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August 1999

Prepared by: Jay S. Albanese, Ph.D.Virginia Commonwealth University

For: American Gaming Association

Casino Gambling and White-Collar Crime:An Examination of theEmpirical Evidence

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Table Of Contents

Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................................................................................3

Introduction............................................................................................................................................3

White-Collar Crime and Street Crime .........................................................................................................................6

Should We Expect a Casino—White-Collar Crime Link ........................................................................7

White-Collar Crimes in Nine of the Largest Casino Markets............................................................7

Arrest Trends in Non-Casino Markets.......................................................................................................................12

Comparison to National Trends.........................................................................................................................................13

Embezzlement and Gambling ..............................................................................................................................................14

The Motivations to Embezzle ...............................................................................................................................................16

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................................................................19

References ..................................................................................................................................................................................................21

About the Author ...............................................................................................................................................................................24

To Receive Copies ..............................................................................................................................................................................25

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Executive Summary

This report investigates the alleged link between casino gambling and the commission of white-collarcrimes. The overwhelming majority of casino customers are people over the age of 25 who work at legit-imate jobs and spend a portion of their income on games of chance. The rapid expansion of casino gam-ing venues in recent years is said to have increased the incidence of white-collar crimes by casino cus-tomers who get themselves in financial trouble by overspending at casinos.

This study investigates this empirical question by using several kinds of data to examine crime andoffender trends in five different ways:

• Trends in embezzlement, forgery and fraud both before and after the introduction of casino gamblingin nine of the largest casino markets.

• Embezzlement, forgery and fraud arrest trends in two comparable jurisdictions without casinos.• Comparison of these city-by-city trends to national trends in embezzlement, forgery, and fraud over the

last decade.• Content analysis of articles published in USA Today over a 10-year period that include mention of

embezzlement and gambling.• Assessment of the reasons offered by people arrested for embezzlement to examine the extent to which

gambling is a causal factor.

This study is the most comprehensive examination to date of the impact of casino gambling on white-collar crime.

The results do not support the claim that casino gambling contributes significantly to trends in embezzlement, forgery, and fraud. In addition to statistical data that document arrest trends, interviewswith convicted embezzlers reveal that single factors do not cause embezzlement. Instead, it is the way in which a person defines a financial problem as non-shareable or a threat to the stability of one’s family that is important in the causal chain. Measures to reduce the instance of this conduct in the future are outlined.

Introduction

• An Omaha, Neb., woman pleaded no contest to stealing more than $100,000 from an elderly womanshe cared for, claiming she used the money at a casino.1

• A Madison, Wis., man told investigators he forged checks stolen from a former employer to feed his gam-bling at Ho Chunk Casino. Several other cases in Wisconsin led an assistant district attorney to remark that“a growing number of the white-collar crimes we prosecute involve either drugs or gambling.”2

• Federal prosecutors in Iowa had eight cases during a two-year period in which suspects admittingembezzling funds or using stolen credit cards to gamble.3

• A theater clerk in Minneapolis was convicted of embezzling more than $300,000 from the theater andwas sentenced to 30 months in federal prison and three years of supervised release with mandatorytreatment for compulsive gambling.4

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1 Angie Brunkow, “Woman Found Guilty in Bilking,” Omaha World-Herald 10 Nov. 1998: 1.2 Richard W. Jaeger, “Gambling Breeds Unlikely Criminals,” Wisconsin State Journal 26 Aug. 1996: 6a.3 Frank Santiago, “Authorities Link Gambling to Cases of Theft,” The Des Moines Register 11 Nov. 1997: 6.4 Dennis J. McGrath, “Gambling-Related Crime is Costly to Taxpayers,” Star Tribune [Minneapolis] 4 Dec. 1995: 6a.

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5 Douglas Montero, “Casinos Would Increase White-Collar, Organized Crime,” The Plain Dealer 1 March 1995: 10; see PatriciaA. Stokowski, Riches and Regrets: Betting on Gambling in Two Colorado Towns (Niwot, Colo: University of Colorado Press,1996) 211-12.

6 See William V. Ackerman, “Casinos Have Proven Beneficial to Deadwood, South Dakota,” and Elizabeth Manning, “CasinosHave Ruined Deadwood, South Dakota,” Legalized Gambling, ed. M.E. Williams (San Diego: Greenwood Press, 1999), 97-110; Vicki Abt, James F. Smith, Eugene M. Christiansen, “Misconceptions Abound in the Debate Over Legalized Gambling,”Legalized Gambling: For and Against, ed. R.L. Evans and M. Hance (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998), 392-434.

These events occurred in different states, but they all involved some kind of embezzlement, forgery, orfraud to support gambling behavior. On the other hand, police officials in Alton, Ill.; Joliet, Ill.;Davenport, Iowa, and elsewhere have reported that crime has not increased there, despite the availabilityof casino gambling. It was thought that “white-collar crimes would increase and organized crime figureswould start showing up. But basically, there haven’t been any problems.”5

Are these events isolated incidents, or are they evidence of larger trends? Do offenders or prosecutorsblame casino gambling as a primary cause of theft, when other causes are more influential? Is the expe-rience of police officials the same in all casino jurisdictions? Arguments for and against casino gamblinghave often relied on anecdotal accounts to make their case, but they are not a sufficient basis for publicpolicy decisions that affect thousands and perhaps millions of people.6

In order to separate anecdotal from objective evidence, it is necessary to gather larger numbers of casesthan individual incidents provide. In this way trends can be assessed over a period of years in a numberof different jurisdictions. This ensures that conclusions are based on the consensus of evidence, ratherthan on isolated incidents that may or may not be representative of the situation in general. In addition,interviews with large numbers of convicted embezzlers and fraud offenders can provide insights into theextent to which specific factors play a role in this kind of criminal behavior.

