case digests - rights of the accused

8/10/2019 CASE DIGESTS - Rights of the Accused

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CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Gamboa vs. Cruz

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees includingpetitioner, he was identi ed by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.Petitioner led a !otion to "c#uit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in theabsence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. $he court deniedsaid motion. %earing was set, hence the petition.Issue: &hether or 'ot petitioner(s right to counsel and due process violated.Held: 'o. $he police line-up was not part of the custodial in#uest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, atsuch stage, to counsel. %e had not been held yet to answer for a criminal o)ense. $he moment there is amove or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or evenplain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should thenand there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and inthe presence of counsel.*n the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutionalright, as he was duly represented by a counsel. %e was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and topresent evidence to substantiate his defense+ only that he chose not to, and instead opted to le a !otionto "c#uit after the prosecution had rested its case. &hat due process abhors is the absolute lac of

opportunity to be heard.'avallo vs. andiganbayan

Facts: "ccused was the Collecting and Disbursing * cer of the 'umancia 'ational /ocational chool,which school is also located at del Carmen, urigao del 'orte. %is duties included the collection of tuitionfees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittanceof collections e0ceeding P511.11 to the 'ational $reasury. "n information for malversation of public fundswas led. " warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 21 December234 , Presidential Decree 'o. 2616 too e)ect creating the andiganbayan and conferring on it originaland e0clusive 7urisdiction over crimes committed by public o cers embraced in $itle /88 of the 9evisedPenal Code. *n 25 'ovember 23 :, 'avallo was nally arrested. %e was released on provisional liberty

upon the approval of his property bail bond. &hen arraigned by the 9$C on 2 ;uly 23 5, he pleaded notguilty. ui?ones-!arcos opined that since 'avallo had already beenarraigned before the case was transferred to the andiganbayan, the 9$C should continue ta ingcognizance of the case. $he matter was referred to the * ce of the *mbudsman which held otherwise.

$he information was then doc eted with the andiganbayan. " new order for 'avallo@s arrest was issued bythe andiganbayan. $he warrant was returned with a certi cation by the 9$C Cler of Court that theaccused had posted a bail bond. 'avallo led a motion to #uash, contending A2B that the andiganbayanhad no 7urisdiction over the o)ense and the person of the accused and A B that since the accused hadalready been arraigned by the 9$C, the attempt to prosecute him before the andiganbayan wouldconstitute double 7eopardy. %owever this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.Issue: &hether or 'ot the constitutional right against double 7eopardy and in custodial investigations infavor of the accused violated.Held: 'o. Double 7eopardy re#uires the e0istence of the following re#uisitesA2B $he previous complaint or information or other formal charge is su cient in form and substance tosustain a conviction+A B $he court has 7urisdiction to try the case+AEB $he accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge+ andA:B $he accused is convicted or ac#uitted or the case is dismissed without his e0press consent.

$he 9$C was devoid of 7urisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had

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already been conferred on the andiganbayan. !oreover, neither did the case there terminate withconviction or ac#uittal nor was it dismissed.'o. "ppellant is not in custodial investigation. " person under a normal audit e0amination is not undercustodial investigation. "n audit e0aminer himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcemento cer contemplated in the above rule. 8n any case, the allegation of his having been FpressuredF to signthe 0amination 9eport prepared by Dulguime Ae0amined cash, as ordered by spino, the provincialauditorB appears to be belied by his own testimony.

People vs. "licando

Facts: "ppellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Hhazie !ae Penecilla, a minor, fouryears of age, cho ing her with his right hand. $he incident happened after appellant dran li#uor. "neighbor, =eopoldo antiago found the victim(s body and the parents and police were informed. "ppellantwas living in his uncle@s house some ve arm@s length from Penecilla@s house. "ppellant was arrested andinterrogated by P*E Danilo $an. %e verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. *n thebasis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to now andrecovered from appellant@s house, Hhazie !ae@s green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, astained pillow and a stained $-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. %e wasarraigned with the assistance of "tty. 9ogelio "nti#uiera of the P"*. "ppellant pleaded guilty. $he 9$Cconvicted him. %ence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: &hether or not petitioner(s right to counsel and due process were violated.

Held: 8n the case at bar, P*E $an did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all importantconfession of the appellant in writing. 'either did he present any writing showing that appellant waived hisright to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant violation ofappellant@s constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to Iow into the recordsand illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. 8t is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemnedas inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. $he pillow and the $-shirt with the allegedbloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally e0tracted by the police fromthe appellant.

People vs. Jolanos

Facts: *scar Pagdalian was murdered in !arble upply, Jalagtas Julacan. "ccording to Pat. 9olando"lcantara and Krancisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whomthe accused who had a drin ing spree with the deceased. &hen they apprehended the accused they foundthe rearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. $hey boarded accusedalong with !agtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. &hile inthe vehicle Jolanos admitted that he illed the deceased. 9$C convicted him hence the appeal.Issue: &hether or 'ot accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.Held: Les. Jeing already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol 7eep on the way tothe Police tation where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have beeninformed of his Constitutional rights under "rticle 888, ection 2 of the 23 4 Constitution, more particularlypar. 2 and par. E.

People vs. ;udge "yson


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Facts: Kelipe 9amos was a tic et freight cler of the Philippine "irlines, assigned at its Jaguio City station.8t was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tic ets, the P"= managementnoti ed him of an investigation to be conducted. $hat investigation was scheduled in accordance withP"=@s Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Jargaining "greement signed by it withthe Philippine "irlines mployees@ "ssociation AP"= "B to which 9amos pertained. " letter was sent by9amos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P46,111. $he ndings of the "udit team were givento him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tic ets also stating that he was prevented from settlingsaid amounts. %e pro)ered a compromise however this did not ensue. $wo months after a crime of estafa

was charged against 9amos. 9amos pleaded not guilty. vidence by the prosecution contained 9amos(written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was ta en without theaccused being represented by a lawyer. 9espondent ;udge did not admit those stating that accused wasnot reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. " motion for reconsideration

led by the prosecutors was denied. %ence this appeal.Issue: &hether or 'ot the respondent ;udge correct in ma ing inadmissible as evidence the admission andstatement of accused.Held 'o. ection 1 of the 23 4 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination Aonly towitnesses other than accused, unless what is as ed is relating to a di)erent crime charged- not present incase at barB.

$his is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion ofsubpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. $he right is not to Fbe compelled to be awitness against himself.M 8t prescribes an Foption of refusal to answer incriminating #uestions and not aprohibition of in#uiry.F the right can be claimed only when the speci c #uestion, incriminatory in character,is actually put to the witness. 8t cannot be claimed at any other time. 8t does not give a witness the right todisregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testifyaltogether. 8t is a right that a witness nows or should now. %e must claim it and could be waived.

