caesar 07 - the balance of power

8/4/2019 Caesar 07 - The Balance of Power

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CAESAR - 7APPROVED FOR RELEASDATE: JU N 2007

-- JTHE BALANCE OF POWERAugubt 1948AoOctober 1950

H R 7 0-14(U )

Office of Current IntelligenceCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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Ksganovlch remained respons ible f o r building materlals,and also was Chief of the Sta te Caarmittee for Material-Technical Supply (Gossnab).for the phnning and allocation of' material for the Sovieteconomy.industries, and presunlsbly a ls o retai ned responsi bilty forinternal and foreign trade.matters i n February 1950.On the second level of the Poli tbur o, however, a number of

This committee was responsible

Mikayan w a s In charge of the f ish, meat, dairy am foodHe was iden t i f ied in foreign trade

changes took place i n the di str ibu tio n of power:Andreev retained hi s int ere st i n agriculture and hi s

post as Chairman of the Council f o r Collective Farm Affairs,but was publicly rebuked in a Pravda a r t i c l e of 19 February1950 f o r pursuing an in correct li ne an agricultural LaborqUes t i 0 ~ ~ .

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Voznesensky disappeared in'March 1949, and was replacedas Chsinnan of Gosplan by M. Z. Saburov, a reported Malenkovadherent.Khrushchev was transferred f r c w the Ukrainian Partyorganization t o replace G. M. Popov as All-Union Secretaryand as Secretary of' the important Moscow Oblast Committee.Khrushchev also became the Politburo spokesman on agricul-t u ra l policy , following Andreev's humiliation.Bulganin and Kosygln both apparently retained theirresponsib i l i t ies for national defense and light industryrespectively; Suslov, not a Pol it bu ro member, became theleading Soviet functionary who most &ten represented theUSSR a t Sate l l i t e po li ti ca l ceremonies. Other newcomerst o Sub-Politburo level were Ponomsrenko and Shklryatov .

Aside from the p ol it ic al events mentioned i n the aboveparagraphs, the chief events and developmdx of the period underreview were the following:

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1. The adoption by the USSR, sametime i n late 1948, ofa rearmaments program.f o r completion by 1952.

This program was apparen tly, scheduled

2. The withdrawal of the USSR from i t s exposed p os iti oni n Europe, i.e., the liquidation of the Berlin blockadeand the Greek C i v i l War.- 2 -


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3. The i nte rn al consolidation of th e E a s t EuropeanSatel l i tes , and the ini t ia t ion of programs ca lcu late d t ointe gra te th ei r economies with tha t of the USSR.

4. The triumph of the Chinese Communists on the main-land, and t h e proclamation of the Peoples Republic ofchinaIn October 1949.5. The attack on South Korea by the North Korean Gov-ernment on 25 June 1950, the subsequent Intervention of theUN, and the commitment of the Chinese Communist armies i nOctober 1950.

MAUZKOV'S RISEThe clearest indicat ion of Malenkov's r i s e t o prominence isfound in the cgf i c i a l l i s t i ngs of the Politburo members publishedfrom time t o t i m e .

* occupied a posi t ion in the Pol i tburo ,varying from f i f t h t o ninth .In late 1948, however, he-moved t o the number four posltion, fol-lowing Molotov (number two) and Beria (number three).then changed places w i t h Beria In ea r ly 1949, but shortly there-after dropped again t o number four position.t h i r d posi t ion In mid-1949 ana held It unt i l t he time of Stalln'sdeath.

Pr ior t o Zhdanov's death, Malenkov had usudly

MalenkovHe moved back t o

During t h i s period, Malenkov's name again began t o appear 1 J

. .on, joint decrees issued by the Government and the Central Com-m i t t e e were signed by Stal in for the Council of Ministers, and byMalenkov f o r the Central Colmnittee of the Party.

On 7 November 1949, Malenkov delivered the speech on th e an-niversary of the Revolution, which i n previous yea rs had beengiven by Molotov.wri t ten by the var iou s Po li tb ur o members on the occasion ofStalln'e seven tieth -birthday, Malenkov's a r ti c l e preceded a l lotx ers , Including even Molotovls, i n both the Pravda and Bolshe--ik versions.

