round 3 compiled digests (kulang 4)

8/3/2019 Round 3 Compiled Digests (Kulang 4)

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LocGov A2010

ACEBEDO OPTICAL v CA supra

POWERS, DUTIES… (SangguniangBayan)

MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS VLIBANGANG MALOLOS, INC.

159 SCRA 525MELENCIO-HERRERO; April 8, 1988

NATUREPetition for Review on Certiorari to reverse thedecision of the CA.

FACTS- Respondent Libangang Malolos, Inc. (LIBANGANG)has been operating the "Malolos Cockpit Arena" atSitio Canlapan, Barangay Sto. Rosario, Malolos,Bulacan, since 1914.- Before the expiration of its license, Libangang soughtits renewal for 1985 but the Acting Mayor of Malolosdenied renewal predicated on Sangguniang Bayan

Resolutions Nos. 6 & 9 disallowing its operation sinceit was within a prohibited area.- Because of the non-renewal, and pursuant to Section4 of P.D. No. 1802-A, Libangang filed with thePhilippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) a complaintseeking a review of the action taken by the Mayor andthe Council. Libangang also sought authority toresume operations pending hearing on the merits of the case.- PGC in a resolution allowed Libangang to resumeoperation. This prompted Municipality of Malolos(MALOLOS) to file a Petition for certiorari andProhibition with the Regional Trial Court.- February 22, 1985: PGC filed a Motion to Dismiss theInjunction Case on the ground that, under Sec. 9 (3) of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review orders of quasi-judicial agencies,instrumentalities, boards or commissions is vested inthe CA.- After hearing, the RTC, through Judge Manuel E.

Yuzon, issued an Order, dated August 20, 1985,dismissing the Injunction Case for lack of merit and forwant of jurisdiction.- MALOLOS filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Thistime, RTC Judge Felipe Villajuan, Jr. grantedreconsideration and directed LIBANGANG to desistfrom operating its cockpit pending trial of the case.- PGC and Libangang filed with the CA a Petition toannul the Orders issued by RTC Judge Villajuan, Jr. CAreversed the RTC, and denied the subsequent Motion

for Reconsideration.

ISSUE(S)

1. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to review the Ordersof the Philippine Gamefowl Commission;

2. WON the Municipal Mayor's authority to issue alicense to operate a cockpit is subject to reviewand supervision by PGC.

HELD

1. YESReasoning Jurisdiction was lodged in the CA by virtueof BP 129.Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Courtshall exercise:xxx xxx xxx(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final

judgments, decision, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,instrumentalities, boards or commissions, exceptthose falling within the appellate jurisdiction of theSupreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of thefourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of

1948. (B.P. Blg. 129)- Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the PhilippineGamefowl Commission provides:Section 1. Appeals from the Commission. Partiesaggrieved by ruling, award, order, decision or

judgment of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission,may appeal therefrom to the Intermediate AppellateCourt, within the period and in the manner heretoprovided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. xxx- The PGC being statutorily at par with the RTC,applying by analogy the rule that a Court has nopower to interfere by injunction with the judgments ordecrees of a Court of concurrent or coordinate

jurisdiction so also must it be held that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the PGC and the subject matter of this controversy.

2. NORatio It is the municipal mayor with the authorizationof the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary powerto issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits.Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in themunicipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laiddown by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.- The PGC’s power to license is limited only tointernational derbies and does not extend to ordinarycockpits. Over ordinary cockpits, it has the power notof control but only of review and supervision.

Reasoning It is clear that the PGC cannot substitute itsown discretion for the discretion exercised by themunicipal authorities in determining the applicant to

which a permit or license to operate a cockpit shouldbe issued.- Reliance by the Appellate Court and the SolicitorGeneral on Section 4, P.D. No. 1802-A is misplaced;"review and supervision" have their own peculiarmeanings and are not synonymous with control.- As thus defined, the power of supervision does not

allow the supervisor to annul the acts of thesubordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that thesubordinate performs his duties in accordance withlaw. The power of review is exercised to determinewhether it is necessary to correct the acts of thesubordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must bedone by the authority exercising control over thesubordinate or through the instrumentality of thecockpits of justice, unless the subordinate motu

proprio corrects himself after his error is called to hisattention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over him.- Neither can the PGC derive its authority to issue theorder authorizing the resumption of the operation of

the Libangang Cockpit from Sec. 2, Rule IX of theRules of Procedure of the PGC, stating that “(t)heCommission may grant a temporary operation orclosure of a cockpit xxx.” clearly relates to temporaryoperation or closure upon violation of cockfightinglaws and of the rules and regulations of theCommission, but not in respect of a license or permitto operate, the grant of which, as heretofore stated,appertains to the local authorities.

DISPOSITION The judgment under review is REVERSED in so far as itholds that the power of City and Municipal Mayors togrant a license to operate a cockpit is subject toreview and supervision by the Philippine Gamefowl

Commission, but AFFIRMED as regards the ruling thatthe Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over thePhilippine Gamefowl Commission and the subjectmatter of this case.

LTO V CITY OF BUTUAN322 SCRA 805

VITUG, J.; January 20, 2000

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari from the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC

FACTS- The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Butuan passed SPOrdinance 916-92 providing for, among other things,

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the payment of franchise fees for the grant of thefranchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registrationof the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permitfor the driving thereof. The City of Butuan filed withthe trial court a petition seeking the declaration of thevalidity of the SP Ordinance and the prohibition of theregistration of tricycles-for-hire and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO. LTOopposed.- The RTC of Butuan City held that the authority to

register tricycles, the grant of the correspondingfranchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers' license, andthe collection of fees therefor had all been vested inthe LGUs. Accordingly, it issued a permanent writ of injunction prohibiting and enjoining LTO fromregistering tricycles and issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals sustained the trialcourt. LTO filed the instant petition.- Respondent asserts that the Local Government Codeallows LGUs to collect registration fees or chargesalong with the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.Petitioner explains that one of the functions of thenational government that has been transferred tolocal government units is the franchising authority

over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but not theauthority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and toissue to qualified persons licenses to drive suchvehicles.

ISSUE/S1. WON the power of the LTO to register tricycles aswell as to issue licenses for the driving thereof hasdevolved to local government units

HELD1. NORatio The powers of LTO under RA 4136 requiring theregistration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used oroperated on or upon any public highway" in the

country is clearly unaffected by the Local GovernmentCode.Reasoning Registration and licensing functions arevested in the LTO while franchising and regulatoryresponsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under theLocal Government Code, certain functions of the DOTCwere transferred to the LGUs, which now have thepower to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hireand to grant franchises for the operation thereof.Nevertheless, the power of LGUs to regulate theoperation of tricycles and to grant franchises for theoperation thereof is still subject to the guidelinesprescribed by the DOTC. The newly delegated powerspertain to the franchising and regulatory powersexercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the

LTO.

Disposition The assailed decision is REVERSED andSET ASIDE.

THE CITYRequisites for Creation

Territorial Jurisdiction by Metes andbounds

Municipality of San Juan, MetroManila, v. CA466 SCRA 78

2005

MARIANO JR V COMELEC242 SCRA 211

Officials of the City Government

ANDRES MAMA JR. v CAG.R. No. 86517REGALADO; April 30, 1991

NATUREPetition for Review of CA decision

FACTS- Petitioners, with the exception of Mama, Jr., wereeither doctors, nurses, midwives or employees of theS.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency Hospital of OzamizCity which was then engaged in rendering generalmedical services to the city residents.- On Feb. 2, 1988, respondent Jesus Sanciangco, Jr.

and his co- respondents herein assumed office as thenewly elected local officials of the City of Ozamiz.Sanciangco, was elected mayor, along with Caballeroas vice-mayor, and Cortes, Roa, Tapayan, Neri,Pactolin and Ortega as city councilors.- On March 10, 1988, the city council passed itsResolution No. 61 abolishing the S.M. Lao MemorialCity Emergency Hospital of Ozamiz City allegedly dueto losses incurred and poor services rendered to theconstituents.- Said resolution was duly approved on March 15,1988 by respondent mayor and vice-mayor.Parenthetically, the city treasurer certified in writingthat as of Dec. 31, 1987, the Ozamiz City GeneralFund had incurred a cash overdraft of P267,141.90

and its Retained Earnings Account reflected a deficitof P3,133,151.91.Hence this petition for mandamus and prohibition,with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and

damages.

ISSUEWON the abolition of the S.M. Lao Memorial CityEmergency Hospital which reportedly resulted in theabolition of the positions held by the employeestherein is valid.

HELD YESRatio The power of City Council of Ozamiz to abolishthe hospital and the different positions therein underthe factual ambience of the case is indisputable. Therule is well settled that the power to create an officecarries the consequent prerogative to abolish it.Further, the abolition of an office neither means theremoval nor separation therefrom of the occupant whois not accordingly covered by the protection of thesecurity of tenure clause of the Constitution. However,in order to be valid, the abolition must be made ingood faith.Reasoning There was no bad faith in this case. The

hospital’s opening, with the avowed purpose of specializing in maternity and children's cases, wasdictated by circumstances beyond the control of respondents. The land where hospital is constructed isdonated property. The donation is subj. to conditionthat once land is not used for a hospital, same willrevert to the donor or his successors in interest. So, inorder to prevent reversion of the property, to theprejudice of the city, the opening of the hospital wasimperative and necessary in order to serve theinterests of city residents.- By the subsequent opening of the hospital, it cannotbe said that the reasons advanced for its previousabolition were untrue and constituted a meresubterfuge for the removal without cause of herein

petitioners. The indubitable fact is that with theopening of the hospital, structural changes were madein order to attain economy, efficiency and preventfurther losses, which were the very purposes soughtto be attained by its prior abolition. The hospital is nolonger rendering general but only limited medicalservices specializing in maternity and children's cases,and the number of officials and employees wasreduced from 34 to only 11- By reason of structural reorganization and changesin the operational objectives, the present hospitalcannot be considered as the same hospital that wasabolished. Substantial differences now exist betweenthe old and the new hospital, altho the name remainsthe same in honor of the late Dr. Santiago Lao,predecessor in interest of donors, such being acondition of the donation. So, its opening alone, w/proof that the positions created carried exactly the

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same functions and duties as those abolished, is notsufficient basis for a finding of bad faith.- It is within the legal competence of the City Councilof Ozamiz, in the exercise of its sound discretion, tocreate such other offices as may be necessary to carryout the purposes of the city government, orconsolidate the functions of any one of such officeswith another in the interest of efficiency and economy.It may also create, consolidate, and reorganize cityoffices and positions wholly supported by local funds.

The city council has no obligation to keep a uselessoffice or a position that is neither needed nor in thepublic interest by reason of, as in this case, financiallosses and incapacity to render adequate publicservices.- The city council may take such course as it maydeem necessary, expedient or conducive to the publicgood. In the exercise of its discretionary functions,good faith is always presumed, and on the partyalleging bad faith lies the burden of proof. Failure of petitioners to present evidence to prove bad faith of respondents leaves

Disposition CA decision AFFIRMED.

Chief Executive Powers…Power to Enforce Laws andOrdinances

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, CABIGAOAND TUMBOKON V ATIENZA

GR 156052CORONA; March 7, 2007

FACTS-Nov 20, 2001: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manilaenacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayorapproved it on Nov 28, 2001. It became effective Dec28, 2001, after publication.-Ord. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police powerdelegated to LGUs, a principle described as the powerinherent in a gov’t to enact laws, within constitutionallimits, to promote the order, safety, health, moralsand general welfare of the society. This is evidentfrom Sec 1 and 3 thereof which state:

SEC 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urbanplanning and ensuring health, public safety, andgeneral welfare of the residents of Pandacan andSta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land useof those portions of land bounded by the Pasig Riverin the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, BeataSt. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest,

and Estero de Pancacan in the west, PNR Railroad inthe northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in thenortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L.Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino ObreroSt., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are herebyreclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxxSEC 3. Owners or operators of industries and otherbusinesses, the operation of which are no longerpermitted under Sec 1 hereof, are hereby given aperiod of 6 months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist fromthe operation of businesses which are hereby inconsequence, disallowed.

-Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companiesCaltex (Phils), Inc., Petron Corporation and PilipinasShell Petroleum Corporation.-However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and theDepartment of Energy (DOE) entered into amemorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oilcompanies in which they agreed that "the scalingdown of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viableand practicable option." Under the MOU, the oilcompanies agreed to perform the following:

Sec 1. Consistent with the objectives stated above,the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU,undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan

Terminals which shall include, among others,

immediate removal/decommissioning process of 28tanks starting with the LPG spheres and thecommencing of works for the creation of safetybuffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan

Terminals. xxxSec 2. Consistent with the scale-down programmentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shallestablish joint operations and management,including the operation of common, integratedand/or shared facilities, consistent with internationaland domestic technical, safety, environmental andeconomic considerations and standards.Consequently, the joint operations of the OILCOMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall bel imited to the common and integrated

areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering thecommercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OILCOMPANIES.

Sec 3. The development and maintenance of thesafety and green buffer zones mentioned therein,which shall be taken from the properties of the OILCOMPANIES and not from the surroundingcommunities, shall be the sole responsibility of theOIL COMPANIES.

-The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand,

committed to do the following:Sec 1. The City Mayor shall endorse to the CityCouncil this MOU for its appropriate action with theview of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.Sec 2. The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistentwith the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OILCOMPANIES to continuously operate in compliancewith legal requirements, within the limited arearesulting from the joint operations and the scaledown program.Sec 3. The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor theOIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.Sec 4. The CITY OF MANILA and the nat’lgovernment shall protect the safety buffer and

green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventingfuture occupation or encroachment into these areasby illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

-The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU inResolution No. 97. In the same resolution, theSanggunian declared that the MOU was effective onlyfor a period of 6 months from July 25, 2002.

Thereafter, on Jan 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adoptedResolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza toissue special business permits to the oil companies.Resolution 13 also called for a reassessment of theordinance.-Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action formandamus on Dec 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza

be compelled to enforce Ord. 8027 and order theimmediate removal of the terminals of the oilcompanies.

ISSUES1. WON respondent has the mandatory legal duty toenforce Ordinance 8027 and order removal of thePandacan Terminals

HELD1. YES.Ratio Reasoning Petitioners contend that respondent hasthe mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b2) of the LGC (RA 7160), to enforce Ord. 8027. Instead, he

allowed them to stay.Respondent’s defense is that Ord. 8027 has beensuperseded by the MOU and the resolutions. However,he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and

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MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that thelatter has not amended the former. He insists that theordinance remains valid and in full force and effectand that the MOU did not in any way prevent him fromenforcing and implementing it. He maintains that theMOU should be considered as a mere guideline for itsfull implementation.A petition for mandamus may be filed when anytribunal, corporation, board, officer or personunlawfully neglects the performance of an act which

the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from anoffice, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinarywrit that is employed to compel the performance,when refused, of a ministerial duty that is alreadyimposed on the respondent and there is no otherplain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to theperformance of the act and it must be the clear andimperative duty of respondent to do the act requiredto be done.Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or tocompel compliance with a duty, which is questionableor over which a substantial doubt exists. The principalfunction of the writ of mandamus is to command and

to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it isneither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure alegal right but to implement that which is alreadyestablished. Unless the right to the relief sought isunclouded, mandamus will not issue.When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public rightand its object is to compel a public duty, the peoplewho are interested in the execution of the laws areregarded as the real parties in interest and they neednot show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila (SJS -political party registered with theCOMELEC; has its offices in Manila; many membersfrom Manila), petitioners have a direct interest in theenforcement of the city’s ordinances.

The LGC imposes upon respondent the duty, as city

mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative tothe governance of the city." One of these is Ord. 8027.As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty toenforce Ord. 8027 as long as it has not been repealedby the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He hasno other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. InDimaporo v. Mitra, Jr: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty onthe ground of an alleged invalidity of the statuteimposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. Itmight seriously hinder the transaction of publicbusiness if these officers were to be permitted in allcases to question the constitutionality of statutesand ordinances imposing duties upon them andwhich have not judicially been declared

unconstitutional. Officers of the government fromthe highest to the lowest are creatures of the lawand are bound to obey it.

The question now is whether the MOU and thesubsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunianhave made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ord.8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is alsoconnected to the 2nd issue raised by petitioners, thatis, WON the MOU and the Resolutions of theSanggunian can amend or repeal Ord. 8027.

Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistentwith Ord. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it andmade it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave itfull force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, atpresent, there is nothing that legally hindersrespondent from enforcing Ord. 8027.Ord. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horrorof the Sep 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of theWorld Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manilafrom the catastrophic devastation that will surelyoccur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan

Terminals. No reason exists why such a protectivemeasure should be delayed.

Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyGRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., asmayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediatelyenforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Issuance of Permits and Licenses

GORDON VS. VERIDIANO II167 SCRA 51

CRUZ; November 8, 1988

FACTS

- The San Sebastian Drug Store (SSDS) and theOlongapo City Drug Store (OCDS), both owned byrespondent Rosalinda Yambao, are located a fewmeters from each other in the same building inOlongapo City. They were covered by Mayor's Permitsissued for the year 1980 and licenses to operateissued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forthe same year.- In 1980, a joint team of agents from the FDA andnarcotics agents from the Philippine Constabularyconducted a "test buy" at SSDS and was sold 200tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth P410 without adoctor's prescription. A report on the operation was

submitted to Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City.He issued a letter summarily revoking the store’s

Mayor's Permit of SSDS "for rampant violation of thePharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."- Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator ArsenioRegala directed the closure of the drug store for 3days and its payment of a P100 fine for violation of

R.A. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambaoagainst a repetition of the infraction. Later, the FDAlifted its closure order after noting that the penaltiesimposed had already been discharged and allowed thedrug store to resume operations. Valium is not aprohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposedwas only a 3-day closure and a fine of P100.- Yambao wrote a letter to Mayor Gordon seekingreconsideration of the revocation of the Mayor'sPermit. Having received no reply, she filed with theRTC of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus anddamages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction, against Mayor Gordon. On the same day,

Yambao requested permission from the FDA toexchange the locations of the two stores for reasonsof "business preference." The request was granted butMayor Gordon disapproved the transfers andsuspended the Mayor's Permit for the OCDS. The CFIissued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunctionagainst Mayor Gordon.

ISSUEWON Mayor Gordon may, in the exercise of his power,prevent the operation of the drug stores previouslypermitted by the FDA.

HELDNO (SSDS) and YES (OCDS).Ratio The power to approve a license includes byimplication, even if not expressly granted, the powerto revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke islimited by the authority to grant the license, fromwhich it is derived in the first place.Reasoning If the FDA grants a license upon its findingthat the applicant drug store has complied with therequirements of the general laws and theimplementing administrative rules and regulations, itis only for their violation that the FDA may revoke thesaid license. By the same token, having granted the

permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions asapplied particularly to Olongapo City have beencomplied with, it is only for the violation of suchconditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.

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- In this case, the closure of the San Sebastian DrugStore was ordered by the FDA for violation of its ownconditions, which it had the primary power to enforce.By revoking the mayor's permit on the same groundfor which the SSDS had already been penalized by theFDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the decision of the latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction.As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug lawswhich the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute,

the mayor had no authority to interpose his ownfindings on the matter and substitute them for thedecision already made by the FDA.- It would have been different if the offense condonedby the FDA was a violation of a city ordinance. The cityexecutive may ignore such condonation and revokethe mayor's permit just the same. In this situation, hewould be acting properly because the enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In this case,the condition allegedly violated related to a nationallaw, not to a matter of merely local concern, and socame under the ‘jurisdiction’ of the FDA.- Factual findings of administrative authorities are

accorded great respect because of theiracknowledged expertise in the fields of specializationto which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice,including this Court, are concluded by such findings inthe absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. Forall his experience in the enforcement of cityordinances, Mayor Gordon cannot claim the superioraptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of thepharmacy and drug addiction laws. He shouldtherefore also be prepared, like the courts of justicethemselves, to accept its decisions on this matter.- It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug

Store was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing atwhich Yambao appeared and testified. By contrast, therevocation of the mayor's permit was merelycommunicated to her in a letter without any hearing. If only for the violation of due process, the mayor'sarbitrary action can be annulled.- The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit forOlongapo City Drug Store was based on its transfer tothe site of the SSDS as approved by the FDA butwithout permission from the mayor. On this matter,the Court believes that the final decision rested withthe mayor. The condition violated related more to thelocation in Olongapo City of business establishments

in general than to the regulation of drug stores inparticular. It therefore came under Mayor Gordon's

jurisdiction.

- The reason for disapproving the transfer was theviolation of the Mayor's Permit which by its terms wasvalid only at the place stated therein. We find thatthat reason was valid enough. The permit clearlyallowed the drug store to operate in the address givenand not elsewhere. No hearing was necessary because

the transfer without the mayor's permission is notdisputed and was in fact impliedly admitted by Yambao. The Mayor's Permit for SSDS could also havebeen validly suspended for the same reason were itnot for the fact that such permit was revoked on themore serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy Lawand the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.- It is understood, however, that the suspensionshould be deemed valid only as the two drug storeshave not returned to their original sites as specified intheir respective permits. Indefinite suspension willamount to a permanent revocation, which will not be acommensurate penalty with the degree of the

violation being penalized. The Court adds that therequest for transfer, if properly made, may not bevalidly denied in the absence of a clear showing thatthe transfer sought will prejudice the residents of thecity. As the two drug stores are only a few metersfrom each other, and in the same building, therewould seem to be no reason why the mere exchangeof their locations should not be permitted.Dispositive Orders of the CFI MODIFIED in the sensethat suspension of Mayor's Permit for OCDSconsidered valid but only until the two drug storesreturn to their original sites as specified in the FDAlicenses and the mayor's permits or until the request

for transfer, if made, is approved by the petitioner. The rest of the said Orders are AFFIRMED.

Authority to File Suits

CITY OF CALOOCAN v CA (GOTESCO)G.R. No. 145004

TINGA; May 3, 2006

NATUREPetition for review

FACTS

- Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City passedOrdinance No. 068 authorizing the city mayor tonegotiate and enter into a contract of sale of a certainpatrimonial property of the city.

-Thereafter, Mayor Asistio and Jose C. Go of EverGotesco executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over thesaid property.- COA disapproved the sale. Later, COA approved oncondition that the selling price is pegged atP8,926.39/sq.meter.- Sanggunian passed an ordinance amending Ord. No.

068, directing that an amended deed of absolute salebe executed, the terms and conditions of which bepursuant to the COA decision. The ordinance wasinitially vetoed by then incumbent mayor Malonzo, onthe ground that since the earlier deed of sale wasvalid and subsisting it was not incumbent upon him toexecute an amended deed of sale over the sameproperty; the Sanggunian, however, passed ResolutionNo. 0609 overriding the veto.- Gotesco executed an "Express Consent to theNovation of the Deed of Absolute Sale" with an"Amended Deed of Absolute Sale". Malonzo receivedthe documents but refused to sign.- Gotesco tendered the payment for the property, aswell as transfer tax and real estate tax to the City

Treasurer and to Malonzo but these payments wererefused.- Gotesco filed a civil case seeking the consignation of the purchase price and tax payments. (C-18274)- Meanwhile, the LRA allowed the registration of thedeed of sale with the Register of Deeds. A TCT wasissued in Gotesco’s name.- Caloocan City filed a petition for prohibition withapplication for preliminary injunction and prayer forthe issuance of a temporary restraining order beforethe RTC of Caloocan (C-18337). During the pendencyof this suit, another case was filed for annulment of sale and cancellation of title (C-18308).- Gotesco moved for the dismissal of the C-18337 onthe ground of forum shopping, but its motion was

denied by the trial court.- Gotesco filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CAdismissed. Upon motion for reconsideration, CAreversed its earlier ruling and ordered the dismissal of C-18337.

ISSUES1. WON the mayor has authority to file cases on behalf of his city2. WON there was forum shopping

HELD1. YES- Sec. 455, LGC provides the powers and duties of acity mayor.

- From the provision, it is clear that the mayor has theauthority to file suits "for the recovery of funds andproperty" on behalf of the city, even without the priorauthorization from the Sanggunian.

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- Being the proper party to file such suits, the mayormust necessarily be the one to sign the certificationagainst forum-shopping, and not the City LegalOfficer, who, despite being an official of the City, wasmerely its counsel and not a party to the case. Thus,the certification against forum-shopping in C-18337 isdefective for having been signed by the City LegalOfficer.