9ights in custodial interrogation as laid down in !iranda v. "rizona the rights of the accused include2B he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

B nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be usedagainst him.EB any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

$he individual may nowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or ma e astatement. Jut unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

People vs. !acam

Kacts *n "ug 2 ,23 4, duardo !acam, "ntonio Cedro, ugenio Cawilan ;r., Danilo 9o#ue and rnesto9o#ue went to the house of Jenito !acam Auncle of duardo !acamB located at :E Kerma 9oad >C.


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accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. %*& / 9, the prosecution did not present evidenceregarding appellant(s identi cation at the line-up. $he witnesses identi ed the accused again in opencourt. "lso, accused did not ob7ect to the in-court identi cation as being tainted by illegal line-up.

$he arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. %*& / 9, they are estopped from #uestioning thelegality of such arrest because they have not moved to #uash the said information and thereforevoluntarily submitted themselves to the 7urisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty andparticipating in trial. $he court believed the version of the prosecution. rnesto 9o#ue, while remainingoutside the house served as a loo ed out.

&herefore, decision of lower court is " rmed. Danilo 9o#ue and rnesto 9o#ue are guilty of the crime ofrobbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to su)er reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Pinlac

Facts: $he accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide.%e assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his e0tra7udicial confessionas evidence which was ta en by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised ofhis constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.Issue: &hether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: $he court nd it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in

the failure of the authorities in ma ing the accused understand the nature of the charges against himwithout appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation.!oreover the prosecution merely presented the e0tra7udicial confession of the accused which isinadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and sub7ectfor rebuttal. $he court ac#uitted the accused.

RIGHT TO BAIL

People vs. ;udge Donato

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on *ctober , 23 6 for actscommitted before and after Kebruary 23 6. Private respondent led with a !otion to >uash alleging thatAaB the facts alleged do not constitute an o)ense+ AbB the Court has no 7urisdiction over the o)ensecharged+ AcB the Court has no 7urisdiction over the persons of the defendants+ and AdB the criminal action orliability has been e0tinguished. $his was denied. !ay 3, 23 4 9espondent led a petition for bail, whichwas opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital o)enseunder PD 2336, 3: and 2 E: amending "9$. 2E5 of 9PC. *n 5 ;une 23 4 the President issued 0ecutive*rder 'o. 2 4 repealing, among others, P.D. 'os. 2336, 3: and 2 E: and restoring to full forceand e)ect "rticle 2E5 of the 9evised Penal Code as it e0isted before the amendatory decrees.

;udge Donato now granted the bail, which was 0ed at PE1,111.11 and imposed a condition that heshall report to the court once every two months within the rst ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner

led a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly as ing the court to deny bail to and to allow it topresent evidence in support thereof considering the Finevitable probability that the accused will notcomply with this main condition of his bail. 8t was contended that2. $he accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention whenarrested+ AChairman of CPP-'P"B

. %e was not arrested at his residence as he had no nown address+

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E. %e was using the false name F!anuel !ercado CastroF at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver@s=icense to substantiate his false identity+:. $he address he gave FPanamitan, Hawit, Cavite,F turned out to be also a false address+5. %e and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity andaddress was also found to be false+6. Pursuant to !inistry *rder 'o. 2-" dated 22 ;anuary 23 , a reward of P 51,111.11 was o)ered andpaid for his arrest.

$his however was denied. %ence the appeal.

Issue: &hether or 'ot the private respondent has the right to bail.Held: Les. Jail in the instant case is a matter of right. 8t is absolute since the crime is not a capital o)ense,therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. 8t is only when it is a capital o)ense that the rightbecomes discretionary. %owever it was wrong for the ;udge to change the amount of bail from E1H to 51Hwithout hearing the prosecution.9epublic "ct 'o. 636 approved on : *ctober 2331, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to thecrime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him."ccused validly waived his right to bail in another caseApetition for habeas corpusB. "greements weremade therein accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees ;ose na Cruz and ;ose !iloConcepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves inthe 7urisdiction of the court. aid petition for %C was dismissed. Jail is the security given for the release ofa person in custody of the law. rgo, there was a waiver. &e hereby rule that the right to bail is another ofthe constitutional rights which can be waived. 8t is a right which is personal to the accused and whosewaiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or pre7udicial to athird person with a right recognized by law.

Comendador vs. De /illa

Facts: $he petitioners in G.9. 'os. 3E244 and 363: who are o cers of the "KP were directed to appear inperson before the Pre-$rial 8nvestigating * cers for their alleged participation the failed coup on December2 to 3, 23 3. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by"rticle of &ar 42. " motion for dismissal was denied. 'ow, their motion for reconsideration, alleging denialof due process.

8n G.9. 'o. 351 1, ;acinto =igot applied for bail on ;une 5, 2331, but the application was denied by theGeneral Court !artial AGC!B 'o.2:. %e led with the 9$C a petition for certiorari and mandamuswith prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary in7unction. ;udge of GC! then granted theprovisional liberty. %owever he was not released immediately. $he 9$C now declared that even militarymen facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

$he private respondents in G.9. 'o. 34:5: led with C a petition for habeas corpus on the ground thatthey were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. $he petition was referred to 9$C. Kinding afterhearing that no formal charges had been led against the petitioners after more than a year after theirarrest, the trial court ordered their release.Issues A2B &hether or 'ot there was a denial of due process+ A B &hether or not there was a violation ofthe accused right to bail.

Held: '* denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at thepre-trial investigation, instead they led a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again as edto submit in writing. $hey had been e0pressly warned in the subpoena that Ffailure to submit counter-a davits on the date speci ed shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence.FPetitioners have a right to preemptory challenge.

8t is argued that since the private respondents are o cers of the "rmed Korces accused of violations of the"rticles of &ar, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere withthe court-martial proceedings.

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$his is without merit. $he 9egional $rial Court has concurrent 7urisdiction with the Court of "ppeals and theupreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other

bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and #uo warranto.

$he right to bail invo ed by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is notavailable in the military, as an e0ception to the general rule embodied in the Jill of 9ights. $he right to aspeedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not e0ist.

*n the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there wassubstantial compliance with the re#uirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. $he "KPpecial 8nvestigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year

because hundreds of o cers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

!anotoc vs. C"

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. %e posted bail. Petitioner led before each of the trial courts amotion entitled, Fmotion for permission to leave the country,F stating as ground therefor his desire to go tothe


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high FIight ris .F ;udge Jernardo, ;r. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raOed o)to Jranch presided by respondent 7udge. Private respondent led a motion for reconsideration of the*rder denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent 7udge. Petitioner led an urgentmotion to vacate the above *rder, but it was denied by respondent 7udge. %ence, the instant petition.

