Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, Respondents.

 

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a

bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3

chanrobles virtual law library

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4

chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac? chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7

chanrobles virtual law library

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by

private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11

chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12

chanrobles virtual law library

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In one case, 13 We said:

Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15 chanrobles virtual law library

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., .

 

Endnotes:

1 Page 27, Rollo.chanrobles virtual law library

2 Page 29, Supra.chanrobles virtual law library

3 Page 3, Rollo.chanrobles virtual law library

4 Page 33, Supra.chanrobles virtual law library

5 Ortega v. Court of Appeals (1987). chanrobles virtual law library

6 Sebial v. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385 (1975). chanrobles virtual law library

7 Ortega v. Court of Appeals, Supra; Valera v. Inserts, 149 SCRA

553 (1987); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540 (1979); Cuizon v. Remolete; 129 SCRA 495 (1984); Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 262 (1976); Coca v. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978); Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353 (1939); Guinguin v. Abuton, 48 Phil 144 (1925). chanrobles virtual law library

8 Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 303 (1938). chanrobles virtual law library

9 Section 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. ..." 10

10 Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, 92 Phil. 273 (1952). chanrobles virtual law library

11 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil, 383 (1953) citing Monserrat v. lbanez, G.R No. L-3369, May 24,1950. chanrobles virtual law library

12 Utulo v. Pasion de Garcia, supra; Fule v. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 (1924); Baldemor v. Malangyaon, 34 Phil. 367 (1916); Bondad v. Bondad, 34 Phil. 232 (1916); Malafasan v. Ignacio; 19 Phil. 434 (1911); Ilustre v. Alaras Frondora; 17 Phil. 321 (1910). In Orozco vs. Garcia, 50 Phil 149, it was held that there is nothing in Section 1, Rule 74 which prohibits the heirs from instituting special proceeding for the administration of the intestate estate, if they cannot agree in the extrajudicial partition and apportionment of the same. Utulo v. Pasion Vda. de Garcia, Supra reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in the cases previous to Orozco. chanrobles virtual law library

13 Monserrat v. Ibanez, Supra cited in Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, Supra. chanrobles virtual law library

14 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, supra. chanrobles virtual law library

15 Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, supra. chanrobles virtual law library

16 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, supra.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21993     June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,

ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, Respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:

It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case". chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Para�aque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Para�aque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Para�aque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. - When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause znotice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Para�aque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:

"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction - Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 - confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:

The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: chanrobles virtual law library

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; chanrobles virtual law library

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed; chanrobles virtual law library

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; chanrobles virtual law library

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Now section 44, subpar. (e) of the Judiciary Actz (R.A. No. 296).

q

243

  EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-8409. December 28, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. AMAND65A EUSEBIO, VIRGINIA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN

EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, Oppositor-Appellant.

 

D E C I S I O N

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos,  all   surnamed Eusebio,  objected to said petition,  stating that   they are   illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying,   therefore,   that   the   case   be   dismissed   upon   the   ground   that   venue   had   been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence,  the case is before us on appeal taken,  from said order,  by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Where  estate  of  deceased  persons   settled.  —  If   the  decedent   is   an   inhabitant  of   the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extension, in said City (Exhibits 2). While 

transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter,  the decedent suffered a stroke (probably   heart   failure),   for   which   reason   Dr.   Eusebio   took   him   to   his   (Dr.   Eusebio’s) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital,   in   the  City  of  Manila,   sometime before  November  26,  1952.  On   this  date,  he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of “acute left ventricular failure secondary to   hypertensive   heart   disease”,   at   the   age   of   seventy-four   (74)   years   (Exhibit   A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extension.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that “a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained” (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 70; chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryRestatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryIn re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; chan   roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) physical presence at the place chosen; chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110;  chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryGoodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169;  chan 

roblesvirtualawlibraryVelilla vs.  Posadas,  62 Phil.,  624;  chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryZuellig vs.  Republic  of the Philippines,  46 Off.  Gaz. Suppl.  No.   11,   p.   220).   Admittedly,   the   decedent  was   juridically   capable   of   choosing   a domicile  and had been  in  Quezon City  several  days  prior  to  his  demise.  Thus,   the   issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent.  Neither  does   the  decedent  appear   to  have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, Petitioner-Appellee, who took the witness   stand,   did   not   testify   thereon,   despite   the   allegation,   in   his   answer   to   the aforemention, opposition of Appellants herein, that “the deceased (had) decided to reside   cralaw 

for   the   rest  of  his   life,   in  Quezon  City”.  Moreover,   said  Appellee  did  not   introduce   the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent,  Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extension was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent’s) purpose in buying said property.  This  notwithstanding,   the   lower  court  held   that   the  decedent’s   intent   to   stay permanently   in  Quezon City   is  “manifest”   from the  acquisition of  said  property  and the transfer of his belongings thereto. This conclusion is untenable.