The spread of casino gambling in recent years began with Atlantic City, which opened its first casino in1978 and opened a total of nine large casino-hotels within a period of five years. By 1998, Atlantic Cityhad a total of 35,057 slot machines and 1,516 gaming tables in 12 casinos. This translates into 44,153“gaming positions” at which customers can sit or stand and gamble. Other cities approached casinodevelopment more cautiously. Outside Nevada, no other city has even half the gambling capacity (“posi-tions”) of Atlantic City. Table 1 presents the relative size of casino gambling in nine of the largest gam-ing markets in the United States.

It is clear that most casino development is considerably smaller than that experienced in Las Vegas orAtlantic City, where casinos form the basis for the local economy. In most other jurisdictions, there arefewer casinos and fewer gaming positions.

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Table 1 Largest Casino Markets by Total Available Gaming Positions7

Casino Jurisdiction Number of Gaming PositionsLas Vegas, NV 89,483

Atlantic City, NJ 44,153Tunica, MS 18,719

Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 15,792Kansas City, MO 11,284

St. Louis, MO 8,978Lake Charles, LA 7,269Shreveport, LA 5,666Vicksburg, MS 3,913

Because these nine cities are among the largest casino markets, they were chosen for inclusion in thisstudy. As gaming positions increase, the opportunities for casino gambling expand correspondingly.Therefore, any impact on crime should be manifested most clearly in the largest casino markets. This isoffset to some extent, however, by the size of the population within commuting distance to the casinosand by other potential factors. These include:

• the availability of competing forms of entertainment in the area • the age composition of the local population (i.e., older and more likely to go to a casino or younger

and less so)• the extent to which the casino draws patrons from far outside its immediate area• the length of stay of these visitors• the nature of employment and income-level of casino patrons

These factors are all measurable, but with great difficulty. This is because precise counts of casino visi-tors, their origin and length of stay, age distribution and backgrounds, and their behavior upon theirreturn home are hard to track with accuracy across different jurisdictions. City-level data such as this areimportant when considering any kind of economic development in the entertainment industry, but theyare generally not kept in reliable fashion and almost never measured regularly over a period of time.

As a result, this study focuses on white-collar crime trends in nine of the largest casino gaming markets.It is important to be clear, however, about what it meant by white-collar crime.

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7 Las Vegas is the only Nevada city examined in this study because it is the largest. Nevada is also unique because its legal gam-bling dates to the 1930s, and the entire state economy is based on casino gambling.

8 Edwin Sutherland, “White-Collar Criminality,” American Sociological Review 5 (1940): 1-12.9 For a summary of the contemporary debate over the scope of white-collar crime, see Proceedings of the Academic Workshop—

White-Collar Crime Definitional Dilemma: Can and Should There Be a Universal Definition of White-Collar Crime?(Morgantown, W.Va.: National White-Collar Crime Center — Training and Research Institute, 1996).

10 Edwin Sutherland, White-Collar Crime (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949) 9. 11 Jay Albanese, White-Collar Crime in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995). chs. 3-5.

White-Collar Crime and Street Crime

The generic term “white-collar crime” was invented by sociologist Edwin Sutherland in 1939. Hereferred to crimes by “persons of high social status” that are committed in the course of one’s occupa-tion as white-collar crimes.8 The term encompasses a variety of specific offenses, some of which may becommitted by persons of low social status (i.e., fraud or forgery), and outside the course of one’s occu-pation (i.e., credit card fraud). There continues to be debate among researchers over the precise scope ofthe term white-collar crime.9 Sutherland’s primary thrust, however, was that the historical bias towardstudying only the crimes of the poor (i.e., street crimes) is as significant “as it would be if the scholarsselected only red-haired criminals for study and reached the conclusion that redness of hair was thecause of crime.”10

In practical terms white-collar crimes include crimes of theft by deception (rather than by force orstealth), crimes against public administration (obstructing government processes), and regulatory offens-es (that impact public health, safety or welfare).11 Unfortunately, there do not exist national counts ofthese offenses, despite their seriousness. Unlike street crimes, such as robbery, burglary and assault,which are counted annually nationwide, there are no comparable counts of white-collar crimes. The onlynational source of data regarding white-collar crimes is provided by arrest statistics. Most police depart-ments report arrests they make each year for 27 offenses; three of these can be considered white-collarcrimes. They are embezzlement, forgery and fraud.

• Embezzlement – the conversion or misappropriation of property entrusted to someone.• Forgery – the making of false legal documents or altering of existing documents, including counter-

feiting (forgery of U.S. currency).• Fraud – larceny by trick or possession of property obtained by deception.

Each of these offenses involves taking money or property by deception or through a violation of finan-cial trust, rather than by force or stealth, which characterizes street crimes.

As previously noted, police report only arrest statistics each year for these offenses. Crimes may not bereported and, if reported, arrests not made. Therefore, arrests always undercount the true extent of anycrime. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe there is a high correlation between offenses known to thepolice and arrests for these crimes. This is because it is unlikely that an embezzlement, forgery, or fraudwill be reported to police until a victim is reasonably sure that he or she has been victimized. Onceaware, victims of these crimes usually have a good idea of who was the perpetrator.

Street crimes are not considered in this study. They have been studied a great deal in recent years bothbefore and after casino development, and in casino and non-casino cities. These street crime studies varya great deal in the time periods they cover, the cities included, and the crime-related factors they consid-

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er. As a result, there are some differences in findings among these studies. The consensus among thesestudies, however, indicates that casino gambling does not have a significant impact on street crimes.12

Given the typical age of casino patrons, this finding might be expected because casinos do not attractlarge numbers of young people (who commit most street crimes). This circumstance led to the presentstudy to investigate whether the comparatively older casino patrons engage in white-collar crimes to support their spending at casinos.13

Should We Expect a Casino—White-Collar Crime Link?

