compiled online digests - rights of the accused.docx

8/17/2019 Compiled Online Digests - Rights of the Accused.docx

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Fact&. A /ew 0or" 1amily Court judge found -inship

'D) by relying on a preponderance of the evidence, the

standard of proof re%uired by 2 344'b) of the /ew 0or"1amily Court Act, guilty of an act 'stealing money from

a poc"etboo" in a loc"er) that 5if done by an adult,

would have constituted the crime or crimes of

6arceny7. #hat the proof might not establish guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt was accepted by the judge

and this nding supported the juvenile delin%uency

charge against -inship 'D). #his position of the court

was a*rmed by the /ew 0or" Court of Appeals and it

also sustained the constitutionality of 2344 'b).

!owever, a review was granted by the 8nited 2tates

2upreme Court.

)&&e. $s proof beyond a reasonable doubt among the

essentials of due process and fair treatment re%uired

during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is

charged during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile

is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if

committed by an adult9

He'*. 'Brennan, :.) 0es. Among the essentials of due

process and fair treatment re%uired during the

adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an

act that would constitute a crime if committed by an

adult is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. #he

re%uirement that guilt of a criminal charge be

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt has a

long history and this has been constitutionally re%uired

in most of this Courts opinions. As it is in adult

criminal prosecutions, the constitutional safeguard of

proof beyond reasonable doubt is of utmost

importance during the adjudication stage of adelin%uency proceeding. ;eversed.

+$#crre#ce. '!arlan, :.) A judge handling a juvenile

proceeding should not water down the factual

conclusion that the accused committed the criminal

act with which helaguer v ?ilitary Commission /o. @4


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; /o. 64 ?ay &&, (3

2ection (. #he =resident shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the =hilippines andwhenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such

armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,invasion or rebellion. $n case of invasion or rebellion,when the public safety re%uires it, he may, for a periodnot exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus or place the =hilippines or anypart thereof under martial law. -ithin fortyeight hoursfrom the proclamation of martial law or the suspensionof the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the=resident shall submit a report in person or in writingto the Congress. #he Congress, voting jointly, by a voteof at least a majority of all its ?embers in regular orspecial session, may revo"e such proclamation orsuspension, which revocation shall not be set aside bythe =resident. 8pon the initiative of the =resident, theCongress may, in the same manner, extend suchproclamation or suspension for a period to bedetermined by the Congress, if the invasion orrebellion shall persist and public safety re%uiresit.cralaw

#he Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours following such proclamation or suspension,convene in accordance with its rules without need of acall.cralaw

#he 2upreme Court may review, in an appropriateproceeding led by any citi+en, the su*ciency of thefactual basis of the proclamation of martial law or thesuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgateits decision thereon within thirty days from itsling.cralaw

A state of martial law does not suspend the operationof the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of thecivil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authori+e theconferment of jurisdiction on military courts andagencies over civilians where civil courts are able to

function, nor automatically suspend the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus.cralaw

#he suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus shall apply only to persons judicially chargedfor rebellion or oenses inherent in, or directlyconnected with, invasion.cralawDuring the suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus, any person thus arrested ordetained shall be judicially charged within three days,otherwise he shall be released.cralaw

A/CA0C>, :E

1AC#2EF :une (@. (G the respondent Chief of 2ta of the

Armed 1orces of the =hilippines @ created therespondent?ilitary Commission /o @4 to try criminalcase led against the petitioners.

F :uly @G, (G an amendedcharge sheet was led forseven '3) oenses, namelyE'() 8nlawful possession of explosives andincendiarydevicesH'&) Conspiracy to assassinate =resident, and ?rs.?arcosH'@) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers :uan=once Inrile, 1rancisco #atad and Jicente =aternoH'4) Conspiracy to assassinate ?essrs. Arturo#angco,

:ose ;oKo and >nofre CorpusH') Arson of nine buildingsH


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functioning, as they do so today and as they did duringthe period of martial law in the country, militarytribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction overcivilians for oenses committed by them and which areproperly cogni+able by the civil courts.

'4) ;espondent ?ilitary Commission /o. @4 appears tohave been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to thepetitioners, and in complete disregard of theirconstitutional right to adduce evidence on theirbehalf.#hus, even assuming arguendo that therespondent ?ilitary Commission /o. @4 does have the

jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commissionshould be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, asobserved by the 2olicitoreneral, the said tribunalacted in disregard of the constitutional rights of theaccused. $ndeed, it is wellsettled that once adeprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist,the tribunal that rendered the judgment in %uestion isdeemed ousted of jurisdiction.') =roclamation /o. &G4 'dated :anuary (3, (()o*cially lifting martial law in the =hilippines andabolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to thenational emergency eectively divests the respondent?ilitary Commission /o. @4 'and all military tribunalsfor that matter) of its supposed authority to trycivilians, including the herein petitioners. #he saidproclamation statesE

M#he military tribunals created pursuant thereto arehereby dissolved upon nal determination of caseOspending therein which may not be transferred to thecivil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state inview of the rules on double jeopardy, or othercircumstances which render prosecution of the casesdi*cult, if not impossible.M

'L) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled torespect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable./onetheless, reverence for precedent, simply asprecedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and

the public interest demand otherwise. #hus, a doctrinewhich should be abandoned or modied should beabandoned or modied accordingly. After all, moreimportant than anything else is that this Court shouldbe right.

alman vs. 2andiganbayan, (44 2C;A 4@ '(L)

1AC#2E Assassination of former 2enator BenignoM/inoyM A%uino, :r. !e was "illed from his plane that

had just landed at the ?anila $nternational Airport. !isbrain was smashed by a bullet red pointblan" intothe bac" of his head by an assassin. #he militaryinvestigators reported within a span of three hoursthat the man who shot A%uino 'whose identity wasthen supposed to be un"nown and was revealed onlydays later as ;olando alman) was a communisthiredgunman, and that the military escorts gunned himdown in turn.

=resident was constrained to create a 1act 1indingBoard to investigate due to large masses of peoplewho joined in the tenday period of national mourningyearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

#he fact is that both majority and minority reportswere one in rejecting the military version stating thatMthe evidence shows to the contrary that ;olando


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alman had no subversive a*liations. >nly thesoldiers in the staircase with 2en. A%uino could haveshot himH that /inoyOs assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. >nlydierence between the two reports is that the majority

report found all the twentysix private respondentsabovenamed in the title of the case involved in themilitary conspiracyH M while the chairmanOs minorityreport would exclude nineteen of them.

#hen =res. ?arcos stated that evidence shows thatalman was the "iller.

=etitioners pray for issuance of a #;> enjoiningrespondent court from rendering a decision in the twocriminal cases before it, the Court resolved by ninetotwo votes (( to issue the restraining order prayed for.

#he Court also granted petitioners a veday period tole a reply to respondentsO separate comments andrespondent #anodbayan a threeday period to submit acopy of his 4page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same ninetotwo

vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petitionand to lift the #;> issued ten days earlier enjoining the2andiganbayan from rendering its decision. #he sameCourt majority denied petitionersO motion for a new day period counted from receipt of respondent

#anodbayanOs memorandum for the prosecution 'whichapparently was not served on them).

#hus, petitioners led a motion for reconsideration,alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legalground for such action and urging that the case be setfor a full hearing on the merits that the people areentitled to due process.

!owever, respondent 2andiganbayan issued itsdecision ac%uitting all the accused of the crimecharged, declaring them innocent and totally absolvingthem of any civil liability. ;espondents submitted thatwith the 2andiganbayanOs verdict of ac%uittal, theinstant case had become moot and academic.

#hereafter, same Court majority denied petitionersOmotion for reconsideration for lac" of merit.

!ence, petitioners led their motion to admit theirsecond motion for reconsideration alleging thatrespondents committed serious irregularitiesconstituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of

justice and gross violation of the constitutional rightsof the petitioners and the sovereign people of the=hilippines to due process of law.

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'() -hether or not petitioner was deprived of his rightsas an accused.

'&) -hether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.


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;86$/E =etitionersO second motion for reconsiderationis granted and ordering a retrial of the said caseswhich should be conducted with deliberate dispatchand with careful regard for the re%uirements of dueprocess.