The aforementioned house and  lot  were bought  by   the decedent  because  he had been adviced   to   do   so   “due   to   his   illness”,   in   the   very  words   of   herein  Appellee.   It   is   not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It   is  well settled that  “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one’s own health”, even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.”  (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173;  chan 

roblesvirtualawlibrarysee, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;  chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Knight, D.C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover,  some of his children,  who used to  live with him in San Fernando,  Pampanga, remained in that municipality.  Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said 

property at No. 889-A España Extension, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his   residence.  Similarly,   the  “A”  and   “B”   residence  certificates  used  by   the  decedent   in acknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly,  the marriage contract Exhibit  1, signed by the deceased when he was married,   in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2)  days  prior   to  his  demise,  stated that  his   residence   is  San Fernando,  Pampanga.   It   is worthy  of  notice that  Alfonso Eusebio,  one of   the   legitimate   full  brothers  of   the  herein Appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first  marriage,  including said  Appellee,  were represented on that  occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from Appellee’s failure to prove satisfactorily that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 — which   is  particularly   strong  when   the  domicile   is  one  of   the  origin  2  as   San  Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused   to   entertain   the   same   in   the   order   appealed   from.   The   reasons   therefor   are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Exhibits ‘1’ and ‘2’ are rejected but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action  Oppositors  may  want   to   take   later  on  because  until   now   the  personality   of   the Oppositors  has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the Oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before  Appellants  had established   their   “personality”   to   intervene   in   the  case,   referring seemingly   to   their   filiation.  When  Appellants,   however,   sought,   during   said   hearing,   to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained Appellee’s objection thereto stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client;  chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryyou are leading to that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If yon are trying to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are the persons who should inherit.” p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus,   the   lower   court   refused   to   consider  Appellant’s   evidence  on   the  domicile   of   the decedent, because of their alleged lack of “personality”, but, when they tried to establish such “personality”, they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised   by   them.  We   find   ourselves   unable   to   sanction   either   the   foregoing   procedure adopted by the lower court or the inferences it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.

To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one 

hand,  he declared that  Appellants  could not  be permitted to   introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the Appellee, said Appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower   court,  Appellants’   counsel   announced   that   he  would   take   part   therein   “only   to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding,” (p. 2, t. s. n.). During the cross-examination of  Petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the   decedent   and   the  Appellants.   As,   the  Appellee  objected   thereto,   the   court   said, addressing Appellants’ counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court  cralaw. If you are trying to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless   you  want   to   submit   to   the   jurisdiction  of   the   court”   (p.   7,   t.   s.   n.).   Thereupon, Appellants’ counsel refused to do so, stating: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “I will insist on my stand.” Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that Appellants “refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these proceedings should  be   dismissed.”   Thus,  Appellants  specifically  made  of   record   that   they  were   not submitting   themselves   to   the   jurisdiction   of   the   court,   except   for   the   purpose   only   of assailing the same, and the court felt that Appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, Appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to  Appellee’s petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent,  3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under   the  Civil  Code of   the Philippines;   chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryand  (b)  his  alleged residence  is Pampanga.   In   other  words,   the   lower   court   should   have   admitted   Exhibits   1   and   2   in evidence   and   given   thereto   the   proper   effect,   in   connection   with   the   issue   under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?” In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga   received   a   petition   of  Appellants  herein,   dated  November   4,   1953,   for   the settlement of the “Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio”. Attached to said petition was another petition for the docketing thereof free of charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including  Petitioner  herein),  moved   for   the  dismissal   of   said   proceedings,  owing   to   the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.”

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did  not  pass  upon the  question of  domicile  or  residence of   the  decedent.  Moreover,   in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, 

said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts   with   concurrent   jurisdiction.   It   could   not   possibly   have   intended   to   deprive   a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which  jurisdiction is denied by  law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specifically, said provision refers mainly to non- resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines,  for the settlement of their  respective estates may be undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent   jurisdiction  — and,   hence,   the  one  first   taking   cognizance  of   the   case   shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to, this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court  immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may be settled before the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“  cralaw The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of   Taciana  Vda.   de  Borja   vs.   Tan,   L-7792   (July   27,   1955).   Should   it   be  decided,   in   the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion,  we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; chan   roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to  appoint   an  administrator  of   the  estate  of   the  deceased,   the  venue having  been   laid improperly;  chan   roblesvirtualawlibraryand that  it  should,  accordingly,  have sustained  Appellants’  opposition and dismissed Appellee’s petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and Appellee’s petition is dismissed, with costs against the Appellee. It is SO ORDERED.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

 

Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. “There is a presumption in favour of the continuance of an existing domicile. Therefore, the burden of proving a change lies in all cases upon those who alleged that he change has occurred. This presumption may have a decisive effect, for if the evidence is so conflicting that it is impossible to elicit with certainty what the resident’s intention is, the Court, being unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion one way or the other, will decide in favour of the existing domicile.” (Private International Law by Cheshire, pp. 218-219.)