In December 1949, In a ser ies of a r t i c l e s

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The same trend was also ev ident i n th e prupagand treatmentnccorded Malenkov.i n January 1952, for example, a propaganda stateaaent was madethat Malenkov had been "a f a i th fu l pup il of Leniq" an outrightfabrication, of course. All th i s culminated in t he selection 09Malenkov as the person t o give the keynote speech on behalf ofthe Central Committee a t the long overdue Nineteenth Party Congressi n October 1952,COMMUNIST PARTY CHANCES OF 1949

On the occasion ad: Malenkov's 50th bi rt hd ay

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Molotov's failure t o delive r the annual 7 Bovember anniversaryspeech in 1949 may be one indication tha t he had l o s t some degree ofinfluence. A t the end of th e war, Molotov took over from Sta l in thehonor of del ive rin g t h i s speech; he gave it in 1945, 1947 and 1948.gThereafter the honor was ro ted among younger Politburo members ,Malenkov givlng it in 1949.a It is quite possible of course, t h a tMolotov -- aging and,. ill - - m e nolonger capable of ha i n g t h i s speech,a mepertheless, his with-drawal from public prominence was evident and was commented upon bya number of sources, including Russian defectors.

However, in sp i t e af having relinquished direct control of For-eign Affairs, Molotov remained as First Deputy Chairman t o Stalin onthe Council of Ministers. Furthermore, he also appeared t o have suf-fered no change in formal pol i t ica l s tatue , s ince he was l i s t e d f i r s tafter Stalin in a l l Pol itburo l i s t in gs up u n t i l Stalin's death. Apossible explanation of t h i s is suggested by speculation current in1949 t o the e f f ec t that Molotov was being relieved of the day-to-aayadministration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he couldconcentrate on broad policy-planning functions -- in part icular , re-lat ions with the Chinese Communists, who a t tha t t i m e w e r e beginningt o show signs tha t they wos3.a take over the mslnland that year.

This S p e C U h 3 t i O U is supported 'by information put out t h r o w aninformal Soviet channel.been former Soviet AmbaSWdOr in Stockholm and who had occasioaa~~ybeen used by the S oviet Government t o co nta ct f or eign embassies,called in the Swedish Ambaessdor in an obvlous e f f o r t t o cormaent onthe various governmental changes that had taken place the month be-fare. Among ot her th in gs , she said that Molotov had been relievedof responsibil i ty for day-to-day problems in order t o concentrate on

In April 1949, Madame Kollontai, who had

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zhdanov delivered the speech in 1946.

2/ A t the 7 November 1949 parade, Molotov was present on th e review-ing stand, but departed same two-and-a-half hours before the d e m -onstrations we& over. Malenkov stood next t o Molotov, bu t, ac -cording t o the US Military Attache, noticeably shunned and turnedhis back on him.reported that Molotov has heart, stomach and liverdL7ou e, and that he was ill in 1948 and 1949. He fa i led t o ap-pear with the Politburo on two occasions in mid-1949.quently has been reported res tin g a t hr lo vy Vary, in Czechoslo-vakia. He fre-

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I I"e ss en ti al and fundamental problems," i n pa rt ic ul ar relations withC a m m u n i s t China. She added t ha t both Molotov and Mikoyan were qui tebusy in connection with the forthcoming Party Congress (which, itmay be noted, did not take place until October 1952).

Furthermore, Molotov was identif ied in matters related t o for-eign policy after h i s release from the M i n i s t r y of Foreign-Affairs.Even though no longer Foreign Minister af the USSR, he attended aconference of Foreign Ministers of the East European Satellites,held in Prague in la te October 1950. The same "VIPr i ed the Soviet delegation t o Prague @d earlier been.notedjZn the;.Soviet Far' Eas t (in the period fram 2 o 9 October)Molotov may have been in the.Far.+Easta t t h a t ti&&"

th& :ar-psWesting'3that ,?