Deputy #anodbayan ?anuel !errera 'made his expose( months later when former =res. was no longeraround) a*rmed the allegations in the second motionfor reconsideration that he revealed that the2andiganbayan :ustices and #anodbayan prosecutors

were ordered by ?arcos to whitewash the A%uinoalman murder case. ?alacaKang wanted dismissal tothe extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the$nvestigating =anel. ?alacaKang Conference planned ascenario of trial where the former =resident orderedthen that the resolution be revised by categori+ing theparticipation of each respondentH decided that thepresiding justice, :ustice =amaran, '1irst Division)would personally handle the trial. A conference washeld in an inner room of the =alace. >nly the 1irst 6adyand =residential 6egal Assistant :ustice 6a+aro were

with the =resident. #he conferees were told to ta"e thebac" door in going to the room where the meeting washeld, presumably to escape notice by the visitors inthe reception hall waiting to see the =resident. Duringthe conference, and after an agreement was reached,=res. ?arcos told them O>"ay, mag moromoro nalamang "ayoHO and that on their way out of the room=res. ?arcos expressed his than"s to the group anduttered O$ "now how to reciprocateO.

#he Court then said that the then =resident 'codenamed >lympus) had stagemanaged in and from?alacaKang =alace Ma scripted and predetermined

manner of handling and disposing of the A%uinoalman murder caseHM and that Mthe prosecution in theA%uinoalman case and the :ustices who tried anddecided the same acted under the compulsion of somepressure which proved to be beyond their capacity toresist. Also predetermined the nal outcome of thecaseM of total absolution of the twentysix respondentsaccused of all criminal and civil liability. =res. ?arcoscame up with a public statement aired over televisionthat 2enator A%uino was "illed not by his militaryescorts, but by a communist hired gun. $t was,

therefore, not a source of wonder that =resident?arcos would want the case disposed of in a mannerconsistent with his announced theory thereof which, atthe same time, would clear his name and hisadministration of any suspected guilty participation inthe assassination. such a procedure would be a betterarrangement because, if the accused are charged incourt and subse%uently ac%uitted, they may claim thebenet of the doctrine of double jeopardy and therebyavoid another prosecution if some other witnessesshall appear when =resident ?arcos is no longer in

o*ce.

?ore so was there suppression of vital evidence andharassment of witnesses. #he disappearance ofwitnesses two wee"s after /inoyOs assassination.According to :. !errera, Mnobody was loo"ing for thesepersons because they said ?arcos was in power. #heassignment of the case to =residing :ustice =amaranH


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no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed byvirtue of a regular raPe, except the uncorroboratedtestimony of :ustice =amaran himself. #he custody ofthe accused and their connement in a military camp,instead of in a civilian jail. #he monitoring of

proceedings and developments from ?alacaKang andby ?alacaKang personnel. #he partiality of2andiganbayan betrayed by its decisionE #hat=resident ?arcos had wanted all of the twentysixaccused to be ac%uitted may not be denied. $nrendering its decision, the 2andiganbayan overdiditself in favoring the presidential directive. $ts bias andpartiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious.

#he evidence presented by the prosecution was totallyignored and disregarded.

#he record shows that the then =resident misused theoverwhelming resources of the government and hisauthoritarian powers to corrupt and ma"e a moc"ery of the judicial process in the A%uinoalman murdercases. M#his is the evil of oneman rule at its veryworst.M >ur =enal Code penali+es Many executiveo*cer who shall address any order or suggestion toany judicial authority with respect to any case orbusiness coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

courts of justice.M

$mpartial court is the very essence of due process oflaw. #his criminal collusion as to the handling andtreatment of the cases by public respondents at thesecret ?alacaKang conference 'and revealed only afterfteen months by :ustice ?anuel !errera) completelydis%ualied respondent 2andiganbayan and voided abinitio its verdict. #he courts would have no reason to

exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools ofinjustice, deception and duplicity to subvert andsuppress the truth. ?ore so, in the case at bar wherethe people and the world are entitled to "now thetruth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at

sta"e.

#here was no double jeopardy. CourtsO ;esolution ofac%uittal was a void judgment for having been issuedwithout jurisdiction. /o double jeopardy attaches,therefore. A void judgment is, in legal eect, no

judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. $t neitherbinds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims Qowingout of it are void.

?otion to Dis%ualify enjoining the 2andiganbayanfrom rendering its decision had been ta"en cogni+anceof by the Court which had re%uired the respondentsO,including the 2andiganbayanOs, comments. Althoughno restraining order was issued anew, respondent2andiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its

decision of total absolution of all the accused pendingthe nal action of this Court. All of the acts of therespondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretionon his part amounting to lac" of jurisdiction whichsubstantively prejudiced the petitioner.

-ith the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, thecases must now be tried before an impartial court with


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an unbiased prosecutor. ;espondents accused mustnow face trial for the crimes charged against thembefore an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutorwith all due process.

#he function of the appointing authority with themandate of the people, under our system ofgovernment, is to ll the public posts. :ustices and

judges must ever reali+e that they have noconstituency, serve no majority nor minority but serveonly the public interest as they see it in accordancewith their oath of o*ce, guided only the Constitutionand their own conscience and honor.

Sa'a,ar -& Pe$%'e

.;. /o. ((@(

&@ 2eptember &GG@

Callejo 2r., :.

DoctrineE $f the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidenceof the accused and ac%uitting him but also on the civilliability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the casewould be a nullity as it violates the constitutional rightto due process.

1actsE

$n (3, petitioner Anmer 2ala+ar and /ena :aucian #imario were charged with estafa before the 6ega+piCity ;egional #rial Court. #he estafa case allegedlystemmed from the payment of a chec" worth =&(4,GGGto private respondent :.0. Brothers ?ar"etingCorporation ':0B?C) through :erson 0ao for thepurchase of @GG bags of rice. #he chec" was

dishonored by drawee =rudential Ban" as it is drawnagainst a closed account. 2ala+ar replaced said chec"with a new one, this time drawn against 2olid Ban". $tis again dishonored for being drawn againstuncollected deposit 'DA8D).

#he DA8D means that the account to which the chec"was drawn had su*cient funds. !owever, the fundcannot be used because it was collected against adeposited chec" which is yet to be cleared.

#rial ensued. After the prosecution presented itsevidence, 2ala+ar led a demurrer to evidence withleave of court, which the trial court granted.

$n &GG&, the trial court rendered judgment ac%uitting2ala+ar, but ordered her to remit to :0B?C =&(4,GGG.

#he trial court ruled that the evidence of theprosecution failed to establish the existence ofconspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between thepetitioner and the issuer of the chec", #imario. As amere endorser of the chec", 2ala+arOs breach ofwarranty was a good one and did not amount to estafaunder Article @( '&)'d) of the ;evised =enal Code.

#imario remained at large.

As a result, 2ala+ar led a motion for reconsiderationon the civil aspect of the decision with a plea to beallowed to present evidence. #he trial court denied themotion. Because of the denial of the motion, she ledpetition for review on certiorari before the

2upreme Court alleging she was denied due process asthe trial court did not give her the opportunity toadduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.


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$228IE

-hether or not 2ala+ar was denied due process.

!I6DE

2ala+ar should have been given by the trial court thechance to present her evidence as regards the civilaspect of the case.

#he ac%uittal of the accused does not prevent a

judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case

where 'a) the ac%uittal is based on reasonable doubt

as only preponderance of evidence is re%uiredH 'b)

where the court declared that the liability of the

accused is only civilH 'c) where the civil liability of the

accused does not arise from or is not based upon the

crime of which the accused was ac%uitted. ?oreover,

the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if

there is a nding in the nal judgment in the criminal

action that the act or omission from which the civil

liability may arise did not exist or where the accused

did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

$f the accused is ac%uitted on reasonable doubt but the

court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the

criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the

judgment of ac%uittal as it would place the accused in

double jeopardy. !owever, the aggrieved party, the

oended party or the accused or both may appeal

from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case

within the period therefor.

8nder the ;evised ;ules of Criminal =rocedure, theCourt explained the demurrer to evidence parta"es ofa motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the

prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonabledoubt. $n a case where the accused les a demurrer toevidence without leave of court, thereby waives hisright to present evidence and submits the case fordecision on the basis of the prosecutionOs evidence he

has the right to adduce evidence not only on thecriminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the caseof the demurrer is denied by the court.

$n addition, the Court said if the demurrer is grantedand the accused is ac%uitted by the court, the accusedhas the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect ofthe case unless the court also declares that the act oromission from which the civil liability may arise did notexist.

$f the trial court issues an order or renders judgmentnot only granting the demurrer to evidence of theaccused and ac%uitting him but also on the civilliability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the casewould be a nullity as it violates the constitutional rightto due process.