2.YES

Ratio There is forum-shopping where a litigant suesthe same party against whom another action oractions for the alleged violation of the same right andthe enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending.

The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar tothe other/s; and, a final judgment is one that wouldconstitute res judicata and thus would cause thedismissal of the rest For litis pendentia to be a groundfor the dismissal of an action, the following requisitesmust concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least suchparties who represent the same interests in bothactions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;and (c) the identity with respect to the two precedingparticulars in the two cases is such that any judgment

that may be rendered in the pending case, regardlessof which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.Reasoning- The cases involve the same principal parties:Caloocan City and Gotesco Investments, while theother parties were merely impleaded as nominalparties. Absolute identity of parties is not required. Itis enough that there is substantial identity of parties.- There is identity of causes of action if the sameevidence will sustain the second action. The principleapplies even if the relief sought in the two cases maybe different. C-18337 and C-18308 are based on thesame set of facts, that is, the failure to execute anAmended Deed of Sale pursuant to City Ordinance No.

068. On the other hand, C-18308 and C-18274question the nature of, and the procedure undertakenin the transfer of ownership of the subject land.Basically, the same set of evidence will have to bepresented to support the causes of action in the 3cases, which as indicated earlier is characterized bysingularity. Thus, a finding in one will sustain a findingin the other. The causes of action in C-18337 beingsimilarly subject of judicial inquiry in C-18274 and C-18308, C-18337 is dismissible on the ground of litis

pendentia. Moreover, the cases are intimately relatedand/or intertwined with one another such that the

judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res

judicata in the other.

Dispositive The petition is DISMISSED.

Appointive Local Officials Common

To All Municipalities, Cities AndProvinces

Appointment, Qualifications…

(Treasurer)

MACALINCAG AND CARLOS V. CHANGGR 96058

May 6, 1992

FACTS- Macalincag approved a formal administrative chargefor dishonesty, neglect of duty & acts prejudicial tobest interest of service, against Chang (ie disbursingan amt during election ban period, disbursing an amtas financial assistance to bereaved families, for

merienda of municipal employees, etc)- The basis of the charge was the COA Report andcomplaints of Councilor Brillante.- Macalincag issued Order of preventive suspensionagainst Chang.- OIC furnished Chang by mail, w/ copy of the order.- Chang filed petition for prohibition w/ writ of preliminjunction.- Court issued order denying Chang’s application. MFRwas filed by Chang. TC issued an order reconsideringand setting aside its previous order.- TC rendered decision in favor of Chang. Hence thispetition.

ISSUESWON Sec of Finance (Macalincag) has jurisdiction toissue Order of Preventive Suspension against actingmunicipal treasurer of Makati (Chang)

HELD YES.- Under PD 807 or Civil Service law, designation of replacement isn’t a requirement to give effect topreventive suspension.- LGC provides for automatic assumption of asstmunicipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of

suspension of municipal treasurer.- Order of Prev. Susp. became effective upon Chang’sreceipt, w/c is presumed when he filed complaint in

TC. Designation of OIC to replace Chang is immaterialto effectivity of latter’s suspension.- Power to discipline is vested under PD 8007 in headsof depts, instrumentalities, etc. Office of Municipal

Treas is under Dept of Finance. Sec of Finance is theproper disciplining authority to issue Order of Prev.

Susp. Acting Sec Macalincag acted w/in his jurisdiction.

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (TheBudget Officer)

EDITHA L. LIRA v. CSC[BRENDA JARANILLA]

G.R. No. L-62133

FERNAN;September 30, 1986

Nature: CertiorariFACTS:-Editha L. Lira, an employee of the city government of Iloilo City holding the position of Barangay FieldCoordinator, was detailed in the Budget, FiscalManagement and Fiscal Research Division of theOffice of the City Mayor until her appointment to theposition of Budget Officer of Iloilo City.-Jaranilla, on the other hand, was the Chief, BudgetOperations Division, Office of the City Treasurer, IloiloCity until her appointment as Internal Auditor in theOffice of the City Treasurer.-When the City Government of Iloilo adopted in 1979 a

Position Classification and Pay Plan [PCPP] pursuant toPD No. 1136, otherwise known as "The LocalGovernment Personnel Administration andCompensation Plan Decree of 1977", the local bodytasked with the classification of city government'spositions reclassified, among others, the position of Barangay Field Coordinator to Budget Officer while theposition of Chief, Budget Operations Divisions of theCity Treasurer's Office was reclassified to InternalAuditor.-Upon approval of the PCPP of Iloilo City by the JointCommission on Local Government PersonnelAdministration, the Mayor of Iloilo City appointed Liraas Budget Officer effective January 1, 1979.-Jaranilla, on the other hand, was appointed as

Internal Auditor under the PCPP of Iloilo City onFebruary 18, 1980 effective January 1, 1979.

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-6 months later, the City Mayor sent to Lira a Notice of Salary Adjustment increasing her salary as "BudgetOfficer in the City Budget Office" from P18,316.80 toP35,532.00 per annum pursuant to LOI No. 1039-Jaranilla filed a protest with the Civil Service RegionalOffice No. VI, Iloilo City contesting the issuance of theNotice of Salary Adjustment to Lira, claiming, amongothers, that the position of Budget Officer, asreclassified from Barangay Field Coordinator, andLira's appointment thereto were not in implementation

of PDNo. 1375 and its implementing letter of instruction, LOI No. 1039. Thus, Jaranilla concluded,said appointment was null and void for lack of legalbasis, and she prayed that she instead be appointedas City Budget Officer.-Jaranilla's protest was referred to the Office of CityMayor Luis C. Herrera, who in an undated decisiondismissed said protest of Jaranilla for lack of merit.-Jaranilla appealed to the Merit System Board of theCSC which in a decision declared as null and void thenotice of salary adjustment for the position of CityBudget Officer of Iloilo City issued to Lira, and orderedthat Jaranilla, who appears fully qualified and held thehighest position in the Budget Operations Division of the City Treasurer's Office should be appointed as City

Budget Officer of Iloilo City.-Lira filed an MR but the Merit System Board of theCivil Service Commission denied said motion.-On appeal, the CSC likewise dismissed the appeal andordered the immediate appointment of Jaranilla asCity Budget Officer of Iloilo City- declaring that

Jaranilla's qualification exceed those of Lira in terms of experience and potential considering her previousposition as Chief of the Budget Operations Division inthe City Treasurer's Office which pursuant to PD 477 isthe Local Budget Staff whose qualified personnelshould have been transferred to the new BudgetOffice upon its establishment in accordance with PD1375. *-Lira filed a MFR but was also denied.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of Lira to thereclassified position of Budget Officer in the Office of the City Mayor pursuant to the Position Classificationand Pay Plan of Iloilo City was in substantialcompliance with the requirements of appointment tothe position of City Budget Officer � a new positioncreated under. PD No. 1375 and its implementingletter of instruction LOI NO. 1039 as a result of thetransfer of the local government budgetadministration from the Ministry of Finance to theMinistry of the Budget.

HELD: NO.-With the enactment of PD No. 1375, the local

government budget administration was transferredfrom the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of theBudget through the creation of a Budget Office in eachlocal government unit. In other words, any office,

section, division or unit in the Office of the Mayorother than the Local Budget Staff of the Treasurer'sOffice performing budgetary functions before thetransfer of the local government budgetadministration to the Ministry of the Budget is but abudget policy- determining arm of the local chief executive.

-In the instant case, the Budget, Fiscal Mgmt andFiscal Research Division of the Office of the City Mayorof Iloilo City where petitioner was temporarily detailedfalls in this category. Otherwise, the said divisionwould be performing functions which duplicate, if notoverlap, the functions of the Local Budget Staff of theCity Treasurer's Office mandated under Sec 24 of PDNo. 477 to provide technical and staff services to theLocal Chief Executive.-The contested position of City Budget Officer underPD No. 1375 is a new position created as a result of the transfer of the local government budgetadministration from the Ministry of Finance to theMinistry of the Budget. Consequently, no particularemployee could claim that he or she is the incumbent

Budget Officer. Such being the case, the contestedposition of City Budget Officer is open to all applicantsprovided that they are qualified and eligible.-Basically, in addition to the three [3]-year experiencein the treasury service or its equivalent number of years of service in budgeting or in any related field orits substitute as provided under Local Budget CircularNo. 6, any prospective appointee to the position of City Budget Officer must meet the minimumqualification requirements for provincial, city andmunicipal treasurers, and his/her appointment by thelocal government head shall be subject to civil servicelaw and approval of the Commissioner of the Budget,now Minister of the Budget. While it is true that a local chief executive is granted

wide discretion and prerogative in his choice of anappointee to a new office, and in determining whopossesses the requisite reputation, integrity,knowledgeability, energy and judgment, theappointing officer's exercise of discretion iscircumscribed in that he is duty-bound to consideronly those who are qualified and eligible.-It is not disputed that Lira was appointed as BudgetOfficer by the Iloilo City Mayor on February 1, 1980,but it must be recalled however, that her appointmentas Budget Officer was the result of the reclassificationof her previous position as Barangay Field Coordinatorwhile she was temporarily detailed in the Budget,Fiscal Management and Fiscal Research Division of theOffice of the City Mayor pursuant to the PCPP of Iloilo

City. It cannot, TF be said that said appointment wasin implementation of the provisions of LOI No. 1039pursuant to the mandate of PD No. 1375 regarding the

creation of a regular Budget Office in each localgovernment unit.-Extending appointments to an office in the guise of complying with the requirements of P.D. 1375 on thecreation of the City Budget Office is repugnant notonly to its enabling statute but to Civil Service Law,rules and regulations as well. Section 19 par. III of the

Civil Service Law provides that opportunity forgovernment employment shall be open to all qualifiedcitizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attractthe best qualified to enter the service. This may beimplemented effectively only through the judiciousexercise of the best judgment and discretion of theappointing authority.

The issuance of the notice of salary adjustmentincreasing the salary of the Budget Officer fromP18,316.80 to P35,532.00-the salary of a regular CityBudget Officer equivalent to the rank and salary of aDepartment Head- cannot justifiably cure the defect of lack of the minimum qualification requirements of petitioner Lira to assume the office of the regular CityBudget Officer as envisioned by P.D. 1375 aside from

the non-compliance with the procedural requirementsbefore a valid appointment is issued as required bythe civil service rules and regulations.-It is interesting to note that Local Budget Circular No.8 dated November 20, 1980 require that "In case aLocal Budget Officer has been appointed as such priorto June 19, 1980 pursuant to Local Budget Circular No.2 as amended by Local Budget Circular No. 6, he shallbe issued a new appointment to the position aselevated in rank and salary under LOI No. 1039 withthe position title of Provincial, City, Municipal BudgetOfficer, effective June 19, 1980." Records reveal thatshe was not issued a new appointment. Even if shewas issued a new appointment, still she cannot validlyclaim the contested position of City Budget Officer

since it was not approved by the BudgetCommissioner, now the Minister of Budget.Appointment becomes complete when the last actrequired of the appointing power is performed. Worse,there is no showing at all that the City Mayor of IloiloCity has reported to the Minister of the Budget hiscompliance with the requirements for the creation of the local budget office as imposed by LOI No. 1039,par. 5.

Dispositive: Petition is DISMISSED. The appointmentof private respondent Brenda R. Jaranilla as CityBudget Officer of Iloilo City as ordered by the CivilService Merit System Board and the Civil ServiceCommission should be effected immediately. This

decision is immediately executory. No costs.