Some observers claim that there is a direct relationship between the availability of casino gambling andwhite-collar crime. It is alleged that some people will overspend in casinos, develop regular or compul-sive gambling habits, and steal from their employers or others as a way to support their continued gam-bling.14 Perhaps the most widely quoted source is the American Insurance Institute, which has been saidto estimate that 40 percent of all white-collar crime is related to gambling. This statistic has been citedby both writers and politicians in arguing against casino gambling.15 But an investigation by JosephKelly, a professor of business, discovered that the American Insurance Institute does not exist and appar-ently never did. He also found no basis to support the 40 percent statistic.16 As a result, there has been agreat deal of rhetoric about casino gambling and white-collar crimes without many facts, and no system-atic data to support the views expressed.

There is intuitive appeal, however, to the notion that white-collar crimes might increase. The increase incheck-cashing and general economic activity created in and around casinos could result in increases inforgery, fraud, and embezzlement. In fact, the casinos themselves may well be the targets of thesecrimes. These offenses would be expected to occur most often near the casino locations, given the largenumber of check and cash transactions that occur inside casinos.

White-Collar Crimes in Nine of the Largest Casino Markets

Arrest data was obtained from the FBI crime reporting unit to which local police departments send theircrime statistics each year. Arrests made each year of adults aged 18 and older from 1988 through 1996(the latest year available) were included. This time period was selected because most casinos opened inthese jurisdictions during the early 1990s, allowing for before and after comparison of arrests. Also,juveniles were excluded due to the infrequency with which they are arrested for these crimes andbecause they are generally excluded from participation in casino gambling.

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12 For a summary and review of many of these studies, see William Miller and Martin D. Schwartz, “Casino Gambling and StreetCrime,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 124-137; Jeremy Margolis, Casinosand Crime: An Analysis of the Evidence (Washington, D.C.: American Gaming Association, 1997); Jay Albanese, “Predicting theImpact of Casino Gambling on Crime and Law Enforcement,” in Gambling: Public Policy and the Social Sciences, ed. W.Eadington and J. Cornelius (Reno: Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commerical Gaming, 1997).

13 The issue of organized crime has been considered elsewhere, although a detailed empirical study in multiple jurisdictions hasyet to be conducted. See Jay Albanese, “Casino Gambling and Organized Crime: More Than Reshuffling the Deck,”Contemporary Issues in Organized Crime, ed. J. Albanese (Monsey, N.Y.: Willow Tree Press, 1995), 1-17.

14 See Paul Simon, “Gambling Has High Social Costs and Should be Restricted by the Government,” Legalized Gambling: Forand Against, ed. R.L. Evans and M. Hance (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998) 201-18; William N. Thompson, LegalizedGambling, second edition (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1997); John W. Kindt, “The Economic Impacts of LegalizedGambling Activities,” Drake Law Review 43 (1994): 51-95.

15 Simon 212; Robert Goodman, The Luck Business (New York: The Free Press, 1995) 50.16 Joseph Kelly, “The American Insurance Institute, Like THAT Bunny, Keeps Going and Going and Going..” Gaming Law

Review 1 (1997): 209-12.

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Figure 1 Las Vegas

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

■ Fraud 947 888 930 869 801 891 940 1,010 999▲ Forgery 226 217 333 368 372 457 431 243 165✱ Embezzlement 221 229 267 196 163 176 237 167 131

Figure 1 displays the trends in arrests in Las Vegas from 1988 through 1996. Although casinos haveexisted for many years in Las Vegas, the city grew to record numbers of casinos, hotel rooms, and visi-tors because of expansion of existing sites and the opening of new casino-hotels during the 1990s.17

Figure 1 shows that despite this increased capacity, embezzlement arrests fell by 41 percent, forgeryarrests dropped by 27 percent, and fraud arrests increased by only 5 percent over this period.

Nevertheless, Las Vegas is a unique city, so it is important to look at the experience of other jurisdictionswith casino gambling. Figure 2 displays trends in arrests for the three white-collar offenses in AtlanticCity. The decline in arrests for these offenses is even more dramatic than in Las Vegas. Over the nine-year period, arrests for embezzlement dropped 44 percent, forgery declined by 72 percent, and fraudarrests dropped by 86 percent. This is a remarkable finding, given increased casino capacity and visitorsto Atlantic City over the last nine years. There are now more than 12,000 hotel rooms there and morethan 44,000 gaming positions there.

Figure 2 Atlantic City

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

■ Fraud 164 130 135 111 106 97 35 16 23▲ Forgery 53 66 41 63 37 86 16 23 15✱ Embezzlement 16 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 9

Figure 3 displays arrests trends in Memphis, Tenn., the city closest to Tunica, Miss., which is the third-largest casino jurisdiction. Many visitors to Tunica come from the Memphis area. Similar to Atlantic

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17 Kevin Heubusch, “Taking Chances on Casinos,” Legalized Gambling, ed. M.E. Williams (San Diego: Greenhaven Press,1999) 23-31.

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City, there was an overall decline in arrests for all three white-collar crimes: embezzlement (-4 percent),forgery (-86 percent), and fraud (-98 percent). The first casinos opened there in 1992. The 1994-96decline in arrests reflects that experienced for the entire nine-year period.

Figure 3 Memphis

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The fourth-largest casino jurisdiction is Biloxi-Gulfport, Miss., located on the Gulf of Mexico. The cityof Biloxi reported arrests to the FBI for only three of the nine years during 1988-1996, so only the cityof Gulfport can be included here. As Figure 4 indicates, Gulfport police reported significant increases inarrests for all three white-collar crimes. Since 1988, embezzlement arrests rose from eight to 30 arrests,forgery increased from six to 73 arrests, and fraud went up from six to 113 arrests.

