caesar 09 - politics and the soviet army

8/4/2019 Caesar 09 - Politics and the Soviet Army

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POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMYAPPROVED FOR RELQ&@opments since October 1952 relating toDATE: JUN 200-7 thepolitical status of theSoviet armed forces

Office of Current IntelligenceCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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CAESAR-y Central Inte llig enc e AgencyOFfice of Cu r r e n t Intel l igeoce12 March 19%

This paper, the ninth in the CAESAR series, addressesi tself primarily t o &evelopments @thin the Soviet armed forcesduring the period October 1952-December 1953. Its purpose i nchronologically summarizing these developments is to p lace i nperspective the position of the military within the context ofthe new Soviet leadership. It should be regarded 8s a workingpaper. Valuable contributions Wve been msde by many parts ofC IA and other intelligenoe agencies,the views of the author% however, and do not represent the of-ficial v i e w s of the Agency. As in the ca$e of the previous pa-pers in t h i s series, suggestions and criticisms xi11 be welcomed.

The views expressed are

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POLITICS AND lcBE s o m RMYTable of Contents

-summary a& Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I. Position of the Military Pr ior t o Stalln's Death . . .Role of th e Military a t the XI X Party CongressThe Doctors ' Plot--Military V i c t i m sThe Death of Sta l in11. Poss ibi l i t i es 'ofMilitary I n t e m n t i o a I n th eSuccession Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Historical TrFlditionRestrictions on Military Freedqm of Action111. Position of the Military after Stelin's Death . . . . .The Governmental Reorgqization of Mrch 1953

The Period of Uncertainty i n the Spring of 1953The MiliLtary'and th e Purge of BeriaIv. Evidences of an Improvement in the Position oft heMi l i t a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Promotions and Reassignments of High-RankLng

Possible Shf t s in Army-MVD RelationshipsDevelopments in the Mecbanlsw of part;y ControlMorale vs. Security i n the Soviet Army ln 1953The Greater Influence of th e Military PolntSummsry of the F ir st Year

Personnel

of V i ew

V. . Toward the Future-7 November 1953 and After . .October Revolution DayMilitary Participation on B e r i a ' s mal Bo8lcdOtlaer Recent DevelopmenCsAppendix I - M l i t a r y Personnel Elected t o Cen tralC m i t t e e of the Communist Party a t th eXMPar tyCongress . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Appendix I1 . romotions Since the Death of Stalin ......Append.tx 111 - Personnel Changes i n the Armed ServicesSince the Death of S t a l i n . . . . . . . . . .

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Summary and Conclusion8The Soviet armed forces do not have a his tory of successfalInterference in i n t e rna l po l i t i ca l crises as a single, or@Ttnizedelement of parer.mentation and inaction during Internal crisis. Military freedomof act ion is r e s t r i c t e d by the interlocking; networks of' p o l i t i c a loffi cer s and secu rity police operating within the ranks, by a ten-dency toward conformity among officers and men alike, by a growinga f f l ce r caste system, and by the presence in the ranks of a hlghpercentage 09 Camrmmis t s subjec t t o Par ty d isc ip l ine. Unless theexisting controls break dawn under d ras t i c circumstances, th e armed

forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive andnon-monolithic body with regard t o a Saviet succession crisis.This study of the postStal in period is undertaken t o discover w h a teffects recent political changes have had on the armed forces a s awhole and on indivlduals or groups among the high-ranking militaryleaders, and w h a t influence these military leaders have exertedrLthin the government. -'

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During the year from October 1952 t o October 1953, the p o l i t i -ca l posit ian of Soviet military leaders progressed through severalphases. From the XIX Party Congress u n t i l Stalin's death, there-re some indications of the part icipation of military leaders inp o l i t i c a l maneuvering, as evidenced by Govorovls belated designa-tion as a candidate member of the Central Commi t t e e and by the nam-Zng of m i l i t b u y off icers in th e Doctors Plo t announcement. !l%eperiod of t he p o s t S t a l i n strug@;lebetween Wlenkav and Beria, fromMarch u n t i l June, vas a time of outward passivity on the part ofthe military leaders, vi th an increase in pol i t ica l contro l OVerthem, indic ated pri ma ril y by th e reorganization of the mlnistrg ofa m d forces and the return of Bule;anin a s min i s t e r . !The re-emer-gence of Zhukav, probably considered by the Party leadership as asafety measure a t a c r i t i c a l momen*, gave increased influence t o anoutspoken p rof ess ion al off i c e r.t a ry in politics probably occurred beginning with the East Germaar i ot s and the Beris purge. The armed forces apparently participat edi n t h e r em o v a l and denunciation uf Beria, and the present Partylead ersh ip probably bought mil i ta ry acquiescence or support by giv-ing the professional military men greater f reedan within th ei r ownestablishment. After June, so(319 high off'icers of the srmed forces

A shift from a passive toward a more active role of t h e mili-

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11. Poss ib i l i t i e s of M i l i t a r y Intervention i n the SuccessionCrisis-The Historical Tradition:

Some observations are appropriate here regarding the natureof the r o l e which t he S oviet armed forc es might have been expectedt o p l ay i n i n t e r n al affai rs a t t a s moment of Russian history.Practical ly every avai lable source, with the exception of some ofthe more imaginative ColumnistsJ warm t h a t we should be verycautious about ascribing any great po li ti ca l influence or freedomof ac tio n t o the Sovi et &med f orc es of today.- Hist orica lly, the Soviet armed for ces have not inh er ite d at r a d i t i o o s tervention i n i n t e rna l affairs.

z : ; y h T ee major succession crises i nthe Time of roubles, 1584-1613,following the death of Ivan the Terrible; th e period of PalaceRevolutions, 1725-1762, following t e death of Peter the Great;and the Decembrist Revolt of 1825.13 I n these three cr ises ,Russian autocracy was challenged af ter the death of a s t rong ru le rby var ious elements who so%ght t o sha re i n power and t o improvethe i r own li vi ng conditions; the autocracy survived a l l threechallenges and continued t o consolida te. A feature of the Time ofTroubles wa s the development of fragmentary military power byvarious groups and temporary cod li tions, who attempted unsuccess-fully t o gain controll ing power for themselves.family was finally able t o s t ab i l i ze the s i tua t ion after hatred ofPolish intervention had goaded the stalemated Cossacks and Russiangentry in to joining forces. .Century were dominated by the small but i n f luen t i a l Guards regi-ments, ori gin all y created by Peter the Great t o protect the throne.Well-placed and closely knit, they were able to exert t h e i rstrength a t the top t o influence the selection of f o u r monarchsafter the death of Peter. !be remainder of the la rg e army whichhad been built by Peter was not in f luen t i a l in these palace

ldla:

!be strong Romanav

he Palace Revolutions of the 18th

1/ Center f o r Internationd. S tudies, Massachusetts In s ti tu te ofTechnology: The Vu ln erab il ity of the Soviet Union and I t sEuropean Sate l l i t es t o P o l i t i c a l Warfare; Cambridge 1952;Vol. 11, Annex 3 (Succession Crises i n Russian History, byAlfred Levin).

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....Party. The Great Purge of the l a t e 1930's al so found the a r m e dforce s i n a passive role, even as t he i r own ranks were riddled.An idea of the extent of t h e purge within the armed forces i sprovided by Japanese and former Sov ie t sources, who estim atethat, following the execution of Tukhachevsky and other leadersi n June 1937, the purge removed more than 400 of f i ce r s i n t hepositions of brigade commanders and higher, 90 per cent of thegenerals, 80 per cent of t he colonels, and ap pr om at el y 30205Qother officers, tot all ing about half the ent ire of fic er corps.Three of the f ive Red Army marshals were purged, as w e l l as alleleven Vice-Commissars of War and 75 of th e 80 members of theSupreme Mili ary Council, including a l l the military d i s t r i c tcommanders.3 Certainly there had developed serious differencesbetween the group around Tukhachevskg and the S t a l i n i s t leader -sh ip . Whether or not an a n t i S t a l i n coup was serio usly plannedmay never be known; i f so, i t was nipped i n the bud, and i t isclear that there wa s no united ef fo rt on the par t of the offic ercorps t o st ri ke back.

