cases - criminal procedure 1

7/28/2019 Cases - Criminal Procedure 1

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ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v. HONORABLEANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Respondent.ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v.SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), RespondentG.R. No. 148076; G.R. No. 153161 January 12, 2011D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Antonio M. Carandang (Carandang) challengesthe jurisdiction over him of the Ombudsman and of theSandiganbayan on the ground that he was being held toaccount for acts committed while he was serving as generalmanager and chief operating officer of Radio PhilippinesNetwork, Inc. (RPN), which was not a government-ownedor -controlled corporation; hence, he was not a publicofficial or employee.

In G.R. No. 148076, Carandang seeks the reversal of thedecision and resolution promulgated by the Court ofAppeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Ombudsmandismissing him from the service for grave misconduct.

In G.R. No. 153161, Carandang assails on certiorari theresolutions dated October 17, 2001 and March 14, 2002 ofthe Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) that sustained theSandiganbayans jurisdiction over the criminal complaint

charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Antecedents

Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto) was a stockholder of RPN,a private corporation duly registered with the Securities andExchange Commission (SEC). In March 1986, theGovernment ordered the sequestration of RPNs properties,

assets, and business. On November 3, 1990, thePresidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)entered into a compromise agreement with Benedicto,whereby he ceded to the Government, through the PCGG,all his shares of stock in RPN. Consequently, upon motionof the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) directedthe president and corporate secretary of RPN to transfer to

the PCGG Benedictos shares representing 72.4% of the

total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN.

However, Benedicto moved for a reconsideration,contending that his RPN shares ceded to the Government,through the PCGG, represented only 32.4% of RPNsoutstanding capital stock, not 72.4%. Benedictos motion

for reconsideration has remained unresolved to this date.

Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct

On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as generalmanager and chief operating officer of RPN.

On April 19, 1999, Carandang and other RPN officials werecharged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman.The charge alleged that Carandang, in his capacity as thegeneral manager of RPN, had entered into a contract withAF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being anincorporator, director, and stockholder of that corporation;that he had thus held financial and material interest in acontract that had required the approval of his office; andthat the transaction was prohibited under Section 7 (a) andSection 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees),thereby rendering him administratively liable for gravemisconduct.

Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrativecharge on the ground that the Ombudsman had nojurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation.

On May 7, 1999, the Ombudsman suspended Carandangfrom his positions in RPN.

On September 8, 1999, Carandang manifested that he was

no longer interested and had no further claim to hispositions in RPN. He was subsequently replaced by EdgarSan Luis.In its decision dated January 26, 2000, theOmbudsman found Carandang guilty of grave misconductand ordered his dismissal from the service.

Carandang moved for reconsideration on two groundsthat the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him becRPN was not a government-owned or -controlledcorporation; and (b) that he had no financial and matinterest in the contract that required the approval of hoffice.

The Ombudsman denied Carandangs motion for

reconsideration on March 15, 2000.

On appeal (CA G.R. SP No. 58204), the CA affirmed tdecision of the Ombudsman on February 12, 2001, st

The threshold question to be resolved in the present cwhether or not the Office of the Ombudsman hajurisdiction over the herein petitioner.

It is therefore of paramount importance to consider thdefinitions of the following basic terms, to wit: A publofficeis the right, authority and duty, created andconferred by law, by which for a given period, either fby law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating powan individual is invested with some portion of the sovfunctions of the state to be exercised by him for the bof the public. (San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of

Appeals, 284 SCRA 276: Chapter I, Section 1, MechemTreatise on Law of Public Offices and Officers). Theindividual so invested is called the public officer which

includes elective and appointive officials and employ

permanent or temporary, whether in the classified orunclassified or exemption service receiving compensaeven nominal, from the government as defined in xxx2 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended]. (Sec. 2Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Unless the powerconferred are of this nature, the individual is not a puofficer.

With these time-honored definitions and the substantfindings of the Ombudsman, We are constrained toconclude that, indeed, the herein petitioner (Antonio Carandang) is a public officer. Precisely, since he (AnM. Carandang) was appointed by then President JoseEjercito Estrada as general manager and chief operatofficer of RPN-9 (page 127 of the Rollo). As a preside


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appointee, the petitioner derives his authority from thePhilippine Government. It is luce clarius that the function ofthe herein petitioner (as a presidential appointee), relatesto public duty, i.e., to represent the interest of thePhilippine Government in RPN-9 and not purely personalmatter, thus, the matter transcends the petitioners

personal pique or pride.

x x x

Having declared earlier that the herein petitioner is a publicofficer, it follows therefore that, that jurisdiction over him islodged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

It is worth remembering that as protector of the people, theOmbudsman has the power, function and duty to actpromptly on complaints filed in any form or manner againstofficers or employees of the Government, or of any,subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations, and enforcetheir administrative, civil and criminal liability in every casewhere the evidence warrants in order to promote efficientservice by the Government to the people. (Section 13 ofRepublic Act No. 6770).

x x x

Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman is, therefore,clothed with the proper armor when it assumed jurisdictionover the case filed against the herein petitioner. x x x

x x x

It appears that RPN-9 is a private corporation establishedto install, operate and manage radio broadcasting and/ortelevision stations in the Philippines (pages 59-79 of theRollo). On March 2, 1986, when RPN-9 was sequestered by

the Government on ground that the same was consideredas an illegally obtained property (page 3 of the Petition forReview; page 2 of the Respondents Comment; pages 10

and 302 of the Rollo), RPN-9 has shed-off its private status.In other words, there can be no gainsaying that as of thedate of its sequestration by the Government, RPN-9, whileretaining its own corporate existence, became a

government-owned or controlled corporation within theConstitutional precept.