Some of this increase may be due to annexation of land by the city of Gulfport. In January 1994, Gulfportnearly doubled its geographic area and increased its population by approximately 50 percent due to a landannexation. This increase in population could be expected to increase the likelihood of crimes.

The first casinos opened in Biloxi-Gulfport in 1992, and the increase in arrests for these offensesappears to have slowed since then. For the 1992-96 period, arrests for embezzlement are up from 25 to 30 arrests, forgery is up from 29 to 73 arrests, and fraud increased from 24 to 113 arrests.

Figure 4 Gulfport

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In Kansas City, Mo., the fifth-largest casino jurisdiction, arrest rates were inconsistent. Figure 5 indi-cates that embezzlement and fraud arrests rose (+185 percent and +42 percent, respectively), whereasforgery arrests declined by 24 percent from 1988-1996.

Figure 5 Kansas City

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996


The first casinos opened in Kansas City in 1994. Since then, changes in arrests have slowed.Embezzlement is up from 17 to 34 arrests, forgery increased by one arrest, and fraud is up by 39 arrests.These are smaller changes than was seen before casinos opened there.

St. Louis reported only one embezzlement arrest over the nine-year period, and both forgery and fraudarrests dropped (by 16 percent and 40 percent, respectively), as summarized in Figure 6. Casinos firstopened in St. Louis in 1994. Since then, forgery arrests are up 36 percent while fraud arrests are down 2 percent.

Figure 6 St. Louis

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The seventh-largest casino jurisdiction, Lake Charles, La., did not report any embezzlement arrests overthe nine-year period, but both forgery (-60 percent) and fraud (-94 percent) arrests dropped significantly.These arrest trends are presented in Figure 7.

Figure 7 Lake Charles

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996


Casinos first opened in Lake Charles in 1994. Since then, both forgery and fraud arrests have continuedto decline.

Shreveport, La., reported a total of only nine embezzlement arrests from 1988 through 1996, whileforgery and fraud arrests were inconsistent. Forgery arrests declined by 59 percent over this period,while fraud arrests rose by 337 percent. These trends are presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8 Shreveport

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996


Casinos opened in Shreveport in 1994. Since then, forgery arrests have dropped 62 percent and fraudarrests have decreased 15 percent, and there were eight arrests for embezzlement.

The ninth-largest casino jurisdiction, Vicksburg, Miss., reported widely varying arrest trends.Embezzlement arrests rose from six to 24 over the nine-year period, while forgery arrests declined from22 to three. Fraud arrests increased, however, from six to 92 as shown in Figure 9. The first casinosopened in Vicksburg in 1993. Since then, arrest trends have been somewhat less pronounced withembezzlement arrests rising from 11 to 24. Forgery dropped from 31 arrests to three, and fraudsincreased from 27 to 92.

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Figure 9 Vicksburg

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To summarize, the nine-year arrest trends in these large casino cities were not consistent. Embezzlementarrests increased in four cities, but declined in three others between 1988-1996. Forgery arrests increasedin only one city, but declined in eight others, and fraud arrests increased in five cities, while theydecreased in four. For all three of these white-collar crimes combined (for all nine cities), therefore,there was a total of 10 increases in arrests and 15 decreases between 1988-1996. When looking at onlypost-casino years, the trends still show more declines than increases in arrests for white-collar crimes.These results indicate that there have been more net decreases over time than there have been increasesin arrests for embezzlement, forgery and fraud among the largest casino jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, these trends may simply reflect arrest trends that are occurring in similar cities withoutbenefit of casinos. This possibility is assessed in the next section.

Arrest Trends in Non-Casino Markets

One way to assess whether arrest trends for embezzlement, forgery and fraud are connected to casinogambling is to examine trends for these offenses in similar cities that lack casinos. Similar patternswould suggest that forces other than casino gambling are driving the arrest rates.

It is recognized, of course, that no two cities are exactly alike. There are always differences betweenjurisdictions that may affect arrest trends (including age and income distribution, employment patterns,the nature of the local economy, and so on). In addition, casino visitors often come from non-casinojurisdictions. Nevertheless, crime impacts would be expected to be felt most severely near casino markets due to the large number of cash and check transactions that occur in and around casinos, and the fact that visitors often come from the immediate area. The results of these city-to-city comparisonsare fascinating.

Table 2 summarizes the comparisons of Las Vegas-Orlando, Fla., and Atlantic City-Myrtle Beach, S.C. It can be seen that arrest trends for embezzlement, forgery and fraud in Orlando were similar to those in Las Vegas. Embezzlement and forgery arrests dropped, while fraud arrests increased only slightly. The declines were larger in Orlando, but police there did not report arrests for these crimes to the FBIfor 1988, 1989, 1991 and 1996, so the Orlando data reflect information for only five years during theperiod 1988-1996.

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Table 2 Las Vegas and Atlantic City Arrest Trends with Comparison Cities(Nine-year trends 1988-1996, except for Orlando 1990-1995)

Offense Las Vegas Orlando Atlantic City Myrtle BeachEmbezzlement -41% -81% -44% 0 (None reported)Forgery -27% -49% -72% +28%Fraud + 5% + 1% -86% +173%

Trends in Myrtle Beach arrests rose (except for embezzlement for which there were no reported arrestsover the 9-year period). In Atlantic City, arrests dropped in every category.

For the other cities, obtaining multiple-city comparisons was difficult due to problems in identifyingjurisdictions that were at all comparable or that were not major feeder markets to casino jurisdictions. Inaddition, a number of cities have not regularly reported annual arrest statistics to the FBI, making com-parisons impossible.

