Cases for BAIL ~ Criminal Procedure

Cases for BAIL ~ Criminal Procedure

Santiago v. Vasquez

FACTSAn information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

ISSUEWhether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.

HELDThe petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

Paderanga v. People

FACTSOn 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19 April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5 November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, 6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUEWhether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail, and whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutors evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or grant the application of bail, respectively.

HELDPaderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.

People v. Donato

FACTSSalas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUEWhether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELDThe SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

Commendador v. De Villa

FACTSThe petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-TrialInvestigatingOfficers for the allegedparticipationthe failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial ofdue process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisionallibertyand a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisionalliberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition forhabeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding afterhearingthat no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

ISSUEWhether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail

HELDThe right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with therequirementsofdue processand the right to a speedy trial. The AFP SpecialInvestigatingCommittee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack ofmerit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Government v. Purganan

FACTSPursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez.A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued.Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez topost bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUEWhether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuanceof warrant of arrest

HELDExtradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for thepurpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent of easier andfaster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crimeand evading prosecution has becomemore frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to lookupon extradition as the majoreffective instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and international law.

Al-Ghoul v. CA

FACTSHerein petitioners are detention prisoners who were arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search conducted pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a motion for bail. However, the resolution of the same was held in abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently, the trial court issued the Order dated February 19, 1996 denying petitioners motion for bail on the ground that the law under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned orders issued by the trial court admitting the evidence of the prosecution and denying petitioners motion for bail. In its Decision dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the assailed orders of trial court, hence this case. On October 30, 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging that with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866, the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are being charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of the strength of evidence against them.

ISSUEWhether or not the petitioner thru the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866 reducing the penalty for the crime charge against him is now entitled to bail.

HELDConsequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period[11] and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which provides as follows:SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.x x x. (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.

Obosa v. CA

FACTSOn 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August 1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong. During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly, Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At the time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver. In its decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6 September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUEWhether the bailbond was validly approved by the trial court.

HELDSince Obosa did file the written notice of appeal on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. While bail was granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990 when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed. As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction then thebailbond was never validly approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the petition should be dismissed.Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Herein, while Obosa, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense.

Bravo v. Borja Jr.

FACTS

ISSUE

HELD

Padilla v. CA

FACTSPetition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Accuses Robin Carino Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolverPadilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).

ISSUEWON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

HELDNo. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) Search of moving vehicle, Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.

People v. Gako Jr.

FACTSRafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan. On 9 July 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. (Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On 6 August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the prosecution having crossexamined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report. On 15 July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. On 20 November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its Decision dated 18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995, the criminal case was set anew for trial. The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the prosecutions Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on the confinement of Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10 November 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on 10 February 1998. On 20 March 1998, Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 471460) before the Court of Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of Judge Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Pea. The petition was signed by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. On 26 March 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2) that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed by counsel for Galan, not by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through counsel, filed a Motion for reconsideration of said Resolution indicating that the OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same date, the OSG manifested before the Court of Appeals that it was joining Galan in her petition and was adopting her petition as its own. On 18 June 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency. The OSG received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari.

ISSUEWhether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the voluminous records of the case, without necessarily hearing the prosecution.

HELDThe assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Basedon the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis. Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judges findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November 1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report when 9 had already passedfrom the time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endangerhis life.

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan

FACTSEdward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000,Chavit accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient.The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan. The accused, herein petitioner took alllegal remedy to bailbut consequently due to numerous petitions andmotion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed forissuance of habeas corpus

ISSUEWON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition for bail;

HELDAlthough he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held thatarraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash.Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law.This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other.

People v. Calo Jr.

FACTS

ISSUE

HELD

Espiritu v. Jovellanos

FACTS

ISSUE

HELD

Yusop v. Sandiganbayan

FACTSActing on an Affidavit-Complaint3filed by a certain ErlindaFadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order4dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, PelaezPantaran, Eduardo Dablo, EfrenSissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also required respondents, within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998,5recommending the prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned.

ISSUEWhether or not the Sanduganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.

HELDPreliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."7The Court explained that the rationale of preliminary investigation is to "protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer." The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court.9The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial court. "If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so the the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

Okabe v. Gutierez

FACTSCecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; theaffidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the partieswere not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.

ISSUEWhether or not the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack ofaffidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyamaand the latters documentary evidence, as well as thecounter-affidavit of the petitioner.

HELDYes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

EndSAFA

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