central asia jihadism: home and abroad asian jihadism.pdf · region) coupled with other impact...

Central Asia Jihadism:

Home and Abroad

Dr. Alisa Fainberg, (Research Assistant, ICT)

Dr. Eitan Azani, (Deputy Executive Director,

ICT)

October 2017

2

ABSTRACT

The rapid rise of Central Asian jihadists both on Syrian battlefields and on the

international scene in 2016 and especially in 2017 forced researchers to

reconsider and renew the notion of the radical Islamic threat coming from the

region. The paper examines the historical background which paved the way for

the rise of local jihadism, the roots, nature and specifics of the Central Asian

foreign fighters phenomenon, as well as current trends and risks for

international and national security.

**The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International

Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

3

Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4

Historical Background and Impact Factors ..................................................................... 6

Specifics of Recruitment ............................................................................................... 13

Militant Activity in Syria ................................................................................................ 25

Threats and Attacks Outside Syria ................................................................................ 34

Implications and Perspectives ...................................................................................... 44

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 47

4

Introduction

The flow of foreign fighters travelling to Syria to join various jihadist groups attracted

the attention of both decision makers and academic researchers, and become an object for a

significant number of papers, not least because of its mass nature and broad geographical

spread.

From the very beginning of the flow (2011) some regions and countries were in the

spotlight: MENA region, Western countries, Russia, and more, and have been studied

comprehensively.

However, the situation in Syria and Iraq has developed and changed, and new trends

in the flow of foreign fighters emerged subsequently. In such a manner, 2015 was marked by

significant intensification of the flow of foreign fighters from Central Asian countries

(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan).1 Central Asian Jihadism

poses a significant threat not only in regards to foreign fighters, but also to countries outside

of Syria and Iraq. This threat was exemplified by the recent (October 31, 2017) vehicular

ramming attack in Manhattan, which was carried out by Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, an

Uzbek national, who reportedly left a note claiming the attack was in the name of ISIS2. This

attack highlights the importance of understanding the phenomenon of Central Asian jihadism,

with its effects both on fighters in theaters of jihad and abroad.

Foreign fighters from the Central Asian region were traced as travelling or attempting

to travel to Syria and Iraq since the beginning of the war, but the flow was humble, and

militants hardly appeared on stage. Since 2015 one can observe a substantial rise to the flow,

which in no small measure was mobilized by propaganda products produced by jihadist

groups operating in Syria and Iraq (Islamic State - ISIS). This period, from 2015 until now, is

marked for ISIS by significant shifts in its positions in Syria and Iraq, accompanied with

losses of territories and fighters. Such circumstances forced the group to turn its attention

toward new potential fighters, and particularly Central Asian fighters.

1 There are several definitions of the borders of Central Asian region based on various grounds. This paper

accepts the definition, which includes five post-Soviet countries, as it was proclaimed by theirs leaders after

gaining the independence.

2 Nicole Chavez. "New Yorkers Defiant After Deadliest Terror Attack In The City Since 9/11". CNN, accessed

November 1, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/new-york-attack/index.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/new-york-attack/index.html

5

Today, foreign fighters from Central Asia number more than 4,000,3 are becoming

more and more visible, and hold important posts within jihadist groups. In the last three years,

the number of terror attacks, performed by natives of Central Asia, rose sharply, which

suggests continued expanding terror activities and growing potential threats coming from this

population. Moreover, analysis of recent trends allows to suggest that Central Asian militants

tend to replace Chechen fighters in the ranks of ISIS - one of the highest valued fighters of

the group. Thus, Gulmurod Khalimov, an ethnic Tajik, former commander of the police

special forces of the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan, superseded Omar al-Shishani after his

death as military commander. Moreover, there are Chechens who play crucial roles in the

radicalization and recruitment of potential militants from Central Asian countries.

Although usually the phenomenon of foreign fighters from Central Asian countries is

examined as a whole, without distinctions between the countries, an extended analysis of

national background seems to contribute significantly to a deeper understanding of the

specifics of the flow.

Moreover, Central Asia today is the center of the geostrategic calculations of USA,

Russia, and China, which makes the situation with foreign fighters, and the terror threat in

general, more complex.

From the other side, it is important to note, that counteractions undertaken by Central

Asian governments seem to be stovepiped and focus on restrictions of civil freedoms, due to

their authoritarian nature, and, as a result, can be defined as ineffective.

The paper is aimed at conducting a deep analysis of the phenomenon of foreign fighters

coming from Central Asian region:

- to review historical background and modern factors affecting the flow of the foreign

fighters,

- to highlight national, political and cultural specifics of fighters coming from each

particular country of the Central Asian region,

3 Thomas F. Lynch III, Michael Bouffard, Kelsey King, and Graham Vickowski “The Return of Foreign

Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy”, Strategic Perspectives 21, National

Defense University Press, October 29, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/987178/the-return-of-foreign-fighters-to-central-asia-implications-

for-us-counterterro/

6

- to reveal specific features of the phenomenon itself, caused, among others, by the

complexity of political and social situation within the region,

- to highlight existing and potential trends and to assess risks for international and

national securities.

Historical Background and Impact Factors

First of all, it is important to note that each country of the Central Asian region

[Kazakhstan (population 18 million), Kyrgyzstan (6 million), Tajikistan (8.8 million),

Turkmenistan (5.5 million), and Uzbekistan (30,5 million)4] has its own political, social, and

cultural specifics, which have formed the Islamic radicalism in the region and today influence

each particular flow of foreign fighters.

Those peculiar features have formed against the historical background of the 1980s

and 1990s, which, among other aspects, is characterized by a religious revival which was

started after 70 years of state atheism on all post-Soviet territories, including Central Asian

countries. Such a sharp increase of interest in religion (Islam - in the case of Central Asian

region) coupled with other impact factors led to emergence and rise of Islamic radicalism in

the regions.

All main influencing factors can be arranged on two levels:

1. Regional level

2. Country level

On the regional level, there are historical and current factors that are shared by each of

those countries and characterize the region as whole:

1. Interrupting tradition. Historically, the ancestors of modern Central Asians were

nomads, and therefore Islam in the region has no deep roots. The nomadic nature of

4 “Central Asia Population”, Worldomoters, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/central-asia-population/

7

ancient Central Asian inhabitants led to formation of specific domestic Islamic

tradition, which is divorced from the generally accepted canonical teachings. Muslims

of Central Asia sometimes do not understand the most elementary religious norms,

and such illiteracy plays into the hands of the jihadists. In the 1990s in order to

correspond with growing religious needs, hundreds of citizens traveled to Middle East

countries and Egypt for Islamic education drawing no distinction between moderate

and radical ideas.5

2. On the other side, from the lack of experience in handling religious extremism and

seeking to establish new geopolitical contacts, including ones with Islamic extremist

movements, Central Asian governments allowed to enter, and in some cases

welcomed, various Islamic radical groups and representatives from Saudi Arabia

and other countries (as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hizb-ut Tahrir, etc.). These preached in the

region and established and inspired various groups and communities, which almost

immediately turned themselves into bases of local radical Islamic movements.6

3. Another important factor is the tough if not repressive nature of governance of

Central Asian countries. Trying to hold power in their hands, the authorities often

suppressed any opposition movements, even moderate Islamic political groups (such

as Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan), forcing them to go underground.

Repression politics and a pursuit of total control over religious life in the countries,

contributed in large part to the formation of a radical Islamic underground.

4. Political and social instability also play an important role in emergence and spread

of radical Islamic ideology, especially outside of metropolitan areas. As in all other

cases throughout the world, people seeking political, economic, and social justice,

often turn themselves to radical Islamic groups, with their promises to build new

society based on Sharia law.

5 Марта Брилл Олкотт, «Очерки истории ислама в Узбекистане», Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, September 11, 2012, accessed September 28, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/11/ru-pub-

49351

6 Роза Токсоналиева “Радикальные течения ислама в странах Цетральной Азии», Время Востока,

December 6, 2013, accessed September 28, 2017, http://easttime.ru/analytics/tsentralnaya-aziya/radikalnye-

techeniya-islama-v-stranakh-tsentralnoi-azii/5312

8

5. Geographical and ethno geographical factors also may be considered as crucial.

All countries of the region, along with shared borders, have long-established

communications with each other on both the governmental and people’s levels.

Therefore, emergence and activity of extremist groups in one country rapidly affects

neighboring ones. Moreover, there are significant ethnic diasporas living in neighbor

countries (the most prominent example is the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan) - the

factor, which also contribute to communication, and by extension to spreading the

radicalism.

6. Among geographical factors the Fergana Valley is of particular importance. The

Fergana Valley is shared by Kyrgyzstan (in the East), Tajikistan (in the South), and

Uzbekistan (in the West). The valley constitutes an enclave that affects all three states,

and, conversely, is subject of influence of each of them. It was always economically

attractive, mainly thanks to plenitude of fertile ground and its deposits of natural

resources. However, the overpopulation led to decrease of economic level of the

inhabitants. Because of the large number of social, economic and political problems,

the Fergana Valley is sometimes called the "valley of discord". Economic and social

depressions together with geographical factor - Fergana valley is surrounded by

mountain systems left with only one narrow passage - turned it turned it to a hotbed of

radicalism, the center for the formation, development and dissemination of radical

Islam in the region. Today, the Fergana Valley has become one of the most

problematic areas in Central Asia.

7. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to a great degree triggered the rise of radical

Islam in the region. Afghanistan, which shares borders with three Central Asian

countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, became a source and a gateway

for radical Islamists entering those countries.7 The main force of resistance in this war

were radical Islamic groups, and geographical proximity of these regions and the

close ties and connections of their peoples also led to the spread of radical Islam in

Central Asia.

7 Сейеде Моттахере Хоссейни, «Последствия распространения салафитско-ваххабитского движения в

Средней Азии», Иносми.ру, November 23, 2013, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://inosmi.ru/middle_asia/20131123/215049927.html

9

8. Propagandist activities of foreign organizations. There is a variety of jihadist

movements and organizations operating across the Central Asian region, including

Al-Qaeda affiliates, Afghanistan’s Taliban, Muslim brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir,

Tablighi Jamaat, and others. Most of them were banned by the governments and

continue to operate illegally, calling potential recruits to join jihad in Syria. Most of

the groups’ representatives are located in the Fergana Valley, where the political and

social situation is not perfectly stable, and in border areas with Afghanistan.

Along with regional factors there are specifics of each country which influence the

nature and the body of foreign fighters’ flows. Thus, Kazakhstan has relatively weak

social base for rooting and spreading radical Islamic ideology, according to experts. Despite

the rise of private mosques, which were not controlled by the government, repressive attitude

to Salafism, and gaps in relevant legislative framework, Kazakhstan traces no prominent

history of radical Islam having emerged and developed on its territory, and started to face

numerous terror attacks only since 2011 (14 attacks were carried out within a year), which

could be one of consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2010.

Kyrgyzstan, on the contrary, represents an example of political, social, and ethnic

complexities. First of all, there is a significant Uzbek minority living mainly in the Fergana

Valley part of Kyrgyzstan (they compose almost 20% of the total population)8, and such

neighborhood engenders various ethnic conflicts. Moreover, since the 1990s the country went

through a number of political unrests: the change of regime in 1991, the tulip revolution of

2005, the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010, which was followed by increased ethnic tension

between Kyrgyz people and Uzbeks. Those events contributed to the political character of

radical Islam in the country. Geopolitically, the country shares borders with the Uighur

region of China, and is close to Afghanistan and Pakistan. From the historical perspective,

due to certain politics of both political parties and government, Kyrgyzstan since the 1990s

became a hub for international Islamic terrorist groups. Among other reasons which were

facilitated by the cooperation of local political parties with such radical Islamic groups such

as Hizb ut-Tahrir, and others, which were granted with permission to operate on

8 «Женщины и мужчины Кыргызской республики», Национальный статистический комитет

Кыргызской республики, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.stat.kg/media/publicationarchive/569ab8c9-2ac4-406e-80d6-29b6c8b8b4ef.pdf

10

Kyrgyzstanian soil, since the Kyrgyzstanian government sought to turn the country into a

base for dialogue between various ideologies (in opposition to Kazakhstan). Thus, Hizb ut-

Tahrir oriented its propaganda in Kyrgyzstan towards women, high-educated people, and

government workers, in contrary to many other examples throughout the world, when radical

Islamic groups turn themselves toward disadvantaged groups. Among the other banned

organizations Al-Qaeda (about 2,000 followers) and Tablighi Jamaat (about 20,000 followers)

may be highlighted. Both have their cells in all regions of the republic. A local organization

known as Jamaat of Kyrgyzstan Zhaishul Mahdi, which carried out several terrorist acts in

various cities and regions of the republic, is engaged in open terrorist activities in Kyrgyzstan.

The group was formed in 2007, but actively began to operate since 2010. Emir of Jamaat was

Kyrgyz citizen S. Islamov. The organization's goal is to build a "caliphate" on the territory of

Kyrgyzstan and other states in Central Asia through the wide application of methods of

terror.9

Such factors as political and social instability, tensions between secular and religious

ideologues, external and internal migration flows, coexistence of (and tensions between)

Islam and paganism within one culture, etc. also contribute to the rooting and spreading of

radical Islamic groups in the country.

The neighbor of Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan today is a primary source of foreign fighters in

the region. Since the 1990s Uzbekistan faces threats of radical Islam both homegrown and

coming from neighbor countries - thus, political unrests in Kyrgyzstan and the civil war in

Tajikistan (1992-1997) jeopardized civil peace in Uzbekistan as well. Therefore, the

Uzbekistani government in parallel to the process of re-introduction of Islam to the society

during 1980s-1990s, since 1992 has launched the war against radical Islamic groups.

Ironically, it is Uzbekistan which became a homeland for Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -

one of the most significant radical Islamic movements in the region, whose actions affected

almost all Central Asian countries, and faced the problem of terror attacks since 1999 - before

other countries of the region. This and other factors, common for all counties of the region,

caused toughness of governmental measures aimed at fighting radical Islam: thus, there is a

9 «Угроза международного терроризма и религиозного экстремизма государствам-членам ОДКБ на

Центральноазиатском и Афганском направлениях», Институт Международных Исследований

МГИМО-МИД России, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://imi-

mgimo.ru/images/pdf/analiticheskie_doklady/igil.pdf

11

common practice of collective punishment of Islamist/ terrorist’s/ foreign fighter’s family

members, public penitence of those who were accused in sympathizing or attempts to join

terror group, harsh conditions of detention for terrorists (they are banned from talking to each

other while in prisons), etc. However, today Islam (and radical Islam, in particular) holds

strong positions in social life of the society, and Uzbekistan faces the vexing problem of

foreign fighters.

Tajikistan in turn is also forced to deal with the pressing issue of foreign fighters, and

there are several significant factors which caused the problem. First, the geographical

location of the country - shared borders with the Uighur region of China and Afghanistan,

closeness to Pakistan, territories lodged between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the one hand,

and vast mountain terrains with plenty of places of hard access on the other, lay the

groundwork for strengthening and outspread of terror groups. Other factors which

contributed to the development of radical Islamic underground in the country include

economic and social instability (as consequences of civil war 1992-1997), high level of

Islam’s involvement in political life of the country, in combination with extremely high

percent of youth (about 70% of population are young people under 30) and governmental

policy of sending youths to work and study abroad. These four aspects fertilized the ground

for radical Islamic groups flourishing. It is important to note, that foreign terror organizations

more catalyzed the spreading of radical ideology and ideas than operated in the country

themselves. Among other reasons it was caused by the strong historical influence of Iran to

the culture, lifestyle, and to a certain extent to politics of Tajikistan, which, considering the

misfiring relationship between Salafi Islam and Shiism, triggers tensions within local

communities. Another important feature of Tajikistan's radical Islam is the strong connection

between local undergrounds and ones in other countries of the region, which helps to create a

kind of terrorist network. Today most of Tajikistan's foreign fighters are recruited abroad -

primarily in Russia as migrant workers, or in Arabic countries, such as Saudi Arabia or

Kuwait as foreign students - this, as was mentioned above, is a result of prolonged

governmental policy. It is important to note, that since 2010 authorities tend to bring back

youths who study abroad, but the problem of outflow of youth and the influence of radical

Islam not only during the studies in Arabic countries, but also during their work time in

Russia, remains.

