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China Influence DA

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A. Uniqueness: Increased economic outreach from China to the Americas now

– designed to offset US influence

Knowland 6-10 Don Knowland, “China’s president visits Mexico and Central America seeking economicties,” World Socialist Web Site, 6/10/2013, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-

j10.html?view=print

China’s new president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and then Mexico last week, on the eve

of his weekend meeting in California with US President Barack Obama. Xi’s trip comes just a month after Obama’s own visit in

early May to Mexico and to Central America. Xi arrived in Trinidad just as US Vice President Joe Biden finished a six-day trip to

Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil aimed at shoring up US economic interests in the region. Xi’s trip is part of a stiffening response

by China to US attempts to undercut Chinese efforts to assure itself worldwide access to critical mineral

resources, and to encircle China under the guise of its “pivot to Asia” policy. There the US has stoked Japan, the Philippines and

Vietnam into increasingly abrasive relations with China over competing claims to various islands in the oil and gas-rich East China and South

China Seas. “China wants to remind the US that just as the US has influence in regions close to China, China too has rising influence in

the Americas,” according to Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. Past Chinese

presidents were deferential to the US, making reference to Latin America as “Washington’s backyard,” as

US Secretary of State John Kerry himself recently called it in testimony in April before the US Congress. But Xi’s Latin America trip,

coming early in his presidency, shows “little concern for American reaction,” Evan Ellis, a professor at the National

Defense University in Washington, told Bloomberg News. China had already invested heavily in South America in

recent years, striking major trade deals with the region’s governments. Beginning in 2009, it supplanted the US as

the number one trading partner of Brazil, Latin America’s foremost economy, as well as its number one source of foreign direct investment. In

the decade spanning 2000 to 2010, trade between China and Latin America as a whole increased 1,500

percent. By 2010, it had risen to $261.2 billion, gaining steadily on US-Latin American trade, which amounted to $351 billion last year.

Between 2002 and 2011, Chinese foreign direct investment in the region rose 100-fold from $22.6 million to $22.7 billion. The areas where US

capitalism has retained clear dominance, Mexico and Central America, were the focus of Xi’s trip.

B. Link: Trade with Latin American countries translates into growing Chinese

influence – but US economic engagement forces a zero-sum tradeoffKreps and Flores-Macías ’13 Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University,

and Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University, “No Strings

Attached? Evaluating China’s Trade Relations Abroad,” The Diplomat, 5/17/2013,

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/

In particular, we find that the more countries in Africa and Latin America trade with China, the more likely they

are to align with the Asian country on one of its main foreign policy issues: non-intervention with respect to human rights. Every

year, the United Nations General Assembly holds country-specific resolutions on human rights, and invariably Beijing votes against condemning

violations, invoking the principle of self determination. Increasingly, African and Latin American countries that have

growing trade ties with China have begun to abstain or vote against resolutions they would have

typically supported. This change in behavior can be quite remarkable for countries with a long-standing tradition of promoting human

rights, such as Costa Rica. That developing countries would be inclined to side with China rather than the other way around is surprising in someways. China has famously touted its “no strings attached” approach on commercial relations. This way of doing business comes in stark contrast

to the conditions imposed by Western countries, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank. When dealing with them, developing

countries have to worry about a number of conditions, including democracy, human rights, and labor provisions in trade agreements,

governance oversight in foreign aid, and economic stringency in loans. The obvious benefit would be that China’s

engagement is not only risk free, but also devoid of any colonial impetus. Mutual economic benefit

would be the main driver of the relationship. To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners

into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this “gravitational effect” has a sound economic

basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries.

In a ten year period, for example, Sudan’s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a

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country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in

these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs

gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design.

Whether by design or not, the convergence with China’s foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in

Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political

agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of

“new colonialism” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird

the relationship make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period inwhich China’s trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the

United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a

zero sum dynamic in which China’s growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in

international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater

engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has

dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign

policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic

agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

C. Impact: Chinese influence key to global security – soft power is essential to

resolving pressing international issuesZhang ’12 Zhang Weiwei, professor of international relations at Fudan University, and a senior research

fellow at the Chunqiu Institute, was a senior fellow at the Centre for Asian Studies, Graduate Institute of

International and Development Studies, and a visiting professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and

International Relations, “The rise of China's political soft power,” 9/4/2012,

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as

internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict,

the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to

decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in

conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has

worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed

countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the

world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary

means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order

which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed

be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of

"exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism

threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the

Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and

root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizationsConflict between Western countries and the Islamic world

is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect

their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay

"The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect othernations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why

few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural

conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer

countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least

responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong

awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese

environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the

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China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four

issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional

values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China

model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of

China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with

challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China

model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

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UQ

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General – Influence

Chinese influence in Latin America rising – economic outreach and direct

investment

Valencia 6/24 Robert Valencia, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for GlobalVoices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy Blog, 6/24/2013,

http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-americaDuring the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage

and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another

area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming

influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an

abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United

States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.” The key question now is will Latin

American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the

two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to

burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be

treated as an equal player. As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States havecourted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe

Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to

foster economic cooperation. China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s

largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then,

Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second

with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

Chinese influence displacing the US in Latin America nowWang ’13 Wang Xiaoxia, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,”

Worldcrunch, 5/6/2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-

s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/

In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter oflinking South America’s "China factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin America’s subtle

choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the

region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development -- while China rises on the back of

globalization. Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has

maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the

United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military

means largely without restraint. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of

global terrorism. Latin America’s strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has

shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The

“realism” that ran through America’s foreign policy during the Cold War has gradually transformed

towards “idealism,” which in consequence weakens its influence in Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism,

America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the protection of American interests was its pragmatic principle.

Washington didn’t care that some Latin American countries were dictatorial or that they violated human rights, as long as their leaders firmly

stood on the side of the anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is also best for the

rest of the world. Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights and a free market economy around the world. America

began to demand that its former dictatorial allies quit their attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S.

has pushed Latin American countries -- many facing a severe debt crisis -- to accept the “Washington Consensus” oriented by market economy

theory. The ultimate goal set by this theory may not be a problem. However, it did not pull Latin America out of the

quagmire of its “lost decade” of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe economic downturn, which

exacerbated the division between the rich and the poor - - leading to serious social problems. The idealism exported by the

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United States intensified the existing contradictions in Latin American society, and eventually led to

the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments.

Chinese influence in the Americas up – economic growth and ideological

apathyWang ’13 Wang Xiaoxia, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,”



In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of

Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of

democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic

relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close

collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the

United States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly

important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial

quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-

for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries.

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General – Trade

Chinese trade and economic presence in the Americas is rapidly expandingGallagher and Peters ’13 Kevin P. Gallagher, associate professor of international relations at Boston

University, where he directs the Global Economic Governance Initiative and the Global DevelopmentPolicy Master’s Program, and Enrique Dussel Peters, Prof essor at the Graduate School of Economics,

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, “China´s Economic Effects on the U.S.-Mexico Trade

Relationship. Towards a New Triangular Relationship?,”China and the New Triangular Relationships in

the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 5/1/2013,

This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated itself into North America in a process beginning in 2001

with China’s adherence to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both Mexico and the U.S. were increasing and

deepening trade relations and regional specializations within the parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001,

however, this process has reversed as a result of China’s massive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico. The

analysis presented herein shows that China’s rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had

significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second

largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume.

As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of tradein the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply,

contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S.

and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing

sector and in products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories

and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the

region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles

(AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we

discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other

variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the “gaps” between the U.S. and Mexico

were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexico’s highly polarized

socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with

NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in

Mexico. In the second phase (2000-…), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this process of integration in termsof investment and intra-industrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United

States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat

in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper).

Chinese engagement with the Americas upWang ’13 Wang Xiaoxia, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,”



BEIJING - China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding

their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady

supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a

Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has

overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin America’s second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of

large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and

energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a

total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States

as Latin America’s single dominant trading partner . In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.

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Chinese economic engagement with Latin America is explodingFarnsworth ’12 Eric Farnsworth, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC and

from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas, “Memo to

Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1, Winter 2012,

http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth

Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of

Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese

enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region , according to China’s National Development and Reform

Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina,

Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often

behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by

guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just

$1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth

that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8

percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—

Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to

Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, morethan $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase

the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus

political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership

transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely

to intensify.

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Cuba

China and Cuba expanding economic interdependence nowXinhua 6/2 “Senior CPC official looks to expansion of China-Cuba cooperation,” Global Times,

6/2/2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786078.shtml#.Ube0__nvu9EA senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official said in Havana Saturday China was willing to expand

cooperation with Cuba in various fields to promote both countries' economic development. Cuba was the

first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties with China , Guo Jinlong, a member of the Political Bureau of

the CPC Central Committee, said when he met Mercedes Lopez Acea, vice president of the Cuban Council of State and first secretary of the

Havana Provincial Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). Guo said the CPC was ready to maintain high-level

exchanges with the CCP and share experience in state governance and party building. As twin cities and

capitals, Beijing was willing to work jointly with Havana to deepen cooperation and expand cultural and

people-to-people exchanges, said Guo, who is also secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee. Lopez said the

relationship between Cuba and China, which was based on mutual understanding and mutual respect, had

become a model of bilateral ties. Each country faced the task of building socialism with its own national characteristics, she said,

adding Cuba was ready to further boost exchanges and cooperation with China.