Issue: &hether or not respondent 7udge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or e0cessof 7urisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential e0traditee.

Held: 'o. Jearing in mind the purpose of e0tradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of thearrest warrant and the Ftemporary detentionF is the possibility of Iight of the potential e0traditee. $his isbased on the assumption that such e0traditee is a fugitive from 7ustice. Given the foregoing, theprospective e0traditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a Iight ris andshould be granted bail.

8n his eparate *pinion in Purganan, then "ssociate ;ustice, now Chief ;ustice 9eynato . Puno, proposedthat a new standard which he termed Fclear and convincing evidenceF should be used in granting bail ine0tradition cases. "ccording to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt buthigher than preponderance of evidence. $he potential e0traditee must prove by Fclear and convincingevidenceF that he is not a Iight ris and will abide with all the orders and processes of the e0traditioncourt. 8n this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is nota Iight ris . Conse#uently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may be granted bail on the basis of Fclear and convincing evidence.F

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

$atad vs. andiganbayan

Facts: $he complainant, "ntonio de los 9eyes, originally led what he termed Fa reportFwith the =egal Panel of the Presidential ecurity Command AP CB on *ctober 234:,containing charges of alleged violations of 9ep. "ct 'o. E123 against then ecretaryof Public 8nformation Krancisco . $atad. $he FreportF was made to FsleepF in the o ce ofthe P C until the end of 2343 when it became widely nown that ecretary Athen!inisterB $atad had a falling out with President !arcos and had resigned from theCabinet. *n December 2 , 2343, the 234: complaint was resurrected in the form ofa formal complaint led with the $anodbayan. $he $anodbayan acted on the complaint on"pril 2, 23 1 which was around two months after petitioner $atad@s resignation wasaccepted by Pres. !arcos by referring the complaint to the C8 , Presidential

ecurity Command, for investigation and report. *n ;une 26, 23 1, the C8 report wassubmitted to the $anodbayan, recommending the ling of charges for graft and corruptpractices against former !inister $atad and "ntonio =. Cantero. Jy *ctober 5, 23 , alla davits and counter-a davits were in the case was already for disposition by the

$anodbayan. %owever, it was only on ;une 5, 23 5 that a resolution was approved by the $anodbayan. Kive criminal informations were led with the andiganbayan on ;une 2 ,23 5, all against petitioner $atad alone. A2B ection E, paragraph AeB of 9". E123 forgiving D@ Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarrantedbene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of his o cial functions+ A B /iolationof ection E, paragraph AbB for receiving a chec of P2 5,111.11 from 9oberto /allar,President General !anager of "mity $rading Corporation as consideration for the release

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of a chec of P5 ,111.11 to said corporation for printing services rendered for theConstitutional Convention 9eferendum in 234E+ AEB /iolation of ection 4 on three AEBcounts for his failure to le his tatement of "ssets and =iabilities for the calendar years234E, 2346 and 234 . " motion to #uash the information was made alleging that theprosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedydisposition of the cases led against him. 8t was denied hence the appeal.Issue: &hether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.Held: L . Due process AProceduralB and right to speedy disposition of trial wereviolated. Kirstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner $atad had afalling out with President !arcos. econdly, departing from established proceduresprescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which re#uire the submission of a davitsand counter-a davits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the

$anodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential ecurity Command for ndinginvestigation and report. $he law AP.D. 'o. 322B prescribes a ten-day period for theprosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.&hile we agree with the respondent court that this period 0ed by law is merely

Fdirectory,F yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, withabsolute impunity. " delay of close to three AEB years cannot be deemed reasonable or 7usti able in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Galman s! Sand"#an$a%an

Facts: "ssassination of former enator Jenigno F'inoyF "#uino, ;r. %e was illed from his plane that had 7ust landed at the !anila 8nternational "irport. %is brain was smashed by a bullet red point-blan into thebac of his head by an assassin. $he military investigators reported within a span of three hours that theman who shot "#uino Awhose identity was then supposed to be un nown and was revealed only days lateras 9olando GalmanB was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down inturn.

President was constrained to create a Kact Kinding Joard to investigate due to large masses of people who 7oined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, 7ustice and freedom.

$he fact is that both ma7ority and minority reports were one in re7ecting the military version stating thatFthe evidence shows to the contrary that 9olando Galman had no subversive a liations. *nly the soldiersin the staircase with en. "#uino could have shot him+ that 'inoy@s assassination was the product of amilitary conspiracy, not a communist plot. *nly di)erence between the two reports is that the ma7orityreport found all the twenty-si0 private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in themilitary conspiracy+ F while the chairman@s minority report would e0clude nineteen of them.

$hen Pres. !arcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the iller.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a $9* en7oining respondent court from rendering a decision in the twocriminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 22 to issue the restraining order prayedfor. $he Court also granted petitioners a ve-day period to le a reply to respondents@ separate commentsand respondent $anodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his :-page memorandum for theprosecution.

Jut ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petitionand to lift the $9* issued ten days earlier en7oining the andiganbayan from rendering its decision. $he


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same Court ma7ority denied petitioners@ motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent $anodbayan@s memorandum for the prosecution Awhich apparently was not served on themB.

$hus, petitioners led a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legalground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people areentitled to due process.

%owever, respondent andiganbayan issued its decision ac#uitting all the accused of the crime charged,declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. 9espondents submitted that withthe andiganbayan@s verdict of ac#uittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. $hereafter,same Court ma7ority denied petitioners@ motion for reconsideration for lac of merit.

%ence, petitioners led their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging thatrespondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of 7usticeand gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of thePhilippines to due process of law.

Issue: &hether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused+ &hether or not there was aviolation of the double 7eopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners@ second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases

which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the re#uirements of dueprocess.

Deputy $anodbayan !anuel %errera Amade his e0pose 25 months later when former Pres. was no longeraroundB a rmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the

andiganbayan ;ustices and $anodbayan prosecutors were ordered by !arcos to whitewash the "#uino-Galman murder case. !alaca?ang wanted dismissal to the e0tent that a prepared resolution was sent tothe 8nvestigating Panel. !alaca?ang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former Presidentordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent+ decidedthat the presiding 7ustice, ;ustice Pamaran, AKirst DivisionB would personally handle the trial. " conferencewas held in an inner room of the Palace. *nly the Kirst =ady and Presidential =egal "ssistant ;ustice =azarowere with the President. $he conferees were told to ta e the bac door in going to the room where themeeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see thePresident. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. !arcos told them @* ay, magmoro-moro na lamang ayo+@ and that on their way out of the room Pres. !arcos e0pressed his than s tothe group and uttered @8 now how to reciprocate@.

