ICES ASC 2012/L:05 Changing attitudes 1970 – 2012. Evolution of the Norwegian management framework to prevent overfishing and to secure long-term sustainability by P Gullestad1, A Aglen2, Å Bjordal2, G Blom1, S Johansen3, J Krog4, O A Misund5 and I Røttingen2

1) Directorate of Fisheries, P.O.Box 185, N-5804 Bergen, Norway, 2) Institute of Marine Research (IMR), P.O. Box 1870, N-5817 Bergen, Norway 3) Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affaires, P.O.Box 8118 Dep, 0032 Oslo, Norway, 4) County Governor of Sør Trøndelag, P.O.Box 4710, 7468 Trondheim, Norway, 5) University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), P.O. Box 156, N-9171 Longyearbyen, Norway, Abstract Fisheries have for centuries been an important part of life along the Norwegian coast. The development of new fishing technology and increasing fishing capacity posed challenges for the sustainability of the fisheries. The Norwegian spring-spawning herring was overfished in the 1960-ies with dire consequences. This event, and the subsequent efforts to rebuild the stock, was paramount to the gradual development of a coherent Norwegian policy to prevent overfishing and to secure long-term sustainability. Nevertheless, overfishing continued the next transitional decades when a range of new management tools were developed and made effective. Internationally the extension to 200 miles economic zones and agreement on the sharing and management of joint stocks were important elements. At the national level the development of measures to curb overcapacity, improvement of exploitation patterns through technical regulations and ban on discard, and the development of procedures for rational decision-making on the setting of TACs through sustainable harvest control rules, were all decisive elements. Besides, the creation of a whole new profession of fishery inspection has been necessary.We describe a system of close collaboration, but distinct roles between scientists, fishery managers, and stakeholders in building a solid framework to prevent overfishing and secure long-term sustainability. Keywords: Management, scientific advice, harvest control rules, Norwegian/Barents Sea Contact author: Ingolf Røttingen, Institute of Marine Research, P O Box 1870 Nordnes, N 5917 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: ingolf@imr.no

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Introduction The term “overfishing” is frequently used in fisheries discussion. Norway experienced dramatic effects on fisheries and coastal communities due to overfishing and the subsequent collapse of the large Norwegian spring spawning herring stock in the late sixties (Dragesund et. al., 1980), and overfishing had detrimental effects on the large fish stocks in the Barents Sea (Jakobsen and Ozhigin, 2011), the Norwegian Sea (Skjoldal et al., 2004), and the North Sea (Skjoldal and Misund, 2008) following rapid technical progress and increased efficiency in fisheries. In everyday jargon overfishing is a rather normative description of fishing pressure measured in tons or fishing mortality being higher than desired. The term is often used rather imprecisely or with different content. According to Pauly (1983), growth overfishing occurs when fish is caught at an average size that is smaller than what would produce maximum yield per recruit, recruitment overfishing occurs when the mature part of a fish population is reduced to a level where it is not able to reproduce the population, and ecosystem overfishing occurs when the balance of the ecosystem is altered by overfishing. However, as argued by Murawski (2000), there are neither any agreed indicators that identify ecosystem overfishing, nor any biological attributes for which ecosystems should be managed. In a recent evaluation, the Norwegian fisheries management system obtained the highest compliance score (Pitcher et al., 2009a) to the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995b), in which prevention of overfishing is among the central principles (no. 6.3). Overall code of conduct compliance by Norway was just about 60 % indicating that there is still a considerable potential for improvement (Pitcher et. al. 2009a, 2008). In a similar evaluation of progress in implementing ecosystem-based management of fisheries (EBFM), Norway rank second after USA, but overall performance score is slightly above 60 % (Pitcher et. al., 2009b). Scores for performance of EBFM principles and EBFM indicators are high, but less for EBFM implementation. However, the rather positive evaluations cited above is counteracted by a similar evaluation of the management effectiveness of world fisheries where the probability of fisheries sustainability is ranked rather low for Norway, much due to excess fishing fleet capacity (Mora, et.al., 2009). In the present paper we attempt to describe the building of the Norwegian framework to prevent overfishing. Within the last decades the authors have had leading roles as scientists, managers and administrators in the Norwegian fisheries management system and had a close cooperation. But our roles have been very different, the scientist advising on the basis of best possible science quality assured through the ICES system, the administrators in the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs help political decisions based on scientific advice supplemented by advice from managers taking account of economic and societal aspects, managers also being responsible for the implementation of regulatory measures. In our analysis we attempt to link biological knowledge and scientific advice with political and societal objectives, and the management challenges that follows.