Pe$%'e V&. */e D$#at$

18 S+RA 130G.R. N$.72 #e 11

Fact&:

=rivate respondent and his coaccused were chargedof rebellion on >ctober &, (L for acts committedbefore and after 1ebruary (L. =rivate respondentled with a ?otion to Nuash alleging thatE 'a) the facts


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alleged do not constitute an oenseH 'b) the Court hasno jurisdiction over the oense chargedH 'c) the Courthas no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendantsHand 'd) the criminal action or liability has beenextinguished. #his was denied. ?ay , (3

;espondent led a petition for bail, which was opposedthat the respondent is not entitled to bail anymoresince rebellion became a capital oense under =D(L, 4& and (@4 amending A;#. (@ of ;=C. >n

:une (3 the =resident issued Ixecutive >rder /o.(3 repealing, among others, =.D. /os. (L, 4& and(@4 and restoring to full force and eect Article (@of the ;evised =enal Code as it existed before theamendatory decrees. :udge Donato now granted thebail, which was xed at =@G,GGG.GG and imposed acondition that he shall report to the court once every

two months within the rst ten days of every periodthereof. =etitioner led a supplemental motion forreconsideration indirectly as"ing the court to deny bailto and to allow it to present evidence in supportthereof considering the Minevitable probability that theaccused will not comply with this main condition of hisbail. $t was contended thatE

(. #he accused has evaded the authorities forthirteen years and was an escapee from detentionwhen arrestedH 'Chairman of C==/=A)

&. !e was not arrested at his residence as he hadno "nown addressH

@. !e was using the false name M?anuel ?ercadoCastroM at the time of his arrest and presented aDriverOs 6icense to substantiate his false identityH

4. #he address he gave M=anamitan, Rawit, Cavite,Mturned out to be also a false addressH

. !e and his companions were on board a privatevehicle with a declared owner whose identity andaddress were also found to be falseH

L. =ursuant to ?inistry >rder /o. (A dated (( :anuary (& , a reward of =&G,GGG.GG was oeredand paid for his arrest.

#his however was denied. !ence the appeal.

)&&e:

-hether or /ot the private respondent has the right tobail.

He'*:

0es. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. $t isabsolute since the crime is not a capital oense,therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.$t is only when it is a capital oense that the rightbecomes discretionary. !owever it was wrong for the

:udge to change the amount of bail from @GR to GRwithout hearing the prosecution.

;epublic Act /o. LL approved on &4 >ctober (G,providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime

of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is notfavorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in anothercase'petition for habeas corpus). Agreements weremade thereinE accused to remain under custody,whereas his codetainees :osena Cru+ and :ose ?iloConcepcion will be released immediately, with acondition that they will submit themselves in the

jurisdiction of the court. 2aid petition for !C was


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dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of aperson in custody of the law. Irgo, there was a waiver.-e hereby rule that the right to bail is another of theconstitutional rights which can be waived. $t is a rightwhich is personal to the accused and whose waiver

would not be contrary to law, public order, publicpolicy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to athird person with a right recogni+ed by law.

>bosa vs. Court of Appeals S; ((4@G, (L :anuary(3T #hird Division, =anganiban ':)E 4 concur

1actsE >n 4 December (3, 2enior 2tate =rosecutorAurelio C. #rampe charged :ose #. >bosa and threeothers with murder on two counts, by separateamended informations led with the ;egional #rialCourt of ?a"ati, Branch L, for the ambushslaying of2ecretary of 6ocal overnments :aime /. 1errer and hisdriver :esus D. Calderon, which occurred on & August(3, at about LE@G p.m., at 6a !uerta, =araKa%ue,?etro ?anila, as 2ecretary 1errer was riding in his car,going to the 2t. Andrew Church near the pla+a of 6a!uerta, to hear 2unday mass. Iach information allegedthat the "illing was with the attendance of thefollowing %ualifyingbosaOs motion and xed bail at=&G,GGG.GG, in each case. >n ( :une (G, >bosa leda written notice of appeal, dated 4 :une (G, therebyperfecting appeal from the decision. >n 4 :une (G,>bosa led a bailbond in the amount of =4G,GGG.GG,through =laridel 2urety and Assurance Company,which the lower court approved. >n the same day, thelower court issued an order of release. #he prisonauthorities at the /ational =enitentiary released >bosaalso on the same day notwithstanding that, at the timeof the commission of the double murder, >bosa wasserving a prison term for robbery. >n L 2eptember(@, the =eople, through the >*ce of the 2olicitoreneral '>2), led with the Court of Appeals anurgent motion, praying for cancellation of >bosaOs bailbond. >bosa promptly led an opposition, to which the=eople submitted a reply. #hereupon, the appellateCourt issued its ;esolution dated ( /ovember (@E


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a) canceling >bosaOs bail bond, b) nullifying the trialcourtOs order of @( ?ay (G which granted bail to>bosa, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediatearrest. >bosaOs twin motions for reconsideration and%uashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the

appellate Court, on ?arch (4, after the partiesOadditional pleadings were submitted and after hearingthe partiesO oral arguments, issued its second;esolution denying said motions for lac" of merit.>bosa led the petition for certiorari with the 2upremeCourt.

$ssueE -hether the bailbond was validly approved bythe trial court.

!eldE 2ince >bosa did le the written notice of appealon ( :une (G, >bosaOs appeal was, perforce,perfected, without need of any further or other act,and conse%uently and ineluctably, the trial court lost

jurisdiction over the case, both over the record andover the subject of the case. -hile bail was granted bythe trial court on @( ?ay (G when it had jurisdiction,the approval of the bail bond was done withoutauthority, because by then, the appeal had alreadybeen perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction./eedless to say, the situation would have beendierent had bail been granted and approval thereof

given before the notice of appeal was led. As theapproval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validlyapproved. >n this basis alone, regardless of theoutcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that thepetition should be dismissed. /evertheless, 2ection (@,Article $$$ of the (3 Constitution which provides thatMall persons, except those charged with oensespunishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence ofguilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by

su*cient sureties, or be released on recogni+ance asmay be provided by law. #he right to bail shall not beimpaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus is suspended. Ixcessive bail shall not bere%uired.M !erein, while >bosa, though convicted of an

oense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua orlife imprisonment, was nevertheless originally chargedwith a capital oense. >bosa can hardly be unmindfulof the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, thereis a substantial li"elihood of his conviction 'and thecorresponding penalty) being a*rmed on appeal, orworse, the not insignicant possibility and innitelymore unpleasant prospect of instead being foundguilty of the capital oense originally charged. $n suchan instance, >bosa cannot but be sorely tempted toQee. >ur ;ules of Court, following the mandate of our

fundamental law, set the standard to be observed inapplications for bail. 2ection @, ;ule ((4 of the (;ules on Criminal =rocedure. $n Borinaga vs. #amin,which was promulgated in (@, the Court laid downthe guidelines for the grant of bail. !owever, saidguidelines, along with ;ule ((4 itself, have since beenmodied by Administrative Circular (&4, which wasissued by the 2upreme Court and which came intoeect on ( >ctober (4. Jerily, had >bosa madeapplication for bail after the eectivity of said circular,the case would have been readily and promptlyresolved against >bosa. =ursuant to amendments, notonly does the conviction of >bosa for two counts ofhomicide dis%ualify him from being admitted to bail asa matter of right and subject his bail application to thesound discretion of the court, but more signicantly,the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, dand e of =aragraph @, 2ection of the (4 ;ules ofCriminal =rocedure, which are present in >bosaOssituation, would have justied and warranted the


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denial of bail, except that a retroactive application ofthe said circular is barred as it would obviously beunfavorable to >bosa. But be that as it may, the ruleson bail at the time of >bosaOs conviction do not favor>bosaOs cause either. #he appeal in a criminal case

opens the whole case for review and this includes thepenalty, which may be increased. #hus, on appeal, asthe entire case is submitted for review, even factual%uestions may once more be weighed and evaluated.

