chapter 16copyright ©2009 by south-western, a division of cengage learning. all rights reserved 1...
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Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 1
ECON
Designed byAmy McGuire, B-books, Ltd.
McEachern 2008-2009
16
CHAPTERPublic Goods and Public Choice
Micro
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 2
Private, Public Goods, and in Between
LO1
1. Private goods– Rival in consumption– Exclusive– Provided by private
sector
2. Public goods– Nonrival in
consumption– Nonexclusive– Provided by
government
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 3
Private, Public Goods, and in Between
LO1
3. Natural monopoly– Nonrival but exclusive– With congestion:
private goods– Provided by private
sector or government
4. Open-access good– Rival but nonexclusive– Regulated by
government
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 4
Exhibit 1LO1
Categories of Goods
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Optimal Provision of Public Goods
LO1
Nonrival in consumption– Once produced: available to all
consumers Market demand curve
– Vertical sum of individual demand curves
– Marginal benefit Efficient level of public good
– Market D curve intersects MC curve
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 6
Exhibit 2LO1
Market for Public GoodsBecause public goods, once produced, are available to all in identical amounts, the demand for a public good is the vertical sum of each individual’s demand.
The efficient level :MC of mosquito spraying equals its marginal benefit; at point e, where the marginal cost curve intersects the market demand curve.
The market demand for mosquito spraying (D) is the vertical sum of Maria’s demand, Dm, and Alan’s demand, Da.
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 7
Paying for Public Goods
LO1
Tax = marginal valuation– Free-rider problem
• People try to benefit from the public goods without paying for them
– Ability to pay
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Public Choice in Representative Democracy
LO2
Public choices– Government decisions
• Public goods• Taxes
Median-voter model– The preference of the
median voter will dominate other choices
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 9
Special Interest and Rational Ignorance
LO2
Elected officials: Maximize political support– Special interest rather than – Public interest
• Asymmetry • Voters ‘rational
ignorance’
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Distribution of Benefits and Costs
LO2
1. Widespread benefits; widespread costs– Traditional public-goods legislation– Positive impact on economy
• Total benefits > total costs
2. Concentrated benefits; widespread costs– Special-interest legislation– Harms the economy
• Total costs > total benefits– Pork-barrel spending
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 11
Distribution of Benefits and Costs
LO2
3. Widespread benefits; concentrated costs– Populist legislation– Beneficiaries: rationally ignorant
4. Concentrated benefits; concentrated costs– Competing-interest legislation– Fierce political battles
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 12
Exhibit 3LO2
Categories of Legislation Based on the Distribution of Costs and Benefits
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 13
LO2C
ase
Stu
dy
Farm Subsidies The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 1937
Prevent ‘ruinous competition’ One in four Americans: farm Floor prices
2007 One in fifty Americans: farm
$18 billions a year
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 14
LO2C
ase
Stu
dy
Farm Subsidies To subsidize farmers, consumers pay
Higher product price For the surplus (taxpayers) For storage (the government buys
the surplus) E.g. milk
Free market p=$1.50 Subsidized p=$2.50+$2.50+
$0.50 Farmers: normal profit
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 15
Exhibit 4LO2
Effect of Milk Price Supports
0 75 100 150Millions of gallons
per month
$2.50
1.50
Dol
lars
per
gal
lon
S
D
Excess quantity supplied
No government intervention: market price = $1.50 per gallon, and 100 million gallons are sold per month.
Government: floor price = $2.50 per gallon, quantity supplied increases and the quantity demanded decreases.
To maintain the higher price, the government must buy the excess quantity at $2.50 per gallon.
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 16
Rent Seeking
LO2
Activity interest groups undertake – Secure special favors from government
Political action committees Shift resources from production No incentive for economic efficiency
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 17
LO2C
ase
Stu
dy
Campaign Finance Reform Special-interest money Soft money Hard money Money matters more to challengers Efforts to limit campaign spending
Chapter 16 Copyright ©2009 by South-Western, a division of Cengage Learning. All rights reserved 18
The Underground Economy
LO3
Unreported market activity– To avoid taxes– Illegal
Tax avoidance– Legal– Pay least possible tax
Tax evasion – Illegal– No or fraudulent tax return
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The Underground Economy
LO3
Underground economy grows more– Government regulation increase– Tax rates increase– Government corruption widespread
Estimated: $1.4 trillion in 2007
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Bureaucracy in Representative Democracy
LO4
Bureaus– Government departments, agencies
Ownership– Taxpayers
Funding– Government appropriation
Less incentive to eliminate waste and inefficiency
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Bureaucracy in Representative Democracy
LO4
Bureaucratic objectives– Serve the public– Maximize budget
• Larger budget than desired by median voter
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Bureaucracy in Representative Democracy
LO4
Private vs. public production– Private production – may be more
efficient– Public production – preferred by
public officials