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The collapse of the Norwegian spring spawning herring In a Norwegian context, the collapse of the Norwegian spring spawning herring is a standard reference to overfishing (Røttingen 2004). The herring fishery was traditionally carried out with small wooden vessels in inshore waters and the herring was located by sign such as the presence of birds and sea mammals. However, the fishery developed into an industrialized offshore fishery using large vessels, sophisticated electronic search instruments and large fishing gears. As catches increased, the fishery crossed the line from being sustainable to non-sustainable. The experience with the Norwegian spring spawning herring included elements such as open access, increasing number and size of fishing vessels, more effective equipment, and lack of necessary international and national regulatory measures, which all eventually contributed to overfishing. Fishery policy objectives In the 1960ies and 70ies the broadly recognized Norwegian fishery policy objectives were (Anon 1978):

• Firstly, the fisheries sector had a major responsibility for the maintenance and development of settlement and employment in coastal communities.

• Secondly, the fisheries sector had to be sufficiently profitable, being able to secure wages and living conditions similar to those of other sectors of the Norwegian economy.

• And, with the collapse of the Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring Stock around 1970, a third objective emerged: fish stocks should not be depleted.

Temporary financial problems, caused alternately by either low catches or deteriorating world market prices for fishery products, combined with the political objectives, led the Government and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association to sign a General Agreement on financial support to the industry in 1964. The intention was that such support should help the industry to overcome what was regarded as temporary, short term economic problems. But it very soon turned out to become an integral part of the management system were the industry annually negotiated with the government for next years support package. In retrospect, it is easy to recognize that the financial problems were not of a temporary or short term nature. The fisheries sector could no longer solve its financial problems under the existing social policy objective of being the backbone in securing employment and settlement in coastal Norway. One fundamental reason was that catches, which had be rapidly growing in the 1950ies and 60ies due to technological progress and increased efficiency, stagnated and started to decline due to overfishing and dwindling stocks (Fig. 1). Another fundamental reason was that real prices of fish on the world market increased less than real wages in Norway. With more than 95 % of Norwegian fisheries products being exported, this meant that each fisherman every

4 year would have to fish more, or receive an increasing amount of subsidies, to keep up with the standard of living of his non-fishing neighbours (Fig. 2). Change of policy and policy objectives tend to occur only gradual and slowly, even though often triggered by initial shocks like the herring stock collapse. What with hindsight may look like obvious and clear historical facts did not appear like that at the time it happened. This may be even more the case when strong interests are connected to the status quo and continuation of existing policies. It takes time to adapt policies and behaviour to new realities. Limiting access Initiated by the overfishing and collapse of the Norwegian spring spawning herring stock, the process to limit access to Norwegian offshore fisheries was given a push. A new law on the participation in fisheries entered into force in 1972. Starting with the access regulations of pelagic fisheries in 1973, gradually all offshore fisheries were closed for new entrants. In parallel the Law of the Sea process led to the enlargement of 200-mile economic Zones in 1977, limiting foreign fleet’s access to coastal state waters and entitling coastal states with rights and obligations with regard to the management of its living marine resources. In the Norwegian case this also meant extended cooperation especially with Russia and the EU, nearly all economically important fish populations being shared stocks. By 1990 the critical stock situation for Northeast Arctic Cod, caused by overfishing, led to the closure of most of the Norwegian coastal fishery for cod. This was a draconian step, in a country where open access to fishing had been regarded more or less like a human right since the country was first inhabited. This first comprehensive access regulation of a coastal fishery was at the time politically explained and defended as a pure emergency measure which should be repealed as soon as the stock situation had improved. Gradually it was, however, reluctantly accepted that this was not only an emergency measure, but one of the permanent steps necessary to curb overfishing, regardless of the stock situation. In the late 1990ies and early 2000ies a number of coastal fisheries became subject to access regulations, and since 2004 the remaining open access opportunities in coastal fisheries are all small scale and in many cases regulated by overall TACs, creating in general minor impact on stocks and on investment behaviour. The end of subsidies The subsidies to the Norwegian fisheries sector peaked around 1980 when subsidies amounted to about one third of the first hand value of fish (Fig. 3). The subsidies were gradually reduced in the 1980ies, had a temporary increase during the aforementioned cod crisis, but have since the mid 1990ies been negligible. An important factor which politically facilitated the phasing out of subsidies was an international commitment signed in 1989 to do so under the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).