#hat being the situation, the possibility of convictionupon the original charge is ever present. 6i"ewise, ifthe prosecution had previously demonstrated thatevidence of the accusedOs guilt is strong, as it haddone so in the present case, such determinationsubsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesseroense, since such determination is for the purpose of

resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does nothave any bearing on whether >bosa will ultimately beac%uitted or convicted of the charge. -hile theaccused, after conviction, may upon application bebailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion Uparticularly with respect to extending the bail Ushould be exercised not with laxity, but with cautionand only for strong reasons, with the end in view ofupholding the majesty of the law and theadministration of justice. And the grave caution thatmust attend the exercise of judicial discretion ingranting bail to a convicted accused is best illustratedand exemplied in Administrative Circular (&4amending ;ule ((4, 2ection which now specicallyprovides that, although the grant of bail isdiscretionary in noncapital oenses nevertheless,when imprisonment has been imposed on theconvicted accused in excess of L years andcircumstances exist 'inter alia, where the accused isfound to have previously escaped from legal

connement or evaded sentence, or there is an undueris" that the accused may commit another crime whilehis appeal is pending) that point to a considerableli"elihood that the accused may Qee if released on bail,then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail

previously granted should be cancelled. $n sum, bailcannot be granted as a matter of right even after anaccused, who is charged with a capital oense,appeals his conviction for a noncapital crime. Courtsmust exercise utmost caution in deciding applicationsfor bail considering that the accused on appeal maystill be convicted of the original capital oensecharged and that thus the ris" attendant to jumpingbail still subsists. $n fact, trial courts would be welladvised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction fora lesser crime than the capital oense originally

charged, to the appellate courtOs sound discretion. #hetrial court had failed to exercise the degree ofdiscretion and caution re%uired under and mandatedby our statutes and rules, for, aside from being toohasty in granting bail immediately after promulgationof judgment, and acting without jurisdiction inapproving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored theundeniable fact of petitionerOs previous escape fromlegal connement as well as his prior convictions.

.;. />. ((&&, ?arch (3, &G(G 6eviste v. CA, et al.

Digest Corono, :.E

1AC#2E

Charged with the murder of ;afael de las Alas,petitioner :ose Antonio 6eviste was convicted by the;egional #rial Court of ?a"ati City for the lesser crimeof homicide and sentenced to suer an indeterminatepenalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as


15/47

minimum to (& years and one day of reclusiontemporal as maximum.

!e appealed his conviction to the Court ofAppeals. =ending appeal, he led an urgent application

for admission to bail pending appeal, citing hisadvanced age and health condition, and claiming theabsence of any ris" or possibility of Qight on his part.

#he Court of Appeals denied petitionersapplication for bail. $t invo"ed the bedroc" principle inthe matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretionto extend bail during the course of appeal should beexercised 5with grave caution and only for strongreasons.7

=etitioners motion for reconsideration was

denied.

=etitioner %uotes 2ection , ;ule ((4 of the;ules of Court was present. =etitioners theory is that,where the penalty imposed by the trial court is morethan six years but not more than &G years and thecircumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of2ection are absent, bail must be granted to anappellant pending appeal.

$228IE

-hether the discretionary nature of the grant of bailpending appeal mean that bail should automatically begranted absent any of the circumstances mentioned inthe third paragraph of 2ection , ;ule ((4 of the ;ulesof Court9

!I6DE

=etitioners stance is contrary to fundamentalconsiderations of procedural and substantive rules.

=etitioner actually failed to establish that the Court ofAppeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion.!e simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appealsshould have granted bail in view of the absence of anyof the circumstances enumerated in the thirdparagraph of 2ection , ;ule ((4 of the ;ules of Court.

-e disagree.

=ending appeal of a conviction by the ;egional #rialCourt of an oense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is

expressly declared to be discretionary.;etired Court of Appeals :ustice >scar ?. !errera,another authority in remedial law, is of the samethin"ingE

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. $tis a matter of right when the oense charged is notpunishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment. >n the other hand, upon conviction bythe ;egional #rial Court of an oense not punishabledeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail

becomes a matter of discretion.

2imilarly, if the court imposed a penalty ofimprisonment exceeding six 'L) years then bail is amatter of discretion, except when any of theenumerated circumstances under paragraph @ of2ection , ;ule ((4 is present then bail shall bedenied. 'emphasis supplied)


16/47

$n the rst situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. #his means that, if none of thecircumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of2ection , ;ule ((4 is present, the appellate court hasthe discretion to grant or deny bail.

>n the other hand, in the second situation, theappellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of theenumerated circumstances in fact exists. $f it sodetermines, it has no other option except to deny orrevo"e bail pending appeal.

iven these two distinct scenarios, therefore,any application for bail pending appeal should beviewed from the perspective of two stagesE '() thedetermination of discretion stage, where the appellatecourt must determine whether any of thecircumstances in the third paragraph of 2ection , ;ule((4 is presentH this will establish whether or not theappellate court will exercise sound discretion orstringent discretion in resolving the application for bailpending appeal and '&) the exercise of discretion stagewhere, assuming the appellants case falls within therst scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,the appellate court may consider all relevantcircumstances, other than those mentioned in the third

paragraph of 2ection , ;ule ((4, including thedemands of e%uity and justiceH on the basis thereof, itmay either allow or disallow bail.

A nding that none of the said circumstances ispresent will not automatically result in the grant ofbail. 2uch nding will simply authori+e the court to usethe less stringent sound discretion approach.

!owever, judicial discretion has been denedas 5choice.7 Choice occurs where, between 5two

alternatives or among a possibly innite number 'ofoptions),7 there is 5more than one possible outcome,with the selection of the outcome left to the decisionma"er.7 >n the other hand, the establishment of aclearly dened rule of action is the end of discretion.

#hus, by severely clipping the appellate courtsdiscretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factnding body in applications for bail pending appeal inall instances where the penalty imposed by the trialcourt on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding sixyears, petitioners theory eectively renders nugatorythe provision that 5upon conviction by the ;egional

#rial Court of an oense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission tobail is discretionary.7

#he aforementioned provisions were reproducedas 2ections @ to L, ;ule ((4 of the (L4 ;ules ofCriminal =rocedure and then of the ( ;ules ofCriminal =rocedure. #hey were modied in ( toread as followsE

2ec. @. Bail, a matter of rightH exception. U All personsin custody, shall before nal conviction be entitled tobail as a matter of right, except those charged with acapital oense or an oense which, under the law atthe time of its commission and at the time of the

application for bail, is punishable by reclusionperpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

!ence, for the guidelines of the bench and barwith respect to future as well as pending cases beforethe trial courts, this Court en banc lays down thefollowing policies concerning theeectivity of the bailof the accused, to witE

&) -hen an accused is charged with a capital oenseor an oense which under the law at the time of its


17/47

commission and at the time of the application for bailis punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesseroense than that charged in the complaint orinformation, the same rule set forth in the preceding

paragraph shall be appliedH

Amendments were further introduced inAdministrative Circular /o. (&4 dated August (L,(4 which brought about important changes in thesaid rules as followsE

2IC#$>/ . Bail, when discretionary. U 8ponconviction by the ;egional #rial Court of an oense notpunishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, the court, on application, may admitthe accused to bail.

Denial of bail pending appeal is 5a matter of wisediscretion.7

2ection (@, Article $$ of the Constitution providesE

2IC. (@. All persons, except those charged withoenses punishable by reclusion perpetua whenevidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, bebailable by su*cient sureties, or be released onrecogni+ance as may be provided by law. x x x'emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, thepresumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,the constitutional right to bail ends. 1rom then on, thegrant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the ris"of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercisedwith grave caution and only for strong reasons.

-!I;I1>;I, the petition is hereby D$2?$22ID.

De la Camara vs. Inage S; 6@&(&, (3 2eptember(3(T ;esolution In Banc, 1ernando ':)E concur, (concurs in result, ( too" no part

1actsE ;icardo de la Camara, ?unicipal ?ayor of

?agsaysay, ?isamis >riental was arrested on 3/ovember (L and detained at the =rovincial :ail ofAgusan, for his alleged participation in the "illing of (4and the wounding of (& other laborers of the #irador6ogging Co., at /ato, Isperan+a, Agusan del 2ur, on &(August (L. #hereafter, on & /ovember (L, the=rovincial 1iscal of Agusan led with the Court of 1irst$nstance a case for multiple frustrated murder andanother for multiple murder against de la Camara, hiscoaccused /ambinalot #agunan and 1ortunato algo,resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. #hen on (4

:anuary (L, came an application for bail led by dela Camara with the lower court, premised on theassertion that there was no evidence to lin" him withsuch fatal incident of &( August (L. !e li"ewisemaintained his innocence. :udge ?anuel 6ope+ Inage'=residing :udge of the Court of 1irst $nstance ofAgusan del /orte and Butuan City, Branch $$) startedthe trial of de la Camara on &4 1ebruary (L, theprosecution resting its case on (G :uly (L. #he

:udge, on (G August (3G, issued an order granting dela CamaraOs application for bail, admitting that there

was a failure on the part of the prosecution to provethat de la Camara would Qee even if he had theopportunity, but xed the amount of the bail bond atthe excessive amount of =(,(,&GG.GG, the sum of=4G,GGG.GG for the information charging multiplemurder and =@,&GG.GG for the oense of multiplefrustrated murder. >n (& August (3G, the 2ecretaryof :ustice, Jicente Abad 2antos, upon being informedof such order, sent a telegram to the :udge stating that


18/47

the bond re%uired Mis excessiveM and suggesting that a=4G,GGG.GG bond, either in cash or property, would bereasonable. De la Camara led motion forreconsideration to reduce the amount. #he :udgehowever remained adamant. De la Camara led a

petition for certiorari before the 2upreme Court. $n themeanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from theprovincial jail.