Be it noted that a government-owned or controlledcorporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or

non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating topublic needs whether government or proprietary in nature,and owned by the Government directly or through itsinstrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as inthe case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least

fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock; Provided, Thatgovernment-owned or controlled corporations may befurther categorized by the department of Budget, the CivilService, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of theexercise and discharge of their respective powers, functionsand responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

(Section 2 , Executive Order No. 292).

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, this Court is of theview and so holds that RPN-9 perfectly falls under theforegoing definition. For one, the governments interest to

RPN-9 amounts to 72.4% of RPNs capital stock with anuncontested portion of 32.4% and a contested or litigated

portion of 40%. (page 3 of the Petition for Review; pages8-9 of the Respondents Comment). On this score, it oughtto be pointed out that while the forty percent (40%) of theseventy two point four percent (72.4%) is still contestedand litigated, until the matter becomes formally settled, thegovernment, for all interests and purposes still has the rightover said portion, for the law is on its side. Hence, We cansafely say that for the moment, RPN-9 is a governmentowned and controlled corporation. Another thing, RPN 9,though predominantly tackles proprietary functionsthoseintended for private advantage and benefit, still, it isirrefutable that RPN-9 also performs governmental roles inthe interest of health, safety and for the advancement of

public good and welfare, affecting the public in general.x x x

Coming now to the last assignment of error- While it maybe considered in substance that the latest GIS clearly

shows that petitioner was no longer a stockholder of record

of AF Broadcasting Corporation at the time of hisassumption of Office in RPN 9 x x x (Petitioners Rep

Comment]; page 317 of the Rollo), still severing ties AF Broadcasting Corporation does not convince this Cfully well to reverse the finding of the Ombudsman thAntonio Carandang appears to be liable for Grave

Misconduct (page 10 of the Assailed Decision; page

the Rollo). Note that, as a former stockholder of AFBroadcasting Corporation, it is improbable that the hepetitioner was completely oblivious of the developme

therein and unaware of the contracts it (AF BroadcastCorporation) entered into. By reason of his past (AntoCarandang) association with the officers of the AFBroadcasting Corporation, it is unbelievable that herepetitioner could simply have ignored the contract enteinto between RPN-9 and AF Broadcasting Corporationnot at all felt to reap the benefits thereof. Technicallytrue that herein petitioner did not directly act on behaAF Broadcasting Corporation, however, We doubt tha(herein petitioner) had no financial and/or material inin that particular transaction requiring the approval ofofficea fact that could not have eluded Our attentio

x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant toapplicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, thepresent Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lackmerit. The assailed decision (dated January 26, 2000the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0349hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to co

SO ORDERED.

After the denial of his motion forreconsideration, Carandang commenced G.R. No. 14

Violation of Section 3 (g), Republic Act No. 3019

On January 17, 2000, the Ombudsman formally chargCarandang in the Sandiganbayan with a violation of S3 (g) of RA 3019 by alleging in the followinginformation, viz:


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That sometime on September 8, 1998 or thereabouts, inQuezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, accused ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, a highranking officer (HRO) being then the General Manager ofRadio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9), then agovernment owned and controlled corporation, did then andthere willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarrantedbenefits to On Target Media Concept, Inc. (OTMCI) throughmanifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence andcaused the government undue injury, by pre-terminating

the existing block time contract between RPN 9 and OTMCIfor the telecast of Isumbong Mo Kay Tulfo which assured

the government an income of Sixty Four Thousand andNine Pesos (P 64,009.00) per telecast and substituting thesame with a more onerous co-production agreementwithout any prior study as to the profitability thereof, bywhich agreement RPN-9 assumed the additional obligationof taking part in the promotions, sales and propermarketing of the program, with the end result in that in aperiod of five (5) months RPN-9 was able to realize anincome of only Seventy One Thousand One Hundred EightyFive Pesos (P 71,185.00), and further, by waiving RPN-9scollectible from OTMCI for August 1-30, 1998 in the amount

of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand and Forty Five Pesos (P320,045.00).

Carandang moved to quash the information, arguing thatSandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because he was not apublic official due to RPN not being a government-owned or-controlled corporation.

The Sandiganbayan denied Carandangs motion to quash

on October 17, 2001.

After the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his motion forreconsideration, Carandang initiated G.R. No. 153161.

On May 27, 2002, Carandang moved to defer hisarraignment and pre-trial, citing the pendency of G.R. No.153161.

On July 29, 2002, the Court directed the parties in G.R. No.153161 to maintain the status quo until further orders.

On November 20, 2006, G.R. No. 148076 was consolidatedwith G.R. No. 153161.

Issue

Carandang insists that he was not a public officialconsidering that RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; and that, consequently, theOmbudsman and the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdictionover him. He prays that the administrative and criminal

complaints filed against him should be dismissed.Accordingly, decisive is whether or not RPN was agovernment-owned or -controlled corporation.

Ruling

We find the petitions to be meritorious.

