der Schweiz(Evaluation of clean-airpolicy n Switzerland) Chur, Switzerland:Verlag Riiegger,1991). TheBox-Tiao methodwasproposedbyGeorge E. P. Box andGeorge C. Tiao, Intervention nalysiswithApplications o Economic and Environmental roblems, oumal ftheAmerican tatistical

Association 0 (March1975), pp. 70-79.65. W. Christopher enhardt, International rade and Measuring heGATT Regime Effecton DevelopingCountry rade, paper presented t the annual convention f the InternationalStudiesAssociation,Acapulco, Mexico,23-27 March 1993.

66. DieterRuloff nd Gerald Schneider, Gorby,Grit, rRambo:A Quantitative ppraisaloftheEnd oftheCold War, paper preparedfor heannualconventionf the nternationaltudiesAssociation,Atlanta,Georgia, 1 March-AApril 1992.

67. Glenn G. Stevenson, Common Property conomics:A General Theory nd Land UseApplicationsCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1991).

68. Ibid.





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chlorideemissions data back to 1885 are available) could produce similar,perhaps venmoreprecise, esults.69

For qualitative ssessments f nstitutionalffect, e rely n processtracingor thickdescription. his meansdevelopingdetailed narrative ccountsthatdescribethe causal chains leadingfrom nstitutionso goal attainmentndfocus nparticular n critical ecision-makingoints.Counterfactualnalysis,which s essentially thought xperiment,70nhancescausal claims that aremade in thisregard.Counterfactualnalysis xploreswhatgoal attainmentmight ave ooked ike nthe absence of a given nstitution.

If we can demonstrate, hrough tatistical nalysis r qualitativemethods,

thatpreferences r power tructureshat re independent f an internationalinstitutionause variation n goal attainment,he nstitution as no effect.nthestratosphericzone case,for xample, he nstitutionas no effectfwe canprove that CFC producershave cut their productiononly because theyexpectedhigher rofitsrom hesale ofCFC substituteshanfrom he sale ofCFCs, irrespectivef whathappened nterms f nternationalegulation.Wemight lso argue,however,hattheregulatoryffort,purred ythediscoveryof theozone hole, changedthe ncentives fCFC producers nd caused themto invest nresearch n CFC substitutes. his research ed toCFC substitutes,

whosemarket alue is higher. f there had been no international egulatoryeffort,FC substitutes ould have comeon themarketmuch aterand CFCproductionwouldhave diminished t a lowerrate.71fwe can disconfirmhenullhypothesisn part through uch an argument, e musttry o assess therelativeweight f nstitutionalndnoninstitutionalxplanatoryariables.

The ozone example suggests hatmeasurementsf institutionalffectwillrarely e clear cut and totally eliable,because behavior nd environmentaloutcomesare oftendue to multiple auses and because we cannot controlhistorys we do laboratoryvents. uch measurements illalways ontain n

elementof udgment. ndependent valuations f the same institutionlongthe linesproposedhere and an intensifiedebate about criticaldata amongresearchers ill, herefore,e important. n additional trategyoenhance hereliabilityf institutionalffect cores s to submit hemto policymakersndexperts or ndependent eview.

Ideally,the assessmentof institutionalffectwill produce ordinal-scaledscores ndicatinghedegreeto which nstitutionsffect oal attainment vertimeor acrosscases. The data on goal attainment nd institutionalffect an

69. Thomas Bernauer, International inancing f Environmentalrotection.70. See JamesD. Fearon, CounterfactualsndHypothesis esting nPolitical cience, World

Politics 3 (January 991),pp. 169-95; and David Dessler, BeyondCorrelations: owarda CausalTheory of War, International tudies Quarterly 5 (September 1991), pp. 337-55. For acomprehensivereatment fqualitativemethods, ee GaryKing,Robert0. Keohane,and SidneyVerba, Designing ocial Inquiry: cientificnference n QualitativeResearch (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton niversityress,1994).