5 Besides the intended positive effect of maintaining an (artificial) high level of employment in the fisheries sector, the subsidies had several negative effects. The obvious one was the preservation of fleet overcapacity, and even contributing to its increase, putting stocks under permanent pressure and threat of overfishing. Another one was the annual negotiation process for financial support to the industry itself. In these negotiations prognosis of next years prices and catch levels were decisive factors when determining what would be the actual income gap to be filled with subsidies. The government, obviously wanting to minimize subsidies for budgetary reasons, had thereby a strong incentive to be optimistic with regard to next years catch opportunities. The system as such invited to short-sightedness with respect to stock conservation. Reducing overcapacity Limiting access and putting an end to subsidies were, however, not sufficient to reduce overcapacity and the threat of overfishing. During the 1980ies some of the financial support to the sector was utilized to finance scrapping schemes to reduce fleet capacity. From the 1990ies such schemes have gradually been replaced by license aggregation schemes where voluntary scrapping of one vessel entitles the owner to add its fishing opportunities to another, remaining vessel for a period of 20 years. This policy has succeeded in reducing the number of fishing vessels and halted the growth in fishing capacity as measured by aggregate horsepower of the fleet (Fig. 4). Distribution of annual fishing opportunities – stakeholder participation The national distribution of quotas between fleet groups and between vessels within each group has been a very demanding issue, particularly up to around 2005 when the most important distributional issues have been settled and seem to have found durable, long term solutions. In this process The Norwegian Fisherman’s Association (NFA), organizing fishers and vessel owners from most fleet segments, played a vital role in negotiating delicate, but rather robust compromises between its members. Recent catch history was an important, but not the only component when reaching solutions. These compromises, and the intensive efforts of the Association in this context, have been appreciated and to a large extent been followed in practical politics of the Parliament and changing governments. This has contributed to political stability on these often very sensitive issues. Generally the experience is that consultation and stakeholder participation in the regulatory process has contributed significantly to the development of fisheries management, and to the industry’s acceptance of regulatory measures. Specifically, their involvement and influence on distributional issues have been considerable, and gradually the long term sustainability perspective on fisheries management is being accepted by a majority of stakeholders.

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International cooperation and agreements As most fish stocks harvested in the Norwegian fisheries are shared with other nations, international cooperation in research and management has been instrumental for the development of sustainable fisheries management systems. For the Barents- and Norwegian Seas fisheries, the close and long standing cooperation between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia has been of particular importance. In recent times, a close cooperation in research was initiated in 1957 and further developed and extended over the years (Alekseev et al. 2011), while the cooperation in fisheries management was formalized by the establishment of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission in 1976 (Hønneland, 2012). Exploitation pattern and discard policy Potential yield from a fish stock is both related to exploitation level and the issue of recruitment overfishing, and to exploitation pattern and the issue of growth overfishing. Figure 5 illustrate that Northeast Arctic Cod nearly double its potential yield being harvested as nine year old fish compared to that of three year old fish. A comprehensive effort has been conducted over the years to improve the exploitation pattern of Norwegian fisheries. Fundamental steps were the introduction of a system of Real Time Closures in 1984, the discard ban for cod and haddock in 1987, and mandatory sorting grid in shrimp trawl and ground fish trawl in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Today the discard policy comprises most species. The annual economic benefit in 2012 as a result of improved exploitation pattern for Northeast Arctic Cod compared with that of the 1970ies is illustrated in Figure 6. It may be argued that the calculated results are based on simplified assumptions of a more complex reality. Still, it underpins the magnitude of potential economic benefits from improved exploitation pattern, and its importance in relation to the question of overfishing. Exploitation level - the precautionary approach, harvest control rules, and the MSY approach Already during the early years of ICES, growth overfishing was recognized as a potential problem and a special Committee was established in 1902 for dealing with the topic. The rather long process of developing management advice for fisheries management and communicating this to the management bodies is described by Sætersdal (2002 and 2008). The world wars and lack of international agreements on shared stocks seem to be important reasons why it took some 70 years to get an advisory system in routine operation.

7 In the mid 1970-ies the Liaison Committee issued annual advice for several commercially important fish stocks. This has later been continued and developed by ACFM (1978-2007) and by ACOM (from 2008). In the period 1976-1986 the main focus was to reduce “growth overfishing” and the basis for advice was mainly fishing mortality reference points derived from yield per recruit calculations (Fmax, F0.1). From 1987 additional fishing mortality reference points derived from stock/ recruitment relationships (Fmed, Flow, Fhigh) were used for the advice. This reflects the concerns for avoiding reduced reproduction capacity (too low spawning stock). This concern was also the reason for introducing the Minimum Biological Acceptable Level (MBAL) in 1992. In the period 1992-1997 clear and specific advice were given only in cases when the spawning stock was below MBAL. When the stock was “within safe biological limits” (above MBAL) the advice was rather open to the manager’s choice and phrases like “the stock sustains current fishing” was used when the situation appeared rather stable, or “no long term gain in increasing F” in cases when F was well above Fmax or Fmed. The precautionary approach stating that lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation, was incorporated in official Norwegian fisheries policy through a White Paper to the parliament in 1997 (Anon., 1997). This came as a response to the Declaration from the Rio Conference in 1992 (Anon., 1992), the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (Anon., 1995a), and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Anon., 1995b). In the following years stock specific target and limit reference points were developed through the ICES advisory working groups for the major fish stocks in Norwegian waters. Limit reference points refer to stock specific, absolute values of spawning stock biomass (Blim) and fishing mortality (Flim) considered acceptable. However, to take care of the uncertainty in data and assessment models, precautionary reference (Bpa, Fpa) points were introduced. (Table 1). In 1998 the Precautionary Approach (PA) was introduced in the advisory process. Upper limits were defined also for fishing mortality in addition to lower limits for spawning stock. In addition, uncertainty was taken into account by setting “safety margins” relative to those limits. Now uncertainty became an argument for a more conservative management. Earlier, uncertainty was often used by the industry as an argument for increasing quotas (the stock might be larger than assessed by the scientists). In the following years the increasing environmental concerns lead to increased “political costs” for non-precautionary or unsustainable fisheries management. Throughout the nineties the Norwegian Spring Spawning herring stock was increasing and resumed its summer migrations in the Norwegian Sea, thus becoming available for fishing outside Norwegian waters. Through a process in NEAFC based on a scientific considerations on catches and stock distribution, the coastal states agreed on a TAC allocation key (Røttingen, 2004). To stabilize catches and prevent critical stock levels, NEAFC initiated the development of a harvest strategy. In 1999 the coastal states agreed on a harvest control rule for Norwegian Spring Spawning herring constructed as a function with the limit and precautionary reference points as triggers (Røttingen, 2004, see Table 2). The agreement on the TAC allocation and the harvest control rule have given a stable management regime for