China and Cuba seeking greater interconnection in the futureUPI 6/19 “China and Cuba seek greater cooperation,” United Press International, 6/19/2013,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/06/19/China-and-Cuba-seek-greater-

cooperation/UPI-69371371651113/

BEIJING, June 19 (UPI) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping said his country would like to work more closely with Cuba

on international and regional issues. Xi told Cuba's visiting first vice president, Miguel Diaz-Canel, that China would like

to forge a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean nations, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua

reported. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America. As for China

and Cuba, Xi said he would like to maintain a bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-

party exchanges and enhance political trust. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building

ties with China.

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Mexico

Mexico shifting towards economic engagement with China – away from

dependence on the US

Shahani ’13 ARJAN SHAHANI, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” Americas Quarterly,6/5/2013, http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico

Barack Obama’s recent visit to Mexico is the first hint that with the PRI back in power, President Enrique Peña

Nieto’s government will not shun its important relationship with the United States. But it does intend to diversify Mexico’s

international agenda and change the rules by which the country will play in the global arena.

Washington can expect more resistance on a number of bilateral issues than during the Fox and Calderón years—

including the ability of U.S. police forces and drone planes to operate within Mexican borders. Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint,

Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is

engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Peña Nieto’s participation in

the conference of the Boao Forum For Asia—a China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forum—and

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexico’s global pivot. President

Xi’s visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral commercial and diplomatic relationship.

Nieto has reversed previous Mexican governments’ shunning of China – recent

agreements signal burgeoning China-Mexico cooperationShahani ’13 ARJAN SHAHANI, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” Americas Quarterly,

6/5/2013, http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexicoFox and Calderón did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Calderón angered the Chinese

government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal

government and representatives from the private sector involved in President Xi’s visit are predicting

the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not

exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a

courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Darío Celis in a June 3 radio

interview that “agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial

balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow

China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future.” Grijalva estimates

that “during Peña’s administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports,

telecom projects, and railway transportation systems.” A joint declaration signed and issued by Peña Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the

amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of

understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries,

infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil

industry. In addition, it was announced that sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese

market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China.

Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Peña Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in

expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working

relationship between their tourism ministries.In the political arena, Peña Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderón’s

diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the “One China” principle. Peña Nieto stated that it is Mexico’s position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of

Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that “given the improvement of

diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit

to both nations.” They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and

scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xi’s visit shows, the

coming years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic

growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial way—while breaking Mexico’s trade dependency on the U.S. market.

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Venezuela

Chinese engaging Venezuela now – exports and infrastructure projectsValencia 6/24 Robert Valencia, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global

Voices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy Blog, 6/24/2013,http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and

technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the

first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez

introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a

handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a

major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02

million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

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AT: N-UQ – EU

Chinese engagement is rapidly outpacing EuropeDe Oliveira ’13 Astrid Prange De Oliveira, “Europe losing out to Chinese conquista,” DW, 1/26/2013,

http://www.dw.de/europe-losing-out-to-chinese-conquista/a-16551832China's growing economic presence in Latin America comes at Europe's expense. European leaders are

trying to make up lost ground at this year's annual EU-Latin America Summit in Chile. A battle for access to Latin

America's markets is being waged between Europe and Asia. German companies, too, are increasingly exposed

to Asian competition. That is why German Chancellor Angela Merkel is set to seek closer ties with her Latin American counterparts at

the summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in the Chilean capital Santiago this weekend

(26-27.01.2013). "The most important Latin American countries have very dynamic trade with the countries of the Pacific Rim and China," said

Günther Maihold, deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, who currently teaches at the Humboldt

Institute in Mexico City. "The Europeans need to consider how to position themselves," Maihold told DW. "More is expected of them than just

free trade agreements." China conquers Latin America Ten years ago, Asia's presence in Latin America was insignificant.Chinese and South

Korean cars on Latin America's roads were as unthinkable as Chinese trains and roads. But today, Chinese manufacturers JAC Motors and CN

Auto have set up shop along with Ssangyong from South Korea - and competition for European manufacturers such as VW, Audi or BMW is

gearing up."Chinese companies sometimes come with very attractive financing options with which we can

not compete," said Rafael Haddad, head of Brazil Board, an association of German companies investing in Brazil, concedes. Chinese

companies are increasingly trying to buy up Latin American companies, Haddad told DW. "Germany can't catch up" According to the

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China increased its direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean from $621

million in 2001 to nearly $44 billion in 2010 (including investment in the Caribbean offshore financial centers). By comparison, German direct

investment in the region grew over the same period from $4 billion to $50 billion. Oliver Parche, coordinator of the German industry's Latin

America Initiative, does not see the growing competition between Asia and Europe as a huge problem. "We cannot catch up with

the Asian countries," he says, "but we will certainly improve our position in the coming years." As Division Head for North and South

America at the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK), Parche says he believes there is a "great future" for collaboration between

German and Latin American small and mid-sized businesses.Germany is still one of the major foreign investors in Latin America. The production

volume of local German subsidiaries alone totaled $160 billion in 2010. According to a survey by the Chamber of Commerce's Latin American

Association, German direct investment in Latin America doubled from 2001 to 2010, from $36 billion to $72 billion. Germany is losing market

share However, Germany's economic influence in Latin America has waned compared to the 1990s. "After German

reunification, the door opened to the east, and mid-sized businesses concentrated their resources there,"

Parche said. In the 1990s, many Latin American countries embarked upon radical privatization programs. But Germany lagged behind its

European neighbors when it came to buying up Latin American companies and resources: Spain became the second-largest investor after the

United States, while Germany lost market shares.

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Links

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General

US re-engagement of Latin America reverses ‘benign neglect’ that allows

Chinese expansion

Pham ’10 J. Peter Pham, director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, waseditor of American Foreign Policy Interests, “China's Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It

Means for U.S. Interests,” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on

American Foreign Policy, Volume 32, Issue 6, 2010, pages 363-381, DOI:10.1080/10803920.2010.535762

All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the

State Department last year that she found the gains that China was making in Latin America ‘‘quite disturbing.’’

She went on to add, ‘‘I mean they are building very strong economic and political connections.... I don’t think that’s in

our interest.’’85 How then, in the face of China’s growing commercial and political relationships across the

region, might American interests be secured and, indeed, advanced? First, U.S. policymakers need to

acknowledge that America’s Latin American and Caribbean neighbors matter to the United States not only for its traditional

security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers in the Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the

momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional

cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal immigration to

narcotics trafficking to environmental issues. Hence it is in the interests of the United States to renew relations with the

countries to its south by developing and articulating a comprehensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of

‘‘benign neglect’’ of the region. Second, rather than lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dictated the

terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region is ‘‘shaping its future far more than it shaped its past’’86 ought

to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and peoples on mutually agreeable terms is by far a more

sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of

the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the region of their own individual destinies

are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it becomes apparent that

American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its

Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third,

despite China’s efforts to secure access to Latin America’s natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy

and other commodities for the United States as well as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy

imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys 20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union.

Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity, U.S. businesses still have a comparative

advantage over overseas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere .87 Thus the

administration must recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand America’s

economic ties with its neighbors to the south. In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia

and Panama as ‘‘key partners’’ with which he promised to strengthen trade relations.88 Yet absent proactive White House leadership, the free

trade agreements with those two countries have still not been ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force

under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last year’s enactment of a measure canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened

Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and to settle a dispute over cotton

subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia, especially

since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive sanctions

against American products.89

Chinese economic engagement in the Americas is key to its foreign policy

expansionArmony ’13 Ariel C. Armony, “Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-China Relationship,” China

and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations,

5/1/2013,

http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=clas_publications

The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexico’s regional and global position

is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The decline in US

influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexico to adjust to a

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growth strategy less dependent on the United States. China’s rising role as a regional and global power

and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial

commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which China’s “going

out” strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is likely that there

will be an adjustment in the triangle’s dynamic, which may result in a closer relationship between

these two countries.

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General – Zero-Sum

Chinese expansion now pushes out US influence – but competition for

engagement is zero-sum – plan edges China out

Watson ‘9 Cynthia A. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, “U.S. Responses to China’sGrowing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere,” Enter the Dragon?

China’s Presence in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a

major distraction for Washington over the past five and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy.

This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism

of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in

Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to

consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear

weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties

between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of

Latin America –U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of

fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion toethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region,

rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China

claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefi t for all, not a

zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it

creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to

trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations

theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the

United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the

PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously

accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other

warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong

relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the

United States. At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests

directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvementin the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its

current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust

and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties

between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare

applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the

region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties.

Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to

manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American

neighbors.