12

Turkmenistan stands apart from all other Central Asian countries, primarily due to

governmental policy of isolation. It also caused limitation of knowledge regarding the level

of radicalization in the society, number of foreign fighters coming from the country, etc.

Since the 1990s Saparmurat Niyazov - the leader of Turkmenistan from 1985 until his death

in 2006, pursued a coherent policy of controlled islamization, despite the fact that according

to its constitution, Turkmenistan is defined as a secular country: gradual increase of mosques

(from 4 to 500 in ten years), organized procedures for religious education abroad along with

continuous suppression of both secular and religious opposition, turned Islam to the object of

politics. The repressive character of governing was supplemented by planted cult of

personality of Niyazov, and, therefore, tensions between ruling tribe and other ones.

Intertribal relations play more significant role than interreligious and most Turkmens espouse

secular or moderate Islamic views (because of the nomad background), and despite this, there

is radical Islamic underground formed in Turkmenistan mainly because of its repressive inner

policy. What distinguishes Turkmenistan from other countries of the region is its close

diplomatic relations and coalition policy with the Taliban since 1994 and welcoming of

jihadist ideology at the beginning of 1990s. Such relations were not least caused by a huge

Turkmenian diaspora (about 1 million) living in Afghanistan. In 2004 the law restricting

activities of radical religious organizations in Turkmenistan was revoked, which provided

free rein for all religious groups. Such (formal) freedom together with the repressive nature of

politics in general and isolation of society (for today Turkmenistan has visa regime will all

countries in the world except Turkey) led to mixed results: on the one hand, there is no

legible information regarding scale and activity of radical Islamic underground, as well as

regarding foreign fighters origin from the country, while on the other there is information

about a camp close to the capital - Ashgabat, where all local Islamists undergo basic training

before leaving for the Middle East, and potential (or actual) contribution to the foreign

fighters flow made by diaspora in Afghanistan - the possibility which cannot be disregarded.

Until 2013-2014, when the problem sharply escalated, Turkmenistan managed to avoid

the appearance of jihadist groups and their agents of influence on its territory, but with the

beginning of unrest in the border areas of Afghanistan in 2014, the number of religious

citizens increased sharply in the country, which became noticeable in terms of the number of

visitors. Today there is a significant threat coming from the Afghan-Turkmen border, which

appears to be guarded inefficiently. According to some sources, up to 70% of the Turkmen

13

army was transferred to the Afghan border in 2015, but analysts question its fighting capacity.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense is trying to double the number of conscripts - thus, the

conscript age has been increased from 27 to 30 years.10

The political, social, and cultural background formed in the region since the 1990s

contributed significantly to the emergence and development of local radical Islamic

movements. One of the most prominent of them is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU) formed in 1998 by ethnic Uzbeks from the Fergana Valley - Juma Namangani

(Jumaboi Khodjiyev), who was a former soldier who had participated in the Soviet-Afghan

war, and Tohir Yuldashev. Namangani used his combat experience fighting in Tajikistan civil

war along with United Tajik Opposition, but lately left for Afghanistan, and then to Pakistan,

where he established connections with the Al-Qaeda leadership. Initially the movement was

aimed to oust the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov and to create an Islamic state on the

territory of the country. Since 1999 the movement, based in Tajikistan, carries out terror

attacks against governments and civilians throughout the region: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,

and Tajikistan. However, after international pressure was made on Tajikistan's government,

IMU was expelled from the country and rebased in Afghanistan and lately in Pakistan,

turning to close cooperation with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and continuing to carry out

attacks on the international level. After the movement undergone leadership, membership

(today the exact number of its members is unknown and estimate from 500 to 1,000 fighters),

and financial crises, on August 6, 2015 it’s leadership pledged the allegiance to ISIS, giving

rise to talks about the future of the movement itself and in the region in general, but there are

no doubts that the new status of the IMU will affect the radical Islamic underground in

Central Asia. The case of IMU plays an important informative role for the analysis of the

nature of foreign fighters leaving and especially returning to their countries with gained

combat experience.

Specifics of Recruitment

As seen from the previous chapter, there is a fertile ground in the Central Asian

region for the forming of a flow of foreign fighters. However, until the end of 2014 -

beginning of 2015 the intensity of the flow remained very low, comparing to ones from top

10

«ИГИЛ и Центральная Азия: бедных и беззащитных легче убедить», Центр-1, April 11, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/igil-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-bednyh-i-bezzashhitnyh-legche-ubedit/

14

regions (MENA, for example). The growth of the numbers since the end of 2014 is primarily

caused by a shift in the attention of ISIS, which in the light of the slump of fighters’ flow

from its main sources (MENA, West, and North Caucasus) launched a recruitment campaign

oriented towards “backup” regions, including Central Asia. The fighters from the region were

nonpriority at first mainly because of the lack of combat experience (as compared to those

from MENA and North Caucasus) and the absence of propagandist attraction (as distinct

from Western fighters). When the situation changed and Central Asia became a target for

ISIS’ propaganda, the flow of foreign fighters had grown rapidly - about 2,500 fighters

arrived from Central Asia to Syria and Iraq in just one year (second half of 2014 - first half of

2015).11

Today, as was noted in the introduction, the total number of the fighters coming from

the region12

is about 4,000-5,00013

- unfortunately, there are no data updates neither general,

nor by countries since late 2015, and even reports from 2017 use those numbers,14

so only

speculations can be made regarding more precise numbers. In any case, even 4,000 fighters

make Central Asia the one of the largest source of jihadists leaving their homes to join ISIS

and other militant groups in Syria and Iraq, trailing behind only the MENA region and

Western Europe, and being nearly on the level with Russia.

As all other foreign fighters, militants originating from Central Asia have their

specific features, caused by political, social, and cultural factors, and they are important

for understanding the nature of the phenomenon and its perspectives assessment.

11

Thomas F. Lynch III, Michael Bouffard, Kelsey King, and Graham Vickowski “The Return of Foreign

Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy”, Strategic Perspectives 21, National

Defense University Press, October 29, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/987178/the-return-of-foreign-fighters-to-central-asia-implications-

for-us-counterterro/

12 Unfortunately, there is common confusion between those citizens who leaving the country, and those, who

coming to Syria from Russia. Such confusion persists when it comes to data per country.

13 Mehdi Jedinia, “IS 'Cyrillic Jihadists' Create Their Own Community in Syria”, VOA, March 30, 2016,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/is-cyrillic-jihadists-create-their-own-community-in-

syria/3261535.html





15

For deeper analysis, the recruitment of Central Asian fighters may be divided into two

general groups:

- Inside the region

- Outside the region

Such a distinction is necessary due to conceptual differences in the nature of the two

groups: persons of recruits, motivation and driving factors lying behind their joining radical

groups, specifics of recruitment process, personalities of recruiters, etc.

Inside the region

As shown in the first part, jihadist background in Central Asia varies from one country to

another, but at the same time has features shared by all of them. The situation with today’s

foreign fighters is identical. Among shared characteristics of militants leaving their homes for

jihad in Syria and Iraq are the following:

1. Lack of jihadist combat experience. As mentioned above, despite the history of

jihadism in the region, the presence of local and international radical Islamic groups

and networks, and the number of terror attacks, fighters coming from Central Asia

(comparing to those from the MENA region or North Caucasus) hardly participated in

armed conflicts as part of jihadist groups.15

2. Family jihad. Another feature which distinguishes Central Asian fighters from those

coming from the MENA region, North Caucasus, or West Europe, is their tendency

for “relocation” together with their families - wives and children. An interesting fact

is that family plays twofold roles in the radicalization of Central Asians. On the one

hand, families (because of high importance and strong influence of the family and

15

Those Central Asians, who joined jihadist opposition in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion, as well as those,

who carried out terror attacks on Central Asian soil, base mainly in and operate from Afghanistan and/or

Pakistan and in case of their joining jihad in Syria and Iraq, they do not come from their home countries, but

from mentioned countries. However, such cases remains unresearched.

16

community on the person) may prevent a person from radicalization and/or from

jihadist migration. On the other, however, in the case of immigration, family becomes

an additional force arriving with a fighter, which turns mere joining of an individual

to struggling forces to fully resettlement, establishment of full-fledged community,

etc.

3. Prevalence of offline recruitment. While Western jihadists (due to Western youth’s

cultural background) are recruited mainly online via social media websites,

messengers, and other tools of digital communications, fighters coming from Central

Asia undergo radicalization and recruitment processes in small cells operating in local

mosques and religious centers via personal contacts. This feature, which is caused by

a number of reasons, including a strong jihadist background in the region, strong

social ties and pressure, mentioned above, and hard censorship politics pursued by the

governments towards online communication tools. Thus, Facebook, YouTube, as well

as Russian social media - Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki (along with global media

websites) were and are permanently or temporarily banned by local governments, 16

which obviously impedes online recruitment.

4. Interethnic dissociation. Central Asian fighters (unlike North Caucasian, for example)

do not tend to come as one group and do not remain together with others from the

region or even from the same country, but divide into groups associated with different

belligerents. This is caused on the one hand by tensions between ethnic groups lasting

since the Soviet rule, and by the strong influence of clan and local community, which

is even more important than ethnic or country bounds.

5. Turkey pass. All Central Asian countries have a visa-free regime with Turkey, which

makes the latter a most convenient pass for foreign fighters in their way to Syria and

Iraq.

16

See for example: “В Казахстане заблокировали полсотни зарубежных сайтов”, Decan.kz, September 3,

2011, accessed September 28, 2017, http://decan.kz/v-kazaxstane-zablokirovali-polsotni-zarubezhnyx-

sajtov.html; “В Узбекистане усилили интернет-блокаду”, Lenta.ru, Aurust 10, 2011, accessed September 28,

2017, https://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/10/block/; “В Таджикистане заблокировали Facebook”, Asia-Plus, March

3, 2012, accessed September 28, 2017, http://news.tj/ru/news/v-tadzhikistane-zablokirovali-facebook; Дарья

Ивашкина, “В Таджикистане заблокировали «Одноклассников» и «ВКонтакте»”, Комсомольская Правда,

May 29, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.kp.ru/online/news/2068923/

17

These shared features do not rule out specifics of the countries. Kazakhstan, as seen

from the first part of the paper, appears to be the most prosperous and stable country in the

region and has not faced any significant threats from radical Islamic groups until 2011.

Ironically it is Kazakh fighters who joined ISIS the very first in Central Asia and became the

faces of jihadist propaganda. By 201517

about 400 fighters left Kazakhstan for Syria,

reportedly 150 of them women and about 50 children, which confirms the scale of family

jihad.18

Today there are two main hotbeds of jihadist recruitment in Kazakhstan, located in the

south and the west. In the southern part of the country the jihadist threat is higher mainly

because strong positions of Islam in general. In the west intensive industrial development of

oil and gas reserves led to the concentration of socially marginalized groups, especially

migrants (first of all, oralmans - ethnic Kazakhs who returned to Kazakhstan), and this social

environment led to the rise of radical Islamist groups.19

The main places of recruitment are

mosques and local religious communities, and it is interesting to note that main recruiters are

local representatives of the Tablighi Jamaat group.20

However, recently the Internet took

strong positions in recruitment.

Researchers note that the main driving factors for fighters to leave lie in political

and social spheres: on the one hand, the socio-economic crisis, as a consequence of a

significant decrease in oil revenues plays an important role among the reasons for the growth

of terrorist and extremist threats. The crisis led to a fall in the national currency (tenge) rate,

price increases, and cuts in social expenditures of the state. Social tension resulted in mass

17

As mentioned above, there is no data updated since 2015 on countries of Central Asia.

18 “Казахстанские добровольцы в рядах ИГИЛ: смерть в погоне за иллюзиями - эксперт”, Zakon.kz,

October 9, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.zakon.kz/4747832-kazakhstanskie-dobrovolcy-v-

rjadakh.html; Joanna Paraszczuk, “Kazakhs Fighting with IS Are 'Victims Of Radical Propaganda'”, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, March 20, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-is-

fighters-propaganda-victims/26911658.html





20 Anna Dyner, Arkadiusz Legieć, Kacper Rękawek, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into

Central Asia”, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 19 (121), June 2015, accessed September 28,

2017, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20020

18

protests, which took place between April and May 2016 in the cities of Western Kazakhstan

(Atyrau and Aktobe). On the other hand, there is a phenomenon of clan membership in

Kazakhstan, which appears to be extremely important in Kazakhstani society, which may

contribute to the rise of religious extremism in the case if the transit of power from the first

president of Kazakhstan will be accompanied by serious inter-clan conflicts.

Finally, it is necessary to note the tendency of criminalization of local radical Islamists or,

conversely, Islamic radicalization of ordinary bandits. It is particularly evident in the example

of Western Kazakhstan, which also impact the growth of numbers and threats coming from

local jihadists.

Kyrgyzstan in turn shows a unique example of foreign fighters’ flow. There are more

than 500 fighters that have left Kyrgyzstan for jihad in Syria (according to some experts there

are about 300 Kyrgyzstan citizens in addition which were not considered by the

government)21

, including 63 families, 122 women22

and more than 100 children, which again

demonstrates the trend of family jihad. There are several hotbeds of jihadism in Kyrgyzstan -

Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken provinces,23

and all of them are located in the southern part of

the country and are part of, or border with, the Fergana valley. An interesting fact is that all

three provinces are main places of living for local Uzbeks24

, and, moreover, about 80%25

of

foreign fighters origin from Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Uzbeks, which hold Kyrgyzstani passports.

That fact drastically changes the picture, since the specifics of the flow, as well as motivation

and driving factors of the fighters differ from ones relevant for ethnic Kyrgyz. First, Uzbeks

living in Kyrgyzstan are more religious than ethnic Kyrgyz. Secondly, they are historically

21

Роман Некрасов, “ Киргизия и надвигающаяся угроза «Исламского Государства»”, Однако, April 25,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.odnako.org/blogs/kirgiziya-i-nadvigayushchayasya-ugroza-

islamskogo-gosudarstva/

22 “122 Women Citizens of Kyrgyzstan Among Terrorist Groups in Syria”, Armedia, November 11, 2015,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://armedia.am/eng/news/26195/122-women-citizens-of-kyrgyzstan-among-

terrorist-groups-in-syria.html

23 Эдуард Пунегов, “Как вербуют террористов ИГИЛ: специальный репортаж”, Вести.RU, February 24,

2016, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2724104&cid=9

24 Osh province: 470,000 (55% of total population), Jalal-Abad province: 283,000 (31,8% of total population),

Batken province: 70,500 (8,3% of total population).

25 Йоанна Паражчук, Алиса Вальсамаки, “ Задержанных узбеков подозревают в попытках выехать в

Сирию”, Радио Азаттык, November 9, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://rus.azattyq.org/a/uzbekistan-podozrenia-plany-vyezda-v-siriyu/27352962.html

19

oppressed by the dominant ethnic group both politically and socially. Moreover, Osh city

became a scene for repeated ethnic discords. All those factors together aggravated the

situation in the region and in the country and led to formation of foreign fighters’ flow.

Uzbekistan itself faces foreign fighters’ problem at the same level as other countries of

Central Asia. Again, the exact number of Uzbeks joining the jihadi groups in Syria is

unknown, and there is a wide gap between data provided by the Uzbekistani government -

about 200 people (relevant for 2015) and unofficial estimates - more than 1,000.26

The most

feasible number, according to experts, is about (more than) 500 fighters. There is lack of data

regarding quantity of families and children coming from the country.