71. For an analysis f the ozone case, see Benedick,Ozone Diplomacy; nd Parson, Protectingthe Ozone Layer.





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thenbe used to form score ofinstitutionalffectiveness.he most effectiveinstitutions illbe those where boththe degree of goal attainment nd thedegree of nstitutionalffect re high.The least successfulnstitutions illbethosewheregoal attainmentnd institutionalffect re low. Suchan indexwillbe comparable ver time nd acrosscases. Itmightndicate, or xample, hatthe nstitutionhatoversees ong-rangeransboundaryirpollutionn Europehas,inthe pastfewyears,been moreeffectivehan the nternational halinginstitution as in the 1960s.

Institutionaldesign and theeffectivenessf institutions

The final step in the analysis consistsof examining he implications finstitutionalesignfor nstitutionalffectiveness.n thepreceding ection,wefocused n the extent owhich ariationngoal attainmentanbe explainedbythe existence r operationof institutions. ow we pose questionsabout thedegreetowhichparticular eatures f nstitutionsre responsible or ariationin theperformancef these nstitutions.

As notedearlier, olitical cientists nd othershaveputforth plethora fpropositionss to which ypes f nstitutionsre likely obe moreeffective.o

render meaningful uantitative r qualitative nference bout the conse-quences of institutionalesignpossible,we mustfocuson a smallnumber finstitutional esignvariables.Froma theoretical iewpoint,hisreductionnthenumber fexplanatoryariables houldaim at reducing he number fadhoc propositions nd focus on variableswe can integrate nto a coherenttheoreticalrgument. hisapproachmay eem somewhatessattractiveo thepolicymakerhan o the ocial scientistnterestednsystematicheory uilding.However, fwe cannotdetermine he causal relationshipsorrectly, e cannotoffer ood advice topolicymakers.he methodologyor xamininghe mpact

of nstitutionalesign n institutionalffectivenesss similar othatused in thepreceding tep.Dependingon the availabledata,our assessmentmayrely nstatisticalnalysis ronprocess racing rthick escription.

The focuson institutional esignvariablesthat we derive fromrational-choicetheoryslikely oproducerelativelyoherent xplanations. largebodyof rational-choiceiteraturen political cience and economicsexplainshowindividual hoices are aggregatedntocollective ecisions hrough oting ulesor othermechanismsndhow variables uchas the extent nd distributionfinformationn actor intentions nd behavior nfluence he possibilities f

successfulcooperation.72 ecision rules, membership onditions, nd thecompliance ystem f nstitutionsre amongthemore mportantnstitutional

72. See, for example,Michael Taylor,The Possibilityf CooperationCambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1987);Todd Sandler,Collective ction:TheoryndApplicationsAnn Arbor:TheUniversityfMichiganPress, 1992); Peter C. Ordeshook,Game Theorynd PoliticalTheory: nIntroductionNew York: CambridgeUniversityress, 1986); and Kyddand Snidal, Progress nGame-Theoretical nalysis f nternational egimes.





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designdimensions. hey nfluence heeffectivenessfinstitutionsy shapingthefunctionshat hese nstitutionserform.

We couldhypothesize,or xample, hatmajority oting ules ombinedwithopen membership re likely o make an institutionmoreeffective.Majorityvoting orces tates o revealtheir references. hus, texposes environmentallaggardsmoreclearly. t allowsmoreprogressivetates ndnongovernmentalorganizationsNGOs) to setthe goals and push the aggards orward hroughspecificallyargetedpunishments r rewards.Moreover,even if the moreprogressivetatesmove headwhile verruledtatesdrag heir eet, heoveralloutcome nterms fgoal attainmentmay ften e superior oa lowest ommon

denominatorpproach.We can make such an argument orthe international haling nstitution.Because this nstitutionsopento any tate, dvocates fa totalbanon whalingwere able to bringmanynonwhaling ations nto the InternationalWhalingCommission.Most of the newcomers upporteda total ban. The majorityvotingrule of the commission huspermitted he strengthenedntiwhalingcoalitionto overrule aggardstates such as Japanand Norway nd adopt ablanketmoratoriumn1982 with two-thirds ajority.73hether his hangehas enhanced the effectivenessf the institution equires further tudy.