* The Commission noted the following:

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Jaranilla holds the degree of Bachelor of Science inCommerce from the Far Eastern University. She is aCertified Public Accountant [RA 1080] with more thansix [6] years experience in budgeting work havingserved as Tax Examiner from January 16, 1974 to June1, 1975 and a Chief, Budget Operations Division in theCity Treasurer's Office, Iloilo City, from June 2, 1975until said position was reclassified to Internal Auditor effective in 1979. She is a Director of the Government

Association of Certified Public Accountants and a

member of the Philippine Association for Government Budget Administration, Local and National TaxationConsumer's Cooperative, and Institute on CivilService.On her part, Lira is also a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Commerce [Accounting major] from theUniversity of San Agustin Iloilo City; a Career ServiceProfessional [Local Government] eligible, withbudgeting experience of a little over two [2] years asof the effectivity of her appointment as Budget Officer on January 1, 1979. She was an Accounting Aide from

April 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976 or about six [6]months; Statistician from December 1, 1976 to

January 1, 1978 or for one [1] year and two [2]months; and Barangay Field Coordinator from August

7, 1978 to December 31, 1978 or for more than four [4] months. She acquired her budgeting experiencewhen she was detailed in the Budget, Fiscal Researchand Fiscal Management Division in the Office of theCity Mayor. Except the orientation course onmanagement on September 4-7, 1977 at Cebu City,all other seminars/workshops attended by Lira weresubsequent to her appointment as Budget Officer.

xxx xxx xxx Significantly, we credited the two [2] years of relevant experience gained by Lira when she was detailed in1979 to the Budget, Fiscal Research and FiscalManagement Division, Office of the City Mayor.However, we found that she lacks the required budgeting experience of three years at the inception

of the protest case on November 8, 1980 while Jaranilla has already gained more than the minimumof three years relevant experience. Jaranilla'sappointment as Division Chief of Budget Operationsbefore it was reclassified to Internal Auditor will attest to her potential in contrast to the position of Barangay Field Coordinator.

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (TheEngineer)

GENOBLAZO V CA174 SCRA 124

CORTESFACTS

- A civil case was filed by spouses Genoblazo on aclaim of ownership by extraordinary acquisitiveprescription of 2 lots in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and theimprovements thereon. They also sought to enjoin thede los Reyeses from further demolishing or destroyingthe remnants of the structures built on the land,sought recovery damages, and determination of the

issue of ownership over the land.- The de los Reyeses claimed absolute ownership of the lots in question as evidenced by TCT No. 160694of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and relied on theregularity and lawful issuance of the Demolition OrderNo. 014 S-1984 dated June 11, 1984 issued by the CityEngineers' Office, Lands and Building Official.- The RTC judge ordered the Reyeses to stop doingacts that will disposses the Genoblazos of theirshelter, and the Genoblazos to not introduce anyimprovements. Despite the order of the court, theGenoblazos added improvements on their barong-barong. Genoblazos asked the court for writ of preliminary injunction to stop the demolition. Ahearing was conducted.

- The RTC found in favor of the Reyeses, upholding thevalidity of the TCT and the Demolition Order as beingvalidly issued by the City Engr and Bldg Official underthe National Bldg Code.

ISSUEWON the Demolition Order was valid(WON the Bldg Official had authority to issue suchorder, considering that under the CC, it is the HealthOfficer that determines the abatement of nuisances)

RULING YES.- The issue presented before the court a quo is notreally whether the structures can be considered a

nuisance under the Civil Code but whether there hasbeen a violation of the National Building Code so as towarrant an order for the demolition of said structure.Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue thequestioned demolition order in view of his finding thatthe disputed structures are dangerous buildings and-structures within the meaning of the National BuildingCode.- The fact that the buildings in question could alsoconstitute nuisances under the Civil Code does notpreclude the Building Official from issuing the assaileddemolition order. Indeed, the National Building Codeitself provides that:When any building or structure is found or declared tobe dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall

order its repair, vacation or demolition dependingupon the degree of danger to life, health or safety.This is without prejudice to further action that may betaken under the Provisions of articles 482 and 484 to

707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines [Section 214,par 2].

PATAGOC V CSC185 SCRA 411

Cortes; May 14, 1990FACTS-Petitioner was appointed City Engineer byZamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan on December1, 1988, to take the place of the deceased cityengineer, Dionisio Esperat.-On December 6, 1988, private respondent, theincumbent Assistant City Engineer, filed a protestagainst petitioner's appointment with the Civil ServiceRegional Office on the ground that he was next-in-rank.-The Civil Service Regional Director, in a decisiondated January 6, 1989, ruled against petitioner, andrevoked his appointment

-Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission,but it was dismissed-Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this wasdenied-Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of theCommission's action on petitioner's appointment.

ISSUEWON the CSC may disapprove the appointment of aCity Engineer by the City Mayor and order theappointment of someone else

HELDNo.-The pertinent provisions of the Local Government

Code are very clear and need not be interpreted.Petitioner's appointment is subject to civil service law,rules and regulations. And, under the provisions of P.D. No. 807, the position belongs to the careerservice.-Section 185 of the Local Government Code providesthat "[n]o person shall be appointed city engineerunless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moralcharacter, a licensed civil engineer, and has been anassistant city engineer or has engaged in the practiceof his profession for at least five years."-It is not disputed that both petitioner and privaterespondent are qualified for the position. But theCommission is of the view that it can disapprovepetitioner's appointment and direct the appointment

of private respondent to the disputed position,considering that the latter is next-in-rank.

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-It must again be emphasized that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary and that theCommission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointment power. The Commission, under P.D.No. 807, may only approve or disapprove theappointment after determining whether or not theappointee possesses the appropriate civil serviceeligibility or the required qualifications. It cannot orderor direct the appointment of a successful protestant.-In the case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the

Court said: Appointment is an essentially dictionarypower and must be performed by the officer in whichit is vested according to his best lights, the onlycondition being that the appointee should have thequalifications required by law. If he does, then hecannot be faulted on the ground that there are othersbetter qualified whose appointment should have beenpreferred. This is a political question involvingconsiderations of wisdom which only the appointingauthority can decide.-All the Commission is actually allowed to do is checkwhether or not the appointee possesses theappropriate civil service eligibility or the requiredqualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved;if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted

by law to be employed by the Commission when itacts on an appointment made by the properauthorities.-Significantly, the Commission on Civil Serviceacknowledged that both the petitioner and the privaterespondent were qualified for the position incontroversy. That recognition alone rendered itfunctus officio in the case and prevented it fromacting further thereon except to the validity of thepetitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had noauthority to revoke the said appointment simplybecause it believed that the private respondent wasbetter qualified for that would have constituted anencroachment on the discretion vested solely in thecity mayor.

-In Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, it washeld that: It is well-settled that when the appointee isqualified, as in this case, and all the other legalrequirements are satisfied, the Commission has noalternative but to attest to the appointment inaccordance with the Civil Service Law. TheCommission has no authority to revoke anappointment on the ground that another person ismore qualified for a particular position. It also has noauthority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on thediscretion vested upon the appointing authority. Anappointment is essentially within the discretionarypower of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the onlycondition that the appointee should possess the

qualifications required by law.

Qualifications, Powers, Duties(Health officer)

ALBA V PEREZG.R. No. L-65917

PARAS; September 24, 1987 NATUREPetition for review by certiorari from the decisionrendered by respondent judge granting the petition formandamus filed by Dr. Francisco A. Perez, City HealthOfficer of San Pablo City

FACTS-Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was namedoutstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee,Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit

increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562.- Ministry of Health requested the SangguniangPanglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr.Perez' salary in full to appropriate the amountcorresponding to the merit increase in its currentbudget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of LocalGovernment opposed the proposed merit increasebecause the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only toofficials/employees in the national government, andconsequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitledthereto, since he is an employee of the localgovernment as provided for in the charter of SanPablo City.-This prompted Dr. Perez to request the Ministry of

Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue anotice of salary adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by theMinistry of Health, dated November 20, 1981,acknowledged that the merit increase programapplies only to the officials/employees of the nationalgovernment but declared Dr. Perez as one suchofficial or employee and concluded that the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him.-Relying on such opinion, the Ministry of Health issuedto respondent Dr. Perez on Dec 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment which release of the amount wasdenied by the Office of the Budget and Management.Dr. Perez made his appeal to the Ministry of Healthwho forwarded it, recommending favorable action

thereon to the Office of the President of thePhilippines. The latter referred the appeal to theMinister of the Budget who affirmed his earlier

decision of disallowing the merit increase andreiterating the same reasons.-A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of theBudget and Management to pay the merit increasewas then filed by Dr. Perez before the lower courtwhich granted it.Petitioner’s Arguments

1. The position of private respondent as the CityHealth Officer of San Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states amongother things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8of the same decree shall cover the City Officer, amongother officials, whose salary shall be paid out of cityfunds and therefore a local government employeewhose position does not appear in the list of nationalgovernment employees defined under another law(P.D. 985).2. The constitution provides that no money shall bepaid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of anappropriation made by law. Since there is no suchappropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot becompelled to release the amount for the payment of

the merit salary increase because such allocationentails the exercise of judgment and discretion of theMinister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as anemployee of the national government would have farreaching effects such that all other city health officersand local officials similarly situated would also be soentitled to an personal benefits given to nationalemployee. Dr. Perez's exemplary accomplishmentwhich merited for him the grant to a two-step increasemust yield to the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must setaside for the purpose.

ISSUEWON Dr. Perez, City Health Officer is a national official(thereby entitling him to the salary increase) HELD

YES-Art. IV of the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA#5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) states that the positionof a City Health Officer is not included among theheads of the regular departments of the city butincluded among the national officialsperforming municipal functions under the directcontrol of the Health Minister and not the citymayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter.-Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act

of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority isthe Health Minister and not the local officials.Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru thetestimony of its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief

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of the Compensation and Position Classification and aspecialist thereon that the City Health Officer is underthe administrative and technical supervision of theMinistry of Health. Be it noted that, Section 7 of PD1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that thebasic salary of the City Health Officer is paid from cityfunds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec.7, excludes the city health officer from theclassification of local government official as can begathered from the phrase "... except those occupied

by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in theconstitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under the direct supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are paid wholly or partially fromnational funds."-Provincial and city health officers are allconsidered national government officialsirrespective of the source of funds of theirsalary because the preservation of health is anational service.-Private respondent Dr. Perez is a career official of theMinistry of Health and not of San Pablo. Promotions inthe Ministry are covered by a Merit Promotion Plan of postgraduate studies and academic qualifications,

extensive training, experience, and highly satisfactoryperformances.-There is no basis in petitioner's allegations that theycannot be compelled by mandamus as theappropriation is not authorized by law and it isdiscretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budgetwhether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez hasbeen proven to be a national government official,hence covered by the merit promotion plan of thegovernment more particularly the Health Ministrywherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary forthe year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes theministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve therequest for allotment. Having failed to do so, he couldbe compelled by mandamus.

Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED.

PANDI V. CA380 SCRA 436

CARPIO, April 11, 2002

NATUREPetition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS- August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director &Sec. of Health of the DOH-ARMM issued aMemorandum designating Dr. Pandi (then DOH-

ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of theIPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur. Dr. Macacua also

designated Dr. Sani (then the Provincial health officerof the IPHO-APGH) to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office.- September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur ProvincialGovernor issued Office Order NO. 07 designating Dr.Saber as the OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.-Dr. Sani challenged the Memorandum transferringhim in a complaint filed with the RTC claiming therein

that he was appointed as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity.-Dr. Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with aprayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he islawfully designated OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from furtherdischarging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH.-Dr. Sani filed a Motion for Intervention.- November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issuedE.O. 133 transferring the powers & functions of heDOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM, Dr. Macacua (as DOH-ARMM Sec.-Designate)issued a 2nd Memorandum reiterating thedesignation of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the IPHO-APGH and the detail of Dr. Sani to the Regional

office in Cotabato City.-Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr.Saber’s petitioner on the ground that the issuestherein had become moot & academic because of theenactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, aswell as the execution of the Memo of agreementbetween the DOH-National Government and the ARMMRegional Government.-CA: designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGHupheld; the Provincial Governor has the power toappoint the provincial health officer under the LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani cannot claim to have permanentdesignation as provincial health officer because hewas not appointed by the Provincial Governor.

ISSUEWON the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (WON the appointment of Saber isvalid) at that time

HELD(NOTE: MAY MAHABANG HISTORY PART SA ORIGINALCASE. Just see the case)NO.Reasoning. When Saber was appointed by theprovincial governor on September 15, 1993, theprovincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still anational government official paid entirely fromnational funds. The provincial health officer was stillappointed by the national Secretary of Health to a

region and not to a province. The Secretary of Healthexercised supervision and control over the provincialhealth officer. The Secretary of Health was also the

official authorized by law to assign the provincialhealth officer to any province within the region.Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, ProvincialGovernor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber asOfficer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.Consequently, the designation of Saber as suchOfficer-in-Charge is void.