$he Court then said that the then President Acode-named *lympusB had stage-managed in and from!alaca?ang Palace Fa scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the "#uino-Galmanmurder case+F and that Fthe prosecution in the "#uino-Galman case and the ;ustices who tried and decidedthe same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist."lso predetermined the nal outcome of the caseF of total absolution of the twenty-si0 respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. !arcos came up with a public statement aired over television

that enator "#uino was illed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. 8t was, therefore,not a source of wonder that President !arcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent withhis announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of anysuspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangementbecause, if the accused are charged in court and subse#uently ac#uitted, they may claim the bene t ofthe doctrine of double 7eopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shallappear when President !arcos is no longer in o ce.

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!ore so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. $he disappearance ofwitnesses two wee s after 'inoy@s assassination, according to ;. %errera, Fnobody was loo ing for thesepersons because they said !arcos was in power. $he assignment of the case to Presiding ;ustice Pamaran+no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raOe, e0cept the uncorroboratedtestimony of ;ustice Pamaran himself. $he custody of the accused and their con nement in a militarycamp, instead of in a civilian 7ail. $he monitoring of proceedings and developments from !alaca?ang andby !alaca?ang personnel. $he partiality of andiganbayan betrayed by its decision $hat President !arcoshad wanted all of the twenty-si0 accused to be ac#uitted may not be denied. 8n rendering its decision, the

andiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. 8ts bias and partiality in favor of theaccused was clearly obvious. $he evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored anddisregarded.

$he record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and hisauthoritarian powers to corrupt and ma e a moc ery of the 7udicial process in the "#uino-Galman murdercases. F$his is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst.F *ur Penal Code penalizes Fany e0ecutive o cerwho shall address any order or suggestion to any 7udicial authority with respect to any case or businesscoming within the e0clusive 7urisdiction of the courts of 7ustice.F

8mpartial court is the very essence of due process of law. $his criminal collusion as to the handling andtreatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret !alaca?ang conference Aand revealed only

after fteen months by ;ustice !anuel %erreraB completely dis#uali ed respondent andiganbayan andvoided ab initio its verdict. $he courts would have no reason to e0ist if they were allowed to be used asmere tools of in7ustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. !ore so, in the case atbar where the people and the world are entitled to now the truth, and the integrity of our 7udicial systemis at sta e.

$here was no double 7eopardy. Courts@ 9esolution of ac#uittal was a void 7udgment for having been issuedwithout 7urisdiction. 'o double 7eopardy attaches, therefore. " void 7udgment is, in legal e)ect, no

7udgment at all. Jy it no rights are divested. 8t neither binds nor bars anyone. "ll acts and all claims Iowingout of it are void.

!otion to Dis#ualify 8nhibit should have been resolved ahead. 8n this case, petitioners@ motion for

reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the $9* en7oining the andiganbayanfrom rendering its decision had been ta en cognizance of by the Court which had re#uired therespondents@, including the andiganbayan@s, comments. "lthough no restraining order was issued anew,respondent andiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all theaccused pending the nal action of this Court. "ll of the acts of the respondent 7udge manifest grave abuseof discretion on his part amounting to lac of 7urisdiction which substantively pre7udiced the petitioner.

&ith the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial courtwith an unbiased prosecutor. 9espondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged againstthem before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

$he function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,is to ll the public posts. ;ustices and 7udges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve noma7ority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath ofo ce, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Dumlao vs. Comelec

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Facts: $he Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of 'ueva /izcaya, whohas led his certi cate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of ;anuaryE1, 23 1. Petitioner, 9omeo J. 8got, is a ta0payer, a #uali ed voter and a member of the Jar who, as such,has ta en his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, "lfredo

alapantan, ;r., is also a ta0payer, a #uali ed voter, and a resident of an !iguel, 8loilo. Petitioner#uestions the constitutionality of section : of Jatas Pambansa Jlg. 5 as discriminatory and contrary tothe e#ual protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.

ection : provided that any retired municipal or provincial city o cial that already received retirementbene ts and is 65 years of age shall not be #uali ed to run for the same local elective o ce from which hehas retired. 8t is also provided that F"ny person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the tate,including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be#uali ed to be a candidate for any of the o ces covered by this "ct, or to participate in any partisanpolitical activity therein provided, that a 7udgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shallbe conclusive evidence of such fact and the ling of charges for the commission of such crimes before acivil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue: &hether or 'ot ec. : of JP.5 is unconstitutional being contrary to the right of presumption ofinnocence.Held: Les it is unconstitutional. 0plicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall en7oy the right to be heard byhimself and counsel A"rticle 8/, section 23, 234E ConstitutionB. "n accusation, according to thefundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. $he challenged proviso contravenes the constitutionalpresumption of innocence, as a candidate is dis#uali ed from running from public o ce on the groundalone that charges have been led against him before a civil or military tribunal. 8t condemns before one isfully heard.

$hat portion of the second paragraph of section : of Jatas Pambansa Jilang 5 providing that F. . . theling of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary

investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such factF, is hereby declared null and void, for beingviolative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

!ar#uez vs. Comelec

Facts: 8t is averred that at the time respondent 9odriguez led his certi cate of candidacy, a criminalcharge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pendingbefore the !unicipal Court of =os "ngeles, < ". " warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged NIightM from that country. Jefore the!ay 233 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent(s certi cate of candidacy on the ground of thecandidate(s dis#uali cation under section :1 of the =ocal Government Code Q ection :1. Dis#uali cation.

$he following persons are dis#uali ed from running for any local elective position... AeB Kugitive from 7usticein criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.R was led by petitioner, but C*! = C dismissed thepetition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of >uezon. Petitioner instituted #uo warrantoproceedings against private respondent before the C*! = C but the latter dismissed the petition.

Issue: &hether private respondent, who at the time of the ling of his certi cate of candidacy is said to befacing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the termNfugitive from 7ustice.M

Held: $he upreme Court ruled that "rticle 4E of the 9ules and 9egulations implementing the =ocalGovernment Code of 2332 provides

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"rticle 4E. Dis#uali cations S $he following persons shall be dis#uali ed from running for any elective localposition

N0000AeB Kugitives from 7ustice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Kugitive from 7ustice refersto a person who has been convicted by nal 7udgment.M

8t is clear from this provision that fugitives from 7ustice refer only to persons who has been convicted bynal 7udgment. %owever, C*! = C did not ma e any de nite nding on whether or not private respondent

is a fugitive from 7ustice when it out rightly denied the petition for #uo warranto. $he Court opted toremand the case to C*! = C to resolve and proceed with the case.