“In the absence of any circumstances from which the courts may infer the animus, they are

accustomed to fall back on two legal presumptions, without which it would in some cases be impossible to arrive at any conclusions as to a party’s domicile.

“The first of these is the presumption that the party has retained the last domicile known to have been possessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile once acquired is retained until another is gained, and from the other principle growing out of it that the burden of proof is on him who alleges a change of domicile.” (Conflict of Laws by Minor, p. 123.).

2. “It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a stronger presumption against change from a domicile of origin than there is against other changes of domicile. ‘Domicile of origin cralaw differs from domicile of choice mainly in this — that is character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off.’ The English view was forcibly expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which Lewis, J., said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ‘The attachment which every one feels for his native land is the foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No temporary sojourn in a foreign country will work this change.’ In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point was emphasized.” (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, p. 129.)

3. Which has not been categorically denied, Appellee’s counsel having limited themselves to alleging, in an unsworn pleading, that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief on said claim of the Appellants.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.

GARCIA, respondents.

 

MARTIN, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,

therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased." chanrobles virtual law library

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the

order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause

of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia." chanrobles virtual law library

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." chanrobles virtual law library

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

chanrobles virtual law library

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to

do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

chanrobles virtual law library

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11 chanrobles virtual law library

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel

Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." chanrobles virtual law library

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong

for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18

chanrobles virtual law library

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

chanrobles virtual law library

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Muñoz Palma, J., took no part.

Endnotes:

* Court of Appeals, Special First Division, composed of JJ. Reyes, L.B., Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro. chanrobles virtual law library

1 Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. - Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. chanrobles virtual law library

2 July 2, 1973, July 26, 1973, August 9, 1973, July 17, 1974, July 25, 1974, at 270-391, Rollo of No. L-40502. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Diez v. Serra, 51 Phil. 286 (1927). chanrobles virtual law library

4 See Malig v. Bush, L-22761, May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 453-454. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 530-32 (1911). chanrobles virtual law library

6 In re Kaw Singco. Sy Oa v. Co Ho, 74 Phil. 241-242 (1943); Rodriguez v. Borja, L-21993, June 21, 1966, 17 SCRA 442. chanrobles virtual law library

7 McGrath v. Stevenson, 77 P 2d 608; In re Jones, 19 A 2d 280. chanrobles virtual law library

8 See 92 C.J.S. 813-14; See also Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, L-24742, October 26,1973, 53 SCRA 377. chanrobles virtual law library

9 See 77 C.J.S. 286.chanrobles virtual law library

10 Kemp v. Kemp, 16 NYS 2d 34. chanrobles virtual law library

11 See 92 C.J.S. 816.chanrobles virtual law library

12 See Rules of Court, Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed., at 32; Manzanero v. Bongon, 67 Phil. 602 (1939). chanrobles virtual law library

13 A special administrator is a representative of decedent, appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co., 121 NW 606, cited in Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 ed., at 106. chanrobles virtual law library

14 See Proceedings of the Institute on the Revised Rules of Court, UP Law Center, 1963, at 99. chanrobles virtual law library

15 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281 (1956); Hon. Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 736 (1957). chanrobles virtual law library

16 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 419-20 (1953). chanrobles virtual law library

17 Roxas v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 410 (1948). chanrobles virtual law library

18 Idem, at 411. chanrobles virtual law library

19 Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.chanrobles virtual law library

20 Fernandez v. Maravilla, L-18799, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 597. chanrobles virtual law library

21 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 113. chanrobles virtual law library

22 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 219, Annex "SS" to Petition for certiorari and/or Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction by Preciosa B. Garcia in CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. chanrobles virtual law library

23 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 268; Annex 5 to Answer filed by Virginia G. Fule to petition of Preciosa B. Garcia in C.A.-G.R. No. 03221-SP.chanrobles virtual law library

24 See Perido vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, Makalintal, C.J. ponente, First Division, 63 SCRA 97. chanrobles virtual law library

25 53 SCRA 381.