Uzbekistan today (and especially the Uzbekistani part of the Ferghana Valley) is the main

hotbed of Islamic extremism in the Central Asian region. There is an expression in

Uzbekistan society regarding inter-region differences: “One in Samarkand rules, one in

Tashkent makes business, one in Fergana prays”, which again highlights the important role of

religion in Fergana valley, and in its Uzbekistani part in particular; moreover, almost all key

Islamic leaders of the country traditionally origin from Fergana. At the beginning, when the

phenomenon of foreign fighters from Central Asia began to gain momentum (2013-2014),

ethnic Uzbeks were the most visible group of the region.27

In October 2014 the Islamic

movement of Uzbekistan gave to the flow an additional impetus, when it pledged allegiance

to ISIS.28

Another threat comes from Afghanistan districts, such as Darzab and Qush Tepa,

which are inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks, some of whom joined IMU and other jihadist

organizations.

As in other countries of the region, the two main driving factors for foreign fighters are

economic and political: an economic crisis caused by an income drop and a drop in oil prices

26

“Вербовка узбеков в ряды ИГ все чаще происходит в «Одноклассниках»”, Озодлик Радиоси, June 11,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27066270.html

27 Noah Tucker, “Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Uzbekistan“, Central Asia Program, February

2016, accessed September 28, 2017, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CERIA-Brief-

12-February-20161.pdf

28 “"Исламское движение Узбекистана" заявило о присоединении к ИГ”, MKRU, October 6, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/06/islamskoe-dvizhenie-uzbekistana-zayavilo-o-

prisoedinenii-k-ig.html

20

on world markets, which led to growing unemployment, and inter-clan struggle, which also

can be used by jihadist recruiters.

It is important to note the role of Russian social media (Odnoklassniki social network in

particular) in jihadist recruitment in Uzbekistan. Despite censorship politics (but partly

because of it - such politics push people off online to express their opinion), social networks

became an important part of recruitment along with offline activities.29

It is mainly caused by

numerous propaganda efforts which Uzbek fighters in Syria have produced since 2013 for

their countrymen both in Uzbekistan and in Russia.30

According to Tajikistan's government, as of 2015 there were more than 1,000 citizens of

the country fighting for jihadi groups in Syria. Most of them came from Khalton province

(400), which borders Afghanistan on the south and Uzbekistan on the west, Sughd province

(272), which is located in the north of the country and is part of the Fergana valley, and

districts of republican subordination (393, including 139 from Dushanbe - the capital of the

country), which are located in central Tajikistan and share borders with Kyrgyzstan, Khalton

province, and Uzbekistan.31

Even though the data was not updated since 2015, there are clear

trends of jihadist hotbeds in Tajikistan. As in other countries of the region there is a gap

between governmental, expert, and unofficial estimates on the numbers of foreign fighters

origin from the country: from 200 to 2,000 jihadists.32

An interesting fact is that, unlike other

Central Asian countries, the Tajikistan government (particularly Ramazon Rakhimzoda,

Minister of the Interior) does not understate those numbers comparing to estimates provided

by experts, but conversely, articulates the much higher data - 1,000 against 200. There is an

example of mentioned above confusion between Tajikistani citizens coming to Syria from the

country and those Tajiks who come from Russia: according to governmental report, about 85%

29

“Вербовка узбеков в ряды ИГ все чаще происходит в «Одноклассниках»”, Озодлик Радиоси, June 11,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27066270.html

30 Jihadist propaganda targeting Central Asian citizens will be examined in more detailed way in the next

chapter (see page 21).





32 “Нусрат Назаров утверждает, что более 2000 таджиков воюют за ИГИЛ”, Asia-Plus, January 29, 2015,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://news.tj/ru/news/nusrat-nazarov-utverzhdaet-chto-bolee-2000-tadzhikov-

voyuyut-za-igil

21

of the fighters are labour migrants working in Russia,33

which leaves us with 200 fighters

coming from Tajikistan.

Inside the country the main driving factors for radicalization are poverty (that is also the

reason for broad-scale labour migration), social exclusion (due to importance of clan

membership and local connections labour migrants, even in case of return to Tajikistan, find

themselves excluded from social life), and external influence: Tajikistan of all Central Asian

countries has the longest border line with Afghanistan, and the continuing complex military-

political situation in Afghanistan poses a serious threat of the spread of extremism and

terrorism in Tajikistan. Such a neighborhood also provides to Tajikistani fighters an

alternative path to Syria in addition to the one via Turkey.

As in the case of Uzbekistan fighters, there is lack of verifiable information regarding

family jihad from Tajikistan, however recorded cases highlight the trend.

Finally, Turkmenistan, due to its closed nature, appears to be the most difficult country

in the region to gather any reliable information and to highlight any trends from.

It might be stated that between 200 and 400 Turkmens fight in jihadist groups in Syria.

Comparing to other Central Asian countries, Turkmen fighters appeared on the international

jihadi scene relatively late - at the end of 2014 - beginning of 2015. Such lateness is caused

by several factors. First of all, the historically ritual and nonpolitical nature of local Islam

(since Turkmen traditional culture is nomad), which naturally prevents jihadist radicalization

of people. Moreover, it is necessary to mention the role of the promoted cult of the president -

Turkmenbashi and the book he wrote - Ruhnama, which until the certain level was equated

with Quran. The combination of those two factors along with the destruction of the local

political and religious opposition back in the 1990s, hard censorship, and severe restrictions

of Internet access for population, for a long time brought to naught external influence of

radical Islamic groups.

33

«Угроза международного терроризма и религиозного экстремизма государствам-членам ОДКБ на




22

However, there always was a potential threat from the Afghan border, especially

considering the significant number of Turkmen tribes living along that border in Afghanistan

(three out of ten districts of the Jowzjan province of Afghanistan border Turkmenistan.

According to the reports, 70% of the population of the province are ethnic Turkmen),34

which

traditionally support Taliban and keep contacts with their countrymen inside the country. On

the cusp of 2014-2015, the military situation on the border escalated, because ISIS forces

appeared in the border regions and recruited significant number of Turkmens from local

tribes. At the same period within the country an upsurge of jihadist propaganda targeting

local youths was registered.35

Along with external factors there is an impact made by economic crisis (debt crunch for

Chinese gas pipeline, oil prices drop, etc.), political specifics (intertribal tensions

subsequently the president elections)36

, and, on the personal level, by identity crisis, when a

potential fighter due to various reasons (for example, labour migration) becomes excluded

from the clan. It is worth noting, that Turkmens have worked as labour migrants in Turkey

(and not in Russia), because of close Turkmen-Turkey relations since the 1990s. Those

migrants are one of the primary target for jihadist recruiters.37

Finally, there is a confusion one may see in some articles and academic papers38

between

citizens of Turkmenistan fighting for jihadist groups, and Turkmens living in Syria and Iraq.

The latter support Turkey government and in some cases Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian

34

“Афганистан: В «узбекских» районах на границе с Туркменистаном армия ведет бои с ИГИЛ”,

Фергана, June 22, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.fergananews.com/news/26545





36 President Berdymukhamedov, unlike the deceased Turkmenbashi (who, as is known, grew up in an orphanage,

and therefore did not show respect to his tribe), favor his tribe’s relatives. As a result, there is a discontent grows

among the representatives of other tribes. This creates a potential threat to the "Libyan scenario" for

Turkmenistan.

37 Джумагулы Аннаев, “Как ИГИЛ вербует джихадистов из Туркменистана”, Анти-Террор, February 19,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.counter-terror.kz/ru/article/view?id=3470

38 Anna Dyner, Arkadiusz Legieć, Kacper Rękawek, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into

Central Asia”, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 19 (121), June 2015, accessed September 28,

2017, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20020

23

Army,39

and what is more important they do not have any connections (political, social, or

even cultural) with militants origin from Turkmenistan.

Outside the region

As was mentioned repeatedly, the poor economic situation and, in some cases,

economic crises push citizens of Central Asian countries to seeking work abroad, mainly in

Russia and Turkey (as in case with Turkmens).40

The phenomenon of labour migration is widespread in Russia. There is lack of exact

numbers of labour migrants because of the gap between official and unofficial estimates, and

numbers vary from 5,7 to 10 million people.41

Nongovernmental experts highlight that from

two-thirds to 80% of them work illegally, which makes the official statistics irrelevant. It is

important to note, that 60% of all labour migrants are settled in two major Russian

metropolitan areas: Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.42

Workers from Central Asia are engaged in trade, transport, building, housing and

utilities sectors on unskilled positions. However, they do not integrate into Russian society,

but on contrary create parallel infrastructure – economic, social, and cultural.

Such social and cultural closeness, along with high-profile migrant crimes, lead to

further isolation of foreign workers, and together with disconnection from home and

39

“Сирийские туркмены - активные участники гражданской войны в Сирии”, Infoabad.com, August 29,

2016, accessed September 28, 2017, http://infoabad.com/v-mire/siriiskie-turkmeny-aktivnye-uchastniki-

grazhdanskoi-voiny-v-siri.html

40 There are 1,8 million labour migrants in Russia from Uzbekistan, 860,000 from Tajikistan, 588.000 from

Kazakhstan, and 570,000 from Kyrgyzstan (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (along with Russia, Belarus, and

Armenia) are members of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which allows the citizens of those countries to

stay and work in Russia without any impediments). Turkmenistan's workers - 24,000 - are hardly (comparing to

others) represented.

41 Александр Киденис, “Слишком много понаехавших”, Труд, January 20, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017, http://www.trud.ru/article/20-01-2017/1346056_slishkom_mnogo_ponaexavshix.html

42 Евгений Разумный, “Отношение к мигрантам в России ухудшается – «Левада-центр»”, Ведомости,

April 27, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/04/28/687871-

otnoshenie-migrantam-uhudshaetsya

24

community and xenophobia from locals,43

poor working and living conditions egg migrants

from Central Asia towards radicalization.

Seeking new backbones and identity, Central Asian migrants, even those who

never were religious back at home, turn to Islam, often in its radical forms - because

they also find themselves excluded from local Islamic communities.44

A crucial role in radicalization of Central Asians, according to witnesses and media,

especially at the beginning (2014-2015) played Chechens. Thus, migrants who live and work

in Moscow claim that several small (3-4 men) groups of Chechen propagandists (all of them

are at mid-30s) almost every evening visit migrants at dormitories after they finish their work.

Their calls to migrants to move to Syria and join jihadist groups there (mainly ISIS and

Jabhat al-Nusra) are based on promises of decent respectful religious living and options to

choose - to become a fighter, or to live as civilian. Propagandists offer potential recruits from

$5,000 to $15,000, and highlight the importance of moving with whole family, arguing that

otherwise governments will use the families as a bargaining chip.45

Today the Central Asians themselves became recruiters, which might raise the

number of potential fighters among migrant workers from the region. Russian media sources

frequently report about arrests of Central Asian jihadist propagandists all over the country.46

43

There is controversial myth in Russian society, that workers from former Soviet Union are “better” than those

from China, Vietnam and other countries, because the shared past and cultural frameworks of post-Soviet

countries help to forge relationships between the locals and migrants. However, that myth is get broken when

faces the reality: most of the Central Asian workers are young: they were raised in post-Soviet societies, their

belief systems are in stark contrast to what is expected by Russians, and finally they (in contrast to previous

generation) hardly speak Russian. The divergence of expectations with reality creates an additional tension in

society.

44 Iris Oppelaar, “Central Asia and Islamic State: The Russian Connection”, The Diplomat, March 8, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/central-asia-and-islamic-state-the-russian-

connection/

45 Даниил Туровский, “Был гастарбайтером — стал боевиком”, Meduza, April 20, 2015, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://meduza.io/feature/2015/04/20/byl-gastarbayterom-stal-boevikom

46 Илья Давлятчин, “Восьмой вербовщик ИГ арестован в Петербурге”, Росбалт, April 7, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2017/04/07/1605727.html; “В Самаре гражданин Киргизии

осужден за пособничество терроризму”, Экстремизм.РФ, July 5, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://xn--e1aecglcxhj1i.xn--p1ai/v-samare-grazhdanin-kirgizii-osuzhden-za-posobnichestvo-terrorizmu/;

“Уроженец Киргизии, пытавшийся завербовать в ИГИЛ астраханца, приговорен к 6 годам колонии”,

25

The min audience for recruitment among migrants are those who stay in Russia

illegally, have problems with police, and/or cannot find a job. Along with homes of migrants

propagandists in Moscow, in particular, often appear in front of one of the mosques close to

city center after Friday sermons.

Another mean of recruitment of migrants is the Internet and social media networks.

Unlike in their home countries, in Russia workers from Central Asia enjoy free access to

Internet resources, and may easily become a target for jihadist propaganda.

The standard path for recruits is flight from Moscow to Istanbul, and then to the

Syrian border.

In general, it might be stated that the subject of Central Asian labour migrant recruited

by jihadist groups in Russia, despite all its importance (there are known cases of Central

Asians carrying out terror attacks in Europe and Russia,47

and not only in the Middle East,

and moreover, many of those migrants currently work on various strategic facilities, as

Moscow subway, stadiums construction, public transportation, etc.), is still under researched

and requires further examination. For example, the exact numbers of thos who travel from

Russian is unknown, as well as the origin and persons of recruiters, as well as procedure and

details of recruitment.

Militant Activity in Syria

As well as fighters from all over the world, Central Asian recruits in Syria as a part of

radical Islamic groups are employed in various positions: militant, civilians - thus, there were

special reports back in 2015 on ISIS recruiting doctors and engineers - the vital

specializations for building civil society - from Uzbekistan, etc. 48

Экстремизм.РФ, July 19, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://xn--e1aecglcxhj1i.xn--p1ai/urozhenec-

kirgizii-pytavshijsya-zaverbovat-v-igil-astraxanca-prigovoren-k-6-godam-kolonii/

47 Those cases will be examined below (see page 35).

48 Йоанна Паражчук, Алиса Вальсамаки, “ИГ вербует врачей из Узбекистана?”, ЦентрАзия, September 10,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1441893960

26

There are significant propagandist efforts put into recruitment of Central Asian

potential fighters both inside the region and in Russia. Along with offline propaganda, there

are video, audio, and print materials produced in Syria and Iraq, mainly by ISIS’

propagandists.

The first video clip, released by ISIS and oriented toward Central Asian fighters,

appeared back in November 2014, and (as was mentioned above) pictured Kazakh children

during their military trainings.49

The dialogues in that prominent video, titled “Race Towards

Good” interchange between Arabic and Kazakh with Arabic, English, and Russian (for

recruits from other countries of Central Asia) subtitles.

This video clip was followed by number of similar ones, promoting both children and

adults, calling for potential recruits to join ISIS and threatening Central Asian and Russian

governments and societies in local and/or Russian languages - thus in one of such videos

Kazakh boy presumably executes two men accused by ISIS of being Russian spies.50

In its propaganda toward Central Asians ISIS takes into account local specifics and

focused not only on threats to return to their states and establish the new order, but also on

“family values” (the institution of the family is highly valued in the traditional Central Asian

society) - people are encouraged to emigrate to ISIS with their families and “protect the

caliphate”. Those videos emphasize the spirit of camaraderie, social justice, the possibility of

raising children in accordance with Islamic norms, a peaceful life, examples of mutual

assistance, etc.