. It can be seen, therefore, th at the Sovie t armed forces en-tered the p os tS ta li n period without a history of successfuli nt er fe rence i n i n t e rn a l po l i t i c a l c r i s e s by the military as asing le, organized element of power. h e i r heritage instead wasa tendency toward fragmentation, s p l i t t i n g up and taking si des ,and failure t o ac t a t all under the stimulus of crisis. A s aconcomitant to this generalization, i t i s noteworthy that asmall, well-placed mili tary group once .exercised considerab leinfluence under conditions of palace intrigue.Restrictions on M i l i t a r y Freedom of Action:

R e a l re s t r i c t i ons are placed on the freedom of the armedforces t o ac t as a unit, the m o s t powerful being the interlockingnetworks of control operated within the armed services by theParty and the security police, now the MVD.operate separate chains of command, par all el in g t he normal a m ychain of command up from company or regimensi b le t o e ssentia lly non-military agencies.put i t , there is triple-control within theautonomous p o l i ti c a l police, the open, brazen power of th e Par tydictato rship, and the off icer s, whose knowledge and figure are

These organizations

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merely tolerated.m The Chief Po li ti c a l Direc torate of the Minis-try of Defense, t o whom the po l i t i c a l off ice rs are responsible,i s a t once a directo rate of th is ministry and a department of theCentral Committee of the Communist Party.carrying out the w i l l of the Party i n the armed forces, accomplish-ing this by unceasing ind oct rina tio n of the troops, re sp on si bi lit yf o r the maintenance of morale and di sc ip line , guidance of th eactivi t ies of Party ce l l s a t the various echelons withkthe armedforces, and detailed reporting on the political reliability of allof fi ce rs and men, re gardle ss of rank. The Chief Direc torate fo rCounterintelligence was officially transferred from the Ministryof Armed Forces t o the MGE3 i n 1946, thus formalizing a de f ac tosi tuat ion . I t s off ice rs, found throughout the regimental echelon( there are s t a f fs a t the higher leve ls ) are the successors ofSERSH, responsible for investigation and surveillance, and forliquidation of counter-revolutionary elements and enemy penetra-tio ns w ithin the armed forc es. Thus the Soviet armed forces arepermeated with informers, monitors and sp ec ia l operat ives , manyof them under cover, all of them potential enemies of any groupor clique seeking t o develop an independent l ine of action on anysubject.

A wealth of material attests 'to the influence exerted by thethe 'population i n general.the p ol i t ic a l of f icer , as follows: "The po l i t i ca l o f f i cer on thecommander's staff i s i n e f fe c t a spy, is gener ally regarded assuch, and i s usually thoroughly hatedO1ll/ Ely further statesth at the Russian, having accustomed himself t o t hi s con stant sur--veillance, copes with i t by-adopting a personal policy of con-formi ty. The whole systemfof co nt ro ls and indoctrination severely .l i m i t s individual in it ia ti ve throughout the ranks of the armedforces, despite the efforts of the auth orit ies t o develop thedouble standard of flexibili studying Soviet defections hasd come t o adopt an at t i tude ofi n p ol i t ic a l mat ters .found th a t many averaopportunism, as so ciati n themselves with the winning s id e wi thou tregard t o convictions.$ This attitude has been advanced as one ofthe reasons that the army f a i l e d t o act i n i ts own defense duringth e Great Purge; younger officers found that the purge of seniorof fi ce rs opened up tremendous po ss ibi li t ie s f o r personal advance-

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, .Party,and MTD i n f ragnht ing the Soviet armed forces as well asColonel Ely sums up the position of

i n military matters and conformity

Louis B. my: The Red Army Today; Harrisburg 1949; page 128-I

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ment.Navy chie f, t o command of t h e Paclific Fleet a t the age of 37 asa result of the purge of several superiors.)memory of these purges is still in the minds of the Soviet mili-tary hierarchy, and t h i s may be a strong deterrent to any inde-pendent action. After World War 11, a tendency was shown towardreassigning o ff icers who had seen combat toge ther , i n odestroy the feeling of comradeship which had grown up.

( A popular example i s t h e rise of N * G. Kuznetsov, nowUndeniably, the

has chosen a typ ical ly Russian expression t o desc""fsol i dari ty and indifference to the f at e ofothers that the system has created among military personnel:"Onel s shirt i s nearest to one' s body."The Soviet armed fo rces a r e a l s o s p l i t horizonta lly by a cas tesystem which has developed a t l eas t sin ce the re-introduction ofmilitary ranks f o r of fice rs during the period of preparation f o rWorld War 11. Colonel Ely states that " the marshals form a casteof their own and th e generals form another, both being as d i s t i n c t

from the officer caste as the la t te r are from the enlisted group.nyPay and pr iv ile ge s now crea te a greater gulf between higher offi-cers and troops than exists i n maw Western armies. The officersowe the ir privj leges and high standard of l iv ing t o the regime a di t s continued existence. I n add ition , the Suvorov schools, cr eat edi n 19&3 t o t r a in young boJCs from the age of nine or ten t o becomecareer office rs, annually turn out a group of p ol it i ca ll y indoctri-nated, hig hly regimented and class-conscious cade ts, who Kill tendt o h,&den this caste system. G-2 estimates t h a t there a re now 28Suvorov schools, each having an average attendance of 600. Mostof the students are sons of World War I1 casualties, high-rank$ngoff ic er s and in f lu en ti a l Communist Pa rt y membersFina lly, the very presence i n th e armed forces of a high per-

centage of Connaunists, subject t o Party discipl ine, is a fac to rlimi ti ng the armed forces' freedom of pol i t i ca l act ion as long asParty sol i dar i ty i s outwardly maintained a t the top. I n the post-war years, Party membership has become essential to a successfulcareer as a Soviet military officer, and favorit ism i s shown t oParty s t a l w a r t s i n promotions and assignments. The question ofwhich comes f i r s t , Party membership or professional success, hasbeen raised by many students.the war, military competence was a much more important factor i nIt i s gene rally agreed that, during

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an officer's career than i t i s today. S ta ti st ic s on decorationsawarded during the w& provide some interesting Mnts on thispoint. A high percentage, bu t by no means d , o f the recipientsof awards were Pa rty menhers.Kuznetsov st at ed that, of the ll,OOO Heroes of .th e -Sdviet Union,7,500 (60 per cen t) were Communists. Other Swiet sources indi-cate t ha t an additional 18 per 'cent or 27 Der 6

A t th e XW Party Congress, F. F.I

I. To sum up, there i s much i n the rec en t and pas t h i s tory of theSoviet armed forces ,to l i & t severely t he i r ab i l i t y t o a c t as a

u n it i n time o f i n te r na l p o p t i c a l c r i s i s . The armed forces as awhole m ys t be looked upon as a re la t ive ly passive body, non-mono-li th i c , probably not capable of being "delivered" t o anyone as aunified element of po li t i ca l power unless the existing controlsbreak down under circumstances far more drast ic than any yetevidenced. Instead, the t 9 t a l i n era should be studied with aneye toward discovering what effects the political changes have hadon the armed forces as a whole (especially on the control mecha-nism operating within them), what at ti tu d es the pol i t i ca l l eadershave displayed toward th e armed for ces , what cl iq ue s o r groups ofhigh-ranking military lead-ms' have pr of it ed by th e changes i n theregime, and what influence these military leaders have had withina non-revolutionary framewcwk of palace intrigu e i n a highly cen-t ra l ized state.

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111. Position of the Military after Stalin's Death* \

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The Governmental Reorganization of March 1953:1 !!he f i r s t o f f i c i a l move by the Soviet leaders after the deathof Stalin was the complete reorganization of the government's etruc-ture. The general effect of the reorganization was to cenwalizeand streamline the governmental struc ture a t the top; with a re-duction of the number of ministries by about one-half.and a returnof the old Politburo group to direct control over key ministries.In the reorganizations of 6-15 March, the armed forces were treatedin accordance w i t h t h i s general pattern; th e War and Navy Ministrieswere merged in to a single Ministry of Defense, and Bulganin re-turned to dir ect control as Minister. !Phis action reversed a six-year trend toward relaxation of personal control of th e armed forcesministry by the Par ty leaders. During the immediate postwar period,when Stalin was engaged in minimizing the battle-won popu larityand independence of Soviet military leaders, he retained his positionas People's Commissar of Defense and assumed the t i t l e of Generalis-simo. I n Wrch 1946, the services were unified. A gradual, l imitedrelaxation of contro l over the minishry may have begun some timeduring the next; year, although not un t i l the most pop-r mi lit aryleader, Msrshal Zhukov, had been packed off t o Odessa. Stalin re-signed as Minfster i n March 1947 and appointed in his place a loyal"po l it ic a l general" and old comrade, General Bulg;anin, who was 'pro-moted t o marshal short ly thereafter.post in 1949, to become Politburo member without portfolio (buts t i l l reli ably reported t o have general responsibility fo r m i l i t a r ymatters). Marshal Vasilevsky, an able staff officer, replaced Bul-ganln. In February 1950, the services were again separated, withVasilevsky becoming Minister of War. The Navy regained s ta tus asa ministry, and the next year the post of mjnister was returned t oVice Admiral IT. G. Kuznetsov, who came out of h i s enforced retire-ment but did not receive his former rank of Admiral of the Fleet.The reunification of the services i n March 1953 re turned them tothe situation existing under Bulganin in 1947-1949, tendiw t o re-establi sh closer control by a top Party leader.

The neutralizing influence of this s tep may be related to thepersonal status of Bulganin himself, who a t th a t time appeared notto be a serious contender for personal supremacy bu t , rather, a mn-partisan &presentative of Soviet collective leadership.published listings of high Soviet 'offLcials since St al in ls death,Bulganin has regularly ranked just behind the topmst leaders; hewas l i s t e d sixth in the Party Presidim on 13 mrc h 1953 and was

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Bulganin w i t h d r ew from the

In the

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--.hg. een' elii 'nated. A EpeCiaj: CIAdek'.tIaat, .wi.thinthe armed f p x e s ,r' pmfesiii-on& ,or persorial po pu ur it y

adminiitrator who actti, as ,yaa$og for.maj0.g..celebrations: tnvolv'ng . the'..'armedOc;to&r,.Revolution ,by,,Bulganin 'bokmili,tary speech; ,excep.t fo r One year,o h,onor :two ' d if f e r + , mili tary. , eaders. - . . . . , . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . : ::' . .