It is not d isputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction overadministrative cases involving grave misconduct committedby the officials and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan hasjurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involvingviolations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and

employees, including presidents, directors and managers ofgovernment-owned or -controlled corporations. Therespective jurisdictions of the respondents are expresslydefined and delineated by the law.

Similarly, the law defines what are government-owned or -controlled corporations. For one, Section 2 of PresidentialDecree No. 2029 (Defining Government Owned orControlled Corporations and Identifying Their Role inNational Development) states:

Section 2. A government-owned or controlled corporation isa stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing

governmental or proprietary functions, which is directlychartered by a special law or if organized under the generalcorporation law is owned or controlled by the governmentdirectly, or indirectly through a parent corporation orsubsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majorityof its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding votingcapital stock.

Section 2 (13) of Executive Order No. 292 (AdministrCode of 1987) renders a similar definition of governmowned or -controlled corporations:

Section 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the speciwords of the text or the context as a whole or a particstatute, shall require a different meaning:

x x x

(13) government-owned or controlled corporations reany agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporavested with functions relating to public needs whethegovernmental or proprietary in nature, and owned bygovernment directly or indirectly through itsinstrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable asthe case of stock corporations to the extent of at leasof its capital stock.

It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is consideredgovernment-owned or -controlled corporation only whthe Government directly or indirectly owns or controlsleast a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Apthis statutory criterion, the Court ruled in Leyson, Jr.

Office of the Ombudsman:

But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner isupport of his claim that the CIIF companies aregovernment owned and/or controlled corporations areincomplete without resorting to the definition of

government owned or controlled corporation contai

par. (13), Sec.2, Introductory Provisions of theAdministrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organiza stock or non-stock corporation vested with functionrelating to public needs whether governmental orproprietary in nature, and owned by the governmentdirectly or indirectly through its instrumentalities eith

wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stockcorporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) peof its capital s tock. The definition mentions three (3)requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a sor non-stock corporation; second, vested with functiorelating to public needs whether governmental orproprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Gover


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directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to theextent of at least fifty-one (51) of its capital s tock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprisingthe CIIF companies were organized as stockcorporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares ofLEGASPI OIL, xxx. Obviously, the below 51% shares ofstock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definitionof a government owned or controlled corporation. x x x The

Court thus concludes that the CIIF are, as found by publicrespondent, private corporations not within the scope of itsjurisdiction.

Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor acontrolled corporation because of the Governments total

share in RPNs capital stock being only 32.4%.

Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan(Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG ofBenedictos shares that represented 72.4% of the total

issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, suchquantification of Benedictos shareholding cannot be

controlling in view of Benedictos timely filing of a motion

for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted thatthe shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPNs outstanding capital stock. With

the extent of Benedictos holdings in RPN remaining

unresolved with finality, concluding that the Governmentheld the majority of RPNs capital stock as to make RPN agovernment-owned or -controlled corporation would bebereft of any factual and legal basis.

Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) haverecognized RPNs status as being neither a government-owned nor -controlled corporation.

In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, thePCGG communicated to San Luis as the president andgeneral manager of RPN regarding a case involving RPNand Carandang

MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS

President & General Manager

Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking

PCGGs position on the following:

1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporationoutside the scope of OGCC and COAs control given 32%Government ownership x x x.

x x x

It appears that under the RP-Benedicto CompromiseAgreement dated November 3, 1990 validity of which hasbeen sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087,March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation,if he has any, in RPN-9, among others, to the governmentwhich rights, interest and/or participation per PCGGs

understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e,about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capitalstock of RPN-9.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), onmotion of the government through PCGG, ordered thepresident and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to effectthe immediate cancellation and transfer of the9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedictos

proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of thePhilippines c/o PCGG (Sandiganbayans Resolution of

February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto

Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion forreconsideration of said Resolution, contending that thenumber of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only hispersonal holdings and those of his immediate family andnominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding theRPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and

Investors, Inc. (FEMIE), which is about 40%, as the

corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his persholdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pendresolution by the Sandiganbayan.

x x x

We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not agovernment owned or controlled corporation within thcontemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for

admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs anprofits, and not for public needs and was not specificavested with functions relating to public needs.

Neither could RPN-9 be considered a government-owor controlled corporation under Presidential Decree (

No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said as follows:

Sec.2. Definition. A government owned- or controlcorporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whetperforming governmental or proprietary functions whdirectly chartered by special law or organized under tgeneral corporation law is owned or controlled by the

government directly, or indirectly through a parentcorporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent oleast a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of ioutstanding voting capital stock;

Provided, that a corporation organized under the genecorporation law under private ownership at least a maof the shares of stock of which were conveyed to agovernment corporation in satisfaction of debts incurwith a government financial institution, whether byforeclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation ogovernment corporation organized exclusively to ownmanage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets

acquired by a government financial institution insatisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in case by enunciated policy of the government is requirbe disposed of to private ownership within a specifiedperiod of time, shall not be considered a governmentowned or controlled corporation before such dispositioeven if the ownership or control thereof is subsequen


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transferred to another government-owned or controlledcorporation.

A government-owned or controlled corporation is eitherparent corporation, i.e., one created by special law

(Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a subsidiary corporation, i.e, onecreated pursuant to law where at least a majority of theoutstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by

parent government corporation and/or other government-owned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029).