Along with propaganda products made by ISIS, there are (far less, however) video

clips produced by other jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. For example, in December 2015

Katibat Imam al Bukhari - an Uzbek group allied to Jabhat al-Nusra, released a video of

49

Tom Wyke, Darren Boyle, “ISIS release shocking new video of child soldiers from Kazakhstan being trained

with AK47s”, Mail Online, November 22, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2845531/ISIS-release-shocking-new-video-child-soldiers-Kazakhstan-

trained-AK47s.html

50 Michael Martinez, “ISIS video claims to show boy executing two men accused of being Russian spies“, CNN,

January 15, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/middleeast/isis-video-boy-

execution-russian-spies/index.html

27

Uzbek children receiving military training in Syria, 51

which may be considered as a response

for the similar video produced by ISIS.

There is a noticeable struggle between ISIS and Al-Qaeda (and its affiliates) for the

minds and hearts of potential (including ones from Central Asia) fighters on the propagandist

level. Thus, in June 2015 ISIS released a video message of Abu Hussein al-Uzbeki - one of

the group’s militants, who, according to his own words, arrived in Syria back in 2013 to join

his countrymen fighting for Jabhat al-Nusra under the alias of Abu Salah al-Uzbeki. However,

after spending some time with Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Hussein left the group for ISIS, claiming

that all groups in Syria (other than ISIS) treat their foreign fighters badly, and use them as a

cannon fodder.52

The appearance of Uzbek nationals in propagandist videos is deliberate -

Uzbek fighters compose a majority of Central Asian recruits, and, moreover, wield influence

among other ethnicities of the region.

According to media reports, there are 11 training camps in Syria, where Central Asian

and Caucasian fighters undergo their military education, and four of them belong to Uzbeks53

- that again confirms the important role and place of Uzbek fighters among other ethnic

groups from the region.

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (now part of Tahrir al-Sham) are two main destinations for

Central Asian foreign fighters on the Syrian front: there are ethnic-based (sometimes mixed)

battalions and smaller groups in the ranks of major organization (or affiliated with them).

The exact breakdown between two main competitors, as well as exact number of

battalions remain unclear, but there is a data regarding the most prominent of them.

Despite the propagandist efforts toward Central Asian fighters made by ISIS, the

largest and most noticeable group from the region which operates in Syria - Katibat Imam

Al Bukhari (Imam Bukhari battalion), which is made up mainly of Uzbeks (500 fighters,

as for 2015), is allied today to Jabhat al-Nusra as a part of Tahrir al-Sham, as was mentioned

51

Bill Roggio, Caleb Weiss, “Uzbek group in Syria trains children for jihad”, Long War Journal, December 29,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/uzbek-group-in-syria-

trains-children-for-jihad.php

52 Joanna Paraszczuk, “'Leave Nusra, Join IS,' Uzbek Militant Urges In New IS Video”, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, June 20, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-video-

urges-uzbeks-others-to-leave-al-nusra-front/27082876.html

53 Дениз Зейрек, “Как был убит аль-Узбеки”, Иносми.ру, April 25, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://inosmi.ru/politic/20170425/239212981.html

28

above.54

The group was formed in 2013 and operates in both Afghanistan (where they

pledged their loyalty to Taliban)55

and Syria. The founder and leader of the group - Akmal

Jurabaev (nomme de guerre - Salahuddin al-Uzbeki, assassinated in April 2017) was born

and raised in Namangan city of Fergana valley (Uzbekistan) and possessed considerable

militant experience back from Afghanistan (according to media sources, Salahuddin joined

IMU in 1999 and fought alongside its leaders since then).56

After the death of Salahuddin he

was replaced by Abu Yusuf a Tajik national, who became the new leader of the group.57

It is

interesting to note that Salahuddin’s assassinator was a member of the group of Uzbek or

Tajik origin named Jobir, which indicates the tensions within the group.

Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ), also known as Jannat Oshiklari (Paradise

Loving), is another Uzbek group operating in Syria, which consists of Uzbeks

(predominantly) and Kyrgyz nationals (as well as small number of native Syrians and

Uighurs). The group was presumably established in 2013 (however there are sources which

mention 2014 - the year when the group split from the Seyfuddin Uzbek Jamaat58

of Jabhat

al-Nusra).59

Despite splitting KTJ continues to cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra, since both

groups are parts of Tahrir al-Sham. Moreover, the group maintains coordination and shares

propaganda materials with Katibat Imam Al Bukhari,60

since both of them are Uzbek groups,

both have ties to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and finally, both operate in Aleppo province,61

54

In November 2014, some members of the group pledged allegiance to ISIS: “Imam Bukhari Jamaat (Katibat

Imam al Bukhari)”, TRAC, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/imam-

bukhari-jamaat.

55 Joanna Paraszczuk, “Main Uzbek Militant Faction In Syria Swears Loyalty To Taliban”, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, November 12, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-

uzbek-militant-faction-syria-taliban/26686992.html

56 Максим Енисеев, “В Узбекистане осуждены еще больше экстремистов”, Караван-Сарай, August 22,

2016, accessed September 28, 2017, http://central.asia-

news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/08/22/feature-01

57 “Узбекские боевики в Сирии назначили себе нового временного главаря ”, Радио Озодлик, May 2, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/28462938.html

58 Originally recruited by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

59 “Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad”, TRAC, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad; “Central and South Asian groups in

Syria”, The Line of Steel, May 13, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://thelineofsteel.weebly.com/analysis/central-and-south-asian-groups-in-syria-part-i

60 “Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad”, TRAC, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad

61 “Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad”, The Line of Steel, March 1, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://thelineofsteel.weebly.com/news/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad

29

and Sayfullah Shishani’s Jamaat - a Chechen (primarily) brigade also operating in Aleppo

and led by ethnic Uzbek Abu Ubayda al Madani.62

The leader of the group is Sirojiddin

Mukhtarov (nomme de guerre - Abu Saloh), an ethnic Uzbek origin from Osh province of

Kyrgyzstan. There is a significant number of both Uzbeks and Uighurs living in his home

village - Kashgar-Kyshtak, which explains the presence of Uighurs among the fighters of

KTJ. Abu Saloh was presumably radicalized by a local imam back in Osh,63

and arrived to

Syria in 2012. According to the Kyrgyzstan government, ethnic Uzbeks who composed the

core of the group originate mainly from Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken provinces, which, as

was mentioned above, are the hotbeds of radicalization in the country. Abu Saloh puts

significant efforts to producing and distributing propaganda materials, also in social media

networks. An interesting fact is that he apparently looks beyond Syrian battlefields - the

certain number of KTJ fighters, after completing initial military trainings in Syria, returned to

Kyrgyzstan, where they established local jihadist cells,64

preparing for and carrying out terror

attacks. Thus, local cells of KTJ were reportedly responsible for the Chinese Embassy in

Bishkek bombing (30 August 2016).65

Moreover, according to Russian and Central Asian

sources Abu Saloh is responsible for the St. Petersburg metro bombing in April 2017 (the

case will be examined below). 66

According to SITE group, KTJ claimed credit for the

62

The very fact, that Uzbek national became a leader of Chechen brigade is remarkable, and confirms the

(recent) military raise of Central Asian fighters on Syrian battlefields.

63 “Абу Салох из Киргизского Кашгар-Кыштака: теракты на расстоянии”, Asia Terra, April 21, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/abu-salokh-iz-kirgizskogo-kashgar-

kyshtaka-terakty-na-rasstoyanii

64 Вадим Ночевкин, “Террор в Кыргызстане продолжается”, Дело №, January 20, 2016, accessed September

28, 2017, http://delo.kg/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-33/9185

65 “Взрыв в посольском квартале Бишкека: Спецслужбы Киргизии назвали заказчиков и исполнителей”,

Asia Terra, September 8, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/vzryv-v-

posolskom-kvartale-bishkeka-spetssluzhby-kirgizii-nazvali-zakazchikov-i-ispolnitelej

66 Darya Podolskaya, “Contractor of terrorist attack in St. Petersburg metro wanted by Interpol”,

Информационное агентство 24, April 26, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://24.kg/english/50509_Contractor_of_terrorist_attack_in_St_Petersburg_metro_wanted_by_Interpol/;

Oved Lobel, “Is al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate adopting Islamic State tactics in Russia?”, The New Arab, July 4,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/7/5/is-al-qaedas-syrian-

affiliate-adopting-is-tactics-in-russia

30

attack.67

Today there is an official Russian language website of Tahrir al-Sham group, which

also covers the activities of KTJ in Syria - Sham Center.68

Ethnic Central Asian groups also fight alongside ISIS, however less information is

available on this topic. Media sources allows to suggest at least three such groups.

Uzbek-Tajik69

(or, according to other sources - Chechen-Uzbek)70

Sabri Jamaat, was

presumably founded back in 2013 by Emir Abdurrahman al-Uzbeki, but its most known

leader was ethnic Uzbek Abdullah at-Toshkandi.71

It is based in Aleppo and has about 70

fighters in its ranks.72

The jamaat was named after its second leader - Sabri (details are

unknown), who as well as the first one was killed. The jamaat pledged allegiance to ISIS in

March 2014. Today’s leader of the group is unknown; however, some sources claim the

group has changed its ethnic composition and became a Daghestani jamaat led by Khalid ad-

Daghestani.73

Another group is Kazakh Jamaat. Its title, as well as any other details regarding this

group are unknown, but the Kazakhstani security forces,74

as well as former fighters confirm

its existence. Thus, one of the Chechens who fought for ISIS in 2014-2015, claimed that

67

“Alleged AQ-Linked Group Claims St. Petersburg Metro Bombing”, SITE Intelligence Group, April 25, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/alleged-aq-linked-group-claims-st-

petersburg-metro-bombing.html

68Sham Center, accessed September 28, 2017, http://shamcenter.site/

69 Анна Калашникова, “Ерлан Карин: Нельзя уповать только на спецслужбы”, Ratel.kz, February 5, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.ratel.kz/outlook/erlan_karin_v_sirii_uje_pogibli_okolo_70_nashih_grajdan

70 Johanna Paraszczuk, “Syria: Why ISIS cares about tiny North Caucasus Jamaat pledge to Umar Shishani”,

From Chechnya to Syria, March 23, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21259

71 P Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, October 22, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185062/IB_ISIS_pstobdan221014.pdf

72 “Террористическая организация "Исламское государство". Досье”, ТАСС, May 10, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://tass.ru/info/1264570

73 Johanna Paraszczuk, “New Video: The History of Sabri’s Jamaat (Uzbek Group in IS)”,From Chechnya to

Syria, August 28, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22465

74 “В составе ИГИЛ создан «Казахский джамаат», Городской портал, November 20, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, ”http://gorodskoyportal.ru/ekaterinburg/news/news/9946158/

31

Kazakh jamaat was ruling al-Shaddadi’s oil fields in Syria, 75

which may suggest the high

rank of the group.

Finally, there is a Tajik Jamaat, operating in Syria on behalf of ISIS. The exact

number of the fighters is unknown, but media sources note that initially many of those

fighters joined Ahrar al-Sham group76

and changed sides after the appearance of Gulmurod

Khalimov, whose case deserves more detailed examination, since it sheds light on certain

trends in Central Asian foreign fighters’ flow.

Gulmurod Khalimov (born in 1975) was a lieutenant-colonel and served as head of police

special forces back in Tajikistan. During his service between 2003 and 2014 Khalimov

completed five counterterrorism training courses organized by US Anti-Terrorism Assistance

program in both Tajikistan and USA. He disappeared from the country in April 2015, and

appeared next month in ISIS’ propagandist video. He explained his decision as a reaction on

restrictions Tajikistani government applies on practicing Islam (impossibility of wearing

Islamic clothes, etc.), as well as on current geopolitical relations between Tajikistan, US, and

Russia. Khalimov defined all labour migrant from Central Asia working in Russia “slaves of

kafirs”, and called them to leave for Syria and join ISIS to start a new life of free men.

According to Tajikistani officials, the family of Khalimov, his second wife and eight

children, joined him in Syria. Moreover, there is an unknown number of other fighters from

special police forces who moved to ISIS together with Khalidov, being inspired by him.77

Two of his brothers back in Tajikistan were killed, and three were arrested by local police in

July 2017 on suspect of terrorism and attempts to join jihadist groups in Syria.78

Central Asian and Russian experts highlight the importance of the case of Khalimov,

which indicates the shifts in ranks of foreign fighters from Central Asia: one can talk now not

just about undereducated labour migrants, but also about highly qualified and trained

75

“Вернувшийся из ИГИЛ рассказал о торговле боевиков нефтью с Турцией”, Regnum, December 28,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://regnum.ru/news/2045186.html

76 “Таджикский батальон "вгрызся" в землю Ирака”, Sputnik, March 9, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://ru.sputnik-tj.com/opinion/20170309/1021835165/tadzhikskiy-batalon-mosul-terroristy.html

77 Андрей Серенко, “ Раньше в ИГИЛ шли гастарбайтеры-неудачники, теперь офицеры спецслужб”,

Speakercom, May 28, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://speakercom.ru/columns/668

78 Мумин Ахмади, Муллораджаб Юсуфзода, “Нелегкая тишина в селе беглого таджикского полковника”,

Радио Азаттык, July 9, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/tajikistn-ig-komandir-ex-

polkovnik-gulmurod-halimov/28604171.html

32

militants.79

Despite that there is no information regarding other similar cases, there are

concerns raised over the possible influence of Khalimov’s image to his colleagues back in

Tajikistan who may be dissatisfied with governmental politics. Thus, the Tajiki jamaat has

united and strengthened especially after appearance of Khalimov, and its prestige among the

supporters of ISIS grew significantly.

In September 2016, Khalimov was appointed to a military commander of ISIS,

instead of Chechen Umar al-Shishani, who was killed in July. There is another important

trend might be depicted: since middle 2015 - beginning 2016 Central Asian fighters became

more visible on the jihadist scene, driving out and replacing Chechens on the leading

positions to a certain extent.

Thus, another Central Asian - Abdulrahman Uzbeki (ethnic Uzbek, as followed from

his name) was a close associate of al-Baghdadi and served as a head of financial department

of ISIS until his killing in April 2016 by US forces.80

Abdulrahman Uzbeki was probably

connected to the terror attack in the Reina nightclub of Istanbul in January 2017.81

Another example is Abu Ibrakhim Khorasani of Tajik origin, who in July 2015

became a new commander of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) - a prominent Chechen

group operating in Syria, which was founded by Umar al-Shishani. Khorasani replaced

Salakhuddin, an ethnic Chechen from Pankisi Gorge, who was killed.82

This case is rather

indicative since the Chechen fighters (and Chechens from Pankisi Gorge, in particular) from

the very beginning comprised the “core team” of JMA, and the appearance of Tajik as a

leader, points to the certain shifts in division of powers among post-Soviet jihadists in Syria.