The Mqrch reorganization brought the.'annolnlcement of the re-turn of Marshal G. K. Zhdsov from re'lative, obscurity t o be a F i r s tDeputy Defense Minister, an appointment which could not f a i l t od r a w wide notice and would appear t o co nt radi ct evidence of attemptsto t ighten po l i t ica l control over the armed forces.pointment probably had both polit i+ and military implications; itwo l p t o insure support for the government by the lower r a 9* of a q , , and it represented the return to headqumtere of a topSoviet:mllitary strategist a t a time of possible danger t o th enation. Zhukov, the best known of the Soviet ma~shals,is coq-sidered an example of an "ideal type," the anti-pollt ical profes-stonal off icer . mere is some q q s t i o n as t o tde t r u t h of vaiious-colo rful sto rie s regarding Zhukov's past brushes w i t h Presidiumme'mbers, inclpding Mal-kov, Bulganin, and Voroshilov ( a l l of whompresumably @d to give a t l e a s t t a c i t consent t o plukov's appoint-ment in March), but it is known hat ZhUkov is outspoken, blunt, andno t afk%id.to make enemies in high places. plukovrs opposition t opdlit ical interference, in m i l i tters is well confirmed, -par-ticularly .his belief--expresse cly after the Finnish cam-paigns--that the power of the pol i t ical ofl icers should be swictlyl imi ted . An extremely able strategist, Zhukov headed the wartime

general headquarters, the Stavlca, daring i t s entire existence from1942 t o 1966; in this post and as F i r s t Depuw People's Commiasarof Defense, he was direc t ly under Stalin' It is generally believedthat Zhukov's great popular i ty w i t @ the Soviet people was the basic'cause fo r h is re lega tton t o command of the Odessa Mllitary Districti n 1946, prohably as a result of the personal decision of Stal in." !4 contributing factor may have been h is frlendly contact'with West-. ern mili tary leaders, including General Eisenhower. According t o1 the'immediate cause was Zhukov's clash w i t h Vasily Stalin

Zhukov's ap-

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time of the XIX Party Even the kvy newpaper, RedFleet was suspended and merged w i t h Red Star on 8 Apri l , .after 14y e a r s of publication; Red Fleet had c T t i . o publish duringprevious-period of ar66Ts-ee unlficatlon, from 1946 t o 1950.Evidence-of efforts to reassure the naval leadership subsequent t othe establishment of increased control may be found in the awardingof medals i n Apri l to a number of militar y officers, mostly navyofficers , for "long and meritorious service;" the repor3d designa-t i on i n June of former Navy Minister Kuznetsov as a F i r s t DeputyDefense mister; Kuznetsov's promotion during.the spring to h i sWarld War I1 rank of Fleet Admiral; and extensive, favorable .pub-l i c i ty given in'the Soviet press to %vy Day i n July and t o th ev i s i t of the cruiser Sverdlov to the Br itish coronation In June.The Period of Uncertaintg in the Spring of 1953:some of the mpopular policies of the Soviet government, w i t h th eiron Und removed from th e top, th e new leaders vying to ingrat ia tethemselves with t h e i r people, the SatellitesY.3ndhe world, andBeria making a strong bid for per\sonal supremacy.amnesty brought pardon t o minor civi l ian and a c L l i t a r y offenders, i nA p r i l the largest prize cut in four years was announced, and In thenext two months th e f i r s t Indications appeared of an easing of theagr icul tura l and consumer goods si tuat lons. "heq articipatedin Soviet effor ts to relax international teasiona: in mid-Wch,after a Bri t ish aircraft had been shot d a m by Soviet fighters i nGellpaqy, General Chuikov sent a most,con cili ato ry note, which re-sulted i n the opening of negotiations on revision of the Berlin a i rcorridor r a e s (the negotiations have accomplisw nothing, althougPthey continued in desultory fashion uti1 Late 1953). The renewedSoviet propaganda theme of cooperation among nations was aided byBulganin on May Day: a f t e r an unusually ahort military parsaey he

The monm following Stal in 's death w i t n e s s e d a reversal of

On 27 March the

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one other interesting feature of &y my-i953 m e he con-spicuous absence of L t . Gen. Vasily Stalin, since 1949commander of the Moscow a i r garrl60n.sections of the parades untfl Avlation Day In 1952, on thatoccasion commanding a formation which spelled out "Glory t oGtalin." He was not i n evidence a t either occasion In 1953,and hfs present whereabouts is unknown, A t Aviation Day In1953, the formation spelled "Glory to th e WSSR."

He had led the air

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Following the reversal of the Doctors' Plo t, emphas3.s was onrespect for legality and willingness to admit a mistake on thepart of the Soviet government, which nobody believed.Soviet'.tmops during this period is found in the programs ofRadio Volga, which broadcasts t o Soviet troops in Ehst Europef o r about 14 hours daily. Most of t h l s broadcast t im e -tgdevoted t o rebroadcasts of Moscow transmissions, in which thesoldier hears exactly the same news and propaganda as theRussian civ ilia n, but three hours daily are devoted t o pol it i callectures, literary programs and technical. information designedspecifical ly fo r the troops.is wri tt en by +e Party.emerge from a study of Radio V o l g a broadcasts specificallyintended for Soviet troops between 9 Mrch and 15 October 1953:g

Other interesting source material on propaganda fed to the

It I s believed that 'thismaterialThe following significant features. . .

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- A stri kin g continuation of the Sta l in my th , even though thistheme was a l l b u t dropped by other propaganda media almostimmediately after Stalin's death.leader actually increased throughout A p r i l and May, withRadio V o w l ec tu rer s d i spby ing a curious tendencytoconttnhe speaking of Stalin in the present tense, a s if hewere s t i l l al ive . Stalin comment had slaeked off by July,but it continued t o be frequent in comparison with othermedia.

!I!he emphasis on the dead

- Continued prominence of th e vigilance theme, primarily. directed a t external enemies, with some stress on the 'In keeping w i t h thiseed t o safeguard m i l i f a r y secrets ."hard" l ine , the troops heard considerably less of welfareand consumer goods propaganda than, he general public.- Mention of Malenkov's name considerably more ofien thanthat of any other l i v n n g leader.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Y ~omign roadcast Information Service: h a l o v o w roadc casts

Inasmuch as thesebefore March 1953,t o Soviet Troops, A p r i l FBIS Research Report#B-2; 9 November 1953broadcasts were not monitothere is no basis of comparison w i t h the period prior to Sta l in ' sdeath.

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- Emphasis on loyalw to th e Party , the Motherland, and thegovernment.Par* organization in the Amy.There was constant reference t o the ro le of the- Failure to emphasize present military leaders or to stimu+late loyalty t o military heroes of the Russian past, suchas was the practice during World War 11.VomshiLov, and Vasilevsb were the only names mentloned,and these only rarely.broadcast time was devoted t o popularizing the Sovietcommander as such, urging "the increased author ity ofcommanders." .

Bulganin,After Apri l , however, considerable

This r e v i ew shows that thq material prepared for the troops didnot respond s igni fica ntly t o events, remaining notably inflexibleduring the ent i re period.In early June, the Soviet policies of conciliation wereintensified, w i t h the compromise proposal on Korea on 8 Juneand the announcement of the "new course" in East Germally on the9th. The dissolution of the Soviet Control Collmnissions i nGermany and Au s t r i a is nuu considered t o have been preparationf o r the easing of tensionq in East Europe, although a t the t i m ethere was speculation that the Soviet Foreign Ministryuasassert ing i tself over the in the occupied areas. (onea r t i c l e in Taeglische Rundschaa, the Soviet newspaper in EastGermany, placed some of the blame f o r previous repressive pol icie son the m i l i t a r y chief of the Control Coprmission, b u t this was notrepeated.) The Control Commission i n Germany was abolished on28 May.b i l i t i e s res t r ic ted to mili tary matters, and h is former political

adviser, V.S. Semenov, was made Hi@ Commissioner, laterAmbassador.an unnamed post in the USSR and was replaced as military commanderby Col. Gen. A.A. Grechko, who had been commander of the Kiev MD.Chuikov's appearance on 7 November as commander of the Kiev MDrevealed that these men had simply switched Jobs. Also in June,1.L Ilyichev, a career diplomat, assumed the duties of H i g hCommfssioner in Au s t r i a , and shortly thereafter Lt. Gen. V.P.Sviridov was replaced as milltary commander in Austria-Hungaryby Col. Gen. S.S. Biryuzov, former commander of the Maritime MDa t Vladivostok and once Soviet representative on the AllledControl Commission in Bu l g a r i a . Sviridov has not subsequentlybeen identified.