$he *versight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutionalin rmity of ection :1AeB of 9" 4261 if the dis#uali cation therein meant were to be so ta en as toembrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. " similar concern was e0pressed by enator 9. "./. aguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the enate and the %ouse of9epresentatives, made this reservation Nde ipa-re ne lang natin @yung language especially @yung, thescope of fugitive. !edyo bothered a o doon, a.M

$he *versight Committee nally came out with "rticle 4E of the 9ules and 9egulations 8mplementing the=ocal Government Code of 2332. 8t provided

"rt. 4E. Dis#uali cations. $he following persons shall be dis#uali ed from running for any elective localposition AeB Kugitives from 7ustice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Kugitive from 7usticerefers to a person who has been convicted by nal 7udgment. 8t includes those who after being chargedIee to avoid prosecution. $he C*! = C is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of thegiven clari cation with the term Nfugitive from 7usticeM.

Corpus vs. People

Facts: Petitioner see s reversal of the lower court(s decision nding him guilty for malversation of publicfunds. $he accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial $reasurer(s o ce. %e deniedhaving misused the whole amount of P4 , E.1 which was discovered to be a shortage fromthe government funds contending that the P51,111.11 was the unli#uidated withdrawal made by their

paymaster Pineda thru the : chec s he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced bytheir Provincial $reasurer "luning to post said amount in his cash boo despite not actually receiving theamount.Issue: &hether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of thecharge against him

Held: 8t is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive ndings that hemalversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on thecharge imputed against him. 9ecords shows that the chec s issued for the paymaster were duly li#uidatedto the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash boo s and that he was not really on leaveon the day the said chec s were disbursed by the paymaster.

R"#&t t' $e Hea(d $% H"msel) and C'unsel

People vs. %olgado

Facts: "ppellant Krisco %olgado was charged in the court of Kirst 8nstance of 9omblon with slight illegaldetention because according to the information, being a private person, he did Ffeloniously and without

7usti able motive, idnap and detain one "rtemia Kabreag in the house of "ntero %olgado for about eighthours thereby depriving said "rtemia Kabreag of her personal liberty. %e pleaded guilty Awithout a counselB

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and said that he was 7ust instructed by !r. *campo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: &hether or 'ot there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Les. 9ule 22 , section E of 9*C that N8f the defendant appears without attorney, he must beinformed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be as ed if he desiresthe aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de o cio to defend him. " reasonable time must beallowed for procuring attorney.M $his was violated. !oreso the guarantees of our Constitution that Fnoperson shall be held to answer for a criminal o)ense without due process of lawF, and that all accusedFshall en7oy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.F 8n criminal cases there can be no fair hearingunless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.

$he trial court failed to in#uire as to the true import of the #uali ed plea of accused. $he record does notshow whether the supposed instructions of !r. *campo was real and whether it had reference to thecommission of the o)ense or to the ma ing of the plea guilty. 'o investigation was opened by the court onthis matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposedinstruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. "pparently the courtbecame satis ed with the scal@s information that he had investigated !r. *campo and found that the

same had nothing to do with this case. uch attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that amere statement of the scal was not su cient to overcome a #uali ed plea of the accused. Jut above all,the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the#uali ed plea given by him and the seriousness of the o)ense found to be capital by the court.

People vs. "gbayani

Facts: $he appellant was charged for raping his 2:-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime ofrape. " motion for a new trial was led before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing theirregularities pre7udicial to the substantial rights of the accused invo ing the failure of the court to informthe accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a daypreparation for trial. 8n the instant case, the trial court appointed two de o cio counsel who assisted the

appellant at his arraignment, one of whom e0tensively cross-e0amined the rst witness for theprosecution, Dr. Klorante Jaltazar.

Issue: &hether or not the failure of the record to disclose a rmatively that the trial 7udge advised theaccused of the right to have counsel is su cient ground to reverse the 7udgment of conviction and to sendthe case bac for a new trial.

Held: 8t is settled that the failure of the record to disclose a rmatively that the trial 7udge advised theaccused of his right to counsel is not su cient ground to reverse conviction. $he reason being that the trialcourt must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an a rmative showing to the contrary. $husit has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trialcourt failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused wasinformed by the court of such right. Jesides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of thefailure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. "t no time did he previously raise it in thetrial court despite ample opportunity to do so. %is consent to be assisted by counsel de o cio, coupled withsaid counsel@s e0tensive cross-e0amination of Dr. Jaltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to#uestion the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.

R"#&t t' $e In)'(med ') t&e Natu(e and Cause ') Accusat"'n

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Pecho vs. People

Facts: $he decision of the upreme Court for convicting the accused for the comple0 crime ofattempted estafa thru falsi cation of o cial and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double 7eopardy. $he charge againstthe accused was on violation of 9" E123 of which he was ac#uitted because it only penalizesconsummated crime. 8n the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accusedwas ac#uitted but the court held 7udgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thrufalsi cation of o cial and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged."ccused invo es the defense of double 7eopardy since his ac#uittal from the charge involving 9" E123 is abar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsi cation of o cial and commercialdocument and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the ling of theinformation.

Issue: &hether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he isconvicted

Held: $he court presented the ob7ectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature andcause of the crime he is charged with as follows

$o furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma ehis defense+

$o avail himself of his conviction or ac#uittal for protection against a further prosecution for thesame cause+

$o inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are su cient in law tosupport a conviction, if one should be had.

8n order that this re#uirement may be satis ed facts must be stated not conclusions of law. $he complaintmust contain a speci c allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. &hatdetermines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts statedin the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor thespeci cation of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. 8t followsthen that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarilyincluded in the latter. 8t has been shown that the information led in court is considered as charging fortwo o)enses which the counsel of the accused failed to ob7ect therefore he can be convicted for both oreither of the charges.

%owever by reviewing the case at bar the C nds lac of su cient evidence that would establish the guiltof the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the Cwas deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was ac#uitted.

oriano vs. andiganbayan

Facts: $an was accused of #uali ed theft. $he petitioner, who was an "sst. Kiscal, was assigned toinvestigate. 8n the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.:111 from $an as price fordismissing the case. $an reported it to the 'J8 which set up an entrapment. $an was given a Php. 111,mar ed bill, and he had supplied the other half. $he entrapment succeeded and an information was ledwith the andiganbayan. "fter trial, the andiganbayan rendered a decision nding the petitioner guilty asa principal in violating the "nti Graft and Corrupt Practices "ct A9.".E123B. " motion for reconsiderationwas denied by the andiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Issue: &hether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime

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Held: $he petitioner claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the 9evised Penal Code becauseto do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of theaccusation against him. &rong. " reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearlyma es out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