All above examples and cases clearly demonstrate that Central Asian fighters in Syria

“rose through the ranks” from unskilled cannon fodder under the command of Chechens to

79

Андрей Серенко, “ Раньше в ИГИЛ шли гастарбайтеры-неудачники, теперь офицеры спецслужб”,

Speakercom, May 28, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://speakercom.ru/columns/668

80 Дениз Зейрек, “Как был убит аль-Узбеки”, Иносми.ру, April 25, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,


81 “США ликвидировали террориста – соратника главаря ИГИЛ”, Слово и Дело, April 27, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2017/04/22/novost/mir/ssha-likvidirovali-terrorista-soratnika-

glavarya-igil

82 Joanna Paraszczuk, “Meet The Tajiks Fighting In Syria (But Not With IS)”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,

July 22, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-tajiks-fighting-

syria/27142561.html

33

militant leaders, holding key positions and replacing the Chechens, which, according to the

experts, resulted in a situation where Chechens started to lose their positions in jihadist

groups.83

Such changes engender the conflicts within what sometimes is called “Cyrillic jihadist

community”84

- jihadists from post-Soviet countries who use Russian language for

communication. Thus, there was an incident between Chechen and Tajik brigades of ISIS,

when Chechen fighter referred to Tajiks as “slaves who work for Russians”. The conflict

ended with shooting and resulted in several deaths.85

The conflicts are not limited to infighting between Central Asians and Chechens, but

Central Asian brigades themselves were embroiled in interethnic tensions. For example, in

late 2015 Central Asian fighters on their accounts in Vkontakte social network (see pictures

below) actively discussed the corruption scandal, which involved Kazakh Jamaat of ISIS:

other Central Asian fighters denounce them for theft of the organization’s money. In addition

to that, Kazakhs were accused of nationalism and ethnic bias when it came to combats: it was

said that representatives of other nationalities (Ingush, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, etc.) were sent first to

the battle by Kazakh administration, and the Kazakhs themselves stayed in reserve:86

Source: Vkontakte.com

83

“Чеченцы потеряли позиции в ИГ”, On Kavkaz, April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://onkavkaz.com/blogs/2123-chechency-poterjali-pozicii-v-ig.html

84 Leon Aron, “The coming of Russian Jihad: Part I”, War on the Rock, September 23, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/

85 “Вместо стройки на джихад: как исламисты из Центральной Азии угрожают жителям России”,

RuPosters, April 6, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017, https://ruposters.ru/news/06-04-2016/vmesto-strojki

86 Ibid.

34

The above examples highlight the point that Central Asian (and moreover “Cyrillic”)

jihadist community does not come as a body, but in opposite, each ethnic group origin from

post-Soviet space should be examined separately, since each of them has its own specifics

and special relationships with others.

Threats and Attacks Outside Syria

The two recent years, 2016 and 2017, were marked by stepped-up terror attacks

carried out by Central Asia foreign fighters. Indeed, the militants who gained combat and

tactical experience in Syrian battlefields apply that experience beyond the war’s frameworks.

All threats posed by Central Asian militants might be divided into three groups,

depending on location:

- Central Asian region

- post-Soviet space (mainly Russia)

- Worldwide

Despite the warnings directed by the foreign fighters against local governments in various

video clips, there are no clear trends of growing terrorist threats from returning jihadists.

There were two prominent incidents in the last two years within the region: multiple

shootings in Aktobe (Kazakhstan) in June 2016,87

and the bombing of Chinese embassy in

Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in August 2016, carried out by jihadist of Uyghur origin.88

87

“Islamist violence and a spate of protests have rattled Kazakhstan’s ruler”, The Economist, June 10, 2016,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21700499-shaking-throne-central-asias-

biggest-country-islamist-violence-and-spate-protests-have

88 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Suicide Bomber Attacks Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan“, The New York Times,

August 30, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/bishkek-

china-embassy-kyrgyzstan.html

35

However, there is a tangible threat of military clashes on the Turkmen-Afghan and the

Uzbek-Afghan borders, considering the flock of jihadists in those areas.89

It might be suggested that foreign fighters who originate from Central Asia turn their

attention to the international scene, with particular stress on Russia.

Indeed, since the beginning of 2017 three noticeable terror attacks involving Central

Asian perpetrators have occurred, targeting civilians in Istanbul, Stockholm, and St

Petersburg.

Istanbul St Petersburg Stockholm

Date January 1, 2017 April 3, 2017 April 7, 2017

Place Reina nightclub Metro Street

Type of attack Mass shooting Bombing Vehicle-ramming

(truck)

Casualties 39 deaths, 70 injuries 16 deaths, 64 injuries 5 deaths, 14 injuries

Perpetrator ISIS Tawhid wal-Jihad ISIS (inspired)

Assailant Abdulkadir Masharipov Akbarzhon Jalilov Rakhmat Akilov

The three cases are obviously not enough to elicit any trend in terror attacks carried

out by Central Asian militants, but the analysis of attackers’ personalities may contribute to

better understanding of some perspectives of the phenomenon.

89

“Брешь в ОДКБ: боевики ИГИЛ готовят атаку на Туркмению и Узбекистан”, YouTube, June 28, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOv_2yeZEKw

36

Abdulkadir Masharipov (nomme de guerre Abu Mohammed Khorasani

Abdulkavi)90

is a 34-year-old ethnic Uzbek, who was born in Fergana province of

Uzbekistan.91

For some time he studied at physical faculty of one of the universities in

Uzbekistan, however he never graduated.92

It is unclear when exactly and under which

circumstances Masharipov was radicalized, but Turkish media report he was linked to the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) before joining ISIS.93

He is described by both

Turkey officials and media as intelligent and a well-trained and educated person. Indeed, he

speaks five languages - Uzbek, Russian, Arabic, Turkish, and Chinese, and trained in militant

camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan94

- probably in connection to IMU.

Masharipov swore allegiance to ISIS back in Pakistan and arrived illegally to Turkey

via Iran in January 2016, a year prior to the attack, along with his family: a wife - Zarina

Nurullaeva of Uzbek origin, and two minor children. His son was probably taken by ISIS’

fighters and was being sought by the police. Nurullaeva denies any connections to her

husband’s terror plans or actions.95

It might be suggested Masharipov belonged (or had ties)

to an ISIS’ Uzbek cell in Turkey - after his arrest police conducted raids on such suspected

cells in several districts of Istanbul.96

Along with Uzbek connections, there are possible ties

he had with local Uyghur radicals: first of all, as was mentioned above, Masharipov speaks

Chinese, and secondly, after the attack, he, according to his own statement, entered Uyghur

90

Angela Dewan, Emily Smith, “Istanbul nightclub attack suspect confesses, governor says”, CNN, January 17,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/17/europe/istanbul-reina-attack-

arrest/index.html

91 Kareem Shaheen, “Istanbul nightclub attack: suspected gunman 'had training in Afghanistan'”, The Guardian,

January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/17/istanbul-

nightclub-attack-suspected-gunman-abdulgadir-masharipov-had-training-in-afghanistan

92 “Стамбульский стрелок родился в Таджикистане, учился в Узбекистане”, Центр-1, January 18, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/stambulskij-terrorist-rodilsya-v-tadzhikistane-uchilsya-

v-uzbekistane/

93 “Reina terrorist willing to cooperate with police if they find his son”, Yeni Şafak, January 20, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/reina-terrorist-willing-to-cooperate-with-police-if-

they-find-his-son-2599725

94 Rengin Arslan, “Abdulkadir Masharipov: Who is Istanbul gun attack suspect?”, BBC, January 17, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38648350

95 “ISIL told me they are taking my son to Iran: Istanbul nightclub attacker’s wife”, Hurriyet Daily News,

February 5, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-told-me-they-are-

taking-my-son-to-iran-istanbul-nightclub-attackers-wife.aspx?PageID=238&NID=109356&NewsCatID=341

96 Jack Moore, “What we know about Istanbul Nightclub Attack Suspect Abdulkadir Masharipov”, Newsweek,

January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/what-we-know-about-istanbul-

nightclub-killer-abdulkadir-masharipov-543468

37

restaurants to contact his friends working there.97

That fact might again confirm connections

between Central Asian and Uyghur jihadists, which exist despite all historical tensions

between two regions.

Finally, Masharipov had a supervisor for that terror attack - Islam Atabiev (nomme de

guerre Abu Jihad al-Shishani or Abu Jihad al-Karachai, which implies his Karachai or

Chechen origin), whom he communicated with in Russian via Telegram.98

Akbarzhon Jalilov (22 years old at the time of the attack) was an ethnic Uzbek born

and lived in Osh city of Kyrgyzstan. According to the witnesses neither he nor members of

his family were religious.99

The boy graduated from the local school and in 2011, a year after

inter-ethnic tensions between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs in Osh, Jalilov moved to Russia along

with his father and became a Russian citizen (as was mentioned above, the procedure of

obtaining Russian citizenship for Kyrgyzs is easier and faster than for other Central Asians).

During the first two years in Russia both father and son had worked in auto repair

shop, but in 2013 father had returned to Osh, and the son stayed in St Petersburg, working in

a sushi shop as a cook.

Each year Jalilov visited his family in Osh, however in 2015-2016 he did not come.

His family claim he served in the Russian army, but there are no evidence confirming that -

documents or photos. Russian police and officials, as well as one of the Turkish newspapers

argue that Jalilov spent those two years in Turkey (his purpose and activities are unknown)

and was deported to Russia in December 2016.100

It is unknown where and how exactly Jalilov was radicalized: while Kyrgyzstani

sources insist it happened in Russia, the representatives of the investigative committee of

Russia maintain that the radicalization process started back in 2015 while he was in Turkey.

97

“Стамбульский стрелок родился в Таджикистане, учился в Узбекистане”, Центр-1, January 18, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/stambulskij-terrorist-rodilsya-v-tadzhikistane-uchilsya-

v-uzbekistane/

98 “Reina canisi Abdulkadir Masharipov: Eylem talimatını Ebu Cihad verdi”, Sözcü, January 28, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/reina-canisi-abdulkadir-masharipov-eylem-

talimatini-ebu-cihad-verdi-1647166/

99 “Что известно об Акбаржоне Джалилове — биография”, Sputnik, April 5, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017, https://ru.sputnik.kg/society/20170405/1032748314/akbarzhon-dzhalilov.html

100 “Отец Акбаржона Джалилова – о теракте в Питере и сыне”, Центр-1, April 18, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/kyrgyzstan/otets-akbarzhona-dzhalilova-o-terakte-v-pitere-i-syne/

38

According to that source, during that time Jalilov shared jihadist content via his account in

Vkontakte social network. After the terror attack all extremist information was deleted.101

In

any case it is unlikely that Jalilov was radicalized in St Petersburg, since he had no any

jihadist connections in his social circle prior to the radicalization. He never visited either an

official mosque (there is one main mosque in St Petersburg), or private praying rooms, most

of which are located on the territory of Sennoy market - a hub of labour workers in the city.

A noticeable fact - when some workers of the marked were asked about knowing Jalilov, they

argued he was an Uzbek and they are Tajiks, which is the main reason they have nothing to

do with him.102

This case does not form a rule, but illustrates a dividing line drawn between

the nations and ethnicities of Central Asia.

A few months prior to the terror attack, Jalilov rented a relatively expensive flat in St

Petersburg, which is unusual for labour workers (even for those with citizenship, such as

Jalilov), who usually prefer to rent shared apartment and to save money for their families

back at home. Jalilov, however, apparently had another unknown source of income, since the

rent ($350) and the amount of money he sent home ($300-350) exceeded his salary ($350)

twice.103

Jalilov visiting his family in Osh in February - March 2017 for the last time. According to

witnesses after that visit he changed his behavior: became unsociable and secretive. Russian

police suggest that trip became decisive in his radicalization. Moreover, unlike previous visits,

this time he chooses another itinerary - not direct as usual, but with connection in Moscow.

Investigation suggest he met someone connected to terror attack in Moscow, probably his

supervisors.104

101

“Репортаж РБК: как «тихий мальчик» из Оша стал террористом-смертником”, РБК, April 10, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/04/2017/58ea61ce9a79470eda97883d

102 “Петербургский смертник Акбаржон Джалилов репетировал теракт две недели”, MKRU, April 5, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/05/peterburgskiy-smertnik-akbarzhon-

dzhalilov-repetiroval-terakt-dve-nedeli.html

103 Даниил Александров, “Кто такой Акбаржон Джалилов: что известно о жизни и последних днях

предполагаемого петербургского террориста”, Medialeaks, April 6, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://medialeaks.ru/0604dalex-kto-takoy-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-chto-izvestno-o-zhizni-i-poslednih-dnyah-

predpolagaemogo-terrorista/; “Репортаж РБК: как «тихий мальчик» из Оша стал террористом-смертником”,

РБК, April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/04/2017/58ea61ce9a79470eda97883d

104 Герман Петелин, Дмитрий Евстифеев, “Смертник Джалилов работал автослесарем”, Газета.ru, April

4, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2017/04/04/10610225.shtml#page1

39

The investigation revealed that Jalilov was not a lone wolf. It is confirmed both by

above facts (unknown money source, change in the itinerary), as well as by others. Thus, his

school teacher in Osh insists Jalilov was extremely poor at physics and chemistry and was not

be able to create a bomb by himself.105

Analysis of the movements of Jalilov on the day of

attack, as well as his last calls allowed the police to suggest he probably was not chosen as a

suicide bomber, but was due to pass the bomb to some other person.106

A week after the attack the police in Moscow arrested a person who presumably

planned the bombing. Abror Azimov (very little is known about him) was in contact with

Jalilov a few minutes before the latter entered the metro station. Azimov partly admitted guilt

for the attack, but insisted he was just a link in a chain.107

That allows to assume a presence of jihadist cell, operating at least in St Petersburg

and Moscow.

Rakhmat Akilov is a 39 year old ethnic Uzbek, who was born in Samarkand (second

largest city of Uzbekistan). Little is known about his life until 2012, when he, together with

his wife, moved to Russia as labour migrants (Akilov had previously worked in Russia for

about five years), leaving in Samarkand their five children.

While in Russia, Akilov divorced with his wife and left for Turkey, but was deported

from the country, being accused of extremism and links to ISIS, as Turkish newspaper Daily

Sabah reports.108

His brother - Olim Akilov - describes Rakhmat as a smart, modern, industrious person.

He was not religious, however, according to his brother, was able to read Quran in Arabic.109

105

“Перед терактом Джалилов рассказывал о планах достроить дом и жениться”, РБК, April 8, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/04/2017/58e7d3b99a79474b7a069216

106 “Репортаж РБК: как «тихий мальчик» из Оша стал террористом-смертником”, РБК, April 10, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/04/2017/58ea61ce9a79470eda97883d

107 “Предполагаемый организатор теракта в Петербурге отказался от признания вины”, Interfax, April 18,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/558950

108 “Turkey had deported Stockholm, St Petersburg attackers for trying to join Daesh”, Daily Sabah, April 13,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/04/13/turkey-had-

deported-stockholm-st-petersburg-attackers-for-trying-to-join-daesh

109 “«Шведы думают, что Узбекистан – исламистская страна»”, Центр-1, May 19, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/shvedy-dumayut-chto-uzbekistan-islamistskaya-strana/

40

The timeline of Akilov’s movements during the last five (or even more) years, as well

as his background in general, are not clear. His brother claims Akilov had been working

abroad for years, including countries such as Russia, Germany, Denmark, Czech Republic,

and finally Sweden, but never mentions Turkey. On the other hand, Rakhmat Akilov himself,

when applied for residence permit in Sweden in 2014, mentioned his active involvement in

protest movements while in Uzbekistan (as a basis for application). Migration service officers

doubted his story, and refused a permit.110

Uzbekistan authorities in turn insist that Akilov

was radicalized during those years abroad (however, there are no details regarding exact

place or time), and was actively involved in dissemination of jihadist propaganda in online

social networks, including Facebook and Telegram. He was prosecuted in Uzbekistan for

involvement in activities of extremist and terrorist organizations, as well as for calling against

the Uzbekistani government. The Head of Ministry of Interior in Uzbekistan stresses that

they sent all the information regarding Akilov to Swedish officials, however representatives

of Swedish Ministry of Interior deny they received any files.111

While in Sweden Akilov had been working in construction, and was described by his

former colleagues as normal, not very social and not religious person.112

This description

disaccords with the Uzbek authorities' assertion that Akilov was already radicalized, when he

arrived at Sweden. Moreover, Swedish journalists found out that contents of both his

Facebook page and his account in Odnoklassniki social networks (both are deleted for now)

indicate Akilov’s involvement in jihadist propaganda: he followed Tawhid wal-Jihad page

and shared ISIS propaganda videos.113

Along with that, the Local newspaper’s investigation revealed that there were at least

two men in Sweden who used the name Rakhmat Akilov. The terrorist, after his request for a

110

“Теракт в Швеции: Рахмат Акилов арестован и пройдёт психиатрическое обследование”, Фергана,

April 11, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.fergananews.com/news/26258

111 Анна Мамонова, “Жители Самарканда: "Наверное Рахмат совершил теракт в Стокгольме под

воздействием наркотиков"”, Комсомольская Правда в Украине, April 14, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017, http://kp.ua/politics/573110-zhytely-samarkanda-navernoe-rakhmat-sovershyt-terakt-v-stokholme-pod-

vozdeistvyem-narkotykov

112 “Stockholm attack: Who is suspect Rakhmat Akilov?”, BBC, April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39552691

113 “В Швеции выявили связь между терактами в Стокгольме и Петербурге”, Центр-1, May 16, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/v-shvetsii-vyyavili-svyaz-mezhdu-teraktami-v-

stokgolme-i-peterburge/; “Stockholm attack: Who is suspect Rakhmat Akilov?”, BBC, April 10, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39552691

41

residency permit was denied, appealed to the immigration court under the name Rahmantjon

Kurbonov. Another Rakhmat Akilov was an employee at Scandic Hotels (fired in January

2017), but the management of the hotel insist their worker is not the same person who carried

out the attack.114

In any case, Akilov (in fact, both) lost his job few months prior the attack. It is

unknown how he spent those months, and what exactly triggered the attack. Along with that

there is no clear evidence Akilov was a member of any jihadist cell. However, he was in

contact with some person, who was identified as an ISIS supporter (and had a Russian

telephone number) prior and immediately after the attack and exchanged with him messages

in Russian via WhatsApp:115

Source: Expressen.se

Thus, before the attack Akilov described the ingredients he has, asked for advice on

bomb manufacturing, and outlined his plans for tomorrow (to find a big car and drive it into a

crowd), and after described the situation on the spot: “I knocked down 10 people in the

114

“Who is the real Rakhmat Akilov?”, The Local, April 12, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.thelocal.se/20170412/who-is-the-real-rakhmat-akilov-stockholm-truck-attack

115 “Påstådd Akilov-chatt ifrågasätts”, Expressen, April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/pastadd-akilov-chatt-ifragasatts/

42

Stockholm’s center, and now I need to get out!!!”. His confidant asks for video proofs of the

attack.