Army General V.Z. Chuikov, i ts chief, had his responsi-On 7 June Chuikov was transferred from Germany t o

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' .... . ...... .

. .

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. .

One of the outstanding revelations of the East German r i o t sof 17 June was the complete reliance on the power of the SovietArmy t o maintain Communist c on tr o l' in East Germany.authorit ies reacted swiftly and eff icie ntl y, corre ctly evaluatingthe nature of the situ atio n and calling i n the troops. The f i r s ttroops were actual ly arriving in East B erlin in the e arl y morningof the l7th, martial l a w was declared a t 1:OO p.m. the same day,and by the 19th a t o t a l of 25,OOO Soviet troops with at+east450 tanks and self-propelled guns were estimated to be in the c i ty .A general a l er t was maintained by the Soviet 24thsAir Amy from17 t o 20 June,Iareas to more than 50 c i t i es and towns i n East Germany.contrast, units of the East German Garrisoned People's Policewere reportedly alerted b u t confined to th ei r barracks on 17 Jane.They were not committed in Berlin un ti l the r io ts had been broughtunder control by Soviet forces, and they did not begin to replaceSoviet uni ts i n the ci t y u n t i l mid-July.calm manner in which the Soviet forces handled the East Germandisturbances was a clear reminder to the Soviet polit ical leader-ship of their capabi l i t ies as a security force and could not helpb u t enhance the shea& high reputat ion of the Soviet armed forcesamong the Soviet people.

Soviet

D u r i n g this period,miri- w e r e retumea mom weir' summer t ra iningIn

The firm bu t generally

The Military and th e Purge of Beria:The exac t ciscumstances of the removal of Beria later i nJune are not b m n , but strange developments i n Moscow on thenight of 27 June give rise to the strong suspicion that elements

of the a- were involved. The first indication that Beria hadcome to grief was his absence from a carefully staged tableauof Soviet po li ti ca l leade rs Which presented i ts el f a t the operathat evening. (TIE opera, incidentally, was "!RE ~ecembrist ,"dealing with the ansuccessful m i l i t a r y coup of 1825.) Reportsfrom Western military attaches in &scow indicate that there wereunusual military movements in t he c i w b e gi n ni x i n the lateafternoon of the 2'7th. Several dozen tanks and military vehiclesarrived in MOSCOW by r a i l a t about five o'clock and apparentlyproceeded from the s ta t ion into the c i t y and along the boulevardleading past the Kremltn and Beria's residence.was not discovered.heard or seen during that night and on subsequent nights through30 June. Early on the Wth, tank tracks were seen on s t ree t s i nthe c i ty .

Their destinationAdditional movement of military vehicles 7386

Although much of this ac t i v i t y could have been connected- 21 -

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. , . . ........ . .

. .....,._.,.. ... . . ... . .. . .

w i t h summer training of mili tary units i n the &scow area, thepresence of the tanks and vehlcAes in the center of the city,highly unusua l i n i t s e l f , was so closely timed with the stagedh i n t of Beria's downfall as to make mere coincidence seem doubt-full. This is not to suggest that Beria was arrested by a tankcrew. Assuming, however, that he was taken into custody on orbefore 27 June, a show of m i l i t a r y force in Moscow when h i sdemise was publicly revealed could have served a t once as a.sign t o Beria's loyal followers that resistance was f u t i l e andas a precaution against any popular dis0rders.g

Unfortunately, the tanks in qu estio n c a w t be positivelyidentified. The US Army Attache in Moscow *ported that t he i rturrets bore s ingle-digi t identifying nmbers, instead of thethree-digit numberq cwried by tankg of the f ield forces. "hepossibi l i ty has been raised that they were no t B r u w tanks a tall, s ince a t l e a s t one motorized MVD division-assumed by G-2t o have some organic t a nkq - - F s known to be st at io ne d i n Moscgw.I n view of the circumstances, however, and of Beria's positionas MVD head, it is considered most likely that the tanks weream y tanks brought in from outside the ci ty.help signify the complete2ess of Beria's disgrace and thesol idar i ty of the ipvernment.the 10 July announcement of Beria's purge, Army General A. I.htonov, commander of the Transcaucasus MD ( f i lch includesBeria's native Georgia) addressed a spe cial meeting of themi lit ar y d is t r i c t a t whLch he denounced Beria and pledged the

Personnel of the armed force6 &re prominently used t oOn about 13 July, short ly a f te r

axmy Communists behind the decision of the Centralhis was one of the f i r s t meetings of this type t o

. . . .... . .

..:... . .... ... . . .1/ f i rnough there is co dl ic t in g evidence on this point, it seemsmost likely that Beria's arrest occurred on 26 June, since thePresidium decree regsrding 'h is "ant i -s ta te act ivi t les , " pre-sented to the Supreme Soviet f o r ra t i f i c a t i on i n August, wasdated 26 June.j tonov , c k i o u s v , was not elected either member or candidatemember of the Central Committee in October 1952, althoughhe commanded a key m i l i t a r g d l s t r i c t and was active in theGeorgian Communist.Party. During World War 11, he had bees

deputy t o Marshal Vasllevsky on the general s t a f P . WhenAntonov was Chief of the General Staff fo r a br ie f periodimmediately after the end of the war, Shtemenko was his deputy.- 2 2 -


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be held .in the USSR and wad the f i r s t such meeting of a m i l i t a r yd is tr ic t , to 'be p\ iblicized i n Red Star .that the denunciatlon by the mi li ta ry conuusnder i n Georgia couldbe a warni,@ t o Beria's followers tbst the army was maintainingfirm control over the sit uat ion In Beria's native state; sub-sequent events confirmed this impression.

A t the time, it seemed

. .'y :. . . . . ... . . ... .. ..... . .. . ,.... . .. . . .. .. . . . .

. .

The pledge vas taken for a l l the armed services InaMoscmmeeting which was publicized in Pravda on 16 July, under theheadline "Bolmdleas Devotion t o the Communist Party." Accordingt o this ar t ic le , a meeting of the Pam akt lv of the DefenseMinistry had "recently" been held t o d iscuss the decisionS, ofthe Central Committee regarding the dismissal of Beria. Thespeakers included Bulganin, Zhukov, N.G. Kuznetsov, Sokolovsky,Budenqy, Covorov, and others, but evidently not Vasilevsky orIlronev. The standard resolution was then unanimously adopted,pledging " t r u e and devoted support" t o the Party, service t othe cause of the Soviet people, and "determined and unconditional"fulf i l lment of Party and government decisions. No po l i t i ca lleaders w e r e specifically llhentioned in the resolution.The period of confusion a t the t i m e of Beria's purge pro-duced a spate of rumors- n Moscow, supposedly f'ron Sovietsources, suggesting a keen awareness of the potentiallyimportant role of the military among the Soviet rank-and-file,as well as among the diplomatic community.rumored that Zhukov was under arrest, but this was quicklydisproved by his appearance a t a reception on 12 J u l y .1 then reported the rumored arrest of thecommander of the Moscow MD and the commandant of the ciw of

Moscow. One of $hese men appeared a t receptions on 14 Julyand 22 August, b ut subsequently the re lacement of both wasrevealed is the Soviet press. ?[.also c i t e d rumors thatthe i n the s l ze of the armedforces, apd the reported rumors that the t e r mof mili tary sedeferment policy liberalized.Vasilevsky from off icl al functions and l l s t ings from 22 July t o8 September, including absence from A i r Force Day celebrationson 23 Augu s t , gave r is e t o f als e rumors that they had beenremoved, bu t both have appeared often since, and i n early 1954were nominated as deputies to the Supreme Soviet.s u ch rumors in 1(Ioscar tapered off af ter last summer.

It was a t firstThe

was t o be reduced and"he absence of both zbukov and

Reports of

Rumors about the Soviet amy's role i n poli t ics wereprevalent a l l over the world during the summer.London datelines claimed that a military t r i um v i r a t e (Voroshilov,Stories under- 23 -


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Bulganin and Zhukov) had aseuned real power in the USSR, thatBeria was in a ntlitary prison in bscow, cind that Kowv &abeen arrested as a supporter of Berla.US newspapers carried varlous other "instde" stor ies . Suchstories are not believed to have am validity reearding the

Italian, Austrian, and-actual situation in the USSR. ...

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i

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, . -IV. Evidences of an Improvement in the Posi t ion of the Military

... . . ... . . . . ., Womotions 8-nd Reassi&nts of Hlgh-Ranking Personnel:

Since June 1953, a number of develapments have occurred whichsuggest a greater mobili ty for top military personnel,greater freedom from close control, and some increase in part ic ipa-t i o n i n p o l i ti c a l matters.of a s h i f t from a passive toward a more active role, beginning wlththe incidents of the East Geman riots and the B e r i a purge.The general.impression created is one

- 25 -

The fee l ing of increased mobility i s conveyed by the number ofpromotions and reassignments of top commanders.has disclosed the promotion of two men t o t he rank of marshal, onet o f l e e t admiral, one o admiral, and six t o army (four-star) gen-eral sinc e June 1953.3 In general, thos e promoted are noted morefor their professior.&La b i l i t i e s than fo r t he i r p ol i t i c a l conqec-t ions..frozen for top Soviet A m y off icers . - The only promotions t o armygeneral between the end of World War 11 and 1953 'occurred in 1948( i n tha t year four off4cers received th e rank) and the only promo-t ions t o marshal we r e Sokolovsky's in 1946 and Bulganin's i n 1947.

