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1
Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
GENERAL FRAMEWORK • The Colombian conflict can be roughly characterized as a three-sided one involving
left-wing guerrillas, government forces and illegal right-wing paramilitaries.
• There has been a rough equilibrium over the years; paramilitary activity has been high
during periods when the government has done a poor job of containing the guerrillas
and vice versa.
• Existence of the paramilitaries reflects a failure of the state to contain the guerrillas,
although the paramilitaries now have a life of there own and will continue to exist with
or without the guerrillas.
MAIN ILLEGAL GROUPS
GUERRILLAS – FARC AND ELN • Check point/road block actions (without robbery), infrastructure attacks and attacks
on means of transport account for roughly half of all guerrilla events in our dataset.
• Then come bombings, incursions, ambushes, mine explosions and massacres
(kidnappings are not included in our data at present but are a big activity)
BRIEFING ON THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT
By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
Portfolio of attacks by guerrilla groups
Massacre2% Incursion
8%
Check point20%
Mass kidnapping1%
Infrastructure15%
Means of transport12%
Bombing9%
Ambush8%
Mine explosion3%
Other22%
• The ELN stresses infrastructure attacks more and bombings less than the FARC.
• Are the Guerrillas narco-terrorists? Yes, but the term is too narrow. The guerrillas do
lots of things (e.g., infrastructure attacks) not normally associated with terrorism and
lots of things inconsistent with a desire for a quiet life dealing drugs.
Guerrillas – FARC and ELN
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• The ultimate goal of the guerrillas is to take power, not to get rich off drug-dealing. A
more medium-term and realistic goal is to maintain and extend local power.
• Guerrilla revenue comes not just from drugs but also from kidnapping, extortion and
theft, notably of land and cattle.
• The guerrillas cause most injuries to civilians, these coming mostly in bombings.
Distribution of injured civilians in attacks by identified group attacking
78%
11%
11%
Injured civilians by guerrilla groups Injured civilians by paramilitary groups Injured civilians by government
Guerrillas – FARC and ELN
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
Mass kidnapping5% Check point and/or road
blockage9%
Incursion16%
Massacre70%
PARAMILITARIES
• Basic strategy has been to massacre civilians they suspect of helping the guerrillas.
Portfolio of attacks by paramilitaries
Paramilitaries
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres Paramilitary massacres
• Cause most killings of civilians, mostly through massacres.
Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres 1988-2004
Paramilitaries
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• The paramilitary Killing/Injury ratio is on the order of 10, compared to roughly 2 for the
guerrillas and 1 for the government. This is because they mostly kill people by shooting
them at short range in massacres.
Ratio of killings to injuries in attacks by group attacking 1988-2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
K/I by guerrillas K/I by paramilitaries K/I by government forces
Paramilitaries
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• Generally perform very badly in clashes with other armed groups, getting killed much
more than the opposing guerrillas and government forces.
Killings by group in (clashes with paramilitary participation)
paramilitary clashes 1988-2004
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Guerrillas killed Paramilitaries killed Government forces killed
Paramilitaries
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• Very high levels of Government-Guerrilla clashes
Government guerrilla clashes 1988-2004
MAIN TRENDS UNDER URIBE
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Uribe's government
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
1.800
2.000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
Guerrillas killed Government forces killed Ratio Gue/Gov
Uribe's government
• Higher ratios of guerrillas killed to members of government forces killed
Number of government forces and guerrilla s killed 1988-2004
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• Government forces have increased both their initiative and responsiveness against
the guerrillas.
• Heavy activity in the so called ¨Operación JM¨zone in the deep south of the country;
but not just there, activity remains all over the place.
0
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Combatants killed Civilians killed
Uribe's government
• Many combatants killed, fewer civilians killed.
Combatants and civilians killed 1988-2004
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
Map 1: Clashes between government forces and
guerrillas in 2004
• Notable problem areas are Southeastern
Antioquia and near the Venezuelan border
with the Ecuadorian border emerging as
an issue.
Main Trends under Uribe
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
Map 2: Attacks
Main Trends under Uribe
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• Government-Paramilitary clashes rose from almost nothing to something, but then
disappeared.
• Fewer guerrilla attacks (one-sided events) although these have started to come back.
Number of guerrilla attacks
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Uribe's government
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ELN clashes ELN attacks
Uribe's government
• ELN is disappearing as an attacking force.
Number of ELN clashes and attacks
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• Fewer paramilitary attacks (one-sided events)
Number of paramilitary attacks
0
50
100
150
200
250
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Uribe's government
• Since 2002 the paramilitaries have been on an official ceasefire. They have violated it
frequently but have, nevertheless reduced their activity, focusing less on the guerrillas
and more on land-grabbing, drug dealing and political infiltration
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• The paramilitaries are killing fewer civilians than before but the numbers are growing.
• Civilian killings are overwhelmingly in isolated rural areas, mainly from paramilitary
massacres.