8 the Norwegian spring spawning herring for the last decade, and due to good recruitment in the later nineties - early two thousands, the catches have varied between 0.766 – 1.687 mill. tons. Development and construction of harvest control rules based on reference points established by ICES followed for all the major commercial fish stocks within Norwegian waters in the early two thousands. For the Barents Sea species such as capelin, Northeast Arctic cod and Northeast haddock, the species specific harvest control rules were developed and agreed upon in the Joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries commission in the years 2000 – 2004, subsequent to modelling and testing within the ICES Arctic Fisheries Working Group (Kovalev and Bogstad, 2011; Hønneland, 2012). In 2010 the “MSY-framework” became the main basis for the ICES advice. This has shifted the focus from avoiding limits to aiming for maximum sustainable yield. Since the mid 90-ies the management bodies have adopted management plans or harvest rules for a large number of stocks. Such plans are in most cases pre-agreed procedures for setting the annual TAC. When those plans are in accordance with the PA and/or MSY, ICES gives advice according to the plans. It is important to note that management plans may have other objectives than MSY, for example MEY (maximum economic yield), still being fully sustainable and precautionary. Within ICES there is no unique definition of the term overfishing. In view of the history described above the following interpretations of a “scientific overfishing concept” could be valid: Period Overfishing concept Key ref. points 1976-1986 Too high F to utilize individual growth Fmax 1987-1991 Too high F to utilize individual growth and/or

too high F to maintain a “healthy” spawning stock Fmax and/or Fmed

1992-1997 Too high F to allow SSB > MBAL in the short term MBAL 1998-2009 Unsustainable F and/or too high F to avoid risk of

reduced reproductive capacity Flim and Blim Fpa and Bpa

2010--> Too high F to obtain maximum sustainable yield in the long term, or to keep SSB>MSY Btrigger in the short term

FMSY and MSY Btrigger

Monitoring, control and surveillance One of the lessons learnt the last decades is that robust science and regulatory measures are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for curbing overfishing. Throughout the 1980ies it became clear that prudent control and enforcement, both at sea and in harbour, were essential elements in successful fisheries management, and that a more or less entirely new field and profession had to be established and developed to perform the task. Over time reduced

9 overcapacity and increased stakeholder participation may ease the control tasks. Nevertheless, the common nature of fish resources does require a sustained effort in this respect. Ecosystem approach To advice on a more holistic management of the living marine resources and the marine environment, ICES adopted an ecosystem approach strategy in 2002 (Anon., 2002a), and an ecosystem approach is a central principle for management of Norwegian waters and the living resources therein (Anon., 2002b). There has been a transition from fisheries research and oceanographic cruises to ecosystem cruises where more holistic surveillance and investigations of the ecosystem being surveyed are attempted (Olsen et al., 2011, Misund et al., 2011). The role of the sand eel as a key species in the North Sea ecosystem was recognized in the mid two thousands. The sand eel abundance was much reduced due to overfishing and poor recruitment at that time, especially in the Norwegian exclusive economic zone in the North Sea. To rebuild the stock an area based approach has been developed in cooperation with stakeholders. If appropriate sand eel abundance is evident on the particular fishing grounds, approximately half the area is opened for fisheries of a defined quota, the remaining parts of the grounds are kept closed. An ecosystem approach is an underlying element of such a management model. Integrated Ocean Management Plans During the nineties conflicting interests between an expanding offshore oil and gas industry and the traditional fisheries regarding use of specific areas at sea became more pronounced. At the same time environmental concerns were raised about effects of pollution and the effect of traditional fisheries on fragile marine biota, including overfished fish stocks. Therefore, the concept of Ocean Management Plans for the Norwegian waters was launched in 2002, and the Lofoten – Barents Sea decided as the first plan area. The Ocean Management Plans should have a cross sectoral, holistic approach. Representatives of all Ministries and their underlying directorates and institutions with responsibilities within the ocean areas participated in the development of the plans. With its overall responsibility for the environment in areas under Norwegian domain, the Ministry of Environment lead the planning process. Underlying reports on the marine environment and living marine resources in the Lofoten – Barents Sea area, on the fisheries activity, the shipping activity, the offshore oil and gas activity in the area, and on the vulnerable and especially valuable areas were prepared. Based on these, the government presented the first Lofoten – Barents Sea ocean management plan as a white paper to the Parliament in March 2006 (Anon., 2006, Olsen et al., 2007, Winsnes and Skjoldal, 2008). To enable a more regular planning process an