RPN-9 may not likewise be considered as an acquiredasset corporation which is one organized under the general

corporation law (1) under private ownership at least amajority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to agovernment corporation in satisfaction of debts incurredwith a government financial institution, whether byforeclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporationof a government corporation organized exclusively to ownand manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assetsacquired by a government financial institution insatisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in anycase by enunciated policy of the government is required tobe disposed of to private ownership within a specifiedperiod of time (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the followingreasons:

1. as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) ofits capital stock;

2. said 32.4% shares of stock, together with thecontested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to agovernment corporation or the government in satisfaction

of debts incurred with government financial institution,

whether by foreclosure or otherwise;

3. RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation ofa government corporation organized exclusively to own andmanage, or lease, or operate specific physical assetsacquired by a government financial institution insatisfaction of debts incurred therewith.

It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4%shares of stocks were turned over to the government byvirtue of a compromise agreement between thegovernment and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is

a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto,

Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and others, to

recover from them ill-gotten wealth (Amended Complaint,Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case

between the government and Benedicto, his family andnominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncementwas made as to the character or nature of the assets andproperties turned over by Benedicto to the government whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not.

The PCGGs Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OPitself on February 10, 2000:

February 10, 2000

Mr. Edgar S. San Luis

President and General Manager

Radio Philippines Network Inc.

Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman

Quezon City

Dear President San Luis,

x x x

Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm thePCGGs opinion that RPNI is not a government-ownedand/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13),

Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock ornon-stock corporation vested with functions relating topublic needs whether governmental or proprietary innature, and owned by the government directly or indirectlythrough its instrumentalities either wholly, or whereapplicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent

of at least 51% of its capital stock. As governmentownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stocpending the final judicial determination of the true anownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private

Even earlier, a similar construction impelled theOmbudsman to dismiss a criminal complaint for violaR.A. 3019 filed against certain

RPN officials, as the Ombudsmans resolution

dated December 15, 1997 indicates, a pertinent portiwhich is quoted thus:

This is not to mention the fact that the other respondthe RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this O(Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a corporation registered with the Securities and ExchanCommission, the RPN, which is not a government owncontrolled corporation x x x

Considering that the construction of a statute g iven badministrative agencies deserves respect, the uniformadministrative constructions of the relevant aforequotlaws defining what are government-owned or -contro

corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive.

Lastly, the conclusion that Carandang was a public ofby virtue of his having been appointed as general maand chief operating officer of RPN by President Estraddeserves no consideration. President Estradas interve

was merely to recommend Carandangs designation ageneral manager and chief operating officer of RPN toPCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis--vis positions. Under the circumstances, it was RPNs BoaDirectors that appointed Carandang to his positionspursuant to RPNs By-Laws.

In fine, Carandang was correct in insisting that being private individual he was not subject to the administrauthority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisof the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions in G.R. No. 1480and G.R. No. 153161.


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We reverse and set aside the decision promulgatedon February 12, 2001 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.SP No. 58204, and dismiss the administrative charge forgrave misconduct against the petitioner.

We annul and set aside the resolutions dated October 17,2001 and March 14, 2002, as well as the order dated March15, 2002, all issued by the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)

in Criminal Case No. 25802, and dismiss Criminal Case No.25802 as against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992]

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B.REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDINGJUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FOURTHJUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL,AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O NCRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable lawspecifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipalordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercialpurposes without a mayor's permit in violation of OrdinanceNo. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, inthe Province of Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. Thereferral-complaint of the police was received by the Office

of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. Thecorresponding information was filed with the Municipal TrialCourt of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on theground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was

denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, thedenial was sustained by the respondent judge.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, thepetitioner first argues that the charge against her isgoverned by the following provisions of the Rule onSummary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure inthe Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,

and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:x x x

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules andregulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penaltyprescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceedsix months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposablepenalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liabilityarising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)

x x x

Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminalcases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either bycomplaint or by information filed directly in court withoutneed of a prior preliminary examination or preliminaryinvestigation: Provided, however, That in MetropolitanManila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced

only by information; Provided, further, That when theoffense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the correspondingcomplaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal bythe offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "AnAct to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations

Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances aProvide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," readinfollows:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, uotherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordanwith the following rules: x x x Violations penalized bymunicipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the be not known at the time, from the discovery thereofthe institution of judicial proceedings for its investigaand punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedinginstituted against the guilty person, and shall begin toagain if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons noconstituting jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shacts defining and penalizing violations of law not incluthe Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed wabeyond the two-month statutory period from the datethe alleged commission of the offense, the charge agaher should have been dismissed on the ground ofprescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescrperiod was suspended upon the filing of the complainagainst her with the Office of the Provincial ProsecutoAgreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor Genalso invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject trule on summary procedure in special cases, the instiof criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of tRegional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the
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appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting therequisite preliminary investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of theMunicipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, byfiling the complaint directly with the said courts, or acomplaint with the fiscals office. However, in MetropolitanManila and other chartered cities, the complaint may befiled only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period ofprescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondentmaintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office ofthe Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "suchinstitution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to allcases, without distinction, including those falling under theRule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was anadoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court ofAppeals:

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order toprovide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, hasarrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, andshould be, the one established by the decisions holding thatthe filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if itbe merely for purposes of preliminary examination orinvestigation, should, and does, interrupt the period ofprescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the courtwhere the complaint or information is filed can not try thecase on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion:first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, indeclaring that the period of prescription "shall be

interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in thecourt for preliminary examination or investigation merely,or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court wherethe complaint or information is filed may only proceed toinvestigate the case, its actuations a lready represent theinitial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it

is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtainvindication on account of delays that are not under hiscontrol. All that the victim of the offense may do on his partto initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgatedon May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation ofthe Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On theother hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having beenincorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on

Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the lastparagraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "foroffenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure inspecial cases," which plainly signifies that the section doesnot apply to offenses which are subject to summaryprocedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the lastparagraph obviously refers to the cases covered by theSection, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule onSummary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to thecanon that words in a statute should be read in relation toand not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover

the true legislative intent.As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedurethat among the offenses it covers are violations ofmunicipal or city ordinances, it should follow that thecharge against the petitioner, which is for violation of amunicipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that ruleand not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offensesfalling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courtsand Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference isto Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offensespunishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four yearsand two months, or a fine of not more than four thousandpesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless ofother imposable accessory or other penalties, including thecivil liability arising from such offenses or predicatedthereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount

thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involvingdamage to property through criminal negligence theyhave exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposabdoes not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on SummProcedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, complaint or information shall be filed directly in cour

without need of a prior preliminary examination orpreliminary investigation." Both parties agree that thprovision does not prevent the prosecutor from condua preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, tcase shall be deemed commenced only when it is filedcourt, whether or not the prosecution decides to condpreliminary investigation. This means that the runninthe prescriptive period shall be halted on the date theis actually filed in court and not on any date before th

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quAct No. 3326 which says that the period of prescriptioshall be suspended "when proceedings are institutedagainst the guilty party." The proceedings referred toSection 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary submission of the Solicitor General that they includeadministrative proceedings. His contention is that we not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a mof fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflictbetween the Rule on Summary Procedure and SectionRule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the formshould prevail as the special law. And if there be a cobetween Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules onCriminal Procedure, the latter must again yield becauCourt, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not

allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive runder Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irreleto observe that the decision would have been conformto Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was g
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oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Codewith arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period. By contrast, theprosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipalordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed sixmonths, and is thus covered by the Rule on SummaryProcedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, acrime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed

seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally ornot, he delays the institution of the necessary judicialproceedings until its too late. However, that possibilityshould not justify a misreading of the applicable rulesbeyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced fromtheir plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of themeaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent theproblem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crimeimputed to the petitioner commenced from its a llegedcommission on May 11, 1990, and ended two monthsthereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of thecomplaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor onMay 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. Thejudicial proceeding that could have interrupted the periodwas the filing of the information with the Municipal TrialCourt of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challengedOrder dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal CaseNo. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal,is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is soordered.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,vs.HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge,CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9thJudicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDOBAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial courtacting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by theProvincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary ofJustice to whom the case was e levated for review, mayrefuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignmentand trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala withthe approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information forestafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Courtof Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. When the case was set forarraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignmenton the ground that there was a pending petition for reviewfiled with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of theOffice of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of theinformation. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presidingjudge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied themotion. A motion for reconsideration of the order wasdenied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignmentwas deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine forpetitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for apreliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused inthe Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.06978. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appealsrestrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with thearraignment of the accused until further orders of theCourt. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor Generalhe recommended that the petition be given due course. OnMay 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court ofAppeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the

judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignmentof the accused in the case until the Department of Justiceshall have finally resolved the petition for review.

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review

reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissthe information filed against the accused. A motion todismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by theProvincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trialcourt, attaching thereto a copy of the letter ofUndersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposthereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied themotion and set the arraignment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to d ismiss this rase filed byprocuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidencesuggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident fAnnex "A" of the motion wherein, among other thingsFiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason thcheck involved having been issued for the payment opre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resothe innocence of the accused on evidence not before

on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justicematter that not only disregards the requirements of dprocess but also erodes the Court's independence andintegrity, the motion is considered as without merit atherefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby sDecember 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohiband mandamus with petition for the issuance of prelim

writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining orderCourt of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. S08777. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act ofarraignment of the accused until further orders from tCourt. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court ofAppeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraini
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order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration ofsaid decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolutionof February 19, 1980.

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed byaccused whereby petitioner prays that said decision bereversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetuallyenjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with thearraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case,declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal

force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss thesaid case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner aspurely civil.

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of thisCourt without giving due course to the petition required therespondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motionto dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In thecomment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends thatthe petition be g iven due course, it being meritorious.Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to thecomment and a separate comment to the petition askingthat the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved totransfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution ofFebruary 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give duecourse to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respectivebriefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieuof brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Courtof Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge beordered to dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions eithercommenced by complaint or by information shall beprosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The

institution of a criminal action depends upon the sounddiscretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file thecomplaint or information, follow or not follow thatpresented by the offended party, according to whether theevidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish theguilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason

for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction andcontrol of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfoundedprosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled bythe complainant. Prosecuting officers under the powervested in them by law, not only have the authority but alsothe duty of prosecuting persons who, according to theevidence received from the complainant, are shown to beguilty of a c rime committed within the jurisdiction of theiroffice. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecutewhen after an investigation they become convinced that the

evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a primafacie case.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation thatthe fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie casethat would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courtscannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control ofthe criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or evenpermissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute aproceeding originally initiated by him on an information, ifhe finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficientfor conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order thefiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain

period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal'sdiscretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, afiscal who asks for the d ismissal of the case for insufficiencyof evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grantthe same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate acase and subsequently move for the dismissal should there-investigation show either that the defendant is innocentor that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonabledoubt. In a clash of views between the judge who did notinvestigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal andthe offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal'sshould normally prevail. On the other hand, neither aninjunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may

be issued by the courts to restrain a criminalprosecution except in the extreme case where it isnecessary for the Courts to do so for the orderlyadministration of justice or to prevent the use of the strongarm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is notwithout any limitation or control. The same is subjectapproval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief staprosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevatedreview to the Secretary of Justice who has the power affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct thatmotion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwthat an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiacriminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdictiothe case, which is the authority to hear and determincase. When after the filing of the complaint or informwarrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himto the Court or was duly arrested, the Court therebyacquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exwarranting the prosecution of the accused is terminatupon the filing of the information in the proper court.turn, as above stated, the filing of said information semotion the criminal action against the accused in CouShould the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigof the case, at such stage, the permission of the Courbe secured. After such reinvestigation the finding andrecommendations of the fiscal should be submitted toCourt for appropriate action. While it is true that the fhas the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whethenot a criminal case should be filed in court or not, onccase had already been brought to Court whateverdisposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in thethereafter should be addressed for the consideration Court, The only qualification is that the action of the Cmust not impair the substantial rights of the accused right of the People to due process of law.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not andwhether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal oreview by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the


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exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny itand require that the trial on the merits proceed for theproper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grantthe motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directiveof the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in theprosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannotpossibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who doesnot believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the

fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the casethereby defying the superior order of the Secretary ofJustice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor asWe all know is to see that justice is done and notnecessarily to secure the conviction of the person accusedbefore the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to thecontrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with thepresentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court toenable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgmentas to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility ofappearing for the People of the Philippines even under suchcircumstances much less should he abandon theprosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a privateprosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null andvoid. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue toappear for the prosecution although he may turn over thepresentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor butstill under his direction and control.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once acomplaint or information is filed in Court any disposition ofthe case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of theaccused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Althoughthe fiscal retains the d irection and control of the

prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is alreadyin Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with thecase before it. The determination of the case is within itsexclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismissthe case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court

who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does notmatter if this is done before or after the arraignment of theaccused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigationor upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice whoreviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby theopinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the actionof the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, theSecretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain

from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from theaction of the fiscal, when the complaint or information hasalready been filed in Court. The matter should be leftentirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of meritwithout pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE,Petitioner v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]

December 13, 2005D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Aycoof Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabatoallowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People

v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of

Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to presentevidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, evenin the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote whowas prosecuting the case.

State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20,2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine HeartCenter in Quezon City, hence, his absence during theproceedings on the said dates.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of thecriminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004,

State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine thedefense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Aymaintaining that the proceedings conducted on Augusand 20, 2004 in his absence were void.

State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed aManifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial he restating why he was not present on August 13 an2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos a

allowing the defense to present evidence in his absen

erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that should not be coerced to cross-examine those twodefense witnesses and that their testimonies be strickthe record.

By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, JAyco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered theprosecution to have waived its right to cross-examinetwo defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) agaiJudge Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the

Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.

By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondeproffers that complainant filed the complaint to save

face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaishandling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in

complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Govof South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the caseSecretary of Justice.

And respondent informs that even after complwas already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, hea motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearin

On the above-said Manifestation filed by compbefore the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondbrands the same as misleading and highly question

complainants having undergone medical treatment at

Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 habeen relayed to the trial court only on said date.


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On his Order considering the prosecution to havewaived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the sameon complainants failure to formally offer the evidence forthe prosecution despite several extensions of time grantedfor the purpose.

Finally, respondent proffers that no substantialprejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainantwas permitted to cross examine the two defense witnessesbut he refused to do so.

By way of counter-complaint, respondent chargescomplainant with Contempt of Court and Grave

Misconduct and/or Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of

the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of theRevised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent tohave breached said rule and accordingly recommends thathe be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetitionof the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure reads:

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - Allcriminal actions commenced by a complaint or informationshall be prosecuted under the d irection and control of theprosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the eventof lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may beauthorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Officeor the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute thecase subject to the approval of the Court. Once soauthorized to prosecute the criminal action, the privateprosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to theend of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,

unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall beprosecuted under the control and direction of the publicprosecutor.

If the schedule of the public prosecutor does notpermit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors,a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by theChief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional StateProsecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to theapproval of the court. Once so authorized, the privateprosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until thetermination of the trial even in the absence of a public

prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwisewithdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the Peopleof the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the persondirectly prejudiced, he being merely the complainingwitness. It is on this account that the presence of a publicprosecutor in the trial of c riminal cases is necessary toprotect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interestto vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of thepeople.

Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the

defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public

prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for thepurpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules whichcould not be rectified by subsequently giving theprosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondents intention to uphold the right of theaccused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter hownoble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If theaccused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Respondents lament about complainants failure to

inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement

thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsiderationof his Orders allowing the defense to present its twowitnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does notabsolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco ishereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS

(P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the samsimilar acts in the future shall be dealt with more sev

Respecting the counter-complaint againstcomplainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respois advised that the same should be lodged before theSecretary of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179497PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee v.RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao delPENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur;Appellantsand BAGINDA PALAO (at large), Alias Abdul WaSultan, Accused.01/25/12D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the court is the center of this controversy. The well-know

though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is thfindings of facts and assessment of credibility of witneare matters best left to the trial court. Hence, [u]nlecertain facts of substance and value were overlookedif considered, might affect the result of the case, the courts assessment must be respected.

Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Dof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 0which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan CiBranch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convictingRenandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum

Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murde

On February 9, 1996, the following Information for mwas filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao (Palao) Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.
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That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the said accused, except for others whose cases arestill under preliminary investigation, conspiring with andconfederating together and mutually helping each other,armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, bymeans of treachery and evident premeditation, and withintent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R.Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical

injuries, to wit:

Cardio respiratory arrest

Hypovolemic shock

Multiple gunshot wound

which caused his death.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the RevisedPenal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treacheryand evident premeditation.

Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduledarraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-accused, Palao aliasAbdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellantspleaded not guilty and trial proceeded against them.

Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) in its brief and substantiated by thetranscripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are asfollows:

Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon,Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain Nito were

working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoons auto repairshop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, IliganCity.

Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied byappellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan.Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his

two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical greenfatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrestwarrant and told the latter he was serving it againstBatoon.

The arrival of Baginda Palaos group prompted Juanito

Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and observewhat was happening.

Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, asthey would settle the matter after he [Batoon] [finishes]tuning-up an engine he had been working on.

Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and

pointing a .45 caliber p istol at him. Baudelio Batoon thentried to grab Palaos gun, causing the two of them to

grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control ofthe gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind BaudelioBatoon, shot from behind Batoons right thigh with a .38

cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was alsostanding behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shootingBatoons left arm pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol.Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palaofinished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back.

Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene,stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantagepoints three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesseshad a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.

Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, thenCommanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile ForceCompany, was riding a civilian car a long the highway,heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied byhis driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. Theyheard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop atBaraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver tostop the car. They alighted and proceeded to the source of

the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men incamouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a personalready lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares group

shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what theywere doing and to drop their firearms, at the same timeannouncing that they (Mijares group) were policemen.

The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at thepolicemen. The latter fired back. During the exchangegunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan rantowards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijaresable to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yeelikewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to ginside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by thpolicemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Pbut he escaped.

Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas andAmpuan to the hospital for treatment and they wereeventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon wbrought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronodead on arrival.

Based on the necropsy examination of the victims bo

Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3)gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batooat the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflictedclose range due to the presence, or at least traces, ofgunpowder burns.

Only appellants testified for their defense. Theirtestimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follo

Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 3years old, married, carpenter and a resident of PiagapLanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, hin Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan Citsee a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arat the Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to thhouse of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind abouto a movie and returned to the Tambacan terminal in to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., AbduWahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on boar

car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to gothem because he will collect some money and afterwathey will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat atrear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the fseat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They droBaraas. They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid


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Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before walking away, AbdulWahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver withinstructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At firsthe refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted thegun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop leavingthe rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heardthree gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the doorwas open and saw policemen, who arrived and surroundedthe car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his handsas a sign of surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed

the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shothim on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. Helost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital.

He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend.He is also known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum Ampuan isnot known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.

He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo thatonly Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan enteredthe shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that thetestimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim isnot true. He denied any part in the shooting to death ofBaudelio Batoon.

Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 yearsold, single, student and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao delSur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he leftMarawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armakjeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the GaisanoSuperstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the storeand went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out,he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they walked tothe Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed theintention to go home to Marawi City. He accompaniedBessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded tothe house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North

of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which isSouth of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayedovernight at his Uncle Alis house. At about 9:00 a.m., the

following day, February 1, 1996, he left the house of hisuncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking fora certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help

him collect a debt. They went to the terminal at the back ofGaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him towait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store.Baginda returned without having found Baser and onceagain he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. Alittle later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by oneAminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal butagain did not find Baser. Instead, they saw RenandangMamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them toBaraas to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and

they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place neara shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain inthe car because he was going out to collect the debt.Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About tenminutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire. Hestepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao[shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police ledby Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key andarrested them except Baginda Palao who escaped. Theywere taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, thesustained wounds when mauled by the children of thevictim but in another breath he admitted that his injury wasa gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as

the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside thecar when he was hit. He further admitted that BagindaPalao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shootingBaudelio Batoon.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC debunked appellants defense of denial and held

them guilty as principals by direct participation in the killingof Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith andcredence to the evidence of the prosecution especially onthe presence of conspiracy among the malefactors andrendered a verdict of conviction, thus:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused RenandangMamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murderqualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 ofthe Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presenceof any other aggravating circumstances and hereby

sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLPERPETUA with the corresponding accessory penaltiesattached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs ofBaudelio Batoon the sums of:

P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;

P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;

P50,000.00 as death indemnity and

P100,000.00 for and as moral damages

without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

Cost against the accused.

Having been under preventive detention since Februa1996, the period of such detention shall be credited inin favor of said accused in the service of their respectsentences.

SO ORDERED.