TEE VOZI'?ESENSKY CASEThe problem of explaining Voznesensky's disappearance i n 1949has been ccmpllcated further by the appearance of h i s name i n Decem-ber 1952 and i n January-February 1953 i n connection with the BO-ca ll ed "Voznesenskg deviat ion," L e . ,' is alleged deviation fromStalin's views on Mamism$nd the economic laws of socialism. Vozne-sensky, as we have already bad occasion t o note, f i r s t achieved prom-inence as Chairman of the City Planning Commission i n Leningrad i n1935. Subsequently, he went t o Moscow t o heaa t he State PlanniugCommission and during the war he served on the State Defeqse Commit-tee, the all-powerful "war cabinet". He was not o m of the or iginalmembers of the committee, having joined it on 4 February 1943. I nMarch 1949, he disappeared f r o a r eight and his name was not mentioned

in the Saviet press unt i l th e December 1952 a t tack on h i s views byM. A. Suslov in Pravda.-hree p rin ci pa l hypotheses have been advanced t o expl ain Vozn e-Sensky'S political demise. The f i r s t hypothesis i s tha t Voznesenskywas sssoc la ted with the so ka ll ed Zhdanov cli que in MOSCOW, t n oppo-s i t i o p t o Malenkav, and that following Zhdanavls dea th i n 1948 ana h i sapparent diegrace, Voznesemky was purged. The second hypothesis i sthat Voznesensw had made many m i t r t a k e s i n Gosplan and, according tosome 8ource8, had badly advised St a l in and the other leaders i n re-gard t o the Soviet economic situation and capabilities.hypotheeis is that Voznesenslry opposed St a l i n either on Ideologicalquestions regarding th e nature of the economic problems and the l a w s.._.. The t h i r dI

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and policies of a Social ist s t a t e or on practica l policy matters af-fecting the Soviet economy and the planning function.The f i r s t hypothesis, that Voznesenelry was associated with the*Zhdanov group, i s supported by the circumstancial evidence of Vozne-sensky's career -- and particularly by the f ac t tha t h i s disappear-ance was concurrent with a ser ies of other important politiEa1 shiftsof ea r ly 1949, which i n turn cle arly Indicated the uns eatipowerful political group. D u r i r g the war,t h a t Voznesensky was a supporter of Malenk

that he switched sides when Zhdanov re turned t o Moscow and took OVer1Sp ec ia l Committee i n Moacw headed by Malenkov.Voznesenslgr as Chairman of Gosplan i n March 1949 and held th i s posi-t ion un t i l Sta l in ' s death.wi th Gosplan, moving i n and aut of it, as a Deputy ChaiIman, se ve ra ltimss. Not a l l aspects of Saburov's history are clear and it i s im -possible t o say j u s t w h a t & is rela;tiona with Voznesensky were. A tthe most, hi s history tends t o support t h i s f i r s t hypothesis.

Saburov replacedFor many years he had been associated

&dame Kollontai, i n her talk with the Swedish Ambassador, sa id. that Voznesenslry had been r e m o v e d because he was "no executive andGosplan had =de many mistakes under .his administration." A Sovietengineer who defected from the USSR i n 1949, reported hearing that- 10 -

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Voznesensky had been removed because he had atteiupte t o deceiveS ta li n regarding the degree of the fu lfil lme nt of the Five Year Plan.Fina l ly , in la te 1948 and early 1949, aus t preceding Voznesenslgr'sdisappearance, S ov ie t propaganda media embarked on a very short-l ivedcampaign for the fulfillment of th e Five Year Plan i n four years.The "five year plan i n four years" theme was f i r s t voiced by Molotovi n t he 7 November 1948 anniver sary speech, This was followed by in-tensive propaganda on t h i s theme through November, December and upunt i l the publ icat ion d a Gosplan re po rt i n mid-January 1949. Inth e 21 January 1949 speech on the anniversary of LeniD's death, how-ever, the theme was not mentioned and, while t h e r e were occaeionalreferences t o it i n subsequent months, f o r a l l practical purposes ithad disappeared from Soviet propaganda.ganda i n mid-January, taken with the above-mentioned in di ca tio ns oforg ani zat ion al and economic readjustment i n 1948, tends t o supportth e hypothesis that there had been serious mistakes In planning; andperhaps a seriously distorted picture of the state of the economy a tthe top leve l of the Government.