10 overarching management forum lead by the Norwegian Polar Institute, a surveillance group led by IMR, and a risk assessment group lead by the Norwegian Coastal Authority were established. A revised, updated Lofoten – Barents Sea plan was presented to the Parliament in March 2011 (Anon., 2011). A similar plan for the Norwegian Sea was presented to the Parliament in 2009 (Anon. 2009, Ottersen et al., 2011), and one for the Norwegian sector of the North Sea is expected in 2013. The Marine Living Resources Act On January 1st 2009 the Marine Living Resources Act entered into force. The previous act relating to fisheries focused mainly on the exploitation of commercial stocks whereas the new act applies to all living marine resources. The Marine Living Resources Act states that its purpose is to ensure sustainable and economically profitable management of the resources and several provisions describes conservation of biodiversity as an integral part of sustainable management. The act reflects recent developments in international law with regard to conservation and fisheries. By integrating conservation and sustainable use as basic principles, the new law represents a regime shift in the management of fisheries. Results As for many other coastal states, Norwegian fisheries developed rapidly after 1945(Fig. 1). The broad picture is a fisheries development phase up to the 1960ies, then a rather evident overfishing phase with reduced yield culminating in the latter part of the 1980ies, followed by rebuilding of major stocks giving room for increased yield (Fig. 1). Management strategies and harvest control rules based on the Precautionary Approach, along with improved technical measures and an extensive enforcement regime, have contributed to the rebuilding of depleted stocks (Table 1), and laid the foundation for improved profitability in fishery. Ecological sustainability is radically improved. Aggregate spawning stock of the ten economically most important stocks for Norwegian fisheries is more than tripled since the latter part of the 1980ies (Fig. 7a, b), so far enabling a sustainable long term annual aggregate catch level of around 2,5 mill tons (Fig. 1). Not surprisingly this is a lower level than the unsustainable peak years of the 1960ies and 1970ies, but it still represents an increase in aggregate catches of approximately 40% compared to the latter half of the 1980ies. Most of the economic important stocks are trans-boundary, Norway sharing its management responsibilities with neighbouring coastal states. Norwegian efforts have focused on reaching agreement on sustainable long term management plans and efficient harvest control rules, improved technical regulations (including the ban on discards and Real Time Closures for the protection of juveniles), and on enforcement and surveillance issues (IUU, Port State Control, VMS, ERS etc.).

11 Mainly due to reduced stocks and catches, aggregate real income from fisheries decreased throughout the 1980ies. From 1990 this trend has been reversed as a consequence of the rebuilding of stocks and the subsequent gradual possible increase of sustainable catch levels (Fig. 1, 8). In combination with structural measures reducing the number of vessels, this has improved profitability of the remaining fleet considerably. In recent years the average operating margin in Norwegian fisheries has fluctuated between 12 % and 16 % (Fig. 8). This in stark contrast to the period where the industry, even as receiver of substantial amounts of subsidies, failed to achieve satisfactory profitability. The reduction in number of fishermen and vessels has facilitated increased productivity and profitability for those remaining in the industry (Fig. 1, 8). Fewer vessels and fishermen have on the other hand reduced the industry's role in the maintenance of rural settlement and employment in coastal communities. Departure from fishing has however occurred in a period of generally low unemployment and available alternative employment opportunities in Norway. As countermeasures to meet policy objectives with respect to regional stability and diversified ownership when the participation in fisheries is declining, regulations limiting ownership concentration and the transferability of fishing rights between geographical regions and between fleet groups have been introduced. This has to some extent mitigated the adverse effects of fewer vessels and fishers. Discussion Since the collapse of the Norwegian spring spawning herring stock in 1970, Norwegian fisheries and its management system have been through a long transitional period. Fisheries policy objectives have gradually shifted towards a stronger emphasize on ecological and economic sustainability, and a complex set of regulatory measures have been developed and put into force. The economically important fish stocks have responded with producing higher spawning stock biomasses enabling higher yield. The Norwegian goal and focus has been on the rebuilding of the economically important fish stocks. Resources of minor economic significance have not been subject to the same research and management efforts, and some of these resources are in a depleted state. As part of the development of ecosystem-based fisheries management, more attention is now given to resources of less economic significance. This is a trend increasingly experienced through the last decade. But the movement is not towards a management regime for these species identical to that of the resources of greater national economic importance.

