caesar 41 - strains in soviet - east german relations: 1962-1967

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DATE: J U N 2007

D IRECTORATE OF

I N TELL IGENCE

RSS No. 0019Copy NO:24 February 1967

Intelligence MemorandumSTRAINS Z G SOVIET-EAST GERMAN

RELATIONS: 1962-1967

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXIX)

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STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

Contents

Page-I I I ILD1~Y..............................................i

I . THE SHELVING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FORCEFUL GERMANOCTOBER 1962-OCTOBER 1963...........

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STRATEGY:

The Cuban Missile C r i s i s and the G e r m a nProblem .......................................The Aftermath of The Crisis: Diminution ofThe German C r i s i s . . . . .........................

The Detente And The German Problem .............I I. TEE DEVELOPMENT OF KHRUSHCHEV* S GERMAN POL CY:

OCTOBER 1963-OCTOBER 1964... ..................0

Evaluat ing The New Chancellor.................10Trouble With East G e r m a n y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 3

Adzhubey's Last Ambassade.....................19Mounting GDR I n s e c u r i t y . ...................... 29The P r e s i d i u m Oppos t ion In t e rvenes . . . . 35

111. THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE GEREbANQUESTION: OCTOBER 1964-JANUARY 1967. . . 46

The German Problem And The COUP...............^^S i g n a l s of Renewed Disquiet ...................51The Respite, Then The Renewal of The

Triangle... . . . . . . . . . ......................... 6 5The Coal i t ion And The Cont ras t s............... 3

I V . CONCLUSION: FACTORS FOR CONTINUING S T R A I N I NSOVIET-EAST GERMN RELATIONS... ............... 8

APPENDIX: THE O R I G I N O F 'MIE "SELL-OUT" IDEA ........ s

APPENDIX TWO: KHRUSHCHEV'S REPORTED SUPPORT FORAN ANTI-ULBRICW' CABAL IN 1956......104

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STRAINS I N SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

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Summary and Conclusions

The diminut ion i n Sovie t tens ion s and t h e comparativeimprovement in Soviet-West German r e l a t i o n s t-hat has fo l -lowed t h e 1962 Cuban missile crisis h a s had an adversee f f e c t on Soviet-East German re la ti on s.

The E a s t Germans have shown concern t h a t , if a rap-prochement develops between West Germany on t h e one handand t h e S ov ie t Union and its Eastern European- a l l i e s on t h eo t h e r , t h e n t h e E a s t German s t a t e w i l l f i r s t be weakenedby t h a t accommodation and th en eve ntual l y f a l l v ic t im t oa p o l i c y of re un if ica t i on . Moscow's for e ig n po l i cy s i nc ethe 1962 m i s s i l e crisis h a s n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued t h et a c t i c of improving re la t ions w i t h Bonn, and Soviet spokes-men have repeatedly t r i e d t o convince E a s t German leaderst h a t they have not dec ided t o r e v e r se t h e i r l o ng - st an d in gpolicy--of consol id a t ng t h e s ta t u s quo i n Germany--int h e i n t e r e s t of advancing re un if ic at io n. However, m i l i -t a r y developments, p o l i t i c a l changes in Western Europe,

a l te ra t ions i n West German policy, problems w i t h E a s tEuropean a l l i e s and t h e Chinese Communists, internalSoviet concerns and other elements which l e d t h e E a s tG e r m a n s t o make t h a t r a d i c a l a ss es sm en t i n t h e last twoyears of Khrushchev's r e i g n have not fundamentally changeddur ing t h e Brezhnev-Kosygin administrat ion.

Thus, s t r a i n s i n USSR-GDR r e l a t i o n s w i l l probablyp e r s i s t as long as t h e present Kremlin r e g h e holds af l e x i b l e p o s i t i o n v i s- a- v is t h e West Germans, and as longas Moscow refrains from i t s 1958-1962 s t r a t e gy of t r y i n gt o f o r c e a German settlement on i t s terms.

Khrushchev's s t r a t e gy of b r a n d i s h in g m i l i t a r y

t h r ea t s and s e r v in g u l t i m a t u m s on B e r l i n betweien 1958 and1961 ( t h e per iod of t h e supposed " m i s s i l e gap") had not

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o n l y f a i l e d t o b r i n g about t h e d e s i r e d r e s u l t s , b u t provedt o be counter-product ive , f i r s t , i n drawing t h e Westernpowers closer together , second, i n showing by sev er albackdowns t h a t Moscow re cogn ized i ts s t r a t e g i c i n f e r i o r i t y .F r u s t r a t e d , he made a f i n a l , u n s u c c e s s f u l attempt in 1962t o break the East-West deadlock over t h e German questionw i t h a badly miscalculated v e n tur e t o place s t r a t e g i c m i s -

s i l e s i n Cuba. The h u m i l i a t i n g and c o s t l y f a i l u r e of

t h a t venture , which weakened Khrushchev's position a thome, marked an important turn ing poin t in Sovie t po l icy-- the t a c t i c of t r y i n g t o f o r c e a German set t lement wasgradua l ly she lved.

Following Xhrushchev's r ec ov er y in i n t e r n a l S o v i e tp o l i c y d e b a te s i n t h e s p r i n g of 1963 and following t h era ther aimless d r i f t in Sovie t po l icy on t h e German prob-l e m dur ing th e remainder of FEG Chancellor Adenauer'sadm ini str atio n, evidence began to accumulate that Khru-shchevss t a c t i c s , and perhaps h i s g o a l s , w i t h respect t oSoviet-Rest German r e l a t i o n s w e r e being modified..es tabl ishment of a new Bonn Government, interested in a''pol i c y of movementt1 and in taking soundings of MOSCOW~Sat t i t ud e toward German re uni f ic a t i on, w a s p r i v a t e l y greetedw i t h Khrushchev's probes for a meeting w i t h Adenauergssuccessor, Chancellor E r h a r d , and Khrushchev's expres-s i o n s of i n t e r e s t i n g r e a t l y expanded t rade r e l a t i o n sw i t h West Germany. Apparently to mol l i fy t h e i n c r e a s in g lyanxious and disgruntled E a s t German leaders, t h e Sovie t sin June 1964 s igned a f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y w i t h t h e GDR(which changed nothing basic i n t h e Moscow-East Berlinequat iqn) .e f f e c t on E a s t German a n x i e t i e s . For Khrushchev continuedt o press forward in h i s own p o l i c y of movement w i t h Bonn.In J u l y Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey i n his v i s i t toBonn t o make advance soundings made repeated s ta tementssugges t ing t h a t E a s t German party chief Ulbricht was anobstacle t h a t would not long stand in the way of g r e a t l yimproved USSR-FRG r e l a t i o n s . Adzhubey also renewed Wru-shchev's e a r l i e r expre ssed i n t e r e s t i n a Moscow-Bonnaccommodation along t h e l i n e s of th e 1922 German-Soviet

Ra pa ll o P a ct . Adzhubey, who was snubbed by Ulbricht ont h e r e t u r n t r i p t hr ou gh East Berlin, coauthored in A u g u s t

The

B u t t h i s hold ing ac t ion had l i t t l e p o s i t i v e



two h i g h l y c o n c il i a t or y a r t i c l e s i n I zv es ti ya on t h e%hangedB9m e n ta l i t y o f t h e West German people and t h e i rleaders . Meanwhile, Chinese a n d Albanian propagandistswere charging an intended v*sel.€-cmuS'' of t h e GDR, andE a s t German leaders were making remarks suggest ing con-c e rn ov er t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a Moscow b e t r a y a l . Then on2 September, Khrushchev adcepted Er h a r d ' s informal invi-t a t i o n t o come t o Bonn f o r talks--which, had t h e v i s i tt aken p lace , w o u l d have been another Khrushchev first,

The unique acceptance of BOnn's i n v i t a t i o n w a sas f a r as Khrushchev had gone i n implement ing h i s newGerman probes before h i s opponents i n th e pres idium

intervened. On 6 September, two days af te r it w a s pub-l i c l y announced (outs ide t h e USSR only) t h a t Khrushchevwould go t o Bonn, a t e c h n i c i a n attached t o t h e West Ger-man Embassy in Moscow wa s attacked w i t h m u s t a r d gas,touching off a scanda l th at imper i led Xhrushchev's invi-t a t i o n . The S o v i e t s d i d n o t o f f e r Bonn an accep tab lea p o lo g y u n t i l 1 2 October--the day t h e CPSU presid iumvoted in camera t o o u s t Xhrushchev. Also, i n September,there were a number of other developments t h a t suggestedt h a t Khrushchev's opponents were r e s i s t i n g him and wereg a in in g t h e upper hand: a c o n c i l i a t o r y s t a t e m e n t b yAdzhubey about FRG p o l i t i c a l leaders w a s d e l e t e d from aPravda vers ion of h i s remarks b u t wa s p u bl i sh e d i n I z v e s t i y a' ( 25 p t em ber ) ; th e GDR-Soviet f r i end sh i p t r ea ty w a s a t

l a s t r a t i f i e d a f t e r a three-and-a-half month d e l a y (also25 September); Pravda warned t h a t it would be a ncistaket o t h i n k t h a t a m o v e m e n t i n t h e Soviet-FRG r e l a t i onscould take p la c e a t t h e expense of t h e GDR (27 September); -TASS announced on 28 September t h a t Brezhnev, not Khru-shchev as w o u l d have been expected, would go on t o t h eCDR ann iversa ry celebrat ion . Then Suslov "guaranteed1*t h a t t h e GDR would not be s o l d out (5 October), andBrezhnev pledged (6 October) t h a t t he re would not be anydea l s made w i t h Bonn behind the backs of t h e E a s t G e r m a n s .A week l a t e r , Khrushchev w a s s t r i p p e d of a l l powers. Thet iming of these developments, i n view of t h e importanceof the German question and t h e a l l us i ons t o Khrushchev' smisconduct of German a f f a i r s r e p o r t e d ly r a i s e d a t t h e 14

October CPSU Ce nt ra l Committee t r i a l , would s e e m t o suggestt h a t Khrushchev'sGerman4pol~icywas a t l e a s t one of t h ef a c t o r s t h a t l e d t o h i s downfall .

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The new cautious and conservative leaders soonmade c lea r t h a t t h ey were not ready t o take risks o rcome up w i t h ty p i ca l l y Khrushchevian at tempts t o achievebreak5hroughs by b ol d i n i t i a t i v e s i n p o l ic y . T h e irr e s t r a i n t on German issues was evidenced in t h e s h e l v i n gof Bonn's i n v i t a t i o n a n d t h e a l t e r a t i o n of c e r t a i ne a r l e r G e r m a n f o r m u l a s ; a "se t t lement It replaced c a l l sfor a German "peace t r e a ty" a nd r e f e r e nc e s t o t h e needto a l t e r t h e s t a t u s of West B e r l i n were e v e n t u a l l yomit ted from t h e new Sovie t s ta t eme nts on t h e German ques-t i o n . T h e E a s t Germans, w h i l e e n t h u s i a s t i c a b ou t t h enew regime 's a t t i t u d e towakd a Bonn v i s i t , reacted to

Moscow 's ho ld ing operat ion by obst i n a t e ly hold i n g on tot h e o l d peace treaty-West Berlin demands throughout t h ef i r s t h a l f of 1965 in a c on t inu ing , he a t e d d i s c our s ew i t h t h e Sov ie t s .ove r Moscow's s h e l v i n g of t h e West Berlin demands,r a i s e d t h e s u b j e c t of German-Soviet s t ra ins d u r i n g t h eea r ly postwar Russ ian occupa tIon days , repeated p l a i n t s( f i r s t made i n t h e week before Khrushchev's ouster) ove rt h e S o v i e t reparat ions rape of t h e Ea st er n Zone, andp r a i s e d CPR s uppor t for GDR po l i c y .

U l b r i c h t pub l i c ly ve n t ed h i s anger

In t h e l a t t e r h a l f of 1965 a nd e a r l y 1966, how-e ve r , Moscow-Eas t B e r l i n r e l a t i on s im proved . Th i s re-s p i t e was ge ne r a l l y c o inc ide n t w i t h t h e hea t ing up of t h eV ie tnam s i t u a t i o n and t h e a t t e nda n t c oo l i ng of Moscow-Bonn r e l a t i o n s . T h e of West Germany was em -phas ized a t t h a t time as part of Moscow's r a t i o n a l e f o ri ts l i m i t e d a c t i v i t y i n V ietnam a nd as p a r t of Moscow'sde f e ns ive c oun t e r t o Chinese.' Comthunist charges t h a t t h eS o v i e t s were planning t o withdraw from--rather than openup--the front in Europe.

The respite , however, was s h o r t l i v e d . C o n d i t i o n son th e Europehn f r on t had not grown more t h r e a t e n ing ; i n -deed, t h e opening up of another Moscow-init iated c r i s i sover Ber l in and Germany--par t icular ly a t a t i m e whenFrance ' s de Gaul le had withdrawn from meaningful p a r t i -c i p a t i o n in NATO and when t h e U . S . w a s c onc e n t r a t i ng ont h e w a r i n Vietnam--would ag ai n have be$n c ou nt er pr od uc ti ve

to MOSCOW'S long -stan din g i n t e r e s t i n weakening NATO and

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d r i v i n g a wedge between the U.S. and its remaining con-t i n e n t a l a l l i e s . In t h e wake of the CPSU Congress inA p r i l 1966 t e n s i o n s w i t h t h e E a s t Germans reappeared, asMoscow renewed co nc il ia to ry g es tu re s toward th e West Ger-mans.t r e a t y and began a direc t , private exchange w i t h WestBerlin Mayor Brandt, whi le Ulbr i c h t p u b l i c l y r e v iv e d t h efears about an abandoned GDR which he had expressed int h e days before Khrushchev's ouster . Ulbricht was upsetb y lh i s a l l y ' s e x c h a n g e w i t h Bra ndt , and, u nl ik e Moscow,p a r t i c u l a r l y upset by t h e subsequent pol it i c a l coal i t ion--i n December 1966--of Braridt 's p a r t y ( t h e QPD) w i t h t h ep a r t y of Erhard's succe ssor , Chancel lor Kies inger ( t h e

CDU/CSU) .

Moscow made plans t o renew t h e USSR-FRG trade

C u r r e n t l y , r e l a t i o n s are s t r a i n e d o v e r t h e FRGc o a l i t i o n ' s e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n sw i t h E a s t European s ta tes . (Rumania has already estab-l i s h e d formal t i e s . )support t o E a s t B e r l i n ' s i n s i s t e n c e of formal West i.

German re co gn it ion of E a s t Germany as t h e p r e c o n d i t i o nfor the improvement of r e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t Europeann a t ons.

And Moscow has n o t g iv e n e f f e c t i v e



I . THE SHELVING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FORCEFUL GERMAN STRATEGY:OCTOBER 1962 - TOBER 1963

1. THE CuGiUf &iIGJIL%CRISIS AND TIE GXIIkIAN PROELEM

In 1962, f ru s t r a t e d by t h e f a i l u r e s o f f o u r y e a r s, of Be r l i n u lt ima tums and re a l i z i ng t h a t t h e Sovie t s t r a -

t e g i c p o s i t i o n had t o be d r a s t i c a l l y improved i f t h eUnited Sta te s were t o g i v e i n t o So vi et demands i n West-e r n Europe, Khrushchev made a f i n a l , u n s u c c e s s f u l a t temptt o break t h e B e r l i n deadlock w i t h a hard-line approach.

T h i s was t h e v e n tu r e t o p l a c e o f f e n s i v e mi ss i l e s i n Cubai n order to improve t h e s t r a t e g i c ba lance i n h i s f a v o r-- if not mi l i t a r i ly , the n psycholog ica lly - -long enought o make another ult imatum on Ber l in p roduce the d e s i r e dr e s u l t s .

The t iming of his Cuba mi ss i l e p la n s was c l o s e l yt i e d i n w i t h h i s e f f o r t to overcome h i s e a r l i e r Germanp o l i c y b lu n d e r s . S h o r t l y before t h e U.S. discovery oft h e m i s s i l e l au nc he r c o n s t r u c t i o n a c t i v i t y in Cuba, a12 September 1962 TASS s t a t e m e n t on Cuba pledged t h a tno i n i t i a t i v e s on the German problem w o u l d take placebefore t h e ''U.S. elect ions," which a t t h a t t i m e wereclose a t hand. In r e t r o s p e c t , what t h e statement be-

t r a y e d w a s t h a t no aew S o v i e t i n i t i a t i v e w i t h a chance ofsuccess could t ake p la c e before t h e es tab l i shment of

t h e Cuban missile bases, w h ich was also c lose at hand.

t o l i q u i d a t e t h e occupat ion regime i n West B e r l i n w a sd i s c u s s e d i n a c l a s s i f i ed Sovie t Foreign Min is t ry posi-t i o n p ap er d a t e d 30 September, which a l s o p r e s e n t e d t h eSoviet ' s "problem fif7 how t o r e c o n c i l e f i o v me s t i t 7 aUSSR-GDR peace t rea ty w i t h t h e West 's ideres ts in t h eFRG and West Berl in ." The po si t i on paper c i t e d Gromyko'so v e r ly o p t i m i s t i c 24 A p r i l 1962 Supreme S o v ie t a n a ly s i sof t h e 11 March 1962 Geneva meeting w i t h U.S. SecretaryRusk. R e f l e c t i n g t h e w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g in Xhrushchev's

Cuban venture in genera l , t h e pos i t ion paper d i d n o treport the U.S. State Department 's react ion t o Gromyko'sassessment--a react ion which d i d not suppor t Gromyko'soptimism on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c o n c i l i n g t h e West's

The 1 2 September TASS announcement w i t h i t s t h r e a t

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i n t e r e s t s i n West Germany and West Berlin--and emphasizedonly th e "po s i t ive fac to rs ' ' th a t Gromyko saw l e ad i n g t oa r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of S o v i e t and Wes te rn i n t e r e s t s :*

A.A. Gromyko noted, a f t e r a meeting w i t hSe cr et ar y Rusk i n Geneva i n March 1962,'as a ' pos i t ive fac to r . . . t h e d e c l a r a t i o nof t h e American s ide t h a t it does n o tsee obstacles to t h e combining of f r e eaccess t o West B e r l i n w i t h t h e demandf o r respect of t h e s o v e r e ig n ty of t h eGDR.' Wfth respect t o t h e ques t ion oft h e non-arming w i t h n u c l e a r weapons of

t h e GDR and t h e FRG, A.A. Grmyko notedt h a t 'on t h e American s i d e the re is under-s t a n d i n g of t h e importance of t h i s ques-t i o n . T h i s is a pos i t ive f a c t , i f , ofcourse, these s e n s ib l e g le am s do n o t d i eo u t here under t h e in f luence of otherwinds.O A.A.. Gromyko further noted t h a t' i n t h e course of exchanges of views be$ -:tween t h e Governments of t h e USSR and theU.S. t he re was achieved i n p r i n c ip l e m u t u a lunders tand ing regard in g t h e n e c e s s i t y ofconcluding, Qn one form or ano ther , a pactof non-aggression between NATO and the O r -g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Warsaw Pact. T h i s is a

move In a u s e f u l d i r e c t i o n . 'The c la s s i f i ed p o s i t i o n p ap er went on t o claim t h a t t h eGovernment of West Germany had s u c c e s s f u l l y "appl ied pres-s u r e on Washington i n order to d i s r u p t the contemplatedagreement f i i c p , b u t , in conclus ion, l e f t t h e impressiont h a t t h e SZviZts could s t i l l f o r c e a wedge between Wash-ington and Bonn and accomplish t h e in tended Moscow-E?s tGerman maneuver :

The U.S. does not want t o l e a v e West B e r l i n .B u t in t h i s case, a f t e r t h e t r ans fer of

*Five days a f t e r t h e Rusk-Gromyko meeting, Khrushchevi n h i s 16 March 1962 speech made h i s f i r s t comment on aUSSR-GDR peace t r e a t y q in c e h i s 17 October 1 96 1 c e n t r a lcommittee report to t h e 22nd CPSU Congress, when he w i t h -d re w h i s t h r e a t to sign the t r e a t y b e f o r e ' t h e end of 1961.

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c o n t r o l t o t h e GDR of t h e r o u te s t o WestB e r l i n , t h e Americans w i l l have t o n e g o t i a t ew i t h t h e Government of t h e GDR on q u e s t i o n sof access. There is a d i s c u s s io n in t h eU.S. p r e s s w i t h regard t o t h e degree towhich t h e U.S. shou ld recogn ize t h e sover-e i g n t y of t h e GDR. In t h i s m a t t e r it isborne in mind t h a t Chancellor Adenaueris a g a i n s t any kind of recogn i t ion .

And I l r e p o r t s saeda t t h a t t i m e t h a t t h e S o v ie t Union was making extensive

m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p r e p ar a t io n s f o r t h e s i g n i n g ofa s e p a r a t e p eac e t r e a t y w i t h E a s t Germany in November*1962*--t h e &&ionmonth which w o u l d a l s o have marked t h e comple-t i o n of 40 missile l a u n c h e r s in Cuba. Khrushchev f o rt h e f i r s t t i m e may w e l l have see n hims elf , once t h e m i s -s i l e bases were i n C u b a , i n a much more favorable posi-t i o n e i t h e r t o employ suc ces s fu l ly h i s one-sided demandst h a t t h e West upgrade the position of East Germany byn e g o t i a t i n g access procedure with t h e GDR Government,o r t o o f f e r t h e withdrawal of the Cuban bases f o r West-ern concess ions in or withdrawal from Berlin.

The f a i l u r e of the Cuban venture turned o u t t o bean impor tan t tu rn i ng po in t in Khrushchev's Germanj po li cy :w i t h t h a t e v e n t , t h e p o l i c y of t r y i ng t o fo r ce a Germanset t lement upon t h e West began to founder.

2. THE AFTERMATH OF TBE CUBAN CRISIS: THE DIMINUTIONOF THE GERMAN CRISIS

The e a r l i e s t high-level pronouncement t o t h e e f f ec tt h a t Moscow was a t t e n u a t i n g t h e c r i s i s atmosphere on t h eGerman problem which had preceded and accompanied t h e Cubam i s l i l e crisis w a s given in Kos ygin 's 6 November 1962speech on. t h e ann iversa ry of t h e 1917 Communist c oun ter -r e v o lu t i o n in R u s s i a .

*The c l a s s i f i e d Foreign Minis t ry posi t ion paper c i t e d--and d i d not deny--press r epor t s t o t h e effect t h a t a f t e rNovember 1962 t h e USSR w o u l d sign a s e p a r a t e peace t r e a t y ,and th a t "a new 'bloc kade' of West B e r l i n w i l l t ake p lace ."

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The S ov ie t Government ha s announced E i c 7and is announcing now t h a t the peaceTul-no rm a l i za t i on of Germany can be imple-mented without detriment t o t h e i n t e r e s t so r t h e p r e s t i g e of any country or groupof c o u n t r i e s t hr ou gh a goodwill agreementon t h e p a r t of a l l i n t e r e s t e d s i d e s .

Kosygin i n h i s November speech d i d n o t t h r e a t e n a s e p a r a t eUSSR-GDR p e a c e t r e a t y , a s had o t he r S ov i e t l eaders p r i o rt o the week of t h e m i s s i l e c r i s i s , s u c h as presidium mem-ber Kozlov I n a 6 October Moscow speech on t h e GDR's 1 3 t h

a n n i v e r s a r y . N o r d i d Kosygin demand t h e withdrawal oft h e Western occupa t ion forces from West Berlin--a "pre-cond i t i on , '' s a i d Foreign Minister Gromyko on 24 Octoberi n E a s t B e r l i n d u r i n g t h e week of t h e Cuban cris is , f o rany agreement l e a d i n g t o a German peace treaty.

The de c r e as e i n t h e i n t e n s i t y of h o s t i l e , t h r e a t -en in g remar ks from Moscow di d n ot , however, fo ll ow ane v e n p a t t e r n a f t e r Kosygin's G November speech. In f a c ton t h e d a y of Kosygin's remarkably m i l d c a l l for a "good-

w i l l agreement, '' Sov iet Ambassador t o th e GDR Pervukini n an E a s t Ber l in Neues Deutschland a r t i c l e t h rea t enedt h a t a f t e r a s e p a r m e a c e t r ea t y w i th E a s t Germany, con-t r o l of access t o and from West B er l i n and o t he r areas

w i t h i n E a s t Germany would be tu rn ed ov er t o t h e GDR. AndKhrushchev and Gromyko renewed t h e s ep ar at e t r e a t y t h r e a ti n t h e i r Supreme Sovie t speeches o f 12 and 13 December1962 , r e spec t i ve l y .

of a sepa ra t e t r e a t y dimini shed , and by ea r l y 1963 sucht h r e a t s h ad v i r t u a l l y d i sa pp ea re d f r o m Soviet propaganda.(For example, SED media, b u t n o t CPSU media, publicizedan 18 January East Be rl in int erv iew i n which Khrushchevmade h i s l a s t recorded r e f e r e n c e t o a s e p a r a t e t r e a t y .The r e fe renc e , i nc i de n t a l l y , w a s couched in co ndi t i ona lterms and s t ressed t h e desire t o reach an agreement with

B u t fo l l ow i ng t h e S upreme S ov i e t s e s s i on , t h re a t s

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t h e West "so t h a t no u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n s w i l l be taken."*)And along w i t h t h e diminut ion of such t h r e a t s , p r e s s u r efor a German solution decreased i n e l i t e Soviet comments.

Khrushchev himself in h i s 16 January 1963 EastB e r l i n speech made t h e argument that t h e conclusion ofa p e a c e t r e a t y w a s no longer the problem it had been be-fore t h e cons t ruc t i on of t h e B e r l in wall (13 August 1961)i n an excep t ion a l ly def ens ive passage , which at tacked t h eviews of ltsome peo ple " who " t h i nk t ha t fou r yea r s f i fS ov i e t po l i cy on t h e German ' q u e s t ion7 have been wagtedIn f a c t , Ehrushch ev's 1958-1962 dipTomacy f o r th e Ger-manies represented an i ng l o r i ous r ecord of po l i cy f a i l u r e s .H e had t r i e d and f a i l e d t o d r i v e a wedge between West Ger-many and o t h e r Western powers and t o se t West Germanya d r i f t from NATO,** to prevent the recrudescence of aGerman mi l i t a ry th rea t t o the Soviet Union by keepingGermany divided; t o conclude a peace t r e a t y w i t h t h e

*In response to a question, repor t ed D i e Wahrheit ( t h eorgan of t h e West B er l i n SJZD) on 31 Janu-, Khrushchevon 18 January i n an in t e rv iew w i t h West B er l i n SED repre-s e n t a t i v e s r e p l i e d t h a t " i f we s i g n a peace t r e a t y with-o u t t h e Western powers, we will l eave West Berl in untouched.

W s h a l l merely t a ke th e fo l lowing road :communication w i l l be placed under t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n oft h e GDR; t he occupa t ion w i l l end; t h e r i g h t s ole t h e occupa-t i o n powers w i l l end, for order on t h i s t e r r i t o r y w i l lth en be guaranteed by the peace t r e a t y . T h i s is our posi -tion. However, w e are seek ing t o reach an agreement w i t ht h e West so t h a t no u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n w i l l be t a k e n , a f t e ra l l w e are not demanding any gains for ourselves , w e aredemanding nothing, we want t o f i n a l i z e what e x i s t s .

**As a r e s u l t , t h e Western powers drew c l o se r t oge t he rand b u i l t u p t h e i r forces in Europe, t h e r e b y help ing t h eSoviet champions of s t r o n g e r theater f o r c e s t o h a l t t h et roop c u t i n s t i t u t e d e a r l i e r by Khrushchev and t o push

through t h e i r pre fe r r ed defense programs a t th e expenseof Khrushchev's schemes for general economic progress.

t h e l i n e of

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Germanies on Sovie t terms and t o a l t e r t h e s t a t u s of WestB e r li n ; t o f o r c e a withdrawal of U.S. f o r c e s from Germans o i l ; t o make E a s t Germany a v i ab l e sove re i gn s t a t e andt o gai n non-bloc r eco gni t io n f o r E a s t Germany; t o expandS ov i e t i n f l uence i n West Germany and promote Soviethegemony in Western Europe; t o get West Germany t o re -l i n q u i s h claims t o t e r r i t o r y l o s t t o Eas t Europe a f t e rWorld War 11; t o c u t back s u b s t a n t i a l l y S o vi et f o r c e ss t a t ion ed i n Eas t Germany; or even t o achieve some degreeof m i l i t a r y disengagement through an East-West nonaggres-sion p a c t .

One of the **somepeople" t h a t Khrushchev on 16January 1963 was re bu t t i ng may w e l l have been presidiumco ll ea gu e Kozlov, who d i d n o t r e i t e r a t e Khrushchev's 16J a n u a r y s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e B e r l i n wall f o r a Germanpeace t r ea ty , and cont inued t o appeal f o r th e "swi f t con-c l u s i o n of a German peace t r e a t y and norma lizat i on, ont h e b a s i s of t h a t t r e a ty , of t h e s i t u a t i o n in West Ber l in t1(Leningrad e l ec t i on speech , 26 February 1963) . A l m o s t

as i f h e were r e p l y i n g t o su ch "people" and as i f h e weretrying to a l l a y fears in some quarters t h a t he migh t con-s ider abandoning the GDR, Khrushchev in h i s 27 February1963 e l ec t i on speech pledged th a t t he Sovie t Union w o u l dnot engage i n a ba rga i n w i t h t he "West German revanchists"to so lve t e r r i t o r i a l di s pu t es by purchase . La t e r , in

his 8 March 196 3 Moscow spee ch , Khrushchev cr i t i c i zedBeria and Malenkov for making "the prov ocat ive pro posa lt o l i q u i d a t e t h e GDR as ' a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e . "*

*The fir t r e f e r e n c e t o an E a s t G e r m a n se l l -out wasg i ven i n t h e S ov i e t p r e s s i n t he days fo l l owi ng Khru-shchev's 22d CPSU Congress withdrawal of t h e 1961 dead-l i n e f o r a p e a c e t r e a t y . I t was also a t i m e when (as i ne a r l y 1963) Khrushchev's freedom of'maneu ver w a s hampered.H i s aggr ess i ve po l i c y had brought about mob i l i za t ion andi nc rea sed combat e f f i c ie n c y i n t h e West and had l e d t ot h e suspens ion of h i s p roposed one- th i rd t roop c u t plan .The source of t h e s e l l -o u t r em inde r was an Ulbr i ch t speech

publ i shed in Pra vda i n November 1961 which included a pas-sage s t a t i n g € I Z 3 7 i t is known" t h a t Beria, like Malenkov,opposed t he bu i ld i ng of social ism i n E a s t Germany. Theappendix (pages 94-104) examines t h e "Beria her es y. ''

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3. THE DETENTE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In mid-Apri l , K o z 1 0 V j whose i nf lu en ce on So vi etp o l i c y i n g e n e ra l was a t i ts h e i g h t , l e f t t h e Sovie tp o l i t i c a l scene , t h e v i c t i m of a hear t a t t ack .* Khru-shchev in t h e s p r i n g of 1963 than managed t o g e t t h eu pp er hand i n t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i c y d e b at e s , and f o r e i g npol icy began t o t ake a more d e l i b e r a t e course in t h eg e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n of re laxed tens ions .**

\

*During t h e w in te r a nd e a r l y s p r i n g of 1963, many of K h r u -shchev's ea r l i e r pol ic ie s were either h a l t e d or reversed .And Kozlov in p u b l i c s pe ec he s a t t h a t time appeared t obe l ead ing th e cha l leng e t o Khrushchevian pol ic ie s r e l a t -i n g t o t h e correct r o l e for t h e CPSU, re sour ce al lo ca ti on ,r ef or m i n a g r i c u l t u r e , a r t and l i tera ture , and Yugoslavia .(Kozlov's heart a t t a c k came a t about t h e time of t h eunique 10 Apri l Pravda "correct ion ' ' i n t h e 1963 May Days logan t h a t Y u g o m "is b u i l d i n g The o r i g -

i n a l 8 A p r i l release of t h e s lo g a n d i d not s t a t e t h a tYugoslavia is " b u i l d in g socialism"--a Kozlovian , b u t nota typical ly Khrushchevian omission.) By l a t e May 1963,Kozlov's name, whiqh had followed Khrushchev's i n pro to col

r a n k in g s s i n c e t h e October 1961 CPSU Congress, was andcont nued t o be 1 s t e d in s t r ic t a lphabe t ica l o rder .

**Chief of t h e S o v ie t d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e Geneva disarma- -ment t a l k s , Tsa rap kin (c ur re nt ly Ambassador t o t h e FRG),made a "big: concesslon.'f a t Geneva and accord was reachedon a Washington-Moscow d i r e c t communications link, t h e"hot l i n e " ; t h e S o v i e t s asked for resumption of b i l a t e r a lt a l k s on Berlin and Germany, e t c . The new course gainedmomentum, w i t h t h e s i g n i n g of t h e p a r t i a l t e s t ban t r e a t yi n J u l y , t h e s i g n i n g of a UN agreement t o ban o r b i t a lnu cle ar weapons i n October, t h e announcement i n Decemberof a reduc t ion in t h e m i l i t a r y b u dg et , a "contemplated"c u t in t h e s ize of Sovie t fo rc es , and a p o l i c y of arms

redu ct ion by " m u t u a l example ."

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B u t even in t h e new warmer atmosphere Khrushchevc on t in u ed t o b e t roub l ed by t h e German question, becauseso many of h i s o t h e r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s were t i e d t oit. The German question s tood in t h e way of substant ia lpr og re ss toward improving E a s t - N e s t r e l a t i o n s , grea te rs t a b i l i t y i n Europe , and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e arms race , whichw o u l d have pe r m i t t e d h i m t o press forward w i t h h i s ambi-t i o u s economic programs. In a d d i t i on t o t h e German ques-t i o n , p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China addedurgency for t h e achievement of Khrushchev's pos t -miss i lecr is is o b j e c t i v e s w i t h t h e West. P a r t ic u l a r l y a f t e r t h ec r i s i s , the re was growing e viden ce t h a t t h e i r ne ighbor

to t h e E a s t was being looked upon by Soviet m i l i t a r y plan-ners more as a p o te n t i a l m i l i t a r y op po ne nt t h a n a s a n a l l y .S o vi et m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s a g a in s t p o s s ib l e i n c u r s io n sby Chinese t roops a long t h e v a s t borders were being gradu-a l l y b u i ld up, and t h e S o v i e t s were beginning t o developa new and more f l e x i b l e m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e s u i t a b l e f o rd e a l i n g w i t h t h e k i n ds of m i l i t a r y th rea ts s h o r t of "mas-s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n " which China might pose fo r t h e USSR.