Two weeks after the attack Swedish police arrested another person in Stockholm (30

years old, of Uzbek origin) on suspicion of terrorism, who was presumably connected to

Akilov. As Expressen newspaper reports, that arrested person has ties with Chechen

militants.116

That proves Akilov was a part of an unknown jihadist network, operating in Sweden

(and probably abroad).

The analysis shows that all three cases share common features and correspond

with the radicalization factors, listed in the previous chapters.

All the assailants are ethnic Uzbeks, which might prove the crucial role of Uzbek

foreign fighters does not limited by Syrian battlefields.

All of them originate from secular families and neighborhoods, and did not

demonstrate sights of radicalization openly until the moment of the attack, which

complicates the identification of potential terrorists at an early stage.

The attackers presumably were not radicalized in their home countries, but

while living abroad.

An important role in their radicalization plays time spent in Turkey: as was noted

in previous chapters, all Central Asian countries have a visa free regime with Turkey, which

makes the trip for the citizens much easier than to other countries; there are significant

Central Asian ethnic communities living in Turkey, due to long historical relationships

between the country and the region.

Finally, all of them did not act alone, but were part of local jihadist cells/

networks, receiving various kinds of support, guidelines, etc.

In addition to terror attacks performed by Central Asians, there is a significant

number of precluded plots (mainly in Russia), which grew noticeably since 2016.

116

“Спецслужбы Узбекистана арестовали брата «стокгольмского террориста»”, Радио Озоди, April 25,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/28450545.html

43

Thus, in May 2016 twelve citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (labour

workers) were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of plotting a terror attack in the city on

Victory Day (9 May). They all were members of Jabhat al-Nusra and planned a mass

shooting in the center of Moscow.117

In November 2016, Russian security forces in St Petersburg and Moscow arrested ten

members of ISIS, who planned the repetition of the Paris attacks (November 2015) on its

anniversary, including a bombing and mass shooting. All of them arrived in Russia from

Central Asia (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan mainly).118

Finally, in May 2017 four ISIS members of Central Asian origin were arrested in

Moscow, when planning the terror attack in Moscow metro (like the one in St Petersburg, but

on a larger scale).119

In addition to the terror plots there are groups and gangs composed of Central Asian

migrants, which combine criminal and jihadist sides. The most prominent case is the so-

called GTA gang (named after Grand Theft Auto video games) – a group of 10-16 of Central

Asian origin (predominantly Tajiks and Uzbeks), which initially was formed in Moscow and

nearest suburbs in 2012 as a training group for potential fighters willing to leave for Syria by

Ibaydullo Subkhanov - probably ethnic Uzbek from Osh, Kyrgyzstan, who had gained

military experience in Syria, fighting for ISIS. The members of the gang called themselves a

jamaat, highlighting their jihadist basis,120

however the activities of the group were solely

criminal: robbery, murders (15 victims), weapons manufacturing, etc. Some of the members

were killed during the arrests in late 2014, other were arrested (including the recruiters

arrested in Tajikistan)121

. In 2017 while all of them were already under arrest, story of the

gang has continued. At the beginning of August, when transporting to court, five of the gang

117

Сергей Машкин, “Боевики называли теракт свадьбой”, Коммерсант, August 7, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3377787

118 “ФСБ предотвратила теракты в Москве и Петербурге”, Lenta.ru, November 12, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/12/stop_terror/

119 “ФСБ предотвратила теракт в Москве”, RNS, May 25, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://rns.online/articles/FSB-predotvratila-terakt-v-Moskve-2017-05-25/

120 “Банда убийц с трассы «Дон» называла себя джамаатом”, Газета.ru, November 6, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/news/2014/11/06/n_6628313.shtml

121 “В Таджикистане задержан вербовщик ИГ из «банды GTA»”, Газета.kg, June 28, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.kg/news/kyrgyzstan/102357-v-tadzhikistane-zaderzhan-verbovschik-

ig-iz-bandy-gta.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto

44

attacked the security guards, attempting to possess their weapons, and entered the court hall,

initiating shooting with the policemen. Thus, three of them were killed.122

All those incidents might have led to the conclusion that the territory of Russia (and

especially large cities) are main targets for Central Asian jihadists today.

Implications and Perspectives

Until 2015 - 2016 the Central Asian jihadism and terrorism remained a regional

problem, concerning local governments and, to a certain degree, neighboring countries and

potential/actual geopolitical partners.

Yet recently the problem drew the attention of both security services and academics

worldwide, especially when Central Asian foreign fighters appeared in the international

jihadist scene.

An analysis of the phenomenon reveals certain trends and perspectives, which might

contribute to a better understanding:

- There are certain hotbeds of jihadism and radicalization inside the region. Those

hotbeds were evoked by the triggering factors, unique to the region, as compared to

other post-Soviet countries. Rich history of jihadism (IMU and other local jihadist

organization, which contribute to the phenomenon of foreign fighters today) prepared

the ground for today’s actors. Closeness to Afghanistan and Pakistan allows local

jihadist organizations to survive, receive support, and communicate with international

counterparts, and for foreign jihadi organizations to enter the region and operate

inside with support of local networks. Finally, inter-ethnic tensions, especially in the

complex areas, such as the Fergana valley, where any local conflict may lead to

escalation of violence, pave the way for jihadist activity.

- Despite that triggers, most of the Central Asian fighters are radicalized outside the

region: mainly in Russia, where they come as labour migrants and where they face

122

Алина Распопова, “«Банду ГТА» встретили пистолетами и стульями”, Газета.ru, August 3, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2017/08/03_a_10816051.shtml

45

economic and social challenges, and suffer from marginalization, and in Turkey,

where potential fighters enjoy a visa-free regime, assistance of ethnic diasporas,

Islamic culture, and finally, closeness to Syria and easiness of joining various jihadist

organizations.

- In Syria, Central Asian foreign fighters are equally spaced between ISIS and Al-

Qaeda groups. At the early stage, there was a kind of dominance of Chechen fighters,

as ones with noticeable militant experience over others from post-Soviet space,

including foreign fighters from Central Asia. Chechens played a crucial role in

radicalization of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia, and occupied leading

positions in jihadist groups in Syria. However, by 2015-2016 Central Asian jihadists

gained great militant experience and started to replace Chechens in both spheres.

Today most of jihadist propagandists operating in Russia among Central Asian

workers are from Central Asia themselves, which certainly might help to raise the

number of potential recruits. Along with that, in Syria Central Asian militants started

to fill the leading positions both in ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliated groups.

- The rise of Central Asian jihadists turned them to a danger threatening the

international community - 2017 was marked by three noticeable terror attacks carried

out by jihadists of Central Asian origin. Two main targets for potential terror attacks

performed by Central Asians may be named: Russia (because of the unsolved

problem with labour workers’ immigration, and its military policy in Syria) and

Turkey (because of the same reasons which were listed above: easiness of reaching,

closeness to Syria, etc.). It is unlikely the threat of such attacks in Western Europe or

North America will grow - the Central Asian diasporas in those regions are not

significant, and there are certain obstacles for them to reach those countries, because

of the visa regimes and economic grievances. Along with that Central Asians rarely

may apply for asylum, since there is no warfare in the region.

The main threat for the region itself posed by foreign fighters is not mass return, which is

unlike, due (among other factors) to the harsh policy of the local governments toward

returning jihadists. However, there is a tangible threat of intervention coming from the

Afghanistan border areas. It is the place, where members of local jihadist groups expelled

46

from the region (as IMU), militants who have ethnic ties with the region, and experienced

local foreign fighters returning from Syria and relocated to Afghanistan are concentrated. All

of them, considering the insufficient level of border control in the region (both outside and

within), are capable of attacking the borders of the Central Asian states and breaking the

peace from outside.

47

Bibliography

“122 Women Citizens of Kyrgyzstan Among Terrorist Groups in Syria”, Armedia, November

11, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017, http://armedia.am/eng/news/26195/122-

women-citizens-of-kyrgyzstan-among-terrorist-groups-in-syria.html

“Abu Salokh iz Kirgizskogo Kashgar-Kyshtaka: terakty na rasstoyanii”, [Abu Salokh from

Kyrgyz Kashgar-Kyshtak: terrorist attacks in the distance] Asia Terra, April 21, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/abu-salokh-iz-

kirgizskogo-kashgar-kyshtaka-terakty-na-rasstoyanii

“Afganistan: V «uzbekskih» rayonah na granitse s Turkmenistanom armiya vedet boi s IGIL”,

[Afghanistan: In the "Uzbek" areas on the border with Turkmenistan, the army is

fighting with ISIS] Фергана, June 22, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.fergananews.com/news/26545

“Alleged AQ-Linked Group Claims St. Petersburg Metro Bombing”, SITE Intelligence

Group, April 25, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/alleged-aq-linked-group-claims-st-

petersburg-metro-bombing.html

“Banda ubiyts s trassy «Don» nazyvala sebya dzhamaatom”, [A gang of assassins from the

"Don" highway called itself Jamaat] Газета.ru, November 6, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/news/2014/11/06/n_6628313.shtml

“Bresh v ODKB: boeviki IGIL gotovyat ataku na Turkmeniyu I Uzbekistan”, [Hole in CSTO:

ISIS militants preparing an attack on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan] YouTube, June

28, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOv_2yeZEKw

“Central and South Asian groups in Syria”, The Line of Steel, May 13, 2015, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://thelineofsteel.weebly.com/analysis/central-and-south-

asian-groups-in-syria-part-i

“Central Asia Population”, Worldomoters, accessed September 28, 2017,


“Chechentsy poteryali pozitsii v IG”, [Chechens lost their positions in the IS] On Kavkaz,

April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://onkavkaz.com/blogs/2123-

chechency-poterjali-pozicii-v-ig.html

http://armedia.am/eng/news/26195/122-women-citizens-of-kyrgyzstan-among-terrorist-groups-in-syria.html

http://armedia.am/eng/news/26195/122-women-citizens-of-kyrgyzstan-among-terrorist-groups-in-syria.html

http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/abu-salokh-iz-kirgizskogo-kashgar-kyshtaka-terakty-na-rasstoyanii

http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/abu-salokh-iz-kirgizskogo-kashgar-kyshtaka-terakty-na-rasstoyanii


https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/alleged-aq-linked-group-claims-st-petersburg-metro-bombing.html

https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/alleged-aq-linked-group-claims-st-petersburg-metro-bombing.html

https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/news/2014/11/06/n_6628313.shtml

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOv_2yeZEKw






48

“Chto izvestno ob Akbarzhone Dzhalilove — biografiya”, [What is known about Akbarzhon

Dzhalilov - biography] Sputnik, April 5, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://ru.sputnik.kg/society/20170405/1032748314/akbarzhon-dzhalilov.html

“FSB predotvratila terakt v Moskve”, [FSB prevented terror attack in Moscow] RNS, May 25,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://rns.online/articles/FSB-predotvratila-

terakt-v-Moskve-2017-05-25/

“FSB predotvratila terakty v Moskve I Petersburge”, [FSB prevented terror attacks in

Moscow and St Petersburg] Lenta.ru, November 12, 2016, accessed September 28,

2017, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/12/stop_terror/

“IGIL I Tsentralnaya Azia: bednyh I bezzaschitnyh legche ubedit“, [ISIS and Central Asia:

the poor and the defenseless are easier to convince] Центр-1, April 11, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/igil-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-

bednyh-i-bezzashhitnyh-legche-ubedit/

“Imam Bukhari Jamaat (Katibat Imam al Bukhari)”, TRAC, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/imam-bukhari-jamaat

“ISIL told me they are taking my son to Iran: Istanbul nightclub attacker’s wife”, Hurriyet

Daily News, February 5, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-told-me-they-are-taking-my-son-to-iran-

istanbul-nightclub-attackers-wife.aspx?PageID=238&NID=109356&NewsCatID=341

“Islamist violence and a spate of protests have rattled Kazakhstan’s ruler”, The Economist,

June 10, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21700499-shaking-throne-central-asias-

biggest-country-islamist-violence-and-spate-protests-have

“"Islamskoye dvizhenie Uzbekistana" zayavilo o prisoedinenii k IG”, [Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan announced joining the ISIS] MKRU, October 6, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/06/islamskoe-dvizhenie-

uzbekistana-zayavilo-o-prisoedinenii-k-ig.html

“Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad”, The Line of Steel, March 1, 2015, accessed September 28,

2017, http://thelineofsteel.weebly.com/news/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad

“Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad”, TRAC, accessed September 28, 2017,


“Kazakhstanskie dobrovoltsy v ryadah IGIL: smert v pogone za illuziyami - expert”,

[Kazakhstani volunteers in the ranks of ISIS: death in pursuit of illusions - expert]

https://ru.sputnik.kg/society/20170405/1032748314/akbarzhon-dzhalilov.html

https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/12/stop_terror/

https://centre1.com/world/igil-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-bednyh-i-bezzashhitnyh-legche-ubedit/

https://centre1.com/world/igil-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-bednyh-i-bezzashhitnyh-legche-ubedit/

https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/imam-bukhari-jamaat

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-told-me-they-are-taking-my-son-to-iran-istanbul-nightclub-attackers-wife.aspx?PageID=238&NID=109356&NewsCatID=341

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-told-me-they-are-taking-my-son-to-iran-istanbul-nightclub-attackers-wife.aspx?PageID=238&NID=109356&NewsCatID=341

https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21700499-shaking-throne-central-asias-biggest-country-islamist-violence-and-spate-protests-have

https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21700499-shaking-throne-central-asias-biggest-country-islamist-violence-and-spate-protests-have

http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/06/islamskoe-dvizhenie-uzbekistana-zayavilo-o-prisoedinenii-k-ig.html

http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/06/islamskoe-dvizhenie-uzbekistana-zayavilo-o-prisoedinenii-k-ig.html

http://thelineofsteel.weebly.com/news/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad


49

Zakon.kz, October 9, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.zakon.kz/4747832-kazakhstanskie-dobrovolcy-v-rjadakh.html

“Nusrat Nazarov utverzhdaet, chto bolee 2000 tadzhikov voyuut za IGIL”, [Nusrat Nazarov

claims that more than 2,000 Tajiks are fighting for ISIS] Asia-Plus, January 29, 2015,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://news.tj/ru/news/nusrat-nazarov-utverzhdaet-

chto-bolee-2000-tadzhikov-voyuyut-za-igil

“Otets Akbarzhona Dzhalilova – o terakte v Pitere I syne”, [Father of Akbarzhon Jalilov -

about the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg and his son] Центр-1, April 18, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/kyrgyzstan/otets-akbarzhona-

dzhalilova-o-terakte-v-pitere-i-syne/

“Påstådd Akilov-chatt ifrågasätts”, [Alleged Akilov chat person is questioned] Expressen,

April 10, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,


“Pered teraktom Dzhalilov rasskazyval о planah dostroit dom i zhenitsya”, [Before the attack,

Jalilov talked about plans to build the house and marry] РБК, April 8, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017,

http://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/04/2017/58e7d3b99a79474b7a069216

“Peterburgskiy smertnik Akbarzhon Dzhalilov repetiroval terakt dve nedeli”, [Petersburg

suicide bomber Akbarjon Jalilov rehearsed the attack for two weeks] MKRU, April 5,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/05/peterburgskiy-smertnik-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-

repetiroval-terakt-dve-nedeli.html

“Predpolagaemyi organizator terakta v Peterburge otkazalsya ot priznaniya viny”, [The

alleged organizer of the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg refused to admit the guilt]

Interfax, April 18, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.interfax.ru/russia/558950

“Reina canisi Abdulkadir Masharipov: Eylem talimatını Ebu Cihad verdi”, [Reina’s murderer

Abdulkadir Masharipov: Abu Jihad gave the instructions for the attack] Sözcü,

January 28, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/reina-canisi-abdulkadir-masharipov-eylem-

talimatini-ebu-cihad-verdi-1647166/

“Reina terrorist willing to cooperate with police if they find his son”, Yeni Şafak, January 20,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/reina-

terrorist-willing-to-cooperate-with-police-if-they-find-his-son-2599725

https://www.zakon.kz/4747832-kazakhstanskie-dobrovolcy-v-rjadakh.html

https://news.tj/ru/news/nusrat-nazarov-utverzhdaet-chto-bolee-2000-tadzhikov-voyuyut-za-igil

https://news.tj/ru/news/nusrat-nazarov-utverzhdaet-chto-bolee-2000-tadzhikov-voyuyut-za-igil

https://centre1.com/kyrgyzstan/otets-akbarzhona-dzhalilova-o-terakte-v-pitere-i-syne/

https://centre1.com/kyrgyzstan/otets-akbarzhona-dzhalilova-o-terakte-v-pitere-i-syne/


http://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/04/2017/58e7d3b99a79474b7a069216

http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/05/peterburgskiy-smertnik-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-repetiroval-terakt-dve-nedeli.html

http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/05/peterburgskiy-smertnik-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-repetiroval-terakt-dve-nedeli.html

http://www.interfax.ru/russia/558950

http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/reina-canisi-abdulkadir-masharipov-eylem-talimatini-ebu-cihad-verdi-1647166/

http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/reina-canisi-abdulkadir-masharipov-eylem-talimatini-ebu-cihad-verdi-1647166/

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/reina-terrorist-willing-to-cooperate-with-police-if-they-find-his-son-2599725

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/reina-terrorist-willing-to-cooperate-with-police-if-they-find-his-son-2599725

50

“Reportazh RBK: kak «tihiy malchik» iz Osha stal terroristom-smertnikom”, [RBC report:

how a "quiet boy" from Osh became a suicide bomber] РБК, April 10, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017,


Sham Center, accessed September 28, 2017, http://shamcenter.site/

“«Shvedy dumayut, chto Uzbekistan – islamistskaya strana»”, [The Swedes think that

Uzbekistan is an Islamist country] Центр-1, May 19, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017, https://centre1.com/world/shvedy-dumayut-chto-uzbekistan-islamistskaya-

strana/

“Siriyskie turkmeny – aktivnye uchastniki grazhdanskoy voiny v Sirii”, [Syrian Turkmens -

active participants in the civil war in Syria] Infoabad.com, August 29, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://infoabad.com/v-mire/siriiskie-turkmeny-aktivnye-

uchastniki-grazhdanskoi-voiny-v-siri.html

“Spetzsluzhby Uzbekistana arestovali brata “stokgolmskogo terrorista””, [Special forces of

Uzbekistan arrested the brother of “Stockholm attacker”] Радио Озоди, April 25,

2017, accessed September 28, 2017, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/28450545.html

“SSHA likvidirovali terrorista – soratnika glavarya IGIL”, [US liquidated a terrorist - a

fellow leader of ISIS] Слово и Дело, April 27, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2017/04/22/novost/mir/ssha-likvidirovali-terrorista-soratnika-

glavarya-igil

“Stambulskiy strelok rodilsya v Tadzhikistane, uchilsya v Uzbekistane”, [The Istanbul

shooter was born in Tajikistan, studied in Uzbekistan] Центр-1, January 18, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://centre1.com/world/stambulskij-terrorist-

rodilsya-v-tadzhikistane-uchilsya-v-uzbekistane/

“Stockholm attack: Who is suspect Rakhmat Akilov?”, BBC, April 10, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39552691

“Tadzhikskiy battalion "vgryzsya" v zemliy Iraka”, [Tajik battalion "bite" into the land of

Iraq] Sputnik, March 9, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://ru.sputnik-

tj.com/opinion/20170309/1021835165/tadzhikskiy-batalon-mosul-terroristy.html

“Terakt v Shvetsii: Rahmat Akilov arestovan i proidet psihiatricheskoe obsledovanie”,

[Terror attack in Sweden: Rakhmat Akilov is arrested and will undergo a psychiatric

examination] Фергана, April 11, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,



http://shamcenter.site/

https://centre1.com/world/shvedy-dumayut-chto-uzbekistan-islamistskaya-strana/

https://centre1.com/world/shvedy-dumayut-chto-uzbekistan-islamistskaya-strana/

http://infoabad.com/v-mire/siriiskie-turkmeny-aktivnye-uchastniki-grazhdanskoi-voiny-v-siri.html

http://infoabad.com/v-mire/siriiskie-turkmeny-aktivnye-uchastniki-grazhdanskoi-voiny-v-siri.html

https://rus.ozodi.org/a/28450545.html

https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2017/04/22/novost/mir/ssha-likvidirovali-terrorista-soratnika-glavarya-igil

https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2017/04/22/novost/mir/ssha-likvidirovali-terrorista-soratnika-glavarya-igil

https://centre1.com/world/stambulskij-terrorist-rodilsya-v-tadzhikistane-uchilsya-v-uzbekistane/

https://centre1.com/world/stambulskij-terrorist-rodilsya-v-tadzhikistane-uchilsya-v-uzbekistane/





51

“Terroristicheskaya organizatsiya "Islamskoe Gosudarstvo". Dosie”, [Terrorist organization

"Islamic State". Dossier] ТАСС, May 10, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://tass.ru/info/1264570

“Turkey had deported Stockholm, St Petersburg attackers for trying to join Daesh”, Daily

Sabah, April 13, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/04/13/turkey-had-deported-

stockholm-st-petersburg-attackers-for-trying-to-join-daesh

“Ugroza mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma I religioznogo extremizma gosudarstvam-chlenam

ODKB na Tsentralnoaziatskom I Afghanskom napravleniyah“, [Threat of terrorism

and religious extremism for states-members of CSTO in Central Asia and Afghanistan]

Институт Международных Исследований МГИМО-МИД России, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://imi-mgimo.ru/images/pdf/analiticheskie_doklady/igil.pdf

“Urozhenets Kirgizii, pytavshiysya zaverbovat v IGIL astrahantsa, prigovoren k 6 godam

kolonii”, [A native of Kyrgyzstan was sentenced to 6 years in a prison, after trying to

recruit Astrakhan citizen to ISIS] Экстремизм.РФ, July 19, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://xn--e1aecglcxhj1i.xn--p1ai/urozhenec-kirgizii-

pytavshijsya-zaverbovat-v-igil-astraxanca-prigovoren-k-6-godam-kolonii/

“Uzbekskie boeviki v Sirii naznachili sebe novogo vremennogo glavarya”, [Uzbek militants

in Syria have appointed a new temporary leader] Радио Озодлик, May 2, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/28462938.html

“V Kazakhstane zablokirovali polsotni zarubezhnyh saytov”, [Fifty foreign websites are

blocked in Kazakhstan] Decan.kz, September 3, 2011, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://decan.kz/v-kazaxstane-zablokirovali-polsotni-zarubezhnyx-sajtov.html

“V Samare grazhdanin Kirgizii osuzhden za posobnichestvo terrorizmu”, [A citizen of

Kyrgyzstan is convicted of aiding terrorism in Samara] Экстремизм.РФ, July 5, 2017,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://xn--e1aecglcxhj1i.xn--p1ai/v-samare-grazhdanin-

kirgizii-osuzhden-za-posobnichestvo-terrorizmu/

“V Shvetsii viyavili svyaz mezhdu teraktami v Stokgolme i Peterburge”, [In Sweden the

connection between the acts of terrorism in Stockholm and St. Petersburg was

established] Центр-1, May 16, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://centre1.com/world/v-shvetsii-vyyavili-svyaz-mezhdu-teraktami-v-stokgolme-i-

peterburge/

“V sostave IGIL sozdan «Kazakhskiy Dzhamaat»“, [Kazakh Jamaat is created as a part of

ISIS] Городской портал, November 20, 2014, accessed September 28,

2017, ”http://gorodskoyportal.ru/ekaterinburg/news/news/9946158/

http://tass.ru/info/1264570

https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/04/13/turkey-had-deported-stockholm-st-petersburg-attackers-for-trying-to-join-daesh

https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/04/13/turkey-had-deported-stockholm-st-petersburg-attackers-for-trying-to-join-daesh

http://imi-mgimo.ru/images/pdf/analiticheskie_doklady/igil.pdf

http://экстремизм.рф/urozhenec-kirgizii-pytavshijsya-zaverbovat-v-igil-astraxanca-prigovoren-k-6-godam-kolonii/

http://экстремизм.рф/urozhenec-kirgizii-pytavshijsya-zaverbovat-v-igil-astraxanca-prigovoren-k-6-godam-kolonii/

http://decan.kz/v-kazaxstane-zablokirovali-polsotni-zarubezhnyx-sajtov.html

http://экстремизм.рф/v-samare-grazhdanin-kirgizii-osuzhden-za-posobnichestvo-terrorizmu/

http://экстремизм.рф/v-samare-grazhdanin-kirgizii-osuzhden-za-posobnichestvo-terrorizmu/

https://centre1.com/world/v-shvetsii-vyyavili-svyaz-mezhdu-teraktami-v-stokgolme-i-peterburge/

https://centre1.com/world/v-shvetsii-vyyavili-svyaz-mezhdu-teraktami-v-stokgolme-i-peterburge/

52

“V Tadzhikistane zablokirovali Facebook”, [Facebook is blocked in Tajikistan] Asia-Plus,

March 3, 2012, accessed September 28, 2017, http://news.tj/ru/news/v-tadzhikistane-

zablokirovali-facebook

“V Tadzhikistane zaderzhan verbovschik IG iz «bandy GTA»”, [The ISIS recruiter from the

"GTA gang" is arrested in Tajikistan] Газета.kg, June 28, 2016, accessed September

28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.kg/news/kyrgyzstan/102357-v-tadzhikistane-zaderzhan-

verbovschik-ig-iz-bandy-gta.html

“V Uzbekistane usilili internet-blokadu”, [Internet blockade is strengthened in Uzbekistan]

Lenta.ru, Aurust 10, 2011, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/10/block/

“Verbovka Uzbekov v ryady IG vse tchasche proishodit v “Odniklassnikah””, [The

recruitment of Uzbeks into the ranks of the ISIS is increasingly taking place in

"Odnoklassniki"] Озодлик Радиоси, June 11, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27066270.html

“Vernuvshiysya is IGIL rasskazal o torgovle boevikov neftiu s Turtsiey”, [Returnee from

ISIS told about the oil trade between the fighters and Turkey] Regnum, December 28,

2015, accessed September 28, 2017, https://regnum.ru/news/2045186.html

“Vmesto stroyki na dzhihad: kak islamisty iz Tsentralnoy Azii ugrozhaut zhitelyam Rossii”,

[Instead of building on jihad: how Islamists from Central Asia threaten the inhabitants

of Russia] RuPosters, April 6, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://ruposters.ru/news/06-04-2016/vmesto-strojki

“Vzryv v posolskom kvartale Bishkeka: Spezsluzhby Kirgizii nazvali zakazchikov i

ispolniteley”, [Explosion in the embassy quarter of Bishkek: Kyrgyz special services

named leaders and executors] Asia Terra, September 8, 2016, accessed September 28,

2017, http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/vzryv-v-posolskom-kvartale-bishkeka-

spetssluzhby-kirgizii-nazvali-zakazchikov-i-ispolnitelej

“Who is the real Rakhmat Akilov?”, The Local, April 12, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.thelocal.se/20170412/who-is-the-real-rakhmat-akilov-stockholm-truck-

attack

“Zhenschiny I muzhchiny Kyrkyzskoy respubliki“, [Women and Men of Kyrgyz Republic]

Национальный статистический комитет Кыргызской республики, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.stat.kg/media/publicationarchive/569ab8c9-2ac4-

406e-80d6-29b6c8b8b4ef.pdf

http://news.tj/ru/news/v-tadzhikistane-zablokirovali-facebook

http://news.tj/ru/news/v-tadzhikistane-zablokirovali-facebook

https://www.gazeta.kg/news/kyrgyzstan/102357-v-tadzhikistane-zaderzhan-verbovschik-ig-iz-bandy-gta.html

https://www.gazeta.kg/news/kyrgyzstan/102357-v-tadzhikistane-zaderzhan-verbovschik-ig-iz-bandy-gta.html

https://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/10/block/

https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27066270.html

https://regnum.ru/news/2045186.html

https://ruposters.ru/news/06-04-2016/vmesto-strojki

http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/vzryv-v-posolskom-kvartale-bishkeka-spetssluzhby-kirgizii-nazvali-zakazchikov-i-ispolnitelej

http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/vzryv-v-posolskom-kvartale-bishkeka-spetssluzhby-kirgizii-nazvali-zakazchikov-i-ispolnitelej





53

Ahmadi, Mumin, Mulloradzhab Yusufzoda, “Nelegkaya tishina v sele beglogo Tadzhikskogo

polkovnika”, [A hard silence in the village of a runaway Tajik colonel] Радио

Азаттык, July 9, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://rus.azattyq.org/a/tajikistn-ig-komandir-ex-polkovnik-gulmurod-

halimov/28604171.html

Aleksandrov, Daniil, “Kto takoi Akbarzhon Dzhalilov: chto izvestno o zhizni i poslednih

dnyah predpolagaemogo peterburgskogo terrorista”, [Who is Akbarzhon Dzhalilov:

what is known about life and the last days of the alleged St. Petersburg terrorist]

Medialeaks, April 6, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://medialeaks.ru/0604dalex-kto-takoy-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-chto-izvestno-o-

zhizni-i-poslednih-dnyah-predpolagaemogo-terrorista/

Annaev, Dzhumaguly, “Kak IGIL verbuet dzhihadistov iz Turkmenistana”, [How the ISIS

recruits jihadists from Turkmenistan] Анти-Террор, February 19, 2015, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.counter-terror.kz/ru/article/view?id=3470