Jor7a vs. !endoza

Facts: Jor7a was accused of slight physical in7uries in the City of Cebu. %owever, he was not arraigned. $hat notwithstanding, respondent ;udge enining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered adecision nding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. $he case was appealed to the Court o Kirst 8nstancein Cebu presided by respondent ;udge !endoza. 8t was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violationof his constitutional rights. 8t was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without re#uiringhim to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered $he olicitorGeneral commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.Issue: &hether or 'ot petitioner(s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.Held: Les. Procedural due process re#uires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed asto why he was indicted and what penal o)ense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that hisguilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. 8t isalso not 7ust due process that re#uires an arraignment. 8t is re#uired in the 9ules that an accused, for the

rst time, is granted the opportunity to now the precise charge that confronts him. 8t is imperative that he

is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crimeimputed to him. "t the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the stateis mobilized against him. Jeing arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him."lso, respondent ;udge enining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. &iththe violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correctthat the olicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside forbeing null. $he absence of an arraignment can be invo ed at anytime in view of the re#uirements of dueprocess to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

&herefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. $he decision of respondent ;udge 9omulo 9. eniningdated December , 234E, nding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical in7uries, is nulli ed andset aside. =i ewise, the decision of respondent ;udge 9afael $. !endoza dated 'ovember 26, 2346,a rming the aforesaid decision of ;udge enining, is nulli ed and set aside. $he case is remanded tothe City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the o)ense of slight physical in7uries, with due respect andobservance of the provisions of the 9ules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

R"#&t t' S*eed%+ Im*a(t"al and Pu$l"c T("al

People vs. $ee

Facts: $he case involves an automatic review of 7udgment made against $ee who was convicted for illegalpossession of mari7uana and sentenced to death. $he defense assailed the decision of the court for ta ingadmissible as evidence the mari7uana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general searchwarrant. $hey further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the

prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 1 hearing dates thereby slowingdown the trial procedure.Issue: &hether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial pre7udiced during the hearingof the case.Held: $he court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated.8t held that the peedy $rial "ct of 233 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be ingeneral 2 1 days. %owever, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do morethan a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.

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$he right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when A2B the proceedings are attended by ve0atious,capricious, and oppressive delays+ or A B when un7usti ed postponements are as ed for and secured+ or AEBwhen without cause or 7usti able motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the partyhaving his case tried.

8t was shown by the records that the prosecution e0erted e)orts in obtaining a warrant to compel thewitness to testify. $he concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighedsuch as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused

and the pre7udice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. $he court did not nd the 1 days ofdelayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of theaccused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always sub7ected to postponementfor reasonable cause of delay. 8n the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious oroppressive, the tate must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

Conde vs. 9ivera

Facts: "urelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in =ucena, $ayabas, has been forced to respond to noless the ve information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses andcounsel at hearings no less than on eight di)erent occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twicebeen re#uired to come to the upreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one

year from the time when the rst information was led, seems as far away from a de nite resolution of hertroubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: &hether or 'ot petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law e0pressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions theaccused shall en7oy the right to have a speedy trial. "urelia Conde, li e all other accused persons, has aright to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right inde ance of law. &e lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting o cer, without good cause,secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time,as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus tocompel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain hisfreedom.

R"#&t ') C'n)('ntat"'n

< vs. ;avier

Doroteo 'atividad on the afternoon of *ctober , 2325, fastened his carabao valued at P251 in his corralsituated in the barrio of $rapiche municipality of $anauan, Province of Jatangas. *n the following morningwhen he went to loo after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao haddisappeared. %e reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the

leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 1th of 'ovember following, encountered the accused=azaro ;avier, "polinario !endoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. &hen the ladrones saw theConstabulary, that scattered in all directions. *n the following day, the Constabulary found this carabaotied in front of the house of one Pedro !onterola in the barrio of anta Clara, municipality of an Pablo. $hecarabao was identi ed by Doroteo 'atividad as the one which had been ta en from his corral on thenight of *ctober , 2325, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.

"s corroborative of such evidence, we have the well- nown legal principle, which as applied to cases ofthis character is that, although the persons who unlawfully too a certain carabao are not recognized at

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the time, and their identity remains entirely un nown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in thepossession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they ma e no satisfactorye0planation of such possession they may be properly convicted of the crime. A ee


18/26

soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed su cient to prove guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt.

$he facts come under article 52 , 'o. E, in connection with article 5 1, as amended, of the Penal Code."ccordingly the defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day ofpresidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs ofboth instances+ the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo 'atividad, if this has not already been done. oordered

$alino vs. andiganbayan

FACTS: $alino, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa throughfalsi cation of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government inthe totalamount of P 6,5 E.11, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been underta en, butactually not needed and never made, on fourgovernment vehicles, through falsi cation of the supportingpapers to authorize the illegal payments. $he cases were tried 7ointly for all the accused untilGenaro Jasilio, "le7andro !acadangdang and petitioner $alino as ed for separate trials, which wereallowed. "t one of the proceedings, Pio


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HELD: '*- $he court has carefully studied the decision under challenge and nd that the respondent courtdid not consider the testimony given by


20/26

incrimination.

Issue: &hether or 'ot the physical e0amination was a violation of the petitioner(s constitutional rightsagainst self-incrimination.

Held: 'o. 8t is not a violation of her constitutional rights. $he rule that the constitutional guaranty, that noperson shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibitionagainst compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. $he corollary to the proposition is that, an ocularinspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

Jeltran vs. amson

Facts: Jeltran, as a defendant for the crime of Kalsi cation, refused to write a sample of his handwriting asordered by the respondent ;udge. $he petitioner in this case contended that such order would be aviolation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such e0amination would give theprosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the rst place. %e also arguedthat such an act will ma e him furnish evidence against himself.Issue: &hether or not the writing from the scal@s dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparingthe latter@s handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsi ed,constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision undere0amination.Held: $he court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely andforever from compelling the petitioner to ta e down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose ofsubmitting the latter for comparison. &riting is something more than moving the body, or the hands, orthe ngers+ writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it re#uires the application of intelligence andattention+ and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means todetermine whether or not he is the falsi er, as the petition of the respondent scal clearly states. 0ceptthat it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels inone@s possession. &e say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between

one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of hishandwriting, for in both cases, the witness is re#uired to furnish evidence against himself. 8t cannot becontended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner@s handwriting is notgranted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipaltreasurer, it should not be a di cult matter for the scal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting.Jut even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the meanscomplained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. 8tmight be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of 7ustice, but such cases areaccidental and do not constitute the raison d@ etre of the privilege. $his constitutional privilege e0ists forthe protection of innocent persons.