In t h i s environment, Khrushchev, who seemed t o be

movdig toward a p o l i t i c a l showdown w i t h t h e Chinese Com-munist Party, began t o r e v e a l t h e desire t o a l l e v i a t e t h em i l i t a r y th rea t from t h e West and t o consummate h i s objec-t i v e of d e t e n t e w i t h t h e West. And throughout t h e sum-

m e r of 1963 Sovie t propaganda references .to Western " m i s -u s e " of West B er li n and t h e a i r corridors t o B e r l i n , t ot h e importance and urgency of s e t t l i n g t h e German problem,t o t h e need t o * * l i q u i d a t e * *h e Western occupation regime,and t o o t h e r p a s t cr is is themes took on a per func to ry a i rwhi le r e f e r e n c e s to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of better.Moscow-Bonnr e l a t i o n s r e cu r r ed more f r e q u e n t l y .

was given unusual stress in Khrushchev's 2 J u l y 1963 E a s tB e r l i n speech . Thus Khrushchev, w hi t e i n d i c a t i n g t h a tt h e S o v ie t Union c o u ld c e r t a in ly l i v e w itho u t a Germanpeace t r e a t y f o r t h e time being, gave consi derab le emphasisin his l eng thy s p e e c h t o t h e need t o normalize economic

and t r a d e r e l a t i o n s be twe en West Germany and t h e USSR.He even recal led p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s i n t h e Donbass coalmines working near German engineers d u r i n g t h e period of

The d e s i r e f o r good r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bonn, f o r example,

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<

L

.. ,

.

t h e Rapa l lo Fact a f t e r World War I "when German s t a t e s -men mustered t h e s t re ng th and courage t o acknowledge t h a tf r ie nd ly r e la t io n s between Germany and t h e Soviet Unionw o u l d b e n e f i t b o t h co un tr ie s and both peoples . lt But hea l so went o u t of h i s way t o reassure Ulbr icht t h a t hew o u l d n o t s e l l - o u t t h e GDR f o r t h e pr i ce 09 good r e la-t i o n s w i t h t h e FRG. W i t h o u t naming Wr $a o r Malenkov,he s t a t ed t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n p u t fo r t h by " s tatesmen oft h e FRG" fo r a "change i n t h e po l i c y a nd s o c i a l sys temof t h e GDR" f o r good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Soviet Union hadbeen "smashed t o smithereens 10 y e a r s aga." (This-wast h e l a s t recorded ins tance of a no s e l l - o u t p l e d g e from

Khrushchev, as w e l l as t h e l a s t time he a l l u d e d t o t h e"BBr i a heresy . 'l)

However, an ot he r f i g u r e , FRG Ch an ce ll or Adenauer,remained as a brake on any major Khrushchevian policy in-novat ions reg ard ing Germany. Adenauer's near i n t ra ns ig en t"no exper iments" pol icy toward t h e East gave Khrushchevl i t t l e f l e x i b i l i t y w i t h which t o explore economic and polit i c a l matters w i t h Bonn and, in Khrushchev's l i g h t s , d i dn ot r e f l e c t t h e "s t rength and courage81which he asc r ibedi n J u l y t o e a r l y post-World W a r I German policy. Khru-s h c h e v ' s a p p a r e n t i n a b i l i t y t o se t a German po li cy i nmotion dur ing t h e l a s t year of Adenauer 's reign was per-haps r ef lec ted i n an i n t r a n s ig e n t s t a t e m e n t of h i s o m ,

i n September 1963 t h a t a

Communist Germany. '(*any Could, i n th! S o v ie t view, only be a

* B u t one year l a t e r , when Khrushchev spoke about t h ef u t u r e p o l i t i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n of a r e u n i t e d Germany, heavoided making a Communist sys t em a c o n d i t i o n f o r Germanr e u n i f i c a t i o n . ( P a g e 22)



11. TEIE DEVELOPMENT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S GERMAN POLICY:OCTOBER 1963.- OCTOBER 1964

1. EVALUATING THE N E W CHANCELLOR

W i t h t h e Erhard admi n is t ra t ion ta k in g over i n mid-October 1963, however, Khrushchev began a cautious recon-nai ssa nce of Bonn's I tpolicy of movement" toward t h e East .*In f a c t , Khrushchev 's i n i t i a l movement on t h e German q u e s -t i o n may have been l i t t l e more than a r e a c t i o n t o Erhard 's

more f l e x i b l e appro ach towa rd Moscow-Bonn problems. Mos-cow's g e n e r a l l y f a v o r a b l e e v a lu a t i o n of Bonn's new coursewas r e f l e c t e d in t h e propaganda which in the main t reatedt h e new cbancellor wit h c i rcumspect ion, and in Sovie tdiplomacy which did not at tempt t o f r u s t r a t e E rh ar d' s(and the FRG businessmen's) "policy of movement" in r e g a r dt o t h e S o v ie t Union and Eastern Europe.

S o v i e t p r o p a g an d i s t s c r i t i c i z e d C ha nc e ll or E r h a r d' sf i r s t B un de st ag p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t (18 October 1963) as ac o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e "ant i - d e t e n t e " p o l i c i e s of his p redeces -s o r . B u t in th e months th a t fo l lowed, t h e p ropaganda took'a more c o n c i l i a t o r y t u r n , t h e German "ant i -de ten te" po l icytheme was dropped, and, with r are exgept ions ,* the image

*While t h e "po l icy of movement" originated i n t h e l a s tt w o y e a r s of th e Adenauer admi n is t ra t ion ( th e po l i cy wa sauthored by Foreign Minister Schroeder), it was l i m i t e di n scope by Adenauer and was not given impetus u n t i l Er-hard 's admi nis t ra t ion . Under Adenauer, t he pol icy ' s m a i nsuccess w a s t he exchange of t r ad e miss ions wi th Po land

, i n March 1963.

**Possibly t o l a y the groundwork for Mikoyan's t a l k sw i th U lb r i c h t , Moscow in a TASS re lease on 6 March 1964

' - launched i t s secon d propaganda cr i t i c i sm of the Erhardgovernment. B u t even i n th e middle of Mikoyan's v i s i t

t o t h e GDR, Moscow [ [ a f f i r m e d ts i n t e n t i o n s t om a i n t a i n h ig h e s t l e v e l contacts w i th t h e Erhard govern-m e n t .

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of a German Chancellor was no longer p resen ted t o S o v ie tc i t i z e ns a s t h a t of a r e v a n c h i s t , m i l i t a r i s t , and in-transigent demagogue of t h e former H i t l e r i t e Reich.Moscow propagand is t s greeted s ta tements by Erhard on im -p ro vi ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t e r n Europe and t h e S o v ie tUnion w i t h optimism and expressed hope t h a t " p r a c t i c a ldeeds" would fo l low the new Chanc el lor ' s pol ic y s ta tem ent .(E rha rd , i n t h e meantime, had been probing for new t r a d ec o n t a c t s w i t h t h e E a s t . )

R a t h e r ,

A t t h e same t ime, t h e S o v ie t press and radio madevery l i t t l e mention of such d i s sonan t themes as checkpoint

" v i o l a t i o n s , w i n t r a - B e r l i n t r a f f i c i n c i d e n t s, w a l l t rpro-voc at i ons , l*provocat ve" occupat ion maneuvers i n WestB e r l i n , " r e v a n c h i s t '* meetings , and "v io la t ions" i n accessprocedures t o West Ber l in . Regard ing access, f o r example,t h e October and November 1963 U.S. Be r l i n convoy in c id en tswere playe d down i n So vi et propaganda. The f i r s t i n c i d e n t(10-12 October) was publ ic ly regarded by Moscow r ad ioas a mean ng le ss even t ( t h e " inc iden t . . . is not worth af a r t h i n g "P ; t h e second (4-6 November) evoked a shor t l i v e dand r e l a t i v e l g m i l d react ion which, w i t h o u t e l a b o r a t i o n,ambiguously warned of poss ible ' 'undesirable consequences**

of f u t u r e U.S. checkpoin t **v io la t ions ." Ins tead of d i s -sonan t themes, a t t e n t i o n wa s pa id t o West Berlin-GDR co-

o p e r a t i o n , which Moscow encouraged. For example, t h e

ground-breaking West Berlin-GDR agreement of 17 December1963 on West B e r l i n h o l i d ay passes t o v i s i t Ea s t B e r l i nwas s a i d , i n a n 11 March 1964 Soviet memorandum, t o havel e d t o a ce r t a in **detente" between E a s t and West Germany;it was sa id , too, t h a t "as a d d i t i o n a l similar agreementsare reached, t h e y w i l l f u r t he r e f f o r t s toward r e u n i f i c a -t ion . A l s o, significantly, Bonn-Moscow cooperation be-

came a common theme i n pr i v a t e st at em en ts and p ra c t i c a ls t e p s were taken. For example, in t h e e a r l y s p r i ng of1964 t h e West German industrial f i r m , Krupps, w a s p e r m i t t e dby Moscow t o open t h e f i r s t N e s t German commercial o f f i cei n t h e USSR.

An im po rt an t developme nt i n t h i s per iod , a water-

s h e d i n KhrushchevOs new ap pro ach toward Germany, occurredon 11 March when Ambassador Smirnov delivered a messagefrom Khrushchev t o Erhard t h a t gave r i se t o the first

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s p e c u l a t i o n in t h e Western press that Khrushchev mightbe cons i de r i ng a meeting w i t h t h e new head of t h e WestGerman s t a t e . The message i t se l f repor t ed ly made nobas ic changes in t h e p r i o r S o v i e t p o s i t i o n s on t h e Ger-man question; i t was only a gambit , b u t t h e f i r s t o fmany which l e d t o a great ly improved atmosphere i n Moscow-Bonn re l a t i on s dur in g t h e remainder of Khrushchev's ef-f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of S ov ie t fo r e i gn po l i cy .

r e a c t i o n t o an offer made in l a t e 1963 by Erhard t o pur-chase t h e GDR was one of s i l ence - - r a t he r t han t h e r i d i c u l eand d i sda in t h a t sp ice d Khrushchev 's e a r ly 1963 pub l i cp ledge t h a t t h e USSR w o u l d not engage in barga ins relatedt o t e r r i t o r i a l purchas e. Erh ard, when he f i r s t discussedt h e idea of r e u n i f ication-through-purchase w i t h a U.S.o f f i c i a l in ea r l y O c tobe r 1963, s a i d t h a t Germany nightc o n tr i bu t e i n d u s t r i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s f o r t h e developmentof S i b e r i a o v er a 10-to-20 year per iod i f Khrushchev wouldagree t o a phased German un i f i c a t io n program.

A l s o s i g n i f i c a n t wa s t h e f a c t t h a t MOSCOW'S p u b l i c

Andl

t h e g e n e r a l i d e a of Erhard 'S reun i f i ca t ion scheme is a l-most cer t a in . For i n e a r l y J u ne , E r h a r d ' s message w a s

pla in ly conveyed in a U.S. News and World Report inter-view w i t h h i m .

W are ready t o conclude a tzade t r e a t y .I can on ly repeat w e w o u l d not shunsac r i f i ces , if by economic means w e c o u l dh p r o v e . t h e l o t of th German people i nt h e Sovie t occupa t ion zone , or could movea s te p towa-rd re un i f ic a t i o n and self-?E€Gr-minat ion.*

*Emphasis supp l i ed here and elsewhere in t h i s paper ,un l e s s otherwise noted.

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f I

.

1



Moscow's propaganda i n June scored E r h a r d ' s "se l f -

determinat ion" appeal (" i t means t h e a b s o r p t i o n of t h eGDR by t h e FRG") b u t r e m a in e d s i l e n t on t h e expressedw i l l i n g n e s s of Erhard to make economic sac r i f i ces i n t h ei n t e r e s t of promot ing reu n i f ica t io n and se l f -determina-t ion. Si mi la rl y, Khrushchev, in extensive remarks ont h e German problem i n h i s '12 June Kremlin speech c r i t i -cized s e l f - d e t e r m in a t i o n as a "non app l icab le1 ' r eun i f i-c a t i o n p r i n c i p l e , b u t nowhere in t h a t or any other p u b l i cspeech mentioned Erh ard 's economic approach t o r e u n i f i c a -t ion, Khrushchev, i n f a c t , f a i l e d i n 1964 t o make anye x p l i c i t "no se l l - ou t " pledges; t h e s e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , weref i r s t made by Khrushchev's pre sid ium opponents a week be-f o r e t h e Kremlin coup.

2 . TROUBLE WITH EAST GERMANY

The shelving of MOSCOW'S s t r a t e g y of t r y i n g t of o r c e a German settlement and t h e concomitant diminutionof E a s t - W e s t and, in p a r t i c u l a r , Soviet-West German ten-sions in Europe had begun to adverse ly effect E a s t Germanr e la t ions wi th t h e Sovie t Union. As i f t o c o u n t e r t h eopenly expressed fea rs of Ulbricht an d h i s E a s t GermanSED co l leag ues about a Bonn-Moscow detente, a stream ofhigh- level Sovie t leaders a r r i v e d in t h e GDR.

Mikoyan's 10-12 March t r i p t o E a s t B e r l i n , o s t en -s i b l y t o celebrate t h e 70th b i r t h d a y of inaca ive PremierGrotewohl, w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y c u r i o u s in l i g h t of t h e f a c t -t h a t no other bloc d i g n i t a r i e s of Mikoyan's rank a t t e n d e d .Mikoyan's ap pea ran ce seemed t o r e p r e s e n t a S o v ie t e f f o r tt o assuage E a s t German f e a r s on ce r t a i n economic andm i l i t a r y * p o i n t s of disag reeme nt. However, ju dg in g from

* A t t h -s t i m e , Ulb i c h t may already have been awareof a contemplated Sovie t scheme, r e p o r t s of which s u r -faced i n J un e , t o wi t hdraw some 20,000 t r o o p s from t h e

GDR. U l b r i c h t may have a l so been concerned w i t h t h econsequences of a planned reorganizat ion of t h e G r o u p( foo tno te c o n t i n u e d on page 14 )

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I I

t h e E a s t German propaganda treatment of Mikoyan and t h esubsequent--and poss ibl y re la t ed --v is i t s of MarshalsGrechko and MaPanovskiy, t h e Soviets ' mid-spr ing e f f o r tt o r e a s s u r e t h e E a s t Germans was n ot e n t i r e l y successful.

One of t h e most l ike ly topics of d i s c u s s io n d u r in gMikoyan's March v i s i t was t h e G D R ' s resentment of t h e actionof othe r East European countries in s i g n i n g trade agree-ments w i t h West Germany t h a t recognized West B e r l i n asp a r t of t h e West German currency area. The E a s t Germans

(footnote cont inued f rom page 13)

of Soviet Forces/Germany (GSFG) . That Ulbr icht fe l t - -a tl e a s t d u r in g March and ea r l y Apri l - - that t h e proposedS o v ie t m i l i t a r y c ha ng es might be less than advantageousfor GDR s e c u r i t y is suggested by E a s t Ber l in ' s and Mos-cow's propaganda treatment of t h e v i s i t s of Grechko andMa linovs kiy. The TASS and ADN r e p o r t s of t h e 9 A p r i lMalinovskiy-Ulbr icht meeting a t yp ic al ly deleted t h es t e r e o ty p e d r e f e r e n c e s t o c o r d i a l i t y ; ADN devoted sixf u l l p a r a g r a p h s t o U l b r i c h t ' s i n v e c ti v e on Bonn's nu-clear a p p e t i t e , ignored Malinovskiy's r ep ly , and t h u s

l e f t t h e impression t h a t Ulbr ich t had d e l i v e r e d a s t e r nlecture t o Moscow on t h e t r u e n a t u re of t h e West Germapmenace. E a s t German media app are ntl y ignored Grechko'sv i s i t al together .

However, subs equen t developments sugg es t t h a t Ulbr ich t ' sa n x i e ty o v e r S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l a n s was a t l e a s t p a r t l yassuaged. The 13 Jun e Soviet-GDR j o i n t communique re-corded Ulbr ich t 's p r a i s e f o r ghrushchev's pol i c y of "mutualexample@' n a manner t h a t co uld be re,ad as giv i ng approva li n p r i n c i pa l t o f u r t h e r S o vi e t e f f o r t s i n t h a t ve in , in -c lu d in g a r e d u c ti o n i n t h e GSFG.

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were p u bl i cl y c r i t i c a l of E a s t Germany's a l l i e s fo r havingp a r t i c i p a t e d in t h i s West German "scheme" t o i s o l a t e t h eGDR, a n d t h e i r cr i t i c i sm was c a n d idly e x p re s se d i n t h eSED p o l i t b u r o ' s 15 February repor t t o t h e 3-7 February1964 SED plenum.

No d i r e c t evidence bearing on Mikoyan.'s stand ont h e V 3 e r l i n clause" c o n t r ov e r s y s u r f a c e d d u r in g h i s d i s -c u s s io n s w i t h Ulbr ich t . That t h e Sov ie ts had adopted a"hands-of f '' p o l c y on t h e problem, however, was re f l ec ted

i n Moscow~spropaganda, which vi r t u a l l y ignored t h e SED'Scampaign aga ins t t h e Ber l i n c lause , and Moscow's i n t r a -

bloc d ip lo m a t i c p o s i t i o n s . For example, MOSCOWd i d n o texpress d i s p lea sure when B u l g a r i a on 6 May signed a N e s tGerman t r ade agreement which included a B e r l i n clause andth us jo in ed Poland, Hungary and Rumania i n t h e FR6 "scheme"t o i s o l a t e t h e GDR. Another example of Mopcow's "hands-o f f " l i n e may be read i n t o a r t i c l e six of t h e 12 June1964 Soviet-GDR fr ien dsh ip t r ea t y . The s t i p ul a t io n i na r t i c l e six t h a t "West B e r l i n is regarded as a s e p a r a t ep o l i t i c a l unit" allowed t h e S o vi e t Union t o concludeeconomic t r ea t i e s with West Germany t h a t might inc ludeWest B e r l i n w i th o u t r e c o g n i z in g it as p a r t o f t h e F ed e ra lRepublic p o l It i c a l l y .

* A f t e r Khrushchev's ous ter , Soviet Deputy ForeignMi ni st er Semenov i n a t a l k w it h FRG Ambassador Groepperon 10 November in Moscow f l a t l y s t a t ed t h a t a r t i c l e s j xof t h e USSR-GDR f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y barred i n c lu s io n of aBer l in c3ause in a USSR-FRG t r a d e pa ct . However, Semenovpromptly suggested a means of g e t t i n g around a r t i c l e six.His sugges t ion , di scussed on page 71, in e f f e c t r e c o g n i z e dt h a t B e r l in is p a r t of t h e West German currency area.Semenov's proposal was l a t e r shelved dur ing a pe r iod ofcool Moscow-Bonn r e l a t i o n s i n 1965.

I I



. .. ... .. . .. .

, . .._

ktts

..

Buying Time w i t h t h e Fr iendsh ip T r e a t y

The s igning of t h a t Soviet -East German fr i en ds hipt r e a t y on 12 June afforded Khrushchev an oppor t un i t y t om o l l i f y Wlbricht , who w a s becoming in creas ing ly r es t i veove r ghrushchev's ' 'detente mood" and, i n pa r t i c u la r , i t smeaning f o r t h e German prob lem. Fo r example, t h i s moodwas re f l ec ted in Khrushchev's e f f o r t s t o n o t i f y in ad-vance t h e Uni ted S t a t e s , Br i t a i n and France t h a t t h et r e a t y w i t h U l b r i c h t w o u l d not af fec t ex i s t ing Weste rnr i g h t s i n West B er l i n . While t h e t r e a t y a n d t h e subsequ-ent 13 June j o i n t communique end ors ed demands for a Ger-man peace t r e a t y and a change i n t h e s ta tu s of West B e r l i n ,t h e f r i e nd s h i p t r e a t y was i n f ac t a fu rt he r postponementof long-standing Sov iet demands,

Some cu r io us development s t end t o be t ray Khrush-chev's i n t e r e s t in s i g n i n g a f r i e n ds h i p t r e a t y w f t b h i sGerman a l l y a t t h a t t i m e . F i r s t , w i t h i n hours of U l b r i c h t ' sdepa r t u re f rom Moscow on 13 June, Khrushchev c al l ed int h e West German .Anbassador fo r a conve r sa t i on i n whichhe i nd i ca t ed h i s interest in meeting w i t h Chancel lorErhard who o nl y. f i ve days before had been quoted i n t h ep r e s s as having favored making economic sacr i f ices i n t h ei n t e r e s t of ach iev ing reun i f i (As i n t h e case of

y th e del icate diplomatic game a t t h i s s t a g e ,re po rte dl y made no change in t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n on t h eG e r m a n quest ion.) Second, Khrushchev, i n pr oje ct i ng t h en a t u r e o f f u t u r e Sovie t - l es t German re l a t ions , repor t ed ly

m a t it w a s on l y a ques t ionOf t u n DeIore rnrxapatrapalr~D olu t ion of 1982 w o u l d preva i l . *T h i rd , despi te East German pressures t o r a t i f y t h e f r i en ds hi p

Khrushchev, con t inu-

1I* I n t e r e s t in a Rapallo-1 i k e rapprochement appeared i n

t h e S ov i e t p re s s in August under t h e e d i t o r s h i p of K h r u -

shchev ' s son-in-law Adzhubey . See pages 26-28.

-16-

'.

t'



E

t r e a t y a t an e a r l y d a t e , t h e So vi et s managed t o d e l a yr a t i f i c a t i o n fo r three-and-a-half months.

The Early Summer Q u a r r e l With U l b r i c h t

In t h e l a t t e r h a l f of Ju ly , t h e unre l ieved tens ionbetween Ulbricht and Xhrpshchev over the d i r e c t i o n i nwhich S o v ie t p o l i c y t h e n appeared t o be moving s p i l l e do v e r i n t o t h e p u b l i c domain. Differences between themwere reflected i n t h e open p r e s s b o t h during and follow-ing t h e P o l i s h 20th anniversary celebrat ions .

S ign i f ican t d i f fe rences appeared , for example, int h e 21 Ju ly anniv ersa ry speeches given by Khrushchev,Gomglka, Novotny, and Ulbr ich t .o t h e r three, complepely ignored t h e i s s u e s of borders ,Bonn's alleged appet i te for nuclear weapons , t h e NATOmul t i l a te ra l nuc lea r fo rce (MLF) i s s u e , any referencet o t h e danger of revanchism, and su rp ri si ng ly , any c a l lf o r a peace t r e a t y . (On t h e same d ay i n t h e West Germancity of Dortmund, Khrushchev's son-in-law Acizhubey, ina remarkably conci l ia tory speech which stressed t h e needf o r better West German-Soviet Union r e l a t io n s , po in te dl ys t a t e d t h a t t h e German pre ss should pay a t t e n t io n t oIChrushchev's simultaneous remarks in Warsaw.) Khrushchev's

f a i l u r e t o mention publicly t h e peace t r e a t y issue un-doubtedly off ended Ulbricht . In addit ion, Khrushchev'st r e a tm e n t of t h e source of t h e main m i l i t a r y t h r ea t wassomewhat d i f ferent than t h a t of h i s East European col-leagues. Khrushchev placed t h e s o l e onus on ' ' imperial-ist forces.. .who are t h r e a t e n in g a war." GoqQlka andU l b r i c h t presented t h e main mi l i t a ry th rea t as o r i g i n a t -ing, i n t h e f i r s t p lace , in West Germany and, s ec on da ri ly ,in t h e " im p e r i a l i s t " c o u n t r i e s .*

Khrushchev, unlike t h e

*On thi point, Gomulka's remarks seem t o be d i r ec t edn o t o n ly t o t h e West but t o Khrushchev as w e l l . Undert h e s e c t i on e n t i t l e d "West German M i l i t a r i s m Is S t i l l t h e

Main Threat, '' Trybuna Ludu gave Gomulka's ve-iled remarksto Khrugbchev: -footnote cont inubd on page 18)

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I I

. . .

U l b r i c h t ' s h u r t f e e l i n g s were ba red i n a speechhe d e l i v e r e d i n E a s t B e r l i n on 28 J u l y , upon returningfrom Warsaw. In t h e speech Ulbricht mentioned Khrush-chev's name only twice, and t hen on l y i n pa s s i ng . B u tUl bri ch t 'n en t ioned Gomulka some t e n times, dwelled onGomulka's remarks a t Warsaw, and repe a ted ly expressedGDR agreement w i t h Gomulka*s views. The impl ied inv id io uscomparison w i t h t h e s t a t e of Soviet-GDR r e l a t i o n s and t h ea d r o i t s l i g h t i n g of Khrushchev could hardly have escapedt h e n o t i c e of U l b r i c h t ' s l i s t e ne r s . Moreover , i n t h esame speech , Ulbr i ch t h in ted t h a t agreement had not beenreached among t h e Communist leaders on t h e matter ofmeet ing t h e MLF problem.ment" had been reached on other matters, he s a i d on l yt h a t t h e A&F issue had been "studied ". (Khrushchev's21 J u l y W a r s a w speech, however, b e l i e d t h e sugges t ont h a t agreement had been reached on many matters underd i s c u s s i o n a t t h e Warsaw meeting.)*

While he s a i d t h a t " f u l l agree-

(footnote COnt€ziU9d f r o m page 17)

The inv ar i ab l e response from t h e West ist h a t we only imagine t h i s threat f i f WestGerman m i l i t a r i s m ' / , t h a t t h e NATO-powers

keep a g i g h t h a d on West German militar-ists, and tha t West Germany follows apeace fu l po l i cy... e have neve= imaginedangthring.

See page: 5 1 f o r post I-coup indicat ions t h a t Gomulkawas not pleased w i t h Khrushchev's overtures t o Bonn.

*A TASS report on 28 Ju ly 1964 s t a t e d t h a t GDR Fore ignMi n i s t e r B o l z had ca l l ed on Gromyko f o r a " f r i end l y" t a l kon **anumber of q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r e s t t o both s i d e s . "Coming so soon a f t e r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Ulbr i ch t ' s s t a t ev i s i t , and a t a time when Adzhubey was s e e i n g Erha rd , t h eBolz v i s i t may have ref lected new E a s t Gerlnan apprehen-

s ons.

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While Khrushchev and U l b r i c h t were q u a r r e l i n g i nW a r s a w , Ebru shchev' s son-in-law--who was the n t h e subjectof rumors ia Moscow t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t he would shor t lyreplace Fo re ig n Mini st e r Gromyko--was making a se r ies ofremarkably concil iatory comments. in t h e t e r E i t o r y ofUlbr icht 's chief "enemy, *'West Germany.

3. ADZHUBEY'S LAST AMBASSADE \

Co nc il ia to ry Comments i n t h e FRO

Adzhubey arrived in West Germany on 20 July. Oneof h i s p rima ry missions t h e r e , e v i d e n t l y , was t o deter-mine Erhard ' s intent ons about meeting Khrushchev and

1 Adzhubeynobl ique y

about the scope of i s s u e s to be discussed.conversat ionasked t h e Chancellor i f he were serious abou t des i r inga meeting w i t h Khrushchev. (Khrushchev on a t l e a s t twopre vio us occasions-i n March and June-had re po rt ed lyacquainted Bonn w i t h h i s i n t e r e $ t in such a meetina.)

in a a a i t ion to a meeting,

AaZhuwy, in response t o a ques t ionin

a l a t e J u l y i n te r -view in West Germany, s ta ted t h a t he could * 'visualize**a con f id en t ia l exchange of l e t t e r s between Erhard andKhrushchev, and t h a t "noth ing b u t good can come of I t . "(Der Spiege l , 2 August 1964)

t h e sub jec t s of t h e K h r u s h C h B c E d e x c h n w e I

-Trade, Adzhubey l e t i t be known, was t o be one of

I

Also on 2'1 July Adzhubey told Bundestagm e m b e r E r l e r t h a t he (Adzhubey) coul d a pp re ci at e t h e

close commerical connection between t h e Federal Repub l i cof Germany and West Berlin, t h e f a c t t h a t West Berlin

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had t h e same currency, and so forth. According t.0 E r l e r ,Adzhubey w a s conf iden t tha t "due account" could be takenof t h e Bonn-West Ber l in re la t i on sh ip i n f u t u r e t r a d eagreements. Thus Adehubep-who had l e t it be known t oFRG jo ur na l i s t s upon h is a r r i v a l on 20 J u l y t h a t he hadm e t w i t h Soviet Minis ter of Trade Patol ichel t before he(Adzhubey) l e f t t h e USSR--seemed t o su gg es t t h a t t he Sovie tUnion could take d u e account of t h e econqmic t i e s betweenWest B e r l i n and Bonn w i t h o u t g e t t i n g i n t o t h e q ue st io nof t h e p o l i t i c a l t i e s between them and t h e f r i e n d s h i

se ld or f) , Adzhubey re por te dl y s t a t ed t h a t West-manyshould have no d i f f ic u l ty i n consummating a t rade andc u l t u r a l agreement w i t h t h e Sovie t Union, s i n c e a l l t h etwo par t ies had t o do was t o find a t*face-savingt* formu laon t h e B e r l i n i s s u e .

n u c l e a r fo rce p roposa l was also t reated w i t h remarkablecandor.on 27 Jul y , Adzhubey ind ica ted t h a t t h e nuclear armamentof West Germany with in th ree y e a r s thr oug h t h e lldLF ort h e fo r ce de f rappe was a planning assumption on whichSoviet pol icy toward West Germany was based. Adzhubeyd i d n o t l i n k t h i s prediction--a nuclear.armed FR@ by

1967--to any t h r e a t , b u t merely sOated h i s sssumpt ionas a fac t which the Sov ie t po l icy p lanners were t a k i n gin to accoun t . On t h e n ex t da y, Adahubey made h i s con-c e r n a b o u t German nuclear armament knownAdzhubey s a i d t h a t t h e German in teres t iment was represen ted by i ts s u p p o r t of t h e m u l t i l a t e r a lnuc lea r force.convey t h e thought t ha t West German p a r t a c i p a t i o n in t h eMLF would wreck any chances of a nego t ia ted se t t l ementof t h e German quest ion. I

t i e s between Moscow and E a s t B e r l i n . And in*t h e chief ed i to r s of t h e Rheinishe Post Dus-

The i s s u e of West Germany and t h e NATO mul t i l a te ra l

In a d i s c u s s io n w i t h prominent Bundestag m e m b e r s

I m a -

And he seemed t o have been t ry ing t o

I I

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I I - .

On t h e nexiaay (au J U L Y ) ana on the s u b j e c t of t h Soviet zone, Adzhu- .

bey to ld I in an un-o f f i c i a l ' t a m t h t t h 12 J ne f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y w i t h t h eGDR was n o t i n te nd ed f o r e t e r n i t y and t h a t it c o n t a in sw i th in i t s p r o v i s i o n s for amendment.

T h a t r e u n i f i c a t i o n could be one of t h e subject t o

bed i scussed

byKhrushchev and Erha rd

wasa ls o made

clearby Adzhubey in h i s Der Spiege l in te rv iew (2 August edi-tion): in response- a ques t ion regarding t h e subjectsto be examined i f such a meet ing w e r e t o occur , Adzhubey

*The reun i f icat on-MLF wi thdrawal o f f e r may not havebeen immediately affected by t h e October change i n t h eKremlin l e a d e r s h i p .ber 1964 c i t ed Bonn s o ur c es t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t West Ger-many was plann ing t o seek a clause i n t h e MLP t r e a t yt h a t would provid e f o r German withdrawal i n t h e event

o f r e u n i f i c a t i o n . As if t o dampen t h e new Soviet leader-ship 's propaganda campaign against Bonn's i n t e r es t i nt h e MFL, t h e 17-18 November re un if i c a t on-MLF withdrawalr e p o r t s were c i r c u l a t e d three days a f t e r a TASS s ta tementwarning of the dangers af a nuclear-armed FRG and th rea t -ening vague countermeasures t o t h e MLF. Moscow's i n i t i a lr e a c t i o n to t h e re un if ication-MLF withdrawal repor t sbetrayed a s e n s e of i n t e r e s t in t h e ttdeal.tt Moscow Radiocommentator Zakharov in a broa dcas t t o Germany on 23 Novem-ber 1964 s ta ted t h a t West Germany is not s incere i n itsd e s i r e f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n , b u t t h e commentator went on t oi n d i c a t e t h a t a n FRG withdrawal from Itdangerous pol ic ies"( i . e . , t h e MLF) would be a p r e co n d it i o n f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n .Af te r the MLF proposal w a s placed i n abeyance a t t h e end

of 1 9 6 4 , i n t e r e s t in such a "deal t t was not pronounced andhas n o t r e c u r r e d r e c e n t l y in monitored Soviet propaganda.

Western press r e p o r t s on 17-18 Noveq:

!.,.,

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answered that I t i f you are r e f e r r i n g t o t h e German problemit may very w e l l be among t h e subjec ts of di scuss ion ."And in a 22 J u l y luncheon i n Essen and i n a 29 July TVinterview Adzhubey repeatedly s t ressed t h e need fo r t h etwo t o t a l k without a f i x e d agenda and without precondi-t i o n s . Although Adzhubey made no e x p l i c i t c on ce ss io nsw i t h respect t o t h e quest ion of German reuni f icat ion,h i s remarks on t h e s u b j e c t w e r e unusual ly~imi ld. He d i p l o -m at i ca l l y . ,s iddstepped a ques t ion by Der S p i e g e l e d i t o r si n a n i n t e r v ie w s h o r t l y be f o r e h i s depa r t u re as t o whetherhe c ou ld v i s u a l i z e a r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany under non-Communist a u s p i c e s ; he d i d not re i tera te t h e l i n e t h a ta reunited Germany could be only a Communist Germany.*

* N o r d i d Kh ushchev when he spoke about the f u t u r ep o l i t i c a l c om po si ti on of a reunified Germany on 15September 1964 in; al l am en t a r i ans in Mo

meet5pg w i t h J a R n e s e par-i'he ru l i ng c lass of t h e Federal Republ ic

of Germans wants a united Germany foundedon capital ism w h i l e t h e people of t h eGerman Democratic Republic want a u n i f i e dGermany founded on soc i a l i sm . In a l lp r o b a b i l i t y , t h e s t a t u s will cont inuefor some t i m e and the problem w i l l beso lved by h i s to r y . However, you prob-ab ly would n ot be s u r p r i s e d even I f I ,as a communist, sh ou ld ex pr es s by bel ieft h a t a un i f i ed soc i a l i s t Germany w i l lemerge. When w i l l i t emerge? I do notknow. Who w i l l dec i de i t? I t shouldbe decided by t h e b rm ans t hemsel ves.