The cessation of th is propa-

The th ird hypothesis -- that Voznesensky was disgraced becausehe opposed Sta lin e ith er on th eor etic al questions o r on prac t i ca lpolicy declslons -- was giyen a grea t dea l of a dd itio nal weight bythe December 1952 disclosures, which have al re ad y been noted, Oneversion of t h i s hypothesis i s that Voznesensky opposed the inaugura-t i o n of a lim ite d rearmament program by the USSR i n the latter hlfof 1948 and instead favored th e further development of consumer goodsindustries.f i r s t devoted t o i t s the ore tica l and ideological aspects, and thesecond t o the pr ac tic al policy problem.This hypothesis w i l l be discuss ed i n two parts, the

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The so-called "Voznesensky deviation" i s drawn from h is book,The War Economy of the USSR during the Great Pa tr io ti c War, whichwas published i n 1947 and which ;received a Sta l i n p ri ze i n May 1948.Ac cm in g t o th is book, planning i s an economic l a w of socialism andone of the chief charac te r i s ti cs di f fe ren t ia t ing the soc ia l i s t fromthe c ap i t a l i s t system. Capitalism, i n Canmunist dogma, is unable t oplan-and i s charac rized by a veritable anarchy of competing monop-o l i s t i c i n t e r e s t s . 3 In a sense, th e ass erti on t h a t planning i s an"economic l a w " of socialism i s a n a t u ra l one f o r economic pla nnerst o hold; Voznesenslry appears t o have been th e chief exponent of t h i spoint of e e w . A series of a r t i c l e s by me mbe r s of Gosplan, published

J / The que stion whether or not it is possible for a c a p i t a l i s t gov-ernment t o plan had been one of the major issues i n the Vargadispute.- 11 -


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minimizing the so-call ed "object ive" fa ct or s i n th e development ofthe Soviet economy.had became &ster of h i s fate and t h a t t h i s was the greatest achieve-ment of the revolution and social ism.^ The l i nes of thought whichsupposedly represent the Vozneseasb dev iatio n continued t o appxrin Soviet theoretical journals and in various propaganda a r t i c le sthrough 1951 and into 1952. AS late a8 issue Bo. 4 of Vopmsi Eko-nomiki (April 1952) the "erroneous11 do ct rine i s expoun.3.ed.

It is extremely dif'f'icult t o beli eve that if Voznesenslry hadbeen removed f o r theor eti cal , ideo logic al deviation i n 1949, a direc-tive would not haveof which Voznesenee was accused wa8 saneth ing manufactured i n 1952,or late 1951, rather than in 1949 or 1 9 . This itself is a f a c t cd?considerable si gnificanc e and th e problem w i l l be taken up subse-quent y.

The ed i t or i a l went on t o s ay tha t S a t man

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n issued a t that t i m e which would have pro-scri bed these views.3 n ather words, it appears that the deviation

There i s very l i t t l e evidence t o either support refu te th ehypothesis that Voznesenslcy opposed StSlin or others on questions ofpr ac ti ca l policy regarding the Sovietieconany and, in p artic ular, re-garding rearmament. It is,pf?rhaps unreasonable t o suppose that Voz-nesensky would have opposed the necessi ty for rearmament.no reason t o believe that he w a u l a ham arrogated t o himself' theproblem 09 evaluating the intentions of foreign governments, in par-ticular of the US. Rearmament began i n 1948, probably nine monthsbefore Voznesensky disappeared; it is possible that he became in-volved i n controversy regarding th e manner fa which t h i s programshould be carri ed out.book an heretical point of v i e w on agriculture (e.&, praise of t h ewar-time system), but there is no evidence that Voznesensky was in -volved in such a controversy.

There i s

It is als o possib le t o read in t o h is

The a gri cul tur e controversy did not

Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A P o l i t i c a l Economy ip th e %king",J. Miller. -The decree of Ju ly 1949 reproving Bolshevik and Agitprop does notmeet this test . In th is decree, prai se of Voznesensky's book wasonly one of the many "shortcomings" crit ized; the reason givenwas that t h i s p r a i se was unjustified. The book itself was not de-nounced. Suslov's a rt i c le i n December 1952, on the other hand,describ ed Voznesensky ' 6 views as 'Iun-hrxist", while discussionsi n January 1953 sa id that they w e r e "anti-Marxist".evolution of a "deviation". Thus, the