12 This is due to a couple of reasons. The most important one being that it will not pay. The research, monitoring, management and control costs of optimizing yield will very quickly exceed the surplus value which may be obtained from an optimally managed stock. Furthermore, in contrast to the large oceanic fish stocks, which in essence are harvested by a limited number of registered, professional fishers, these are in many cases coastal resources where a large and unknown number of recreational fishers may contribute significantly to the exploitation. Hence, the management and control tasks are much more challenging and costly. Realistically, stocks and species counting for close to 90 % of total Norwegian catch value may be managed with the objective to optimize long term economic yield. How this objective in future will evolve into revised harvest control rules in each individual case (MEY, MSY, multispecies MEY etc.) remains to be seen. Stocks with limited information, but still of some economic importance, will be managed with the objective to secure a high, and if possible, stable long term yield. Catches may however, from time to time be higher, or lower, than what with more knowledge would have been regarded as optimal. Such stocks account for another about 5 % of the total catch value. For the many species and stocks that constitute the last 5 % of total catch value, such ambitious objectives are not set. The same applies for non-commercial species, including incidental by-catch of seabirds and marine mammals, for which there is no intended catch and the term yield is not meaningful. However, a general and absolute minimum objective for all species, stated in the Living Marine Resources Act is the protection of biological diversity. More specifically: the objective is to ensure that fishing does not threaten either species or the functioning of ecosystems. The term “threaten” does not in this context have a strict legal interpretation. In addition to the official Norwegian Red List (http://www.biodiversity.no/Article.aspx?m=207&amid=8737), input from ICES, IMR or other scientific sources may be relevant for this assessment. Beyond this environment-related minimum obligation, it becomes a political, economic and practical administrative balance in each case how far one is willing to extend in the direction of optimizing long-term yield or, for that matter, maintaining larger populations of non-commercial species. The further one wishes to go towards ensuring optimal yield for fishery resources with low commercial value or managing non-commercial species, the more it would cost, not only in terms of research and management efforts, but also in terms of demanding regulatory interventions upon commercial and recreational fishing. With this background, decision on management objectives for the various species and stocks has turned out to be an important and integral part of the development of an ecosystem based fisheries management. Promotion of species and size selective fisheries is an important foundation for Norwegian fisheries management. An international debate has emerged on whether more selective fishing

13 really maximizes production and minimizes impacts, and more balanced harvesting of species and sizes is put forward as an alternative as ecosystem modelling shows that such a system gives higher total yield in the long run (Garcia et. al., 2012). We are sceptic to such results, at least we do not find them applicable to Norwegian cold water ecosystems, and argue that experiences from the last 50 years give many convincing evidences of non- selective fisheries having detrimental impact on stocks and yield. As consensus are emerging that we now are in the Anthropocene time epoch (Syvitski and Kettner, 2011), we have attempted to present the development of a management system being able to prevent overfishing and to secure long term sustainability. With all the elements we have described in proper operation, we believe it should be possible to manage fisheries sustainably securing fish as a food source for future generations. Conclusion A complex set of regulatory measures has been introduced to curb overfishing and restore profitability. To further optimize the management of the economically important stocks in an ecosystem based context, the following development is anticipated:

• Efforts will continue to increase economic output through improvements in exploitation patterns and reduction in all forms of incidental and unwanted mortality from fishing

• Efforts will continue to further optimize the long-term economic yield through possible revisions of management strategies and harvest control rules

• As new scientific knowledge becomes available, additional ecosystem considerations will gradually be incorporated in management; including multispecies interactions, effects of fishing on benthic habitats, effects of by-catch of fish, seabirds and marine mammals, etc.

The concept of overfishing, and the measures to curb it, has developed over time. With the introduction of an ecosystem based fisheries management one must assume that this development has not come to an end. References Alekseev, A.P., Bjordal, Å., Røttingen, I., Zilanov, V.K. and Shevelev, M.S. 2011 A brief history of Russian-Norwegian cooperation in marine research. In Jakobsen, T. and Ozhigin, V.K. (eds.) The Barents Sea. Ecosystem, Resources, Management. pp. 15 – 38, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim. Anon. 1978. St.meld. 1977-78. Om langtidsplanen for norsk fiskerinæring, Fiskeridepartementet, Oslo, 1978. (In Norwegian)