Thus Khrushchev appeared t o have moved from h i s unambiguous

be r 1963 t h a t a r e u n i f i e dPa n y ad t o be Communistp o l i c y p o s i t i o n made i n a

(page 9) t o a vague express ion o#?bel ief t h a t it w o u l dbe so.

onversa t ion in Septem-

-22-

I



Adzhubey a l s o commented, in response t o a q u e s t i o nby Der S p i e g e l e d i t o r s a s t o whether h e foresaw any chanceof rslaxing t h e Bonn-!doscow atmosphere , t h a t **a e a l l yb ig s tep" s hou ld be t aken t o improve re la t io ns . Then a tu r e of t h e " rea l ly b ig s t ep" Adzhubey may have had inmind w a s not def ined. B u t Er h a r d ' s s tunned reac t ion t ot h e f a l l of Khrushchev some months l a t e r m a k e s t e m pt ingt h e s p e c ul a t i o n t h a t E r h a r d ' s hopes for a " rea l ly b igs tep" on t h e German question had indeed been r a i sed . I

Adzhubey's c r y p t i c r e f e r e n c e t o a "real ly b ig s t e p "

s ta tement t o t h e edi tors of the Rheinishe Post twtends , in r e t r os p e c t, t o add f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t t o his

c u l t for ghrushchev t o ca r ry o u t h i s policies, and hispub l ic s ta tement In t h e 29 July TV in terview t h a t i f t h e

media of t h e FBG and USSR "were now t o create c e r t a i n t en -dencies in a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e hbrushchev-Erhard7 ta lkst h i s would not be good e i t h e r fzr Erha rd or fo r Brushchev."Adzhubey, in e f f ec t , seemed t o be s t r i v i n g t o leave open -t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a dodge for h i s fa the r - in - law. Forindeed, had Khrushchev become convinced t h a t a d i s cus -sion of t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n q u e s t i o n w i t h Erhard a t t h a ttime would have been a f a i l u r e and/or would have l e d himi n t o i rr e ve r sa b le d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h h i s Kremlin co l leagues ,then he w o u l d have been able t o repeat h i s pas t pract ice

L2re are a l o t of l i t t l e Molotovs"* who make m i f f -

+Molotov was one of t h e chief opponents of Khrushchevover t h e 1955 Austr ian peace t rea ty: See Appendix, page10.1.



of execut ing a turnabout and covering up t h e int 'ent w i t h

t h e l e t t e r si n t h e p a s thave been used i n defense of Khrushchev's If nnocence. If

a high s k i l l . And i n t h i s contingency,which rep ort edl y made no changeon t h e German question, a u l d

Adzhubey w h i l e i n t h e FRG combined h i s c o n c i l i a -t o r y g e s t u re s toward t h e FRG w i t h f r equen t d i spa rag i ngremarks toward t h e CPR.

reported t h a t Adzhubeyl e f t t h e "clear impl ica

den a t t h i s t h r e a t n e c e s s i t a t e dt o t h e S ov i e t Union an

b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany. Two days l a t e r i n h i s con-Adzhubey, in t h e contex t of scor-

versatng CPR m i l i a m y , t h e p o i n t t h a t R u s s i a had oncealready defended Europe from th e Ta rt ar s . And i n a 28Ju ly conversa t ion w i t h Muenchner Merkur chief ed i to r K u r tWessel, Adzhubey sa i d t ha t %he Russians were I n t e r e s t e din having a peaceful Germany a t t h e i r back d ur in g t h i stime of t rouble w i t h China.

In a 26 Ju l y conve r sa ti on 1

e y r e p o r t e d l y asserte IUmUnlSt Ch

And t h a t Ulbr ich t shou l d no t be regarded as aninsurmountable obstacle i n t h e way of a Bonn-Moscow r ap-prochement was i nd i ca t ed in Adzhubey 's repea ted kllM&-#onsabout t h e s e r i o u s l y d e t e r i o r a t i n g c o n d it i on of U lbr i c h t 'sh e a l t h . Adzhubey made a t least three remarks t o t h e ef-f e c t t h a t Bonn ought not t o worry about a "cancer-ridden"Ulbricht who would not be around too much longer.*

* A t t h e September 1964 Pugwash meeting he ld in KarlovyVary, 'Czechoslovakia , Sov iet General Talenskiy, a l e a d i n gm i l i t a r y t b s o r e t i c i a n , also di scussed t h e E a s t German-China problem. H e r e p o r t e d l y s t a t edmajor S ov i e t problem w a s Communist" is eager t o have t h e Chinese Communist nuclear potentialsmashed. It He repor t ed ly added t h a t t h e Soviet Government

wps embarrassed b y t h e U l b r i c h t regime, bu t t h e y were soinvolved " a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e " t h a t they cannot disengagethemselves. B u t i n t h e decades ahead, r b e v e a l e d( foo tno te con t inued on page 25)

I

I



U l b r i c h t 's Conspicuous Snub

O n h i s way home f r o m h i s three-week tour of West

During t h i s s ho r t v i s i t t h e t em pe ra me ntalGermany, Adzhubey on 1 August stopped over i p E a s t B e r l i nfor one day;U lbr i c h t remained %navailableit and chose as h i s r e p r e s p -t a t i v e t h a t Eas t German leader--Norden--whom Adzhubey hadp u b l i c ly embarrassed p r i o r to h i s t r i p t o t h e FR@. Nordenhad authored an ar t ic le t h a t appeared i n Izve s t i ya in whichh e referred t o West German President Luebke as a %olla-b o r a to r of t h e N a z i Gestapo." Adzhubey, in order t o pre-

pa r e a more favorable Moscow-Bonn atmosphere f o r h i s v i s i t ,had promptly ordered h i s duty ed i t o r t o d e l i v e r an or a lapology t o t h e West German Embassy in Moscow f o r Norden'sha r s h remark.c a t i o n of Norden's a r t i c l e had been a "mistake of th e dutyed i to r" and tha t ' I zves t iya ' d i d not agree w i t h Norden'scontent ions. '

poor second t o h i s grand t o u r of t h e FRG.on h i s F R G v i s I t w i t h Nol'den and Norden's re sp on se d i dnot surface,* but assuming t h a t t h e y were as e n t h u s i a s t i c

Adzhubey's apology s t a t ed t h a t t h e p u b l i -

.. .

Adzhubey*s reception in E a s t B e r l i n , t h u s , was a€Iis,comments

I.

1In e a r l y

l i n q u i s h E a s t Germany over a 10 t o 20 year per iod, butt h e p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t h a t t i m e were Moscow*spres t ige within Eastern Europe and t h e concomitant weak-

l a might re- , - 1

,

W h i n e s e p roblem over t h e next two decades t h a t t h eSovie t Union might have t o make concessions as t o its w e s t -ern boundary.

*Peking's People,'s Daily on 8 September 1964 reporteda Norden s t at em en t m a d e e r Adzhubey's v i s i t t h a t ap-pea red to be a reprimand to Adzhubey and Khrushchev. Seepage 34.

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- ,



,

a s h i s subsequent ly .pub1 shed Izves t i ya account s (d i scussedpre sen t l y ) Adzhubey may w e l l have added t o t h e GDR lead-ers ' concern about t h e e x t e n t t o which Moscow w o u l d goi n i ts "rapprochement" w i t h Bonn.t o be an effor t t o reassure t h e E a s t German leaders, oneGerman language radio commentary broadcast t h e day afterAdzhubey returned to4-Moscow r i e d t o b a la nc e h i s effor t st o d ev el op t rade w i t h t h e FRG w i t h a rather vague asser-t i o n t h a t "unreal ist ic po l i $ i c a l deals1*are t h e %sinobstacle" t o f u r t he r expansion of FRGUSSR t rade .

And in what appeared

The Adzhubey ltRarmrochementlt k t i c l e s of 9 and 11 August

Upon re tu rn in g t o Moscow, Adzhubey ev id en tl y report-ed d i r e c t l y t o Khrushahev alone on h i s Bonn mission, rathert han t o t h e p a r t y p re si di um .p o r t s 0 Adzhubey d i d not give. p a cc ou nt in g t o t h e othermembere of t h e pre s i d i um un t i l taro days after his p r i v a t et a l k w i t h Khrushchev. The difference, if any, betweenh i s p r i v a t e repor t to hie fa ther- in- law and h i s r e p or ta t t h e presidium meeting is not.known; L t is tempt ing t ospec u la t e , however, t h a t t h e charge that Adzhubey had I;

given a p r i v a t e version of h i s Bonn v i s i t b ef or e h i s for-m a l presidium debrief lng may w e l l have fanned the susp i -c i o n ~ ~hether j u s t i f i e d or not , of Khrushchev conspira-tors. (Khrushchev w a s no t p re sen t :@$:.'that reported pre-;a W u m meeting; he had l e f t on a tour of sou t he rn RSFSR.)d% dzhubey's a r t i c l e s in Iqv ' s t i y a on h i s German t r i pprobably reflected t h e t one o+r e p or t t o the p res id iumand/or t o Khrushchev.

According t o post-coup re-

A week after his r e t u r n from Germany, Adzhubey andthree colleagues* publ i shed t w o art ic les in I zves t i ya ,e n t i t l e d , "We have Seen West Germany." The tone set byt h e ar t ic les w a s no t one of antagonism and r a s p i n g ont h e theme of German m i l i t a r i s m and revanchism. Rather,

*J. Lednev, N. Polganov and E. Pra ln ikov .

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J-i



l i k i n g of t h e r u l i n g c i rc l e s of t h e FederalRepubl ic of Gprmany.

across t h e t ab l e became, as it were, t h esymbol of an important and i n t e l l i g e n tidea, of a profound understanding of t h es t a t e of t h e modern world, a t which every-one who wants t o be a r e a l i s t would w i l ly -n i l l y a r ri v e.

Y e t t h e l i t t l e piece of paper pushed

T h i s plug fo r t h e " s p i r i t of Rapallo" was used byAdzhubey t o introdt ice t h e r e m a r k s of Beethold Beitz, t h emanaging director of Icrupp who had i n t e r rup ted h i s vaca-t i o n t o r e t u r n t o Essen and meet .%he Soviet group. Beitzwas r epor t ed as being convinced t h a t there is a rea l pos-s i b i l i t y of r a i s i n g t h e USSR's share of West German foreigntrade t o six percent.* B u t Adzhubey's purpose in boost-ing t h e " s p i r i t of Rapallo" may have gone beyond tradeexchanges. H e map have been paving t h e way fo r anotherSoviet a t tempt a t %eninist compromises** i n foreign p o l i c y ,one of which wa s t h e 1922 Treats of Bapallo. (An e n t i r ear t ic le was devoted t o a dis cus sion o f-"Lenin ist compro-m i s t " in t h e June 1964 i s s u e of Problems of History oft h e CPSU. 1

In t h e second instal lment , Adzhubey a$d h i s collea-gues took unprecendented l iber t i es i n de p i c ti ng t h e new

*Exports to t h e So vi et Union amounted t o a l i t t l e morethan 1.5 percent of West German for ei gn tr ad a i n 1964.T h i s s m a l l amouqt w a s reduced by almost one 'ha l f t o .8percen t fo r 1965 (though a puzzl ing TASS addendum t o Brezh-nev-ts 29 September 1965 plenum speech , c i t ed on page 70claimed t h a t t h e Soviet trade w i t h t h e FRG remained '*ap-proximmtely on t h e former level") , and fo r t h e first

seven months of 1966 ( t h e bes t av ai lab le recent informa-t i o n ) t h e dec l ine continued wi th only .6 percent of FRGt r ade going t o the USSR.

-28-

I



face of West Germany. A f t e r asser t ing t h a t t h e q u e st io n

ject of * * p o l i t i c a lnego t i a t ions or p o l i t i c a l deals , * t h eau thor s made i t c lear t h a t other p a r t s of t h e German ques-

w h i l e there were still some m i l i t a r i s t i c t yp es who boastedt h a t there is no '*German qu es tion 1*which cannot be solvedby Germaq m i l i t a r y forces, most of t h e German l e a d e r s ,inc lud ing S t r aoss ( t h e bete, n o i r e of ea r l i e r Soviet propa-ganda) , fu l ly appreciated t h e f u t i l i t y of a ny s u c h thoughts .The authors quoted S t r a u s s as saying t h a t a new worldw a r w o u ld mean i*bio logica l ex t in c t ion " f o r t h e Germans.Erhard , for h i s p a r t , w a s quoted as having describedKhrushchev as t h e man ** re pr es en ti ngin t h e best way t h egreat Soviet power. **

r of postwar border changes i n Europe could not be t h e sub-

* t i o n could be se t t l ed i n tha t way. The au thor s sa id tha t

They pointed out that t hey had not o r i g i n a l l yplanned t o meet with West German poli t ical leaders, and .i n t e r p r e t e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were received by "so manyprominent leaders as a t r i b u t e t o t h e enormous importanceof t h e USSR, i t s government, and t o Khrushchev personally.@*Moreover, they said, in the FBO, "among people of d i f -

f e r e n t p o lit ca l , socia l and economic posit ons, therei s ' r i p e n i n g or beginning t o r i p e n a more 's en si bl e viewof the contemporary world from which t h e r e is no escaping.**They concluded with an anecdote about an i nc iden t du r ing

t h e i r v i s i t : t h e i r car had crashed in to a road barrierupon leaving Erhard 's of f ice , and they explained t ocur ious on looker s th a t **we wanted t h i s baririer t o be t h el a s t on t h e road of improvement of r e l a t i o n s between t h eSovie t Union and t h e FRG.**

-

. 4. MOUNTING GDR INSECURITY

As t h e Soviet -West German "rapprochement" began.

t o grow i n t o a more serious a f f a i r in t h e l a t e A u g u s tand ear ly September days , the East Germans grew increas-i n g ly r e s t i v e . Several developments in p a r t i c u l a r gave

them c a u s e - f o r a l a r m , .. -

. -

-29-



F i r s t , Khrushchew cast t h e d i e f o r talks w i t h t h eWest German head of s t a t e . On 2 September Soviet Ambas-sador Smirnov conveyed a l e t t e r from Ehrushchevformal ly expressing h i s desire for a meetiag w iBonn. (The l e t t e r l e f t t h e de t a i l s of t h e agenda t o beworked o u t , but emphasized t h e need for careful advancepreparations I n t h e talks.) To make matters worse fo rUlbrlcht, Poscow may nbt even have informed him d i r e c t l ythrough off ic ia l channels about Khrushchev's definitein t en t ion t o v i e i t Bonn. Bather, on 4 September, t h eSoviet Embassy in Bonn Informed t h e Bonn corr spondent

of t h e SED newspaper lleues Deutschland t h a t & shchevwo u l d v i s i t West GernGiEXE Dn tna t day, a t leaat one GDBradio aopsentator f la t ly stated t h a t MOBCOWnoif aial ly ' tinformed the GDB of Xhrushchev's v i s i t through t h e news-paper's Bonn correnpondent.

a high-level conference'Jp Prague a t whloh he and Gromygowere engaged in seoret consultations with rtovotny and theforegrr m in in t e r e of Poland, Hungary and B u l g a r i a . Con-spicuously absent from t h e meetings w a s an East Germanrepreeent r t ive .pr lneipal topics dircueoed. Peking's NCNA on 7 Septemberpointedly noted t h a t th e nlaader8 of t h e GDB were not in-

v i t ed t o t h e Psetirrg which diecussedsthe Oeraan question."I t does appear f r o m the aomposition of th e group and thejoint Soviet-meoh statement of 4 September. tha t a iumberof foreign pol iay questions affect ing bloc r e l a t ione witht h e West were disaoesed.+

.ISecond, at 8 b O U t t h e Same t h e , Khrushohev 8ttended

Yet Germany may have been one of t h e

Third , over t h e weekend of 4-6 September, reportsIn t h e West German pres6 etated t h a t West German induetri8lisCe

\

* n e O s t e n s i D i e occasion for Khrushohev's v i s i t t oPrague-the. 20th ann iver sary of t h e Slovak upriaing--did

not warrantIL

figure of h i e rank. The 15th a nn ive r e a r y .of t h e founding of the QDR, however, did warrant ghru-shchev's attendame; Khrushohev, a t t h e tlinsibtenaet*of the presidium, went t o Sochl, and Breahnev t o Berlin.

-30-i



w e r e ready t o o f f e r Moscow a d e a l ransoming t h e GDR f o rlong-term c r e d i t s (some r epo r t s s a i d 30 years ) . Reflect-ing U l b r i c h t ' s uneas iness , a GDR r ad io commentator on 4September promptly ridiculed t h e i t specu la t on" of a GDRs e l l - o u t , b u t he d i d n o t go on t o r e a s s u r e h i s l i s t e n e r st h a t Khrushchev w o u l d re jec t such a n o f f e r . S i m il a r l y ,on the same day another GDR commentary on Xhrushchev'sv i s i t ca l l ed t h e GDR sell-out, concept l rabsurd,*t b u t l e f tt h e i m pres si on t h a t Moscow and Bonn might, neve r t he l e s s ,cons i de r such an absu rd i t y . I t is absurd , t he GDR com-mentator s a i d , t o th in k th a t "an improvement of Sovie t-West German rela t ions could be implemented a t t h e expense

of any t h i r d s t a t e , f o r example t h e GDR; t h e GDR is nota count ry which could be bought from someone in t h e cal-c u l a t i n g way of a huckster ." East Berl in , hence, waspubl i c ly warn ing its p r i n c i p a l f r i e n d a n d its p r i n c i p a lenemy not t o conclude a b i l a te ra l arrangement a t t h eexpense of t h e GDR behind i ts back.

Peking Plays on GDB S e n s i t i v i t e s

Peking media seized upon the s e l l - o u t issue i n av i t r i o l i c p ropaganda campaign sk i l l f u l l y de s igned t o p l a yon anxieties of the E a s t Germans and a t t h e same time t od i s c r e d i t Moscow's good f a i t h toward i t s a l l i e s . *

*While Peking was ac cu sin g Khrushchev of a "GDR s e l l -ou t , " CPB c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r a "GDR backoutit were r epo r t -e d l y d i s c u ss e d by the Chinese in t a l k s w i t h t h e West G e r-mans. \I

1e ortea i 1st IYW th t th chinese Communists lndi-

cated t h a t they might be w i l l i n g to move t h e i r embassyt o Bonn, provided t h a t t h e FRG opened an embassy in Peking,and t h e Chinese ind ica ted they would be wi l l in g t o removet h e CPR embassy from E a s t Berl in and reduce i ts r ep re sen t a -t i o n there t o something l i k e a t r ade mission. RegardingCPR t rade p o l i c y toward Bonn, Chinese Foreign Minis terChen Y i in a May 1964 in te rv ie w w i t h a correspondent of

t h e Fran kfu rt Allgemeine Zei tung ( 5 May ed it io n) ind ic ate dt h a t CPR t r a d e relations with t h FRG are not e n t i r e l yd e t e r m i n e d by p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e GDR. Chen Y i

made t h e remarkably noncommittal statement t h a t " it is

c e r t a i n l y n ot our i n t e n t ion t o e x p l o i t o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t hWest Germany to place E a s t Germany unde r pressure , norto e x p l o i t o u r r e l a t i o n s with East Germany to p u t West( foo tno te con t inued on page 32)

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I+BHHss-

1

Peking's propaganda barrage opened on 7 Septemberw i th an NCNA r e p o r t* which s t a t ed t h a t t h e agenda for t h eforth comin g Khrushchev-Erhard t a l k s w a s not r e s t r i c t e d ,

t h a t Erhard was w i l l i n g t o "pay a hig h 'p ri ce ' economic-a l l y fo r a p o l i t i c a l d e a l w i t h t h e Soviet Union on t h eGerman qu es ti on ,t t and i m p l i e d in conc lus ion t h a t Khru-shchev might accep t Bonn's deal . Reported NCNA:

UP1 on 4 September quoted 'informed sources 'in Bonn as s a y in g t h a t West German Govern-ment leaders were prepared to 6 f f e r Khru-shchev ' large t r a d i n g c re d i t s ' in r e t u r nfor Soviet ' po l it i c a l concess ions . ' Thecon ces sio ns would 'have t o inc lude a reor-g a p i z a t i o n of th e Communist regime i n E a s tGermany.' I t added t h a t some WeSt G ermanssaw ' a r a y of hope' for such a Soviet con-c e s s i o n i n t h e f a c t t h a t the Fore ign Min is te rof t h e GDR d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e Praguemeeting of t h e Soviet and Czechoslovak lead-ers w i t h t h e P o l i s h , Hungarian, and B u l g a r i a nf o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s .

On t h e n e xt d a y t h e r e p o r t of West G e r m a n t r a d i n g credi t sf o r Soviet p o l i t i c a l c on ce ss io ns w a s transmuted and 'ampli-fied by Pek ing -dat o an e l ab or at e l y documented charge of

( foo tno te con t inued from page 31)Germany under pr es su re ." Les s t h an t w o weeks ea r l i e r , SEDp o l i t b u r o m e m b e r Matern had roundly scored CPR p o l i c y to-ward t h e GDR in a speech in E a s t B e r l i n (22 A p r i l ) .cord ing t o ADN, Matern charged t h a t in i t s f ina l consequ-ence @ ' the ndeavors of t h e Chinese leaders amounts t o com-p l e t e abandonment of t h e GDR as t h e wes te rn ou tpos t o ft h e s o c i a l i s t world system in Europe and t o a new form oft h e German policy of t h e Beria c l i q u e which h a s been re-pu l s e d by t h e CPSU Cen*ral Committee under t h e l e a d e r s h i p

of ComradeKhrushchev." The le ng th y Neues Deutschland

account (on 23 Apr i l ) of M a t e r n ' s s p e e c h i d not inc ludet h i s passage , which among o t h e r t h i n g s , e x p l i c i t l y e xo ne r at eda t l e a s t t h e CPSU C e n t r a l Committee from the93er ia heresy. '*

pc-

* I t appeared in People ' s Daily on t h e next d ay andwas summarized i n t h e foreig-guage Pekin g Reviev f o r11 September.

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QOrDOT I



a planned Sovie t se l l -ou t of E a s t Germany. ''A conspi racyt h a t war ran t s a t t en t ion" w a s t h e ope nin g judgment of anau tho r i t a t i ve Peop le' s Da i ly a r t i c l e , t r a n s m i t t e d on 8

September by NCNA, on w E Z E 3 t c a l l e d t h e "current maneuvers"f o r a " d i r t y p o l i t i c a l deal t o s e ll -o u t t h e GDR." Then,t h e a r t i c l e posed the leading ques t ions :

What m a k e s t h e Bonn r e v k c h i s t s so boldas t o advance barefacedly s u c h an i n so len t 'p l a n of 'buying t h e GDR? And what makesthem r ega rd t h e GDR as something p u t onsa l e by c e r t a i a persons? Can it be t h a t

they have received t a c i t approval orh i n ts f rom those who rec en t l y t a l k e d l i k ea minion in praise of t h e West Germanmil i t a r i s t s ? B u t in so doing, thesepeople are r eckoning wi thout t h e i r hos t .They should know t h a t t h e days of Munichare gone for good.

F i n a l l y , t h e art ic le proceeded to provide i ts evidencef o r i ts open ing gu i l ty ve r d ic t by juxtapos ing ce r t a in '

sta te men ts by Adzhubey i n Ju ly and August with co nt ra st -ing p o s i t i o n s t a ke n b y Ulbr ich t dur ing t h e same period.The cont ras t , which Peo pleg s Dai ly sharpened by e d i t o r a l -i z ing upon Adzhubey's s ta te m em e nc o mp a ss ed dive rge nt

remarks- ob-the.: p o s s i b i l i t y of f r u i t f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t ht h e Wsst German leadership and on t h e b a s i c n a t u r e of .West German fo re ig n pol icy. With regard t o negot i a t ons ,People ' s Dai ly reported t h a t Ulbricht h e l d t h a t therew8, re no grounds for t h e idea t h a t t h e Erha rd Wvernmentwould make peaceful and reasonable pol icy s h i f t s , w h i l eAdzhubey he ld t h a t t h e West German l eade r sh ip h e l d ar e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e t ow ard n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h t h e East.And w i t h r ega rd t o Bonn's b a s i c i n t e n t i o n s , th e CCP paperr e p o r t e d t h a t Ulbr icht saw no change i n th e * ' revanchist"p o l i c y of Bonn, whi le Adzhubey was r epor t ed as s t a t i n gt h a t Bonn had abandoned t h e i d e a of wiping out t h e Sovie tUnion. In addit ion, Ulbricht-Khrushchev differences wereimpl ied by People ' s Dai ly t rea tment of the presumed par-

t i c i p a n t s i n n eg ot ia EG ZE on t h e f u t u re s t a t u s of Germany.U l br i ch t was quoted as s t a t i n g t h a t t h e German questioncannot be settled in the absence of or in oppos i t ion t o

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t h e GDR, nor "can i t be s e t t l e d by o the r coun t r i e s . "implied People's Daily, th$s w a s p r e c i s e l y yhat was ins t o r e i n l i g h t of t h e GDR's exclus ion from t h e e a r l ySeptember Prague meet irig of t h e Soviet, Czech, Hungarian,and Bulgarian of f i c i a l s . The People's Daily a r t i c l er e i t e r a t e d t h e e a r l i e r NCNA l t & i - € K Z - t h e R was not in-v i t e d t o t h e meeting which "discussed t h e German question,"and added t h a t Khrushchev's dec3 sion t o visit West Germanyhad been taken a t t h e Prague conference . The f i n a l poin tin t h e a r t i c l e w a s a quote from t h e highes t Eas t Germanleader , Norden, w i t h whom Adzhubey t a lked dur ing h i s shortstopover i n E a s t Ber l in in e a r l y August. According t ot h e a r t i c l e Norden sa id t h a t It was obvious t h a t " it isimpossible t o annex th e GDR, or buy i t from any otherp o c i a l i s t co un tr y, o r i sola te it from i ts So c ia l i s t neigh-bors. '

Y e t ,

And on t h e l l t h , CPR media carr ied an extens ivesummary of an ar t ic le in t h e E a s t B e r l i n q u a r t e r l y F'reieWelt e n t i t l e d , "How Much Does t h e GDR Cost?" The &%ZZescored as "sIn is te r* l t h e idea t h a t t h e GDR could bebought as a kind of merchandise. However, t h e Chinesere po rt included th e Ea st German arJ$3cle's curious exoxtera-t i o n of Khrushchev's role in t he s ' i n i s t e r i dea. I (A sideef fec t of t h e exoneration, however, was t o k eep a l i v e th&susp ic ion of an i n s id ious ro le on Khrushchev's p a r t . )

According t o HCNA's ex te ns iv e summary, th e a r t i c l e main-t a i n e d t h a t :

we would not & in su l t in g Khrushchevif we s h i e lde d him from suspic ion .in no','way concerns Khrushchev's person-a l i t y , b u t t h e p o l i t i c a l understandingof t h e sbeculators who have no moral senseto speak o f . No man i n h i s r i g h t mindcan imagine t h a t t h e head of governmentof t he Sovie t Union, a world power, con-c l u d e d a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h t h eGDR on ly to send h i s f r i e nd t o t h e b u t c h e ra t t h e f i r s t oppor tuni ty . Bu t i n Bonn

(and not only there) there are peoplecapable of s u c h imagination.

T h i s

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A l ba n ia ' s c a p a b i l i t y f o r j u s t t h a t was soon displayedi n a Z e r i I P o p u l l i t a r t i c l e on 23 September whichc h a r g c f i o n g other t h i n g s t h a t

there is no doubt t h a t behind t h i s v i s i t/Xhrushchev's proposed v i s i t t o Bonn7 aEew N. Khrushchev conspiracy is hidxen.. .In t h e name of ' peaceful coexis tence ' anda rapprochement w i t h i m p e r i a l i s m , f r o mwhich it hopes t o draw p o l i t i c a l a n deconomic advantages, t h e rensgade N. Khru-shchev group does not h e s i t a t e t o d e a l

w i t h t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s a t t h e expense oft h e s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s . I t does nothes i ta te t o make a ba rg ai ni ng pawn ofand t o sac r i f i c e a s o c i a l i s t count ryl i k e t h e GDR. B u t t h e GDR is a sovereigns o q i a l i s t s t a t e which cannot be annexede a s i l y and s t i l l l ess be so ld o r bought .by anyone.

5 . TH6: PRESIDIUM OPPOSITION INTERVENES . .

That Khrushchev's new approach t o t h e German prob-

l e m may have. encouraged op po si ti on in grem l in ru l ingc i r c le s , and hence figured i n t h e coup against him, isworthy of con sid era tio n. One well-known in ci de nt t h a toccurred i n ea r l y September raised s p e c u l a t i o n i n t h eWest. t h a t some Sovie t leaders, w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e of theKGB, t r i e d in an underhanded fashion t o torpedo Khru-shchev 's p lanned v i s i t t o Bonn. On 6 September, onlytwo days a f t e r it w a s announced i n pu bli c (w t in t h eUSSR) that Khrushchev w a s going t o Bonn f o r t a l k s w i t hErhard, electronic technician Schwirkmann at tached t ot h e West German embassy i n Moscow w a s myster ious ly at-tacked w i t h mustard ga s. The epi so de caused a scanda lin N e s t Germany and it was touch-and-go f o r a w h i l e ast o whether Erhard ' s i n v i t a t i o n to Khrushchev w o u l d be ,

resc inded. On 24 September, t h e Soviet Government formallyr e j e c t e d a West German memorandum p r o t e s t i n g t h e a f f a i r ,w i t h the haughty and decept ive s ta tement t h a t t h e '?%chwirkmann

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case' venture w a s needed ,by c e r t a i n q u a r t e r s of t h e G e r -man Federal Republ ic t o p re ve nt an improvement of Soviet-West German r e l a t i o n s .*' Curiously, t h e So vi et Govern-ment d i d not offe r Bonn an apology acceptable t o themu n t i l 1 2 October--the day t h e CPSU presidium voted &boust Khrushchev from power.

The long de l ay on t h e p a r t of t h e Soviets couldbe i n t e rp re t ed t o mean t h a t ghrushchev could not marshals u f f i c i e n t power t o p rev a i l upon t h e presidium t o extenda formal apology t o t h e West Germans.* To be sure, t h emus t a rd gas incident can only be regarded as c i rcums tan t i a l

evidence of a p l o t t o f o i l Khrushchev's plan t o v i s i tErhard. S t i l l , t h e i nc iden t seems t q have been a t u r n i ngpoin t in Khrushchev's e f f o r t s t o develop a w a r m e r Soviet-West German atmosphere. For af te r t h e i nc iden t , h i s for -ward momentum, which had been gaining through J u l y andA u g u s t , was brought t o a dead s top .

Khrushchev's Germaq-policy tu rn ed up?toq 25 September.Pravda and I z v e s t i y a w e r e at var iance in reported r e m a r k sm a d e y Adzhubey on t h e previous day--the day t h a t Moscowrejected Bonn's pro tes t over t h e m u s t a r d gas i nc iden t .

7 Another indication of a d i s pu t e i n t h e Kremlin over

*By way of c on t r a s t , Adzhubey promptly apologized t ot h e West Germans over t h e Norden inci den t i n Ju ly.

Brezhnev, through th e coercive 'power of .the KGB, mayhave t'aken t h e lead i n t r y i n g t o torpedo Khrushchev'sGerman policy by au thor i a ing t h e Schwirkmann a f f a i r , ac-cording to Since t h em u s t a r d gas' inc ident took place on t h e same (1!y Khru-shchev returned from h i s v i s i t t o Czechoslovakia, runst h e hypothes is , t h e opera t ion may have been approved inh i s absence. h d % Q u e o BTezhnev's respons ib i l i t i e s oft h e CPSU secretar iat a t t h a t time, t h e KGB would have hadt o seek clearance for such an operat ion from Brezhnev in

Khrushchev,% absence. The hypotbesis concludes t ha t hadt h e KGB been aQtiag without clearance, a speedy apoloawould have been i s sued.



I

\

In r e p o r t i n g a m e e t i n g of t h e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s commissionsof t h e Supreme Soviet convened t o discuss the Soviet-GDRFrien dship Trea ty, Iz ve st i ya ( then under Adzhubey 's con-t r o l ) printed--but Pravda deleted--Adzhubey*s fo l lo win g

c s t a t ement :

Sometime ago, I was i n West Germany,v i s i t e d i t s c i t i e s , and t a l k e d w i t hquite a number of i ts p o l i t i c a l a n ds t a t e f i g u r e s . T h is t r i p and thesemeetings once again confirmed t h e opin-ion t h a t it w oul d be completely in-

correct t o cons i de r a l l Germans who .l i v e in t h e FRG to be r e v a n c h i s t s .

Both Pravda and Izves t iya carr ied h i s next sen tence whichs a i d that

The overwhelming majority of t h e work-in g populace of West Germany want tol i v e i n peace and f r i endsh ip w i t h a l lpeoples . There are sober reasonablef igures even among the bourgeoisieand in bus iness c i rc les . W e w i l l hopet h a t it is they who w i l l g a i n t h eupper hand in t h e Bonn p o l i t i c a l

arena.

Hence, t h e t runca t ed P ravda version d id no t m a k e cleart h a t West German pol iEEZ- leade rs were among th e soberelements of West German s o c i e t y , w h i l e t h e I z v e s t i y a ve r-s i o n s u g g e s ts t h a t t h e y were and tha t i t was feasibre t od i s c u s s p o l i t i c a l matters w i t h theq.'

p o l i c y had g o t t e n t h e upper hand by t h i s time is suggestedby several other developments. On 25 September, af tera ve ry l ong de l ay t h a t could only have been embarrassingfor t h e GDR regime, Moscow a t l a s t exchanged instrumentsof r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e f r i e nd s h i p t r e a t y w i t h E a s t B er l i n .