- The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur becamea provincial government official only after theeffectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which wasenacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25,1994 and approved by the Regional Governor onMarch 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but afterthe issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the RegionalGovernor appointed the provincial health officer whilethe Regional Secretary of Health could assign theprovincial health officer to any province within theARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power toappoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of theprovincial health office.-on reliance on Section 478, LGC: misplaced; not agrant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint

local health officers but simply a directive that thoseempowered to appoint local health officers aremandated to do so; LGC did not amend the OrganicAct of 1989-as regards SANI: his first appointment was void.When he was detailed in Cotabato City, the powersand functions of the DOH were not yet transferred tothe Regional Government, and the Secretary of Healthof the National Government still exercised the powerto assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM.

Thus, the regional Director/ARMM Secretary of Health’s directive assigning Sani to Regional Office inCotabato City is void. As regards the November 6,1993 Memorandum reiterating Sani’s detail, since itwas issued after the issuance of EO 133 which

expressly transferred “supervision and control over allfunctions and activities of the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health, and since it is within the authority of theARMM Secretary of Health, it is valid.-as regards Pandi: August 9, 1993 designation by theARMM Secretary of Health is VOID since at that time,the latter did not exercise yet supervision and controlover the provincial health offices of the ARMM.However, November 6, 1993 designation is valid. Thedesignation of Pandi as OIC, however, while valid isonly temporary in nature, good until a newdesignation or a permanent appointment is made.

-As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to

exercise supervision and control over all provincialhealth offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, byvirtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the

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administrative powers and functions of the Secretaryof Health of the National Government with respect toprovincial health offices within the ARMM. The officialexercising supervision and control over an office hasthe administrative authority to designate, in theinterest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if theoffice becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had theauthority on November 6, 1993 to designate anOfficer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the

permanent provincial health officer. After theeffectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the RegionalSecretary of Health lost the authority to make such adesignation.-Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial healthofficer became for the first an official of the provincialgovernment even though he is appointed by theRegional Governor and draws his salary from regionalfunds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the ProvincialGovernor the power to "exercise general supervisionand control over all programs, projects, services, andactivities of the provincial government." Upon theeffectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial healthofficer passed from the Regional Secretary to the

Provincial Governor. From then on the ProvincialGovernor began to exercise the administrativeauthority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in theprovincial health office pending the appointment of apermanent provincial health officer.

Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTEDand the assailed decision of the Court of Appealsdated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SETASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr.Amer A. Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IntegratedProvincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declaredvoid. On the other hand, the designation on November6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del

Sur, and the assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr.Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office inCotabato City, are declared valid. No costs. SOORDERED.

NOTE SA COMPILER: SORRY, DI KO MABURA UNGBREAK. Note sa class: d ko rin mabura ung break (bycompiler)

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (LegalOfficer)

GRIÑO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONG.R. No. 91602

February 26, 1991; Gancayco

FACTS

- Upon Sixto Demaisip’s resignation as ProvincialAttorney of Iloilo, OIC Governor Licurgo Tiradordecided to appoint, among others, Arandela as theProvincial Attorney.- In February 1988, Simplicio Griño assumed office as

the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month later,he informed Arandela and all the legal officers at theProvincial Attorney's Office about his decision toterminate their services. In his letter, Griño mademention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust andconfidence" that he reposed on them. Demaisip wasreappointed by Governor Griño as the ProvincialAttorney; the latter, on the other hand, arranged the

replacements of the other legal officers. - In March1988, Governor Griño formally terminated the servicesof the respondents on the ground of loss of trust andconfidence. This action taken by the governor wasappealed by respondents to the Merit SystemsProtection Board of the Civil Service Commission.- In March 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued anOrder declaring the respondents' termination illegaland ordering that they be immediately restored totheir positions with back salaries and otheremoluments due them. This was appealed bypetitioner Griño to the CSC.- In a Resolution, the Civil Service Commissionaffirmed the Order of the Merit Systems ProtectionBoard, and directed that the respondents be restored

to their former legal positions and be paid backsalaries and other benefits. Petitioners’ MR denied.ISSUEWON the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily confidential innature so that the services of those holding the saiditems can be terminated upon loss of confidence.HELD YES.Cadiente vs. Santos: The position of a City LegalOfficer is one which is "primarily confidential." Theposition of a City Legal Officer is one requiring thatutmost confidence on the part of the mayor beextended to said officer. The relationship existingbetween a lawyer and his client, whether a private

individual or a public officer, is one that depends onthe highest degree of trust that the latter entertainsfor the counsel selected. The phrase "primarilyconfidential" "denotes not only confidence in the

aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the officebut primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of personal trust onconfidential matters of state.- The tenure of officials holding primarily confidentialpositions ends upon loss of confidence, because their

term of office lasts only as long as confidence in themendure; and thus their cessation involves no removal.When such confidence is lost and the officer holdingsuch position is separated from the service, suchcessation entails no removal but an expiration of histerm.- Officials and employees holding primarilyconfidential positions continue only for so long asconfidence in them endures. The termination of theirofficial relation can be justified on the ground of lossof confidence because in that case their cessationfrom office involves no removal but merely theexpiration of the term of office two different causesfor the termination of official relations recognized inthe Law of Public Officers.

- When an incumbent of a primarily confidentialposition holds office at the pleasure of the appointingpower, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, theincumbent is not removed or dismissed from office,his term merely expires, in much the same way as anofficer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed orelected, is not and cannot be deemed removed ordismissed therefrom, upon expiration of said term.- The main difference between the former, theprimary confidential officer and the latter is that thelatter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of theformer is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed anddetermined when the appointing power expresses its

decision to put an end to the services of theincumbent. When this event takes place, the latter isnot removed or dismissed from office his term merelyexpired.- Should the ruling in Cadiente be made applicable toa provincial attorney? YES. Cadiente must be appliedbecause by the nature of the functions of a provincialattorney and a city legal officer, their positions areboth primarily confidential. A city legal officerappointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the province aprovincial attorney appointed by the provincialgovernor. In the same vein, a municipality may have amunicipal attorney who is to be named by theappointing power. The positions of city legal officer

and provincial attorney were created under RA No.5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust"; both the provincial attorney and city legalofficer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for

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the civil cases of the province and the city that theywork for. Their services are precisely categorized bylaw to be "trusted services."- The fact that the position of respondent Arandela asprovincial attorney has already been classified as oneunder the career service and certified as permanentby the CSC cannot conceal or alter its highlyconfidential nature. As in Cadiente where the positionof the city legal officer was duly attested aspermanent by the CSC before this Court declared that

the same was primarily confidential, this Court holdsthat the position of Arandela as the provincial attorneyof Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position. To ruleotherwise would be tantamount to classifying twopositions with the same nature and functions in twoincompatible categories. This being the case, andfollowing the principle that the tenure of an officialholding a primarily confidential position ends uponloss of confidence, the Court finds that privaterespondent Arandela was not dismissed or removedfrom office when his services were terminated. Histerm merely expired.- The attorney-client relationship is strictly personalbecause it involves mutual trust and confidence of thehighest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a

private person or a government functionary. Thepersonal character of the relationship prohibits itsdelegation in favor of another attorney without theclient's consent.- However, the legal work involved, as distinguishedfrom the relationship, can be delegated. The practiceof delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates isapparent in the Office of the Provincial Attorneywherein it can be gleaned from the power granted tosuch officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts and decision of his subordinates.- It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in thecivil service where lawyers act as counsel inconfidential and non-confidential positions by simplylooking at the proximity of the position in question in

relation to that of the appointing authority. Occupantsof such positions would be considered confidentialemployees if the predominant reason they werechosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship withthe occupant which measures freedom of discussion,without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust on confidentialmatters of state.- This implies that positions in the civil service of suchnature would be limited to those not separated fromthe position of the appointing authority by anintervening public officer, or series of public officers,in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This is an additionalreason why the positions of "City Legal Officer" and

"Private Secretary to the President" were consideredprimarily confidential by the Court. On the otherhand, a customs policeman serving in the HarborPatrol, in relation to the Commissioner of Customs,

and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk inthe Office of the President, were not considered so bythe Court.

RAMOS V CA

269 SCRA 34

OTHER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TOLGUs

Settlement of Boundary Dispute

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs.ROSAL

MEDIALDEA; September 24, 1991Athe

NATUREPetitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

FACTS- On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No.522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly abarrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon,Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and theircorresponding sitios.- A boundary dispute however, later arose betweenthe municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the formerexercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-mentioned but also over other ten (10) barriosallegedly belonging to Sogod.- The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No.617 directing the holding of a plebiscite to determinewhether the people in these barrios would like toremain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc.

The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, andthe results thereof show that more votes were cast infavor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc.- On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issuedResolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of thePhilippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to

include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc,the following barrios claimed by Sogod which are inthe heart of Bontoc but not included in said law,namely: Baugo, Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan,

Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also recommended that a law be enactedannexing to the municipality of Sogod the followingbarrios which are very near Sogod and are claimed bythe latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc,namely: Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangihe board further recommended that the boundary line

between the two municipalities be placed at GranadaCreek.- On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, thenPresident of the Philippines, promulgated ExecutiveOrder No. 368, which approved the recommendationof the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted thebarrios and sitios which shall compose themunicipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executiveorder also specified Granada Creek as the boundaryline separating Bontoc and Sogod.- However the President of the Philippines sent atelegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leytesuspending the implementation of EO 368.- The Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passedResolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of

Executive Order 368. The Board also created acommittee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in thebarrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 andto finally settle the boundary dispute.- The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases:1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the provincialboard and provincial governor from taking cognizanceof the long pending boundary dispute between thetwo municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over thebarrios allegedly belonging to the municipality of Sogod.2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against themunicipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction

not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic ActNo. 522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to thecomplainant municipality of Sogod. The complaintprayed that the municipality of Bontoc be ordered topay Sogod one half of the total amount of taxescollected by the former from the inhabitants of theaforesaid barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959.- The trial court issued an order dismissing the twocivil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the case. MR denied.

ISSUEWON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing thetwo cases for lack of jurisdiction.

HELDNO. The law vested the right to settle boundarydisputes between municipalities on the provincial

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board pursuant to Section 2167 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, which reads:

SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. ? Howsettled ? Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipalgovernments over places or barrios shall be decidedby the province boards of the provinces in which suchmunicipalities are situated, after an investigation atwhich the municipalities concerned shall be dulyheard. From the decision of the provincial board

appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved tothe Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of theExecutive Secretary), whose decision shall be final.Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed bymunicipalities situated in different provinces, theprovincial boards of the provinces concerned shallcome to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to theSecretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whosedecision shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v.Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394).

ReasoningIt is clear from the aforestated legal provision that theauthority to hear and resolve municipal boundary

disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not tothe trial courts. The decisions of the boards are thenappealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in theinstant case show that when petitioner municipalityfiled the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, theprovincial board of Southern Leyte had not yetconducted a plebiscite as ordered by the ExecutiveDepartment in 1960 or rendered any order settling thedispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevatedthe matter of delay to the then Secretary of Interior(now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although existing lawsthen vested on the provincial board the power todetermine or even alter municipal boundaries, theSecretary of Interior or the Executive Department for

that matter, was not precluded during that time fromtaking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569, whichapplied Republic Act No. 2370, known as the BarrioCharter, We held that the power to fix commonboundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of

jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities may alsopartake of an administrative nature that can bedecided by the administrative department, involvingas it does, the adoption of means and ways to carryinto effect the laws creating said municipalities.

DISPOSITION The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of

the respondent judge are AFFIRMED.

LOCAL INITIATIVE ANDREFERENDUM

Limitations Upon SangguniansInitaiative and Referendum

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY V COMELEC

262 SCRA 429

PEOPLE AND STRUCTURES IN THELOCAL GOVERNMENT

Qualifications

ABELLA V COMELEC supra

CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL199 SCRA 692

GUTIERREZ; July 30, 1991

NATUREPetition for certiorari

FACTS- On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for thesecond district of Northern Samar was held.- Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of

Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquitand Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.- Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly electedrepresentative of the second district of NorthernSamar.- The petitioners filed election protests against theprivate respondent premised on the followinggrounds:1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of thesecond district of Northern Samar.- The HRET found for the private respondent.- The records show that in the year 1895, the privaterespondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the

Philippines from China. Ong Te established hisresidence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar wherehe was able to obtain a certificate of residence fromthe then Spanish colonial administration.

- The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuanwas born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Teto Samar in the year 1915.- Jose Ong Chuan married met a natural born-Filipina,Agripina Lao. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in1948.