The data from city-to-city comparisons are suggestive, rather than conclusive, given the inherent differencesin every jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the findings of the Las Vegas-Orlando and Atlantic City-Myrtle Beachcomparisons are remarkable and do not suggest a unique white-collar crime impact in casino markets.

Comparison to National Arrest Trends

Another possibility remains that trends in white-collar crimes in casino jurisdictions are higher thannational trends over the same period. The reasoning might be that greater opportunities for embezzle-ment, forgery, and fraud exist in casino jurisdictions in general and therefore arrests for these crimes willbe higher than in the nation as a whole. In order to examine the merit of this claim, national arrest datafor these offenses were gathered for the period 1988-1996. These data are summarized in Figure 10.

Figure 10 National Arrest Trends

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

✱ Embezzlement 11699 13034 12055 10602 11707 10916 11614 11605 11449

▲ Forgery 73165 80979 74393 77066 88649 89487 93003 91991 88355

■ Fraud 260848 289996 279776 292597 346314 335580 330752 320046 324776

The figure shows that there were 11,699 arrests nationwide for embezzlement in 1988, and that thisnumber fluctuated somewhat over the next nine years ending in 11,449 arrests in 1996, an overalldecline of 2 percent. There were 73,165 arrests nationwide for forgery in 1988, a number that rose andpeaked in 1994 resulting ultimately in 88,355 arrests by 1996, an overall increase of 21 percent. Therewere 260,848 arrests nationwide for fraud in 1988, a number that increased to 324,776 in 1996, a nine-year increase of 25 percent. It is clear that arrests nationwide for forgery and fraud have increased sig-nificantly, whereas arrests for embezzlement have decreased slightly.

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18 See Jay S. Albanese, “The Effect of Casino Gambling on Crime,” Federal Probation Quarterly 49 (June 1985): 39-44;William Miller and Martin D. Schwartz, “Casino Gambling and Street Crime,” Annals of the American Academy of Politicaland Social Science 556 (March 1998): 124-137.

A comparison of these national trends with arrest trends in casino jurisdictions shows a marked differ-ence. Figure 11 tallies the total arrests for white-collar crimes in the nine largest casino jurisdictions overthe same nine-year period.

Figure 11 Total Arrests for White-Collar Crimes in Nine of the Largest Casino Markets

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01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996


For all nine casino markets, combined embezzlement arrests increased from 269 in 1988 to 271 in 1996,an increase of 1 percent. This compares to a national decline of 2 percent for the crime of embezzle-ment. For forgery and fraud the differences are considerably larger. Arrests for forgery declined by 27 percent from 1988 to 1996 in casino jurisdictions (from 1,250 to 917) compared to a nationwideincrease of 21 percent in forgery arrests. In similar fashion, arrests for fraud decreased 12 percent from 1988 to 1996 (from 2,122 to 1,877). This compares to a nationwide increase of 25 percent in fraud arrests.

For the crimes of forgery and fraud, therefore, casino jurisdictions reported significant decreases inarrests whereas the nation as a whole experienced considerable increases. This suggests that the presenceof casino gambling did not contribute to the national increase in forgery and fraud arrests. In fact, theopposite occurred: arrests for these offenses actually declined in the largest casino markets. This is aremarkable finding because it omits the impact of the large number of visitors to these casino markets.The risk per person undoubtedly has declined even further, given the increases in the average daily pop-ulations of these cities that resulted from casino gambling. It would require accurate city-by-city visitorand length-of-stay statistics to determine the precise extent of the decrease in risk.18 Arrests for embez-zlement are considered in the next section.

Embezzlement and Gambling

As the previous section indicates, arrests for embezzlement in nine of the largest casino marketsincreased by 1 percent since 1998. Nationwide, arrests decreased by 2 percent. These changes are slight,but worthy of further consideration.

Perhaps the most important question that remains unanswered in the preceding analysis is “what role didgambling play in any of the embezzlement, forgery, and fraud arrests reported to police?” Crime statis-

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tics provide no information about whether the offenses had any connection to gambling or whether theywere the result of simple greed, alcoholism, drug use, or any one of a wide range of motivations thatmight be used as a reason to commit embezzlement, forgery, or fraud.

In order to examine the extent to which gambling plays a role in these crimes, it is necessary to havedetailed knowledge of each reported case of embezzlement. This is impossible because police do notusually record information about offender motivation, and offenders are often reluctant to discuss theirmotivations. In addition, an effort to track down the offenders caught in the 271 arrests for embezzle-ment that occurred in nine of the largest casino markets in 1996 would be an expensive undertaking. Asan alternative, a content analysis of articles appearing in the newspaper USA Today was undertaken forthe period 1988 through November 1998. A search of all articles with the keywords of “gambling” and“embezzlement” was carried out to assess whether the offender’s reason for the embezzlement was relat-ed to gambling. (Forgery and fraud were not examined in the newspaper analysis because these offensesdid not increase in casino jurisdictions between 1988 and 1996, as shown in the previous section). Table3 presents the results of this analysis.

Table 3 Content Analysis of Articles Appearing in USA Today(Search using keywords of “gambling” and “embezzlement”)

Type of Article Number of Times It AppearedArticle links embezzlement case to gambling 10 Embezzlement attributed to other causes 16Embezzlement with no motivation given 54

All articles were news articles grouped into one of three categories: embezzlement linked to gambling,to other causes or no motivation given.

A total of nearly 80 articles were found from 1988 to 1998. Of these 12 percent linked embezzlement togambling in a specific case. Another 20 percent linked an embezzlement to causes other than gambling.19

Still another 68 percent of the articles made no mention of causation.