(On t h e day before, t h e extra-legal procedure of t h eEas t German People's Chamber i n r a t i f y i ng t h e t r e a t y d i s -played signs of h a s t e :

-

That the presumed opponents of Khrushchev's German

t h e requirement of two readings

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of the 1 2 June t r e a t y w a s not mentioned i n t h e publ i shedproceedings of t h e l a t e June and ea r l y September People 'sChMber meetings.). Khrushchev d i d no t a t t end t h e ceremonyi n Moscow, although he w a s i n town a t t h e time and althoughhe had been a cosigner--with Ulbricht--of t h e t r e a t y andhad p a r t i c i p a t e d in a meeting hel d t a honor i t i n J u n e .

On 27 September, a Pravda ed i to r i a l devo ted t o t h er a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e f r i e n d m r e a t y inc luded a warningthat may have been addressed t 'o'ghrushchev and Adzhubeyas w e l l as Erhard. Pravda g r a t i t u o u s l y asserted t h a t

**whoever h i n ks t h a t m p r o v e m e n t of re la t ions be tweent h e USSR and West Germany can be achieved in t h e s l i g h t-es t degree t o t h e det r iment of t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e GDRis deealy mistaken. '1

On 28 September, TASS announced t h a t Brezhnev--notKhrushchev, whose rank s h o u l d have d i c t a t ed h i s presencea t t h e East Be rl i n celebrations--would head th e Sovietd e l eg a t o n t o t h e GDR's 1 5 t h a nn i ve r sa r y f e s t i v i t y .

On 30 September, Khrushchev l e f t f o r a vacat ioni n t h e s o u t h a t the ' **insis tencer1 f esidium, accord-ing t o And th e l a s tava ig !toward

WestGermany--that he fghrushc hev) ex pec ted

WestGermany, which was not then and is not now a m e m b e r oft h e Uni ted Nat ions , " to c ont r tb ute grea t ly" asc.8 f uguremember of t h e United Nations--was r epor t ed ly made- on 3October i n Sochi before a group ofkvis i t ing JapanesePar1 ament m e m b e r s .Minister Fujiyama i n an in terv iew w i t h t h e Wishington Posta t t h e Japanese Embassy i n Washington, D.C. on 22 O c t o b e r1964, Khrushchev in Sochi brought up th e subjec t of WestGermany in 'a n obl ique re pl y t o Fujiyama's suggest ion th a tt h e UN Se cur i ty Council be broadened t o include Japan.Khrushchev, s a i d Fujiyama, r ep ly ed t h a t "Japan, India,and West Germany w o u l d i n t h e f u t u r e " c o n t r i b u t e g r e a t l yt o t h e U-X.l'

~y KnrushChevoOn f u t u r e Sovie t po l i cy

According to former Japanese Foreign

On t h e day Khrushchev l e f t for h i s vaca t ion inSochi, GDR l e a d e r W i l l i Stoph.made a sudden visit to

Moscow and commenced an i n t e n s i v e t h r ee -day series of



t a l k s w i t h Kosygin and other high-level Kremlin leaders .The t i m i n g of Stoph ' s v i s i t - - o s t e n s i b l y for t h e purposeof opening an exh ib i t devo ted t o t h e 1 5 t h anniversary oft h e G D R - - s u g g e s t s t h a t it may have been more concernedw i t h f i n d i n g o u t t h e actual consequences of theI'$ew Sovie tl i n e toward West Germany than with t h e mpre mundane subjectof t rade m at te r s .

a

Then i n r a p i d succession, Suslov and Brezhnev cameforward w i t h s t ron g s t a t em en t s r eas su r ing t h e East Germanleaders about Sovie t in te nt io ns toward Gerplany. Suslovmade a f l a t n o- se ll -o ut pledge i n Moscow on t h e same day

(5 October) t h a t Brezhnev was welcomed i n E a s t B e r l i n byU l b r i c h t , who had refused t o greet Khrushchev's son-in-l a w two months ea r l i e r . Ulbricht on 6 October respondedw i t h a r a t h e r d e f i a n t lecture on t h e l i m i t s of Sovie ti n t e r f e r e n c e In GDR so ve re ig nt y. And a t t h e same podiumBreahnev promised t h a t there would be no "behind-the-back"d e a l s d e t r i m e n t a l t o GDR i n t e r e s t s .

Suslov 's Guarantee

Suslov in h i s 5 October speech a t a Kremlin meet-ing devoted to t h e GDR anni versa ry went out of h i s way

t o deny t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a Bonn-Moscow deal a t t h eexpense of t h e GDR's "sovereignty." Suslov voiced t h ef l a t l*guaranteelq h a t "even if a l l t h e gold in t h e worldwere of fe red , ' t h e r e l a t i on s between Moscow and E a s tBe rl in would s t i l l not be f o r sa l e . He seemed t o t akes e r i o u s l y t h e idea t h a t there had been a deal in t h eo f f i n g :

Of l a t e t h e revancl@$J&~$~6%es ofWest Germany have begun t o spread i l l u -s ons a b o u t t h e poss i b i l t y of makinga commercial dea l w i t h t h e USSR a t t h eexpense of t h e GDR. If t h e USSR wantst o be on good terms w i t h West Germany,

l e t it s a c r i f i c e t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h eGDR. To say t h a t such p lans are of aprovocat ive na ture is p u t t i n g i t mildly.

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I I

They prove how pig-headedly bourgeoist h e i r au thor s are , who, i n our t i m e s ,s t i l l b e l i e v e i n t h e p o s s i b l i t y ofmanaging t h e f a t e s of peoples by meansof purchase and s a l e , The t r ea ty be-tween the USSR and th e GDR puts an endt o these f o o l i s h i l l u s i o n s . I t s a y s t othose gent lemen: Fi rs t , t h e GDR is a

sovere ign s t a t e , and no one has t h er i g h t t o be t h e master of i t s i n t e r e s t sexcept i t s people; second, t h e re la -

t ons of l f r a t e rna l f r i endsh ip ands o c i a l i s t s o l i d a r i t y l i n k i ng t h e USSRand t h e GDR are not f o r s a l e , even i fa l l t h e gold of the world were o f f e r e df o r them.

Forget your fo o l i s h i l l u s i o n s ,gent lemen revanchis t s ; they w i l l nevercome t r u e . As f a r as normal r e l a t i o n sbetween t h e USSR and West Germany areconce rned , bo th s i de s a re equa l ly in t e r -ested i n them. These r e l a t ions can besuc ces sfu l ly developed, not on th e b a s i sof some shady dea l s , but on t h e bas i s o f

good w i l l and cooperat ion in the inter-,e s t s of a l l the European s ta te s , of t h ecause of peace and i n t e rna t ona l s ec ur i ty .

And in a r e j o i n d e r t o t h e 8 September People 's Daily ar-t i c l e s on t h e Itshady dea ls" between Moscow and E 6 5Suslov added:

And w e are f i rmly convinced t h a t no in-t r i g u e of I m p e r i a l i st r e a c t i o n in N e s tGermany, no provocat ions of t h e Chinesel e a d e r s , who at tempt t o in t roduce d i s -cord i n t o r e l a t i o n s between t h e USSRand t h e GDR and t o s tar t quar re l s be-

tween the SED and t h e CPSU, can for aminute shake t h e f r a t e r n a l u ni t y, e t e rn a l 'f r i e n d s h i p , and comprehensive coopera-t i o n between our s t a t e s , our peoples ,and our Marxist-Leninist p a r t i e s .

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T

i

Suslov a l so took t h i s occas ion t o g i v e t h e Germanpeace t r e a t y i s s u e a higher p r i o r i t y th an i t had beengiven i n Soviet propaganda i n l a t e s u mme r . H e s t a t edt h a t @'one f t h e most important problems, on t h e solu-t i o n 09 which depends the l i qu id a t io n of ten s io n i n Europeand i n t h e en t i r e world, is a peaceful Wrman se t t l eme nt .**In add it ion, Suslov, 1 ke Kozlov in February 1963, in je ct eda;.: sense of urgency into t h e q u e s t f o r a peace t r e a t y .H e s t a t ed t h a t "from th e v iewpoint of t h e v i t a l i n t e r e s t sof European securi ty, t h e need f o r a German peace t r e a t yis becoming more and more imperative." H e als o rtried t opu t on a f a c e of u n i t y apong the Kremlin leaders by at-

t r i b u t in g t o Khrushchev t h e s ta tement t h a t there are nod i f f e r e n c e s in outlook between t h e CPSU and t h e SED. B u ta summary of h i s speech i n Pravda on 6 October dele ted

t h i s r ef er en ce t o K h r u s h c h e m r e b y d i s s o ci a t i n g himfrom Suslov ' s l i ne . ( Izve s t iya ignored t h e Suslov speechal together .) Moreover, i n t h e l i g h t of t h e r epor t edmajor r o l e t h a t Sus lov played in t he ous t e r of Khrushchev,Suslov's po l ic y pronouncements ind ic at e th a t a d e c i s i o nhad been taken on c e r t a i n a s pe c t s of t h e German..issue(e.g. , Xhrushchev's Bonn v i s i t , U l b r i c h t ' s t enure ) int h e absence of or w i t h o u t the approval of Khrushchdv.

Ulbr icht 's Challenge

U lbr i c h t i n h i s own way exacted r e t r i b u t i o n fromEhrushchev by t o t a l l y ignoring him in a l eng thy speech(over 26,000 words) on 6 October , del ivered a t t h e Eas'tB e r l i n c e l e b r a ti o n of t h e GDR anniversary . And i n t h a tspeech he made t h e s t a r t l i n g s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e EastGermans p a i d a l l of t h e w a r r e p a r a t io n s f o r t h e t w o Ger-manies, impljtm t h a t t h e GDR had "purchased1' i t s "soves-eignty" from t h e Sovie t Union. H e also declared in anindignant tone tha t t h e GDR cannot be "pur-chased" by anyone e l se .

Ulbr i ch t ' s s t a r t l i n g d is cu ss io n of t h e s e n s i t i v e

World War I1 w a r r e p a r a t i o n s matter was couched i n ananti-Bonn framework, r a t h e r t h a n i n terms of resentmentd i r e c t e d toward Moscow's heavy postwar d r a i n on the

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. . .

. .._

, . ..

economy of t h e Sovie t zone . B u t U l b r i c h t , ne ve r the l e s s ,placed t h e main onus of t h e G D R ' s postwar economic prob-l e m s on t h e Soviet Union:

The year t h e GDR was founded many ruinswere s t i l l not e l imina ted ; it was s t i l la main concern t o de a l w i t h t h e needsand t o m a ke r e s t i t u t i on for what Germanimper ia l i sm had done to t h e Sovie t Unionand other na t i ons . The c i t i z e ns of t h es m a l l GDR a t t h a t time made re s t i tu t ionTor a l l ~e rmany t h rough ha rd work.

Ulbr i ch t d i d not go on t o d i s c u s s t h e amount of res t i tu-t i o n t h e GDB had made t o t h e Soviet Union, b u t h e c i t e da **Socia ldemocratic s c i e n t i s t " * who ve r i f i e d t h i s s ta te -ment through h i s s t u d i e s of t h e f i r s t postwar per iod andwho 'kame t o t h e conclus ion t h a t West Germany owes t h eGDR a few doz e n b i l l i on marks." I n a dd i t i on t o t h e "fewd o z e n b i l l i o n m a r k s , '' U l b r i c h t c i ted 30 b i l l i o n marksWest Germany allegedly owes t h e GDR f o r " r u t h l e s s exploi-tation o f the open border i n B e r l i n i n t h e ye a r s p r i o rt o t h e w a l l . "

Peking propaganda seized upon U l b r i c h t 's remarksand car r ied a brief ' report of t h e speech under the head-

l i n e "GDR Pays USSR War Repara t ions for Two Germanies,Says Ulbr ich t . " On 13 October, t h e Hong Kong CommunistTa Kung Pao c i t e d U l b r i c h t ' s s ta tements and re la ted as-ser*-T5 show " t h e E a s t German people's resentmenta t th e S ovie t demand t o pay t h e i r de b t s when E a s t Germanywas having a d i f f i c u l t t i m e and a t Khrushchev's attemptt o s e l l o u t t h e i r c o u n t r y t o West Germany.

-

* I d e n t i f i e d b y U I b r i c h t i n h i s A pr i l 1965 SED C e n t r a lCommittee speech , examined on page 63, as a D r . Badde.Presumably t h i s is economics professor D r . Fri tz Baddeof K i e l Unive rs i ty , a n SPD m e m b e r who r e t i r e d from t h eBundestag in 1965.



L a t e r h h i s speech of 6 October, U l br i ch t renewedI t h e l i n e t h a t a reunified Germany can only be Communist

f country . Then, by in di re ct io n, he informed t h e S o v ie t

and again placed on t h e r e c o r d h i s anti-Beria argumentt h a t t h e b u i l d i n g of Communism can t ake p l a c e i n a d iv id e d

Union that it had no r i g h t t o p u t a price on t h e GDR.H e may have had Khrushchev as w e l l as Erha rd i n mind when

, he s a i d t h a t

a r e u n i f i c a t i o n a l s o cannot be had i nthe way t h a t some i n c o r r i g i b l e foolsimagine, namely t h a t t h e GDR be boughtfr om somebody. The GDR belongs t o it-s e l f , it belongs t o i t s c i t i zens who '

are not p repared t o s e l l e i t h e r them-selves or t h e i r r e p u b l i c t o t h e imperi-a l i s t Western powers. For t h i s reason ,one should f i n a l l y p u t an end t o specu-l a t i o n s on such f o o l i sh n e s s i n WestGermany once and fo r a l l and face l i f e

as it is .

'

I t is p o s s i b l e t h a t U lbr i c h t a t t h e time of h i s speechhad. been :told abou t, p res id ium re s i s ta nc e t o Khruehchev'so v e r t u r e s ' t o Bonn. The f a c t t h a t Khrushchev wa's CQnspicuouslys l i g h t e d in U lb r i c h t ' s two-hour speech, combined w i t hUl br i ch t ' s "hands-off-the GDR" cha l lenge and an ind i rec twar r e p a r a t i o n s barb, suggested t h a t Ulbr ich t , a t anyr a te , was confident enough t o s e r v e n o t i c e t h a t he w o u l dn o t s u r r e n d e r h i s pos t s w i t h o u t a f i g h t . (In p r i v a t e ,and a f t e r Khrushchev w a s removed, t h e S o v ie t leaders re-portedly informed some v i sit n g delega t i o n s of fore gnCommunist parties t h a t Adzhubey during h i s German t r i phad committed a grave e r r o r by c r i t i c i z i n g U l b r i c h t ' sl e a d e r s h i p . ) U l b r i c h t 's cha l lenge a l so seemed t o warnt h a t i f a major change occurred i n S o v i e t p o l i c y t ow ar dWest Germany, * Ulbr icht would p u b l i c l y r e t a l i a t e by

*And Adzhubey in t h e FF&, accord ing t o, was regarded a s t h e h a r b in g e r

I-ange n USSR German policy.

-43-

I



.

, j. \. . . I

.. . .. ,

. . . .

d i r e c t l y r a i s i n g a n d e l a b o r a t i n g upon embarrassing i s s u e s .(Such i ssues m i g h t w e l l have included Soviet exploi ta-t i o n t h ro u gh war r e p a r a t i o n s , f a i l u r e t o s u pp or t t h e GDRt h rough s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i t s i n t h e e a r l y y e ar s of i t sdevelopment, v a c i l l a t i o n on S ov i e t po l i cy r ega rdi ng t h epeace t r e a t y matter, and, perhaps, other s p e c i f i c griev-ances accrued during almost t w o decades of East Germanpeonage. 1

Brezhnev's Pledge

A f t e r U l b r i c h t l e f t t h e r o s t r u m , Brezhnev aroset o read a Khrushchev-Mikoyan an niv er sar y gr ee ti ng , whichconta ined a ra ther a m b i g u o u s passage t o t h e e f f e c t t h a tany "p lo t " aga i ns t t h e GDR w i l l be r e b u f f e d . Then Brezh-nev plunged i n t o h i s own speech i n which he pledged t h a tno deal would be s t r u c k w i t h Bonn pol i t i c i ans ' ' beh ind t h eback of t h e GDR" t h a t would be d e t r im e n ta l t o GDR na t i ona li n t e r e s t s and secu r i t y . The r ea l i z a t i on t h a t Khrushchevw a s planning t o v i s i t s u ch p o l i t i c i a n s , and t h e accompany-i n g i n s e c u r i t y of l e a d i n g SED members t h a t Khrushchev mightagree t o a po l i cy de t r i m en t a l t o and "behind-the-back"of t h e GD& was o n ly t h i n l y v e i l e d in ear l ie r speeches byl ead i ng SED members i n Brezhnev's audience. And a f t e r

Khrushchev's ouster an SED po li tb ur o member i n an E a s tB er l i n speech on 6 November harked.' back t o Brezhnev'spledge and publ ic ly t i e d Brezhnev ' publ i c s t a t ement t oSus lov ' s 5 October f l a t promise that t h e GDR cannot bepurchased . *

*The SED o f f i c i a l , Verner, s ta t e d : "Anyone i n Bonno r elsewhere s t i l l h a r b o r i n g i l l u s i o n s t h a t t h e GDR canbe negated, or t h a t it is p o s s i b l e t o make agreementsbehind t h e back of t h e GDR h a r m f u l t o i t s i n t e r e s t , s h a l lbe reminddd of t h e s t a t em en t s of Comrade Leonid Brezhpeva t t h e f e s t i ve m ee t i ng on t h e occasion of t h e 1 5 t h anni-

v e r s a r y of our r e p u b l i c i n B e r l i n. He s a i d a t t h e time:'Today it is poss ib le t o s t a t e w i t h t h e best of reasonst h a t w it ho ut t h e GDR it is imposs ib l e t o s o l v e e i t h e r ques-t i o ns conce rn i ng t h e G e r m a n peace se t t l em en t o r o t h e r(footnote cont inued on page 45)



i'

Hence, it w o u l d s e e m t h a t in e a r l y October Brezh-nev and Susl ov int erv ene d t o prevent Khrushchev f r o mfur the r developing h i s West German overtures and t o re-assure t h e E a s t Germans t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s would notbe sacr i f iced f o r S o v i e t p o l i c y g a in s .

(footnote continued from page 4@

problems connected w i t h t h e conso l ida t ion of s e c u r i t y inEurope and the guarantee of peace." And anyone i n t h esame places still dreaming that t h e r e is a pr ide forwhich t h e GDR can be purchased, or even bel ieving t h a t ,in:the manner of horse traders, agreements caln be con-cluded a t t h e edpense of t h e GDR and improved ' re la t ions

w i t h t h e Sovie t Union, should car ef ul ly read t h e s t a t e -meet of Comrade Mikhail Suslov made a t a Soviet-Germanp i e n d s h i p r a l l y on t h e 15th ann iversa ry of our r e p u b l i cin Moscow. He s a i d : 'Such p la ns t e s t i f y t o t h e bourgeois -narrowmindedness of t h e i r authors who, in our ' p r e s e n tera , still b e l i e v e i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e f a t e s ofn a t i o n s c a n be decided through purchase or sa l e . Thet rea ty be tween t h e USSR and t h e GDR t e l l s these gen t le -men: one, the GDR-is a sovereign s t a t e , wit h-n o oneexcept . t he people having t h e r i g h t t o dec ide on i ts in-te res ts ; and two, r e l a t io ns of b r o th e r l y f r i e n d s h i p andsoc ia l i s t s o l i d a r i t y u n it i ng t h e USSR and GDR cannot beso ld o r bought , even i f a l l t h e gold of t h e world wereoffered. ' This is t r u e and clear , and t h e gentlemen ont h e Rhine w i l l be well advised t o cons ide r t h i s mores e r i o u s l y . *

- 4 s-

\



111. THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE GERMAN QUESTION:OCTOBER 1964 - JANUARY 1967

1. THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE COUP

The l e a d e r s who came t o power in t h e Sovie t Unioni n mid-October found l i t t l e leeway f o r maneuver on t h eGerman ques t ion . w i t h p o l i t i c a l power d i f f u s e d among ac o a l i t i o n of men w i t h dive rse v i ewpoin t s on va r i ous po l i cyques t ions , t h e new Soviet leadership w a s a l so hamstrung

by a v a r i e t y of problems inheri ted from Khrushchev, t h esolut ion of which was made d i f f i c u l t by unchanged objec-t i v e ci rcumstances.t hey d i d no t adm it i n pub l i c t ha t there w a s subs tance t ot h e Chine se Communist char ge t h a t Khrus4bbev had beent r y i n g t o make a deal w i t h Bonn t o sel l-out t h e GDR f o reconomic gain, though Sovie t and East European sourcesi n November and December 1964 p r i v a t e l y s t a t e d t h a t KhruLshchev had favored a deal w i t h Erhard a t t h e expense ofU l br i ch t . The new Soviet leaders may also have t r i e dt o convince t h e East Germans t h a t it was i n t h e i r mutuali n t e r e s t n ot t o implicate Khrushchev in a d e a l t o sea l -o u t t h e GDR.

With r e s p e c t t o t h e German question,

Ea st Germany's Rea ctio n to-:the Coup

T h e i n i t i a l GDR r e a c t i o n t o Khrushchev's ousterand i ts t rea tment of t h e se l l -ou t ques t ion w a s ambivalent .On t h e one hand, there w a s evidence t o suggest t h a t Khru-6 h C h e V ' S removal brought quick r e l i e f t o t h e l eaders inE a s t B er l i n about th e f a t e of E a s t Germany's f ut u re . TheGDR's f i r s t o f f i c i a l r e ac t io n t o the Kremlin coup, whichw a s regis te red i n t h e 17 October communique of t h e SEDC e n t r a l Committee--the f i r s t East ern European p ar ty s t a t e -ment on t h e Khrushchev ouster--was t h a t t h e f r i e n d s h i pt r e a t y of June 1964 w i l l be c ar r i ed out "honorably," im-

p l y i ng , pe rhaps , t ha t there was some ques t ion among t h eEast German leaders a s t o whether it would have beenhonorably implemented prior t o Khrushchev's ouster. As

' -46--



I

t

f a r as Ulbr i ch t himself is concerned, h i s personal reac-t i o n i n t h e f i r s t f e w weeks foll owin g Khrushchev's ou st erw a s not made public.*

munique of 17 October declared in another passage t h a tKhrushchev ' removal caused "deep a g i t a t io n i n our p a r t yand among o u r people," and t h a t Ehrushchev had m e r i t i nimplement ing Warx is t - Leni nis t pol cy as worked o u t by

buro m e m b e r who found i t necessa ry to reca l l t h e pledgesof Suslov and Rreahnev about no deals behind t h e back oft h e GDR, in a speech of 6 November, ex on er at ed Khrushchevby name by saying t h a t he had merit fo r having advocatedt h e p o l i c y of a l 'peaceful and democratic so lu t io n of t h eGerman question." Though he followed t h i s s ta tementw i t h t h e blanket .charge t h a t Khrushchev had "disregarded"and "violated" collective leadership, presumably includ-i n g t h a t worked o u t i n th e Cen tra l Committee, Verner d idn o t e x p l i c i t l y c on ne ct these charges w i t h er ror s i n p o l i c y .

These d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e GDR's i n i t l a l r e a c t i o n ,may be explained by any of s e v e r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s : d iv i -s i o n i n t h e SED, i n i t i a l l a c k of d i r e c t i o n f rom U lbr i c h tand/or t h e new Kremlin lead ers hip , or a c a u t i o u s a t t i t u d eon t h e p a r t of t h e SED i n an e f f o r t t o e v a l u a b t h e i n -t e n t i o n s of the new Sovie t leadership w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h eGerman quest on.

greater s e n s e of s e c u r i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e new Sovietl e a d e r s h ip . Some GDR spokesmen obliquely contrasted t h e

On t h e other hand, t h e SED c e n t r a l committee's com-

t h e CPSU C e n t r a l Committee." A l s o , Verner, t h e m p o I i t -

Subsequently, t h e GDR's p u b l i c l i n e s u gg e st e d a

*It does not seem l i k e l y t h a t t h e Sovie t consp i ra to rswould have made (o r f e l t i t necessary t o make) a breaki n p as t pract ice by bringing a fo re igner ( l i k e U l b r i c h t )i n t o an i n t e r n a l CPSU matter--i.e., t h e 12 and 13 Octoberpres id ium arraignment and t h e 1 4 October Central Committee '

prosecu t ion . The ev idence tha t Ulbr i ch t went t o Moscow

on 12 October is w e a k , dubious and so l e l y specu la t ive .U lb r i c h t was absen t from t h e E a s t Berl in scene f rom 1 2t o 27 October; unl ike other E a s t European p a r t i e s , t h e r ewas no public announcement of an E a s t German party fact-finding commission being s e n t t o Moscow; and a l l of t h eo t h e r East European leaders except Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dsjw e r e repor ted t o have been i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e son t h e f a t e f u l days, 12-14 October.

-47-



. .

. ..

L . . . . ..

1 . .

I

$&&#~.

s i t u a t io n under Khrushchev w i t h t h e one a t hand , po ih t ingu p t h e i r grave susp ic ions about Khrushchevts intent ionse a r l i e r i n t h e y ea r. U l b r i c h t , f o r example , i n h i s speecha t t h e SED plenum on 5 December 1 964 , s t a t e d t h a t t h e SEDwas not d i s tu rbed by t h e *'slander'* created (he s a i d ) i nthe Weste rn press in connec t ion w i t h Adzhubey's July Bonnv i s it because

. .anyone can see f o r himse l f t ha t t h e f r i end - '

s h i p t r e a t y between t h e USSR and the GDR, ass t a t e d i n t h e CPSU telegram of 29 October 1964,c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b a s i s on which % he re la t ionsof ove ra l l f r a t e rn a l coope ra t i on betweeno u r s t a t e s and pa r t i e s are fu r ther deve loped .

Ulbricht thus seemed t o be adm i t t i ng t h a t i t took a gost-coup telegram t o p u t an end t o t h e _ a n t i c i p a t i o n of adverseand r a d i c a l change which had d i s t y b e d t h e SED dur i ngt h e l a s t f e w months of Khrushchev's regime. SED p o l i t b u r omember Honecker--often mentioned as Ulbricht ' s successor--a t t h e SED plenum went f u r t h e r t h a n Ul br ic ht i n e x p l i c i t l ys t a t i n g t h a t "even our enemies.. .have had t o a d m i t t h a tt h e SED and Ulbricht have emerged from the aforementionedevents /Xhrushchev's ouster7 not weakened b u t s t reng thened ."- -

O t h e r .Post-Coup Incriminations

The f ac t t ha t th e new Kremlin l e a de r s h ip , s i n c etakkng over , avoided any s p e c i f i c pub l i c charge that Khru-shche v had mismanaged So vi et p ol ic y on t h e German ques-t i o n s , s ta n ds i n c o n t r a s t t o th e Brezhnev-Suslov l i n e ofea r l y O ct ober , t h a t impl i ed t h a t t he re were elements in . . ,t h e USSR i n t e r e s t e d in s t r i k i n g a d e a l w i t h t h e West G e&mans a t U l b r i c h t ' s expense. Brezhnev 's f a i l u r e t o renewa no se l l -ou t pledge in h i s 29 October r e p l y t o U l b r i c h t t sc o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on t h e former 's new "promotion** is p a r t i -c u l a r l y cu r io u s i n l i g h t of Brezhnev's 6 October "guarantee."In h i s s t a t ement of 29 October, Brezhnev sa i d only t h a t

" t h e CPSU w i l l do a l l t hey can t o guard t h a t h i s t o k i c a lachievement--the unshakable fri en ds hi p between our peoples--l i k e t h e app le of t h e i r eyes , and t o f u r t h e r develop t h e

-48-



r e l a t i o n s of al l -a roudd f r a te rn a l coopera t ion betweenour p a r t i e s and s t a t e s . " The new l e a d e r s h ip ' s f a i l u r et o g iv e such l t gua ran tees' t appea red t o r e f l ec t t h e deci-s io n not t o i mpl ica te Khrushchev i n a dea l t o s e l l - ou tt h e GDR. Th is phenomenon, al on g w i t h other i n d i c a t i o n sof t h e new Soviet policy toward t h e German problem,r a u e d s u s p i c i o n s t h a t t h e new l eaders concluded, i nl i g h t of t h e i r a l r e a d y l i m i t e d maneuverabi l i ty , t h a t 'open disclosure of any devious Khrushchevian i n t e n t onstoward t h e GDR would have made t h e new Kremlin leader-ship vu lne rab le t o a t t ack by f r iend (e.g., t h e GDR) and

f o e (e.g., t h e CPR) a l i k e , and w o u l d have unnecessari lycompl ica ted Sovie t d ip loma t ic re1a t o ns w i t h t h e E a s tEuropean a l l i e s .

by Pravda conta ined o nly one poss ib le l i n k w i t h an ea r l i e ri n d m c h a r g e a g ai n st Khrushchev's o ve rt ur es t o Bonn.

Even t h e p u b l i c charges leveled against Khrushchev

Brezhnev's 6 October 1964East Ber l in speech

Only short-s ighted p o l i t i-c i a n s who have com ple telydivorced themselves from

r e a l i s t i c po l i cy , l i k e somegentlemen on th e banks oft h e Rhine, can indulge i nthe hope of so lu t ion s andagreements behind t h e backof t h e GDR, t o t h e de t r im en tof i ts n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t sand secur i ty . No, gen t l e -men, t h i s w i l l never happen.These gentlemen w i l l neverf i n d t h a t w e w i l l do t h i s .

17 October 1964 Pravdae d i t o r i a l on KhrEZKZEZv's'ouster

The Leninis t par ty is anenemy of subjec t iv ism and

d r i f t i n g i n communist con-s t r u c t on. Hare-brainedscheming, immature conclu-s ion s , and has ty dec i s ionsand ac t i on s divorced fromr e a l i t y , bragging and phrase-mongering, command i s m , un-wi l l ingness t o t a k e i n t oaccount t h e achievementsof sc ience and prac t i ca lexperience are a l i e n t o it .*

*Sheer coincidence cannot , of course, be r u l e d o u t . The

l i n k may be strengthened, though, by Ulbr ich t ' s u s e 'df asomewhat s i m i l a r r he to r i ca l dev ice t o dep ic t a "divorce fromr e a l i s t i c pol icy 1t when he revived s i m i l a r worr ies a f t e r t h e1966 CPSU Congress ("NO one who has command of his f i v esenses" can believe t h a t t h e USSR would abandong t h e GDR. *

See ahead page 75) F r e i e Welt's use of t h e similar device(page 3.3) is another -in p o i n t .

-49-



\

A n e x p l i c i t indictment a l l ud in g t o Khrushchev's miscon-d u c t of German affairs which Suslov w a s purported t o havepresented a t t h e 14 October Cen tral Committee t r i a l ofKhrushchev was included i n some r e p o r t s w r i t t e n by non-bloc CommuniSt reporters in Moscow. The Communist-con-troliked I t a l i a n weekly Paese Sera on 30 October, f o r

p r i n t e d a l i s t d f " 2 ~ a r g e s i i a g a i ns t Khrusi~chev,i c h cr i t i c ized Khrushchev for sending h i s son-

t o Bonn as a n auth oriz ed privateem issary. (The .of t h e "29 charges1' was denied in a Moscow-

ed r e p o r t p r i n t e d i n t h e Italian Communist party'Unita on 31 October. In te re st in gl y, TASS on 3

chose t o deny t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e indictment

which d i d not inc lude t h e Adzhubey-as-emissaryi n t h e I t a l i a n l e f t i s t weekly L'Espresso on 1

I1I / s t a t ed t ha t Khrushchev had contemplated

t r y i n g t o " ne go ti at e an agreementt1 w i t h Bonn a t t h e expenser e p o r t e d l y commented t h a t " t h i s idea"

E I l J i n any sens e new, t h a t Khrushchevof Ulbr i c h t .of Khrushchevhad suggested it on seve ra l occas ions in t h e p a s t , andsomewhat along t h e l i n e s of' Erhard ' s i n i t i a l a ss es sm en t(page 23) of t h e o l i c y i m p li c a ti o n s of th e coup aga ins t

s a i d t h a t w i t h ghrushchev's ouster

Lz2 y agreement between Moscow and WestKhru shchev,there wouldGermany or t h e West on t h e Berlin question for *%any, many

* W h 11 in t h e m Ad hubey r epor t ed d i r e c t l y t o K hru-shchev by phone, or so he t o l d Der S p i e g e l e d i t o r s i n a nin terv iew they p u b l i s h e d on 2 A = s m r e s p o n s e t o an-other question, Adzhubey himself suggested t h a t h e wasKhrushchev's pr iv at e emissary.m u s t give away a secret . The Premier w a n t s us t o come/back t o Moscow7 as qu ick ly as poss ib le . "

e xa mi na ti on o f t h e other r epor t ed cha rges ag a ins t K h r u -

He s ta ted t h a t "now I

For a careful

-50-i



yea.rs.l'

of I I remarks,

idea. According t o

The ltagreementMw a s not s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e r e p o rt

ox m m m n v s - - l a a", or dar t o f t h a t

- \

- I- w a s e x p l i c i t

KhrusncnevA U b o e r 964 t h a t he -

shchev) had been nego t i a t ing w i t h t h e West Germans, t h a tt h e West Germans had agreed they would recognize theOder-Neisse line i f Khrushchev would remove t h e Ber l in

dvall, guarantee f r e e e1ect; lons i n E a s t Germany and promiset h e removal of Ulbricht upon completion of h i s t e r m ofof f i c e . Th e r e po r t , which l i s t e d no o t he r West Germano f f e r s , s t a t e d t h a t Khrushchev t o l d Gomulka t h a t he faceda "hard f i g h t in Moscow" i f he w a s t o push through t h d sscheme. Whatever t h e value may be of t h e report , o t h e rpost-coup reports from Warsaw s t a t e d t h a t Gomulka w a sapparent ly m i s t r u s t f u l of Khrushchev's in te nt io ns towardWest Germany. According t o t h e U.S. Embassy in W a r s a w ,Gomulka was llupsetvtby ghrushchev's e f f o r t s t o improver e l a t i o n s w i t h West Germany. Thus, reported t h e embassy,Khrushchev's removal d is tu rb ed Gomulka less t han o the rCommunist leaders. Gomulka himself sa id c r y p t i c a l l y on28 October 1964 th a t th er e had been " j u s t i f i e d groundstc

f o r t h e ouster of Khrushchev. On 17 October t h e P o l i s hCentral Committee Press B u r e a u br iefed newspaper edi torson t h e removal of Khrushchev and re po rt ed ly s t a t e d t h a tKhrushchev w a s becoming too f r i e n d l y w i t h t h e West andhis proposed t r i p t o West Germany was s p e c i f i c a l l y men-t ioned a s a f a c t o r l ea d in g t o h i s downfall .