Influence is zero-sum – US economic engagement forces China out

Dowd ’12 Alan W. Dowd, ASCF Senior Fellow, has served as an adjunct professor and universitylecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including

the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute, “Crisis in the America's,” American

Security Council, 2012, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of

terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western

Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China. Eyeing energy resources to keep its

economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In Costa Rica,

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China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83 -million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and

telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to

link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly

facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to

China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish,

Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New

offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast,

Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position

itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy andreal-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its

massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for

a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin

America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4

billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum

company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant. There is good and bad to

Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily

accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings. For instance, in

exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one

million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that H ugo Chavez might

try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11

percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S. That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook

diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached

every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and

Venezuela. The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin Americannations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has

begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense

firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the

secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training

infrastructures that support those products.” Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new

security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s

thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military

ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in

the region—a challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share

America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China,

an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity;

democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are

given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political

reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James

Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As

Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.” Second, the U.S. muststop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood

economically, politically and militarily. That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans

for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo

for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal

reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by

an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and

Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China

has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United

States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means

revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war,

the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should

remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it

makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific

region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe

Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages

any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should

make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or

military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is

room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

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Cuba

Cuba engagement offsets critical Chinese leverageLuko ’11 James Luko, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” Nolan Chart, 6/29/2011,

http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.htmlThe Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward

base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region,

while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440

million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National

Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than

China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client'

state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan.

Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of

natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at

least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well

as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in

Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The

Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations,with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking

the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida.

Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to

establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued

support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban

people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost

900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

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Mexico

Mexican trade ties are crucial to expanded Chinese influenceAmerica Economia 6/17 “FOR LATIN AMERICA, CHINA'S BOOM SHOULD NEITHER SCARE NOR

SEDUCE,” Worldcrunch, 6/17/2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/opinion-analysis/for-latin-america-china-039-s-boom-should-neither-scare-nor-seduce/china-latin-america-united-states-commerce-

chile/c7s12346/

This, of course, also includes trade. In what way can Latin America benefit from China's ambitions? What is in the

region's best interest? Chinese leaders, for sure, are not the ones who have the right answers to these questions. China already knows

what it is looking for in the region: cheap raw materials and faithful buyers to their ever-improving

manufacturing. This means that Chinese President and Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Trinidad and

Tobago, Costa Rica, and Mexico was much more than a simple tour promoting commerce. From the start, a

Chinese analyst crudely put it this way: “They (the United States) come to our backyard. We go to their

backyard.” Nobody doubts that there were geopolitical intentions to the visit. Even so, stopping by Trinidad and

Tobago might have had more to do with commercial aims given that this nation is a great producer of oil and gas, and China is always anxious

to diversify its energy providers. Mexico is a former competitor who has become a great customer (and emerging

exporter), as well as, a nation with a long record of political autonomy on the world stage -- so bothbusiness and political intentions mix.

US-Mexico and China-Mexico trade relations are zero-sumPeters et al. ’13 Enrique Dussel Peters, Professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad

Nacional Autónoma de México, Adrian H. Hearn, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the

University of Sydney and Chair of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the

Americas, and Harley Shaiken, Class of 1930 Professor of Letters and Science, Graduate School of

Education and the Department of Geography and Chair of the Center for Latin American Studies, UC

Berkeley; Professor of Social and Cultural Studies at the Graduate School of Education and member of

the Department of Geography at Berkeley, “Foreward,” China and the New Triangular Relationships in

the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 5/1/2013,

http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=clas_publicationsChina’s “come back”, however, is not only limited to these impacts. Until very recently, and as reviewed in the respective articles of this book,

there have been few analyses or initial attempts at understanding how China’s new status is affecting bilateral relationships elsewhere. The

main topic of this book, then, is the triangular relationship between Mexico, the United States, and China, and specifically how China’s

increasing presence in Latin America and the Caribbean is affecting the historic and dynamic

relationship between Mexico and the United States. This triangular relationship is substantially interdisciplinary

and has, at least in the beginning, begun to affect trade, investments, and the political relationship between

the United States and Mexico. This book attempts to identify in which concrete terms China has begun to affect the bilateral

relationship between Mexico and the United States. Contrary to other recent initial analyses on this issue, we base our study on this question in

order to examine the triangular relationship in detail from an economic and political perspective. In the future, this triangular relationship will

necessarily have to weigh more heavily in other fields of research. However, as we shall see below, China is profoundly changing

bilateral and inter-American relationships, specifically between the US and Mexico, resulting in important

implications for the future.

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Venezuela

Venezuelan engagement stifles the linchpin of China’s foreign policy in the

Americas

Pham ’10 J. Peter Pham, director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, waseditor of American Foreign Policy Interests, “China's Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It

Means for U.S. Interests,” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on

American Foreign Policy, Volume 32, Issue 6, 2010, pages 363-381, DOI:10.1080/10803920.2010.535762

Admittedly there is great variation as one examines China’s relationships with each country in the region, but its links with regimes

like Hugo Cha´vez’s with its ambitions to export its ‘‘Bolivarian Revolution’’ and build a broad anti–

United States coalition in the hemisphere65 certainly do not put American policymakers and analysts at ease.

From Washington’s perspective, if the Venezuelan leader’s support for the Castro brothers’ dictatorship in Cuba were not bad enough, his

increasing dalliances with the Islamic Republic of Iran and assorted Middle Eastern rogues have raised further hackles.66 That the PRC

Ministry of Foreign Affairs nonetheless formally describes Beijing’s relations with Venezuela as being a

‘‘strategic partnership’’67 is certainly not very reassuring. One Chinese analyst even argues that the PRC should

view the Venezuelan regime’s schemes opportunistically. The current geopolitical atmosphere in the

Western Hemisphere seems more conducive to Chinese economic expansion than restrictive. WhatChinese policymakers truly wish to see, and some Latin American leaders are also determined to

pursue, is the revival of the Latin American integration project started by Simo´n Bolivar at the beginning of the

nineteenth century. Hugo Cha´vez of Venezuela sees himself as the standard-bearer of a modern version of this concept, as he attempts to take

on Bolivar’s mantle to restart this centuries-old dream. In China, Cha´vez’s so-called Bolivarian Revolution has begun

to draw attention, particularly as a potential vehicle for countries in Latin America to move away from the

Monroe Doctrine concept. Should the Bolivarian regional integration proposal gain traction, the first logical

priority would be to reduce the region’s dependence on the North American market. Hence China’s

attractiveness as an alternative market and partner.68

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Oil

Oil imports from the Americas are key to Chinese expansion and foreign policyWang ’13 Wang Xiaoxia, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,”

Worldcrunch, 5/6/2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/

Initially, China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in

infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries

and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that

plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among

the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past

30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's

second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which

increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its

huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better

protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the

important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently

appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also

focused on its energy sector.

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AT: Cooperation

Ignore rhetoric – Latin American engagement is competitive in natureChang ’11 Gordon G. Chang, JD from Cornell, lawyer, author, and television pundit, “China Takes on

America in a 'Zero-Sum Game',” World Affairs Journal, 11/22/2011,http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china-takes-america-zero-sum-game

Zero-sum competition? That’s not the way Washington’s foreign policy specialists see the international system. Since the end of the

Second World War, they have believed that every nation can better its lot with free markets, free trade, and free politics. Chinese leaders

have eschewed all three of these “Western” concepts, but they have appropriated that awful phrase, “win-

win,” and assure us they believe in it. With a win-win mind-set, governments around the world have

sought to “engage” China, nurture it, and ease its entry into the international community. Naturally, the

Chinese state has prospered in such a benign environment. But instead of accepting the international system as it was—

the fond hope of the engagers—Beijing has sought to upend and replace it with something more friendly to its

brand of authoritarianism. In short, liberal institutions are seen as a threat to China’s one-party state, and so it should come as no

surprise that its leaders view geopolitics as an I-win, you-lose proposition. Should the United States change its conception of geopolitics in

response to Beijing’s world view? No. Yet one thing is clear: the global community needs to understand that engagement with China

has not changed the darkish perspectives of its leaders—who continue to believe that it is in theirinterests to undermine America and its many friends.

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AT: UQ o/w Link

Chinese relations are solid but not locked in – plenty of room for a turn-

around

Ferchen ’12 Matt Ferchen, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY,“China’s Latin American Interests,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4/6/2012,

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av

The Chinese government goes to great lengths to emphasize that its relations with the developing world, including with Latin

America, represent a different approach than that of the United States or Europe. To highlight this difference,

China has long promoted its foreign policy principles of respect for sovereignty and commitment to

noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Yet, there is, in fact, a heated battle to portray the

relationship in a positive or negative light and much wealth and prestige are on the line. But the irony is that

lost in all of this debate is that China’s economic ties to Latin America have important similarities to the historical experience of other rapidly

industrializing countries. That is, China is undergoing an intense period of industrialization and urbanization and

therefore has a voracious appetite for raw materials. Whether or not this industrialization is healthy, sustainable, or even

the product of Chinese government policies is debatable. What is clear is that for all of China’s efforts to emphasize its

different approach to dealing with developing countries, the structure of its trade relationship withLatin America looks very similar to historical relationships between the industrializing countries of the

“North” and the commodity-rich developing countries of the “South.” And difficult questions that

Chinese mining or other firms in Latin America face about labor or the environment are very similar to

those confronted by American or European firms in the past. The real challenges for government and business off icials

in China and Latin America attempting to create a sustainable and stable long-term economic and political relationship are: the

relationship is still very new, is relatively narrow (in its commodity basis), and is potentially more fragile than

often understood (commodity booms can be followed by busts, or at least prices reverting to their historical downward trend). That is,

those officials in China and Latin America might be best served by recognizing that China, at least in terms of its trade and investment

relationship with commodity-rich countries in Latin America and elsewhere, is more “normal” than many recognize or would like to admit.