$ssueE -hether the judge has absolute discretion in thedetermination of the amount of bail, excessive enoughto discourage the accused from Qeeing.

!eldE -here the right to bail exists, it should not berendered nugatory by re%uiring a sum that isexcessive. 2o the Constitution commands. $f therewere no such prohibition, the right to bail becomesmeaningless. $t would have been more forthright if nomention of such a guarantee were found in thefundamental law. $t is not to be lost sight of that the8nited 2tates Constitution limits itself to a prohibitionagainst excessive bail. As construed in the latestAmerican decision, Mthe sole permissible function ofmoney bail is to assure the accusedOs presence at trial,and declared that Obail set at a higher gure than anamount reasonably calculated to fulll this purpose isMexcessiveM under the Iighth Amendment.M /othing

can be clearer, therefore, than that the challengedorder of (G August (3G xing the amount of=(,(,&GG.GG as the bail that should be posted by dela Camara, the sum of =4G,GGG.GG for the informationcharging multiple murder, there being (4 victims, andthe sum of =@,&GG.GG for the other oense ofmultiple frustrated murder, there being (& victims, isclearly violative of this constitutional provision. 8nderthe circumstances, there being only two oensescharged, the amount re%uired as bail could not

possibly exceed =G,GGG.GG for the information formurder and =&,GGG.GG for the other information forfrustrated murder. /or should it be ignored in thepresent case that the Department of :ustice didrecommend the total sum of =4G,GGG.GG for the two

oenses. /o attempt at rationali+ation can give a colorof validity to the challenged order. #here is grim ironyin an accused being told that he has a right to bail butat the same time being re%uired to post such anexorbitant sum. -hat aggravates the situation is thatthe lower court judge would apparently yield to thecommand of the fundamental law. $n reality, such asanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of theConstitution was on a purely verbal level. #here isreason to believe that any person in the position ofpetitioner would under the circumstances be unable to

resist thoughts of escaping from connement, reducedas he must have been to a state of desperation. $n thesame breath that he was told he could be bailed out,the excessive amount re%uired could only mean thatprovisional liberty would be beyond his reach. $t wouldhave been more forthright if he were informedcategorically that such a right could not be availed of.

#here would have been no disappointment ofexpectations then. De la CamaraOs subse%uent escape,however, cannot be condoned. #hat is why he is notentitled to the relief prayed for. -hat the :udge did, onthe other hand, does call for repudiation from the2upreme Court.

overnment of !ong Rong vs >lalia

1acts


19/47

=rivate respondent ?uKo+ was charged before !ongRong Court. -arrants of arrest were issued and byvirtue of a nal decree the validity of the >rder of

Arrest was upheld. #he petitioner !ong RongAdministrative ;egion led a petition for theextradition of the private respondent. $n the samecase, a petition for bail was led by the privaterespondent.

#he petition for bail was denied by reason that there

was no =hilippine law granting the same in extraditioncases and that the respondent was a high 5Qight ris"7.=rivate respondent led a motion for reconsiderationand was granted by the respondent judge subject tothe following conditionsE

(. Bail is set at =hp3G,GGG.GG in cash with thecondition that accused hereby underta"es that he willappear and answer the issues raised in these

proceedings and will at all times hold himselfamenable to orders and processes of this Court, willfurther appear for judgment. $f accused fails in thisunderta"ing, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor ofthe governmentH

&. Accused must surrender his valid passport to thisCourtH

@. #he Department of :ustice is given immediate noticeand discretion of ling its own motion for holddeparture order before this Court even in extradition

proceedingH and

4. Accused is re%uired to report to the governmentprosecutors handling this case or if they so desire tothe nearest o*ce, at any time and day of the wee"Hand if they further desire, manifest before this Court tore%uire that all the assets of accused, real andpersonal, be led with this Court soonest, with thecondition that if the accused Qees from hisunderta"ing, said assets be forfeited in favor of the

government and that the correspondinglien/ a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

;uling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

;atio Decidendi

=etitioner alleged that the trial court committed graveabuse of discretion amounting to lac" or excess of

jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bailHthat there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory


20/47

law providing that a potential extraditee has a right tobail, the right being limited solely to criminalproceedings.

>n the other hand, private respondent maintained that

the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of ;ightsextends to a prospective extraditeeH and thatextradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolongeddeprivation of ones liberty.

$n this case, the Court reviewed what was held inovernment of 8nited 2tates of America v. !on.uillermo . =urganan, =residing :udge, ;#C of ?anila,Branch 4&, and ?ar" B. :imene+, a.".a. ?ario BatacanCrespo ; /o. (@L3 April &GG3, that theconstitutional provision on bail does not apply toextradition proceedings, the same being available onlyin criminal proceedings. #he Court too" cogni+ance ofthe following trends in international lawE

'() the growing importance of the individual person inpublic internationalH

'&) the higher value now being given to human rightsH

'@) the corresponding duty of countries to observethese universal human rights in fullling their treaty

obligationsH and

'4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of theindividual under our fundamental law, on one hand,and the law on extradition, on the other.

$n light of the recent developments in internationallaw, where emphasis is given to the worth of theindividual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court

departed from the ruling in =urganan, and held that anextraditee may be allowed to post bail.

)N THE 5ATTER OF THE PET)T)ON FOR HABEAS

+ORP6S OF +APT. GAR ALEANO PN 5AR)NES9

+APT. N)+ANOR FAELDON PN 5AR)NES9 +APT.GERARDO GA5BALA PA LT. SG A5ES LA6G PN

+APT. 5)LO 5AESTRE+A5PO PA LT. SG ANTON)O

TR)LLANES )V PN HO5OBONO ADAA a#*

ROBERTO RAFAEL ROEL9 P6L)DO

-&.

GEN. PEDRO +AB6A GEN. NAR+)SO ABAA SE+.

ANGELO REES a#* SE+. RO)LO GOLE

G.R. N$. 1207 A/&t 00

FA+TSE Iarly morning of &3 :uly &GG@, some @&(armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior o*cers,

entered and too" control of the >a"wood =remier

6uxury Apartments '5>a"wood7), an upscale

apartment complex, located in the business district of

?a"ati City. #he soldiers disarmed the security o*cers

of >a"wood and planted explosive devices in its

immediate surroundings. #he junior o*cers publicly

renounced their support for the administration and

called for the resignation of =resident loria

?acapagalArroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 3EGG p.m. of the same date, the soldiers

voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several

negotiations with government emissaries. #he soldiers

later defused the explosive devices they had earlier

planted. #he soldiers then returned to their barrac"s.

>n @( :uly &GG@, en. Abaya, as the Chief of 2ta of

the A1=, issued a directive to all the ?ajor 2ervice


21/47

Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior o*cers

to the $2A1= Detention Center. #he transfer too" place

while military and civilian authorities were

investigating the soldiers involvement in the >a"wood

incident.

>n ( August &GG@, government prosecutors led an

$nformation for coup detat with the ;egional #rial

Court of ?a"ati City, Branch L(, against the soldiers

involved in the &3 :uly &GG@ >a"wood incident. #he

government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup

detat as dened and penali+ed under Article (@4A of

the ;evised =enal Code of the =hilippines, as

amended. #he case was doc"eted as Criminal Case /o.