!l!he So vie t press

For seve ral years previously, ranks had apparently been

The tnrao.ber in to p jobs in the Defense Ministry was a l sogrea te r in 1953 than for several years past.probable evldence of the assigrmaent of new persons t o nine key m i l i -tary pos ts since St al in 's death, with seyen of these changes re-vealed slnce last May Day. A rough comparison with recent yea rsshows twt, in 21 key job s i n the ministry, there were nine knownchanges in 1953 but only two in 1952, three1950; in years pr io r to 1950, the known turnover was more nearlycomparable t o that of 1953. In addi t ion to the Moscow MD, elevenother mil i tar y d is t r ic ts probably have had a change i n commandsince Stalin's death, partly as a di rec t r e su l t of the changesi n t he top jobs in %he min1str y.g

There is now firm o r

1 19% and none i n

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .For a de t ai l ed l i s t i n g of these promotions, see Appendix 11.

9 The top posts considered i n t h i s c a p a r is o n w e th ose of Minis-ter, Fi rs t Deput ies ( 3 in number), C W Ground Forces) C l n CNaval Forces, C i nC Military Air Forces, CinC Long Range Av l -ation, CinC Airborne Forces, C i n C Rear SerVlces, C i nC Arti l lery,


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Most of the cbanges snd promotions have been in the groundforces; gavalan8 a i r offteers hold fewer of the to p po siti ons inthe SavLet armed forces, and there does not appear t o have been an$freeze in rank in these two ser vic es before 1953. Within the Navy,one of the more interestlug appointments xas that of Vice A d m i r a lV. A. Fokin as Mavy Chief of' Staff, revpaled in semi-official Sovietannouncements in February and May 1953, and his promotion to admiralduriag the summer.cloeely associated xlth Admiml &vchenko, a Doctors ' Plotiivictim,"and may be a protege of Lewhenko. A d m i r a l A . G. Golovko, whom''okin replaced as Chief of Staff, has probably taken command of th eSouth Baltic Fleet. Noq of these men is a member or candidate mem-ber of the Central Committee.

OM has noted tbt,Fokln was for ' ten years .

Within the air Oorces, where there has been considerable turn-over in top positions elqce the end of World War I f , there m e it-t l e known change in 1953. The announcements of Aviation Day InAu g u s t revealed t h s t Col. Gen. P. F. Zhigarev, C W of MilitaryAviation, had been made a Marshal of Aviation, i n a m o p e similar t othe e'levatloa of the Navy's chief t o Flee t A d m i r a l .It has been uoted t h a t , e$nce J W , Marshal of Aviation K. A. Ve r -shinin has been sign- obi tuaries direct ly after Zhigarev.shinin, QoruterA i r Force chief, had been replaced by Zhigarev in1&3 and had been in obscurity stnce that time, although he waselected a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952.Be i s reported to-b e a str ong qpponent of ground force damlnationamong *he servtces.

In addition,Ver-

Among the more stpificapt reassignments are changes in three

- Ag cmmander of plg Moscqw MD and chief o f the Moscov gars%-604, Col. Gen. P. A. Artemev was replaced by Col. Gen. K. S.Moskalepko. So viet pr es s material indicates that the changekey cotnuand6 tn tbe MQSCW area:

CinC Armored Fowes, Inspector General, Chief of the GeneralStaff, head of the Chief Pol i t i ca l Di rec tora te, Chairman ofDOSAAF, commanders $u Germany and A u s t r i a (2), commander ia theFar East, and commanders in the Moscow Area (2). (Changes inJob designations caused only by r e o r ~ l z a t l o x m f the anuedforces were not counted when the i@ivLdual's dut ies did notchaqge.) For details of these and oth er personnel changes I nthe armed services eincg Stelin's dea th, see Appendix 111.

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probably occurred some time between 23 May and 22 July'1953.This camand is responsible f o r a l l Soviet Army trobps i n. .

,

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. . .. .

. . . .. -. ,

the Moscow area, with at le as t one r i f l e division and otherunits.lected personnel, the best epol i t ica l ly re l iab le of f icers . Inn,. ,

They ar e' pr im ar tl y shaw troops, w ith sp ec ia ll y B e -ut , and well-qiralif led,

-As commandant of the c i t y of Moscow, L t . Cen. K. R. Sinilovwas replaced by MaJ. en. I S. Kolesnikov, probably between22 A u g u s t and 8 Septe mber.g This command co nt ro ls house-keeping and medical elements of the Soviet Army in the Moscowarea. Although the commander has no t ac t i ca l un i ts of hisown, he a c t s a t times as a deputy to the commander of theMoscow garrison and is reg ula rly .charged with main%&iningorder during important Soviet aanfverssries and celebrations.

-As coPnnauder of the Kremlin Guard, L t . Gen. of MVD I?. IC.Spiridonov was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. Y. Vedenin, probablybetween 1May and 7 November.held by an MVD offices, bears avert responsib i l i ty fo r thephysical security of the Kremlin.controls one picked END divls ion and is subordinate t o theGovernment Guard Directorate, which was presumably trans-ferred from the IGB t o t he MV D i n th e governmental reo rgani-zation of March 1953. MaJ. Gen. Kosynkin, whose death xs sannounced in mid-February, was an of l icer of the KremlinGULl2-d.

This position, i n the past!The commander reportedly

, .: .:_. ....._......... . . ,

A6 can be seen from the description of these caamrands, t h e i r incum-bents are in a posit ion t o exert considkrable influence a t the ten-ter of Soviet government during times of c r i s i s or tension.some respects, they are as s t ra teg ica l ly p laced as were the Guardsregiments cre ate d by Peter the Great.In

The replaced of'ficers had a l l held their posit ions fo r msnyyears, encampassing the period from a t least ea r ly in World War 11unt i la f ' te r Ste l in ' s dea th .t i f i e d as an MV D mBn. Artemev had some MVD experience, his lastknown security assignment being couuuand of an NKVD r i f le divisioni n 1939. Sinilov had been charged with preservation of order inOf the three , only Spiridonov is iden-

- _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -A6 mentioned earlier, a m o r was cu rre nt i n Moscov during Ju ly1953 that both Sinilov and Artemev bad been relieved of t h e i rcammends and arrested. - 27 -


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--oscow when the Germans were a t th e gates of t he c i ty in 1g41.gSince t h e i r replacement, the whereabouts of these three men has notbeen determined.

Biographic records show that the new appo intees i n t he Moscowarea are primarily professional m i l i t a r y men, all three of whomheld combat ccwmands during World War 11. Moskalenko, an ex-cavalryofficer, had commanded an which was 011 th e Fourth UkrainianFront Prom 1943 u n t i l lgk5 and wa s in the Carpathian MD aftc% thewar. In about 1950, he became W O air defense) coarmander in theMoscow area. I n September 1953, the Soviet press revealed his pro-motion t o army general. L i t t l e is h a m concerning the careers ofKolesnikov and Vedenin. In 194.4, as a lieuteaant colonel, Kolesni-kov received the award of Hero of the Sovlet Union f o r hi s succ ess-f u l crossing of the Dnieper.i n World War 11and a r i f l e corps C m d e r in Germany in 1952.None 09 these three men was elected member or candidate member ofthe Central Committee i n October 1952, although Moskalenko attendedthe Party Congress as delegate from the Moscow m y ommit tee sadboth he and Vedenia have participated in Ukrainian Party SffaIra.Soviet armed f o k e s has ledtheorize that the promoti -

Vedenin was a r i f l e division commander

The unusual number of recent promotions t o high rank In the t oelieves was f o rent as F i r s t Deputy Minister, which

Stalin governmental reorganization. The promotions, he believes,are consistent with the creation of new commsnds and the possibleorganization of l ar ge s u b d l n a t e planning headquarters.pothe sis would appear t o hinge prima rily on the inclusion amongthose promoted t o army genera l of Biry uzo v , the new CCIlIOmaIIder inA k t r & , and M. M. Papov, commander of the Tauric MD i n t he C r i ~ ~ a .So far, however, there has been no other evidence t o support thetheory of enlarged commands. No k n a m increases in size or expan-sions of function have occurred i n th e commands i n Germmy, A u s t r i a ,o r the Crimea. Also, although Svi ridov had been only a l ieutenant

I

the purpose of revising Soviet1a r plans n i t h the post -This hy-

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The pertiuent extract from Stal in 's order of 19 October 1941provides an instruct ive sidel ight on the relat ionship betweenthe amy and the security forces in t h a t time of cr is le . Afterdeclaring a state of siege and msrtial law in Moscow, Stal in pro-claimed that "the maintenance of s t r ic te s t order in the .c i ty andadjacent raions has been assigned t o th e comanaant of t he c i t y 'of Moscow, Mad . Gen. Sinilov, f o r which purpose th e cormandanthas a t his disposal the troops of internal security of th e IKVD,th e m i l i t i a , and volunteer workers' detachments." Thus the armycommander WBS temporarily given control over th e securi ty forces.