Chavez vs. C"

FACTS this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invo ing 7urisdiction of the upreme Court that he isentitled to be freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, % &"D '8 D *K %8 C*' $8$


21/26

Counsel of the accused opposed. Kiscal Grecia contends that the accused AChavezB will only be an ordinarywitness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. Jut the

7udge ruled in favor of the scal on the grounds that A2B the right of the prosecution to as anybody to actas witness on the witness stand including the accusedA B 8f there should be any #uestion that isincriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his ob7ection and the court will sustain him ifand when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the #uestion would incriminate him. AEB Counselhas all the assurance that the court will not re#uire the witness to answer #uestions which wouldincriminate him

ISSUE: &hether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self S incrimination had been violatedU

Held: &e have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in fullbreach of his constitutional right to remain silent. 8t cannot be said now that he has waived his right. %e didnot volunteer to ta e the stand and in his own defense+ he did not o)er himself as a witness+ on thecontrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. 8f petitioner nevertheless answered the#uestions in spite of his fear of being accused of per7ury or being put under contempt, this circumstancecannot be counted against him. %is testimony is not of his own choice. $o him it was a case of compelledsubmission. %e was a cowed participant in proceedings before a 7udge who possessed the power to puthim under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. 'or could he escape testifying. $he court made itabundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct e0amination would be ta en right then and there on

the rst day of the trial.

Pascual vs. Joard of !edical 0aminers

Facts: Petitioner "rsenio Pascual, ;r. led an action for prohibition against the Joard of !edical 0aminers.8t was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counselfor complainants announced that he would present as his rst witness the petitioner. $hereupon,petitioner, through counsel, made of record his ob7ection, relying on the constitutional right to be e0emptfrom being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to ta e the witness stand,the Joard of 0aminers was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect theconstitutional right against self-incrimination.

$he answer of respondent Joard, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to thewitness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a#uestion calling for an incriminating answer is as ed of a witness. $hey li ewise alleged that the rightagainst self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the rstwitness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge formalpractice. %ence, this appeal by respondent Joard.

Issue: &hether or 'ot compelling petitioner to be the rst witness of the complainants violates the elf-8ncrimination Clause.

Held: $he upreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for allegedmalpractice, respondent Joard of !edical 0aminers cannot, consistently with the self-incriminationclause, compel the person proceeded against to ta e the witness stand without his consent. $he Courtfound for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that Fthe accused in a criminal casemay refuse, not only to answer incriminatory #uestions, but, also, to ta e the witness stand.F 8f petitionerwould be compelled to testify against himself, he could su)er not the forfeiture of property but therevocation of his license as a medical practitioner. $he constitutional guarantee protects as well the rightto silence F$he accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a

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presumption of his guilt.F 8t is the right of a defendant Fto forego testimony, to remain silent, unless hechooses to ta e the witness stand V with undiluted, unfettered e0ercise of his own free genuine will.F

$he reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable ob7ectivesshould not be accomplished according to means or methods o)ensive to the high sense of respectaccorded the human personality. !ore and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accordedan individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. $heconstitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the

dignity and integrity of its citizens.P('&"$"ted Pun"s&ment

People vs. sparas

Facts: sparas was charged with violation of DD" for importing 1 g of shabu. "fter arraignment andpleading not guilty, she escaped from 7ail and was tried in absentia. he was found guilty and wassentenced to death. he remains at large at present.

Issue: &hether the Court may proceed to automatically review sparas(s death sentence despite herabsence.

Held: Les. 8n < v. =aguna A2321B, the Court held that its power to review a decision imposing the deathpenalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. $here, the Court said, mainly, thatthe 7udgment of conviction Acapital punishment of deathB entered on trial is not nal, cannot be e0ecuted,and is wholly without force or e)ect until the cause has been passed upon byte upreme Court. $C acts asa commissioner who ta es the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its recommendation. "decision of $C does not become nal unless and until it has been reviewed by the Court. "n accused whowas sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the factsand circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land,to the end that its 7ustice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. uch procedure ismerciful. 8t gives a second chance for life. 'either the courts nor the accused can waive it. 8t is a positiveprovision of the law that broo s no interference and tolerates no evasions. A$he Court here applied ec. 51,Gen. *rders 'o.5 .B" little history on the matter $he 23E5 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition ofthe death penalty. ection A:B of "rt. /888 provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases. Joththe 9ules of Court of 23:1 and 236: re#uire the transmission to the Court of the records of all cases inwhich the death penalty was imposed by $C, whether the defendant has appealed or not, for review and

7udgment. $hese rules were ta en from the General *rders itself. $he 234E Constitutions did not alsoprohibit death penalty. ec. 3, 9ule 2 provided the procedure for review of death penalty cases bythe Court. ec. 21, 9ule 2 of the 23 5 9ules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure ofreview and even e0pressly used the term Fautomatic review and 7udgmentF by the Court. o in People v./illanueva A235EB, the Court held that the withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not deprive theCourt of 7urisdiction to review his conviction. 8n People v. Cornelio A2342B,which involved the escape of adeath convict, the Court held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its duty of reviewing hisconviction. 8n People v. Daban A234 B, the Court said, spea ing about convictions by $C of death

penalty on the defendant, that until after the Court has spo en enconsulta, no nality could be attached tosaid decision. $his automatic review cannot be waived bathe accused nor by the courts. $he mere fact ofescape of the accused cannot be a bar at all. 8n People v. aliling A2346B, the Court said that it is notprecluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. 8n People v. Juynay A23 :B,the Court reiterated the rule that escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal ofhis appeal.

chagaray vs. ecretary of ;ustice


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Facts: *n ;anuary :, 2333, the C issued a $9* staying the e0ecution of petitioner =eo chegarayscheduled on that same day. $he public respondent ;ustice ecretary assailed the issuance of the $9*arguing that the action of the C not only violated the rule on nality of 7udgment but also encroached onthe power of the e0ecutive to grant reprieve.Issue: &hether or not the C, after the decision in the case becomes nal and e0ecutory, stillhas 7urisdiction over the caseHeld: $he nality of 7udgment does not mean that the C has lost all its powers or the case. Jy the nalityof the 7udgment, what the C loses is its 7urisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. ven after the

7udgment has become nal, the C retains its 7urisdiction to e0ecute and enforce it. $he power to control the e0ecution of the C(s decision is an essential aspect of its 7urisdiction. 8t cannotbe the sub7ect of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of 7udicial power in one Cand in such lower courts as may be established by law. $he important part of a litigation, whether civil orcriminal, is the process of e0ecution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstanceof the parties and compel courts to intervene and ad7ust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. 8tis because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherentand necessary power of control of its processes and orders to ma e them conform to law and 7ustice.