G@&34. #he trial court later issued the Commitment

>rders giving custody of junior o*cers 6t. 2 Antonio #rillanes $J '5#rillanes7) and Capt. erardo ambala to

the Commanding >*cers of $2A1=. >n & August &GG@,

en. Abaya issued a directive to all ?ajor 2ervice

Commanders to ta"e into custody the military

personnel under their command who too" part in the

>a"wood incident except the detained junior o*cers

who were to remain under the custody of $2A1=.

=etitioners led a petition for !abeas Corpus before

the CA, however the same was denied. #he Court ofAppeals found the petition bereft of merit. #he

appellate court pointed out that the detainees are

already charged of coup detat before the ;egional

#rial Court of ?a"ati. !abeas corpus is unavailing in

this case as the detainees connement is under a

valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees

and petitioners do not even %uestion.

)SS6EE ->/ the denial of the petition for !abeas

Corpus was valid

HELDE 0I2

1or obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for

habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination

of the propriety of the remedy. $f a court nds the

alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should

issue the writ and release the detainees. $n the present

case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals

found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively

participating in the hearing before the Court of

Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that

the appellate court had no jurisdiction to in%uire into

the merits of their petition.

#he Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of

habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the

detainees complaint against the regulations and

conditions in the $2A1= Detention Center. #he remedy

of habeas corpus has one objectiveE to in%uire into the

cause of detention of a person. #he purpose of the writ

is to determine whether a person is being illegally

deprived of his liberty.$f the in%uiry reveals that the

detention is illegal, the court orders the release of theperson. $f, however, the detention is proven lawful,

then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

#he use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. $t is not

a writ of error. /either can it substitute for an appeal.

A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional

right is not su*cient. #he courts will extend the scope


22/47

of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is

presentE 'a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional

right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a personH 'b)

the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentenceH

or 'c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such

sentence is void as to the excess.

A2 #> DI/$A6 >1 ;$!# #> C>8/2I6E #he scheduled

visiting hours provide reasonable access to the

detainees, giving petitioners su*cient time to confer

with the detainees. #he detainees right to counsel is

not undermined by the scheduled visits. Iven in the

hearings before the 2enate and the 1eliciano

Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with

the detainees, a fact that petitioners

themselves admit.&@ #hus, at no point were thedetainees denied their right to counsel.

A2 #> $/!8?A/I =8/$2!?I/#E #he boarding of the

iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the

$2A1= Detention Center. #his measure intends to fortify

the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from

passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to

another. #he boarded grills ensure security and

prevent disorder and crime within the facility. #he

diminished illumination and ventilation are butdiscomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do

not constitute punishments on the detainees.

#he limitation on the detainees physical contacts with

visitors is a reasonable, nonpunitive response to valid

security concerns.

A2 #> ;$!# #> =;$JAC0 >1 C>??8/$CA#$>/E #he

letters alleged to have been read by the $2A1=

authorities were not condential letters between the

detainees and their lawyers. #he petitioner who

received the letters from detainees #rillanes and

?aestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees

personal courier and not as their counsel when he

received the letters for mailing. $n the present case,

since the letters were not condential communication

between the detainees and their lawyers, the o*cials

of the $2A1= Detention Center could read the letters. $f

the letters are mar"ed condential communication

between the detainees and their lawyers, the

detention o*cials should not read the letters but only

open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of

the detainees.

I/;$6I vs. 2A/D$A/BA0A/E D$I2# A/D C>??I/#2.;. /o. &(@43H August (, &G(=onenteE Bersamin

D$ctri#e&:Primary objective of bail V #he strength of the=rosecutionOs case, albeit a good measure of theaccusedOs propensity for Qight or for causing harm tothe public, is subsidiary to the primary objective ofbail, which is to ensure that the accused appears attrial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion V ;ight to bailis aorded in 2ec. (@, Art $$$ of the (3 Constitutionand repeted in 2ec. 3, ;ule ((4 of the ;ules of Criminal=rocedure to witE 5/o person charged with a capitaloense, or an oense punishable by reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail


23/47

when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of thestage of the criminal prosecution.7

FA+TS:>n :une , &G(4, =etitioner :uan =once Inrile was

charged with plunder in the 2andiganbayan on thebasis of his purported involvement in the =riorityDevelopment Assistance 1und '=DA1) 2cam. $nitially,Inrile in an >mnibus ?otion re%uested to post bail,which the 2andiganbayan denied. >n :uly @, &G(4, awarrant for InrileOs arrest was issued, leading to=etitionerOs voluntary surrender.=etitioner again as"edthe 2andiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which washeard by the 2andiganbayan. =etitioner argued thatE'a) =rosecution had not yet established that theevidence of his guilt was strongH 'b) that, because of

his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penaltywould only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bailandH 'c) he is not a Qight ris" due to his age andphysical condition. 2andiganbayan denied this in itsassailed resolution. ?otion for ;econsideration wasli"ewise denied.

)SS6ES:() -hether or not bail may be granted as a matter ofright unless the crime charged is punishablebyreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is

strong.a. -hether or not prosecution failed to show that ifever petitioner would be convicted, he will bepunishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. -hether or not prosecution failed to show thatpetitionerOs guilt is strong.

&. -hether or not petitioner is bailable because he isnot a Qight ris".

HELD:(. ES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.Article $$$, 2ec. (4 '&) of the (3 Constitution providesthat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall bepresumed innocent until the contrary is proved. #hisright is safeguarded by the constitutional right to bereleased on bail.

#he purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance ofthe accused at trial and so the amount of bail should

be high enough to assure the presence of the accusedwhen so re%uired, but no higher than what may bereasonably calculated to fulll this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion;ight to bail is aorded in 2ec. (@, Art $$$ of the (3Constitution and repeted in 2ec. 3, ;ule ((4 of the;ules of Criminal =rocedure to witE

Capital oense of an oense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. U /o

person charged with a capital oense, or an oensepunishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt isstrong, regardless of the stage of the criminalprosecution.

#he general ruleE Any person, before conviction of anycriminal oense, shall be bailable.


24/47

IxceptionE 8nless he is charged with an oensepunishable with reclusion perpetua Sor lifeimprisonmentT and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

#hus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been

established that the evidence of guilt is strong.;


25/47

(. $n all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or ofdiscretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of theapplication for bail or re%uire him to submit hisrecommendation '2ection (, ;ule ((4 of the ;ules ofCourt as amended)H

&. -here bail is a matter of discretion, conduct ahearing of the application for bail regardless ofwhether or not the prosecution refuses to presentevidence to show that the guilt of the accused isstrong for the purpose of enabling the court to exerciseits sound discretionH '2ection 3 and , supra)

@. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strongbased on the summary of evidence of the prosecutionH

4. $f the guilt of the accused is not strong, dischargethe accused upon the approval of the bailbond'2ection (, supra) >therwise petition should bedenied.

&. ES.

Petiti$#er=& %$$r


26/47

2eptember &L, &G(&

1actsE =etitioner was charged with two counts of

violation of 2ection (G'a), Article J$ of ;epublic Act /o.

';A) 3L(G or the 2pecial =rotection of Children Against

Child Abuse, Ixploitation and Discrimination Act.

#he ;#C in Nue+on City convicted petitioner as

charged, and sentenced her to two e%ual periods of

imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of years,

4 months, and &( days of prision correccional in its

maximum period, as minimum, to 3 years, 4 months,

and ( day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as

maximum.

=etitioner then appealed and subse%uently led an8rgent =etition2 urged for the denial of the bail application on

the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law

and that she is a Qightris". #he CA denied petitioners

application for bail pending appeal on the basis of 2ec.

'd) of ;ule ((4, ;evised ;ules of Criminal =rocedure.

!ence, this =etition for ;eview on Certiorari.

$ssueE $s the accused entitled to the right to bail9

;ulingE /o. 2ec. of ;ule ((4, ;evised ;ules of

Criminal =rocedure providesE

2ec. . Bail, when discretionary. U 8pon conviction by

the ;egional #rial Court of an oense not punishable

by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,

admission to bail is discretionary. xxx

$f the penalty imposed by the trial court is

imprisonment exceeding six 'L) years, the accused

shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon

a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the

accused, of the following or other similar

circumstancesE

xxx

'd) #hat the circumstances of his case indicate

the probability of Qight if released on bailH

xxx

=etitioner disobeyed court processes when she lied in

order to justify her nonappearance on the ?arch ,&G(G hearing before the ;#C. 2he gave the excuse that

her father was hospitali+ed and died days later when in

fact her father died a year ago. #he ;#C notice sent to

petitioners bonding company was also returned with

the notation Mmoved out,M while the notice sent to

petitioners given address was returned unclaimed

with the notation M;#2 no such person.7 #he fact of

transferring residences without informing her

bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as

petitioners inclination to evade court appearance, asindicative of Qight. Conse%uently, the Court agrees

with the appellate courts nding of the presence of

the fourth circumstance enumerated in the above

%uoted 2ec. of ;ule ((4, ;evised ;ules of Criminal

=rocedure. Also, petitioners argument that she has the

constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of

guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly,


27/47

after one is convicted by the trial court, the

presumption of innocence, and with it, the

constitutional right to bail, ends. #herefore, petitionerOs

application for bail pending appeal is denied.