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the end of 1951 or early 1952.r ~ i g n t e r nits completely reequipped r l t h Je t a irc raf t by 1951.An independent 80urce commenting 011 Soviet mi li ta ry developments re-ported that he had heard important Russians speaking qui te openly i n1948 of the prospects of another war and that the USSR was t o be com-pletely prepared by the end of 1951. A t h i rd

b p o r t e d tne nussians intended t o have

reporting on a conference which Stalin ma II ld with Satel-LZ laders in September 1948 a t Sochi, said t h a t one of the chiefpurposes of the conference was t o plan f or the consolidation and in-tegrat ion of t he S a t e l l i t e economies with the Soviet econmy. Inaddition he reported that S t a l i n had assigned Czechoslovakia thetask of completely transforming i t s economy to heavy industry i n or-der t o contr ibute t o the mili tary potential & the USSR, and tha tt h i s program was t o be completed i n three and a half years. Thiswould place th e t a rge t date i n the spring of 1952, This suppositionon the target date of the program is supportkd by th e completion 09a number of projects and by the appearance of su bs ta nti al amounts ofnew model equipment i n 1951 and 1952.

There are a f e w other indicationp suggesting that , i n 1948,Soviet leaders became more concerned mr the poss ib i l i ty of wa rw i t h the West,stay-behind network i n Germany. in the event that the Soviet Armyvacated Germany,I n Octobes 1948 orders w e r e given t o develop a

aiOninister ialf Minl6 tnecb"Sz;= ?&& -i n securi ty administration. This decree reportedly charged securityof f icers w i t h professional l axi ty and lack of discipline, and calledfo r "reconstruction" of Sta t e Security operations "a*d a t the im-perial ist2c intelligence. It According t o t hs report, a l l foreignersi n t he USSR were t o be placed under clos e observation. \ I

On the other hand, available evidence does not indicate thatthe rearmament program was so great tha t a l l other aspects of eco-nomic development w e r e subordinated t o it. The lnajor emphasis ofthe Soviet econmy remained on heavy industrial development, whichwas long-range i n natu re. Thus the poss ib i l i ty ex is ts that the re-armament program was l i t t l e more than me f o r re-equipment of t heSoviet armed forces with modern weapons. Bulganin, speaking on thet h i r t i e t h anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1948, said that- 15 -


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th e a m y had completed i t s conversion t o a peace-time basis, and wasbeginning to r e e q u i p i t s e l f w l t h the la tes t weapons.A t any rate, while the exact character and scope of the Sovietre am m en t ef fo rt remains an unsolved problem, the re is no reason topresume that it was a bighly cmt ro-er sial issue xi th in the Kremlin.

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5 GRICULTURAL CONTROVERSYA f t e r Voznesenslsy's ouster, the only str iki ng manifestation ofpossible dissension within the Politburo was the criticism leviedagainst A. A. Andreev, on agr icu l tura l matters, by-ravda on 19 Feb-

ruary 1950. It may be recalled t U t Andreev, Commissar for Agricul-ture during the war, was made Chairman of the Council for CollectiveFarm Affairs i n October 1946. He apparently remained t he Poli tburospokestpan on agr icu l tura l matters, even after Malenkovls entry intoag ri cu ltu ra l problems i n 1947.

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The Pravda ar t i c l e , en tit le d "Against Distortion s i n CollectiveFarm Labor Organization," was an at tack on the so-called "l ink" or" t e a m " system of collectivq farming, as opposed t o the "brigade" sys-tem. The practice denounced was t h a t of parcelling out pa r t s of acollect ive farm t o small teams, or sub-groups, of collect ive farmers.The team system had been endorsed by the Party since a t l e a s t 1939,and had been.reaffirmed i n decrees of 1947 and 1948. The Pram ar-title took exception t o the indiscriminate application of t h i s sys-t e m t o grain farming ana t o areas where the Kolkhozes were suppliedw i t h adequate agriculturs lmachinery . It was argued that the systempreclu$ed the effective utilization of' ag ri cu lt Ga 1 machinery andmade overall control of the farmers impossible.in t h i s matter by C o m r a a e A. A. Andreev cannot be overlooked." .Itthen proceeded t o document th e h is to ry of Andreev's incfrom 1939 t o 1949. The author of t h a a r t i c l e is unknownT

I -The ar t i c l e went on t o say that "the Incorrect views expressed

c t d e w sFollowing th e attack oq Andreev and h i s subsequent reca ntat ion,which appeared i n Pravda on 25 February 1950, a movement was begunby N. S. Khrushchev, as Chairman of the Moscar Oblast Par ty C o m m i t t e e ,t o enlarge th e collect ive farms i n the Moscow Ob,Last by mrging or-

Sty l i s t i c cha rac ter i s ti c s of the ar t i c l e ten ta t ive ly suggestauthorship by Khrushchev.