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Soft Power Impact

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China Soft Power Good

China soft power key to East Asian peaceAfridi ’13 Dr Manzoor Afridi, “China: From hard to soft power,” Pakistan Observer, 6/18/2013,

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=210190Under the good-neighborliness diplomacy, China has no war-like situation with its neighbors. Despite the

US long-alliance with South Korea, China has good economic terms with the later and a partner of both in the Six Party Talks about the North

Korean nuclear issue. Although there are some frictions with Japan but Sino-Japanese trade is also moving on. Despite the un-demarcated Sino-

Indian border which was a result of their war, now their bilateral trade is increasing day by day and more understanding has developed. Same is

the case with Russia where there is no tension and mutual suspicions but are good partners within the framework of Shanghai C ooperation

Organization. An important element of international politics is the traditional balance of power . It has been

strategy of the European Powers in ancient, medieval and even in the Cold War eras that a balance of power had to be created

for balancing a rising state. A rising Germany under the Bismarck and Hitler, France under the Napoleon and Italy under the

Mussolini have faced the balancing tactic from the neighboring and surrounding states, but the case of China is different. China has the

biggest military, biggest and fastest growing economy and nuclear status in its region, but still there is

no balance of power by the neighboring countries against her. A question arises that why balance of power notion

doesn’t work in China’s case? What matters here is the hierarchical order in East Asia, opposite of the European

anarchical order, created by China in light of its deep-rooted relations and understanding withneighbors. The same practice Beijing is applying to the world. This is “Soft Power”.

Asian war escalates to nuclear conflict —strategic asymmetry and complex

security dynamicsTwomey ’11 Christopher Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and

Other Dangers,” Asia Policy, No. 11, 2011, MUSE Implications Each element of complexity raises its own problems, which are summarized in this section. In general, most of these effects

increase the challenges facing national security elites throughout the region, increase the prospect for dangerous security competition,

heighten potential for miscalculation, and destabilize the region. Beyond that, the implications of these three individual elements will tend to

interact, as discussed in a later section. The First-Order Effects of Proliferation The simple quantitative increase in the number of nuclear

arsenals has several effects. The most obvious effect is the increase in the number of potentially unstable dyads. Perhaps historically rare

reasons restrained the intense rivalry of the Cold War, preventing it from degenerating into an intense nuclear war.Those factors, however, may not hold in other cases. For instance, there is strong evidence that some dyads

in Asia do not share the [End Page 67] Table 2. Perceptions on the Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Asia [End Page 68] same

characteristics as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Paul Kapur argues that the stability-instability paradox that may have held during the Cold War in

Europe does not hold in South Asia today. Instead, Pakistan views instability at the nuclear level as beneficial to its

bargaining leverage.49 The Cold War did not center on territory claimed as sovereign homeland,

whereas the Taiwan issue serves to complicate Sino-U.S. relations. The Sino-Russian border is long,

and the two sides' strategic arsenals are located more closely to each other than the U.S. and Soviet

arsenals were in the Cold War. Additionally, no Soviet leader was ever as novice to international politics

as Kim Jong-un in North Korea is, and the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet Union was never under as

much stress as that of the Communist Party in China or the North Korean regime today. These and dozens of

other issues highlight potentially salient points of contrast with the Cold War. Some scholars highlight the difficulties in attribution, not only in

substate terrorism cases but also in multipolar rivalries.50 Yet the attribution of state-led attacks, though technically challenging, seems lesslikely to be a concern in reality, given that most surprise attacks occur at times of heightened tension. Still, the difficulty in

identifying attackers might complicate issues in some circumstances. More problematic is the

inherent instability of rivalries among three or more players, a point not systematically evaluated in the existing

literature on Asia.51 Game theorists characterize a "truel" as a duel to the death between three actors. These theorists have reached several

conclusions about the likely outcomes of such contests. First and foremost, in contrast to stylized duels, truels are highly vulnerable to the

specific assumptions about the sequence of shooting, quality of weapons, size of arsenals, knowledge, and range of strategies chosen.52 This

makes generalizing hard for mathematicians but has a very clear implication for policy analysts: the simplicity of a bilateral world

is gone. Slight changes in weapons or strategy can have large effects on the perceived—and actual—

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balance.53 [End Page 69] One manifestation of this is heightened competition due to uncertainty about

potential adversary coalitions. In a series of studies, Stephen Cimbala used straightforward modeling to emphasize that states

in Asia will be pressured to choose risky alert statuses and force postures out of such defensive

concerns.54 More relaxed postures, such as launch after attack, could leave countries with greatly reduced arsenals. Of course, riding out a

first strike is always dangerous. But in a multipolar context, states must be concerned about deterring, or

retaliating against, multiple adversaries after an attack. The number of adversaries a state might face

is also uncertain. In a crisis, the existence of multiple potential enemies will heighten a state's

incentive to not absorb a first strike because doing so will reduce an arsenal that would need to deter

not only its primary, current adversary but also any other adversaries who might be tempted to enter

the conflict soon thereafter. Both these scenarios are worse than the bilateral rivalry in the Cold War and will tend to

catalyze more dangerous force postures. Thus, even if the optimists are right about their characterization of the Cold War,

these dynamics are new and negative in the post –Cold War environment. Modernization across the board paints something of a mixed picture.

The development of a secure second-strike capability for any nation would reduce dangerous mobilization spirals. Thus, such a capability is

likely to be stabilizing in some contexts involving the United States and China. However, a second-strike capability gives China

substantial advantages in competition with India, which previously might have been characterized by a two-sided minimal

deterrent posture. Russia had hoped to balance conventional difficulties with nuclear preeminence in its relationship with China and others, but

will be less able to do so the more secure and robust China's second-strike capability is. Furthermore, in other contexts the

development of secure second-strike capabilities makes coercive strategies much riskier: consider, for

example, the United States and North Korea or China and India.

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AT: China Soft Power Fails

China soft power is strong and effective – their takeouts assume a Western

paradigm of influence that China’s rise has already disproven

Ellis ’11 R. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for HemisphericDefense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study,”

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st quarter, 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-

60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf

In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to

underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are

the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world’s youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use

of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also

important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on

objective reality. Although China’s current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still

limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current

size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future.

Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin Americais shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The “Bolivarian socialist” regime of

Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western “imperialism,” while countries such as Peru, Chile, and

Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market

capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread

perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology

development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be

reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: ■■ hopes for future access to Chinese markets ■■

hopes for future Chinese investment ■■ influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America ■■ hopes for the PRC to serve as a

counterweight to the United States and Western institutions ■■ China as a development model■■ affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic

■■ China as “the wave of the future.” In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of

actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

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AT: China Soft Power Hurts Heg

Chinese influence in the Americas doesn’t dampen US heg Jiang ‘9 Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences, “Three Factors in Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations,”Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Scholars, 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf

The news media in the United States have been portraying a wrong perception of the development of

Chinese relations with Latin America. One editorial in the Wall Street Journal, for instance, says, “The rise of China in the region

could complicate U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money laundering because China is

cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts. Some of these nations may try to use the Chinese

alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.”5 The United States’ concern over the closer relationship between China

and Latin America is misplaced and unnecessary . It is well-known that Latin America has been on the

path of reform and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more

foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one

of the economic partners with whom Latin America has been trying to cooperate. China understands

well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so China has no intention whatsoever tochallenge the American hegemony in Latin America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside

world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further

cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacifi c region and in Latin America.

Such an outcome would also certainly favor the United States.

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Economy Impact

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Economy Impact Module

Sustained engagement is key to Chinese growth – the impact is global collapse

and lash-out

Ellis ’11 R. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for HemisphericDefense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study,”



Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese

companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when

economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also

proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products

in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication

equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa

Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC

has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the

hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have

played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela,

Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue

arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more

explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine

and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a

longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its

economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential ndupress.ndu.edu issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 / JFQ 89 Ellis90 JFQ / issue 60, 1st

quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu FEATURES | Chinese Soft Power in Latin America terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for

the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects

through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the

Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after

failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it

by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for

resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal,

required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other

Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationalswill be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of

Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including

the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a

labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the

declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of

violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely

increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its

influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. Blocking the

Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global

economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global

institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained

growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the

United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chineseinterests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were ef forts to

obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC

has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade

agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading

block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

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Economic collapse causes global warsRoyal ‘10 director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah,

Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict.

Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence

behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable

contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory,

finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power

and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks

such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to

uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a

relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a

rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global

economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although

he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a

dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in

understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits

from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade

decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict

increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be

the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,

others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national

level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,

particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external

conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal

conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the

extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>

Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee

ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore,

crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that,

when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increasedincentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996),

DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least

indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc

greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed

from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the

United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic

scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic

crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic

and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-

security debate and deserves more attention.