,

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general, h i s predecessor i n Austria had been promoted t o army gen-eral i n 1948, while i n the command. For some years, Western intei-ligence has been watch- f o r th e establishment, i n key Orbit borderareas, of s t r a t eg ic c k n d echelons above th e Mil ita ry Dis t r ic t orOccupation Group level. 'Thus far, the only identified command com-parable with the World War I1 "Front" has been Malinovsky's head-quarters, organized in September 1947, with operational and adminis-trative control over the three Military Dis tr ic ts of t heS ovie t Far .Eas t .should include revlew and revision of strategy, and the promotionof professional ofPicers might be a r e su l t of his influence.

It appears log ica l, however, t h a t Zhukov's r es po ns ib il it ie s

the Ministry of Sta te h t r o l a t two nrajor military head&,&ikrs i nthe Soviet Far East is interpreted as par t of the general militaryreorganization I n the area. The net effect of the reorganizationi s further t o concentrate amy au th or it y a t 3Umbarovsk and wvyauthor i ty a t Vladivostok. The purpose of the reorganization iss t i l l not understood; it could be an economy move or could reflectsome replsion of strategy.Possible Shif ts in Army-MVD Relatioriships:

the three Moscow commands h ~ v e een interpretedten ta t ive ly b s "tokens of r i s i n g m i l i t a r y as-c e h n c y o J r . h e m .' ..Certainly' . , he appointment of a combat of-f i c e r t o camnana the Kremlin Guars ra lses the question whether theresponsibil i ty for Kremlin securi ty has been transferred from MVDt o Army c ont rol . This question might be c la r i f i ed if up-to-dateinformation should become available on the present status of theGovernment Guard Directorate, t o which the Kremlin Guard is subor-i n 1950 t o be L t . Gen.of MVD N. S. Vlasik. The other twoG7y oscow commands were underdinate, and of i t s chief, reportedarmy office rs a l l along, but now their long-entrenched incumbentshave been replaced by persons k n m primarily as professional m i l i -tary men.

r he changes

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. ,...-. . . . . .

. .

....., . ... ... .. .......

\...

An army man has encroached upon the MVD in a t least one-otherinstance; here again, the location adds t o the stgnificance of -th echange.ment of A. I. Inauri as Minister of I nt er na l Affatrs (MVD) i n theGeorgian SSR, succeeding V. G. Dekanozov, vho had been dismissedfrom the Georgian Communi s t Party as a supporter of Beris. Inauriis a prof essio nal army of fi ce r, now a major general, who commandedSoviet troops in Iran i n 1945 and 1946 and commanded a mecBnizeddivision in &many from 1948 u n t i l a t least 1952.f i r s t k n m instance i n recent years of the appointment t o a hlRhMVD position of a man who i s neither a m e m b e r of the MVD nor a Partycareeris t . Later, i n midSeptember, the Georgian Party buro ~ 8 8reorganized t o remove the last of Beria's fol larers , and Inauri andArmy General Antonov, who had made t he i n i t i a l a v enunciation ofBeria, were appointed members of th e ten-man b E .reports indioating t h a t , during the summer and early f a l l ofthe Soviet espionage system underwent a process of reorientationand personnel replacement. The Defense Ministry and the MVD per-form most of the Soviet foreign intell ig ence functions.ization s di rec tly concerned are the'foreign and counter-intell i-gence di rec tora tes of t h e m and the intel l igence directorate ofthe Defense Ministry. The f i r s t two are p r i v r i l y concerned withpolit ical intell igence, psychologlcal warfare and counter-intelli-gence, while the last gathers chiefly military, scientific, andeconomic int elli gen ce. During the summer of 1953, many of the of-f ic i al Soviet representat ives abroad believed t o be associated wlththese directorates were withdrawn. The fo re ign in tel lig en ce orga-nization of the Defense Ministry had returned t o i t s former strengthby mid-November, but I t appears tha t only a small number of M Wpersonnel returned t o forei gn assignments. .This may of course bea routine reorientation, securit y measure, or economy move. Theligence has been reduceUom a Chief Directorate o f the Generalprev ious ly mentionedStaff t o a Directorate. There i s no positive evidence t o show anyrecent change i n the ac ti vi ti ee of the Chief Directorate of Comter-intelligence of the MVD withn the arned services;l

On 2 August 1953 the Georgian p re ss announced the appoint-

mi8 is the-

L 7he question of Army-MVD relationships is a l so raised byThe organ-

reports s t a t e that, in the army, i n t e l -

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1In addi t ion to th e several evepts since June 1953 tending t oincrease th e influeuce of Army leaders a t the direct expeise of theEIM, developments of t h a t year reduced the positio n and autho rityof the MVD with respect to a l l other agencies of the Soviet govern-ment, including the Army. These developments inc1udedf;he Doctors'Pl ot fiasco , the purge of Beria, and the appointment of a new min-. . ister without Presidium status. . The scope of MVD ac t i v i t y was re -duced, a t least temporar ily. The awareness of t h i s decli ne amongSoviet rank-and-file is i l l us tr at ed by evidence of consternation.am- MVD off ic ia l s in occwied Eurom i n June an by th e a t t i t udeof commented t h a tthL discomriture of the "IGB" was not disagreeable t o the military.

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Developments i n the Mechanisms of Party Control:With regard t o rela tion s between th e Party and the armedforces, perhaps the most significant appointment of 1953 was theappointment of C o l . Gen. A. S. Zheltov aa head of the Chief P o l i t -i c a l Di rec tora te of the Ministry of Defense. This appointment wasrevealed on 16 July i; the public notice of the meeting of th e De -fense Ministry's Party aktiv, a t which Zheltov reported on th e Cen-tral Committee's dec isi on t o purge Beri a. (The exac t d a t e of theappointment i s not known; a new York Times release cleared by theMoscow censor on 16 July s ta ted that Zheltov had held t h i s posi t ion"for some time.")cept that he was once champion vrestler of the Red Amy. A generalofficer s ince 1939, he served during World War 11as a member of

military councils i n the Far East and the TJkraine. From 1945 u n t i l1950, he was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet element of the Allied

L i t t l e i s knoan regarding Zheltov's car eer, ex-

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A curious but entirely unconfirmed re po rt alleges that the ~ U S -

l a i m t ha t , in. Late July, a l lthose ofBu l g a r i a .the Bulgarian SMEFSH, were returned t o m i l i t a r y control. O f f i -c i a l s of the Soviet MVD working i n the intel l igence sect ion ofthe Bulgarian Ministry of Defense were allegedly replaced bySoviet m ilita ry personnel.finned reports of widespread replacement of MVD personnel inthe Sa te l l i t e s .

In addit ion, there have been MCOII-\

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Control Council for Austria and was also reportedly chief of thePo li ti ca l Directorate of the Centra l Group of Forces i n Aust risand Hungary. In September 1950, he returned t o Moscow fo r "otherduties." After that t i m e , h i s name appeared frequently on obitu-ar ies , bu t it i s noteworthy that he was not elected a member of theCentral Comm i t t e e i n October 1952. Zhel tov appears t o have beenappointed over the heads of a t l e a s t two log ica l candidates whoseParty status was higher than his. One of these nten, Col. Gen. F.F. Kuznetsov, had been the head of th e Chief Po U t ic a l DireEtorateof the Ministry of War pr io r t o St al in 's death. Kuznetsov's back-ground i s of some interest: he was active in the A m y ' s Chief Iu-telligence Directorate beginning in 1938 and headed it from 1946 t o1948; i n 194-4, he had s e m d on the military council of the Lenin-grad front under Zhdanov and Govorov; he may have been something ofa protege of L. Z. Mekhlis, who had taken over the Arply 's p o l i t i c a ladministration in the midst of the Great Purge of the 1930's, andhe was a member of Suslov's committee t o arrange the funeral ofMekhlis in February 1953. Kuznetsov had been elected a candidatemember of the Central C omm i t t e e a t the XIX Party Co ss and hadspoken on Party affai rs i n t he Army a t the C o n g r e s s y The otherlogical candidate passed over by Zheltov was &,j. Gen. L. I.Brezhnev, the Part y lea der who had became p o li t ic al chief of theNavy ea r ly i n March.pointment, Kuznetsov and Brezhnev s t i l l headed the po li ti ca l organ-iz at io ns Kuznetsov signed an obitu ary a f t e rZheltov on 20 October, aud Brezhnev opened the Aviation Day cere-monies on 8 Au g u s t , a t which t i m e hi s promotion t o lieut enant gen-e r a l was revealed.cal chief i n March 1953, i s a w r e n t l y not i n real disfavor, sinceon 6 November he was decorated fo r l otq service.

I t is l i ke ly thst, even after Zheltov's ap-of the army and navy.