This information is useful only insofar as news stories about crime address the offender’s motivation inany detail. The overwhelming majority of news stories just deal with the bare facts: name, charge,amount taken, what happens next, and perhaps a few words about the offender’s background. Also,rarely is a distinction is made in these articles as to whether the alleged gambling was in legal or illegalgames. Very little analysis is usually offered, except in unusual cases where an interview is granted bythe offender or others with detailed knowledge of the case.

In order to assess more carefully the reasons why people embezzle, and any role that gambling mightplay, more detailed information for a large number of individual cases must be obtained. This analysis isprovided in the next section.

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19 Several articles mentioned gambling together with alcohol use or another factor. These cases were placed in both categories.

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20 Wm. W. McCullough, Sticky Fingers (New York: Amacom, 1981) 19.21 Donald R. Cressey, Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson

Smith Publishing, 1973) 75-76.22 Cressey 75.

The Motivations to Embezzle

The problem with analyses of newspaper articles is that they offer incomplete, and sometimes mislead-ing, snapshots of events. In embezzlement cases, for example, defendants may direct blame to variousinfluences as a form of defense strategy, rather than as a confession of truth. Likewise, typical rational-izations for embezzlement such as liquor, debt, gambling, another woman, or playing the stock market“are generalizations that beg the question.”20 That is to say, actual causes of embezzlement are morecomplex because debt can also cause someone to spend less or take out a loan, rather than embezzle.People who spend too much money on drinking or gambling, for example, may decide to reduce theirspending or to seek help rather than steal funds in order to continue their bad habit. Simply stated, thesecommonly blamed factors do not explain why many people in these situations do not violate the law,while some do.

A pioneering investigation of the causes of embezzlement was conducted by Donald Cressey. He inter-viewed 133 prison inmates who were convicted of embezzlement and other fraud-related offensesinvolving a violation of financial trust. He concluded that factors like “immorality, emergencies,increased needs, business reversals, or a relatively high scale of living…cannot be considered as causes”of embezzlement.21 The causes are more complex. Cressey found in his interviews that, “a non-shareableproblem preceded the criminal violation of financial trust.” These problems were all related to the “sta-tus-seeking or status-maintaining behavior” of the violators. In every case, he found the embezzlers wereeither “ashamed” or had “too much false pride” to get help from other people.22 This inability to sharethe problem they faced resulted in the embezzlement. Therefore, it was not the high living or immoralconduct that caused the embezzlement. It was the fact the problem was defined as unshareable thatdirectly led to the theft. This explanation of embezzlement is diagrammed below.

Figure 12 The Causes of Embezzlement

Financial Problem Structure Creates a desire Exploits Justifies(resulting from Problem as for a specific opportunity violationstatus-seeking or non-shareable solution that to violate by rationalizingstatus-maintaining involves no one financial conduct andbehavior) else trust situation

Figure 12 shows that status-seeking or status-maintaining behavior can result in a financial problem thatis defined by the person as something that cannot be shared with others. This leads the individual tocome up with a solution that involves no one else. Exploiting an employer, customer, or client throughembezzlement is available only to those holding positions of financial trust. Others must resort to tradi-tional forms of theft, such as larceny or robbery. Finally, the violation is justified through a rationaliza-tion about the conduct, claiming it is not serious, the money will be replaced in the future, or that thecircumstances left them no choice.

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Therefore, it is not the unbecoming behavior, business problems, alcohol abuse, excessive gambling,or other circumstance that causes the embezzlement. Instead, when the person structures or defines thisproblem as something that cannot be shared with others, embezzlement results. When the offender laterblames the embezzlement on the drinking or gambling, therefore, we are hearing the offender’s rational-ization for the conduct, rather than the cause of it. As Cressey concluded, “thus, one who gambles willnot necessarily violate a position of trust he holds, but a person who gambles might construe a financialproblem arising from gambling as non-shareable, so that it becomes a significant event in the trust viola-tion process.”23 Therefore, it appears that the more gambling is defined as legitimate leisure activity, theeasier it may be for those who gamble excessively to share their problem and seek help, ultimatelyavoiding the need to pursue “solutions” such as embezzlement. As Cressey concludes, “if an individualwho believes, for example, that he is ‘not supposed to’ gamble at a racetrack or speculate on stocks loseshis personal funds in such an endeavor the resulting problem easily could be considered by him as non-shareable. Admission of the loss would amount to an admission of unworthiness.”24

Cressey’s study involved only men, leaving open the question of whether the process is the same forwomen. This question was answered by Dorothy Zietz in interviews she conducted with 100 incarcerat-ed female embezzlers and fraud offenders. She found that rather than a non-shareable financial problem,women embezzle “when it seems to offer the only available solution to financial problems that mightjeopardize the welfare or cause the loss of a child or husband.”25 Therefore, females appear to embezzleprimarily to keep a family or relationship together when threatened by financial problems, whereas menengage in status-seeking or status-maintaining behavior resulting in financial problems that they do notfeel they can share with others.

The importance of these studies is that detailed interviews with offenders make it clear that no singlefactor “causes” embezzlement or any other crime. It is only when a financial problem is defined in a cer-tain way that embezzlement is considered. This provides insights for both how we look at the causes ofcrime and for theft prevention programs. The more we isolate, label, or promote the notion that people infinancial trouble have only themselves to blame, the more it appears we actually encourage them to stealbecause we make underlying problems more difficult to share and to seek assistance.

These findings are supported by a study of 212 frauds that occurred in the United States and Canada.Information was gathered from extensive questionnaires completed by internal auditors in those companiesthat had experienced frauds.26 The internal auditors identified 13 personal characteristics of the offendersthat they believed were important factors behind the fraud. These factors are summarized in Table 4.