Aron, Leon, “The coming of Russian Jihad: Part I”, War on the Rock, September 23, 2016,

accessed September 28, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-

russian-jihad-part-i/

Arslan, Rengin, “Abdulkadir Masharipov: Who is Istanbul gun attack suspect?”, BBC,

January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

europe-38648350

Davlyatchin, Iliya, “Vosmoy verbovschik IG arestovan v Peterburge”, [Eight recruiter of

ISIS is arrested in St. Petersburg] Росбалт, April 7, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017, http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2017/04/07/1605727.html

Dewan, Angela, Emily Smith, “Istanbul nightclub attack suspect confesses, governor says”,

CNN, January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/17/europe/istanbul-reina-attack-arrest/index.html

Dyner, Anna, Arkadiusz Legieć, Kacper Rękawek, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed

Expansion into Central Asia”, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 19

(121), June 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20020

Eniseev, Maksim, “V Uzbekistane osuzhdeny esxhe bolshe ekstremistov”, [More extremists

were convicted in Uzbekistan] Караван-Сарай, August 22, 2016, accessed September

28, 2017, http://central.asia-

news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/08/22/feature-01

https://rus.azattyq.org/a/tajikistn-ig-komandir-ex-polkovnik-gulmurod-halimov/28604171.html

https://rus.azattyq.org/a/tajikistn-ig-komandir-ex-polkovnik-gulmurod-halimov/28604171.html

http://medialeaks.ru/0604dalex-kto-takoy-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-chto-izvestno-o-zhizni-i-poslednih-dnyah-predpolagaemogo-terrorista/

http://medialeaks.ru/0604dalex-kto-takoy-akbarzhon-dzhalilov-chto-izvestno-o-zhizni-i-poslednih-dnyah-predpolagaemogo-terrorista/

http://www.counter-terror.kz/ru/article/view?id=3470

https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/

https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/



http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2017/04/07/1605727.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/17/europe/istanbul-reina-attack-arrest/index.html

https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20020

http://central.asia-news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/08/22/feature-01

http://central.asia-news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/08/22/feature-01

54

Hoseini, Seyede Mottahere, “POsledstviya rasprostraneniya salafitsko-vahhabistskogo

dvizheniya v Sredney Azii“, [The Consequences of the Salafi-Wahhabi Movement in

Central Asia] Иносми.ру, November 23, 2013, accessed September 28, 2017,


Ivashkina, Daria, "V Tadjikistane zablokirovany “VK” i “Odnoklassniki”," [Vkontake and

Odnoklassniki are blocked in Tajikistan] Комсомольская Правда, May 29, 2015.

http://www.kp.ru/online/news/2068923/

Jedinia, Mehdi, „IS 'Cyrillic Jihadists' Create Their Own Community in Syria“, VOA, March

30, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/is-cyrillic-

jihadists-create-their-own-community-in-syria/3261535.html

Kalashnikova, Anna, “Yerlan Karin: Nelzya upovat tolko na spetsluzhby”, [Yerlan Karin:

You cannot rely only on special services] Ratel.kz, February 5, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017,

http://www.ratel.kz/outlook/erlan_karin_v_sirii_uje_pogibli_okolo_70_nashih_grajda

n

Kidenis, Aleksandr, “Slishkom mnogo ponaehavshih”, [Too many of newcomers] Труд,

January 20, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.trud.ru/article/20-01-

2017/1346056_slishkom_mnogo_ponaexavshix.html

Lobel, Oved, “Is al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate adopting Islamic State tactics in Russia?”, The

New Arab, July 4, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/7/5/is-al-qaedas-syrian-affiliate-

adopting-is-tactics-in-russia

Lynch, Thomas F. III, Michael Bouffard, Kelsey King, and Graham Vickowski “The Return

of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy”,

Strategic Perspectives 21, National Defense University Press, October 29, 2016,

accessed September 28, 2017,

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/987178/the-return-of-foreign-fighters-to-

central-asia-implications-for-us-counterterro/

Mamonova, Anna, “Zhiteli Samarkanda: "Navernoe Rahmat sovershil terakt v Stokgolme

pod vozdeystviem narkotikov"”, [Residents of Samarkand: "Rahmat probably

committed the attack in Stockholm being drugged”] Комсомольская Правда в

Украине, April 14, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017, http://kp.ua/politics/573110-

zhytely-samarkanda-navernoe-rakhmat-sovershyt-terakt-v-stokholme-pod-

vozdeistvyem-narkotykov

Martinez, Michael, “ISIS video claims to show boy executing two men accused of being

Russian spies“, CNN, January 15, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,


https://www.voanews.com/a/is-cyrillic-jihadists-create-their-own-community-in-syria/3261535.html

https://www.voanews.com/a/is-cyrillic-jihadists-create-their-own-community-in-syria/3261535.html



http://www.trud.ru/article/20-01-2017/1346056_slishkom_mnogo_ponaexavshix.html

http://www.trud.ru/article/20-01-2017/1346056_slishkom_mnogo_ponaexavshix.html

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/7/5/is-al-qaedas-syrian-affiliate-adopting-is-tactics-in-russia

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/7/5/is-al-qaedas-syrian-affiliate-adopting-is-tactics-in-russia

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/987178/the-return-of-foreign-fighters-to-central-asia-implications-for-us-counterterro/

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/987178/the-return-of-foreign-fighters-to-central-asia-implications-for-us-counterterro/

http://kp.ua/politics/573110-zhytely-samarkanda-navernoe-rakhmat-sovershyt-terakt-v-stokholme-pod-vozdeistvyem-narkotykov



55

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/middleeast/isis-video-boy-execution-russian-

spies/index.html

Mashkin, Sergey, “Boeviki nazyvali terakt svadboy”, [Militants called the terror attack a

wedding] Коммерсант, August 7, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3377787

Moore, Jack, “What we know about Istanbul Nightclub Attack Suspect Abdulkadir

Masharipov”, Newsweek, January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.newsweek.com/what-we-know-about-istanbul-nightclub-killer-

abdulkadir-masharipov-543468

Nechepurenko, Ivan, “Suicide Bomber Attacks Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan“, The New

York Times, August 30, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/bishkek-china-embassy-

kyrgyzstan.html

Nekrasov, Roman, “Kirgiziya I nadvigayuschayasya ugroza «Islamskogo Gosudarstva»”,

[Kyrgyzstan and the imminent threat of the "Islamic State"] Однако, April 25, 2015,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://www.odnako.org/blogs/kirgiziya-i-

nadvigayushchayasya-ugroza-islamskogo-gosudarstva/

Nochevkin, Vadim, “Terror v Kyrgyzstane prodolzhaetsya”, [Terror in Kyrgyzstan continues]

Дело №, January 20, 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://delo.kg/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-33/9185

Olkott, Marta Brill, «Ocherki istorii islama v Uzbekistane», [Essays on the history of Islam in

Uzbekistan] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 11, 2012,

accessed September 28, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/11/ru-pub-

49351

Oppelaar, Iris, “Central Asia and Islamic State: The Russian Connection”, The Diplomat,

March 8, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/central-asia-and-islamic-state-the-russian-connection/

Paraszczuk, Joanna, “Kazakhs Fighting With IS Are 'Victims Of Radical Propaganda'”,

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 20, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-is-fighters-propaganda-victims/26911658.html

Paraszczuk, Joanna, “'Leave Nusra, Join IS,' Uzbek Militant Urges In New IS Video”, Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 20, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-video-urges-uzbeks-others-to-leave-al-nusra-

front/27082876.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/middleeast/isis-video-boy-execution-russian-spies/index.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/14/middleeast/isis-video-boy-execution-russian-spies/index.html

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3377787

http://www.newsweek.com/what-we-know-about-istanbul-nightclub-killer-abdulkadir-masharipov-543468

http://www.newsweek.com/what-we-know-about-istanbul-nightclub-killer-abdulkadir-masharipov-543468

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/bishkek-china-embassy-kyrgyzstan.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/bishkek-china-embassy-kyrgyzstan.html

http://www.odnako.org/blogs/kirgiziya-i-nadvigayushchayasya-ugroza-islamskogo-gosudarstva/

http://www.odnako.org/blogs/kirgiziya-i-nadvigayushchayasya-ugroza-islamskogo-gosudarstva/

http://delo.kg/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-33/9185

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/11/ru-pub-49351

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/11/ru-pub-49351

http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/central-asia-and-islamic-state-the-russian-connection/

https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-is-fighters-propaganda-victims/26911658.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-video-urges-uzbeks-others-to-leave-al-nusra-front/27082876.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-video-urges-uzbeks-others-to-leave-al-nusra-front/27082876.html

56

Paraszczuk, Joanna, “Main Uzbek Militant Faction In Syria Swears Loyalty To Taliban”,

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 12, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-uzbek-militant-faction-syria-

taliban/26686992.html

Paraszczuk, Joanna, “Meet the Tajiks Fighting in Syria (But Not With IS)”, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, July 22, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-tajiks-fighting-syria/27142561.html

Paraszczuk, Joanna, “New Video: The History of Sabri’s Jamaat (Uzbek Group in IS)”, From

Chechnya to Syria, August 28, 2014, accessed September 28, 2017,


Paraszczuk, Joanna, “Syria: Why ISIS cares about tiny North Caucasus Jamaat pledge to

Umar Shishani”, From Chechnya to Syria, March 23, 2014, accessed September 28,

2017, http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21259

Paraszczuk, Joanna, Alisa Valsamaki, “IG verbuet vrachey iz Uzbekistana?”, [Does the ISIS

recruit doctors from Uzbekistan?] ЦентрАзия, September 10, 2015, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1441893960

Paraszczuk, Joanna, Alisa Valsamaki, “Zaderzhannyh uzbekov podozrevayut v popytkah

vyehat v Siriyu”, [Detained Uzbeks are suspected of trying to leave for Syria] Радио

Азаттык, November 9, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://rus.azattyq.org/a/uzbekistan-podozrenia-plany-vyezda-v-siriyu/27352962.html

Petelin, German, Dmitriy Evstigneev, “Smertnik Dzhalilov rabotal avtoslesarem”, [The

suicide bomber Jalilov worked as a car mechanic] Газета.ru, April 4, 2017, accessed

September 28, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2017/04/04/10610225.shtml#page1

Podolskaya, Darya, “Contractor of terrorist attack in St. Petersburg metro wanted by

Interpol”, Информационное агентство 24, April 26, 2017, accessed September 28,

2017,

https://24.kg/english/50509_Contractor_of_terrorist_attack_in_St_Petersburg_metro_

wanted_by_Interpol/

Punegov, Eduard, “Kak verbuyut terroristov IGIL: spetsialniy reportazh”, [How terrorists are

recruited by ISIS: special reportage] Вести.RU, February 24, 2016, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2724104&cid=9

Raspopova, Alina, “«Bandu GTA» vstretili pistoletami I stuliyami”, [GTA Band was met

with pistols and chairs] Газета.ru, August 3, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2017/08/03_a_10816051.shtml

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-uzbek-militant-faction-syria-taliban/26686992.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-uzbek-militant-faction-syria-taliban/26686992.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-tajiks-fighting-syria/27142561.html


http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1441893960

https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2017/04/04/10610225.shtml#page1

https://24.kg/english/50509_Contractor_of_terrorist_attack_in_St_Petersburg_metro_wanted_by_Interpol/

https://24.kg/english/50509_Contractor_of_terrorist_attack_in_St_Petersburg_metro_wanted_by_Interpol/

http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2724104&cid=9

https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2017/08/03_a_10816051.shtml

57

Razumniy, Evgeniy, “Otnoshenie k migrantam v Rossii uhudshaetsya – «Levada-Center»”,

[The attitude towards migrants in Russia is deteriorating - "Levada Center"]

Ведомости, April 27, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/04/28/687871-otnoshenie-

migrantam-uhudshaetsya

Roggio, Bill, Caleb Weiss, “Uzbek group in Syria trains children for jihad”, Long War

Journal, December 29, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/uzbek-group-in-syria-trains-

children-for-jihad.php

Serenko, Andrei, “Ranshe v IGIL shli gastarbaitery-neudachniki, teper ofitsery spetsluzhb”,

[Before gastarbeiters-losers joined the ISIS, now officers of special services]

Speakercom, May 28, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://speakercom.ru/columns/668

Shaheen, Kareem, “Istanbul nightclub attack: suspected gunman 'had training in

Afghanistan'”, The Guardian, January 17, 2017, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/17/istanbul-nightclub-attack-suspected-

gunman-abdulgadir-masharipov-had-training-in-afghanistan

Stobdan, P, “ISIS in Central Asia”, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, October 22,


https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185062/IB_ISIS_pstobdan221014.pdf

Toksonaliyeva, Roza, “Radikalnye techeniya islama v stranah Tsentralnoy Azii», [Radical

Islamic movements in the countries of Central Asia] Время Востока, December 6,

2013, accessed September 28, 2017, http://easttime.ru/analytics/tsentralnaya-

aziya/radikalnye-techeniya-islama-v-stranakh-tsentralnoi-azii/5312

Tucker, Noah, “Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Uzbekistan“, Central Asia

Program, February 2016, accessed September 28, 2017,

http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CERIA-Brief-12-

February-20161.pdf

Turovskiy, Daniil, “Byl gastarbayterom — stal boevikom”, [Was guest worker - became a

militant] Meduza, April 20, 2015, accessed September 28, 2017,

https://meduza.io/feature/2015/04/20/byl-gastarbayterom-stal-boevikom

Wyke, Tom, Darren Boyle, “ISIS release shocking new video of child soldiers from

Kazakhstan being trained with AK47s”, Mail Online, November 22, 2014, accessed

September 28, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2845531/ISIS-release-

shocking-new-video-child-soldiers-Kazakhstan-trained-AK47s.html

https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/04/28/687871-otnoshenie-migrantam-uhudshaetsya

https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/04/28/687871-otnoshenie-migrantam-uhudshaetsya

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/uzbek-group-in-syria-trains-children-for-jihad.php

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/uzbek-group-in-syria-trains-children-for-jihad.php

http://speakercom.ru/columns/668

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/17/istanbul-nightclub-attack-suspected-gunman-abdulgadir-masharipov-had-training-in-afghanistan

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/17/istanbul-nightclub-attack-suspected-gunman-abdulgadir-masharipov-had-training-in-afghanistan

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185062/IB_ISIS_pstobdan221014.pdf

http://easttime.ru/analytics/tsentralnaya-aziya/radikalnye-techeniya-islama-v-stranakh-tsentralnoi-azii/5312

http://easttime.ru/analytics/tsentralnaya-aziya/radikalnye-techeniya-islama-v-stranakh-tsentralnoi-azii/5312

http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CERIA-Brief-12-February-20161.pdf

http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CERIA-Brief-12-February-20161.pdf

https://meduza.io/feature/2015/04/20/byl-gastarbayterom-stal-boevikom

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2845531/ISIS-release-shocking-new-video-child-soldiers-Kazakhstan-trained-AK47s.html

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2845531/ISIS-release-shocking-new-video-child-soldiers-Kazakhstan-trained-AK47s.html

58

Zeyrek, Deniz, “Kak byl ubit al-Uzbeki”, [How al-Uzbei was killed] Иносми.ру, April 25,




59

ABOUT THE ICT

Founded in 1996, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)

is one of the leading academic institutes for counter-terrorism in the

world, facilitating international cooperation in the global struggle

against terrorism. ICT is an independent think tank providing expertise

in terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, threat vulnerability

and risk assessment, intelligence analysis and national security and

defense policy. ICT is a non-profit organization located at the

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel.

More information about the ICT can be found at: https://www.ict.org.il/

https://www.ict.org.il/

central asia jihadism: home and abroad asian jihadism.pdf · region) coupled with other impact...

Documents