Even A d m i r a l Zalrbarov, replaced a6 navy p o l i t i -

. ... ...Changes in the Chief Po li ti ca l Directorate are of the utmostsign ifica nce because of i t s responsibil i ty for Party affairs andm0ral.e within the armed semlces and i t s direct control over thethousands of po li ti ca l of fice rs within t h e i r ranks.function of t h i s whole organization has been a problem about whichCoamPunis t leaders have exhibited considerable vacillation over theyears.

The proper

The position of Red Army Commissar was created by Trotsky's

L/ F. F. Kuznetsov should not be confused wi th Col. Gen. V. I,Kuznetsov, former chairman of D W , he Sovlet paramilitaryand c i v i l defense organizati on. V. I. Kuznetsov was apparentlyreplaced as DOSAAF chairman on or before 26 July 1953 by L t .Gen. K. F. Gritchin, a wartime a i r defense specfalist.- 32 -


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. ...a t the end of the long re t rea t p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t major Soviet of-fensive.parer of the pol i t ical officers for the defense of Stalingrad.One source states t h a t Zhukov demanded curtailment of the

Morale vs. Security in the Soviet Army i n 1953:As World War 11 d r ew t o a close, the po li t i ca l apparatus re -

commanders became so f lagrant that , ac-gained s- of i t s former pcwer.a decree was issue d i n August 1951ording toreprimanding the po li t i ca l of fice rs fo r th ei r arrogant attempts t ousurp authority. The XM Party Congress speech by Vasilevsky; c i t -ing recent measures t o streng then the auth orit y of coarmaaders, plusemphasis on unity of command, Lend cre-2:;: statement. ~ ~ l a d d e dhat the sameorder demande s r c r compliance w army regulations and en-forcement of military discipl ine; tu effect, therefore, it told po-l i t i c a l o f f ic e rs t o g e t o ut of the commanders' bpsiness and t o c rackdam i n their m i e ld . In Germany, t h i s dire ctiv e reportedly pro-duced a series of bulletins and orders tightening regulations, in-tensifying po l i t i cal indoctrinat ion of personnel, restricting the .sale of l iquor t o military personnel, and re-emphasizing the orderforbidding fra ternizatio n w i t h the local population. The impleinen-ta t ion of t h i s new policy is w e l l confirmed; beginning i n mid-1951,intensive neasures w e r e taken throughout occupied Europe t o i so l a t eSoviet military personnel and installations, including the movementof headquarters from urban t o rural areas, building of fences aroundinstallatione, replacement uf local civilian employees with Sovietnatio nals, and s t r i c t enforcement of the ban on fraternizat ion.The general effect of th i s policy was t o make barracks l i f e fo r t hetroops i n occupied Europe seem very l i k e beipg i n prison.w e r e scarcely allowed out of t h e i r compounds except i n escortedgroups, fraternization was forbidden, and w h a t l i t t l e free timethere had been was f i l l e d with more pol i t i c a l l e ctu re s .sources agree that, by 1953, although desertions had been cut down,morale among the men and o ff ic er s i n occupied Europe was lar; mo-rale had been sacr ific ed fo r security.

The encroachment of pol iMcal of-authority" of military coarmanders and

TroapsMost

.

. ..

Following Beria's purge, many of the appressim, res t r ic t ionsOn two occa-n Soviet troops in East Europe began t o be l i f t ed .sions in July, Soviet officers in Berlin sttended receptions in c i -vilian clothes; when questioned about this, they replied tbat theywere now permitted t o wear c iv i l i an clot he s when off duty. Begin-ning about 1August, German innkeepers rep or ted that Soviet troopscould leave t h e i r quart ers during off-duty hours and that many were

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making excursions into towns near the t r a ining areas t o at tenddances and visit the taverns. One repo rt stated that 10 per centof the troops were being given passes each evening, w i t h enl is tedmen observing a one a.m. curfew and officers allowed out overntght.Fraternization became prevalent i n Germany during August and i nA u s t r i a after about 1September.ber indicate'd t ha t local civilians would again be employed a t SovietIns ta l la t ions . In late October, the fami lies of Soviet officers of

Several reports of ea rl y Septem-

the rank of lie ut en an t and abovk began t o arrive i n Eas-Germanyfram the USSR, and it was rumored that teachers would soon arrivet o set up schools fo r t h e e chi ldren. In mid-November, AustrianMinister of In t e r i o r H e h r s ta ted that Soviet mil i tary author i t iesw e r e r en t i ng addi tio na l housing f o r dependents, and a Soviet of'f'i-cer in Auetria rep orted ly sai d the dependents would arr iv e i n De-cember arid January; the f i e l d cormnented that a l l Soviet ofl lcer swe r e t o be permitted t o bring their families t o Austria. (Aftermid-1948, only high-ranking of fic ers and se cur ity personnel hadbeen permitted t o have their families i n occupied Europe, and noprovision was made f o r schooling. ) A t the same time, however,there was evidence that Soviet officetours of duty i n the occupied areas :ports that , on 18 November, a Sovletscheduled r etu rn t o the USSR bad $een cancelled only a f e w hoursbefore his departure sad that he would have t o remain fo r threemore years. It was suggested that lengthened t ou rs of duty werean economy measure, but the saving would not seem t o outweigh thecost of tran spo rtin g famil ies and providing housing f o r them, whichis a S m e t expense i n Aust ria now that the USSR has assumed theco st of maintatning i t s occupation f orces .

e re-

-re is a l so sapbe evidence t h a t a more l ib er al att i tu de ~ 8 8adopted toward the problem of military securi ty in the summer of19%.s li g h tl y and many areas previously closed t o foreigners w e r e de-clared apen; t h is r e m t i o n was pa rt i a l l y rescinded i n November,when 8 few areas were closed again. On 6 September the Ministryd Defense published %he annual order for the routine call-up anddemobilization of conscript classes, the f i r s t such public noticesince 1948, and a Tass announcement of 16 October referr ed t o thedemobilization of X i e r s ~f B specific Soviet tank division.Bulganin's 7 November speech revealed the completion of autumn m a tneuvers. These developments suggest a more re al is ti c security pol-%cy, allarLng the revelation of non-sensitive military information.

On 22 June travel res t r ic t ions i n the USSR were relaxed

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The Greater Influence of the Military'PoInt of View:Obviously the measures relaxins; security controls over the

troops w e r e not the sole responsibility of the Army or of the ChiefPo lit ica l Directorate. They are consistent with the general effort.t o improve li vi ng conditions fo r the Soviet people, followed sinc eSta l in ' s death by the new regime; but it i s pert inent to our problemthat the relaxation of controls on the troops bears dire ctly on thea b i l i t y of the poli t ical off icers and the MVD agents t o keeT closetabs on all personnel and t o press the ir po li ti ca l indoctrination.Although there has been no evidence of any change i n the pol it ic aloff icers responsibil i ty for detatled reporting on political re -l i a b i l i t y , a man with free time, i n civi l ian clothes and allowedt o go where he pleases, is hardly susceptible t o close surveillance.It seem8 clear that t h i s i s essentiaUy a m i l i t a r y man's solutiont o t he problem of army morale--the soldiers were t o be t rea ted likesoldiers instead of being cloistered like a bunch of children, andthe power of the pol i t i cal off icer and the MVD man over t h em wasreduced.securi ty would appear t o ref l ect a m i l i t a r y mu ' s point of v i e wtoward that problem.suggest that a mili tary point of v i e w was taken in to consideration,particularly those appointments In wh'lch professional army off icerswere placed i n pos iti ons formerly held by Party or MVD personnel.

Likew i s e , the more r ea l ie ti c approach t o matters ofSeveral ap poinbents of past months also

Is there support for the inference t ha t a mi li ta ry man'epoint of v i e w can e x i s t In the USSR, shared by some members ofthe professiona l offic er cast e and poss ibly even by some p o l i t i c a lofficers? It was cautioned earlier that the armed services shouldnot be considered a monolithic unit and probably do not constitutean autonomous source of pol iti ca l power. I n spi te of the tendencytoward fragmentation and lack of ini t iat ive, can a t least somepersons within the services express a military point of v i ew i ncompetition w i t h other branches of government, especially the Partyand the MVD, within the l i m i t s imposed by the prevailing eystem?It I s no t believed tha t Party meaibershlp is i n i t sel f a deterrentt o the exlstence of a military point of v i ew ; i n f a ct , E. J. Berman,In capanenttng on the htgh percentage of Party members i n the o f f i -cer corps, has raised the cogent point that, while t h i s m yconstitute a threat t o the mili tary tradit ion, "it may equallyconsti tute anParty i t se l f ." l? Mi l i t a ry terminology was of course commonly usedby Party l eade rs t o describe t h e ir p o li ti c al and economic "campaigns"

'

i l t r a t i o n of the military mentality into the

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1/ I n h i s ar ti cl e, "The Basic Facts about Russia's Army;" The Wash-ington Star, 31 August 1953. ----

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. . . .. . .. . . .. . .

of Zhukov. The non- politica l or an ti -p ol it ic al of fi ce rs might havea more realistic, bard-headed approach to certain n ational problemand might di sp lay more independence of thougbt rGgardiw solutionsthan would "political generals" such as Bulganin. Such an att i tudei n the fi el d of national defense affairs might carry over into thef i e l d of Soviet international relations.l a ted t ha t the samewhat increased fle xi bi li ty in foreign policySham by the Saviet regime since Stalin's death has been fully sup-ported by the military point of v i ew i n the USSR. It must-be.cau-tioned, however, t ha t there i s no really useful current informationon the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and that most opinionsregarding the atti tudes of tup Soviet military men toward the Westare mere suppositions, In the absence of reliable information, itwould be extremely dangerous t o assume t h a t the military point ofview i n the USSR i s more friendly toward the West than are otherSoviet points of v i e w today, or, conversely, that the mi lit ary mindi s any more determined t o seek war with the West.