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Economy IL

Latin American economic engagement key to Chinese growth – natural

resources and emerging markets

Maciel ‘9 Rodrigo Maciel, Executive Secretary of the Brazil –China Business Council, “The EconomicRelationship between China and Brazil,” Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America, Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military influence in Latin

America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic

interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is

not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a

significant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic

growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988

to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America

by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s

intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantialmarket for Chinese goods.

Latin America’s key to Chinese growth – raw materialsJenkins ’12 Rhys Jenkins, Professor of Development Economics in the School of International

Development, University of East Anglia, “Latin America and China—a new dependency?” Third World

Quarterly, vol. 33, issue 7, 2012, pp. 1337-1358, DOI:10.1080/01436597.2012.691834

The clearest evidence of the importance of Latin America as a source of raw materials for China is the

structure of the region's exports and the way that these have evolved over time. Primary products

accounted for over 70% of Latin American exports to China in 2008 and resource-based manufactures

(ie primary products with a limited degree of processing) for a further 16% (see Table 6). The main products exported from the region to

China were copper ore and concentrates, soybean and soya oil, iron ore, crude oil, refined copper and fishmeal. Latin American

exports to China are much more heavily concentrated on primary products and resource-based

manufactures than are the region's exports to the rest of the world, where primary products make up less than 40%

of the total (Table 6). Also the trend over time has been for the share of primary products in Latin American exports to China to increase

significantly, while their share in exports to the rest of the world is lower than in 1990. The increased share of primary products in exports to

China has come partly at the expense of exports of resource-based manufactures. The importance of securing raw materials is

also reflected in the pattern of Chinese FDI in Latin America. The bulk of Chinese investment in the

region is of the ‘resource seeking’ variety, focusing on oil and minerals. Unfortunately there is no detailed breakdown of

Chinese FDI by sector in Latin America, but it is clear that oil and gas and mining have been a major focus for such investment. The UN

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimates that 92% of confirmed Chinese investments in the region were in natural

resource extraction, primarily oil and gas.14 Ten of the 12 major mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms in South America between 2002 and

2008 were in raw materials, energy and power.15 Major Chinese companies with investments in Latin America include Sinopec, cnpc and cnooc

in oil and gas and Minmetals, Chinalco and Wuhan Steel in minerals. Securing access to natural resources has also been an important factor in

other forms of financial flows from China to Latin America too. A report by the US Congressional Research Service noted that over two-

thirds of the projects financed by China in the region were in the natural resource sector, while 28%were in infrastructure and public works, part of which may also have been related to gaining access to

raw materials.16 While these figures may have included some fdi projects, other forms of funding have clearly played an important role in

securing supplies of oil and minerals. Some of the most high-profile examples include loans of $10 billion from the China Development Bank to

Petrobras in Brazil in 2009 in return for 200 000 barrels of oil a day and to the Venezuelan government in 2010 for between 200 000 and 300

000 barrels a day. An earlier example was an agreement signed between the Chinese company Minmetals and the Chilean state owned mining

company Codelco, which agreed to supply copper at a fixed price for 15 years in return for an investment of $500 million in 2005.17

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Latin American trade key to reduce Chinese dependence on the USJiang ‘9 Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences, “Three Factors in Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations,”

Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Scholars, 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf

Chinese achievements in the realm of reform and opening to the outside world have been impressive.But there are problems. First of all, China is facing increasing friction with the developed countries, which have frequently used anti-

dumping practices and other means to restrict Chinese exports. From time to time, the United States uses economic

leverage to exert political pressure on China. Therefore, it is imperative for China to reduce economic

dependence upon the United States and other developed countries. To realize this goal, China needs

to diversify its trade partners. In this regard, Latin America, a continent with a population of more than

500 million people and an economic size of more than US$2 trillion, is certainly a big market for Chinese

products.

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China Economy Good – Lash-Out

Chinese economic collapse devastates the CCP – causes violent lash-outYee and Storey ‘2 Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong

Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002 (The ChinaThreat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, RoutledgeCurzon, pg 5)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC,

resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries.

Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a

shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These

problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political

disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in

neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no

doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could

also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible

local provincial leaders or warlords.'2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threatto its neighbours and the world.

Economic collapse causes Chinese lash-outMead ‘9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on

Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” 2/4/09, http://www.tnr.com/article/only-makes-you-

stronger

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too

fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the

international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial

system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of

millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The

collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation

of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter

climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes . (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and

communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as

nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn,

fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far

been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will

happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain

skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns

could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath

of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current

market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history,

even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very

hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist

response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to

emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely

than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new

constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection.

Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices

has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists

forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its

expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria

against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they

use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the

economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different,

but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in

early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow

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and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks,

grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive.

They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate

on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers

gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the

United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the

idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong

way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never

really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal

democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world,

capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-

heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they

have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has

fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to

develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to

resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a

financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater

economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth.

This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain

their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone

powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war:

The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928,

but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current

crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born?

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China War Impact

China conflict escalates to nuclear warGlaser ’11 Charles Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington

University, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9, Iss. 2, March/April 2011 THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some

changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during

the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and

unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan

declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to

increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because

China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have

such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the

U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly

easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors

involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United

States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure toprotect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests

and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a

crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them .

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make

Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is

modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S.

attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its

bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave

more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile,

could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and

strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further

Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

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AFF

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N-UQ – General

US influence in Latin America remains strong and is inevitableValencia 6/24 Robert Valencia, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global

Voices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy Blog, 6/24/2013,http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america

The United States hasn’t lost Latin America, and is unlikely to lose it completely. It is still the region’s

top trade partner. The United States has recently signed free-trade agreements with Colombia and

Panama, and maintains other trade agreements with Peru, Chile, and Mexico. Central American and

several Caribbean countries rely upon U.S. military cooperation in an attempt to curtail drug trade.

Nevertheless, the post 9/11 years severely eroded U.S.-Latin American relations as the Bush administration focused heavily on the war on

terror, often ignoring issues in Latin America.

US still retains strong ties with Latin America – democratization, exports,

cultural influenceBen-Ami 6/5 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, former

Israeli foreign minister, “Is the US Losing Latin America?” Project Syndicate, 6/5/2013,http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-

shlomo-ben-ami

Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marking the

end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by

the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the

last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable

democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms,

and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth.

As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these

changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and

Central and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America’s second-

largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% overthe past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest

foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic,

stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of

diplomacy – one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as

Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran’s nuclear program mediated by Brazil

and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and

socioeconomic ties, as Obama’s recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important

lever. President Sebastian Piñera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan.

President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America

soon after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the

US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China orRussia, let alone Iran.

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N-UQ – Influence

Other foreign actors engaging Latin America, diluting Chinese influenceEllis ’11 R. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study,”Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st quarter, 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-


Finally, Chinese influence is diluted by increasing interactions between Latin America and other

extraregional actors, such as India, Russia, Iran, and others. Although the PRC is arguably the most

significant new suitor of the region, it is not the only alternative. For Nicaragua and populist regimes in the Andean

region, Russia provides important alternatives with respect to arms purchases and energy sector

investments. An $18 billion commitment by a Russian consortium to develop the Junin-6 oilfield in Orinoco, for example, may have helped

to accelerate China’s subsequent commitment to invest $16.3 billion in Junin-4. In addition to Russia, India is increasingly engaging

in commercial opportunities, particularly in high technology, services, and commodity sector

investments, while challenging the PRC monopoly over “south-south” developing country

partnerships in the region. When China cut off purchases of Argentine soy oil, for example, it was India that

picked up the slack.

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N-UQ – Mexico

Mexico-China trade is minimal – Mexico is deferring to US influenceKnowland 6-10 Don Knowland, “China’s president visits Mexico and Central America seeking economic

ties,” World Socialist Web Site, 6/10/2013, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime- j10.html?view=print

Relations between China and Mexico have been tepid in the past , and they worsened after former President Felipe

Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011. More fundamentally, their economic relations have been unbalanced. In 2012

the value of China’s exports to Mexico were ten times those of Mexico to China, $57 billion to $5.7 billion.

Mexico exported to China copper and other minerals, oil, cotton and car parts, and imported electronics, toys, plastics and furniture. Mexico

and China also have been direct competitors in supplying the US market with manufactured goods .

Mexican businessmen have long felt threatened by China undercutting them as a cheap labor

platform, particularly in electronic and consumer products industries. A decade ago Mexico’s average labor costs

were nearly three times higher than China’s. Recently that labor-cost differential has narrowed sharply, eating into Chinese cost advantage, so

Mexico has regained some US market share. According to at least one report this year, hourly wages in Mexico are now lower

than in China. Mexican companies still complain that Chinese workplace rules on “flexibility”, lower

quality control and lack of respect for intellectual property rights continue to permit unfaircompetition. Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, visited China two months ago, seeking to change this state of affairs. The

reciprocal visit by Xi this week was an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up. Upon his arrival, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexico’s huge

trade deficit. This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. “Access to strategic raw materials is key to

understanding the dynamic of relations with China,” said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. “Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil.” “China is the principal consumer of coal,

gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete,” said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexico’s Center for Bus iness with Asia at the

private Monterrey Technological Institute. “Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs.” Not coincidentally, Xi’s visit to Mexico

comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign

investment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Peña Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the

Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are

exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more.