- The father of the private respondent, unsure of hislegal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Courtof First Instance of Samar of application fornaturalization on February 15, 1954. After trial, CFIdeclared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. Jose OngChuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, acertificate of naturalization was issued to him.- During this time, the private respondent then aminor of nine years was finishing his elementaryeducation in the province of Samar. There is nothingin the records to differentiate him from other Filipinosinsofar as the customs and practices of the localpopulace were concerned.- For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.

registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, andcorrespondingly, voted there during those elections.

ISSUEWON in making the determination that Jose Ong, Jr. isa natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes, theHRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD- NO.- There is no dispute that the respondent's motherwas a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not therespondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

- Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural bornstatus to children born of Filipino mothers before

January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship uponreaching the age of majority.- To expect the respondent to have formally or inwriting elected citizenship when he came of age is toask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason isobvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was hismother a natural born citizen but his father had beennaturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would beamended to require him to have filed a swornstatement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his

already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,election through a sworn statement would have beenan unusual and unnecessary procedure for one whohad been a citizen since he was nine years old.

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- We have jurisprudence that defines "election" asboth a formal and an informal process.- The private respondent did more than merelyexercise his right of suffrage. He has established hislife here in the Philippines.- The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration isa requirement for those who still have to electcitizenship. For those already Filipinos when the timeto elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choicewhich cannot be less binding. Entering a profession

open only to Filipinos, serving in public office wherecitizenship is a qualification, voting during electiontime, running for public office, and other categoricalacts of similar nature are themselves formalmanifestations of choice for these persons.- An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes thatthe person electing is an alien. Or his status isdoubtful because he is a national of two countries.

There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being aFilipino when he turned twenty-one (21).- The domicile of origin of the private respondent,which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed atLaoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned saiddomicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the

present.- To require the private respondent to own property inorder to be eligible to run for Congress would betantamount to a property qualification. TheConstitution only requires that the candidate meet theage, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that thecandidate should also own property in order to bequalified to run.- As previously stated, the private respondent stayedin Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies andlater to practice his profession. There was no intentionto abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On thecontrary, the periodical journeys made to his homeprovince reveal that he always had the animus

revertendi.Disposition The petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Thequestioned decision of the house of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,

Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippinesand a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

Dumpit-Michelena vs Boardo475 SCRA 290

Carpio, J; November 17, 2005

NATUREPetition for certiorari Re COMELEC resolution

FACTS- Tess Dumpit-Michelena filed her candidacy for theposition of Mayor in the Municipality of Agoo, La Unionduring the May 10, 2004 election. Respondents filed a

disqualification and denial or cancellation of hercertificate of candidacy on the ground of materialmisrepresentation in relation to her claim of that shewas a bona fide resident of Agoo. They claim that shewas a registered voter and a resident of Naguilian, LaUnion. Petitioner submitted several affidavits from herneighbors in Agoo attesting to the fact of her being a

resident therein. She also submitted a deed of saleover a house and lot located in Agoo to furtherevidence her being a resident therein.- COMELEC ruled in favor of the respondents and heldthat Dumpit-Michelena was disqualified to run for theposition. A motion for reconsideration was dismissedby the COMELEC EnBanc was dismissed.-Hence this petition for certiorari with the SC

ISSUE/SWON petitioner satisfied the residency requirementunder the Local Government Code of 1991. (this isaside from the procedural issues)

HELD

1. NO. Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was aresident and registered voter of Ambaracao North,Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has alreadyacquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thusqualified to run for the position of mayor. Shetransferred her registration as a voter of San JulianWest on 24 October 2003.

Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of landin San Julian West where she eventually built a house.However, property ownership is not indicia of the rightto vote or to be voted for an office. Further, domicileof origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect achange of domicile, there must be concurrence of the

following requirements:(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the formerplace of residence and establishing a new one; and

(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origincontinues. To effect change, there must be animusmanendi coupled with animus non revertendi. Theintent to remain in the new domicile of choice must befor an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the

place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena where the affiants retracted their previous

affidavits stating that Dumpit-Michelena was not aresident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged thatthey signed the first affidavits without knowing theircontents. However, the COMELEC Second Divisionpointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted affidavitswith the affiants repudiating their previous affidavitsthat Dumpit-Michelena was a resident of San Julian

West. The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit of all the barangay officials of San JulianWest attesting that Dumpit-Michelena is not a residentof their barangay.

Disposition Petition is dismissed..

Disqualifications

GREGO V COMELEC (BASCO)274 SCRA 481

ROMERO; June 19, 1997

FACTS- Basco was removed from his position as DeputySheriff of the City Court of Manila by the SupremeCourt due to serious misconduct in an administrativecomplaint. SC held:> dismissed from the service> with forfeiture of all retirement benefits> with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government,including its agencies and instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.- Basco ran, won and assumed office as Councilor inthe 2nd District of Manila during the 1988 localelections. He sought re-election and won in 1992. But,

he found himself besieged by lawsuits of hisopponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge himfrom his position. Petition for quo warranto beforeCOMELEC was filed by Ronquillo, another candidate,who alleged Basco's ineligibility based on the

Tordesillas ruling. Lopez filed a case before the Officeof the Ombudsman and DILG. But, all these caseswere dismissed.- Basco ran again and won as councilor in 1995 localelections for a third and final term. But, his right tooffice was again contested. Grego, claiming to be aregistered voter filed with COMELEC a petition fordisqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification,for the suspension of his proclamation, and for thedeclaration of Maranan as the sixth duly elected

Councilor. On the same day, the Chairman of theManila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was dulyfurnished with a copy of the petition. The other

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members of the BOC learned about this petition onlytwo days later.- COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case where itordered the parties to submit simultaneously theirrespective memoranda. Before the parties couldcomply, Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco as a dulyelected councilor and Basco took his oath of office.Grego filed an Urgent Motion seeking to annul theillegal and hasty proclamation made by the ManilaCity BOC.

- Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss since he cannot bedisqualified on the ground of (1) Section 40 Par b of LGC because the Tordesillasdecision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata,lis pendens, bar by prior judgment, law of the caseand stare decisis(2) Section 40 Par b of LGC may not be validly appliedto persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivitybecause to do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairsvested rights(3) already been proclaimed and petition being apreproclamation contest under the Marquez v.Comelec should be dismissed by virtue of saidpronouncement

(4) three-time election as candidate for councilorconstitutes implied pardon by the people of previousmisconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec, Rice v. State ,Montgomery v. Newell, People v Bashaw)(5) petition to nullify certificate of candidacy hasprescribed; premature as an election protest; and notbrought by a proper party in interest- COMELEC: dismissed petition for disqualification asthe administrative penalty imposed by the SupremeCourt on Basco was wiped away and condoned by theelectorate which elected him and on account of Basco's proclamation as the sixth duly electedcouncilor, petition would no longer be viable; MFRdenied

ISSUES1. WON Section 40 (b) of LGC applies retroactivelythose removed from office before it took effect on

January 1, 19922. WON Basco’s election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 asCity Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned theadministrative penalty against him3. WON Basco’s proclamation while thedisqualification case was still pending consideration byCOMELEC is void ab initio4. WON Maranan, who placed seventh, may bedeclared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of RepublicAct No. 6646.

HELD

1. NO- SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The following personsare disqualified from running for any elective localposition:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of anadministrative case- Aguinaldo v. COMELEC; Reyes v. COMELEC;Salalima v. Guingona, Jr > Well-settled is theprinciple that while the Legislature has the power topass retroactive laws which do not impair theobligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested

rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to beconstrued as intended to have a retroactive effect soas to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent isexpressly declared or clearly and necessarily impliedfrom the language of the enactment. There is noprovision in the statute which would clearly indicatethat the same operates retroactively. Lex prospicit,non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.2. NO- There is nothing to condone since Sec 40 is notretroactive and Tordesillas decision only applies toappointed positions not elective positions- Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from runningfor any elective position. As can be gleaned from thedecretal portion of the said decision, the Court

couched the prohibition in this wise:". . . AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TOANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCALGOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES ANDINSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED ORCONTROLLED CORPORATIONS."In this regard, particular attention is directed to theuse of the term "reinstatement." Under the formerCivil Service Decree, the law applicable at the timeBasco, a public officer, was administratively dismissedfrom office, the term "reinstatement" had a technicalmeaning, referring only to an appointive position.

Thus:ARTICLE VIII SEC. 24

(d) Reinstatement. — Any person who has been

permanently APPOINTED to a position in the careerservice and who has, through no delinquency ormisconduct, been separated therefrom, may bereinstated to a position in the same level for which heis qualified.RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS.SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINTMENT of aperson who was previously separated from the servicethrough no delinquency or misconduct on his partfrom a position in the career service to which he waspermanently appointed, to a position for which he isqualified.3. NO- RA 7166 SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. —

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim anycandidate as winner unless authorized by theCommission after the latter has ruled on theobjections brought to it on appeal by the losing party.

Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall bevoid ab initio, unless the contested returns will notadversely affect the results of the election.- The inapplicability of the abovementioned provisionto the present case is very much patent on its faceconsidering that the same refers only to a voidproclamation in relation to contested returns and

NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.- RA 6646 SEC. 6.Effect of Disqualification Case. —Any candidate who has been declared by final

judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, andthe votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for anyreason, a candidate is not declared by final judgmentbefore an election to be disqualified and he is votedfor and receives the winning number of votes in suchelection, the Court or Commission shall continue withthe trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protestand, upon motion of the complainant or anyintervenor, may during the pendency thereof orderthe suspension of the proclamation of such candidatewhenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.- The use of the word "may" indicates that the

suspension of a proclamation is merely directory andpermissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.What is merely made mandatory, according to theprovision itself, is the continuation of the trial andhearing of the action, inquiry or protest. The COMELEChas not found any ground to suspend theproclamation and the records likewise fail to show anyso as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court.Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that theCOMELEC gravely abused its discretion.- Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cases misplaced:Duremdes: proclamation was deemed void ab initiobecause the same was made contrary to theprovisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding thesuspension of proclamation in cases of contested

election returnsBenito: proclamation of Benito was renderedineffective due to the Board of Canvassers' violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receivingthe highest number of votes and pave the way tosuccession in office. In said case, the candidatereceiving the highest number of votes for themayoralty position died but the Board of Canvassers,instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner,declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor. Aguam: nullification of the proclamation proceededfrom the fact that it was based only on advancedcopies of election returns which, under the law thenprevailing, could not have been a proper and legalbasis for proclamation.

4. NO- In the first place, Basco was a duly qualifiedcandidate pursuant to our disquisition above.

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Furthermore, he clearly received the winning numberof votes which put him in sixth place.- Labo v. COMELEC > where we laid down a possibleexception to the rule that a second placer may not bedeclared the winning candidate: (1) the one whoobtained the highest number of votes is disqualified;and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in lawof a candidate's disqualification so as to bring suchawareness within the realm of notoriety but wouldnonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible

candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent inthis case.Disposition Petition for certiorari and prohibition ishereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

MORENO V COMELECGR 168550

TINGA; August 10, 2006

NATUREPetition for review resolution of COMELEC disqualifyingMoreno from running for elective office of PunongBrgy of Cabugao, Daram, Samar

FACTS- Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno fromrunning for Punong Brgy on the ground that the latterwas convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention (4 mos. 1 day to 2 yrs 4 mos.Imprisonment). This was forwarded to the Office of theProvincial Election Supervisor of Samar for prelimhearing. The hearing officer recommended thatMoreno be disqualified from running. This wasadopted by COMELECBasis of petition: Sec. 40 of LGC: The followingpersons are disqualified from running for any electivelocal position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgmentfor an offense involving moral turpitude or for anoffense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after servingsentence xxx- Moreno’s contentions: petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.Allegedly, following Baclayon v. Mutia, the impositionof the sentence of imprisonment, as well as theaccessory penalties, was thereby suspended. UnderSec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, the finaldischarge of the probation shall operate to restore tohim all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of hisconviction and to fully discharge his liability for anyfine imposed. The order of RTC on Dec. 18, 2000allegedly terminated his probation and restored to himall the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction,

including the right to vote and be voted for in the2002 elections. Disqualification under the LGC appliesonly to those who have served their sentence and notto probationers because the latter do not serve the

adjudged sentence. The Probation Law shouldallegedly be read as an exception to the LGC becauseit is a special law which applies only to probationers.Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, hissubsequent election as Punong Brgy allegedlyconstitutes an implied pardon of his previousmisconduct.