It thus could be specu-

Summary of the Fi rs t Year:A review of the signfficant developments of' the period fromOctober 1952 through October 1953 affect ing the pol i t i ca l pos it ionof the Soviet armed forces shows a progression through several dis-ti n ct phases. In the months preceding Stalin's death, there wasevidence of the participation of certain army leaders or fact ionsi n p o li ti ca l maneuvering. The period of t h e post-Stalin strugglebetween Malenkov and Beria, from March unti l June, was a time ofoutward passivity on th e part of the Sovlet mili tary leaders, withan increase i n po lit i cal control over t h em . After June, however,high officers of the armed forces enjoyed somewhat greater mobility,professional officers we r e placed i n important secu rity assignments,

and greater consideration was gLven t o a military point of v i e w re-garding questions of morale and secur ity with in the anned forces.It seems qui te l ikely that these changes resulted in part from theincreased influence of Zhaov and others of an "anti-polit ical"frame of mind.extent, possib ly only verbal, i n the removal of Beris, and I t seemsreasonable t o conclude that the present Party leadership boughtmil ita ry acquiescence or support f o r i t s control by giving the pro- .fessional m i l i t a r y mgn greater freedom within th ei r am establish-ment. There was no clear evidence, however, of any drastic changei n the formsl, rela tion shi ps between the a m d forces and any otherbranch of the Soviet government.Party leaders wa8 probably an uneasy one; Zhukov and the militarypoint of v i e w were hardly on w h a t would be called close terms withMalenkov and the other top Soviet leaders.

The armed for ces leadership pa rtic ipat ed t o some

The alliance between top army and

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Mi lita ry Parti cipati on on Beria's Tria l Board:On 23 December, Izvestia -announced t h a t a special session ofthe Supreme Court, u n n c h a i r m a n s h i p of Marshal I. S. Konev,had tried and convicted Beria and six accomplices on charges oftreason and t ha t the death sentence had been ca rri ed out. On th eface of it , the appointment of a high milit ary man as chairman oft h i s court i s another indication that Army leaders are now activeparticipants in, and supporters of, the pol ici es of the prFsentSoviet regime.may be partial1;S explained by reasons of protocol., since Beria hadheld the rank of marshal since 19b5.the defendants were stripped of "all the i r mi l i ta ry t i t l e s andawards."f o r this reason i t seems that, as chairman, Konev was given un-usual precedence over a high Party figure, a l t e rna te Presidiummember I?. M. Shvernik, who was a member of the court.

Membership on the court of a Soviet Army marshalThe sentence specified that

T h i s was not essentially a military tribunal, howeqer;

Regarding Konev, th e most obvious po int of interest t h a tcomes t o mind is t he f ac t t ha t he wa s named as a Doctors' P l ot"victim," although he had been considered ,a loyal, personal 'frien dof Sta l in . He was one of seven top military leaders chosen toguard S tal inl s coff in but was absent'from of fi ci al functionscovered i n the Soviet press from that time until September. Usingth e hypothesis t h a t Malenkov was behind th e Doctors' P lo t announce-ment, that i t was i n p a r t a warning t o Konev and othe rs, and t h a tBeria l a t e r reversed it , i t can be specu lated t h a t Konev's ap-pearance on the trial board reflects his shift from opposition t osupport of Malenkov. On the othe r hand, membership i n the groupconvicting Beria may have been considered an undesirable assign-ment f o r any military o r ci vi li an leader, because of the possi-b i l i t y ' t h a t i t might backf ire l a te r, and Konev may hare acceptedit o n l y reluctanay.who became commander of the Moscow MD a t about th e time of Berial sarrest.Moscow area part ic ipa ted i n the arrest and imprisonment of Beria.If the presence of Konev and Moskalenko on the court indicatesactive military participation i n the po lic ie s of the present re-gime, i t m u s t a lso be noted t h a t Ambassador Bohlen has commentedth at t he court included representatives of the Ampy, the tradeunions, the PlVD and the Georgian branch of the Communis t Party,suggesting an ef fo rt t o involve representatives of a number ofins t i tu t ion s i n the decisions.

Another member of the c ourt was Army General K. S. Moskalenko,His membership i s another h i n t t h a t military forces i n the

A'curious note regarding the present influence of the armed- 40 -


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I , >forces i s found i n an omission from t h e court 's report . The Sta t eProsecutor' s indictment of 1 7 December s pec if ic a ll y accused Beria,among other things, of weakening the defensive capacity of theUSSR. The Court's re po rt of 24,December sai d th a t all pre lh inaryinvestigations and accusations had been %ompletely confirmed;but , i n the detai led l i s t in g of Beria 's criminal acts which fol-lowed this statement, Sov iet defenses were not mentioned.Other Recent Developments:

As pointed out ear lie r, the relaxa tion of controls .over thetroops i n occupied Europe was consistent with th e general e f fo r tt o improve Soviet l i vi ng conditions.relationship between some pol icies of the governmept and the Armyi s a measure adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1953,which w i l l influence both civi l ians and military personnel.decree of th at date rescinded a 1947 decree which made marriagesbetween Soviet cit ize ns and foreigners i ll eg al ; the 1947 decree wasthought to have been par tl y directe d a t Soviet military personnelabroad. Ambassador Bohlen commented t h a t the ac tt on of 26 Novemberseemed connected with ef f o r t s t o lt qu id at e some of the most inflex-i b l e and damaging aspeats of Stalin' s policy,' the advantages ofwhich were not commensurate with t h e losges involved.1954, i t was reported that a decree prmitting marriage to Austrianswas read t o Soviet troops i n the Vienna area.I t i s noteworthy, however, t h a t some of the liberal Sovietpol icies in i t i a t ed during the surmer were pa r t i a l l y reversed'by th eend of the year.closed to foreigners; th is action reversed the trend toward easingtravel res tr ic ti ons which had appeared i n June. During the autumn,various instances of the abuse of increased privileges were re-ported from th e East European areas occupied by Sovi et troops.

th e unfavorable reaction of the German popWtres ion o the SovietDisorders and crimes were reported, aqdsoldier s ' attempts a t fraternization. Cur f ew s , off-limits areas,escorts fo r en li st ed men on passes, and in some cases re s t r i c t i onst o barracks were imposed, and by l a t e December i t w a s apparent thatrestsiot ions on the troops had been pa rt ia ll y re-insti tuted i n bothGermany and Austria. The impress ion cormeyed by the reports, hm-ever) was th at increased freedom f o r the troops was s t i l l the gener-al rul e, with exceptions where sec ur ity required i t , whereas beforeth e summer t i g h t controls over the troops had been the rul e.

An I l lu s t ra t ion of the c lose

A

I n January

On I& November, f i v e new weas of the USSR were

. .,. ... ..

Dependents of Soviet off ic er s arriv ed i n Germany dai ly during

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December, and by January 1954 they had occupied a t le a s t 4,000family dwelling units there. rhe inf lux continued despite consider-able discontent on the part of German uivilians i n areas where manyquarters were requisitioned. USAREUR estimated that, by the end ofJanuary, 18,000 - 20,OOO dependent groups had arrived i n East Ger-m a n y . I n Austria, where housing was apparently requested and paidfor ra the r than requisitioned, few dependents had ar riv ed by theend of 1953.f i r s t of the year.ported to be a shortage of housing, and T l s t a t e d h a t reno- 'vation of apartments for dependents wasi n Austria, with 1March 1954 the scheduled completion date fo r mostquarters. I Preparations for the arrival of Sovie t offic ers' depen-dents have a l so been reported under way i n Poland and Hth e same time, an accumulation of informationto accept reports tha t t h

Their arr ival was suspended temporarily about theThe explanation given t o the o ff ic er s was re-e r way a t 22 locationsi-i c e r sed=n occupied Europe has been lengthened from threet o f i v e ears.

anyThe explanation f o r t h is has not been learned by

The question of the Army-MVD relationship remairq opm, andVarious rumors have had it t ha t t he Army has taken merthe relationship i t s e l f may s t i l l be i n a s t a t e of f lu x within theUSSR.many of t he police functions of the MVD, par t icula rly i n the Mos-

8 -cow area, but these s are nnt ted by the- day-to-daT n oscow. A eptated i n January that, inarmy personnel were supervising the checking of visitors' docu-ments, a function normally performed by the .MvD; this could t i e inwith the&crqase i n importance of hiEh military men i n Geoxy zidasts m e r . 2

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