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23 Cressey 146.24 Cressey 41.25 Dorothy Zietz, Women Who Embezzle or Defraud: A Study of Convicted Felons (New York: Praeger, 1981) 151.26 W. Steve Albrecht, Keith R. Howe, and Marshall B. Romney, Deterring Fraud: The Internal Auditor’s Perspective (Altamonte

Springs, Fla.: The Institute of Internal Auditors, 1984).

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Table 4 Characteristics of Internal Fraud Offenders

Personal Characteristic Factors Response PercentageNeeded the money or desired personal gain 18 %Living beyond means 14In debt 14Temptation too great 14Greed 13Vice (gambling, drugs, alcohol) 9Contempt for company or very low pay 7Desire to lead a wild life 4Family problems 3Emotional/mental illness 2“Dishonest type” 1Desire to blackmail company 1Needed a “loan” 0.4

These factors correspond to the model proposed by Cressey that status-seeking or status-maintainingbehavior leads to non-shareable financial problems which ultimately results in law violation. Gamblingplayed a comparatively small role in these 212 cases, and illegal gambling is much more likely tobecome a non-shareable financial problem than is legal gambling activity.

These detailed analyses of the motivations of those who embezzle provide the greatest insight into whypeople get into financial trouble in the first place and why they choose a criminal “solution” to the situa-tion, rather than a non-criminal alternative. They make it clear that single-factor “explanations” such asgambling, drugs, or greed do not account for the fact that most people in financial difficulty do notengage in criminal activity.

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Conclusion

Recently, an FBI agent was indicted on charges he stole $400,000 in agency funds to support his gam-bling debts.27 This story is similar to those mentioned at the beginning of this study where individualsblamed their misuse of funds on gambling and other factors that produced financial problems. Such acharacterization of a theft grossly oversimplifies the process by which people come to embezzle. Giventhe results of interviews with several hundred embezzlers, it is clear that gambling does not cause white-collar crimes. Instead, it is the way in which a person defines a problem as non-shareable or as threaten-ing to family stability that leads to embezzlement. Only in this way can a person’s decision to seek helpversus violate the law be understood.

This is not to say that compulsive gambling is not a concern. Although estimates vary, 1 percent or 2percent of Americans are considered compulsive gamblers.28 It has been reported that nearly all compul-sive gamblers started gambling before age 14.29 This suggests that preventing access to gambling byminors requires strict enforcement. Casinos must strongly enforce gambling age limits, although Internetgambling and lottery sales to minors would appear to have the greatest possibility to lure underage gam-blers. Also, the availability of Internet gambling to anyone with access to a computer poses a potentiallymore serious problem due to the difficulty in monitoring it, as compared to casinos.30 Given the findingsreported in the previous section, greater availability of supportive (i.e., non-judgmental) assistance tothose individuals with financial problems created by excessive gambling, drinking, spending, or badinvestments would result in fewer individuals seeing their problems as non-shareable.31 This would havethe greatest long-term impact for the prevention of embezzlement.

An examination of arrest trends for embezzlement, forgery, and fraud in nine of the largest casino mar-kets shows no consistent pattern, although more jurisdictions report decreases than increases in arrests.Combining the data from all nine cities together, arrests for forgery and fraud have dropped in casinojurisdictions, while they increased nationwide over the same period. On the other hand, arrests forembezzlement went up 1 percent in casino jurisdictions and declined by 2 percent nationwide.

An examination of articles appearing in USA Today over a 10-year period found that only 12 percentmentioned gambling when reporting on cases of embezzlement. Gambling’s precise role was rarely dis-cussed in these articles, and no distinction was made as to whether legal or illegal gambling took place.

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27 “Miami,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25 Nov. 1998: 2.28 National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, Gambling Impact and Behavior Study. Report to the National

Gambling Impact Studio Commission (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, 1 April1999); Joseph P. Shapiro, “America’s Gambling Fever,” U.S. News & World Report, 15 Jan. 1996: 59; Valerie Lorenz,“Commentary,” USA Today, 26 March 1991: 10C; Henry R. Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling is a Psychiatric Disorder,”Legalized Gambling: For and Against, ed. R.L. Evans and M. Hance (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998) 37-63.

29 Arnie Wexler and Sheila Wexler, “The Hidden Addiction: Compulsive Gambling,” Legalized Gambling, ed M.E. Williams(San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999) 137; Randy Stinchfield and Ken C. Winters, “Gambling and Problem Gambling AmongYouths,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 172-85; Mark Griffiths,Adolescent Gambling (New York: Routledge, 1995).

30 See Report to the Internet Working Group of the National Association of Attorneys General: Gambling on the Internet(Washington, D.C.: National Association of Attorneys General, 1996).

31 For a discussion of the stigma of gambling in broader social terms, see Frederick W. Preston, Bo J. Bernhard, Robert E.Hunter, and Shannon L. Bybee, “Gambling as Stigmatized Behavior: Regional Relabeling and the Law,” Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 186-96.

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Finally, an analysis of the causes of embezzlement through interviews with several hundred offendersand auditors found that no single factor causes embezzlement. Instead, it is the way that a person definesa financial problem as either non-shareable or a threat to the stability of one’s family that is important inthe causal chain. Therefore, efforts to publicize the availability of help for those in financial difficulty,and eliminating any connotation that they are unworthy, will increase the number of people who seekhelp for their problems, and ultimately reduce the incidence of white-collar crime.

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References

Abt, Vicki, James F. Smith, and Eugene M. Christiansen. "Misconceptions Abound in the Debate OverLegalized Gambling." Ed. R.L. Evans and M. Hance, Legalized Gambling: For and Against.Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998. 392-434.

Ackerman, William V. "Casinos Have Proven Beneficial to Deadwood, South Dakota." Ed. M.E.Williams, Legalized Gambling. San Diego: Greenwood Press, 1999. 97-110.