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: amalgams th e small farms. Khrushchev outl ine d t h i s new pol icyi n Pravda on 25 Apr il 1950. 'Although some observers suggested thatt h i s -6 an experimental pragram ap pli ed only i n Moscow Oblast,Khrushchev revealed i n a December 1950 speech that a Central C a a r m i t -te e decree on kolkhoz amalgamation bad been issued, and iapl ied tha t-

ica ted tha t the programnted throughout t h e USSR.

The open censure of A, A. Andreev f o r hi s "incorrect" policyprobably represented more t h a n an ef for t t o provide a scapegoat fora change in policy:qui te rare, and there are numerous cases of dramatic reversals i nSoviet policy with no effort made t o provide a scapegoat; suchchanges are frequently justified on th e grounds that "nev condttfons"req uir e the change, while i n many cases there w i l l be complete denialthat any change has been effected a t all,

eucb public censures of Politburo figures are

Andreev's humilla tion would appear, therefore , t o refle ct funda-mental political controversy, and presumably it slgnslized th e tempo-rary triumph of one po li ti ca l Ra ct io nw er an opposing me. Thus,after Andreev's censure, Muvshchev became th e top -l ev i1 spoksrtranfor agriculture, even though A h e v emained Chairman of the, Councilfor Collective Farms Affairs,9The fur ther development of the agricultural controversy takesus beyond 1950.Report covering the period from October 1950 t o December 1952.The problem w i l l be considered fur the r In th e CAESAR

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND TEE KO= WAR' A di st in ct change in Soviet forei gn polic y took place i n 1949,

This s h i f t coincided with th e victor y af' the Chi-involving a sh i f t i n Sovie t e f for t and a t ten t ion from Western Europet o the Far East .nese Communists on the mainland.ana the Greek C i v i l War were bruught t o an end i n 1949, and f rmthen on, Soviet diplomatic ac t iv i ty in Europe was negligible, entail-ing only a few sporadic propagandistic gestures.I n Europe, the Berl in blockade

In the E a s t European

-r/ Agriculture was not a new f i e l d of a c t i v i t y for Khrushchev. Hewa6 assigned t o the Ukraine i n 1938; i n 1939, according t o avail-abl e records, he began writing on ag ri cu lt ur al problems and, sub-sequently, he became known as an agricul tura l specia l is t .- 1 7 - .


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Sa tel l i t es th e degree of Soviet control was increaseit, opposit-Dnelements were severely repressed, and effo rts were be- t o int egra tethe Sa te l l i t e econmies with that of the USSR.

Some observers at tr ibut e th is foreign policy sh i f t t o the d isap-pearance of Zhdanov's influence and the rise of Wlenkov. Malenkov,it is said, saw an opportunity f a m a j o r interna tional successes inthe Far East, whereas Zhdanov and Molotov repcjrtedly had ignored theFar E a s t and concentrated their at ten t ion on Europe.

For example, Dedijer's biography of Tito a l leges that Sta l in ad-mitted, a t a February 1948 conference, t h a t he and the other Sovietleaders had underestimated the future prospects d he Chinese Cornmu-ni st revolution. In the summer of 1948, St a l i n s igned a condolencet e l e g r a m t o Tog li a tt i , whereas it was Malenkov who signed a s i m i l a rt e l e g r a m i n July 1948 t o t h e Secretary General of the Japanese Commu-nist Party, Tokuda.

The existence of such a fmign policy controversy i s substanti-ate d only by fragmentary indications of t h i s kind. There is no reli-able intelligence on t hi s question, and the e hi ft in Saviet policywhich did Fn fact occus w a ~ , lear ly as much a r e s u l t of circumstancesas of anything else: The Berlin blockade had not only been a failure,but had als o been a strong irr i t an t to th e West and had created a pos-si bly explosive s ituatio n. The conclusion of the Greek Civil War wass i u ~ l y matter of time after Yugoslavia w i t h d r e w i t s sypport. Themilitant Communist policy in France and I t a l y had failed. In the FarEast, however, new poss ib i l i t i e s appeared a s the Chinese CCnHmnistsneared final success.