During Peña Nieto’s April visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day

to the state oil company Sinopec. This week Pemex said the Export-Import Bank of China would provide it with a $1 billion credit line to buy

ships and offshore equipment. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with state-owned Xinxing Cathay International Group to explore

ways to work together on pipelines. For its part, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by theUS. It also recognizes China’s rise as a geopolitical player far beyond Asia. “In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I

think it has arrived to stay, the world’s second economic power," Mexican vice minister of foreign affairs Carlos De Icaza said. Mexico “has to

understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value.” In a speech before the Mexican Senate, Xi said the Sino-

Mexican relationship stands before “unprecedented opportunities”. “China is willing to work alongside Mexico to improve the strategic

association between the two countries,” Xi added. Xi also called on the two countries to oppose protectionism and try to resolve trade

disagreements through consultation. He and Peña Nieto agreed to end a dispute over Chinese textiles that had led to litigation. The Chinese

sought to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism (a huge Mexican industry), science and technology during Xi’s

visit. All that was accomplished, however, were agreements to cooperate on commercial defense, and on access for Mexican tequila and

Mexican pork to the Chinese market. Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said it was “too soon” for a free-

trade agreement between the two countries, perhaps reflecting caution as to the effect of courting China on

Mexico’s neighbor to the north. Mexico, along with the US and other Pacific Rim countries, but not China, is party to

the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, an effort to increase trade among the Americas, Asia and

Australasia. Mexico is keen not to jeopardize those talks.

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No Link

Chinese influence isn’t zero sum with the USWang ’13 Wang Xiaoxia, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,”

Worldcrunch, 5/6/2013, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/

China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States,

but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with

Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-

producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil

production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as

stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on

the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple

choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new

upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States

has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

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China Engagement Bad – Democracy

Unfettered Chinese economic engagement destroys international democratic

consensus – causes authoritarian backsliding

Farnsworth ’12 Eric Farnsworth, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC andfrom 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas, “Memo to

Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1, Winter 2012,


From a foreign policy perspective, the story is even more compelling. The reality is this: China’s still-early but growing efforts in the

Americas provide Latin American and Caribbean nations with additional trade and investment options

that reduce U.S. leverage to promote open market, democratic values. This is not about exporting revolution or

communism or any such thing. In fact, China’s efforts in the Americas are not driven by whether the potential partner is communist, populist,

autocratic, or democratic. Otherwise, the Chinese would have stronger economic and political relations with Cuba and the other Alianza

Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América—Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas—ALBA) countries

(primarily Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) than with Brazil, Chile and Peru. But China goes where the natural resources and primary

commodities are and, unlike the actions of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, cares little about the nature of the government that controls

them. The Chinese are not necessarily looking for a political relationship, nor do they have much sympathy for ideologically driven regional

leaders, some of whom they regard as buffoons. Rather, they are looking for economic benefits based on the domestic political calculus of the

leadership in Beijing. Is China a Threat to the Normative Advances in the Hemisphere? Since the end of the Cold War, however, the region

has struggled to develop a regime of democratic behavior that is intended to prevail in the

hemispheric community of nations. Democracy, including freedom of the press, is to be respected;

labor and the environment protected; corruption and illegal activities inspected and prosecuted. It is

difficult to implement such standards unless leverage exists to develop a broad consensus that

promotes certain behaviors, and at least one nation or regional organization is willing and able to enforce the regime effectively. For

example, U.S. efforts to promote labor and environmental reforms through trade agreements are

undermined when other nations have the ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include

similar provisions. Programs of multilateral lending agencies like the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank that promote

financial reforms and good governance become less relevant if borrowing nations can receive funds from China or elsewhere, including

Venezuela, without conditions. To put it starkly, the oft-maligned IMF has no influence with nations such as Argentina that do not currently

require IMF funding or access to global capital markets.5 In fact, China’s huge purchases of hemispheric commodities

and the provision of credits on favorable terms have greatly assisted Latin American commoditiesexporters in the ongoing global economic crisis. In some cases this has allowed leaders the flexibility to postpone indefinitely

the necessary economic and political reforms that would otherwise be consistent with open market,

healthy democratic governance. Ironically, this has allowed some democratically elected leaders to

undermine democratic institutions, including freedom of the press, and return to the days of

corporatist, rent-seeking economies. This model failed spectacularly during the twentieth century, but

it is now enabled, if not promoted, by Chinese economic engagement.

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China Engagement Bad – Hegemony

Chinese influence in Latin America threatens US global leadershipEllis ’11 R. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study,”Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st quarter, 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-


Analysts looking for signs of imminent Chinese coercion or intervention in Latin America are likely to be disappointed. Nonetheless, Chinese

soft power in Latin America still raises important national security issues, even if the PRC does not explicitly seek

to subvert or marginalize the United States as part of its reemergence onto the world stage. In Latin America, as elsewhere, China’s

currently modest influence is providing it with triumphs of ever-growing scale in strategically

important business, culture, and technology arenas. Although no specific event may directly threaten the U.S. national

interest, the collective effect is to restructure the global flows of value added and influence in a manner

beneficial to China, making the ability of the United States to successfully pursue its own national

goals and interests increasingly dependent on the acquiescence of the PRC. For analysts focused on the “rise” of

China in Latin America and elsewhere, the issue is not whether China is a threat, or whether it has the right to pursue its national interests in

Latin America and other parts of the world. Rather, it is important to recognize the dynamics that this reemergencecreates in a region with close human, geographical, and economic ties to the United States, and to

prepare to mitigate the risks, meet the challenges, and rise to the opportunities that China’s entry

into Latin America makes possible.

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AT: US-China War

No China war—globalization locks in interdependenceXuetong and Haixia ’12 Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at

Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, he has his ownWikipedia page, Qi Haixia, Lecturer Ph.D in the Institute of International Studies , Tsinghua University,

“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China –US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold

War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(2): 105-127, Summer 2012, 10.1093/cjip/pos007

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the

United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end

of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among

states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’.

Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic

relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests

is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma

since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and theUnited States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to

adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security

conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the

United States and China.

Ignore rhetoric—converging interests check China warWallerstein ’12 Immanuel Wallerstein, sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems

analyst, Senior Research Scholar for the Yale Sociology Department, “China and the United States:

Rivals, Enemies, Collaborators?” Agence Global, Commentary No. 321, 1/15/2012,

http://www.iwallerstein.com/china-united-states-rivals-enemies-collaborators/While the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered irrelevant any Chinese-U.S. alliance against it, the relations between the two countries did not

really change. They became, if anything, much closer. The situation in which the world finds itself today is that Chinahas a significant balance of payments surplus with the United States, much of which it invests in U.S.

Treasury bonds, thereby underwriting the ability of the U.S. government to continue to spend vast amounts of

resources on its multiple military activities around the globe (and particularly in the Middle East), as well as to be a good customer for

Chinese exports. From time to time, the rhetoric each government currently uses about the other is a

bit harsh, but nowhere near the rhetoric of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Still, it is never wise to pay too much attention to the rhetoric. In global affairs, rhetoric is

usually intended primarily to have a political effect within one’s own countries, rather than reflecting

true policy towards the country at which it is ostensibly aimed. One should pay more attention to the

actions of the two countries. Notice the following: In 2001 (just before 9/11), off Hainan Island, a Chinese plane and a

U.S. plane collided. The U.S. plane had probably been spying on China. Some U.S. politicians called for a military

response. President George W. Bush did not agree. He more or less apologized to the Chinese, obtaining the eventual return

of the airplane and of the 24 captured U.S. airmen. In the various efforts of the United States to get the United Nations to support its

operations in various ways, the Chinese often dissented. But they have never actually vetoed a resolution sponsored

by the United States. Caution on both sides has seemed to be the preferred form of action, despite

the rhetoric. So where are we? China, as all the major powers today, has a multifaceted foreign policy, engaging with all parts of the

world. The question is what its priorities are. I believe that priority number one is its relations with Japan and the two Koreas. China is strong,

yes, but would be immeasurably stronger if it were to be part of a northeast Asian confederation. China and Japan need each other, first of all

as economic partners and secondly to ensure that there be no military confrontation of any kind. Despite occasional nationalist flare-ups, they

have been visibly moving in this direction. The most recent move is the joint decision to trade with each other using their own currencies,

thereby cutting out the use of the dollar, and insulating them from the ever more frequent fluctuations in the dollar’s value. Furthermore,

Japan is weighing the uncertainty that the U.S. military umbrella may not last forever and it needs therefore to come to terms with China. South

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Korea faces the same dilemmas as Japan, plus the thorny problem of how to deal with North Korea. For South Korea, China is the crucial

constraint on the North Koreans. And for China, instability in North Korea would pose an immediate threat to its own stability. China can play

for South Korea the role that the United States no longer can. And in the difficult adjustments of China and Japan to their desired collaboration,

South Korea (or a putatively united Korea) can play an essential balancing role. As the United States perceives these developments, is it not

reasonable to suppose that it is trying to come to terms with this kind of confederal Northeast Asia as it constructs itself? One could analyze the

military posturing of the United States in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia not as a serious military stance but as a negotiating ploy in the

geopolitical game that is being played out over the next decade. Are China and the United States rivals? Yes, up to a point. Are

they enemies? No, they are not enemies. Are they collaborators? They already are more than they admit, andwill be much more so as the decade proceeds.