$he Court also re7ected public respondent(s contention that by granting the $9*, the Court has in e)ectgranted reprieve which is an e0ecutive function under ec. 23, "rt. /88 of the Constitution. 8n truth, anaccused who has been convicted by nal 7udgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can beclaimed in the appropriate courts. Kor instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his nalconviction cannot be e0ecuted while in a state of insanity. $he suspension of such a death sentence isindisputably an e0ercise of 7udicial power. 8t is not a usurpation of the presidential power ofreprieve though its e)ects are the same as the temporary suspension of the e0ecution of the deathconvict. 8n the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty =awby reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. $he e)ect of such an amendment is li e that ofcommutation of sentence. Jut the e0ercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot beconsidered as a violation of the power of the President to commute nal sentences of conviction. $hepowers of the 0ecutive, the =egislative and the ;udiciary to save the life of a death convict do not e0cludeeach other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. $o contend that only the

0ecutive can protect the right to life of an accused after his nal conviction is to violate the principle ofco-e#ual and coordinate powers of the E branches of the government.

D'u$le -e'*a(d%

People vs. *bsania

Facts: $he accused was charged with 9obbery with 9ape before the !unicipal Court of Jalangao,Pangasinan. %e pleaded not guilty. %is counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allegevivid designs in the info. aid motion was granted. Krom this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.Issue: &hether or 'ot the present appeal places the accused in Double ;eopardy.Held: 8n order that the accused may invo e double 7eopardy, the following re#uisites must have obtainedin the original prosecution, aB valid complaint, bB competent court, cB the defendant had pleaded to thecharge, dB defendant was ac#uitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without his e0press consent.

8n the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the $rial ;udge upon the defendant@s motion todismiss. $he Ndoctrine of double 7eopardyM as enunciated in P.vs. alico applies to wit when the case isdismissed with the e0press consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar toanother prosecution for the same o)ense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes awaiver of his constitutional right privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court fromproceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a 7udgment of conviction against him.8n essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the e0press consent of the

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accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double 7eopardy under ect. 3 9ule 22E,if the indictment against him is revived by the scal.Paulin vs. Gimenez

Facts: 9espondent and Jrgy Capt. !abuyo, while in a 7eep, were smothered with dust when they wereoverta en by the vehicle owned by Petitioner pouses. 8r ed by such, !abuyo followed the vehicle until thelatter entered the gate of an establishment. %e in#uired the nearby security guard for the identity of theowner of the vehicle. =ater that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their gunsat him. $hus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and bloc road to prevent thepetitioners( escape.


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for him. $his was not done. $herefore, there has been no standing of plea during the 7udgment of ac#uittal,so there can be no double 7eopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

smena vs. Pogoy

Facts: Petitioners sme?a and "lba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City forallegedly forcing Kr. $homas $ibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5111 from the ban to be given

to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded N'ot GuiltyM.'o trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest(s re#uest to move it on another date. ometimelater ;udge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial "ug.26, 2343 but the scal informed the court that itreceived a telegram stating that the complainant was sic . $he accused invo ed their right to speedy trial.9espondent 7udge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that thepriest(s telegram did not have a medical certi cate attached to it in order for the court to recognize thecomplainant(s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. "fter 4 days the scal leda motion to revive the case and attached the medical certi cate of the priest proving the fact that thepriest was indeed sic of inIuenza. *n *ct. :, 2343, accused sme?a and "lba led a motion to dismissthe case on the ground of double 7eopardy.

Issue: &hether or 'ot the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due tocomplainant(s failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double 7eopardyHeld: Les, revival of the case will put the accused in double 7eopardy for the very reason that the case hasbeen dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an e)ect of an ac#uittal onthe case led. $he dismissal was due to complainant(s incapability to present its evidence due to nonappearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of thedefendant for the same o)ense. Kor double 7eopardy to e0ist these three re#uisites should be present, thatone, there is a valid complaint or information led second, that it is done before a court of competent

7urisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint orinformation. 8n the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case led was grave coercion, ledin a court of competent 7urisdiction as to where the coercion too place and last the accused were

arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. &hen these three conditions are presentthen the ac#uittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without hise0press consent constitutes res 7udicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the o)ense charged. 8n thecase, it was evidently shown that the accused invo ed their right to a speedy trial and as ed for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no e0pressed consent to thedismissal of the case which would ma e the case led res 7udicata and has been dismissed by thecompetent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will bee#uivalent to ac#uittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

People vs. 9elova

FACTS: 8n this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines see s to set aside the orders

of 9espondent ;udge %on. 9elova #uashing an information for theft led against !r. *pulencia on theground of double 7eopardy and denying the petitioner(s motion for reconsideration.. *n Keb.2 2345,Jatangas police together with personnel of Jatangas lectric =ight ystem, e#uipped with a searchwarrant issued by a city 7udge of Jatangas to search and e0amine the premises of the *pulencia Carpena8ce Plant owned by one !anuel *pulencia. $hey discovered electric wiring devices have been installedwithout authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building.

aid devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption inthe plant(s electric meter. $he case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was led

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nine months prior to discovery when it should be months prior to discovery that the act being a lightfelony and prescribed the right to le in court. *n 'ov :, 2345, another case was led against !r.*pulencia by the "ssistant City Kiscal of Jatangas for a violation of a Jatangas *rdinance regardingunauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and pre7udice to City of Jatangas in the amountof P:2,16 .26. Jefore arraignment, *pulencia led a motion to #uash on the ground of double 7eopardy.

$he "ssistant scal(s claim is that it is not double 7eopardy because the rst o)ense charged against theaccused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authorityfrom the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as

opposed to the second o)ense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the 9evised Penal Codema ing it a di)erent crime charged against the 2st complaint against !r.*pulencia.Issue: &hether or 'ot the accused !r. *pulencia can invo e double 7eopardy as defense to the secondo)ense charged against him by the assistant scal of Jatangas on the ground of theft of electricitypunishable by a statute against the 9evised Penal Code.Held: Les, !r. *pulencia can invo e double 7eopardy as defense for the second o)ense because astediously e0plained in the case of Lap vs =utero, the bill of rights give two instances or inds of double

7eopardy. $he rst would be that N'o person shall be twice put in 7eopardy of punishment for the sameo)ense and the second sentence states that N8f an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, theconviction or ac#uittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same actM. 8n the case at bar, it was veryevident that the charges led against !r. *pulencia will fall on the nd ind or de nition of double

7eopardy wherein it contemplates double 7eopardy of punishment for the same act. 8t further e0plains thateven if the o)enses charged are not the same, owing that the rst charge constitutes a violation of anordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the twocharges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or ac#uittal under either the law or the ordinanceshall bar a prosecution under the other thus ma ing it against the logic of double 7eopardy. $he fact that!r. *pulencia was ac#uitted on the rst o)ense should bar the nd complaint against him coming from thesame identity as that of the 2st o)ense charged against !r.*pulencia.

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case digests - rights of the accused

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