Anothercase wherevariation n votingrulesmay account for nstitutionaleffectivenesss theEuropean Communitynd its successor, heEU. In thiscase, we could examinewhether hegreaterfrequency f majority ecisionmaking ince theadoptionof theMaastricht reaty as changedtheeffective-ness ofEU environmentalegulations.74he explanatory eight fvoting ulesmightbe smaller, however, f we conduct larger-scale omparativework,becausemost nvironmentalnstitutionsperatewith heconsensus ule.

Another ypothesissthat hose nstitutions hosedesigngenerates higherextent nd intensityf nformationlowsmonitoring)t low cost are likely o

be more effective nder prisoners'dilemma conditions.Monitoring ndreporting roceduresof the InternationalLabor Office, he InternationalMonetaryFund, or the GATT (now the World Trade Organization)areinterestingases where thedesignof thecompliance ystems likely o haveimplications or the effectivenessf the institution.75 itchell's studyonintentional il pollution rguesthatchanges n thedesignof thecompliancesystemncreasedcompliance the samewould seemtohold for ffectiveness)

73. See M. J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists,Environmentalists,nd the InternationalManagement fWhaling ; ndAsgrimsson,DevelopmentsLeadingtothe1982Decision of theInternationalWhalingCommission or Zero CatchQuota 1986-90.

74. For an analysis fEuropeanCommunity/Unionnvironmentalolicy rom n institutional-istperspective, ee PhilippM. Hildebrand, The European Community's nvironmentalolicy,1957-'1992':From ncidentalMeasurestoan International egime, n David Judge, d.,A GreenDimensionor heEuropeanCommunity:olitical ssuesandProcessesLondon: FrankCass, 1993).

75. See, for example, Peter H. Sand, LessonsLeamed in Global Environmentalovemance;ChayesandChayes, On Compliance ;and Dan Kovenock nd MarieThursby,GATT, DisputeSettlement,ndCooperation, conomics ndPolitics (July 992),pp. 151-70.





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because they ncreased ransparencynd reduced thecosts of monitoringndenforcement. he generalizable nstitutional esign lesson involved s thatregulations that give practical ability and legal authority o implementregulations o thoseactorswith hegreatestncentive o comply nd monitorand enforce egulationsre likely obemoreeffective.76

These two xamples ffer ropositions e needtotestfurther,ndthe ist sfarfrom omplete.Additionalpropositions orth nalysismight elate to thenature f nternationalecretariats,heorganization fscientificnput, rthescope of the institutionalgenda.77 tudents of domestic nstitutions avecarriedout the most ystematicesearch n theconsequencesof institutional

designfor hemanagementfnatural esources nd environmentalrotection.Manyofthepropositionshatthisresearchhas generated-forexample, hatinstitutional ffectivenessncreaseswiththe congruenceof rules and localconditions,heaccess to low-cost onflict esolutionmechanisms,r thecleardefinition f property ights-appear compatiblewith rational-choice rgu-ment. Keohane, McGinnis,and Ostrom have exploredhow some of thesepropositions ould be translated o the international evel.78 ut so farnoanalystshave undertaken systematic mpirical ssessment.Hence themostinterestingnd potentially ewarding esearchon the effect f international

environmentalnstitutionsiesinthe future.