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Soviet Politburo members who regularly appeared a t Chinese Cam-munlst mrties and receptions from 1949 on w e r e Molotov, Mikoyan andBulganin. It will be remembered t ha t Madame Kollontai spe cif ical lymentioned Chinese Communist a f f a i r s io discussing Molotov; further,Molotov was tentat ively identif ied in the Far East i n ear ly A u g u s tand in early October 1950.The Soviet Amba sador t o China fram February 1948 t o June 1952

was N. V. Rosbch1n.d The Soviet Po li ti ca l Representative in Japan,

L/ Roshchin was renamed Ambassador t o t he Chinese Peoples Republica f t e r r e l a t ions w i t h the Nationalist Gaverment were severed inOctober 1949. Roshchin was replaced as Ambassador t o China inJune 1952 by A. S. Panyushkin, who had fo rmer ly been Ambassadort o th e United S t a t e s .as Chief of the Southeast A s i a Division of th e USSR Ministry ofForeign Affaire.

Roshchin was identifed on 7 October 1952

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Derevyanko, was assigned to t h i s post in 1946 and remained there un-til May 1950. !L%e Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Colonel Gen-e r a l T. F. Shtykov, had been the Chief of the Soviet delegation t othe Jo in t Commission on Korea and Commander of Sovlet Forces i n Koreafrom 1946 u n t i l 1948, a t whic t i m e he was designated Ambassador t obassador t o Korea u n t i l August 1951; a t t h a t t i m e a new Ambisador,V. N. Rszuvaev, was identified.in the Kremlin i n la te 1948 or ea r ly 1949, in the persons re 6p ~m ~l blefor Far Eastern affairs. This conclusion tends t o discount the hypo-thes i s that there had been important policy differences relating t othe Far E a s t and that the sh i f t in Sovie t a tten t ion t o the Far E a s twas a r e su l t of Malenkuv's rise.

the North Korean Government.9 Shtykov presumably remained Soviet Am-The above data would appear t o establ ish tha t there was no change

The new expansive policy in t he Far E a s t cvlminated in the NorthKorean invasion of South Korea.that the proposal for the invasion would have provoked violent contro-versy in th e Kremlin. There were 6ound m i l l t a r y reasons fo r the Sw-i e t leaders t o &stre t o c on t ro l all of Korea.considerations apply equalLy w e l l t o the Chinese Cammunis t s . ) Fur-thermore, there is convincing circumstantial evLdence that the Sovietleaders did not expect UN intervention in Korea; a l l evidence wouldappear t o suggest that they expected the Korean invasion t o be ashort, fa s t campaign which would re su l t i n the consolidation of theentire peninsula under Soviet control.

me re i s l i t t l e r ea son t o bel ie ve

(The same mili tary

Numerous press rumors and reports fromced Moldtov in Peiping i n l a te Ju ly o r ear lyI

in ear ly October 1950, just before the Chinese

J./ Shtykov may w e l l have been a m em b er of ZhdBnov's so-called Lenin-grad clique. He had been a Secretary of the Leningrad Obbst Com-mittee in 1939; during th e war he was a m e m b e r of' the MilitaryCouncil of the Leningrad Front and also a Po li t ica l Officer there ,presumably under Colonel G e n e r a l Shikin.f i e d as a member of the M i l i t a r y Council of the Fi rs t Far EasternFront.I n 1945 he was ident i -

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cOumun

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I I

s t intervention in K o r e a , he w a s again tentat ively identif iedin the Soviet Far East.Despite the evidence suggest ing Molotov's presence a t t b s e pre-sumed po li cy conferences i n the Fa r Eas t , there are no grounds f o rconcluding that Molotov himeelf was the primary spousor of the NorthKorean attack. No one person or group of persons can be so id en ti -fled. Moreover, despite the obvious reverse suff'ered by the USSR i nth e Korean development, and de sp it e the obvious possible r a m i f i c a -t ions of these developments, no readjustaents or other changes werenoted i n the Soviet hierarchy. It thus appears that nobody on thePolitburo .level was held i e d i a t e l y r es po ns ib le or made a scapegoatfor the reverses. -..

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caesar 07 - the balance of power

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