2. S,XGN.IJ&S:OF.3t.ENEWED DISQUIET

Soon a f t e r Khrushchev was replaced, t h e new Sovietl eade r sh ip a l t e red Moscow's long-standing formula on t h eneed fo r a German peace treaty and a "neu t ra l , f r e e c i t y , "

of West B e rl in . The new l e a d e r s h i p referred t o a Germanr a t he r than a peace t rea ty , and,$r'lequentlyom it ted r e fe rences t o V e s t B e r l i n i n t h e Soviet formulas.The East Germans, however, o bs ti na te ly and pole mical ly



.

\ I

h e l d on t o t h e o ld peace treaty-West Be rl in demands through-ou t t h e f i r s t h a l f of 1965. Ulbr ich t ' s polemical remarkst o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e West B e r l i n i s s u e ought not t o be

shelved were complimented by h i s r e w r i t i n g of e a r l y p o s t-war h i s t o r y which exaggerated h i s role and independenceunder t h e Soviet occupation, by h i s renewal of t h e d e l i -cate sub jec t of t h e Sovie t r epa ra t ions rape of t h e I@%*i e t idone, and i n l a t e Apri l by h i s p r a i s e of CPR suppo r tfor GDR po l i cy .

Holding O f f on t h e German I s sue

The new l ea d e r sh i p may have f e l t t h a t other morepre ss ing domest ic and f or ei gn matt ers demanded t h e i ri n i t i a l c o n c e n tr a t io n and t h a t an y major diplomat ic act ion--such as t h e Bonn vis i t - -on t h e German question shou ldbe postponed. Concentrat ion on oth er f ore ign and domesticmatt ers may a ls o exp lain , i n p a r t , Moscow's dropping ofany element of urgency i n t h e new Sovie t peace t r ea ty l in e .An i n i t i a l a t t e m p t by t h e new l e a d e r s h i p t o i n tr o du c et h e urgent e lement, by c a l l i n g for an "ea r ly" ' so lu t ionof the problem of t h e German peace treaty in t h e 17 O ctober ,

j o i n t Soviet-Cuban communique, w a s s h o r t l y afterwards un-done. Brezhnev, i n h i s 6 November October Revolution an-n i v e r s a r y speech and t h e major 13 November Pravda ed i -t o r i a l on post-Khrushchev f o re ig n p o l i cy ma-refer-ence t o th e need for an "early" s o l u t i o n .

In a d d i t i o n t o d r o pp in g t h e f o rm u la t io n c a l l i n gfor t h e "speediest conclusion" of th e German treaty, an-o t h e r s w i t c h pr es en t i n Brezhnev's 19 October and 6 Novem-ber speech es and i n Kosygin's 25 November speech, w a st h e r e fe rence t o " set t lem ent" ' rather than German "peacetr ea ty ." And a t h i r d s w i t c h i n t h e formula she lveg ' thelong-standing e f fo r t to a l t e r t h e s t a t u s of West B e r l i non t h e bas i s of a peace settlement. Moscow's new l i n eon s o l v i n g t h e German problem f r equen t ly con ta ined nop r o v i s o f o r West B e r l i n . The s ta nd ar d l i n e s i n c e Khru-shchev's 1958 t r e a t y u l t i m a t u m had been t h e s o l u t i o n oft h e German peace t r e a t y and t h e normal iza t ion , on t h a t

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b a s i s , of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n West Be rl in .* W-ezhnev i ntwo speeches (6 November and 3 December) and Pravda i ni ts a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r e ig n po l ic y e d i t o r i a l (l-mber) ,by d ropp ing the Ber l in r i d e r t o Moscow's German formulai n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e new Soviet leadership w a s . t r y i n g t od i s s o c i a t e i t s e l f from Khrushchev's six y e a r o ld p o l i c yf a i l u r e s . (The s t a t u s of West B e r l i n and t h e peace" t r ea ty , *I however , were n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y i g no re d in t h ef i rs t f e w months of t h e new lea der shi p. The. s t a t u s ofWest B e r l i n w a s broached-but not t i e d t o a peace t reaty--i n fo rmula t ions which r e i te ra ted t h e con t inuing S ov ie t

view that West Berlin remained a p o l i t y separate fromlest Germany. For example, t h e 4 December 1964 Soviet-Czech communique s t a t e d t h a t " the whole in ternat oaals i t u a t i o n would be helped by t h e conclus ion of a peacet r e a t y w i t h t h e t w o sovereign German s t a t e s and also anagreement on t h e s t a t u s of West B e r l i n as an-dependentp o l i t i c a l unit .'*)

Ulbr ich t ' s P iaue

The sh el vi ng of t h e old peace t r ea ty and West Ber-l i n f or m ulas u p s e t U lbr i c h t .wishes

wasdisp layed on the day of Brezhnev's 6 November

1964 speech, which ignored the subject of West B e r l i n andr e f e rr e d t o a German "settlement . I 1 GDR l e a d e r s te le-graphed Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan on 6 November andpointedly included t h e urgen t appea l th a t " the conclus ionof a peace t r e a t y w i t h t h e two German s t a t e s and, on t h i sbas i s , t h e t r a n s f o r m a t io n of W e s t B e r l i n i n t o a n e u t r a lf r e e c i t y are of extra-ordinary importance i n t h e s t r u g g l efor t h e u n i t y and s o l i d a r i t y of t h e Communist world movement."

A g l a r i n g a f f r o n t t o hds

*Th$s formulation--dating f r o m t h e 1958 Berlin crisis--had been r e i t e r a t e d in the 1 October Soviet-Indanesiancommunique (p re -o us te r) a s well as i n t h e announced Octoberrevo lu t ion s logans (pos t -ous te r, b u t announced prior t oBrezhnev * s speech) .

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Kosygin's Cold Reception

East German displeasure over t h e S ov i e t she l v i ngof t h e peace t reaty-West Ber l in Issues may have accounted,i n p a r t , * f o r t h e su rp ri s i ng ly low-key t reatgent - ' . g ivenby t h e GDR t o Kosygin's 27 February-2 March 1965 v i s i tt o East Germany t o take i n t h e annual Leipzig t r ade f a i r .Kosygin ' s a r r iva l was noted in N e u e s Deutschland in aone paragraph report under a n e w s e m about t he r e t u r nof t h e Pol i sh de lega t ion f rom the Le ipz ig f a i r . U l b r i c h t ' s

g r e e t i n g was a c u r t two-sentence telegram s e n t f r o mCairo** on the day Kosygin l e f t t h e GDR, and during h i sv i s i t E a s t German protocol and publ ic i ty for t h e new Sovietpd&mier d i d not m e a s u r e up t o t h e red-carpet t r e a t m en tgiven by the GDR t o the ceremonial head of s t a t e (Mikoyan)In h i s vi s i t twelve months e a r l i e r .

+Ina d d i t i o n to t h e peace treaty-West B er l i n i s s u e s ,

* .Leu- A Y U t l y agi ta ted" over t h e S ov i e t ' sla issez f a i r e a t t i t u d e toward cont inu ing West German

economic probes w i t h Ea st European Governments. Rece ntreports on E a s t Germany's concern over Bonn's e f f o r t si n l a t e December 1966 and Januar y 1967 t o e s t a b l i s hdip lomat i c t i e s w i t h Eas te rn Europe (pages 8.4-85) re- .f l e c t a g e n e r a l l y s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e on Moscow's p a r t - - t h a tI s , t o d i p l o m a t i c a ll y c a u t i o n t h e E a s t European na t i on st o go slowly and sh rewdly i n t h e i r accommodation w i t hBonn, b u t no t t o exacerbate r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e E a s t E ur op -eans by at tem pt ing to block t h e i r dea l i ngs w i t h t h e FRG.

r epo r t ed t h a t U l b r i c h t i n t h e w in te r

**Ulb r i ch t w a s i n C a i ro engaged i n a vain a t t empt t o

(For GDR loans and cred i t s equ i va l en t t oachieve a major breakthrough i n non-bloc d i p l o m a t i cr ecogn i t i on .100.8 m i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s , the UAR agreed only t o opena consu la t e genera l in E a s t Berl in . ) The' Cairo t r i p hadlong been planned; t h u s . Ulbricht ' s absence, perhaps, wasnot i n itself a major i n s u l t to Kosygin.



A l m o s t t h e only East German report evincing en thu-siasm d u ri n g t h e v i s i t was t h e 27 February scoop by ADN'scorrespondent in Moscow which c r y p t i c a l l y c i t ed " o f f i c i a lc i rc les of t h e Soviet Foreign. Ministry" f o r t h e t i d i n g st h a t Kosygin had not accepted a n i n v i t a t i o n tGermany. The i n v i t a t i o n had been conveyed b

' ~ e e n e l l r e c e iv e d by Kosygin. Kosygin on t h e 2 3r d askedt o e x p r e s s h i s thanks f o r Erhard ' s i n v i t a t i o n ,LzzJ g in ca l l ed a f r i e n d l y act designed t o improve

r e l a t i o n s . He cou ld no t rep ly a t once t o t h e i n v i t a t i o n ,

exp la ine d Kosygin (perhaps w i t h t h e Khrushchev les so n i nmind) , s ince he had t o c o n s u l t his colleagues. Whatevert h e d e c i s i o n of h i s colleagues may have been, it remainedc u r io u s t h a t t h e means of conveying t h e answer t o t h ePRG was by an E a s t German cor resp ond ent i n Moscow whofepor ted t h e news w h i l e Kosygln w a s on h i s way t o t h e GDR.(The day a f te r E a s t German media publicized t h e Moscow-d a t e l i n e d s t o r y by ADN's correspondent , Kosygin, i n re-sponse t o a q u e s t i o n , r e p o r t e d ly t o l d an AFP repor tert h a t he w a s p r e p a r in g no t r i p t o Bonn.)

E a s t German coo lness toward Kosygin stoo d i n con-t rast t o Kosygin's w a r m pra i se i n h i s 1 March Leipzigspeech for E a s t Germany's economic s t r u c t u r e and h i s

boost for Ulbricht's p r e s t ge--Kosygin

Qisclosedt h a t

U lb r i c h t called the January 1965 Warsaw Pact meeting.By t h i s and other gestures , Kosygin 's v i s i t seemed t obear much i n common wi th t h e Mikoyan m i s s i o n t o Ea s tBer l in one year e a r l i e r ; t h a t i s , t o reassure t h e E a s tGermans t h a t t h e i r s e c u r i t y was n o t i n j eo p ar d y d u r in ga per iod of dimi nis hed Soviet-West German te ns io ns . ThusKosygin i n h i s 1 March speech balanced temperate refer-ences t o West Germany (" the Soviet Govelfnment by no meansin t e n d s t o c o n s id e r West Germany as an outcast wheree v e r y th in g is bad and nothing is good") and f a i n t h i n t sof i n t e r e s t i n t h e R a p a l l o l i n e (he praised t h e f a i r asa " t r a d i n g bridge between E a s t and West," s t re s sed t h a tt h e FRG's i n t e r e s t s were bet ter se rved by "normal goodneighbor ly r e l a t i o n s t t w i t h t h e E a s t , a nd , i n p r i v a t e ,r e p o r t e d ly expressed i n t e r e s t i n ex pa nd in g Soviet-WestGerman cooperation in t h e f a b r i c a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o nof f e r t i l i z e r p l a n t s i n a meeting w i t h West Ge rma n s t e e l

tin MOSCOW,a



e x e c u t i v e s ) w i t h sha rp accusat ions a l le gi ng "manif es ta -t i o n s of revan chism i n Bonn." And, Kosygin t r i e d t o re-assure E a s t B e r l i n t h a t t h e Soviet Union would notsac r i f i ce t h e GDR's v i t a l i n t e r e s t s to West German re -vanchism: "W e would l i k e t o make it q u i t e clear t o t h eWest German leaders, I ) emphasized Kosygin, % h a t t h e y s h o u l dnot expect any concess ions on our p a r t where t h e programof revanchism is concerned." And t o f u r t h e r t h e S o v i e t

' e f f o r t t o assuage East B e r l i n , a flood of high- leve l Sov ie to f f i c i a l s * a r r iv e d in t h e GDR on 6 MarchLto . v i s i t the :L e ip z ig a f f a i r and meet w i th E a s t German l eader s . Therank and number of S ov ie t v i s i t s c o n st i t u te d a record

high i n Moscow's e f f o r t s t o s o l i d i f y i n t r a - b lo c v ie ws .

Two V i e w s of A Bundestag "Provocationf*

B u t t r y i n g t o have it both ways w i t h t h e t w o G e r -manies s t i l l d i d not s i t w e l l w i t h Ulbr i ch t , who r e t u r n e dfrom t h e Cairo v i s i t on 6 March and proceeded to talk

. t o ug h er i n t h e n e xt f e w months not only t o t h e W e s t Ger-mans b u t also , i n t h i n l y v e i l e d f o rm u la t io n s, to t h eS o v ie t s .

Ulbr i ch t ' s d i a t r i b e s c o nc e nt r at e d, a t f i r s t , on

t h e 7 A p r i l 1965 Bundestag sess ion in West Berl in . Thes e s s i o n evoked a n o f f i c i a l p r o t e s t by t h e S o v i et U nion,S o v i e t f i g h t e r p l a n e s b uzz ed t h e Reichstag b u i l d i n g inWest B e r l i n d u r in g t h e Bundestag se ss io n, and t h e GSFGconducted mili tary maneuvers w i t h GDR f o r c e s which a tt i m e s h a l t e d autobahn t r a f f i c t o and from West B e r l i n .

-Rosygin's bela ted re t i nu e con sis t ed of t w o f u l l p r e -s id ium m e m b e r s (Voronov and Shelest), t w o m e m b e r s of t h eCPSU Secre t a r i a t (Titov and Rudakov) , f i v e d e p u t y charir-men of t h e Council of Minis te r s ( f i r s t d e p u t y Ustinov,

soon to ibe given a cha i r on t h e s e c r e t a r i a t a n d a candi-dacy in t h e presidium, D y m s h i t s , L. V. Smirnov, Rudnev,Novikov) and 17 m i n i s t e r s .

I I



But MOSCOW s o f t - p e d a l l e d , w h i l e E a s t Berlin h i g h l i g h t e d , t h eeven ts su r round ing t h e Bundestag session. And Brezhnevi n h i s 8 A p r i l Warsaw speech appeared to f u r t h e r down-p l a y t h e s ig n i f i c a n c e of t h e s e s s i o n by c a l l i n g it aI*polit c a l provocation. Ulbr i c h t equated t h e s e s s i o nwit h supposed mi li ta r y provocat ions, renewed and againemphasized h i s d i s p u t a t i o u s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Sovietbackaway from t h e Ber l in i s sue , * and rev ived t h e hoaryimage of blockade and w a r i n a s i n g l e p ar ag ra ph of ana r t i c l e t h a t appeared i n th e May 1965 e d i t i o n of WorldMarxist Review:

-The i l l e g a l appearance of t h e Bonn govern-ment i n West Berlin and the Bundestags e s s i o n there w e r e a dangerous and reck-less provocation, as important a compon-e n t of t h e p o l i c y of revenge as t h e 'for-w a r d s t r a t e g y , ' t h e atomic-mine belt** andp a r t i c i p at i o n i n a mult i i a t e r a l n u c l e a rf o r c e . Bonn t h in k s t h a t i n t h i s way i tw i l l succeed i n annex ing West Ber l in andu s in g it as an o u t p o s t to t h eGDR and force t h e door open t o t h e East.But we have made i t a b s o l u t e l y clear t h a tWest Berl in does not and w i l l never belongt o th e Federal Republic . The ques t ion of!West Ber l in invo lves t h e v i t a l i n t e r e s t s

*The Soviet May Day slogans for 1965, f o r another ex-ample, made no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e need fo r a "free c i t yof West Berl i n . * *

**The atomic-mine belt, or t h e la te-1964 West Germanproposal f o r a zone of atomic mines along th e forwardedge of t h e b a t t l e area i n West Germny, evoked Sovietprotes t on 18 January 1965 which, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , f u r t h e rplaced the: peace t r e a t y i s s u e on t h e ice . The note t ot h e U.S. claimed t h a t "pending t h e conc lus ion of a Ger-man peace t rea ty" the Sovie t Union, a long w i t h t h e USA,Br i t a i n and France, con t inues to have a hand i n FRGp o l i c y on t h e bas i s of t h e Potsdam Agreement.

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II



9.

. .

f .

..e..A, ,

..$&&

of t h e GDR. I t is every b i t as impor tantto us as t he ques t ion of t h Oder-Neisse

border is t o Pol nd. W e r e c a l l t hat underB i t l e r t h e Danzig corridor i s s u e w a s usednot only t o foment revanchism, b u t a l s ot o prepare w a r . Thus, t h e ques t ion ofways of access t o West Berl in could be-come a ques t ion of war and peace. There-fo re t h e crive should be prevented ingood time. Those who want normal com-munication w i t h West Ber l in through GDRt e r r i t o r y by l a nd , water and a i r shouldaccustom themselves t o conclud ing permanentagreements w i t h t h e German DemocraticRepublic. flmphas is i n o r i g i n a l 7

J3rezhnev's relat ively temperate ana lys i s of t h e Bundestags e s s i o n i n h i s 8 A p r i l Warsaw s pe ec h c o n s t i t u t e d t h e o n lycomment on t h e sub j ec t dur ing t h e 4-10 A p r i l Brezhnev-Kosygin v is i t t o Poland. N o Berl in blockade t h r e a t s weremade by t h e Sovie t leaders and t h e Polish-Soviet Treatyof F'r iendsh i p , Coopera tion and Y ut u a l Ass is tance s ignedby t h e t w o p a r t i e s on 8 A p r i l included t h e first Sovie tr e fe rence in a t r e a t y t o t h e Oder-Neisse l i ne . (The 12Ju ne 1964 GDR-Soviet trea ty--which had not been l i s t e di n P ravda' s 1 January 1965 t a l l y of Sovie t fo re ign po l i cysuccesses h 1964--guaranteed b u t d i d no t s p e c i f y t h eGDR borders . N e u e s Deutschland's 10 April 1965 a r t i c l eon t h e S o v i e t - E I E b t r e a t y s t a t e d t h a t t h e "Oder-Neisseborder has been confirmed by t h e t r e a t i e s c on cl ud ed be-tween t h e GDR and Poland" and made no r e f er e n ce t o t h evague 19 64 Soviet-GDR bord er gu ara nt ee .)

- -

Reaction from Ulbricht, which c o n s t i t u t e d a n ad-monishment t o t h e Sovie t s t h a t t h e GDR cannot be t akenf o r g r an t ed , w a s not long delayed.

Ulbr . i ch tQsRewritine: of E a s t German Ristorv

N i n e days a f t e r , t h e si gn in g ceremony in Warsaw,N e u e s Deut s ch land toob'the unusual s tep of pub l i sh ing

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I t for t h e f i r s t time1* f i v e year old U lbr i c h t speech ont h e t e s t y subject of th e scope and r o le of G e r m a n s i n t h eSoviet ?+ne of occupation in t h e immediate p o s t w a r days.The speech, which h e l d t h a t t h e scope of German a c t i v i t ywas la rge and t h e i r ro le w a s n ot f u l l y su b s er v ie n t t ot h e Sovie ts , w a s purpor tedly de l ivered on 12 May 1960.If so, it may have regis tered U lbr i c h t ' s pique over oneof Khrushchev's backdowns on e'arlier t h r e a t s t o s i g n ase arate USSR-GDR peace treaty. (Ehrushchev, on t h ehe& of t h e Pa r i s s u m i t meeting , made such a t a c t i c a lbackdown t n a speech in Eaot Berl in on 20 May 1960) .*Presumably its belated p u b li c a ti o n s e rv e d t o r e g i s t e rsimilar f e e l i n g s over t h e backaway by Brezhnev and Kosy-g i n on t h e peace ttreaty-West Berlin issues. The 1960 .Ulbricht speech made it clear t h a t its purpose was t ocorrect t h e **not qu i t e cor re c t" his to r ica l accounts ofthe development of East German ci v i l adm ini str at on underth e Sovi et Qccupatlon. Gr at ef ul ly acknowledging t h a t* * c a p i t a l i s t o n t r a d ic t o ns " were l i qu id a ted and a newadm in i s t r a t ion w a s e s t a b l i s h e d wi th t h e he lp of t h e Sovie tArmy and t h e Soviet occupation organs, the newly publishedUlbricht speech claimed t h a t Sovie t a s s i s t ance "is onlyp a r t of t h e s to ry . **Ulbr ich t ' s personal role in forming the SED and t h e e a r l ya c t i v i t i e s of G e r m a n s guided by the Y e a d e r s h ip of t h eSED." "!Chis is t h e e s s e n t i a l p o in t which I wanted t oe x p l a i n here as a h i s t o r i c a l lesson, declaimed U l b r i c h t .The publ ica t ion of t h e de layed h i s t o ry l e s son was soonfollowed by Ulbr ich t ' s r e t u r n t o a n ot he r s e n s i t i v e E a s tGerman-Soviet issue--reparations.

GDR, repeated Ulbr icht i n h i s SED Cent ra l Committee plenumspeech published by N e u e s Deutschland on 28 Apri l .

The r es t of t h e s t o ry concerned

Reparat ions for a l l of Germany were made by t h e

After

*A similar r a t onale appeared t o under l i e Ulbricht *sNovember 1961 charge (page 61, made a f t e r another K h r u -shchev backdown on a separate USSR-GDR peace t r ea ty , t h a tBeria and Malenkov did not favor t h e cons t ruc t ion of

s o c i a l s m in East Germany.

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charging t h a t t h e FRO owes t h e GDR an amount '*approach-ing" 120 b i l l i o n deutsche marks fo r t h e Sov,iet w a r repara-t i ons and for West German economic llexploiObtion**ofE a s t Germany i n t h e days before t h e B e r l i n Wall p a t as t o p t o t h e GDR's manpower drain, Ulbricht bemQaned t h el i m i t e d scope of E a s t Germany's n a t i o n a l economy ( " j u s timagine what o u r national economy would be l i k e i f w ehad i nves t ed t h i s addit ional amount of approximately 120 .b i l l i o n d e ut sc he m a r k s * * ) and, t h u s , a s %e had done i n h i s6 October 1964 speech, in di re c t ly p laced the blame on t h eSoviet Union fo r its d i sm an t l ing of t h e E a s t er n Zone d u r -ing t h e e a r l y post w a r yea r s .

The speaker's per sona l ro le dur ing the e a r l y y ea rsand h i s newly claimed independence f r o m S o v i e t t u t e l a g ei n t h e 'forties--he lauded the wisdom ef Pis 1945 preueptt h a t **theway of the Soviets '* could not be fol lowedt-werea g ai n g l o r i f i e d in U lb ri ch t' s len gt hy SED Ce nt ra l Commit-te e speech (over 37,000 words). He made no r e f e r e n c e t oKosygin, or t o t h e Sovfe t leader 's v i s i t t o Leipzig onemonth e a r l i e r , though th & SAipsig f a i r was a t op ic cove redin Ulbr ich t ' s speech. N o r d i d Ulbricht mention Brezhnev,or convey Brezhnev's 8 Apri l formula t ion on p o t e n t i a l l yf a v o r a b l e f o r c e s f o r t h e development of West German-Sovietr e l a t i o n s . **

In P r a i s e of Peking

While a o ns p ic u ou s ly s l i g h t i n g t h eand i t s l e a d e r s . U l b r i c h t w a r m l v m a i s e d

Soviet UnionCommunist China 's

sup po rt f o r GDR'policy. H i s 28-A;ril pra i se f o r t h e CP R

*Unlike t h e way o m h e Bolsheviks. t h e German CommunistP a r t y (KPD) m e r ed w i t h t h e Social Democrats (SPD) i n t h e

sO&@&n~%& ififz4adsmzin s 15 March 1965 formulat ion .Brezhnev balanced charges of West German revanchism w i t ht h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t atWestGermany is not populated by

r evanch i s t s a lone .and t h e r e are f o r c e s which r e j ec t revanchis t ravings andsuppor t a realistic f o r e i g n p o l i c y . * *

There are many peace-loving people,



I \

was p a r t i c u l a r l y gl ar in g s i nc e Peking propaganda t h e daybefore commended itsc,public at tack on t h e post-Khrushchevl eadersh ip . (NCNA on 27 A p r i l t r ansmi t ted t h e p u b l i s h e r ' snote t o t h e f i f t h volume of Ehrushchev's sta tem ent s 'inChinese t rans la t ion which sc or ed "Khrushchev's succ esso rs"fo r "following in h i s foots teps .") And Ulbr i ch t praisedt h e B R n a passage which i n d i r e c t l y sugges ted h i s d i s -pleasure over h i s a l l i e s ' a c t i v i t i e s w i t h Bonn.

The Bonn government avails i t s e l f .of pro-voca t ions because it be l i eves t h a t i$

can e x p l o i t di f ferences of opinion w i t ht h e CPR and t he va r i ous na t i ona l i n t e r e s t s .

of c e r t a i n p e o p le ' s democracies. TheBonn government believes t h a t t h e economicr e l a t i o n s of the people 's democraciesw i t h t h e West German Federal Republ ic canf o r c e ' t h e Warsaw Pact s ta tes to y i e l dground i n t h e eyent of provoca t i owaga i ns t t h e GDR. The cont ra ry was t r u e ,as demonstrated by t h e recent meet ing of .t h e W a r s a w Pact s ta te s . The Bonn govern-ment w a s quickly reminded of t h e limitsof i ts power. The s ta tements of t h e CPRGovernment, too , in di ca te t h a t t h e Bonn

government h a s again speculated erroneously. .

P e k i n g ' s f l i r t a t i o n w i t h E a s t Be rl in commenced i n e ar ne sts h o r t l y a f t e r t h e January W a r s a w Pact meeting, whlch,c o n tr a ry t o Ulbr i ch t ' s di s t or te d den ia l (above), d i d notlead t o a G D R- b lo c agreement on d e a l i n g w i t h West Ger-many's economic pol ic ies toward the E a s t . ' In l a t e Febru-ary Peking announced an agreement which, unl ike m o s tother Chinese-East European t rade agreements a t t h a tt i m e , provided fo r an Increase .in t rade. (CPR propa-ganda s a i d t h a t th e agreement provided for a "remarkableincrease" in t rade) . The GDR reciprocated w i t h seve ra lf r i enddy gestures; o n e w a s a press conference given byt h e GDR Ambassador t o t h e CPS who thanked t h e Chinese

f o r t h e i r s u p p o r t of Ulbr ich t ' s fore ign pol ic ies . And

.

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-4sa?w&&



surrounding t h e development of improved CPR-GDR r e l a t i o n s ,Peki ng propaganda i n A p r i l sporad ica l ly referred t o t h ei nd ica t ions o f U l b r i c h t 's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e e x t e n tof So vi et .and E a s t European support. In May, t h e propa-ganda re turned t o t h e September l i n e of t h e .previousyea r , t h a t is t o allegations of Soviet pol icy t o s e l l

o u t last Germany. (See pages 31-35) In a speech byCCP Poli tburo m e m b e r Peng Chen a t t h e PK.1 anniversaryc e l e b r a t i o n i n Djakar ta on 25 May:

If t h e y , p e new Soviet leadership7 t r u l y.have departed from ghrushchev's czwse

o$ revisionism, then why do t h e y continuepursuin g Khrushchev's po li cy t o sel l -outt h e GDR.i n s o l e n t l y he l d t h e Bundestag session i nWest Be rl in and launched t h e i r i n s e ns i b l eprovocat ion against t h e GDR, why d i d ' theynot dare t o take measur.es t o r e pu l s et h i s provocation? Why d i d t hey p u t i ncold e torage t h e sugges t ion for reachinga peace t r e i t y w i t h Germany as'soon aspossible and for s o l v i ng t h e West B e r l i ni s s u e , and, moreover, not d ar ing t o toGchon t h e subject again?

When WSs* Germany's m i l i t a r i s t s '

Kosygin's Second Mission

P r i o r t o Peng Chen's charge, t h e Soviet Union hadagain attempted, through another Kosygin v i s i t to t h eGDR, t o demonstrate t h a t East Germany would not be fore-saken during a period of improved Soviet-West German re-l a t i o n s . The occasion for Kosygin's second visit i n oney e a r was t h e 20 th anniversary of VE Day. 'And i n ' t h emarning before h i s a r r i v a l , U l br i ch t found occasion t o

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Provide c ont ra s t i ng backdrop ..for Kosygin's subsequentperformance:

Ulbricht , 5 May People'sChamber speech

P o l i t i c a l~ , - tmosphere

". t h e cr imina l Hit le r i teideology f i f revanchism7p r e v a i l s In Bonn.. .*'-"Twenty years a f t e r t h el i b e r a t i o n , there pre-v a i l s a g ai n i n Bonn'sdomest ic pol icy th e s p i r i tof t h e war-economy lead-ers , t h e Hit ler i te armyo f f i c e r s , t h e S.S. special-ists i n t h e police, andH i t l e r i t e blood judges i nt h e jud ic ia ry . Apar tfrom some except ions , thep o l i t i c a l l y and morally in-ferior m a s s press, rum&$?:i n a t i n g on t h e most basei n s t i n c t s , s y s t e m a t i c a l l ypoisons pub1ic opinion. **

Reuni f ica t ion

*'The road toward u n i f i -c a t i o n of t h e German8t ate6 .;LB881jixvi a dis r-mament and a peace t rea ty ,and a l so thro=e-t i o n of t h e remnants ofWorld W a r I1 and comple-t i o n of t h e great workof l i b e r a t i o n from m i l i -t a r i s m and imperialismand fascism i n West Ger-many.

Kosygin, 7 May E a s t B e r l i nVE Day dpeech

i n West Germany

"The Soviet Union by nomeans holds t h a t a l l WestGermans are imbued w i t h t h eideas of revanchism. Wunders tand that m b s t ofthe peop le of the GermanFedera1 Republ ic want t ol i v e i n peace.." " I t isbeing s a i d tha t the newgenera t ion of Germans whohave grown up i n t h e Federa lRepub l i c s i n c e t h e w a r can-not be he ld respons ib le f o rt h e crimes committeed bynazism. It would indeed beu n ju s t t o sadd le today ' s WestGerman youth w i t h t h i s graver e s p a n s i b i l i t y . ''

*I.. whoever r e a l l y wantsto look for genuine waysl e a d in g to German reuni-f c a t ion m u s t not seekthem through p o l i t i c a land m i l it ary adventuresbut on t h e basis of avoluntary agreement be-tween t h e t w o Germans t a t e s .



West Ber l i n So l u t i on

@*No ebates and no con- (no r e f e re n c e t o a Westf l i c t would be neces sa ry Be r l i n so l u t i o n )because of West B e r l i n i fWest B e r l i n d i d n o t l e ti t s e l f be misused by theBonn r evanch i s t s , i f WestB e r l i n becomes a -n e u t r a lfree c i t v .

--

.

In add i t i on t o remaining s i l e n t on a West B e r l i n s o l u t i o n ,Kosygin did not broach U l b r i c h t ' s 5 May repeated c a l l fo r

120 b i l l i o n marks from t h e FIUG, h i s mil i t an t compla in t ' r e -gard ing t h e Buadestag meeting i n W e s t Berl in , and h i sd i s t r es s over a l l ege d Western proposals t o t h e GDR'se a s te r n neighbors--one of which, U lb r i c h t d i sc l osed , wasa U.S. scheme t o buy off **indol lars" and border guaranteesi n t e r e s t e d East European coun t r i e s i n r e t u r n f o r E a s tEuropean support for Bonn's "revanchis t pol icy toward theGDR." This charge, presumably, w a s Ulbricht 's l n t e rp r e -t a t i o n of t h e U.S . bridge-bui lding proposal . The FlRD!st r a d e - b u i ld in g p r o p o s a l s were in t e r p r e t e d i n a similar

d i s t o r t e d fa sh io n, and i n May,Neues Deutschland pr in te da flood of articles c a u t i o n i n g m a h i e s on Bonn's s u p -posedly subvers ive t rade tac t ics , t h e aims of which werealso seen as s t r eng t hen i ng Bonn's l l revanchis t pol icyrp

toward t h e GDR.

3 . THE RESPI'l%, TEEN TEE RENEWAL OF TBE TRIANGLE

East German expressions of confidence i n Sovie tsupport followed Kosygln's second mission t o t h e GDR i nMay.p a r t i c u l a r l y hos t i l e Sovie t a t t i t udes , expressed in pr i -vabe as w e l l as pub l i c s t a t ement s , toward West Germany.The Soviets were t h e n i n f l a t i n g t h e West German. "threat"i n order t o suppor t t h e r a t i o n a l e : f o r l i m i t e d a c t i v i t yi n Vietnam. The in f la te d "threa t*@ ay a l so have been a

defensive response t o CPR charges tha t t h e Sovie t s wereplanning t o p u l l back f rom, ra ther than open up,a '*second

U l b r i c h t ' s confidence may have stemmed from t h e



f ron t " i n Europe. The resp i te dur ing t h i s per iod of coolr e l a t i o n s between Moscow and Bonn s t i l l d i d no t r e s t r a i nUlbr ich t i n J u l y from his r e w r i t i n g of Ea s t German historyor Brezhnev in early September from sounding o u t t h e V e s tGermans on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of improving re la t ions in t h ei n d e f i n i t e f u t u r e . B u t i n l a t e September , a f t e r Ulb r ich t 'st r i p t o the Soviet Union, t h e Sovie ts appeared t o haveadopted t h e G D R ' s ha r sh assessment of t h e FRG. And a f t e rt h e conclusion of a long-term t r a d e p a ct i n December 1965,U l b r i c h t appeared t o have noth ing b u t s e r v i l e s a l u t i t i n n st o e x te nd t o t h e Sovie t Union.