Conclusion

We have made substantial rogress n understandinghe conditionsunderwhich states are able to establish nternational nstitutions o protecttheenvironment.We havebeen less successfuln explaining heperformancefthese nstitutionsnce theyhave been established.Many analysts f interna-tionalpoliticsbelieve thatthe existence r operationof internationalnstitu-tions, ndgood institutionalesign nparticular,an contribute oprogressnenvironmental rotection.Others contend that, as long as there is noenvironmentaleviathan, he distribution f power and the interests f keyactors account for collective utcomes n international elations. ystematicempirical esearch nto the effect f international nvironmentalnstitutionscontributes o international elations heory yassessingthe twocompetingclaims. It mayalso generate practicaladvice to policymakersy evaluatingwhetherdecisionmakers,NGOs, or other actors should preferably ry o

manipulate ower tructuresndpreferenceso achieve heir oals,or whetherthey an also facilitate nvironmentalrotection y mprovinghedesignofinternationalnstitutionsnd, f o,how.

76. Mitchell, Regime DesignMatters.77. A preliminaryiscussion f such designdimensions an be found n Wettestad,nstitutional

Design nd the ffectivenessf ntemational nvironmentalegimes.78. Keohane, McGinnis, nd Ostrom, roceedingsf a Conferencen Linking ocal and Global

Commons.





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Current esearchon the effect f international nvironmentalnstitutionssuffers rom wo deficiencies. ependent variables institutionalffect, ffec-tiveness, fficiency,tc.) and explanatory ariables (institutionsnd theirfeatures) re ill-defined,ontested, nd rarelymarried o a coherent heory.Second, analystshave focused on whetherthe existence or operationofinstitutionser se has an effectn actorbehavior nd other utcomes.Virtuallyno work has offered eneralizable nd empirically ubstantiated nowledgeregardingwhich nstitutional esign variables are critical o the success orfailure f nstitutionsnder pecific onditions.

This articlehas outlined positive esearch trategyhatmay erve s a basis

formore ystematicndpolicy-relevantesearch n the effect f nternationalenvironmentalnstitutions.he proposedresearch trategyonsists f threesteps. First,we measure the outcomes to be explained in terms of goalattainment,efined s the differenceetween ctorbehavior rthestateofthenaturalenvironmentn dimensionsdefinedby institutional oals and endpointsdefinedby institutional oals. Second, we assess the effect f aninstitutionn terms f the extent owhich he nstitution as, ceterisparibus,contributedo variation ngoal attainment.We transformhesetwovariablesinto a score of institutionalffectiveness.hird,we analyze therelationship

between nstitutionalffectivenessndparticularnstitutionalesign ariables,for xampledecisionrules,membership onditions,r thecompliance ystem.Thisresearch trategys rather emanding, nd we mayhave to modify arts

of it as empiricalresearch continues.Moreover, I have conceptualizedexplanatorynd dependent ariables uite narrowlyokeep the taskmanage-able. Thisapproachmay vokecriticism romnalystswho have one foot nthepolicyworld.Unfortunately,owever,we cannot offergood policyadvicebeforewe clearlyunderstand he causal relationships etween nstitutionaldesign ptions ndtheperformancef nstitutions.o far,wehave notreached

thispoint.The proposedresearch trategy rovides starting ointformorerigorous

and comparable ase studies.These case studies re required o sharpen heresearchdesign ndgeneratenewhypotheses. he strategyan also serve s astarting ointfor arger-scaleomparative esearch. uch research s ndispens-able to arriveat generalizablepropositions bout necessaryor sufficientconditions for the effectiveness f international nstitutions. he UnitedNations Conferenceon Environment nd Development in 1992 and thescholarly ctivityt has spurredhave generated arge amounts of data on

internationalnvironmentalnstitutions,he associated behaviorof govern-ments nd other actors, nd changes n the natural nvironment. nd moredata are yetto come,not leastfrom heexpanding ctivities f internationalorganizationsnd NGOs. Ifwe canshapeouranalytical oncepts, ropositions,and research trategies roperly, e could make an importantontributionointernational elations heory nd also facilitate heprotection f theearth'senvironment.

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