14 Anon. 1992. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, International Legal Materials, 31: 874, Art. 15. Anon. 1995a. “Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, New York, 4 August 1995, International Legal Materials 1547 – 80. Anon., 1995b. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Rome, UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Anon. 1997. St.meld. nr. 51 (1997-98) Perspektiver på norsk fiskerinæring, Fiskeridepartementet, Oslo, 1997. Anon., 2002a. Towards the 21st century. A Strategic plan for ICES. http://www.ices.dk/reports/bureau/StrategicPlan.htm. Anon., 2002b. St.meld. nr. 12 (2001-2002) Rent og rikt hav. Miljøverndepartementet. Oslo, 2002. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/dok/regpubl/stmeld/20012002/stmeld-nr-12-2001-2002-.html?id=195387. (IN Norwegian) Anon., 2006. St.meld. nr. 8 (2005–2006) Helhetlig forvaltning av det marine miljø i Barentshavet og havområdene utenfor Lofoten (forvaltningsplan. Miljøverndepartementet, Oslo, 2006. (In Norwegian) Anon., 2009. St. meld. nr. 37 (2008-2009) Helhetlig forvaltning av det marine miljø i Norskehavet (forvaltningsplan). Miljøverndepartementet, Oslo, 2009. (In Norwegian) Anon., 2011. Meld. St. 10. (2010 – 2011) Oppdatering av forvaltningsplanen for det marine miljø i Barentshavet og havområdene utenfor Lofoten. Miljøverndepartementet, Oslo, 2011. (IN Norwegian) Anon., 2012. ICES Advice 2012, Book 3. ICES, Copenhagen. Dragesund, O., Hamre, J. and ulltang, Ø. 1980. Biology and population dynamics of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring. Rapp.P.V.Reun.Cons. Int.Expl.Mer, 177: 43-71. Garcia, S.M., Kolding, J., Rice, J., Rochet, M.-J., Zhou, S., Arimoto, T., Beyer, J.E., Borges, L., Bundy, A., Dunn, D., Fulton, E.A., Hall, M., Hein, M., Law, R., Makino, M., Rijnsdorp,

15 A., Simard, F. and Smith, A.D.M. 2012. Reconsidering the consequences of selective fisheries. Science, 335(3), 1045-1047. Hønneland, G. 2012. Making Fishery Agreements Work. Post-Agreement Bargaining in the Barents Sea. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK., 152 pp. Jakobsen, T.J. and Ozhigin, V.K. 2011. The Barents Sea. Ecosystem, Resources, Management. Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim, 825 pp. Kovalev, Y.A. and Bogstad, B. 2011. The scientific basis for management. In Jakobsen, T and Ozhigin, V.K. (eds.) The Barents Sea. Ecosystem, Resources, Management. pp. 621 – 646, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim. Misund, O.A., Lepesevitch, Y.M. and Filin, A. 2011. Planning for the future. In Jakobsen, T and Ozhigin, V.K. (eds.) The Barents Sea. Ecosystem, Resources, Management. pp. 809 – 818, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim. Mora, C., Myers, R.A., Coll, M., Libralto, S., Pitcher, T.J., Sumaila, R.U., Zeller. D., Watson, R., Gaston, K.J. and Worm, B. 2009. Management effectiveness of the world’s marine fisheries. PLos Biol., 7(6): e1000131, pp 1-11. Murawski, S. 2000. Definitions of overfishing from an ecosystem perspective. ICES J.Mar.Sci., 57: 649-658. Olsen, E., Gjøsæter, H., Dommasnes, A,. Fossum, P., Sandberg, P. 2007 The Norwegian ecosystem-based management plan for the Barents Sea. ICES J. Mar. Sci., 2007, 64, pp. 599-602. Olsen, E., Michalsen, K., Ushakov, N.G., and Zabavnikov, V. 2011. The ecosystem survey. In Jakobsen, T and Ozhigin, V.K. (eds.) The Barents Sea. Ecosystem, Resources, Management. pp. 604 – 608, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim. Ottersen, G., Olsen, E., Meeren, G. I., Dommasnes, A., Loeng, H.O., 2011. The Norwegian plan for integrated ecosystem-based management of the marine environment in the Norwegian Sea. Mar. Pol., 2011, 35(3) 389-398. Pauly, D., 1983. Some simple methods for the 1983 assessment of tropical fish stocks. FAO Fish.Tech.Pap., (234): 52 p. Pitcher, T.J., Kalikoski, D., Pramod, G. and Short, K. 2009a. Not honouring the code. Nature, 457(5), 658-659.