The pe r i od of compara t ive t ranqui l i ty was not longl i ved . After th e CPSU Congress in April 1966 Ulbrichtpub l i c l y r ev i ved o l d fears about 8~ abandoned GDR whileMoscow was making plans to renew the USSR-FRG t r ad e t r e a t ywhich had expired in 1963. And though the Soviets werequick t o re ject new West German o f f e r s t o buy o u t t h eGDR, SovietTGDR differences on a number of key develop-ments were not papered over. Cont ras t ing views were ex-

posed over the proposed SED-SPD t a l ka from which t h e EastGermans backed away while the Sovie t s expressed t h e viewt h a t the exchange w o u l d be welcome and usefu l ; over Sovie tAmbassador Abrasimov's d i rec t t a l ks w i t h West Berlin MayorBrandt about which t h e GDR was not pleased; and over theeva l ua t i on of t h e "grand Coali t ion" in Bonn t o which Mos-cow attached s a m e hope while E a s t Ber l in pa in ted t h e newFRG Government i n hues as black as t h e GDR depic ted t h eE r h a r d and kdenauer predecessors of t h e c o a l i t i o n .

Signs of "Correct" But C a u t i o u s Soviet-GDR Relations

The red carpet t reatm ent give; t o Kosygin on h i ssecond v i s i t t o t& eGDR in 1965 was followed by expres-s i on s of conf idence in Soviet commitments by Ulbrichtand other GDR l eaders . For example, U l br i ch t expressedsuch conf idence i n re bu t t in g SPD leader Er le r ' s A p r i l1965 Foreign A f f a i r s propos i t i on t ha t since it w a s hope-

less t o talk with tlie East German regime about the termsfor its l i q u i d a t i o n only Moscow c ou l d nego t i a t e Germanr e u n i f i c a t i o n . Thus, in opposing E r l e r ' s propos i t ion ,

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Ulbr i ch t ' s c h i e f argument i n h i s speech a t t h e 10 th SEDplenum (23-25 June 1965) w a s t h a t "the Soviet Union hasunequivocal ly declared t h a t normal iza t ion of r e l a t i o n sand r eun i f i ca t ion of t h e two German s ta tes is a matterfo r t h e Germans." Other SED speakers , such as Herman Axen,p oi nt ed t o t h e t a l k s between Ulbricht and Kosygin inE a s t B e r l i n and Honecker and Stoph w i t h Brezhnev andKosygin in Moscow i n which ' I the leading Soviet comradesemphasized t h a t t h e a l l i a n c e between th e S ovi et Union andt h e GDR is f i r m and in di so lu bl e. " And by e a r l y J u l y,Ulbr ich t came c l o s e t o endors ing Kosygin's 7 May "volun-t a r y agreement" formula--a f o r m u l a reminiscent of Kosygin'sNovember 1962 appeal for a "goodwill agreement." In a4 Ju l y speech

in Rostok,Ulbr ich t s a i d

t h a t r e u n i f i c a t i o nis poss ib le only through es tabl i shment of "good peacefulre la t i on s" i n Germany i t s e l f ,

t o s ea so n h i s r e w r i t i n g of e a r l y postwar h i s t o r y in t h eEa st er n '&ne. And i n a speech on 13 J u l y , U lb r ic h t d i r e c t l yr e f e r r e d t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of e a r l y differenc.es of op in ionw i t h the Russ ian occupiers.parties in E a s t Germany, Ulbricht boasted

Independence on Ulbricht 's part , however, continued

The post w a r a n t i f a s c i s t

can t ake c r ed i t f o r t h e great successof e s t a b l i s h i n g a f i r m unbreakable al-l i a nce o f - . f r i endsh ip wi th th e Sov ie t

Union. This was not always easy. Aftero u r l i b e r a t i o n from Hit le r l t e t e r r o r ,t h e Sovie t Union pro tec ted our an t i -f a s c i s t democratic r econs t ru c t ion andhelped u s f u l f i l l many t a s k s .our Sovie t f r i en ds could not take f romo u r shoulder s independent c re a t iv e th ink-i n g and i nd ep en de nt i n i t i a t i v e i n t a k-i n g t h e democratic road of t h e a n t i -f a s c i s t democrat ic order a n d s o c i a l i s tr e c o n s t r u c tion in accordance w i t h t h es p e c i a l cond i t ions i n Germany.

However,

And through early August Ulbr ich t , w h i l e maintaining anatmosphere of " c o r r e c t " r e l a t i o n s w i t h Moscow, w a s s t ills t i c k i n g t o his West Ber l in formula : "we are willing t o



guarantee access t o a f r e e and neut ral c i t y of West B er l i n " heresponded i n an intervi ew w i t h t h e Indian paper B l i t z(Bombay) on 5 A u g u s t .

3

During t h i s per iod of correct relations, Moscowd i d not close o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an eve ntu al . normali-z a t i o n of a f f a i r s w i t h t h e FRG. Expressions of Moscow'sw i l l i n g n e s s to even t ua l l y improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bonn,fo r example, preceded FRG S t a t e S e c r e ta r y C a r s te n ' sSeptember t r i p t o t h e Sovie t Unioa--a v i s i t d i re c t lyaimed a t a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e prospec t s fo r improving Bonn-Moscow relations. On t h e eve of C a r s t en ' s v i s i t , Brezh-

nev in a 14 September sp eec h a t a Soviet-Czech meetingi n t h e Kremlin, seemed t o be o f f e r i n g h o s p i t a l i t y t o t h eWest German fore ign a f fa i r s expert:

In t h e Sovie t Union we would natural lywelcome t he no rm a li za t ion of r e l a t i o n sw i t h t h e Federal German Republic, butone thing must be clear once and f o ra l l . Such a normal i za t ion cannot bea t t a i n e d on t h e bas i s of s a t i s f y i n gr e v a n c h i s t claims by Bonn. There canbe no normal izat ion a t t h e expense oft h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e G e r m a n DemocraticRepublic, t h e Czechoslovak Social i s t

Republ i c , t h e Pol i s h People 's Republic,o r any other s o c i a l i s t c ou n tr y. T hi ss h a l l n o t be. And if in West Germanyt he re r e a l l y e x i s t s t h e i n t e n t i o n ofd e ve lo p in g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e SovietUnibn, t hen an end must be put t o t h ef u t i l e aggressive desires , and th e bas i sof r e a l i t y accepted wi thout ignor ingt h e r e s u l t s of the war and postwar de-

velopment i n Germany and i n Europe.

Thus w h i l e pledging t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e GDR (amongo t he r s ) would be guarded by t h e USSR, Brezhnev l e f t wideopen t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of improved rela t ions w i t h t h e FRG.

A l i k e sugges t i on was made d i r e c t l y t o Cars t ens dur ipgh i s f a rew e l l d i nne r .emphas ized at the d i n n e r t h a t the West Germans and t h e

Deputy Foreign Minister SemenooSr..

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, SECRET \



Sovie t s should s e t a s i d e t h e i r di f fe rences and "get onwith our busin ess." And, acc ord ing t o t h e U.S. Embassyi n Moscow, Car st en ' s hosts a l s o a l l e g e d l y a s s ur ed himt h a t a way could be found t o exclude recognizing t h eEa st Germans i n any NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggressiont r e a t y .

Sig ns of Clos e and Confident Soviet-GDR Re la ti on s

B u t a f t e r Cars ten 's visit and Ulbricht ' s Septemberv i s i t t o t h e USSR, t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r improved re la-

t i o n s were f l a t l y discla imed by Brezhnev himse l f i n h i s29 September speech a t t h e CPSU plenum. However,' someambivalence was preserved by TASS's cur ious and as y e tunexplained addendum t o t h e text of Brezhnev's address:

/With regard t o West Germany7 w e area e a l i n g w i th t h e main centeF of reac-t i o n and d l i t a r i s m i n Europe and w i t ht h e main ally of aggress ive P.S. imper i -

. alist ci rc les , and it is b u t - n a t u r a lt h a t under these cond i t i ons there areno p o s s i b i l i t i e s for f ru i t f u l deve l op -ment, of re la t ions w i t h West Germany.(Although economic l i n k s on mutually

prof i t ab le b as i s cont inue t o ex i s t , i np a r t i c u l a r our trade w i t h t h e GermanFederal Republic remains approximatelyon t h e former level--TASS)

And leaving t h e imp res sio n t h a t Moscow w a s w i l l i n g t osac r i f ice tha t mutua l ly prof i t ab l e t rade for USSR-GDRp o l i t i c a l pr in ci pl es , Sov iet Ambassador Abrasimov, ac-cording t o a 4 November ADN account of an in te rv iew i nEas t Ber l in , p roudly poin ted out t h a t "for about th ree .years n h e USSR7 has 'signed no t r ade and c u l t u r a l agree-ments S i t h the-Federal.Repub1ic because Bonn is tryingt o include West B e r l i n 88 p a r t of t h e Federal Repub l i ci n these agreements." Abrasimov?s p u b l i c s ta tement t h u s

provided f ur th er ev idence th a t t h e Sovie t s had turned

.



from t h e c o n c i l i a t o r y l i n e t h a t had been ra i sed anew a f t e rKhrushchev's ouster.*

East German leaders favorab ly responded to Brezh-nev's and Abrasimov's s tr on g sup port fo r Ulbr ich t ' s in-t r a n s i g e n t l i n e tow ard West Germany, and GDR expres s ionsbecame par t icu lar ly w a r m when it became cl e ar t h a t t h es t a t em en t s by Abrasimov and others :accur t i te ly indica tedt h a t Moscow's discourse w i t h t h e FRG had i n f a c t t akenon the symptoms of p o l i t i c a l anaemia. Po li t bu m memberAxen, who had pra i sed t h e " indissoluble" GDR-USSR a l l i -

ance i n June, ampl i f ied t h a t theme i n a 5 November anni-ve r sa ry speech which scored "imperialist p o l i t i c i a n s andso-ca l led Kreml inologis t s who t r y t o d e ce iv e t h e workingpeople and themselves about t h e bankruptcy of t h e i r ownp o l i c y w i t h s i l l y and e q u a l l y b o ri n g s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u tdiscord between t h e GDR and t h e USSR." Axen deliveredanother punch t o "those gentlement" who e n t e r t a i n d e si g nson t h e GDR by l ec tu r ing t h a t t h e wide ly p ropagandized"October Storm" Warsaw Pa c t maneuver i n Ea st Germany w a san "auxi l ia ry lesson" aimed a t dampening t h e a rdor ofthe West German "imperialists." Axen also demanded thatt h e CPR p re s s di sc on ti nu e its publ ic polemics agains tt h e Sovie t Union--a demand whikh w a s another ges ture onbehalf of t h e Sovie t Union inasmuch as t h e GDR Foreign

Minis t ry had ea r l i e r denied rumor% circulated in West%*

*That is, t h a t a Bonn-Moscow t r a d e pa ct co ul d i n effec ti nc lude some type of B e r l i n clause, such as t h e recogni-t i o n , i mp lie d o r e x p l i c i t , t h a t t h e D-Mark West (FRC c u r -rency) area i n c lu d e s t h e area of West Berlin. A Sovie to v e r t u r e t o t h i s ef fec t s u r f a c e d 1964when Deputy Foreign Minister SemAnov duggested

t h e B e r -

a l e t t e r t o t h e S o v i e t s d e f i n i n g t h e area covered in t h e

b i l a t e r a l trade agreement as D-Mark West Area, r a t h e rthan making an ex p l i c i t r e fe re nce t o the Nest GermansLands and t e r r i t o r y of West B e r l i n a s t h e area coveredby t h e t r a d e t r e a t y .

- #8 .

1 a means ofin clause issue. He suggested t h a t Bonn could present

V Y 1.'.,...W.,. I.,...,,

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II \ *

German media t h a t Ulbr icht would v i s i t t h e CPR sometimewithin t h e next three months.* And Ulbr ich t ' s h i s t o r ylessons s h i f t e d from th e theme of E a s t German t roublesw i t h the Soviet Union t o t h e theme, which he repeatedover and over in a 7 November TV discdssion, t h a t coopara-t i on and a l l i ance w i t h R u s s i a had been and w i l l remaint h e Gemmans' w i s e s t and most important foreign p o l i c yaccomplishment.

With t h e knowledge t h a t Brezhnev i n l a t e Septemberhad disclaimed t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of improving relat ionsw i t h Bonn, Ulbr i ch t i n t h e TV discuss ion sa fe ly andhypoc r i t i c a l l y asserted t h a t "as far as w e are concerned,w e, th e representa t ives of t h e GDR, are w i l l i n g $0 doeverything in our power t o promote t h e development off r i e ndl y re la t i on s between t h e West German Federal Repub-l i c and t h e Soviet Union."

Economic policy support was, a t t h a t t i m e , anotheraccomplishment t h a t U l b r i c h t may w e l l have had i n mind.His subsequent and frequent re fere nce s t o Soviet supp ortconveyed t h e impression ( l a t e r born o u t ) of a . d e n i a l t othe West German new8 repor ts t h a t t h e Soviet Union w a aplanning a substant ia lc 'cut in its economic commitment t o

of a f i v e ye a r trade t r e a t y , U lbr i c h t meticulously glossedove r t he t echn i ca l troubles which preceded, and may havebeen related t o , t h e dramatic s u i c i d e of East German plan-n ing ch ie f , E r i c h Apel. T h u s Ulbricht i n h i s 2'7 Decemberpra ise of t h e t r e a t y a t t h e 1 1 t h SED Central Committeemeeting d i d not provide s uppor t t o t h e Western repor tst h a t Apel had shot himself t o dea th on t h e day the t r e a t ywas signed due t o h i s opposi t ion t o t h e USSR's tradepolicy toward t h e GDR. Instead, Ulbricht indicated t h a t

.#

4

\

>&#@ t h e GDR. &id following t h e conclusion on 3 December

*Handelsbla tt (D sse ldorf ) repor t ed on 26 October 1965

t h a t m b i c h t w o u l d v i s i t Pek i ng i n December at t h e ea r l -i e s t , and February a t t h e l a t e s t . D e r Spiegel on 3 Novem-

ber repor ted t h a t Ulbr i ch t would v i 3 3 Peking in February1966.



. .:,. :... . .. . .

%, ... . .

.., .., .\ .

1

Ape1 had been maneuvered i n t o a quarrel "between t h ei n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y on t h e one hand. ;.and t h e . i n t e r e s t sof b r a n c h i n t e r e s t s , which f r e q u e n t ly a dd r es s u n r e a l i s t i cdemands motivated by wishful thinking and which cannotbe implemented by /Apel's7 Sta te Planning CommisGion.itAnd in suppor t of €he long-term t r a d e pact w i t h t h e Sovie tUnion, U l b r i c h t r a t i o n a l i z e d t h a t i t s conclus ion "1s apain for r eac t iona ry c i rc l e s in West Germany because t h e yhad hoped t o be abl e t o blackmail t h e GDR by economic?m e a s u r e s . TheLsegentlemen now understand t h a t conclud-ing t hd s long-term agreement ruin ed t h e i r plans."

-

B u t one yea r l a t e r , when t h e long-term trade agree-ment w a s up f o r annual readjustment and when re l a t i o n shad been showing signs of s t r a i n s i n c e ' th e CPSU Congressin April 1966, E a s t German d i s s a t i s f a c t io n with t he Sov ie t ' st r a d e p o l ic y toward the GDR was not suppressed.*

*The five year t rade agreement prELised by U lbr i c h t(above) ov er Apel's body calleq for, but apparent ly w a snot followed up in i t s second year by, a s u b s t a n t i a l i n -crease in t o t a l trade. And treatment of t h e 10 December1966 t r a d e agreement si gn ed i n Moscow betr ayed E a s t Ger-

man disenchantment: Neues Deutschland's announcement oft h e second year of th-g-term t rade agreement omittedt h e t r a d i t i o n a l trappings--which Pravda's announcementprovided-of t h e t tcordia l atmosphereivof t h e t r a d e t a l k sand of t h e " f u l l agreementtt achieved. So vie t Mi nis terof Fore ign Trade Pato l ich ev i n a. 12 January 1967' Iz ye st iy ain te rv iew d ip lom at i ca l ly s ides t epped any in d ica t ion th a tt h e long-term t r ade agreement signed in December 1965would increase as r a p i d l y as ea r l i e r planned.ing t h a t Soviet t r ad e volume in 1967 w i t h s o c i a l i s tc o u n t r i e s w i l l increase "not less than n ine percent , "Pato l ichev d i d n o t t i e t h e pro jec ted inc rease wi th t r a dea c t i v i t i e s w i t h t h e GDR, which he, nonethe less , descr ibedas " t h e p r i n c i p a l S o v i et t r a d i n g p a r t n e r t t

Envisag-



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>;\.,. .+. ..., i. ..

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..+... ...

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.;,a

Concern A f t e r t h e CPSU Congress

Emphasizing in public t h e s t a l e l i n e t h a t t h eWest German m i l i t a r i s t s are pp&s1Bd.to pounce on t h e l o s tt e r r i to r ie s t o t h e East , Moscow as t e l l i n gt h e West Germans i n ea r l y March e y wouldl i k e t o begin t rade negot+ at ions "without any precondi-t i o n s " a f te r t h e 23rd CPSU Congress (29 March-8 Apr i l ) .*

And in t h e Congress speeches by S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s ,t h e only precgndi t ion f o r improved rela t ions was t h e

vague ins is tence t h a t Bonn should pursue a po l i cy ofpeaceful cooperat ion. In t h e con t ext of t h i s i n s i s t e n c e ,Gromyko a t t h e Congress re f e r red t o Moscow's desire fort h e "norm aliz ati on and improvement" of r e l a t i o n s w i thWest Germany where Y!ar from a l l Germans...are poisonedby t h e i deas of revanche." He had made similar p o i n t sin h i s 9 December 1965 Supreme Soviet reply t o i n t e r p e l -l a t i ons from Soviet d e p u t i e s , b u t t h e tone of h i s 2 A p r i l1966 Congress speech was much less s t r i d e n t and.;demand-ing on other Soviet-FRG related matters. For example,i n December he s ta te-d t h a t Chancel lor Erhardls 10 Novem-ber 1965 pol icy s ta tem ent " is an aggregation of m i l i t a r -is t and revanchist i d e a s which is r a r e l y met i n such anaked form." In April, Gromyko judged Chancellor Erhard's

gene ra l l y simi lar 25 March 1966 pol icy s ta tement as onlya 9uixup of notions." In April, Gromyko s t a t e d t h a t "wes t and f o r t h e norm al iza tio n and improvement of r e l a t i o n sw i t h t h e F'RG on t h e basis of i ts t u rn i ng t o t h e p o li cyof peaceful cooperation and realism." In December 1965,he had r e q u i r e d t h a t "good rela t ions" were possible ' 'onlyi f there is a change i n t h e FRG's pol icy. . . f l r o d m i l T t a r & s m- - -

*One month e a r l i e r . Sov iet assador Smirnov t o l d

cluded i n any t rade t a l k s . The t a l k s , which began on3 October 1966, were subsequent ly recessed, and areexpecked t o commence w i t h t h e new Bonn co a l i t i o n govern-m e n t e a r l y t h i s year .

h a t one precondi t ion&u rram c u W G w o u l d have t o be ex-

-73-



and revanchism. Former Ch an ce llo r Adenauer, who wasd e r i d e d by Gromyko i n December, was applauded by Gromyko

i n g t h e So vie t Union's demonstrated desire ( i .e . , t h eTashken t t a l ks ) fo r peace . And Gromyko, who i n Decemberhad threatened a Ifdue r ebu f f " t o at tempts to . inc ludeWest B e r l i n i n t o t h e FRG, followed t h e example.of t h eother Congress spokesmen in h i s Congress speech i n n oteven mentioning West Ber l in . N o r d i d Gromyko repeat t h et h r e a t p r e s e n t e d in his h a r s h December11965 speech whichs t r u c k a l i n e somewhat s i m i l a r t o U l b r i c h t ' s demands f o rFRG re t r ib ut io n fo r w a r debts .*

% \ > \ * in April for making "quite a reasonable admission" regard-

Ulbr ich t promptly took no te of Gromyko's Congressb id s and displayed ea r l i e r ferns of be in g abandoned i nh i s 11 Apr i l s t a t em en t on t h e r e t u r n of t h e SED delega-t i o n from Moscow:

Comrade Gromyko c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t t h eSovie t Union, which is l i nked w i t h t h eGDR through t i e s of c l o s e f r i e n d s h i pand cooper t ion, des r e s good and objec t ive

*Gromyko's unusual December demand, which has not beenrep,eated, he ld t h a t " the S o v i e t 'Union and t h e o t h e r s t a t e swhich f e l l victim t o German aggress ion are i n t h e r i g h tt o presen t a b i l l f o r a l l damages i n f l i c t e d by t h e w a runleashed by Germany:f o r t h e crimes perpetrated by German f a sc i s t t r o o p s onoccupied t e r r i t o r i e s , f o r t h e m i l l i o n s of peop le to r tu redt o dea th in N a z i to r ture chambers 'and concentration camps,f o r t h e destroy ed towns and vi l l ag es , and f o r the innumer-o u s , b r u t a l i t i e s which marked t h e road of t h e H i t l e r a r m i e s .This b i l l cannot be erased from t h e memory of our people .And if t h e r e c k l e s s n e s s o f th e policymakers in West Ger-many makes it necessary , o u r people w i l l presen t t h i s b i l l . "

On t h e s u b j e c t of " b i l l s , " and in a s h a r p l y c o n t r a s t -in g ton e, Adahubey i n h i s 21 Ju l y 1964 speech i n k h e WestGerman c i t y of Dortmund s ta ted t h a t n e i t h e r t h e USSR nort h e PRG owed t h e other any d e b t .

f o r t h e dea*h of mil l9ons of people,

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r e l a t i o n s w i t h West Germany. However,he l e f t no doubt t h a t i t is t h e t a s kof t h e West German Government t o p roveby deeds t h a t it is wi l l i ng t o make acon t r ib u t i on t o peace and t o abandonthe adventurous pol icy of revanchism.

The 23rd congress also was designed t oend a l l s p e c u l a t i o n by i n c o r r i g i b l e 'r evanch i s t po l i t i c i a ns , and t o inducethem t o abandon t h e i r foo l i sh hope t h a tthey can make some kind of deal w i t h

t h e Soviet Union a t the expense of t h eGDR. The SED de l ega t i on is convincedthat implement ing the decis ions adopteda t t h e 23d CPSU Congress w i l l c o n t r i b u t et o t h e f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n in g of t h e goodand f r a t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i pand objective cooperat on between o u rp a r t i e s a n d s t a t e s .

Pravda's report-:(13 April ) of U l b r i c h t 6 statemen, deletedall r e f e r ences to West Germany and i t s ' * foo l i sh hope" ofd e a l i n g w i t h t h e USSR behind t h e GDR's back, though Pravdap r i n te d t h e l a s t sentence. of Ulbr i ch t ' s above s t a t e n G GAnd ni ne days l a t e r PraVda and oth er S ovi et media d e l e t e d

another example srf m t ' s ear of being betrayed byMoscow. The d e l e t e d pa ssag e in h i s 21 Apr i l speeuh inE a s t JBerlin marking t h e 20th anniversary of t h e ' SED d e a l twi th U l b r i c h t ' s d i s p l a y of concern over unrequi ted pol icy -suppor t :

The f a i r y t a l e s p re ad by West German anticom-munists t h a t t h e soc iaBis t : . count r ies ofEurope could be played up aga i ns t eacho t h e r has burs t l i k e a soa p bubble. The23rd CPSU C ongress t e s t i f i e d t o t h e inners t r e n g t h , cr ea t i ve forc e, and purposeful-ness of Lenin 's pa r t y and t h e peoples oft h e Sovie t Union. No one who has command

of his f i ve s enses can be l i eve t h a t i nt h i s pe r i od when t h e major i ty of t h e peopleof Europe l i v e i n t h e Soviet Union and i n

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s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s , t h e Soviet Union couldbe w i l l i n g t o f avor t h e dismantl ing ofs o c i a l i s m I n the GDR.

And in h i s 21 Apr i l speech, he r a t t l e d t h e o ld c lose t edske le ton of t h e January 1959 Soviet d r a f t peace t r e a t yand c a u s t i c a l l y r e c a l l e d t h a t " the Soviet Union declaredt h a t it would do everything in i t s power f o r t h e conclu-s i o n of a peace t r ea ty w i t h Germany."had placed t h a t iipowerit i n abeyance was instanced by theomission of t h e eight-year o ld c a l l fo r a German peace

t r e a t y i n MOSCOW'S 1966 nat ional day s logans , releasedon 17 October .)

Congress references which kep t a l ive t h e not ion of an-',abandoned GDR, West German s ta tements on t h e subject ofeconomic sac r i f i ce for a r eun i t ed Gezmgny drew promptand negat ive rea c t i ons from Moscow i n t h e s p r i n g of 1966.*For example, within hours of Chancel lor Erhard 's co me nt son t h e pub l i ca t ion of an l?RG White Paper on t h e subjectof r e u n i f i c a t i o n , a 30 A p r i l Moscow Radio commentarybeamed t o Germany concluded w i t h t h e pledge t h a t "therew i l l be no r e l i a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e aggressive claimsof t h e i nd us t r i a l and f i na nc ia l o l iga rchy and Its p o l i t i c a lpuppets a t t h e cost of t h e GDR and t h e t e r r i % o r i e s of'o t h e r g t a t e s . " (The lengthy FRG White Paper releasedon 29 A p r i l contained 193 previously published documentsdescr ib ing Bonn's e f f o r t s since t h e 1955 Geneva c on fer -ence t o ach ieve r eun i f i ca t ion . None of t h e documentsshed any l i g h t on former Chancellor Adenauer's l a t e March1966 s ta tement made a t t h e CDU convention, t h a t when t h eGerman a rch ives are open fo r h i s t o r i a n s , t h e world w i l lthen know what he had o f f e r e d f o r reunif icat ion.)a s r m il a r prompt Sov iet pledge aimed a t crushing any EastGerman doubts followed Bundestag m e m b e r Barael's 17 June1966 Ne w York speech in which he p resen ted a . un i f i ca t ion

(That t h e new regime

While Sovie t media f a i l e d t o record Ulbr i ch t ' s post-

.

;%!a$&!

And1roposals in t h e s p r i n g of 1964.See pages 1 2 and 13.

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i

I 1

plan which of f e r ed t h e s t a t i o n i n g of S o v ie t t r o o p s i n areunited Germany and t h e assumption of East Germany'seconomic commitments t o t h e Soviet Union for t h e nexttwenty yea rs. For t h e same time p e r i o d , he suggested ayea r ly expans ion of 5 pe rcen t i n t h e shipm ent of "advant--ageous suppl ies ." I aves t i ya qu i ck l y r e j ec t ed B a r a e l ' seconomic temptation, and Pravda writer Mayevsky on 19 Juner e f e r r e d t o Barzel 's n o v e l p idea 88 " the Teuton*scrude, though i t i s ' p r e s e n t e d as naive, proposal t o'guarantee ' th e presence of Sov i e t t r oops i n Gemany.**Mayevsky s a i d t h a t t h e "hopes of some *deal '" a t t h eexpense of t h e G D R ' s sovere ignty are futi1e"and avowed

t h a t " a l l t b e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s guard t h e @ i n s of t h eGDR.

I

Two Key Developments, Two D i f f e r e n t A t t i t u d e s

Soviet pledges notwithstanding, the renewed expo-s u r e of Ulb r ich t ss concern over t h e degree of Sovie t sup-por t and Moscow's renewed b i d f o r improved rela t ions w i t hWest Germany and West B e r l i n were common fe a t u r e6 i n t h etwo pr in ci pl e post -Congress developments re la t i n g t o t h eGerman problem during t h e remainder of Erhard's adminis-t r a t i o n - - t h e s c u t t l i n g of t h e pro posal f o r SED-SPD t a l k s ,

and t h e development of d i r e c t S o v ie t c o n t ac t s w it h B e r l i nMayor Brandt .

SED-SPD t a l k s , aimed a t "breaking the ice in t h e -German questionB' by br i ng i ng t oge t he r t h e "two s t rongestGerman p ar ti es " t o d i s c u s s what type of . t u t u r e na t i on"Gerian workers" would l i k e t o see b u i l t , were proposedin an open l e t t e r of 7 February f r o m t h e SED Cen t r a l Com-mittee s igned by U lb r i c h t . The Invi ta t ion w a s repeatedi n a n ot he r "open l e t te r" of 24 March, and on t h e day t h eCPSU Congress convened (29 March), N e u e s Deutschland pub-l ibhed another U lb r i c h t h i s t o r y les-ich warmlyp r a i s e d t h e 1946 merger between t h e German Communist P a r t y(KPD) and t h e East German SPD. B u t fol lowing t h e CPSU

Congress and fol lowing SPD leader Brandt ' s "open answer"of 14 Apr i l which accepted t h e SED i n v i t a t i o n , U l b r i c h tseemed t o d i s p la y second thoughts about the r i s k s of t h e



. .I

venture (such as SED p a r t y s o l i d a r i t y , and E a s t Germanpopul a r r eac t i ons* ) i n deba t ing t he SPD. I n l i g h t of t h ep o t e n t i a l r i s k s involved, i t has been argued t h a t t h eventure was i n i t i a t e d by U l br i ch t f o r t h e so le purposeof r epea t i ng pas t p ropaganda t a c t i c s t h a t would followan expected SPD refusal . Indeed, claims of SED reasonable -ne ss and SPD ob st ru ct io ni sm ha d followed U l b r i c h t ' s 1963and 1964 inv i t a t ions , which were not accepted. On t h eother hand , i f t h e proposa l was i n tended t o be more thana repeat of a hollow propaganda gimmick, it may have beenaimed a t promot ing di fferences between t h e SPD and t h eW e s t German government over t h e i r approaches toward E as t

Germany. Thus t h e t a l k s w o u l d have been p a r t of a ser iousGDR e f f o r t t o project a be t te r image abroad i n o r de r t o -suppo r t t h e GDR's prot racted e f f o r t t o g a i n e v e n t u al non-communist recognit ion. If t h e l a t t e r w a s t h e case, t h e nf u l l and credible Sovie t suppor t t o o f f s e t t h e SED's poten-t i a l r i s k s would have been es se n t i a l . And fo l lowingt h e Congress, U l b r i c h t ' s concern over Soviet support** ac-companied references which sugges ted t h a t U l b r i c h t was

aw!4 * E a s t German c i t iz e n s rep or te dly purchased ov er onem i l l i o n copies of Neues Deutschland's 26 March e d i t on

which p r i n t e d t h e f i r s t (and non-committal) "openanswer" of 18 March t o t h e SED's 7 February "open l e t t e r . "The SPD's second answer of 1 4 A p r i l which e x p l i c i t l yaccepted t h e i n v i t a t i o n was n o t p r in t e d u n t i l 29 May byN e u e s Deutschland--at which t i m e E a s t Germans a ga in snappedu p e m aper .

**Inasmuch as U lbr i c h t i n t h e pas t had evinced concernover So vie t p l ans f o r wi thdrawing t roops from t h e GDR,it seems noteworthy t h a t h i s renewed anxiety was co i nc i den tw i t h pos t -Congress repor t s in t h e Western press on animpending major withdrawal of S ov i e t forces from E a s tGermany. The magn itude of t h e r epo r t ed wi thd rawa l hadgrown t o f i v e d i v i s io n s in the West German p r e s s by m i d -

June. ( D i e Welt, 15 June 1966.) And S ov i e t sources i nl a t e J u n e l m d t o t h e l * p o s s ib i l i ty ' t of a r educ t i on ofits force i n E a s t Germany. Whatever may have been t h eSoviet plans a t t h a t t i m e , n o s u bs e q u e n t r e d u c t i o n i n t l ~ cGSFG for 1966 was confirmed.

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I \



a l s o concerned about t h e risks of t h e SED-SPD speakerexchange.

February and March open l e t te r s notably cont ras ted w i t hh i s post-Congress statement on th e t a lk s . For example ,t h e 7 February l e t t e r sta ted t h a t "it is r e a l l y h i g htime" t o create cond i t i ons l ead i ng t o j o i n t a c ti o n. B u tt h e tone of U l b r i c h t ' s 18 A p r i l remarks to v i d i t i n g l a bo runion delegations--his f i r s t comment a f t e r t h e Congresson t h e accepted invitat ion-euggested t h a t h i s i n t e r e s thad s h i f t e d i n t o a lower gear : i n br ie f l y acknowledgingt h e SPD's acceptance, he s a i d t h a t t h e main thing is

"gradually" to achieve jo i n t ac ti on of German workers.And i n h i s 18 A p r i l speech, as in the two post-Congressspeeches c i t ed e a r l i e r (11 and 2 1 Apr il) Ulbr ich t d idnot touch upon pre-Congress refe ren ces t o Sov iet supportf o r GDR a t t i t u de s and po l i c i e s t oward West Germany. Inf a c t , Soviet views toward West Germany and t h e SPD inp a r t i c u l a r c o n t r as t e d w i th GDR propaganda i n May and Juneand t h e diver gent t reatm ent evidenced i n commentar ies ont h e 1-5 June SPD Congress in Dortmund was pronounced.*E a s t German treatment of 'the SPD Congress w a s almostwholly negat ive--i t even roulidly at tac ked le ad ing t _ -- iSBD speakers (Brandt, Wehner, E r l e r , Schmidt and others) ,some of whom were t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the proposed exchangew i t h th e SED. Sovie t t r ea tment , on t h e ot he r hand, wasremarkably m i l d . A 6 June a r t i c l e by Pravda correspondentV. M ikhailov a pp ro vi ng ly quoted r e m a r k m h e l e a d in gSPD speakers :

The urgency of t h e exchange which permeated h i s

Helmut Schmidt, who de l i ve r ed th e maint h e s i s on foreign policy, spoke of 'bet-t e r chances f o r peace: and l im it at io nof armaments, ' he spoke of a l l -European s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , 'he s a i d t h a t ' there is not a s i n g l e

*For a good examination of divergent East Europeanr e a c t i o n to t h e SPD Congress,I

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@##&

n a t i o n i n t h e world which cou ld suppor tt h e i l l u s o r y dreams about changing t h eOder-Neisse f r o n t i e r . He a l so i n d i c a t e dt h a t it would be p o s s ib l e ' t o reachagreement on disarmament without anypre l iminary po l it ca l condi t ions and evenon 'guarantees of t h e i n v i o l a b i l i t y oft h e f r o n t i e r s of t h e German Democrat i cR e p u b l i c . Willy Brandt, t h e p a r t y cha i r -man, expressed t h e idea, al though r a thert imid ly , . about t h e p o s s i b l l i t y of qual-i f i e d c o e x i s t e n e of t h e two p a r t s ofGermany. ' F

With t h e c o n t r a s t i n g SED at tacks on t h e SPD becoming s h r d l -l e r , more 'demanding and more f requen t , SED P o l i t b u r om e m b e r Norden i n a 29 J u n e p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e s i g n a l l e dt h e withdrawal of t h e SED f r o m th e e xc han ge .gr es s i ve tone, Norden made it clear t h a t t h e GDR consid-ered t h a t a safe-conduct l a w passed on 23 June by t h eBundestag made t h e exchange impossible: t h e l a w **isgross c h a u v in i s t i c p r o v o c a t i o n which even t ransgressesH i t l e r ' s l e g i s l a t i o n . . .it cements t h e d i v i s i o n of Ger-

many.'* In a defensive tone, Pravda commentator Mikhailov'sbela ted 6 J u l y r e a c t i o n t o t h e F E - l a w w a s a c i r c u i t o u sr e b u t t a l of a s ta tement by a Bonn spokesman t o t h e effec t

t h a t t h e l a w removed a l l obst ac le s on t h e road t o t h edialogue (which, in f a c t , i t d i d ) . Mikhailov d i d n otecho Norden's and other E a s t Germans' h o s t i l e i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n of t h e l a w as a r e g r e s s i o n t o N a z i ju r i sp rudence ,d i d not r e i t e r a te GDR c a l l s for t h e r e p e a l of the l a w ,d i d not conc lude tha t t h e l a w f i n a l i z e s t h e d i v i s i o n ofGermany, and d i d n o t s u p p o r t t h e GDR's view t h a t t h e lawsounded t h e exchange's swan song.