In view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants

RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. BResolution dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolveaccept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants wererequired to file their brief. Appellants thus filed their bon November 20, 2000 while the OSG submitted the for the Plaintiff-Appellee on May 2, 2001. Later, howeconsonant with this Courts pronouncement in PeopleMateo the case was transferred to the CA for appropraction and disposition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeacourt affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Sacourt ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecutionwitnesses testimonies pointed out by the appellants only to minor and collateral matters which do not diluprobative weight of said test imonies. Regarding theerroneous designation of appellant Ampuans name in

Information, the court went on to hold that such erro


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only a formal defect and the proper correction of which wasduly made without any objection on the part of the defense.The CA likewise held that treachery attended thecommission of the crime.

The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is herebyDISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated July 19,1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas andPendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonabledoubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the RevisedPenal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and arehereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally,the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 byway of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 asactual damages.

SO ORDERED.

Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in

view of their Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the CA.

By Resolution dated November 19, 2007, this Court notifiedthe parties that they may file their respective supplementalbriefs within 30 days from notice. In their respectivemanifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs theyearlier filed as their supplemental briefs.

In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:

That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when theyshould have been acquitted for fa ilure of the prosecution toprove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and

The information filed before the t rial court was substantiallydefective.

The basic thrust of appellants first assignment of error is

the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellantscontend that the trial court anchored its finding and

conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo(Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp.Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent intheir stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable.They question the prosecution witnesses identification ofAbdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and averthat the same only leads to the logical conclusion that saidwitnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue thatAmpuan failed to grasp the information read to him as hewas arraigned as Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum

Ampuan.

On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance ofthe appealed Decision, opines that inconsistencies on minorand collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecutioneyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contendsthat whatever defect the information subject of appellantAmpuans arraignment has had been cured with the latters

consent during the trial.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried tocast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo anchored onthe following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistencyin his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before theincident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incidentwithout giving any assistance to his fallen employer as wellas his immediate return to work thereafter is contrary tohuman nature and experience; (3) while he testified thatappellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspectsduring the encounter, he failed to identify him in court;and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan asone and the same person but later on testified to thecontrary.

Credibility of witnesses not affected by minorinconsistencies.

The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knowsAmpuan even before the incident is inconsequential as todiscredit the credibility of Gepayos testimony. The

inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effthe nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies thawitness was neither coached nor was lying on the witstand. What matters is that there is no inconsistency Gepayos complete and vivid narration as far as the

principal occurrence and the positive identification ofAmpuan as one of the principal assailants areconcerned.The Court has held that although there minconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on min

details, they do not impair their credibility where therconsistency in relating the principal occurrence and pidentification of the assailant.

It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a saferduring the shooting incident and did not render assistto his wounded employer. To appellants, this reactioncontrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. Thisimputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarilydiminish the plausibility of Gepayos story let alone de

his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the boundsexpected human behavior. Surely, he was afraid that might kill him because the malefactors were then armwith guns. Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop tand stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is sett

that different people react differently to a given situaor type of situation, and there is no standard form ofhuman behavioral response when one is confronted wstrange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessingcrime is an unusual experience which elicits differentreactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cstandard form of behavior can be drawn.

The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in courtnot bolster appellants cause. As the CA correctly poin

out:

x x x We agree with the prosecutions observation thaalthough he did not positively identify appellantMamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was howeverto point out that there was a third person who accomassailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victiduring the incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mij


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testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their gunsat the victim who was already lying prostrate on theground.

In any event, even without Gepayos identification of

Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of anotherprosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points toMamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:

Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid togetherwith two companions, presented the warrant of arrest toyour father, what happened thereafter?

A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.

Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] yourfather?

A: Abdul Wahid, Sir

Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed[at] your father?

A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from AbdulWahid, Sir.

Q: What happened after?

A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.

Q: Who [first shot] your father?

A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x xx his name[,] he answered that he is RenandangMamaruncas)

x x x x

Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father,

what happened thereafter?

A: The other companion fired the next shot (witnesspointing to a person sitting at the bench inside theCourtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, heanswered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)

Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo andBatoon on material details are straightforward andconsistent with each other. They personally saw appellantsat the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.Their combined declarations established beyond reasonabledoubt the identities of both appellants, along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.

As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul WahidSultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the same person

in his affidavit and yet later on testified to the contrary, thisCourt finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightlyjustify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recentcase, this Court reiterated that as between an affidavitexecuted outside the court and a testimony given in opencourt, the latter almost always prevails. It emphasizedtherein that:

Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony incourt do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused.Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witnesssince ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do notpurport to contain a complete compendium of the details ofthe event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings

generally consider sworn statements taken out of court tobe inferior to in court testimony (citation omitted).

The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that itwas the police officers who supplied the names of thesuspects in Gepayos affidavit.

Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.

Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that theInformation filed before the trial court was substantiallydefective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan asone and the same person when in fact they were identified

as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able tocomprehend the Information read to him.

The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is wellto note that appellants failed to raise the issue of thedefective Information before the trial court through amotion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the

information. Their failure to object to the a lleged defebefore entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to waiver of the defect in the Information. Objections a

matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation canbe made for the first time on appeal.Records even sthat the Information was accordingly amended duringto rectify this alleged defect but appellants did notcomment thereon, viz:

FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:

Per manifestation and admission of this witness, theInformation be amended from [Renandang] Mamarunand the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao aliAbdul Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan erased as corrected.

COURT:

Any comment from the accused.

ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:

No comment, Your Honor.

Treachery correctly appreciated.

From the evidence and as found by the trial court andaffirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently that treachery was employed by appellants. The attacBaudelio was so swift and unexpected, affo

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