Albanese, Jay S. White Collar Crime in America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Albanese, Jay S. "The Effect of Casino Gambling on Crime." Federal Probation Quarterly 49 (June1985): 39-44.

Albanese, Jay. "Predicting the Impact of Casino Gambling on Crime and Law Enforcement," Ed. W.Eadington and J. Cornelius. Gambling: Public Policy and the Social Sciences. Reno: Institute for theStudy of Gambling and Commercial Gaming, 1997. 351-66.

Albanese, Jay. "Casino Gambling and Organized Crime: More Than Reshuffling the Deck," Ed. J.Albanese, Contemporary Issues in Organized Crime. Monsey, N.Y.: Willow Tree Press, 1995. 1-17.

Albrecht, W. Steve, Keith R. Howe, and Marshall B. Romney. Deterring Fraud: The Internal Auditor’sPerspective. Altamonte Springs, Fla.: The Institute of Internal Auditors, 1984.

Brunkow, Angie. "Woman Found Guilty in Bilking." Omaha World-Herald 10 Nov. 1998: 1.

Cressey, Donald R. Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement.Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith Publishing, 1973.

Goodman, Robert. The Luck Business. New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Griffiths, Mark. Adolescent Gambling. New York: Routledge, 1995.

Heubusch, Kevin. "Taking Chances on Casinos." Ed. M.E. Williams. Legalized Gambling. San Diego:Greenhaven Press, 1999. 23-31.

Jaeger, Richard W. "Gambling Breeds Unlikely Criminals." Wisconsin State Journal 26 Aug. 1996: 6a.

Kelly, Joseph. "The American Insurance Institute, Like That Bunny Keeps Going and Going andGoing.." Gaming Law Review 1 (1997): 209-12.

Kindt, John W. "The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities." Drake Law Review 43(1994): 51-95.

Lesieur, Henry R. "Pathological Gambling is a Psychiatric Disorder," Ed. R.L. Evans and M. Hance,Legalized Gambling: For and Against. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998. 37-63.

Lorenz, Valerie. "Commentary." USA Today. 26 March 1991: 10C.

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Manning, Elizabeth. "Casinos Have Ruined Deadwood, South Dakota," Ed. M.E. Williams, LegalizedGambling. San Diego: Greenwood Press, 1999. 97-110.

Margolis, Jeremy. Casinos and Crime: An Analysis of the Evidence. Study prepared for the AmericanGaming Association. Washington, D.C.: American Gaming Association, 1997.

McCullough, Wm. W. Sticky Fingers. New York: Amacom, 1981.

McGrath, Dennis J. "Gambling-Related Crime is Costly to Taxpayers," Star Tribune [Minneapolis] 4Dec. 1995. 6a.

"Miami." Richmond Times-Dispatch 25 Nov. 1998: 2.

Miller, William, and Martin D. Schwartz. "Casino Gambling and Street Crime." Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 124-137.

Montero, Douglas. "Casinos Would Increase White-Collar, Organized Crime." The Plain Dealer[Cleveland] 1 March 1995: 10.

National Association of Attorneys General. Gambling on the Internet. Report to the Internet WorkingGroup of the National Association of Attorneys General. Washington, D.C.: National Association ofAttorneys General, 1996.

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Preston, Frederick W., Bo J. Bernhard, Robert E. Hunter, and Shannon L. Bybee. "Gambling asStigmatized Behavior: Regional Relabeling and the Law." Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 186-96.

"Can and Should There Be a Universal Definition of White Collar Crime?" Proceedings of the AcademicWorkshop — White Collar Crime Definitional Dilemma. Morgantown, W.Va.: National White CollarCrime Center–Training and Research Institute, 1996.

Santiago, Frank. "Authorities Link Gambling to Cases of Theft." Des Moines Register 11 Nov. 1997: 6.

Shapiro, Joseph P. "America’s Gambling Fever." U.S. News & World Report 15 Jan. 1996: 59.

Simon, Paul. "Gambling Has High Social Costs and Should be Restricted by the Government." Ed. R.L.Evans and M. Hance. Legalized Gambling: For and Against. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998.201-18.

Stinchfield, Randy, and Ken C. Winters. "Gambling and Problem Gambling Among Youths." Annals ofthe American Academy of Political and Social Science 556 (March 1998): 172-85.

Stokowski, Patricia A. Riches and Regrets: Betting on Gambling in Two Colorado Towns. Niwot, Colo.:University of Colorado Press, 1996.

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Sutherland, Edwin. "White-Collar Criminality." American Sociological Review 5 (1940): 1-12.

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About the Author

Jay S. Albanese is professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice at VirginiaCommonwealth University in Richmond, Va. He received the M.A. and Ph.D. from Rutgers University,where he was the first Ph.D. recipient from the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice. At VirginiaCommonwealth University, Dr. Albanese directs an undergraduate program in criminal justice with nearly 500 students and master’s programs in forensic science and criminal justice with a total enroll-ment of more than 100 students. The graduate program is one of the largest in the nation.

Dr. Albanese served as interim research director at the Training and Research Institute of the NationalWhite-Collar Crime Center during 1998-99. In this capacity, he developed a three-year research plan forthe Institute.

Dr. Albanese is author of seven books, including Criminal Justice (Allyn & Bacon, 1999) OrganizedCrime in America (Anderson, 3rd edition, 1996) and White-Collar Crime in America (Prentice Hall,1995). He was a recipient of the Excellence in Teaching Award from the Sears Foundation, and is listedin Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in American Law, Who’s Who in Education, and Who’s WhoAmong America’s Teachers. He is a past president of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and ofthe Northeastern Association of Criminal Justice Sciences.

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