Population density and civilians killed in paramilitary massacres
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0-50
100-
150
200-
250
300-
350
400-
450
500-
550
650-
700
800-
850
900-
950
1050
-110
0
1650
-170
0
2350
-240
0
2750
-280
0
4100
-415
0
4500
-455
0
5650
-570
0
1610
0-16
150
People per square kilometre
Cu
mm
ula
tive
par
tici
pat
ion
Population2005 KCivMasPar
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0-50
50-1
00
100-
150
150-
200
200-
250
250-
300
300-
350
350-
400
400-
450
450-
500
500-
550
550-
600
650-
700
750-
800
800-
850
850-
900
900-
950
1000
-105
0
1050
-110
0
1100
-115
0
1650
-170
0
1700
-175
0
2350
-240
0
2650
-270
0
2750
-280
0
3650
-370
0
4100
-415
0
4350
-440
0
4500
-455
0
5600
-565
0
5650
-570
0
9350
-940
0
1610
0-16
150
People per square kilometre
Cu
mm
ula
tive
par
tici
pat
ion
Population2005 KCivMasGue
Population density and civilians killed in guerrilla massacres
Main Trends under Uribe
• Civilian injury rates remain very high due to a sustained guerrilla bombing campaign.
• Civilian injuries tend to concentrate in biggest cities and the most isolated rural areas
but these effects are not as pronounced as for massacres.
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
Population density and civilians injured in guerrilla bombings
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0-50
100-
150
200-
250
300-
350
400-
450
500-
550
650-
700
800-
850
900-
950
1050
-110
0
1650
-170
0
2350
-240
0
2750
-280
0
4100
-415
0
4500
-455
0
5650
-570
0
1610
0-16
150
People per square kilometre
Cu
mm
ula
tive
par
tici
pat
ion
Population2005 ICivBomGue
• 2004 was not as good as 2003 and indications are that 2005 will show further
backsliding.
Main Trends under Uribe
Source: CERAC
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• The government has made serious mistakes in the political side of counterinsurgency.
• It has not made a good case internationally, e.g., its bewildering campaign to deny that
Colombia has a conflict.
• There is weak international support for paramilitary demobilization, in part due to failure
of the government to build a wide coalition for its Peace and Justice Bill.
• Resources, including time but also money, are lacking for investigation of paramilitary
crimes. The government is doing a poor job of doing forensic tests on guns and
pairing them with demobilizing combatants.
• More importantly, resources are scarce for reparations. Building a good victims registry
is the key to this process but it will be expensive to get this right. The international
community should focus more on reparations for victims and less on punishments for
perpetrators.
• The UN needs to be brought into the demobilization process. Right now the OAS is
carrying this load almost by itself with little support and lots of criticism just for
monitoring the process.
• Potential security vacuum as paramilitaries demobilize. The government is addressing
this problem with a new division and 5,000 additional police but this is unlikely to be
enough.
BIGGER PICTURE
Bigger Picture
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
• No sign that the guerrillas are really on a trajectory of defeat at this stage.
• Uribe remains remarkably popular but this has translated into only modest additional
financing for the conflict.
• Neighboring states, primarily Venezuela and Equator, must be pressured to cooperate.
These countries clearly have understandings, implicit or explicit, that illegal groups
can go there as long as they threaten only Colombian interests. Venezuela is just
now setting up a production line that will be able to produce ammunition usable by the
FARC for weapons they have been struggling to feed.
• There needs to be a broader, more integrated program of taking away territory, hol-
ding it and building institutions, including police, judges and prosecutors. There does
seem to be some desire to do this but the resources are lacking.
• In this context training for special forces, military, police, judges, prosecutors and
emergency medicine is very valuable.
• Controlling land is the most promising approach to cutting the supply of drugs in
the long run. It is vital for Colombia to do a comprehensive land survey. There is
too much ungoverned space for spraying to really work as the primary tactic in the
drug war.
Bigger Picture
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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC
1988-2004 1998-2004
Ratio of killings in events with paramilitary participation to total number of killings 0,26 0,36Ratio of injuries in events with guerrilla participation to total number of injuries 0,82 0,79Ratio of killings to injuries in paramilitary attacks 11,23 11,21Ratio of killings to injuries in guerrilla attacks 0,96 0,92Ratio of killings to injuries in government attacks 2,64 2,43Civilian killngs 12771 7766
• Continued US funding seems assured but with an unfortunate single-minded focus on
spraying.
Some Ratios for the Colombian Conflict 1988-2004
Professor Michael Spagat is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of CERAC and Research Associate.
He is a professor of Economics at Royal Holloway-University of London and has an extensiverecord of research in political economy of conflicts, dictatorships and repressive regimes. He hasalso done research in comparative and monetary economics.
Professor Spagat holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University and is a member of the CEPRand the William Davidson Institute.
e-mail: [email protected] website: www.cerac.org.co
Bigger Picture
Source: CERAC