Both US and China prefer cooperationLieberthal and Jisi ’12 Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior

fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, was a professor at U

Michigan for 26 years, and Wang Jisi, Director, Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean

of the School of International Studies, Peking University, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,”

Brookings, 3/30/2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal

The U.S. and China have a wide-ranging, deep and relatively mature relationship. The presidents of

both countries have repeatedly indicated the value of developing a cooperative relationship for the

future. Both sides have a pragmatic awareness of the issues on which they disagree, and both

appreciate the importance of not permitting those specific disagreements to prevent cooperation on

major issues where cooperation can be mutually beneficial. In addition, the leaders and top working-level

officials on both sides have gained substantial experience in dealing with each other and, in many cases, have

come to know each other fairly well. 1

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AT: US-China Relations

Baseline relations with China are resilient —competition yields symbiotic

cooperation

Xuetong ’13 Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at TsinghuaUniversity and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, PhD in Political Science

from UC Berkeley, “Strategic Cooperation without Mutual Trust: A Path Forward for China and the

United States,” Asia Policy, no. 15, January 2013, pp. 4-6, 10.1353/asp.2013.0015Beijing thus believes that the U.S. rebalancing strategy aims at constraining China from becoming the dominant power in East Asia, in spite of

assurances from Washington that the strategy does not target China. Yet faced with this policy, mainstream Chinese strategists continue to

regard mutual trust as a precondition for strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington and worry that the lack of mutual trust will

undermine bilateral relations and increase the risk of war. This view is actually shared by Washington. Communication is seen as an

effective approach for improving mutual trust. For instance, with the exception of Vice President Xi Jinping, who had injured

his back, all of China’s national leaders met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to China in

September 2012, even though they knew these meetings could not result in any common

understanding. The Chinese government similarly values the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)

because it believesthat

this mechanism can help improve mutual trust with the United States. In fact, the S&ED is

less useful for improving mutual trust than it is for finding common or complementary interests between the two countries. Chinese

realists agree with the mainstream strategists that growing competition between China and the United States is

inevitable as the gap in comprehensive national power narrows between the two countries. With China poised to become a superpower

second only to the United States by 2022, the strategic competition between them will likely only intensify and proliferate into more sectors.

Yet Chinese realists have confidence that selfish interests, such as the desire to avoid military clashes between

two nuclear powers, will encourage U.S.-China cooperation, especially preventive cooperation. As

long as both sides are vigilant, they can keep their competition peaceful. Consider, for example, that the

disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have had almost no impact on

China-U.S. relations. This phenomenon illustrates that both Beijing and Washington are wary of

conflicts that could escalate to military clashes. In comparison with U.S. policy toward China during the first term of the

Clinton administration, the current U.S. rebalancing strategy is much softer and clearly illustrates the superficial friendship between China and

the United States. This state of superficial friendship drives rivalry between the two countries, but the strategy of superficial friendshipfacilitates cooperation between them.1 China and the United States have been able to maintain this superficial

friendship since the late 1990s, even in the absence of mutual trust, mainly because they share objective

strategic interests, such as nuclear nonproliferation, peace in the Asia-Pacific, counterterrorism in Central

Asia, and trade and investment. In the late 1990s, for example, China and the United States agreed to no longer

target nuclear weapons at each other, which helped stabilize bilateral relations. In order to manage

unavoidable competition, the principle of “peaceful competition” may be more useful than the principle of “peaceful

coexistence.” During his visit to China in October 2011, Vice President Joe Biden was warmly received by his counterpart Xi Jinping. Xi

suggested to Biden that China and the United States should develop a new type of major-power relations characterized by “healthy

competition.” Following the meeting, no voice from the U.S. side opposed this suggestion. It may be possible for China and the United States to

agree on the principle of peaceful competition through preventive cooperation, even if they cannot agree on healthy competition, because the

former principle can provide a red line for both sides. China and the United States should thus expend more effort on developing preventive

cooperation than on trying to improve mutual trust. Cooperation can be based on conflicting as well as shared

interests. Although in the coming years China and the United States should be psychologically prepared to witness conflicting interests

increase faster than common interests, Beijing and Washington can skillfully manage competition by focusing on

developing preventive cooperation based on these conflicting interests. China and the United States can develop

such cooperation not only in the military sphere but also in addressing nontraditional security threats, such as those posed by energy, finance,

and climate change.2

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Diverging interests prevent substantive US-China cooperationFriedberg ‘12 Aaron L Friedberg, professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University,

served as a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President from 2003-

2005, “Bucking Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2012,

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/bucking-beijing/

Today, China's ruling elites are both arrogant and insecure. In their view, continued rule by the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) is essential to China's stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not coincidentally,

vital to their own safety and comfort. Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism in

the economic sphere, they remain committed to preserving their hold on political power. The CCP's

determination to maintain control informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious about their legitimacy, China's rulers

are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor. Although they believe China is on track to become a world power on par

with the United States, they remain deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological subversion. And despite Washington's

attempts to reassure them of its benign intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced that the United

States aims to block China's rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government. Like

the United States, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued an essentially constant approach toward its

greatest external challenger. For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright confrontation with the

United States while pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its "comprehensive national power," a Chinese strategic

concept that encompasses military strength, technological prowess, and diplomatic influence. Even as they remain on the defensive, however,

Chinese officials have not been content to remain passive. They have sought incremental advances,slowly expanding China's sphere of influence and strengthening its position in Asia while working

quietly to erode that of the United States. Although they are careful never to say so directly, they seek

to have China displace the United States in the long run and to restore China to what they regard as

its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese strategists do not believe that they can achieve this

objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead, they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive

force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the

ancient military strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which

overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile. The failure to date to achieve a genuine entente

between the United States and China is the result not of a lack of effort but of a fundamental

divergence of interests. Although limited cooperation on specific issues might be possible, the ideological gap between

the two nations is simply too great, and the level of trust between them too low, to permit a stablemodus vivendi. What China's current leaders ultimately want -- regional hegemony -- is not something

their counterparts in Washington are willing to give. That would run counter to an axiomatic goal of

U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the

Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers. The reasons for this goal involve a mix

of strategic, economic, and ideological considerations that will continue to be valid into the

foreseeable future.

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AT: China Soft Power

Chinese engagement with Latin America doesn’t change international power

dynamics

Farnsworth ’12 Eric Farnsworth, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC andfrom 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas, “Memo to

Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly , vol. 6, no. 1, Winter 2012,


To the extent that simple commercial exchange dominates the China story in the Americas, the

implications for the United States are minimal. A rational and appropriate response would s imply be to promote a level,

transparent playing field for U.S. business and investors to compete effectively with a new, well-financed competitor. This is exactly the way

Chinese leaders have presented their efforts: as benign economic actions that offer little challenge to

U.S. interests. Indeed, the stock of U.S. investment in the region continues to dwarf Chinese investment,

and regional trade with the United States continues to surpass trade with China by a factor of almost

four to one. At this point, neither Chinese pronouncements nor concrete actions establish a reason to

believe that China has strategic designs on Latin America from a military or security perspective,

either to project power into the region or to challenge U.S. military predominance from a hemisphericplatform.

No China soft powerDyer 13 Geoff Dyer, former Beijing bureau chief of the Financial Times, writes about U.S. foreign policy

for the newspaper, “China’s Glass Ceiling,” Foreign Policy, 3/28/2013,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/28/china_glass_ceiling_number_two

That won't work. China treats soft power as a problem that can be solved by bureaucrats -- by throwing

money at it, in the way that it has with high-speed rail or wind power. But modernity is not something that can be

acquired off-the-shelf . Soft power is generated by society rather than the Ministry of Culture. The

effort to shift its image is constantly undermined by the way that China actually treats its more

awkward and interesting citizens -- from well-known figures like Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and artistAi Weiwei to the writer Yu Jie, who has been living in the United States since shortly after he wrote a critical book about former premier

Wen Jiabao. Its media companies will not prosper abroad because the one thing they really have to offer -- the inside story on what is really

happening in China -- is the one thing they cannot report. China hopes its soft power investments will blunt criticism of its political system, but

it is the political system that is holding back its soft power . Even favored artists suffer. I once asked Zhang Yimou, the

film director and creative genius behind the Olympics opening ceremony, why his recent films had all been period pieces that shunned the

fascinating complexities of contemporary China. If I made a film about today's China, he answered, I would have so many problems with the

censors that it would not be worth my trouble.