16 Pitcher, T.J., Kalikoski, D., Short, K., Varkey, D. and Pramod, G. 2009b. An evaluation of progress in implementing ecosystem-based management of fisheries in 33 countries. Marine Policy, 33, 223-232. Pitcher, T.J., Kalikoski, D., Pramod, G. and Short, K. 2008. Safe conduct? Twelve years fishing under the UN Code. Pp 1-63. Available at http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/blue_planet/publications/?uNewsID=154581. Røttingen, I. 2004. Management of pelagic fisheries in the Norwegian Sea. In Skjoldal, H.R., Sætre, R., Fernø, A., Misund, O.A. and Røttingen, I. (eds). The Norwegian Sea Ecosystem. Pp. 535-548. Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim. Skjoldal, H.R. and Misund, O.A. 2008. Ecosystem approach to Management: Definitions, Principles and Experiences from Implementation in the North Sea. In Bianchi, G. and Skjoldal, H.R. (eds.) The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries. CAB International and FAO, Rome, pp. 209-227. Skjoldal, H.R., Sætre, R., Fernø, A., Misund, O.A. and Røttingen, I. 2004. The Norwegian Sea Ecosystem, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim, 559 pp. Syvitski, J.P.M. and Kettner, A.J. 2011. Sediment flux and the Anthropocene. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal SocietyA, 369: 957 – 975. Sætersdal, G. 2008. From fisheries research to fisheries science, 1900-1940: Tracing the footsteps of Johan Hjort in Bergen and the ICES. In Nakken, O (ed.); Norwegian spring-spawning herring & northeast arctic cod – 100 years of Research and Management. Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2008. pp 17-32. Winsnes, I. and Skjoldal, H.R. 2008. Management Plans for the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea Ecosystem. In Bianchi, G. and Skjoldal, H.R. (eds.) The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries. CAB International and FAO, Rome, pp. 228-246. Table Table 1. Biological (spawning stock termed SSB or B) and management (fishing mortality termed F) reference points for the major commercial fish stocks in Norwegian waters based on stock status given recent updates of ICES Advice 2011 - 2012. Subscripts refer to type of management approach (MP for management plan, Trigger is a point defining change of action, LIM is a critical level not to be exceeded, PA is a target level management should aim for). Colours: green: stock status 2011 – 2012 within objectives for Management plan, MSY

17 approach, or Precautionary approach, yellow: increased risk of exceeding objectives of Management plan, MSY approach, or Precautionary approach, red: above objectives of Management plan, MSY approach, or Precautionary approach. Species Management plan MSY approach Precautionary approach SSBMP FMP BTRIGGER FMSY BLIM BPA FLIM FPA

NEA cod 460 000t 0.40 460 000t 0.40 220 000t 460 000t 0.74 0.40

NEA haddock

80 000t 0.35 80 000t 0.35 50 000t 80 000t 0.77 0.47

NEA saithe 220 000t 0.35 n.d. n.d. 130 000t 220 000t 0.58 0.35

Greenland halibut

n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.

Redfish (S. mentella)

n.d. n.d. n.d. 0.0651 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.

Redfish (S. marinus)

n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.

Northern Shrimp

n.d. n.d. 0.5 BMSY F of B 0.3 BMSY n.d. 1.7 FMSY

n.d.

Capelin SSB > BLIM (95% prob)

n.d. n.d. n.d. 200 000t n.d. n.d. n.d.

Ncw cod n.d.5 n.d.5 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d

Nss herring 5 000 000t 0.125 5 000 000t 0.15 2 500 000t 5 000 000t n.d. 0.15

Blue whiting

2 250 000t 0.18 2 250 000t 0.18 1 500 000t 2 250 000t 0.51 0.32

Mackerel 2 200 000t 0.20 – 0.22

2 200 000t 0.22 1 670 000t 2 300 000t 0.42 0.23

NS saithe 200 000t 0.3 200 000t 0.3 106 000t 200 000t 0.6 0.4

NS cod 150 000t 0.4 150 000t 0.19 70 000t 150 000t 0.86 0.65

NS herring n.d. function of SSB2

n.d. 0.25 800 000t 1 300 000t n.d. 0.253

Sandeel4 195 000t n.d. n.d. 195 000t n.d. n.d.

n.d.: not defined, 1) considered as a proxy for FMSY, 2) if SSB >1.5 mill.t F2-6=0.25, if 0.8 < SSB<1.5 mill.t F2-6 = 0.25- (0.15*1500000-SSB)/700000)), if SSB<0.8 mill.t F2-6=0.10 3) F2-6

or fishing mortality for age groups 2-6 being targeted by Norwegian vessels, 4) Sandeel in the central eastern North Sea (Norwegian EEZ) where an experimental management plan have been applied since 2010, 5) A management plan for Norwegian coastal waters cod, provisionally consistent with the precautionary approach is implemented, prescribing a defined percentage reduction in fishing mortality until survey index improves.

18 Figures

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1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010

5,84 5,30 5,03 5,35 5,64 5,64

The increase in annual long term yield when average age of landings improved from 5,03 to 5,64 is 6,3% Actual cod quota in 2012 : 772 000 tons Quota reduced by 6,3% : 723 000 tons Estimate of annual benefit: 49 000 tons x NOK 11,42 = NOK 560 million Figure 5. Yield per recruit of Northeast Arctic cod as a function of age.

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Figure 6. Benefits of increased average age at capture for Northeast Arctic cod.

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Figure 7a) Aggregate spawning stocks of important pelagic species (Norwegian spring spawning herring, North Sea herring, Barents Sea capelin, mackerel, blue whiting).1985-2011

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Figure 7b) Aggregate spawning stocks of important groundfish species (Northeast Arctic cod, Northeast Arctic haddock, Northeast Arctic saithe, North Sea saithe, Greenland halibut). 1985-2012.

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