In an ag-

The Brandt-Abrasimov t a l k s i n t h e medntime hadbeen underway s i n ce e a r l y May.i n g ( t h e day Pravda's Mikhailov approved c e r t a i n SPDCongress statements) Abrasimov dismissed t h e v i o l e n tSED a t t acks on SPD o f f i c i a l Wehner as "being of l i t t l e

imp0rtanc.e" and conveyed the impression, which Pravda'sMikha i lov sus ta ined in h i s 6 J u l y a r t i c l e , % h a t t h e S o v ie tUnion was assuming t h a t t h e SED-SPD dia logue would t a k eplace . (Brandt himse l f i n a 28 June in terview w i t h AP

& by t h e 6 June meet-

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..L ...,.,

correspondent John Hightower, s a i d t h a t Abrasimov hadgiven him no reason t o b e l ie v e t h a t t h e Soviets opposedth e exchange.) In t h e 6 Jun e meeti ng, Abrasimov a l s oseemed to b e t r y i n g t o arouse B ra nd t' s i n t e r e s t i n ameet ing wi th Soviet leaders i n h i s c l os i ng remark t o t h ee f fe c t t ha t B rand t had made a ser ious t ac t i ca l error i p

ref using t o accept Khrushchev's January 1963 ia vi t at ' iont o meet i n E a s t B e r l i n because, s i i d Abrasimov, "Khru-shchev had had some i n t e r e s t i n g t h in g s t o say** t o Brandt.*And i n th e weeks fo l lowing another Brandt met ing w i t hAbrasimov on 29 September, mounting E a s t German worr i eswere r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r e s c a l a t i n g p ropaganda a t t a c k s on

t h e West Berlin Mayor. Thus on 12 October--the day Brandt,by Soviet prearrangement bypassed East German borderguards on h i s way through Checkpoint C h a r l i e i n t o E a s tB e r l i n ( h i s .first v i s i t s i n ce t h e B er l i n w a l l w a s b u i l t )t o m e e t Abrasimov--East German pr op ag an di st E i s l e r authoreda s h a r p l y c r i t i c a l a r t i c l e in Berl iner Zeitung denouncingB r a n d t f o r , among o t h e r things, "committing a crimea g a i n s t t h e German workers class" by "r iding the oxenof anti-communism.t' And oh t h e day a f t e r Brandt 's check-free passage through the i-11, th e GDR's People's Ch-amberpassed a law empowering East German authori t ies t o prose-c u t e a l l West Germans and West'Berliners who have evercomnitted t h e crime of "persecuDing or help ing to persecute"

* E as t Ce many's en th us ia s t i c rea c t io n i n January 1963to B rand t ' s r e fu sa l t o v i s i t Khrushchev in E a s t B e r l i nbet rayed t h e same gene ra l s ense of r e l i e f reflected int h e GDR t reatment of Xosggin's February 1965 shelvin g ofan i n v i t a t io n t o v i s i t Bonn (pages 56-56]. With gus to ,t h e GDR promptly score d Brandt ' s decis ionr .not to v i s i tKhrushchev dur in g th e Ja nuary 1963 SED Congress. Sovie tcomment on t h e a f f a i r , which somewhat more mildly scoldedBrandt f o r not making u s e of a chance t o d i s c us s " v i t a lproblems concerning t h e West B er l i n s i t ua t i on , ' ' d i d notsur face u n t i l early February 1963.

-

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, . . . .. .

. ..... . ..

.. . : .

m

E a s t Germans.* I I.

e 22 N vem-m e r meezlng, ADrasimov made more e x p l i c i t h i s e a r l i e rh i n t s of a Moscow inv it at ion -- he sad d t h a t h i s people int h e S o v i e t U ~ i o n o u l d be:happy i f Brand t cou ld v i s i tMoscow--and, s a i d Brandt , Abrasimov seemed q u i t e i n t e r e s t e d

*The l a w , which on th e surface appeared t o be t h e G D R ' sr e t a l i a t i o n f o r Bonn's 23 June safe-conduct law, repre-se nt ed an oth er GDR-sponsored t h r e a t t o West German useof t h e access routes through E a s t Germany.A l l i e d u s e of those access?routes a l s o appeared t o be t h emotive behind a ser ies of E a s t German probes in l a te Augus talong the inrtobahn between E e l m s t e d t an d Babelsberg, f r o mwhich t h e S o v i e t s diseocia ted th em se lv es . And hhe Sovietsd i d not backtap t h e GDR p o s i t i o n on t h e E l b e River incidenti n mid-October, though E a s t B e r l i n sought t o engage t h e i rs u p p o r t . ( B r i t i s h of f i c e r s accompanied West German E l b ep a t r o l o f f i c i a l s i n r e sp o ns e t o E a s t German attempts t opreven t a West German survey boat from conducting sound-in g s a lo n g t h e G D R - c l a i m e d e- te rn shore of a segment oft h a t r i v e r ; )pro tes t on 20 October--the E l b e i n c i d e n t "is a r e p e t i t i o nof t h e p r a c t i c e s of the H i t l e r regime"--the Sovie t s mi ld lyprotes ted t o B r i t i s h mi l i ta ry headquar ters i n Germany.And, as i n t h e case of a mid-November Pan-American A i r -

ways cargo p la n e c r a s h on E a s t German terr i tory , t h e S o v i e t sd i d not g ive t h e E a s t Germans oppo rt uni ty t o upgrade t h e"sovereignty" inasmuch as t h e S o v ie t s , n o t t h e E a s t G e r -mans, delivered what remained of t h e PAA crew and cargoplane.

Control over

In c o n t r a s t t o t h e h a r s h and p u b l i c GDR

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r-



\ \

I.

,

i n Wehner's 12 October proposals f o r an economic integre-t i o n of E a s t and West Germany.

One week a f t e r t h e 22 November Brandt-Abrasimovmeeting ( th e f i f t h known meeting), Ulbricht i n a N e u e sDeutschland in ter vie w vented himself in an o u t b u r E Z T ?redirected rage a gai ns t Brandt for h i s accep tance of aCDU-CSU proposal f o r a West German poli t ical in tegra-t ion-the "@rand @o al t on. *'

4. TIE COALITION AND THE CONTRASTS

The "grand doal i t ion, l l sa id Ulbr icht in a 29 Novem-ber E a s t Ber l in in terv iew, is a government of "rightwing-

ems** i n which Brandt "is t o ac t as d ip lom at i c adve r t i s ing .ch ie f f o r t h e adven tu r i s t p o l i c y " and Wbhner I t i s t o e n r i c ht h e psychologica l w a r f a r e aga ins t t h e GDR w i t h new methods. w

And i n even b lacker terms, GDR propaganda axman E i s l e rin a rad io rounil table dis cus sio n with high-level SED lead-ers (Matern, Norden, Winzer) unleashed ano ther v i t r i o l i cbarrage against SPD leaders, and Wehner i n p ar ti cu la r,on 4 December. B u t in a Sovie t radio roundtable d i scus -s i o n on t h e same day t h e i nc lus ion of Social Democratsin t h e new government was t r e a t e d n ot only w i t h r e s t r a i n t

--which had ch ar ac te ri ze d ear l ie r Soviet comment on t h eprospect of such a merger-but also w i t h a touch ofoptimism. One sp ea ke r s a i d t h a t t h e presence of Brandtand Wehner i n th e new government lt pr ov ld es th e Soc ia lDemocratic leaders w i t h c e r t a i n o p p or t u ni t ie s " t o m a k ea *'realistic** u r n away from Bonn's pas t pol icy .

Discussion of t h e new Chancellor, Kiesinger, andnew Finance Minister, S t r a u s s , followed somewhat s i m i l a rp a t t e r n s :ha r sh and f requent a t tacks on both , w h i l e Sovie t p u b l i cmedia was res t ra ined .not emphasize Kiesinger 's p a s t membership i n t h e N a z iParty and acknowledged b u t d i d not stress S t r a u s s ' nat ion-

a l i s t sympathies.cumspect i n t h e i r discuss ion of t h e top coalition l eade r .Kosygin, f o r example, re po rt ed ly r e p l i e d to a D e u t s c h e

East German propaganda and GDR l e a d e r s made

Soviet propaganda noted b u t d i d

And Soviet leaders were notably c i r -

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Presse-Agentur , DPA: .Han:hurg). correspondent. , n Lyons' *

France on 6 December th a t it is ,up t o t i es i ng e r t o maket h e f i r s t move t o improve Soviet-West German relations.And acc or di ng t o DPA, Kosygin i n response t o a q u e s t i o nd i d n o t s h u t t h e door on a p o ss i bl e v i s i t t o Bonn. ' * A t

t h e moment I have no r e a s o n t o envisage a journey t o Erin;a f t e r a l l , I cannot go t h e Federal Republic a s a t o u r i s t . "

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r c o n tr a s ti n g r e s t r a i n t on t h ep o l i t i c a l complexion of t h e new Bonn government, t h e So-

v i e t s have con t inued t o hold on t o t h e i r subtle--and

f exible--f ormulat on r e g a r d in g t h e r e l a t i o n s h ip betweenBonn and E a s t Ber l in and t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h a t r e l a -t i o n s h ip f o r Bonn-Moscow re1a t ons . That i s , Moscow, un.1l i k e Eas t Ber l in , does not l a y down th e cond i t io n offormal West German recognition of East Germany fo r th eimprovement of Moscow-Bonn re1a t ons . Thus, Kosygin i nParis on 3 December r e i t e r a t ed ear l ie r Sovie t fo rmula t ionst h a t West Germany's po l i cy contr ibu t io n t o Europeanse cu r i ty involved, among other things,* "acknokrledgementt*of the actual s i t u a t i o n i n E urop e * *th atwe have two Germans t a t e s , t h e GDR and the FRG, and t h a t no outs ide forcecan change i t ." (Less a r d e n t l y , b u t t o t h e same e f f ec tof prese rv in g an e lement of f l e x i b i l i t y , t h e 5 Ju ly 1966W a r s a w Pact D e c la r a t i o n ca l l ed upon t h e FRG to "take as

a p o in t of d e p a r tu r e t h e e x i s t e n c e of two German s t a t e s , "and Kosygin i n Sverdlov sk on 13 October 1966 sta ted t h a tt o insure European secur i ty means '*to roceed f r o m t h ef a c t t h a t t w o German s t a t e s e x i s t , **)

B u t U lb r i c h t i n h i s 15 D e c e m b e r SED C e n t r a l C o m m i t -t e e speech, whi le prh i l ing Kosyg in ' s P a r i s remarks ont h e e x i s t e n c e of t w o Germanies, purposefully d i s rega rdedt h e s u b t l e t y of t h e S o v i e t f o r m u lat i o n i n s up p o r t of h i ss t r iden t and r ig id demand t h a t West Germany and West

*Such a s , s a i d Kosygin, recognition of e x i s t i n g fron;t i e r s and renuncia t ion of e f f o r t s t o gain nuclear weaponry.

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I



B e r l i n m u s t "recognize**E a s t Germany a s t h e q u i d f o r a l lnego t i a t i ons . ( A t t he t i m e t h e quo w a s t h e Christmas/New Y e a r pass agreement, which, for t h e f i rs t t i m e s i n c eit was i n i t i a t e d i n December 1963, was no t renewed.) Andi n h i s ' 15 December speech, U l b r i c h t , i n r oundl y s co r i n gKies inger ' s 13 December po l i cy s t a t emen t , made t h e e x p l i c i tdemand t h a t t h e *'establishment of normal s t a t e r e l a t i o n sthrough o f f i c i a l nego t ia t i ons" between t h e two Germaniesm u s t be pa r t ' of t h e new Chancel lor 's pol icy c a l l in gf o r d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t European countries.In e f f ec t , Ulbr icht ' s demand of F R G G D R r ecogn i t i on ast h e prerequ i s i t e fo r FRG-Eas t European reco gni t ion repre-

s e n v a n o t h e r e f f o r t on E a s t Germany's part t o t r y t oundermine t h e FRG's claim t o so l e r ep re sen t a t i on ofGermany.

The growing Blest German contacts w i th c e r t a i n E ab tEuropean governments prompted Ulbr icht i n a New Year'sr ecep t i on speech i n E a s t B e r l i n t o caut ion, again, t h eambassadors and o t he r b l oc r ep re se n t a t i ve s t o t h e GDR no tt o be t r i c k e d by Bonn's new policy of "expansion andhegemony**--which, i n Ulbr ich t 's l i g h t s , merely r e f l ec t . ,old covetous designs on h i s possess ion. Ulbr ich t , however,d i d not vo ice N e u e s Deutschland's b i t t e r lament a t t h et u r n of t h e y e n a t " m e m b e r s of sister pa r t i e s haveno$hing bet ter t o do t han t o s t a b German Marxists-Lenin-

ists i n t h e back."Deutschland 's p la in t were sus t a i ned i n a 26 January"authorized kDN s ta tement" which impl ic i t ly exhor tedE a s t B e r l i n ' s a l l i e s a g a i n s t l e g a l i z i n g t h e F R G ' s "aggres- -s i v e expa nsion is t program" by es t a b l i s h i ng d i p loma ti ct i e s w i t h i t .

B u t h i s New Y e a r ' s w a r n i n g s and N e u e s

In t h e meantime, So vi et spokesmen cont inuedt o echo t h e S o v i e t ' s calculated vagueness on t h i s i s s u eby r e i t e r a t i n g B re sh ne v' s 13 January 1967 Gorky formula-t i o n which d id not specif i c a l l y t i e improved relat ions



... . * .

< :IC..,.

ind nego t i a t i ons w i t h t h e FRG t o i t s r ecogn i t i on of E p s t

Germany. * Soviet spokesmen have also voiced Brezhnev'scomment i n h i s Gorky speech on Chance l lo r Kies inger ' sDecember po l i cy s t a t emen t , which, l ike Kosygin 's s t a t e -ments in P a r i s and Lyons, l e f t the door open fo r t a l k sand c a l l e d for "deeds not words.tfs i o n s ref lec ted both MOSCOW'S cau t i on toward Kies inger ' sgrand coal it on program--which "un for tun ate lyf t co nt ain s"ample evidence'' t h a t o l d i m p e r i a l i s t goals remain un-changed--and Moscow 's w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u p p o r t ff appropr i a t es t eps" under t aken by t h e FRG:

And Brezhnev's expres-

Chance l lo r Kies inger s a i d s p e c i f i c a l l yt h a t h i s government w i l l s t r i v e t o deepenm u t u a l understanding and t r u s t between t h eGerman Federal Republic and the SovietUnion in orde r t o p r o v i d e r e q u i s i t e s forfu t u re su cces s f u l m eet ings and t a l k s .B u t so far t h e r e are on ly words. Andthese words, by .the way, are denied byother s t at e me n ts i n t h e program of t h enew government of t h e German FederalRePublic .N a t u r a l l y , w e s h a l l suppo r t eve ry t h i ngt h a t is sens i b l e and u se fu l f o r peace

i n Europe, h c l u d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s t e p sby t h e German Federal Republic, shou ldsuch s t e p s be t aken .

*Without r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l ly to t h e FRG, he s a i d

t h a t t h e USSR "is f i rmly convinced t h a t uncondi t ionalr e c o g n i t i o n of t h e GDR as a sovereign independent s t a t eis , in our t i m e , one of t h e bas ic pre requi s i t e s f o r r e a lnormal i za t ion of t h e s i t u a t i o n in Europe." In hfis 21June 1966 meeting w i t h de G a u l l e i n the S ov i e t Union,Brezhnev r e p o r t e d l y voiced t h e s imi la r l i n e t h a t progress

cou ld be made once t h e ffWest'f ecognized " the r e a l i t yof t h e t w o German s t a t e s . "

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a



f,

,

The s t e p of West German-Rumanian dip lo ma tic re co gn it io n,and t h e advance react ion in Moscow and Ea st B e rl in t ot h a t groundbreaking development (formally consummated on31 Jqnuary) , provides t h i s s t udy ' s f i n a l case i n S o vi et -E a s t German contrasts on t h e Bonn c o a l i t i o n . I n s t e a d oft h e backdrop of alarmis t cavea t s t h a t Ulbricht 's redundantappea l s and AD"s s 'author ixed s ta tement" offered t o t h eGDR's a l l i e s , Moscow on 28 January i s s u e d a So vi et Govern-ment statement which d i d not ihc lude passages pressu r ingits a l l i e s t o block t h e FRG recognition campaign and d i dno t f l a t l y demand t h a t t h e FRG's recogni t ion of t h e GDRought t o be t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e fo r a p o l i c y of r ecogn i t i on

and cooperation w i t h t h e E a s t . In f ac t , t h e Soviet s t a t e -ment alleged t h a t t h e Soviet Government w o u l d **continueto work f o r ... ooperation between East and West Europeans t a t e s , including, of cou rse , t h e German Fed era l Republic."And l i k e Brezhnev in Gorky, t h e s ta tement saw both hope-f u l and menacing indications in the Kiesinger Government'spo l ic y s ta tem ent . One of t h e menacing indications inc ludedt h e p a r t i c u l a r l y malicious "a t t en t i ve ana l ys i s " t h a t '*int h e f i n a l c o u n t there are numerous common features i nt h e pol i t i ca l o r i e n t a t o n of neo-Nazis of d i f f e r e n t shadesand i n t h e off l c i a l r evanch i s t -mi l i t a r i s t cou r se of t h eGerman Federa1 Republ ic cu l in g circles. ''* However, t h eaccompanying note t o t h e s ta tement t o t h e FRG includeda remark which tended t o s e p a r a t e t h e West G e r m a b Govern-

ment from neo-Nazis; t h e accompanying not e, acc ord ing t oTASS on 28 January, s t a t ed t h a t tlre Soviet Government"expected t h e government of t h e FRG t o t ake app ropr i a t emeasures t o curb t h e d an gerou s a c t i v i t i e s of neo-Nazi and -m i l i t a r i s t forces ."

*This h o s t i l e as so ci at i on may w e l l have representedan attem pt t o ,humor U lbri cht , who i n h i s New Y e a r ' spleonasm had gone one s t e p f u r t h e r in charg ing- tha t the:Bonn government w a s ** i n f i l t r a t ed rom t op t o bottom" by" m i l l ions of 1 t t l e N a z i s . '@

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...

. . .I. . ...;.:<.:.. i '. , . . , . . .

. ..;:. .... . .. . I .

. .....

. .

d.%&

8

IV. CONCLUSION: FACTORS FOR CONTINUING STRAIN IN USSR-ONS

--

Ulbr i c h t h im s el f, takirg r i g d , black-and-white viewsof t h e n a t u r e of West German intent ions, has representeda f a c t o r oppos ing t h e development of improved Soviet-West German r e l a t i o n s s i n c e t h e 1962 C u b a n missile cr i s i s .In t h e per iod of diminished tens ions i n Europe, h e has ,a t t h e least, acted as a c a t a l y s t b r i& $ ag t o t h e surfacet h e inherent problems i n t h e r e l a t i o n s b etween h i s a r t i -f i ca l ly - suppor t ed regime and t h e f r e e l y c o n s t i t u t e d Bonn

government on t h e one hand and t h e Soviet Union on t h eother . And t h i s t r i a n g u la r r e l a t io n s hi p i n t h e post-mis-s i l e c r i s i s period has been viewed, l og ic al ly , by Ulb ric htin a form as s h a r p as h i s view of t h e unchanging n a t u r eof Bonn p o l i t i c s . T h a t is Ul br ic ht 's seemingly monomaniacalf ear t ha t i f a rea l rapprochement develops between Bonnand Moscow (and t h e capi t a l s of Eastern Europe) , thenUlbr i ch t and h i s e rsat z s t a t e w i l l be %tabbed in t h eback" and w i l l , i n e v i t a b l y , w i t h er . Ulbr ich t ' s r i g i dpremises have not cons is tent ly f i t Moscow's fo re ig n po li cyi n t e r e s t s s i n c e t h e s h e l v i n g of t h e i r 1958-1962 forcefuls t r a t e g y on t h e German problem , and t h u s Soviet spokesmenhave repeatedly t r i e d t o cdun te r U l b r i c h t ' s apoca lyp t i cconclusion. But ob je ct iv e cond i t ions , which have inf lu-

enced t h e broad o u t l i n e of Sovie t p o l i c y s i n c e t h e 1962Cuban m i s s i l e ven ture , have not r ad ic a l l y changed and w i l ll i k e l y r em ain i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e .cond i t ions (d iscussed below) have l e d U l br i ch t , and per-haps h i s s u c c es s o rs , * t o t h e rad ica l conclus ion tha t t h e

And these o b j e c t i v e

*One schoo l of thought on t h e p o l i t i c a l makeup of t h eSED l e a d e r s h i p f e e l s t h a t t h e evidence is t o o t h i n t o beable t o d i s c e r n major p o l i t i c a l differences w i t h Ulbr i ch t 'spo l ic ie s . Another school , which inc ludes West B e r l i nSenat o f f i c i a l s who claim t o have c re d ib le informat ion

from East German sources, ho l ds t h a t two f a c t i o n s e x i s t ;t h e "hard- l iners" are r ep resen ted by h e i r apparent Honeckerand t h e " s o f t - l i n e r s " cen te r around Premier Stoph .

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she lv ing of MOSCOW'S forceful German s t r a t e g y meant t h a tt h e Soviet Union Wght w e l l have decided t o r ev er se t h eob j e c t i ve of con sol i dat ing th e German s t a t u s quo and t op u r s u e , s t e p by s t e p , a p o l i c y of accommodation and eventualr e un i f i c a t i on .

M i l i t a r y c ons i der a t ions c o ns t i t u t e one such opera-t i v e fac to r on Sov iet polh$y making. St ra te gi ca ll y, : Khru-shchev had been s t r ong l y of t h e opinion t h a t Soviet 'deter-rence and wartime requirements fo r t h e European theaterd i d not require large ground forces i n forward areas i nview of t h e massive IRBM/A!RBM fo rc es and on t h a t bas i s

s t r o v e t o c u t back Sov iet ground forces across t h e board.The commitment of 20 ne a r l y f u l l s t r e n g t h d i v i s i o n s inEa st Germany, t he n, w a s seen by him as unessen t i a l fors t r a t e g i c purposes. And though t h e Soviet m i l i t a r y theo-r e t i c i a n s i n t h e post-Khrushchev pe rio d have s tr o n g l yargued for t h e cont inuing re levance of ground forces inc o n t ~ t p p & & ~ , ~ondi t ions of w a r , t h e f a c t remains t h a tt h e modernized E a s t European forces--which began t o t akeover a greater share of t h e defen se burden on t h e West-e r n f r o n t i e r In the early 1960s*--and t h e projected de -velopments in Soviet a i r 1if c a p a b i l i t i e s could s e r ve 88

t h e b a s i s f o r an eventual , low-risk withdrawal of a l a rgenumber of t h e co s t l y and oversized Soviet force fromUlbricht 's supported s t a t e .

anxiety over t h e contemplated p a r t i a l Soviet withdrawalsIn t h e s p r i n g of 1964 and t h e s p r i n g of 1966 might w e l lrecur i n case of an actual implementation of a majorSov iet redeployment i n t h e f u t u r e .

The apparent E a s t German

Pol it c a l considerat ions regarding Western Europe,p a r t i c u l a r l y in l i g h t of c u r r e n t m i l i t a r y developments,a l s o a u g u r ill f o r t h e smooth fu nc tio nin g of t h e Moscow-E a s t B e r l i n r e l a t i ons h i p . For example, Sovie t l eader sthemselves have oc ca si on al ly acknowledged and applauded

*See CAESAR o 7 June 1965, *tWarsawPact M i l i t a r ySt ra tegy , a Compromise in Soviet St ra teg ic Thinkingt t RSSNo. 0007/65.

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de Gaul le ' s f r e q u e n t pronouncements, which surroundedh i s de fec t i on f rom e f f ec t i ve pa r t i c i pa t i on i n NATO, t h a tt h e dang er of war i n Europe is s l i g h t . And t h e consequentd e b i l i t a t i n g e f fec t on t h e Sov i e t f o r ce s ' r a i son d 'e t r ein Ea st Germany has tended t o p r e s e n t Moscow w i t h some-t h i n g o f a dilemma. If they choose t o i n f l a t e t h e m i l i -t a r y ' 'th reat" from Western Europe in o rd er t o r a t i o n a l i z et h e i r s t a t i c pos i t i on , t hen they s t and t o impale them-s e l v e s on t h e horn of Ulbricht ' s p o l i t i c a l i n f l e x i b i l i t y .And current Soviet pol icy--with its i n t e r e s t i n d r i vi n ga wedge between t h e United Sta tes and i ts remaining NATOal lies--would not be helped by re ve r t in g t o t h e 1958-1962

crisis s t r a t e g y which tended t o upgrade the importanceof the GDR w h i l e it proved t o be counterproduct ive f orS o v i e t i n t e r e s t s .

E a s t European and Chinese Communist considerationsadd other compl ica t ions t o t h e Moscow-East B e r l i n r e l a -t i o n s . With r ega rd t o t h e former, t h e new Soviet leader-sh i p , un l i ke t h e GDR l eadersh ip , apparent ly s e e s l i t t l eadvantage in t ry in g to block t h e development of mutuallyadvantageous FRG-Eas t European re la t i on s . The add i t io nof new elements of f r i c t i o n w i t h Moscow's East Europeana l l i e s would add an unnecessary complicat ion, pa r t ic ul ar lyin l i g h t of t h e long range congidera t ion t h a t West G e r -many's involvement i n Eas te rn mrope might f u r t h e r long

range Sovie t in te res t s - - tha t is , t o weaken t h e F R G ' s t i esw i t h t h e West, t o develop an eastward-looking peacefulWestern Germany, t o s e t t l e border issues, t o p re ve ntBonn's n u c l e a r armament, and t o ga in long-term economicb e n e f i t s , o r to work o u t co l la te ra l and commerical in te r-changes reminiscent of t h e Rapa ll o t r e a t y . At any r a t e ,t e n s i o n on MOSCOW'S western f ro nt would c on st i t ut e an-o t h e r compl icat ion t o Sov i e t po l i cy makers, pa r t i c u l a r l yin l i g h t pf Moscow's su sta in ed and expanding d i f f i c u l t i e sw i t h t h e CPR. Re lie vi ng te ns io ns i n t h e West to concent ra teon t h e h m t i l i t y of China was a Khrushchevian formula(1963-1964) t h a t has not been cons i s ten t ly rejected byt h e new lea de rsh ip . And t h e e f f o r t to s t r eng t hen Sov i e tdefenses along t h e Sino-Soviet border t h a t got w e l l under-

way a f t e r t h e r eo rgan i za t i on of t h e KGB border gua rds in1963 has continued under t h e new Kremlin leadership w i t ht h e add i t i on of fou r d i v i s i ons a l ong t h e border and t h e

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movement of So vi et combat ad v i s e r s and a i r defensespec i a l i s t s i n t o Mongolia .

t h e c um ul at iv e e f f e c t s of t h e economic imbalance stemmingfrom th e monumental mi li ta r y claims on t h e Soviet budget ,were exacerbates du ri ng Moscow's att emp t t o force i tsw i l l on Western Germany. And t h e opening up of anotherMoscow-initiated crisis in t h e R e s t i n ord er, among ot he rt h i n g s , to Upgrade E a s t Germany would do l i t t l e t o f u r t h e rt h e a m b i t i o u s Soviet economic programs announced by Brezh-nev and Kosygin i n 19 65 and 1966.

i n a d d i ti o n , l l t r l e t o f u r t h e r Moscow's cu rr en t in te r-e s t in e a s in g i n t e r n a l s t r a i n s by making a major ancreaseIn trade r e l a t i o n s w i t h Western Europe. These co ns id er a-t ions , when viewed i n l i g h t of E a s t Germany's actualeconomic value t o t h e USSR, take on added s igni f icancewhen t h e examination of t h e extreme cas e--g ivin g up con-t r o l of E a s t Germany-has l e d t o t h e conclus ion t h a t t h eSoviet Union in pu rel y economic terms has l i t t l e to lose.*I n fact, s i n c e t h e GDR payments fo r Sovie t occupat ioncos t s were discont inued in 1959, v i r t u a l l y a l l t h a t re -mains is t h e S o v i e t i n t e r e s t in t h e E a s t German uranium ,

mines.

F i n a l l y , i n t e r n a l S o v ie t p ro ble ms , p a r t i c u l a r l y

A new c r i s i s would, *_

*Colleagues i n ORB have r ece n t l y r ea f fi rm ed t h e conclu-s i o n s of an ORR repor t en t i t led * 'Economic In teres t of the 'USSR In Contro l of E a s t Germany" of August 1965 which heldt h a t a f t e r a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t on Germany, t h e accompany-ing changes in t rade terms and commodity composition would''involve l i t t l e o r no net economic l os s t o t h e USSR.*8The study, which t ook i n t o accoun t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a tSov iet- East German t r a d e would d ec li ne a f t e r such a se t -t lement , s ta ted t ha t "the USSR could r ea di ly make t h enece ssar y economic adjustments a t l i t t l e cost , mainly bys h i f t i n g from the production of c e r t a i n goods now tak enby E a s t Germany t o t h e product ion of s u b s t i t u t e s f o r somegoods now imported from East Germany. Under any s u c h

set t lement , however, t h e Soviet government probably wouldi n s i s t on r e t a i n i n g c o n t r o l of t h e East German uraniummines until they are e xhau s t e d

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9n s p i t e of assurances tha t t h e GDR's i n t e r e s t s

w i l l be protec ted and tha t t h e Soviet Union w i l l s t r i v et o p re ve nt t h e i s o l a t i o n of t h e GDR, Moscow's currente f f o r t t o maintain t h e broad o u t l i n e of t h e s t a t u s quoin Central Europe w i l l not in i t s e l f r e l i e v e t h e s t r a i n si n Soviet -East German re la t i on s . For , Soviet v i t a li n t e r e s t s t ake p recedence ove r t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i rGerman satrapy.

.<. , rem ain f e a r f u l t h a t i n t h e long term, i f t h e ga i ns aregood enough o r t h e danger gr e a t enough, Moscow w i l lagain sac r i f ice German Communists i n or d e r t o f u r t h e rS o v ie t i n t e r n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s .

And East Germany leaders w i l l m o s t , probably

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APPENDIX: TEE O R I G I N OF THE "SELL-OUT" IDEA

The idea t h a t t h e abandonment of E a s t Germany would

T t s roots may be traced back t o 1953, t o t h e th ink-be a Sovie t ga in is not new t o S ovi et policy-making cir-cles.ing of Beria, Malenkov, and po ss ib ly even Khrushchev i nt h e months fo l lowing S ta l i n ' s d e a t h . Khrushcheo la id the1953 sel l -out i de a e n t i r e l y on t h e doors teps of Beria andMalenkov.t i o n t h a t Khrushchev himse l f had toyed w i t h t h e idea as

e a r l y as 1953, or t h a t he w a s t r y i n g t o develop a p o l i c yl e a d i n g to t h e sel l -out of East Germany in 1968. -

To date there h a s been no p u b l i c Sovie t allega-

1. B e r i a Moves t o "Undermine" t h e SED

According t o Khrushchev, Beria began h i s e f f o r tt o **undermine" Sovie t r e l a t io n s w i t h f r a t e r n a l c o u n t r i e sin t h e '"first f e w days" a f t e r S t a l i n ' s beath. This m a yrefer to a warning which t h e GDR premier, Grotewohl,rece ived w h i l e h e was i n Moscow fo r S t a l i n ' s f u n e r a l .When he r e tu r n e d to E a s t Germany he t o l d h i s co l leagues .t h a t t h e Soviets w o u l d be unable to f u l f i l l many of their

economic commitments t o t h e GDR. Moscow promised t o d i s -cuss t h e q u e s t i o n f u r t h e r , b ut G rotewohl had b een p u ton n o t i c e . In view of Grotewohl 's ra nk i n t h e h ie r a r c h yand t h e s t a t e of Sovie t p o l i t i c s a t t h a t t i m e , it isprobable t h a t he h e l d d i s c u s s io n s w i t h Malenkov, Be r i a ,or Molotov. Despite t h i s warning, t h e East German lead-ers responded by appeal ing t o t h e S o v ie t s i n e a r l y A p r i lfo r "advice and action," on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e y hadconcluded t h a t t h e y could not mhke t h e ?necessary changes'*in economic policy quickly enough by themselves. (Some-time i n Ap ri l Moscow r e p l i e d by urging t h e SED leadersto s o f t e n t h e i r r i g o r o u s economic p o l i c i e s and t a k e mea-sures t o improve t h e l o t of t h e populace.)