COMELEC: considering Sec.40(a) and fact that Morenowas released from probation on Dec. 20, 2000,disqualification shall commence on this date and end2 years thence. The grant of probation to Morenomerely suspended the execution of his sentence butdid not affect his disqualification from running for anelective local office. LGC takes precedence over thecase of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and theProbation Law because it is a later law and a speciallaw setting forth the dis/qualifications of elective localofficials.

ISSUE1. WON Moreno has “served sentence” that will takehis case within the operation of the disqualification

provision (“… within 2 years after serving sentence”)HELD1. NORatio Those who have not served their sentence byreason of the grant of probation which should not beequated with service of sentence, should not likewisebe disqualified from running for a local elective officebecause the 2-yr period of ineligibility under Sec.40(a) of LGC does not even begin to run.Reasoning The phrase “service of sentence,”understood in its general and common sense, meansthe confinement of a convicted person in a penalfacility for the period adjudged by the court. Thisseemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however,

has spawned a controversy because the COMELEC, inthe assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadenedthe coverage of the law to include even those who didnot serve a day of their sentence because they weregranted probation.Baclayon v. Mutia: an order of probation is not asentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of theimposition of sentence. The grant of probation topetitioner suspended the imposition of the principalpenalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessorypenalties of suspension from public office and fromthe right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.- Applying this doctrine here, the accessory penalties

of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetualspecial disqualification from the right of suffrage,attendant to the penalty imposed upon Moreno were

similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.During the period of probation, the probationer is noteven disqualified from running for a public officebecause the accessory penalty of suspension frompublic office is put on hold for the duration of theprobation.- Clearly, the period within which a person is under

probation cannot be equated with service of thesentence adjudged. Probation Law (sec.4) specificallyprovides that the grant of probation suspends theexecution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penaltyimposed upon him by the court but is merely requiredto comply with all the conditions prescribed in theprobation order.- Sec. 40(a) of the LGC unequivocally disqualifies onlythose who have been sentenced by final judgment foran offense punishable by imprisonment of 1yr ormore, within 2yrs after serving sentence.- When Moreno was finally discharged upon the court’sfinding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all

civil rights lost or suspended as a result of hisconviction were restored to him, including the right torun for public office.- LGC was enacted in 1991, 7yrs after Baclayon v.Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved thedisqualifications under Sec. 40(a), it is presumed tohave knowledge of the ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia onthe effect of probation on the disqualification fromholding public office. That it chose not to includeprobationers within the purview of the provision is aclear expression of the legislative will not to disqualifyprobationers.- Probation Law should be construed as an exceptionto the LGC. While LGC is a later law which gives thedis/qualifications of local elective officials, the

Probation Law is a special legislation which appliesonly to probationers. A later statute, general in itsterms and not expressly repealing a prior specialstatute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisionsof such earlier statute.- Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Brgy.He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from thepeople of Brgy Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15,2002 elections. This situation calls to mind thepoignant words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Frivaldov. Comelec: “it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex butlittle understood legalisms.”Obiter : there is no need to rule on whether ArbitraryDetention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted,

involves moral turpitude. This issue was never raisedin the petition for disqualification because the groundrelied upon by Mejes, and which the COMELEC used, ishis alleged disqualification from running for a local

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elective office within 2 years from his discharge fromprobation after having been convicted. Besides, adetermination this issue is not decisive of this case,the crucial issue being whether Moreno’s sentencewas in fact served.Disposition Petition is granted. Decision of COMELECannulled.

MERCADO V MANZANO

307 SCRA 630

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ VS. COMELECAND BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.,

259 SCRA 296FRANCISCO, J.: 1996

FACTS

Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and privaterespondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. (Rodriguez andMarquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the

gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimedduly-elected governor.

Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition forquo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28).Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the UnitedStates where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, ispending against the latter before the Los AngelesMunicipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grandtheft and attempted grand theft of personal property.Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" whichis a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility underSection 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A.7160), so argued Marquez.

The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’ quo warrantopetition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February 2,1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.

Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPCNo. 92-28 before this Court via petition for certiorari,docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of saidpetition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from

justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LocalGovernment Code based on the alleged pendency of acriminal charge against him (as previouslymentioned).

ISSUEWhether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice andtherefore disqualified.

HELDNO.

RATIO "fugitive from justice":"x x x includes not only those who flee after

conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evadeis the compelling factor that animates one's flightfrom a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, therecan only be an intent to evade prosecution orpunishment when there is knowledge by the fleeingsubject of an already instituted indictment, or of apromulgated judgment of conviction.

REASONINGRodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. Thereis no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from theUS on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by

the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 and June 26of 1995, preceded the filing of the felony complaint inthe Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant bythat same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. Itwas clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have knownabout such felony complaint and arrest warrant at thetime he left the US, as there was in fact no complaintand arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speakof yet at such time. What prosecution or punishmentthen was Rodriguez deliberately running away fromwith his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZDecision definition, is just nowhere to be found in thecircumstances of Rodriguez.

With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELECin having made the. same analysis in its "x x xCOMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, otherobservations consistent with such analysis made bythe poll body that are equally formidable so as tomerit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:

It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez' intent to evadethe law. This was done by offering for admission avoluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits Ito I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimescommitted which led to the filing of the chargesagainst petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose

of establishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation dueto its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusionmisleads because investigations of this nature, no

matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded withutmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantageof surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of theinvestigation would be nothing short of a well-

publicized announcement to the perpetrators of theimminent filing of charges against them. And having

been forewarned, every effort to sabotage theinvestigation may be resorted to by its intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to showRodriguez' intent to evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will be nothing more than proof that even privaterespondent accepts that intent to evade the law is amaterial element in the definition of a fugitive.

"The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17)days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothingmore than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose

cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof tosubstantiate such claim. In fact, the evidenceof petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines wasdue to his desire to join and participatevigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in thecountry, the upheaval wrought by the political forcesand the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in Philippine history.The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres.Marcos and precipitated changes in the politicalclimate. And being a figure in these developments,

petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home provinceas OIC-Board Member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he waselected Governor in 1988 and continues to beinvolved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for

petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns — first against the Marcos government, then for thegovernorship. And serving the people of Quezon

province as such, the position entails absolutededication of one's time to the demands of the office.

MARQUEZ VS COMELEC

239 SCRA 11April 18,1995 ; Vitug

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NATUREPetition for certiorari

FACTSBienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for theelective position for the elective position in theProvince of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 electionsfiled this petition for certiorari praying for the

reversal of the resolution of the Commission onElections ("COMELEC") which dismissed hispetition for quo warranto against the winningcandidate, herein private respondent EduardoRodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.It is averred that at the time private respondent filedhis certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge againsthim for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grandtheft of personal property was still pending before theMunicipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, Countyof Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrantissued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, hasyet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. A petition forcancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate

of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate'sdisqualification under Section 40(e) of the LocalGovernment Code, was filed by petitioner with theCOMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissedthe petition.Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R.No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however,to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quowarranto proceeding against private respondent. TheCourt, in i ts resolution of 02 June 1992,held:“Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court wasa pre-proclamation controversy. Since the privaterespondent had already been proclaimed as the dulyelected Governor of the Province of Quezon, the

petition below for disqualification has ceased to be apre-proclamation controversy. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in aseparate proceeding (lower court dismissed petition).Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitionerinstituted quo warranto proceedings against privaterespondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02December 1993, denied a reconsideration of theresolution.ISSUE

WON private respondent who, at the time of the filingof his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to

be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court andevading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term"fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e)of the Local Government Code and, therefore,

disqualified from being a candidate for, and therebyineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.HELD: NORATIO

The Oversight Committee evidently entertainedserious apprehensions on the possible constitutionalinfirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so takenas to embrace those who merely were facing criminalcharges.

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing theLocal Government Code of 1991. It provided:Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shallbe disqualified from running for any elective localposition:(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political

cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment When there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in anenabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it isso written. An administrative rule or regulation can

neither expand nor constrict the law but must remaincongruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds,albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente(expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations),that Article 73 of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991, tothe extent that it confines the term "fugitive from

justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "whohas been convicted by final judgment." is aninordinate and undue circumscription of the law.Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make anydefinite finding on whether or not, in fact,private respondent is a "fugitive from justice"as such term must be interpreted and applied inthe light of the Court's opinion. The omission is

understandable since the COMELEC dismissedoutrightly the petition for quo warranto on thebasis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules andRegulations promulgated by the OversightCommittee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case tothe COMELEC for a determination of thisunresolved factual matter.DISPOSITION

The questioned resolutions of the Commission onElections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the caseis hereby REMANDED to the Commission

Manner of Elections

GUIA VS COMELEC208 SCRA 420

BELLOSILLO; May 6, 1992

NATURE This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailingthe validity and the enforcement by respondentCOMELEC of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rulesand guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the

number of elective members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan in provinces with only 1 legislativedistrict and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalitiesin Metro Manila for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial ElectionSupervisors and Election Registrars, RESOLUTION NO.2379, approving the Project of District Apportionmentsubmitted, and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding thatpars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d),all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992elections.

FACTS- Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbentMember of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality

of Parañaque, Metro Manila. He prays for reversal of the position of COMELEC insofar as it affects themunicipality of Parañaque and all the othermunicipalities in Metro Manila.- R.A. 7166 is "An Act Providing for SynchronizedNational and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for OtherPurposes."- Sec. 3 thereof provides:Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod andSangguniang Bayan. The elective members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsodand Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative

districts, the elective members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . ..(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district,the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districtsfor purposes of electing the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan . . .(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayanin the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davaoand any other city with two (2) or more legislativedistricts shall continue to be governed by theprovisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No.6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shalldivide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area

into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan. . . . and,

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(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11,1992, elective members of the SangguniangPanlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be electedat large in accordance with existing laws. However,beginning with the regular elections in 1995, theyshall be elected by district . . . .- Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion forClarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiringwhether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and the other municipalities of Metro

Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district inMay 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.- In the Project of Apportionment, Parañaque togetherwith the other 12 municipalities in the Metro ManilaArea was divided into 2 districts with 6 electivecouncilors for each district.- COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion by stating thatthe election of elective members of the SangguniangBayan, by district, of the 13 municipalities in MetroManila shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections.- Petitioner filed the instant petition. He claims thatthe second proviso of par. (c), which requires theapportionment into districts of said municipalities doesnot specify when the members of their Sangguniang

Bayan will be elected by district. He wouldconsequently lean on par. (d) to support his view thatthe elected members of these municipalitiesmentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected atlarge in the May 11, 1992 elections.- De Guia therefore insists that the elected membersof the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under thiscategory so that they should continue to be elected atlarge until the 1995 regular elections.

ISSUES1. WON De Guia has locus standi.2. WON the elected members of the SangguniangBayan of Parañaque should continue to be elected atlarge until the 1995 regular elections.

HELD1. NODe Guia does not allege that he is running forreelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by theelection, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he doesnot appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law,personal or substantial interest. He does not alsoallege any legal right that has been violated byrespondent. He does not appear to have any cause of action.- However, considering the importance of the issueinvolved, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretionand violation of the Constitution by respondent, thequestion of procedural infirmity shall be brushed

aside.2. NO- To pursue De Guia’s interpretation would lead to anabsurd conclusion because then there would have

been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and themunicipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned inthe second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned atonce into 2 districts each if the members of theirrespective sanggunian after all would still be electedat large as they were in the 1988 elections.- No law is ever enacted that is intended to bemeaningless, much less inutile. A construction shouldbe rejected that gives to the language used in astatute a meaning that does not accomplish thepurpose for which the statute was enacted, and thattends to defeat the ends which are sought to beattained by the enactment.- The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 isshown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861which states in part: Specifically, it seeks to: (1)Reduce the number of positions to be voted for byproviding therein that the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsodand Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, butby district...

- COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent asreflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting thepreamble to its Resolution No. 2379:WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order toreduce the number of candidates to be voted for inthe May 11, 1992 synchronized electionsrecommended, among others, to the Congress of thePhilippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayanseats;- This avowed policy of having sanggunian memberselected by district is also manifest from the fourcorners of Sec. 3. Thus, a careful analysis of theprovisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to

reduce the number of positions to be voted for in theMay 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure theefficiency of electoral process. Considering that thesingle-district provinces and the municipalities in theMetro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, andunder pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportionedinto two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electingthe members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan andSangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11,1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside theMetro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at large themembers of their Sangguniang Panlungsod andSangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be

apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. Bythen, COMELEC would have had enough time to

apportion the single-district cities and themunicipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.- As they now stand in relation to thedistricting/apportionment of local government units forpurposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it isclear that: 1. for provinces with 2 or morelegislative districts contemplated in par. (a),they shall continue to be elected by district; 2.for provinces with single legislative districts, asthey have already been apportioned into 2districts each under par. (b), they shallhenceforth be elected likewise by district; 3. forcities with 2 or more legislative districts, e.g.,the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shallalso continue to be elected by district under thefirst part of par. (c); and 4. for the 13municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, whichhave already been apportioned into 2 districtseach under the second proviso of par. (c), theyshall likewise be elected by district in theregular elections of May 11, 1992.

DISPOSITIVEDISMISSED

Term of Office

BORJA, JR. v COMELEC (CAPCO, JR.)G.R. No. 133495

MENDOZA; Sept. 3, 1998

FACTS:- Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateroson Jan 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. OnSept. 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of 3 years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8,1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of 3years ending June 30, 1998.- On March 27, 1998, Capco Jr. filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,1998 elections. Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also acandidate for mayor, sought Capco Jr. 'sdisqualification on the theory that Capco Jr. wouldhave already served as mayor for 3 consecutive termsby June 30, 1998 and would thus be ineligible to servefor another term.- COMELEC (2nd Division) disqualified Capco Jr. fromrunning for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However,COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decisionand declared Capco Jr. eligible to run for mayor in theMay 11, 1998 elections. It stated: In both theConstitution and the Local Government Code, the

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three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made noreference to succession to an office to which he wasnot elected…. Capco was not elected… Mayor in the

Jan. 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to suchoffice by operation of law and served for theunexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently,such succession into office is not counted as one termfor purposes of the computation of the three-termlimitation under the Constitution and the Local

Government Code.- Capco Jr. won in the 1998 elections.- In this petition for certiorari, Borja Jr. contends thatCapco Jr.'s service as mayor from Sept 2, 1989 to June30, 1992 should be considered as service for one fullterm, and since he thereafter served two more termsas mayor, he should be considered to have servedthree consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, sec 8 of the Constitution and sec 43(b) of theLocal Government Code. He argues that it is irrelevantthat Capco Jr. became mayor by succession becausethe purpose of the constitutional provision in limitingthe number of terms elective local officials may serveis to prevent a monopolization of political power.

ISSUE: WON a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainderof the term is considered to have served a term in thatoffice for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:NO. Relative provisions are Art X sec 8 of theConstitution1 and sec 43(b) of LGC (RA 7160)2

The term limit for elective local officials must be takento refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,it is not enough that an individual has served threeconsecutive terms in an elective local office, he mustalso have been elected to the same position for the

same number of times before the disqualification canapply. A: Aside from the prevention of establishment of political dynasties, the other policy embodied in theconstitutional provision is that of enhancing thefreedom of choice of the people. To consider,

1 The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptionin the continuity of his service for the full term for which hewas elected.2 … (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than

three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned waselected. . . .

therefore, only stay in office regardless of how theofficial concerned came to that office – whether byelection or by succession by operation of law – wouldbe to disregard such purpose.- The Constitutional Commission rejected Com.Garcia’s proposal that after serving 3 consecutiveterms there should be no further reelection for localand legislative officials. Instead, they adopted Com.Monsod’s proposal that such officials be simply barredfrom running for the same position in the succeedingelection following the expiration of the thirdconsecutive term. Com. Ople said: “…. we want to

prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections,officials… tend to develop a proprietary interest intheir positions and to accumulate those powers and

perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families ina subsequent election…. (T)hat is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or theunbroken service of all of these officials. But where wenow decide to put these prospective servants of the

people or politicians…under a perpetualdisqualification,… we are taking away too much fromthe people, whereas we should be giving as much tothe people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice….” (other Commissioners’ comments omitted)- Two ideas emerge from this consideration: service of term, derived from the concern about theaccumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stayin office, and election, derived from the concern thatthe right of the people to choose those whom theywish to govern them be preserved.- In discussing term limits, the drafters of theConstitution did so on the assumption that the officialsconcerned were serving by reason of election.B: Textual analysis reveals that Art. X, sec 8

contemplates service by local officials for threeconsecutive terms as a result of election. The firstsentence speaks of "the term of office of elective localofficials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving formore than three consecutive terms. The secondsentence, in explaining when an elective local officialmay be deemed to have served his full term of office,states that "voluntary renunciation of the office forany length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of his service for the fullterm for which he was elected ." The term served musttherefore be one "for which [the official concerned]was elected." The purpose of this provision is toprevent a circumvention of the limitation on thenumber of terms an elective local official may serve.

Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which hewas elected because he is simply continuing theservice of the official he succeeds, such official cannotbe considered to have fully served the term

notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of officeprior to its expiration.- In the case of Senators or Representatives, thoseelected to serve the unexpired term of another whodies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removedfrom office, no matter how short, will be considered tohave served for one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.

The Senator of Representative is elected to fill thevacancy. It is different in the case of a vice-mayor,however, as he succeeds to the mayorship byoperation of law.- Petitioner argues that the case of a Vice Presidentshould be applied by analogy to the case of a vicemayor. In the case of the VP who succeeds to thePresidency in case of vacancy in that office,Constitution provides that he shall not be qualified forelection to the same office at any time if he hasserved for more than years. This provision wasincluded as without it, the VP, who simply steps intothe Presidency by succession, would be qualified torun President even if he has occupied that office formore than four years. The absence of a similarprovision in Art X sec 8 on elective local officialsthrows in bold relief the difference between the twocases. It underscores the constitutional intent to coveronly the terms of office to which one may have beenelected for purposes of the three-term limit on localelective officials, disregarding for this purpose serviceby automatic succession.- Another reason why the VP who succeeds to thePresidency and serves in that office for more than fouryears is ineligible for election as President is that theVP is elected primarily to succeed the President in theevent of the latter's death, permanent disability,removal, or resignation. He may also be considered toseek the Presidency. Electors likewise choose as VP

the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency inthe event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in thePresidency for more than four years may rightly beconsidered as service for a full term.- It is different for the vice mayor, as under the LGC,he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and heappoints all officials and employees of such localassembly. He has distinct powers and functions,succession to mayorship in the event of vacancytherein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of avacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumptionof the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more amatter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in

that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

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-Illustrations3

Disposition Petition dismissed.

ONG V ALEGRE479 SCRA 481

GARCIA; January 23, 2006

FACTS- Alegre and Francis Ong filed certificates of candidacy

for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May

3 1. A is vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of death

of incumbent. 6 months before next election, he resigns and istwice elected thereafter. Can he run for mayor in the nextelection? Yes. Although he has already first served as mayorby succession and subsequently resigned from office beforefull term expired, he has not actually served three full termsin all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Voluntaryrenunciation of the office is not considered as an interruptionin the continuity of his service for the full term only if the termis one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completingservice of the term of the deceased and was not elected, Acannot be considered to have completed one term. Hisresignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.2. B is elected mayor and, during his first term, is twice

suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twicereelected after that, can he run for one more term in the nextelection? Yes, because he has served only two full termssuccessively.In 1&2, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because thetwo conditions for the application of the disqualificationprovisions have not concurred: that he has been elected threeconsecutive times and that he has fully served threeconsecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official isconsidered to have served three full terms notwithstandinghis resignation before the end of the first term, the factremains that he has not been elected three times. In thesecond case, the local official has been elected threeconsecutive times, but he has not fully served threeconsecutive terms.3. Vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves

a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purposeof applying Art. X, sec 8. Suppose he is twice elected afterthat term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in thefirst term but simply found himself thrust into it by operationof law. Neither had he served the full term because he onlycontinued the service, interrupted by the death, of thedeceased mayor.

To consider C to have served the first term in full andineligible to run a third time would be not only to falsify realitybut also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choosewhom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns outto be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation bysimply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the otherhand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way thepeople can return him to office (even if it is just the third timehe is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term iscounted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit. Toconsider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord withthe view that while the people should be protected from theevils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, careshould be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly

10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbentmayor.- January 9, 2004 - Alegre filed with the COMELECProvincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny DueCourse and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francison the ground that Francis had violated the three-termrule, having run for mayor in 1995, 1998 and 2001and had assumed office as mayor and discharged theduties for 3 consecutive full terms corresponding tothose elections.- In the 1998 elections, Alegre and Francis also ranagainst each other for mayor. Francis won but Alegrefiled an election protest. The RTC eventually declaredAlegre as the mayor but the decision came out in July2001 after Francis had served the 1998-2001 termand was already serving as mayor for the 2001-2004term.- The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed Alegre’s

petition to disqualify Francis’ certificate of candidacyfor the May 2004 elections, saying that: “One of therequisites for the application of the three term rule isnot present. Francis Ong might have indeed fullyserved the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however,from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his becausehe was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet,Camarines Norte has voided his election for the 1998term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegrewas the legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoraltyelection in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.”- May 7, 2004 – After Alegre filed a motion forreconsideration, the COMELEC en banc overturned theFirst Division’s resolution and declared Francisineligible for candidacy in the 2004 elections.- May 8, 2004 – Francis received a fax copy of theCOMELEC en banc resolution. His older brotherRommel Ong was immediately nominated as

candidate and at 5:05 PM, past the deadline for filing acertificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his owncertificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, assubstitute candidate for his brother Francis.- May 9, 2004 (a day before the May 10 elections) -Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or CancelCertificate of Rommel Ong.- Counsel for the Ongs addressed a letter to theProvincial Election Supervisor of Camarines Cariño andActing Election Officer Basilonia in which he appealedthat, owing to the COMELEC’s inaction on Alegre'spetition to cancel Rommel’s certificate of candidacy,the name “Rommel Ong” be included in the officialcertified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente,Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by

the PES.

curtailed.

- May 10, 2004 – Alegre wrote COMELECCommissioner Garcillano (why, hello again Garci! )seeking clarification on the legality of Cariño’s actions.Garcillano ordered Cariño to implement theCOMELEC’s May 7 resolution which stated that“substitution is not proper if the certificate of thesubstituted candidacy is denied due course.” It was

also added that it was the COMELEC’s policy “not toinclude the name of a substitute candidate in thecertified list of candidates unless the substitution isapproved by the Commission.”- The Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concernednot to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, promptingthe latter to file a protest with that Board.- May 11, 2004 – Alegre was eventually proclaimed thewinner.- May 12, 2004 – Francis filed before the Court apetition for certiorari. Rommel’s petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus, with application forinjunctive relief followed and both petitions wereconsolidated.

ISSUEWON Francis’ assumption of office as Mayor of SanVicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998to 2001 should be considered as full service for thepurpose of the three-term limit rule.

HELD YESReasoning- The three-term limit rule for elective local officials isfound in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,which provides:Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,except barangay officials, which shall be determined

by law, shall be three years and no such official shallserve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of his service for the full term for which hewas elected.- For the three-term limit for elective local governmentofficials to apply, two conditions or requisites mustconcur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has beenelected for three (3) consecutive terms in the samelocal government post, and (2) that he has fullyserved three (3) consecutive terms.- The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thuseffectively barring petitioner Francis from running formayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,

2004 elections.- There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Onghaving been duly elected mayor of that municipality inthe May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections

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and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full.- Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in theMay 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initiallydeclaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of SanVicente. The Court holds that that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the fullterm", and should be counted as a full term served incontemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by

the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,barring local elective officials from being elected andserving for more than three consecutive term for thesame position.- Even if the Daet RTC proclaimed that Alegre won theelection, the disposition was without practical andlegal use and value, having been promulgated afterthe term of the contested office has expired.- The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contraryview is not hard to discern. Such contrary view wouldmean that Alegre would, under the three-term rule, beconsidered as having served a term by virtue of averitably meaningless electoral protest ruling, whenanother actually served such term pursuant to aproclamation made in due course after an election.

Dispositive Petitions dismissed.

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round 3 compiled digests (kulang 4)

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