China soft power fails: no cultural exportsKeck 13 (Zachary, assistant editor of The Diplomat, “Destined to Fail: China’s Soft Power Push” The

Diplomat 1/7/13 http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-

offensive/?all=true)

Finally, the CCP’s soft power offensive is doomed to fail because of its ability to tolerate (much lesscultivate) “cultural ambassadors.” In the realm of soft power, a county’s entertainers, artists, and

intellectuals are some of its strongest assets. One needs only to look to South Korean rapper Psy, and the “flash

mobs” he’s inspired in places as varied as Jakarta, Bangkok, Sydney, Dhaka, Mumbai, Dubai, American college

campuses and shopping malls, Taipei, Hong Kong, and, yes, the Chinese mainland.¶ A country as large and dynamic as China

undoubtedly has many potential worldwide celebrities. And yet, as a China Daily op-ed points out, China “is still far from making a

product like Gangnam Style. China does export a large amount of cultural products every year, but

few of them become popular abroad.”¶ The major reason China fails to export its cultural products, as

http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/?all=true






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Peng Kan, the author of the op-ed rightly notes, is that “Government organizations and enterprises are the main

force behind the exports….But these organizations and enterprises… cannot promote satires like

Gangnam Style through official communication channel. But cultural products without entertainment

value rarely become popular in overseas markets.”

China soft power fails in Latin America – cultural and economic dividesEllis ’11 R. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study,”



The growth and exercise of soft power by the People’s Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As

with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin

America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty

in learning each other’s culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a

pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China

and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of

Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business

and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRChas operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is

language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very

few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although

Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese

character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is

a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the

China Academy of Social Sciences, which currently has the world’s largest Latin America studies program—and truly multinational Chinese

corporations—such as Hong Kong –based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—the general

knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited,

restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most

importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived

as “not one of us”—a reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in

many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even

where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings,

suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of

friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving

the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In

the arena of China –Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs

are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.

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AT: China Economy

Chinese economy is resilient – smart monetary and fiscal policy overcomes

hurdles

Pilkington ’11 Philip Pilkington, “Chinese bubble bursting: A probable non-event,” Naked Capitalism,11/7/2011, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/chinese-bubble-bursting-a-probable-non-

event.html

Well, the doomsayers are probably going to be a little peeved because in all likelihood the bursting of the Chinese

property bubble will likely prove a paper tiger. You see, we in the West seem to think that a financial

crisis – and crises related to the extension of excessive credit – must be catastrophic for the real economy. But this is not

so. If there is a strong government in place that operates under its own sovereign currency and has no

childish qualms about increasing deficit spending, then pretty much any financial-ish crisis can be

deficit-spent into oblivion. As Bill Mitchell put it the other day in an excellent post about Western doomsday fantasies surrounding

China: “The Chinese government is the currency issuer and they demonstrated during the early stages of

the crisis that they know exactly what they are doing with respect to using that monetary supremacy

to maintain growth as one component of spending collapses.” That says it all really. If the property bubble

collapses, the Chinese government can simply extend and expand the already existing government

construction projects. Hell for the environment, of course, but not so much for the Chinese worker. They can boost this with

New Deal-style direct government works projects if they so wish. In fact, they can do pretty much

anything they want to boost domestic employment and demand because they don’t have the likes of

John Boehn-head cock-blocking them every time they try to get anything done. This will probably provoke

inflationary pressures, but given the choice between widespread unemployment – ‘unemployment’ being Chinese for ‘social unrest’ – the

government will likely start to ignore it. Indeed, they will probably come to realise, if they haven’t already, that their inflation

problems are likely due in large part to income inequality. This will spur them on to create the domestic

consumption base that they sorely need. And if it doesn’t the inflation itself might just do the work for them

in the coming decades. Either way, the money currently be splurged on property will find its way into the

domestic consumption base and into investing in productive capacity that supplies this base. The Chinese

government can either do this directly through redistributive taxation policies or the inflation will take care of it by eroding the value of the

upper-classes hoardings… erm… I mean ‘savings’. I’d favour the former, but if ignorance (and power-plays) win out the latter will suffice in the

medium-to-long run. Just ask Latin America! Yes, the property bubble in China looks like its bursting. But no, this will probably not prove to be a

catastrophe. Instead, we in the West are going to get schooled once again, when our Eastern ‘comrades’ show us just how to run an advanced

capitalist economy. History, eh? It’s just one big irony.

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AT: Global Economy

No risk or impact to economic declineDrezner ‘11 Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers,” Foreign Policy, 8/12/11,http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/please_come_down_off_the_ledge_dear_readersSo, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause

governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie

echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while,

because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931?

Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931

played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying

the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe

downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. The legacy

of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger

cement for the current system. In terms of [public] attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll

about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S.

support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very

high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany

and China. On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public

attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something,"

that something is not a return to autarky or anything so [drastic]. Another big difference is that

multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters,

even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures

are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-

trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of

the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan

to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the

status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. Thatis setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. Even if there are disagreements,

communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse. Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social

unrest. The working paper cited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that

paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget

cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more

spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we

limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil

rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more

democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might

prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political

institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

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AT: CCP Collapse

No CCP collapse – rapid crackdowns and incentive packages coopt resistanceKurlantzick ’11 Joshua Kurlantzick, fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations,

“Beijing has bought itself a respite from middle class revolt,” The National, 4/7/2011,http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/beijing-has-bought-itself-a-respite-from-

middle-class-revolt?pageCount=0As governments across North Africa have been overthrown or are seemingly near the verge of collapse, some Chinese writers and activists are

hopeful that this democratic wave might sweep over the world's largest and most powerful authoritarian state. Unknown Chinese activists have

anonymously posted an online manifesto calling for their own "Jasmine Revolution". Groups of protesters - even joined by the American

ambassador to China - have gathered in Beijing to heed the call for revolt. The Chinese authorities, taking no chances, quickly

shut down protests and apparently jailed some of the demonstrators. They have also been blocking any internet

discussion of activists' "Jasmine Manifesto". But despite Beijing's quick response, in reality China's leadership has far

less to fear than Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi. For one thing, unlike in many parts of the Middle East, China's

urbanised centres haven't turned against the regime. Instead, most city residents essentially support, or at

least tolerate, the regime. And why not? The government has been very, very good to them, as Minxin Pei, a

professor at Claremont McKenna College, documented in his book China's Trapped Transition. After the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the

Chinese Communist Party, recognising the power of educated urban protesters, delivered a raft of new

incentives to co-opt the urban middle class. The government directed growth to urban areas, and launched other pro-middle

class programmes. These included higher salaries for academics and other professionals; restrictions on

rural people's housing and schools so that peasants cannot attend many of the best urban

institutions; and opening the Party to membership for entrepreneurs, many of whom eagerly joined as a business

networking opportunity. The Party reinforces the middle class content with the status quo by using speeches and state media to suggest that, in

a democracy, total freedom of movement would allow rural peasants to swamp the cities, ruining the standard of living in wealthier urban

areas. All these incentives are reasons why Chinese city residents in polls show high appreciation of the

current state of affairs. In one recent survey, nearly 90 per cent of Chinese expressed satisfaction with

the current station of their nation; since these polls, conducted by telephone, are focused on urban

areas, they represent more closely the views of the urban middle class.

CCP leadership is resilientKurlantzick ’11 Joshua Kurlantzick, fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations,

“Beijing has bought itself a respite from middle class revolt,” The National, 4/7/2011,

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/beijing-has-bought-itself-a-respite-from-

middle-class-revolt?pageCount=0

China's leaders also are not as out of touch, isolated or brittle as some of those in the Middle East. The

Communist Party may be an authoritarian regime and there is certainly plenty of corruption - one Chinese scholar estimates that corruption

costs China more than $80 billion (Dh294 billion) in growth each year. Still, the leadership now is a collective one, and no

single official amasses the type of enormous wealth of leaders like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. China's

collective leadership, unlike in Mao's time, also has some ability to listen to and respond to public

opinion. In 2008, for example, protests in Tibet initially were met by a relatively moderate response from

the central government. But angry online sentiment - the Chinese blogosphere is highly nationalistand often conservative - partly prompted a tougher crackdown, according to Chinese officials and scholars. Perhaps

most importantly, unlike much of the Middle East, China's economy is booming, and not simply because of resource

extraction. In Tunisia, and then in Egypt, protests erupted after immolations by young men and women who, although they had

undergraduate degrees, were unable to find work in economies that could not keep pace with growing populations. Although Chinese

university graduates certainly have a tougher time finding jobs than they did several years ago, the Chinese economy continues to boom:

China grew by more than 9 per cent last year, during a global economic crisis, and will likely grow at

least as much this year, a rate it has kept up for roughly three decades (the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao,

downgraded that to 7 per cent this week). Educated young men and women still can find high-paying jobs,

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particularly if they are willing to move to interior cities that have been prioritised by the central

government. And, unlike in places like Egypt, foreign powers such as the United States - which has sold roughly $2 trillion

in government debt to China - do not have much leverage over the People's Republic. In the early 1990s, when China

remained a global pariah because of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, America had more leverage to push Beijing on human rights and

democracy, and President Bill Clinton, during a visit to the country, publicly and harshly criticised China's record on rights. Today, the story is

much different. Dependent on China not only to keep the American economy propped up but also for cooperation on global issues like trade

and climate change, the Obama administration has taken a much softer approach to Beijing. When Barack Obama headed to China for the first

time as president in the fall of 2009, he agreed to a "press conference" with the Chinese president Hu Jintao at which the two actually took no

questions, and when the American president held a town forum with Chinese students, he delivered none of the broadsides against China's

rights record that his predecessor had. Any change that happens in China in the future is going to come from domestic events, not from

external pressure. But don't expect that change to happen anytime soon.

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