.;. /os. (G44&@ ?ay @(, (4

=I>=6I >1 #!I =!$6$==$/I2, plaintiappellee, vs.>;6A/D> 1;A>, accusedappellant.

:8D$C$A6 N8I2#$>/E

-hether or not he is guilty of rape in crim. case no.(449

1AC#2E

#he accused, >rlando 1rago was charged with rapeand attempted rape doc"eted as criminal cases nos.(44 and (4. #he information states that theaccused >rlando 1rago committed the crime in theearly morning of &L 2eptember (G in the =oblacionof Nue+on, =alawan.

:icelyn 6ansap, ( years old girl, was boarding in ahouse which belongs to 1ortunato ?oral with herrelatives. Before intruding the house of :icelyn, rst the

accused who was ice cream vendor went inside theresidence of ;onalyn =astera secretly at around threefortyve in the morning. !e was about to ta"e ;onalynout of the room but she suddenly wo"e up and shoutedfor help. #hen, her father immediately responded byswitching the lights up. #hus, the accused had toescape from the house. 2ince he fail to dele ;onalyn,he next went to the boarding house of :icelyn whichwas fty meters away from the house of ;onalyn.

:icelyn 6ansap was bodily carried by accused >rlando1rago to a nearby house belonging to Dado Andor.

#hen at around vethirty in the morning, she wasawa"ened by appellant who was already stranglingher. 2he was hurt by the accused especially her private

part and found out that she had been raped. At thesame day, ;onalynOs father and :icelyn reported topolice authorities.

$n Crim. Case /o. (4, it was ac%uitted due to lac" ofclear and convincing evidence that the accused 1ragoperformed the act of crime of rape against ;onalyn=astera. $n Crim. Case /o. (44, the accused claimedthat at nine in the evening of september &, (G, hefell asleep with his family after his tiring wor" and

wo"e up at six on next morning. $n his appeal, heimputes error to the trial court in convicting him on thebasis of an identication which was made without theassistance of counsel. Also, according credence to thestory of :icelyn, thereby it is denying his constitutionalright to be presumed innocent until proved guiltybeyond reasonable doubt.

#he court sustains the defense on the insu*ciency of

the identication of appellant >rlando 1rago. -ith thetestimony of :icelyn, she has no reliable basis forpointing to the accused as the person who raped her.2he said that the face was covered, and she did nothave the opportunity to observe the height of therapistH and, that the only evidence of sexualintercourse is the result of the medical examination.>n the other hand, the =astera sisters may haverecogni+ed the accused positively because their roomwas lighted and also he was not wearing anything on


28/47

his face. #hey identied him on & 2eptember (G,(4 whereas :icelyn pointed him out only on >ctober(G. 2ince they are neighbors, =astera family mighthave shared the identity of accused to :icelyn. #hen,the identication of appellant by :icelyn is doubtful.

;I2>68#$>/E

-!I;I1>;I, the decision of the court a %uo ndingaccusedappellant >;6A/D> 1;A> guilty of rape inCrim. Case /o. (44 is ;IJI;2ID and 2I# A2$DI, andhe is ACN8$##ID as his guilt has not been provedbeyond reasonable doubt. $t appearing that he isdetained, his immediate release from custody isordered unless he is held for another cause.

Costs de ocio.

2> >;DI;ID.

=I>=6I >1 #!I =!$6$==$/I2 vs. DA//0 >D>0 :8DII82#AN8$> W. AC>##, :; vs. ?A8;$C$> ;I0/>2>, :;.and IJA =. =>/CI DI 6I>/ Case Digest

Constitutional 6aw ( Case Digests

=I>=6I >1 #!I =!$6$==$/I2 vs. DA//0 >D>0 :8DI I82#AN8$> W. AC>##, :; vs. ?A8;$C$>;I0/>2>, :;. and IJA =. =>/CI DI 6I>/

1actsE A complaint was led by judge Iusta%uio W.acott, :r. of the ;egional #rial Court of =alawan and=uerto =rincesa City, Branch 43, to cite for indirectcontempt ?auricio ;eynoso, :r., a columnist, and Iva =.=once de 6eon, publisher and chairman of the editorial

board, respectively, of the =alawan #imes. !is !onorOsplaint is based on an article written by respondent;eynoso, :r. in his column, M>n the Beat,M andpublished in the :uly &G, (4 issue of said newspaperwhich is of general circulation in =uerto =rincesa City.

#he complaint avers that the article tends to impede,obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade theadministration of justiceH that the article containsaverments which are disrespectful, discourteous,insulting, oensive and derogatoryH that it does notonly cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty ofcomplainant as a judge and on his ability to administer

justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputationthat he is biased and he prejudges the cases ledbefore himH and that the article is sub judice because itis still pending automatic review.

$ssueE -ho has jurisdiction in contempt proceedingswhere the alleged contumely is committed against alower court while the case is pending in the Appellateor !igher Court

!eldE $n whatever context it may arise, contempt ofcourt involves the doing of an act, or the failure to doan act, in such a manner as to create an aront to thecourt and the sovereign dignity with which it isclothed. As a matter of practical judicialadministration, jurisdiction has been felt properly torest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to agiven controversy. =artly because of administrativeconsiderations, and partly to visit the full personaleect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule hasbeen that no other court than the one contemned willpunish a given contempt.

#he rationale that is usually advanced for the generalrule that the power to punish for contempt rests with


29/47

the court contemned is that contempt proceedings aresui generis and are triable only by the court againstwhose authority the contempt are chargedH the powerto punish for contempt exists for the purpose ofenabling a court to compel due decorum and respect

in its presence and due obedience to its judgments,orders and processesE and in order that a court maycompel obedience to its orders, it must have the rightto in%uire whether there has been any disobediencethereof, for to submit the %uestion of disobedience toanother tribunal would operate to deprive theproceeding of half its e*ciency.

#here are, however, several jurisprudentially andstatutorily recogni+ed exceptions to the general rule,both under =hilippine and American jurisprudence, vi+.E

(. $ndirect contempt committed against inferior courtmay also be tried by the proper regional trial court,regardless of the imposable penalty.

&. $ndirect contempt against the 2upreme Court maybe caused to be investigated by a prosecuting o*cerand the charge may be led in and tried by theregional trial court, or the case may be referred to itfor hearing and recommendation where the chargeinvolves %uestions of fact.

@. $n =eople vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruledthat Min the interrelation of the dierent courts formingour integrated judicial system, one court is not anagent or representative of another and may not, forthis reason, punish contempts in vindication of theauthority and decorum which are not its own. #heappeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with theauthority to deal with contempts committed after theperfection of the appeal.M #he apparent reason is that

both the moral and legal eect of a punishment forcontempt would be missed if it were regarded as theresentment of personal aronts oered to judges.Contempts are punished as oenses against theadministration of justice, and the oense of violating a

judicial order is punishable by the court which ischarged with its enforcement, regardless of the courtwhich may have made the order. !owever, the rulepresupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to theappellate court, and there is authority that where thecontempt does not relate to the subject matter of theappeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.

4. A court may punish contempts committed against acourt or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies,as in the case of a court composed of several

coordinate branches or divisions.. #he biggest factor accounting for the exceptions iswhere the singular jurisdiction of a given matter hasbeen transferred from the contemned court to anothercourt. >ne of the most common reasons for a transferof jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. #hecases involving venue deal primarily with the %uestionwhether a change of venue is available after acontempt proceeding has been begun. -hile generallya change of venue is not available in a contemptproceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change inproper circumstances.

L. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders enteredby its predecessor, although where the successor courtis created by a statute which does not extinguish

jurisdiction in the predecessor, an a*rmative transferof jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessaryto empower the successor court to act.