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Meanwhile, t h e GDR regime introduced no changesi n i t s p o l i t i c a l o r econouic p o l i c i e s . In e f f e c t , u1-

b r i c h t s t i l l hoped t o gain some economic subsistence t osee h i s regime through t h e s u m m e r , and t o pe r m i t t he p a r t yt o . c o n t i n u e w i t h i t s hard p o l i t i c a l l i n e . I t is p o s s i b l et h a t he chose t o ignore Sov iet recommendations on t h eadvice of p a t r o n s in Moscow. A t any r a t e , he w a s c l e a r l yheading toward a cr is is .

During this per iod , a d e f i n i t e g r ou p of opponentst o U l br i ch t began t o t ake shape. The group was l e d byRudol f Herrns tad t , t h e e d i t o r of N e u e s Deutschland, andt h e C h i e f of t h e S e c u r i t y Service-helia Zalssel ' ,

Hersns tad t was a cand ida te member of t h e p o l i t b u r o an dZaisser a f u l l m e m b e r . They had t h e s u pp o rt of a t l e a s t .three other cand ida te members of t h e p o l i t b u r o : AntonAckermann, ac t i ng fo re ign min is t er , h i s former w i f e Elli

Schmidt, head of t h e E a s t German Women's F ede ra ti on , andBaus Jendre t sky , ch ie f of t h e E a s t Ber l in pa r ty o rgan iza -t i o n .The m o s t prominent was Max Fechner, Minister of Jus t i ce .

w r i t t e n program. From what has been alleged a b o u t t h i sdocument, it looked t o sweeping changes and a basicr e v i s i o n of pol icy . I ts main premise w a s t h a t t h e e n t i r ecourse of E a s t German policy since t h e w a r was incor-

rec t , because of t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of "bu i ld ing socialism"i n a divided countr$ . The new program advocated a com-p le t e r e f o r m a t io n of t h e SED i n t o a People's P a r t y whichw o u l d r e p r e s e n t a l l classes. A new economic plan w o u l dbe adopted,, and i n e f f e c t , t h e GDR w o u l d prepare t o d i s -solve i t s e l f i n t o a "new Germany". Herrnstadt w o u l d be-

come head of t h e p a r ty , Zaisser Minis te r of I n t e r i o r .In e f f ec t , t h e program ca l l ed for a new party which mightcooperate w i t h West German Soc ia l i s t s i n a new s t a ks .

O t h e r lesser f u n c t i o n a r i e s s u pp o rt e d t h i s group.

This oppos i t ion group went so f a r as to d r a f t a

I t is h ig h ly u n l i k e ly t h a t t h i s group would havecontemplated s u c h a d r a s t i c p o l i cy r e ve r s a l i f t h ey d i dnot have good reason t o be l i eve t h a t . t h e Sov ie t s woulds u p p o r t them. There is var ious ev idence ind ica t ing t h a t ,

in f a c t , B e r i a was t h e i r p a tr o n u n t i l h i s undoing inJune 1953. A f t e r t h e purge of Herrnstadt and Zaisses,

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in ea r l y 1954, U l br i ch t p u b l i c l y l i n k e d them t o B e r i a ,b u t of course there w a s no mention of Malenkov. In anunpublished report to t h e ce nt ra l commit tee, Ulbr ichtr evea led B e r i a ' s p r i v a t e c o n t a c t s w i t h Zaisser, as w e l las some of t h e d e t a i l s of t h e i r ef for ts t o r e p l a c e t h eSED leaders. As subsequent den unci at io ns of Za iss er andHer rns t ad t were made, t h e con nect ion w i t h Beria w a ss t rengthened. In March 1954, f o r example, t h e head oft h e SED Control Commission reported t h a t t h e t * f a c t i o n a la c t i v i t y of H e r r ns t a dt and Zaisser must be viewed i nr e l a t i o n s h i p t o the i n f l u e n c e of Beria." In addi t ion ,Zaisser wa s accused of fo l lowing a p o l i c y which wouldhave r e s u l t e d i n Western c on t ro l of t h e GDR, a p o l i c y

which corresponded w i t h t h e "views of Beria."

The S o v i et p a r t y a l s o l i n k e d B e r i a t o t h e Germans i t u a t i o n , i n a p r i v a t e l e t t e r c i r c u l a t e d to Conmunistp a r t i e s a f t e r Beria's f a l l . According t o t h i s ver s ionB e r i a had imposed on t h e GDR leaders t h e harsh pol ic ieswhich p r e c i p i ta t e d t h e riots i n Ea st Germany; the otherSovie t leaders were aware of Beria ' s machinat ions b u twere power less t o act.

These accusa t ions are, of course , pos t facto. B u tt h e y are confirmed in genera l by t he evidence from formerE a s t German Communists Heinz Brandt and Fri tz Schenk.*Both of them became aware of Ulbr i ch t ' s f a l l from Soviet

favo r, and Brandt lea rne d of Beria's involvement d i r e ot lyfrom He rrn sta dt . Moreover, he concluded that Malenkovwas suppor t ing an anti-Ulbricht movement as p a r t of afo re ign po l i c y l i n e which foresaw the d i s d o l u t i o n of t h eGDR i n r e t u r n f o r n eg ot ia te d concessions from the West.I t w a s bel ieved by Brandt and h i s colleagues t h a t Malen-kov w a s prepar ing f o r or a l r eady engaged i n secret nego-t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e 7 1

-

1 0 1 imraes d e r Dik ta tu r1962, p.. 182; H e i n n r a n d t , R e v i e w , Imge Nagp I n s t i t u t e ,

October 1959, p. 99 i f .

Cologne,

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A connection between Beria and Z a i s s e r , a t l e a s t ,is q u i t e plaus ib le on o ther grounds . As t h e now notorious"General Gomez", Zaisser was one of Moscow*s ag en ts i nt h e Spanish Civil War. H e r e t u r n e d t o t h e USSR and mayhave been imprisoned f o r a t i m e . As chief of S t a t e Secur-i t y in t h e GDR he was a lm os t c e r t a in ly invo lved w i t h Beria.After S t a l i n ' s death, Be r ia moved rap id l y t o re gai n com-p l e t e c o n t r o l o ve r t h e S o v i et s e c u r i t y a p p ar a t us i n E a s tGermany. Herrnstadt w a s a j o u rn a l i s t who went to Moscowin t h e ea r ly 1950 ' s where he s e r ve d i n S o v i et m i l i t a r yi n t e l l i g e n c e . E a s t German par ty func t iona r i e s r ega rdedbo th of t h e m as having spec ia l connect ions w i t h t h e So-

v i e t s .

he may n o t have realized what degree of So viet supportt h e y had.w a s probably a prel iminary t o a more dras t ic purge. J u s tp r i o r to May Day 1953, p a r t y members lea rned t h a t D a h l e m ,a politburo member and considered by same as second onlyt o U l b r i c h t , w a s t o be expe l l ed in a Slansky-l ike a f f a i r .The purge of Dahlem, however, was only partrsof Ulbricht 'scounterof fens ive . A t i t h e 1 3 t h p a r t y plenum which announcedt h e Dahlem a f f a i r ( 1 4 May) t w o other forward moves weremade by U l b r i c h t . F i r s t the work norms were t o be raisedby 10 percent by 1 June. Second, Ulbr ich t ' s 60 t h b i r t h -day on 30 June, w a s t o be transformed i n t o a stupendous

o c ca s io n f o r g l o r i f y i n g t h e General Secre tary .

Moscow's disapproval of t h e s e developments w a sev iden t in t h e p u b l i c reac t ion . Pravda and Izv es t iyapubl i shed only s ho r t TASS a c c o u n t s h e p l e mbr i e f l y m en tioned t h e D a h l e m a f f a i r , b u t ignored botht h e long harangues on t h e ' ' lessons of t h e Slansky t r i a l **and t h e economic decisions. Tension between Berlin andMoscow is a l s o sugges ted i n t h e exchange of messages ont h e a n n iv e r sa r y of V-E Day. No message f rom the Savie tControl Commission w a s p u b l i s h e d , al though an East Ger-man message w a s p r i n t e d on 9 May by Pravda and I zves t iy a .Moreover, Malenkov's formal g r e e t i n g n e GDR w a sc u r t , w i t h no mention of t h e . u s u a l slogan about bui ld ing

E a s t German "soc ia li sm ." Molotov and Mikoyan, were t h eon ly prominent Soviet le ad er s t o at tend an E a s t German

Ulbr ich t w a s aware of t h i s opposi t ion, al though .

H i s move against F'ranz D a h l e m i n e a r l y May

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I

r e c e p t i o n i n Moscow, and t h e c e l e b r a t i o n s in B e r l i n weremarked by the absence of t h e GSFG commander, GeneralChuikov.

The growing tensions inside t h e E a s t German partywere drnmathed by t h e long del ay between t h e conclus ion02 th e pa r t y p lenum on 14 May and tbe approval of t h enew work norms by t h e GDR Council of M i n i s t e r s on 28 May,t o o l a t e fo r implementation by 1 June, and res ched ule dfo r 30 June ins tead. On t h e following day Pravda announceda change of p o l i c y for Germany. The Soviet-ol Com-mission was dissolved, and replaced by-a High Commissionsimilar t o t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e Western powers' adminis-

t r a t i o n i n West Germany.was V. S. Semenov, who would a s s u m e a l l the occupa t ionf u n c ti o n s h i t h e r t o performed by t h e S o vi e t m i l i t a r y i nGermany. In early June General Chuikov was recalled an dre pl ac ed by Colonel-General Grechko.

The new Soviet High Commissioner

The change of Sovie t po l icy w a s a major event , but

He presentgd for im-

what it meant fo r E a s t Germany w a s not completely clearu n t i l 3-5 June, when Semenov returned t o W l s h o r s t andsummoned t h e E a s t German politburo.mediate adoption an o u t l i n e of a new economic po1,icy whichw o u l d emphasize production of consumer goods and repudiatet h e harsh m e a s u r e s already taken aga i n s t the populace.From t h a t p o in t f or wa rd t h e p o l i t b u r o was almost c o n s t a n t l yi n s e s s i o n, w i t h Semenov in v ir tu al control . Speed, wassupposedly of t h e greatest importance because of t h e ha-pending %egotiat ions'? with C h u r c h l l l .assigned t h e $ a sk of d r a f t i n g a new po li cy stat eme ntbased on t h e Soviet outl ine and proposing a reorganiza-

-

t i o n of t h e pol i tbvro and secretar ia t . Ulbr ich t w a sp a r ty leader i n name only. S ov ie t o f f i c i a l s d i s c r e e t l ysounded o u t East German off ic ia ls on t h e i r r e a c t i o n t ot h e possible removal of Ulbricht . Semenov causticallysuggested t h a t Ulbr ich t c e l e b r a t e h i s b i r t h d a y as Lenind i d his 50th b i r t h d a y , t h a t is , by i n v i t i n g in a "fewfrie nds .'? One Ea st German func t ionary s a i d t h a t Moscowbecame impatient and simply forwarded a Russian t e x t fort r an s l a t io n and pub l ica t ion . The po l i tbur o ' s s t a tementon t h e new course was f i n i s h e d on 9 June and published

on 11 J u n e .

Herrns tad t was

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Even so, U l b r i c h t managed t o sa lv ag e something i nthose f e w d a y s . F i r s t , i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e p a r t y s t a t u t e s ,the centra l commit tee d i d not meet t o approve t h e neweconomic measures. This was a p a r t i a l v i c t o r y for U l b r i c h tbecause if t h e ce n t ra l committee had been convened U lbr i c h tpr ob ab ly would have been removed. Second, t h e pronounce-ment of 9 J u n e d i d not con ta in a revoca t ion of t h e new worknorms. Thus U l b r i c h t managed t o withhold some of t h e s u b -s t a n c e of t h e new p o l i c y whi le fo rmal ly enforc ing i t .

Despi te U l b r i c h t ' s l imi ted success in prevent inga complete re pudia t ion of h i s pas t p o l i c y , t h e n ex t f e wdays a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n of 9 June i nd i ca t ed tha t a majorchange was underway. The So vi et oc cu pa ti on newspaperemphasized t h a t t h e new r e s o l u t i o n s had grea t "interns- .t i o n a l s i gn i f ic a n ce . " The ac tua l t e x t s of t h e p o l i t b u r od e c i s i o n also h in t e d a t a change at' S o v ie t p o l i c y on t h eGerman question by c l aim ing t h a t t h e new economic deci-s i on s would f a c i l i t a t e German u ni fi ca ti o n. On 11 June,-t h e B e r l i n p a r ty o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s i n s t r u c t e d t o removeq u i e t l y a l l s logans and pos te r s which contained any refer-ence t o "bui ld ing socialism" i n t h e GDR. T h i s is a s i g n i -f i c a n t aspect in view of Khrushchev's accusation t h a tBeria and Malenkov ttrecommended" t h a t t h e Socia l i s t U n i t yP a r ty of Germany abandon t h e s logan of t h e s t r u g g l e t ob u i l d l lsocialism.

A f t e r t h e announcement of t h e new course, t h es t r u g g l e co n ti nu e d i n B e r l i n . On 14 June, Herrnstadtused an e d i t o r i a l t o at tack the f a i l u r e t o revoke t h enorm increase announced a month ear l i e r .i t was clear to Semenov that f u r t h e r m e a s u r e s were needed.A t a s e s s io n of t h e p o l i t b u r o it w a s d e cide d t o a b o l i sht h e new work norms and t h e d e c i s i o n was announced th a tevening. I t was too l a t e , of c o u r s e ; r i o t i n g had a l readybegun, and i t broke o u t in f u l l f u r y t h e following day.

By 16 June

2. The Fall of Beria, t h e R i s e of U l b r i c h t

The 17 J u n e upris ing and t h e S o v ie t i n t e r v e n t i o nd i d not en d the p o l i c y s t r u g g l e , b u t it m u s t have dec i s ive ly

I I



I

weakened the p o s i t i o n of Herrns tadt , Zais ser and B e r i a .However, u n t i l t h e ar res t of Beria (26 June a t t h e l a t -e s t ) , there were s i g n s of v a c i l l a t i o n both i n Moscow,and East Berl in.

The E a s t German pa rt y remained o v er tl y divide d,a s i n d i c a t e d in public pronouncements by t h e var ious lead-e r s , u n t i l ea r l y Ju ly . For example, on 20 J u n e Z a i s s e rrece ived t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b i r th d a y g r e e t i n g s f r o m t h e SEDcentral committee 'and Herrnstadt continued to carp a tp a r t y - m i s ta k e s i n t h e columns of Neues'Debtschland. A tt h e party plenum of 21 June thereTi3TiF no iaajor person-n e l changes, and t h e "new economic course" was re-endorsedf o r "many, many ye ar s t o come.** Ulbricht remained in t h ebackground, while Grotewohl made t h e main address t o t h eplenum.t h e demands of t h e workers who part icipated in t h e up-r i s i n g and t h i s s ta tement was r e p r i n t e d i n b ot h N e u e sDeutschland and Taegliche Rundschau (29 and 30 J

Max Fechner was so bold as t o j u s t i f y p ub li cl y

The d e c l i n e and f a l l of Beria, however, turnedt h e t i d e i n U l br i ch t ' s favor . A t f i r s t , bo th I zves t lyaand Pravda were reticent on the events in B e r l i n . On 21June , however, Pravda publ i shed an e d i t o r i a l c a l l i n g fo r"heightened vig3XEEZ" and t h e suppress ion of a l l in$r i -g u e s of tv i mp er i a l i s t n te l ligence"- -akuost exa c t l y t h esame l i n e t ak en a f t e r Beria's f a l l . B u t on 1 9 June and

again on 22 June, Pravda and Izv es t ipa rep r in ted ed i to r i a l sfrom N e u e s D e u t s c h m p r e s u m a b l y by Herrns tadt ) t h a twere m c a l of t h e regime and sympathetic t o the "hon-es t people of good w i l l who were s e i z e d w i t h d i s t r u s t "of t h e p a r t y .t o r i a l l i n k i n g t h e even t s in B e r l i n 0 t h e release ofp r i s o n e r s of w a r i n South Korea as p a r t of a westernplo$. Pravda s ta ted t h a t : '*The co l l apse of t h e f o r e i g nh i r e l i n g s venture i n Be rl i n opened t h e eyes of many whohad believed t h e f a l s e claims of t h e propagandis t s op-posing peace.'* By June 26, t h e day of Beria's arrest ,there occurred an obvious change from t h i s v a c i l l a t i o n :Pravda devoted its e n t i r e se co nd page t o r e p o r t s of sup-

m o r h e GDR regime; on 28 June, i n t h e same i s s u e

ofPravda t h a t

carr iedt h e announcement t h a t

a l lt h e

lead-ers except Beri a a t t ended th e ba l l e t , there was ex tens ive

Then on 23 June Pravda published an edi-

L

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... , _...

. .

coverage of Sov ie t workers ' mee t ings sup po r t in g the GDR,a nd r e po r t s of s o l i d a r i t y me et in gs i n East Germany.

The f a l l of Beria must have encouraged Ulbr ichtto ac t a g a i n s t Beria's a l l i e s i n t h e E a s t Zone. Theo f f i c i a l record a g a i n s t H e rr n s ta d t -Z a i ss e r r e f e r s t o a"week-long de bat e " a f t e r t h e up r i s i ng o f 17 June . H e r -r n s t a d t s u p p o s e d l y revealed h i s p rogr am $or t h e p a r t y ,and Zaisser proposed Her rns tad t fo r t h e p o s t of f i r s ts e c r e t a r y . H e r r ns t a d t e ve n t h r e a t e ne d t o appea l t o t h e'tmasses I* According t o t h e p a r t y ' s v e r s i o u , J e n d r e t s k y ,Ackermann and Schmidt sup por t ed t h e o ppo si t ion " " in t h ebeginning , ** b u t l a t e r abandoned them a f t e r they "capi tu-

lated." I t is n o t known e x a c t l y when U lb r i c h t carr iedt h e d ay , b u t on t h e ba s i s of t h e change i n N e u e s Deutsch-l an d t o ne , t h i s s t r u g g l e w a s probab ly r e s o l m y 12 J l - Y 8

T I E € is t w o days a f t e r th e announcement of Beria ' s arrest.C e r t a in ly H e r r ns t a d t had l o s t by 16 July when M a x Fechnerw a s removed from o f fi ce .

,

The forma l cha rges were unve i led a t t h e c e n t r a lcommittee plenum of 24-26 Jul y. Tbe purge of Eaisser andEerrnstadt, however, w a s developed carefully. Moreover,t h e y w e r e n o t e x cl u de d f r om t h e p a r t y . N o t u n t i l a monthl a t e r (22 August) a f t e r t h e E a st German leaders had beeni n v i t e d - t o Moscow by Molotov, d i d th e pa r t y i s s u e f u r t h e rindic tment s ag a in s t them. And no t u n t i l J anua ry 1954,

a f t e r Beria 's " t r i a l * ' i n December, were they removed fromt h e p a r t y .

3. Unanswered Questions of t h e "Beria Heresy"

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Malenkov's role is a l so not clear.* Unt i l Ulbr ich t ' sspeech af ter t h e 22nd CPSU Congress i n 1961, no a l l e g a t i o n swere made a b o u t Malenkov's * s u p p o r t f o r Beria's plan t o**liquidate**h e GDR. However, Khrushchev cou ld have hadgood reasons fo r avoiding t h i s quest ion. A f te r Malenkov'sr e s i g n a t i o n as Premier in early 1955, it would have beenimprudent for Khrushchev to accuse him of a c o n c i l i a t o r yp o l i c y on Germany, s i n c e a t t h a t time ghrushchev w a sq u a r r e l l i n g w i t h Molotov over a somewhat s imilar s i t u a -t i o n ( in which Khrushchev was t h e c o n c i l i a t o r y f i g u r e )i n A u s t r i a and Yugoslavia. Also i n 1957 after t h e defeatof the an t i -pa r ty g roup it w o u l d still have been unwiset o l i n k Palenkov w i t h Ber ia ' s p lans for Ulbricht and E a s tGermany, since t h e genera l l ine a g a i n s t t h e a n t i - p a r t ygroup w a s t h a t it wa s S % a l i n i s tand opposed new i n i t i a t i v e s ,

*Malenkov and Khrushchev have changed roles as oppon-e n t s of Beria. The or ig inal indic tment of Beria cred i ted

Malenkov with prop.osing h i s removal.c e n t r a l committee rece ived cred i t . In the 1962 ,

vers ion of t h e par ty h i s to r y , however, t h e central com-mittee, qcafter he ari ng Khrushchev's statemen t adopted

h i s proposal and cur ta i led the criminal activity of Beria."

Later only t h e

1 .

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!

P.. .

\

such a s the rapprochement wi th T i to , th e Aus t r ian t re a ty ,and t h e h i g h l e v e l c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e West.

N e v e r th e l e s s , t h e ac tua l al ignment of f or ce s i n

After S t a l i n ' s d e a t h t h e e n t i r e pr es id iu m ap pa r-Moscow i n t h e s p r i n g of 1953 is s t i l l an in t r ig u in g ques -t i o n .e n t l y accepted the necess i ty for some major economicchanges i n Eas tern Europe, but t he re was a d i v i s i o n onhow f a r t o ca r r y such moves i n bo th t he USSR and E a s t e r nEurope. On some i s s u e s , Beria and Malenkov w e r e probablyn a t u r a l a l l i e s ag a in s t th e pr imacy of th e pa r ty underKhrushchev. They are b e l i e v e d t o have reorganized t h e

t o p command of th e government immedia te ly a f t e r S ta l i n ' sdemise . Unt i l 1955, r e l a t i o n s wi th Eas t Germany werecarried on primari ly through government ra ther thanpa rt y channe ls. Malenkov obviou sly had d e f i n i t e i d e a sa bo u t f o r e i g n p o l i c y and t h e s i t u a t i o n i n E a s t e r n Europe.He is c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i th t h e f a l l of Rakosi and th epromotion of Imre Nagy. For h i s pa r t , Rakosi id en t i f i edBeria so complete ly wi th t h e new economic and p o l i t i c a lcourse i n Hungary t h a t he a t tempted to renege on h i spromises af te r Beria's f a l l , and had t o be warned byWrushchev. One st ud en t of S o vi e t a f f a i r s a s s o c i a t e sMalenkov and Ber ia wit h German po li cy under S t a l i n andc r e d i t s Malenkov w i t h i n i t i a t i n g t h e s o f t l i n e whichpreceeded t h e Sovi et note s of March-April 1952* t h a t

*The 1 Y b X S v i e t p r o p os a l s were v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a lt o t h e e a r l y 1 95 4 S o v i e t p r o p o s a l s on t h e peace t r e a t yi s s u e . % at is , t h e 1952 and ear ly 1954 Sov ie t p roposa l sb ot h i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e t w o German regimes should inde-penden t ly conduc t the i r own e l e c t i o n s - - r a th e r t h a n t h eEden plan's c a l l f o r Big F ou r e l e c t i o n g u a r a n to r s .

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e m bod ie s S t a l i n ' s o f f e r to conclude a German peace t r e a t y . *Thus , it is poss ible tha t both Ber ia and Malenkov lookedtoward a ne go t i a t e d se t t l em en t on Germany a s a p r e r e q u i s i t et o a r e l a x a t i o n of t e n s i o n s in o r d e r to implement t h e i reconomic pol i c es .

Knowledgeable E a s t Germans c r e d i t Molotov andKaganovich with sav ing U lbr icht a t t h e c r i t i ca l momentbefore t h e upr is ing .** Molotov 's e n t i r e record w o u l d

, place him i n oppos i t i on t o any experiments in f o r e i g npol icy. Si mi lar ly , Kaganovich 's record s ugge s t s athorough-going con serv at iv e out lo ok. Mikoyan a l s o seemsl ink ed wi th t h i s group; h i s appea rance wi th Molotov a tt h e V-E Day recept ion p oi n t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . More-ove r , one of his proteges , I.F. Semichastnov, s e r y e d asGeneral Chuikov's deputy. Obviously, o th er powerfull e a d e r s m u s t have opposed Beria.because of f ear of h i s growing power, does: no t mean t h a the d id no t have some sympathy f o r h i s p o l i c i e s .

But oppos i t i on t o Ber ia ,

I t is po ss i bl e th a t Khrushchev and ot he r pres idiumm e m b e r s may have equivocated over Ber ia ' s p l a n s f o r G e r -many. When U lbr ic h t accused Beria and ldalenkov of want-ing to restore c a p i t a l i s m in Germany, he mentioned thatBeria became "outraged and I argued agains t" him; t h i ss ugge s t s a pe r s ona l c on f r on t a tion, which m u s t have takenp l a c e in Moscow. Ulbr ich t a l so mentioned S hepi lov ' s op-p o s i t i o n to Ulbr ich t ' 6 " c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s

errors.' ' T h i s t o o s u g g e s t s a pe r s ona l c on f r on t a t i on ,which took p lac e according t o Ulbr ich t a t t h e "HigherPa r ty School. " I f Ulbr ich t d i d plead his case be f o r et h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s i n c l u d i n g Beria, as Rakosi d i d , t he nh e c l e a r l y d i d not win u n q u a l i f i e d endorsement. H i s men-t i o n of Shepilov may i n d ic at e Khrushchev's p os it ia n wasequivoca),because a t t h a t t i m e and u n t i l 1957 Shepilovw a s gen era l ly regarded a s Khrushchev*s pro tege . I f

*Brand t , op. s.,. 101.-**Boris Meissner, Ru ssland, D i e West Maechte und Deutsch-

land.- -1C3-

II



S h e p i l o v o pp os ed U l b r i c h t , a n d d i d n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y suf-f e r f o r i t , t h e n h e m us t h a v e b e e n p r o t e c t e d by Khrushchev .A l l t h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t K h ru sh ch ev may h av e b e en w i l l i n gt o c o ns id e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of abandoning Eas t Germanyi n 1953.

APPENDIX TWO: KHRUSHCHEV'S REPORTED SUPPORT FOR AN ANTI-ULBRICHT CABAL IN 1956

A ba nd on in g U l b r i c h t i n 1956 is o ne i n t e r e s t i n g t o p i ci n a book t o b e pu b li s he d i n e a r l y March t h i s y e a r b y former

E a s t German Communist He in z Bra nd t (whose e a r l i e r workwas c i t e d o n pa ge s 95 an d 103) e n t i t l e d E i n Traum, D e r -N i c h t E n t f u h r b a r 1st (A D r e a m T h a t Is B e K d E h r A c -cording t o a Der W e g F l - r G 20 Februar-7,B r a n d t ' s b o o k , a f t e r e x a m i n i n g t h e 1953 Malenkov-Ber ia"ar rangement" t o s a c r i f i c e t h e GDR ( t h e r e p o r t d o e s n o ti m p l i c a t e K hr us hc he v i n t h e 1953 " h e r e s y " ) , d i s c u s s e si n some d e t a i l K h ru sh c he v 's a l l e g e d a p p ro v a l i n 1956 oft h e i d e a t o o u s t U l b r i c h t .

The p o s s i b i l i t y of a n U l b r i c h t o u s t e r i n 1956 h a sb ee n t h e s u b j e c t of m u c h a n a l y s i s . For ex amp le , CarolaS t e r n i n h e r e x e m p l a ry b i o g r a p h y U l b r i c h t : A P o l i t i c a lBio g r ap h y (1965 Praeger) c o n c l u d e d t h a t i n f m a s t

G er ma ns v ie we d U l b r i c h t ' s d i s m i s s a l as t h e n o s t i m po r ta n tco n s eq u en ce t o be drawn from t h e d e c i s i o n s made a t t h e2 0t h CPSU Con gre ss (pa ges 152-1701, S t e r n ' s g e n e r a l con-c l u s i o n is s t r e n g t h e n e d b y B r a n d t ' s more s p e c i f i c recol -l e c t i o n s . The h i g h l i g h t s of Der S p i e g e l ' s e x c e r p t s ofB r a n d t ' s n e w book fol low:

_.__

Kar l S ch ir de wa n [ U l b r i c h t ' s h e i r a p p a r e n t i n1956, e x p e l l e d from P o l i t b u r o i n F eb ru ar y19581 a s s e r t e d t h a t h e had t o l d N i k i t a K h r u -s h ch e v t h e f o l lo w i n g o n t h e o c c a s i o n of av i s i t t o Moscow a f t e r t h e 2 0 t h C o n g r e s s ,when t h e two of them were a l o n e :

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'You had t o cope w i t h your B e r i a , and w ehave t o cope wi th our German Ber ia- -o ther -w i s e t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 2 0 t h C o n g r e s s oft h e CPSU w i l l no t have any e f f e c t among us.'

The German Ber ia was Walter U l b r i c h t .

Accord ing t o Schirdewan, Khrushchev ad-v i s e d c a u t i o n . H e ment ioned h i s ownr a t h e r d i f Pic u1 posi i on.

'Tomorrow U l b r i c h t w i l l a l l y h i m s e l f w i t h

a l l those who can make t r o u b l e for you

b ec a us e t h e y t h i n k t h a t you are g o i n g toof a r , ' S ch ir de wa n u r ge d .

Ni k i t a Khrushchev : 'The re m u s t be no newo u t b u r s t or shake-up i n t h e GDR. Thechange i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p m us t b e s mo ot h.You m u s t g u a r a nt e e t h i s . '

The re i s no d o u b t t h a t N i k i t a Kh ru sh ch evwas for a s h o r t t i m e i n favor of t h e i d eaand e v e n worked toward t h e id ea of hav ingKar l Schirdewan promoted t o F i r s t S e c r e ta r yof t h e SED and t o e s t a b l i s h a new P o l i t i c a lBu r e a u .

A t t h a t time he saw i n S c hi rd ew a n t h e GermanGomulka and he promised him h i s su pp or t :' Bu t b e c a u t i o u s , v e r y c a u t i o u s ; you havemany duraki (dopes) among you. '

' U l b r i c h t ' s crimes are so t remendous,S c hi rd ew an p e r s i s t e d a n d a s s u r e d K h ru sh ch ev ,' t h a t w e w i l l b e ab le to d i s c l o s e them tot h e German [Communis t] Par ty on ly i n sm al ldos es , d rop by d rop . '

A f t e r a d i s c u s s i o n of S c h ir d ew a n 's a l l e g e d p l a n s t o de-s t a l i n i z e and l i b e r a l i z e p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n d it i o n s

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within East Germany, D e r S p i e g e l e x c e r p t s a passage ofBrandt ' s new book w h l F d i s c u s s e s e l i t e SED approva l ofsuch changes :

. .

So long as Khrushchev gave h i s w e l l -meaning approval , O t t o G r o t e w o h l , F r i t zSelbmann, Franz Dahlem, Fred Oe l s sne r ,Ge rha r t Z i l l e r , Kurt Hager, and a numberof o the r h i g h a nd v e r y h i g h p a r t y l eade r smore or l e s s ' e x t en s ive l y sympa thi zedwi th Schirdew an's plan s.* But when Khru-s hc he v r a n i n t o g ro wing d i f f i c u l t i e sa f t e r t h e Hungarian debacle , and a f t e ra l l h e was accused of having t r iggeredphenomena of d i s s o lu t i o n i n t h e h i t h e r t o

*Of t h e s i x o f f i c i a l s named by Brandt above , t h ree wereaccused of b e i n g members of Schi rdewan 's "ant i -Par ty"group: Selbmann, a t t h a t time t h e G D R ' s Deputy PlanningC h i e f , w a s removed f r o m t h e SED C e n t r a l Committee underc r i t i c i sm of h i s s u p p o r t of t h e Schirdewan g roup; Z i l l e r ,t hen SED Sec re t a r i a t m e m b e r r e s p o n s i b l e fo r the economy,

s h o t h i m s e l f t o d e a th i n 1957 and was posthumously accusedof having been a member of Schirdewan's group; and Oels-s n e r w a s e x p e l l e d from t h e P o l i tb u r o i n 1958 because ofh i s r o l e i n Sch i rdewan ' s " op por tun i s t i c g roup" and becauseof h i s c r i t i c i s m of e co no mi c a nd a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y .P r i m e Min i s t e r Gro tewohl d i ed i n October 1964; Hager isc u r r e n t l y c h a i r m a n of t h e P o l i t b u r o ' s I d e o l o g i c a l Commis-s i o n ; Dahlem , in F i r s t D ep uty S t a t e S e c r e t a r y f o r Univer-s i t i e s and Technica l Schools .

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. .

I

' m o n o l i t h i c ' E a s t B l o c w i t h h i s sec re tspeech and h i s thaw p o l i c y - - h e found him-

s e l f fo rced t o d r o p t h e Schirdewan-Wollweber* f r o n t .

Walter U l b r i c h t o n c e a g a i n was f i r m l y i nt h e s a d d l e and now launched a r u t h l e s sc o u n t e r a t a c k.

Like the 17 J u n e 1953 B e r l i n u p r i s i n g , t h e H un ga ri an\

r e v o l t w h i c h began on 23 October 1956 t u r n e d t h e t i d e i nU l b r i c h t ' s favor . O r a s S t e r n c o n cl u d ed i n h e r b i o g ra p h y ,

U l b r i c h t ' s s tock rose i n Moscow s i n c e he had made s u r et h a t t h e P o l i s h example was not fo l l owed and s i n ce he hadpreven t ed t h e H un gar ian r e v o l u t i o n from s p i l l i n g o v e r i n t oE a s t Germany. However, w e l l ove r a yea r pa s sed beforeKhrushchev agreed t o U l b r i c h t ' s purge of Schirdewan,Oe l s sne r and Wollweber, announced i n Neues Deutschl andon 7 February 1958--the year w h i c h marked the beg inn ingof Khrushchev' s f o r c e f u l s t r a t e g y o n t h e German q u e s t i o n .

*Erns t Wollweber, i n 1956 M i n i s t e r of S t a t e S e c u r i t y,w a s e x p e l l e d from t h e SED Ce nt ra l Commit tee i n 1958 dueto h i s co l l ab or a t i o n wi th Sch irdewan. Sch irdewan , a f t e rh i s e x p u l s i o n from t h e P o l i tb u r o i n 1958, remained ch ief

o f t h e GDR S t a t e A rc hi ve A d m in i st r at i on u n t i l September -

caesar 41 - strains in soviet - east german relations: 1962-1967

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