30/47

3. #ransfers of jurisdiction by appellate review haveproduced numerous instances where contempt againstthe trial court has been punished in the appellatecourt, and vice versa. 2ome appellate courts haveta"en the view that a contempt committed after an

appeal is ta"en is particularly contemptuous of theappellate court because of the tendency of suchcontempts to upset the status %uo or otherwiseinterfere with the jurisdiction of such court.

. A judge may dis%ualify himself, or be dis%ualied, ona contempt hearing or in the main case, whichcircumstance may re%uire a transfer of jurisdiction, butwhere a judge is dis%ualied only in the main case,because of matters which do not dis%ualify him in acontempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in

the contempt proceeding. 6i"ewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an orderis entered by another judge and made returnable tothe proper court, the regular judge may punish forviolations of orders so entered.

. -here the same act is a contempt against two ormore courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings inone of them that there is also a contempt against theother.

(G. -hile professional disciplinary proceedings have

been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, themore recent view is that punishment is of secondaryimportance to the need to protect the courts and thepeople from improper professional practice. #o thesubstantial extent that disciplinary action remains apunishment, disciplinary measures imposed byanother court than the one contemned furnish anexception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court.

((. 2ome contemptuous acts are also crime, usuallymisdemeanors, which are often punishable in othercourts than those against which the contemptuous actwas done.

(&. 1inally, a conviction for contempt against anothercourt has been allowed to stand on the basis that thefailure of the defendant to ma"e timely objectionoperated as a waiver of the right to be

tried before the court actually contemned.

#he rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable tothe present incident, is that where the entire case hasalready been appealed, jurisdiction to punish forcontempt rests with the appellate court where theappeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or

where there is a tendency to aect the status %uo orotherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of theappellate court. Accordingly, this Court havingac%uired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirectcontempt against herein respondents, it has ta"en

judicial cogni+ance thereof and has accordinglyresolved the same.

Re: +$#-icti$# $f */e A*$raci$# G. A#/e'e&F$r +


31/47

recommended that respondent be indenitelysuspended. #he CourtOs 2econd Division approved allof these recommendations, thus, suspendingrespondent from performing her judicial functionswhile awaiting the nal resolution of her criminal

cases. ;espondent led an 8rgent ?otion for;econsiderationH he claimed that the suspension orderwas wielded against her without aording her theopportunity to be heard since she was not furnishedcopies of 22= JelascoOs letter and >CAOs AdministrativeComplaint. #hus, respondent submitted that hersuspension is essentially unjust. ?oreover, respondentmanifested that the two criminal cases against her areon appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yetattained nality. As such, respondent still enjoys theconstitutional presumption of innocence and her

suspension clashes with this presumption and istantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. 22= Jelascoled an 8rgent Appeal


32/47

judges, not having been expressly included in the

;ules of Court, are amorphous at best. 6i"ewise, we

consider respondentOs argument that there is no

urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the

criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she

cannot, by using her present position as an ;#C :udge,do anything to inQuence the CA to render a decision in

her favor. #he issue of preventive suspension has also

been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this

administrative case.

!owever, even as we nd that the >CA and 22=

Jelasco have not clearly and convincingly shown

ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive

suspension, we do note the use of oensive language

in respondentOs pleadings, not only against 22=Jelasco but also against former CA 6oc". #o reiterate

our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use

of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly

below the standard expected of an o*cer of the court.

#he esteemed position of a magistrate of the law

demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in

conduct and in language. $llustrative are the following

statementsE MCA 6oc"Os hostile mindset and his

superstar complexMH M$n a fren+ied display of arrogance

and powerMH M'CA 6oc"Os) complaint is merely apathetic echo of the ndings of the trial courtMH and

Mwhen 'CA 6oc") himself loses his objectivity and

misuses the full powers of his >*ce to persecute the

object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step

down.M $n the attempt to discredit CA 6oc", respondent

even dragged CA 6oc"Os son into the controversy, to

witE

$t is noteworthy to mention that CA

6oc"Os hostile attitude was aggravated

by his embarrassment when the

undersigned mentioned to him that she

"new how he used his inQuence to

secure a position for his son at the ;#C6ibrary of =asay City which was then

managed by :udge =riscilla ?ijares. CA

6oc" had made sure that his son be

assigned to the library to enable the

latter to conveniently adjust his

schedule in reviewing for the bar

examination.

/either was 22= Jelasco spared. >f him, the

respondent saidE MA reading of the motion forreconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly

anchored on 22= JelascoOs malicious speculations

about the guilt of the undersigned. *peculations,

especially those that emanate from the poisonous

intentions of attentionsee-ing individuals, are no

dierent from garbage that should be rejected

outrightH and M!is malicious insinuation is no less than

a revelation of his arped mindset that a personOs

position could cause pressure to bear among

government o*cials. #his brings forth a nagging%uestion. %id **P /elasco use his position at the %+0

to 1cause pressure to bear1 and obtain a favorable

disposition of the administrative cases lodged against

him by the undersigned2 3s he afraid of his on

ghost2M $t must be stressed again that, as a dispenser

of justice, respondent should exercise judicial

temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and


33/47

insulting language. 2he must maintain composure and

e%uanimity. #he judicial o*ce circumscribes the

personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of

restrictions. #his is the price that judges have to pay

for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in

the administration of justice. >ne nal word. #heparties herein have admitted in their various pleadings

that they have led numerous cases against each

other. -e do not begrudge them the prerogative to

initiate charges against those who, in their opinion,

may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them

that this privilege must be exercised with prudence,

when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the

pursuit of truth and justice. #his prerogative does not

give them the right to institute shotgun charges with

rec"less abandon, or allow their disagreement todeteriorate into a puerile %uarrel, not unli"e that of two

irresponsible children.

82 vs Ash

Brief Fact S!!ar". A number of informants wereas"ed to identify a number of suspects in connectionwith a ban" robbery. #he respondent, Ash 'the5respondent7), challenged the identication because

counsel was not present at what was arguably acritical stage of the prosecution.

S"#$%&i& $f R'e $f La(. An accused does not havethe right to counsel at a post indictment photographiclineup

Fact&. #he 2upreme Court of the 8nited 2tates

'52upreme Court7) granted certiorari to resolve thesplit in the circuits as to the issue of whether anaccused has the right to counsel at a post indictmentphotographic lineup. #he 2upreme Court held that theright to counsel at a display at which the defendant

himself was not entitled to be present was notembodied in the 2ixth Amendment of the 8nited2tates Constitution '5Constitution7). #he Court ofAppeals reversed.

)&&e. -hether the 2ixth Amendment of theConstitution grants an accused the right to havecounsel present at a post indictment photographicidentication procedure9

He'*. #he 2ixth Amendment of the Constitution does

not grant an accused the right to counsel during a postindictment photographic identication procedurebecause the accused himself is not entitled to bepresent, rendering it impossible that the accused willbe confused or overpowered by the proceedings.

Di&&e#t. #he dissent writes to emphasi+e that thephotographic lineup is indeed a critical stage of theproceedings.Concurrence. :ustice =otter 2tewart '5:. 2tewart7)concurs to emphasi+e the point that any issues

involved could be resolved through traditional methodssuch as cross examination.

Di&c&&i$#. #he 2ixth Amendment of the Constitutionguarantees the assistance of counsel during stages ofthe proceeding at which a defendant is faced witheither the intricacies of the law, or a +ealousprosecutor. /either of these situations exist at a


34/47

photographic display. #he historical test to be appliedto the 2ixth Amendment issues indicates that the righthas only been expanded when new facts havedemanded it for the protection of the defendant.

;oc" vs Ar"ansas

Brief Fact S!!ar". #he petitioner, ;oc" 'the5petitioner7), was charged with manslaughter forshooting her husband, and sought to introduce herown testimony that had been refreshed by hypnosis.An expert witness corroborated the petitionersrefreshed testimony that the gun was defective. #hetrial court ruled that hypnotically refreshed testimonywas inadmissible per se and the Ar"ansas 2upremeCourt a*rmed.

S"#$%&i& $f R'e $f La(. #he states legitimateinterest in barring unreliable evidence does not justifya per se exclusion because the evidence may bereliable in an individual case.

Fact&. During a domestic dispute, the petitioner shother husband. Because she could not remember theprecise details of the incident she submitted tohypnosis by a licensed hypnotherapist. After the

hypnosis, the petitioner recalled that she did not haveher nger on the trigger when the gun red during ascuPe. An inspection by an expert revealed that thegun was defective. #he trial court ruled that nohypnotically refreshed testimony would b

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