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Choice Theory, Elaboration Likelihood, and Counterplans as Arguments: A

Framework for Evaluating Theory in IPDA Debate.

Chris Harper - Arkansas State University

Abstract

This article argues for the social scientific principles of choice theory and the

elaboration likelihood model of persuasion as foundational criteria for the

inclusion of theoretical arguments into the context of IPDA debating. Further-

more, this article attempts to illustrate these criteria by advocating an

“Argument” framework of rhetorical counterplan theory in the unique space

of IPDA debate rounds.

Introduction

“It is hoped that this discussion accurately represents the development of

theory, not as a static presentation, but as an evolving conversation (Broda-

Bahm, 1999)”. These words were penned by Dr. Ken Broda-Bahm approxi-

mately ten years ago in an article attempting to ground the use of negative

fiat in intercollegiate policy debate. It is interesting that these words were

written around the time that the International Public Debate Association was

beginning to take traction and shape. Ten years later, IPDA is a thriving inter-

collegiate debate division involved in the evolving conversation that Broda-

Bahm spoke of in the aforementioned article. Recent issues of the IPDA jour-

nal have produced two well written and thought provoking articles that at-

tempt to situate the role of counterplan debate theory in the context of IPDA

debating. These recent articles referenced many of the same arguments and

concerns expressed by previous authors involved in the rhetorical discussion

in regard to issues of counterplans and fiat (Broda-Bahm, 1999).

In some ways, this essay is a response to the articles written by Hodge &

Puckett (2009)and Puckett (2010). In other ways, this essay is a voice that

seeks to become part of the ever evolving discussion of rhetorical theory and

its use and function in the context of intercollegiate debating organizations.

Specifically, this essay will make three points regarding the function and

framework of debate theory. First, we can gain valuable insights from choice

theory that should drive our decisions as a debating community in regard to

the theoretical underpinnings and application of theory in IPDA debating.

Second, this essay will provide a definitive view of counterplans viewed as

arguments. Finally, this essay will clearly explain why counterplans viewed as

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arguments will answer important questions raised by both choice theory

and recent questions raised by Puckett (2010).

It is important to note that this discussion specifically intends to discuss

the role of counterplan debate theory in the context of the International

Public Debate Association. Due to the historical pre-existence of intercolle-

giate debate divisions such as NDT or CEDA debate organizations, the ma-

jority of literature written in regard to the theoretical use of counterplans

has been written with those specific contexts in mind. Clearly, each debate

organization or division has certain characterizations that can be identified

that distinguish those divisions as unique formats of debate. Also, it seems

reasonable to assume that at times those unique characteristics of a debate

division will influence both practice and pedagogy. More relevant to this

discussion, it is possible, even likely that the unique vision and framework

of IPDA debate should be a driving force when discussing the role of debate

theory within its given space. .

IPDA: The Context:

To understand this, let’s begin by taking a look at some of the unique

features of IPDA debating. It seems obvious that one of the major claims

and benefits of IPDA debate is that of inclusion. This inclusion involves both

debate judges and debaters. IPDA debate is one of (if not the only) inter-

collegiate debate division in the United States that not only allows un-

trained judges, but embraces untrained judges (Cirlin, 2007). The use of

these untrained “lay judges” is designed to force competitors to adapt their

unique rhetorical skills to different audiences as needed. This inclusion and

often reliance on untrained judges is one important feature that separates

IPDA debating apart from its NPDA, CEDA, and NDT counterparts (Lowery,

M. (2010).

Another claim made in regard to IPDA is that it is more accessible to un-

experienced or “classroom” debaters. In other words, a well educated col-

lege (or high school) student could walk out of the classroom and into an

IPDA tournament and compete with some level of competence and confi-

dence. This is possible because IPDA debate has focused on real world ap-

plication and a focus on substantive issues instead of creating a platform

that depends upon complex theoretical principles and debate terminology

(Eldred, 2009). It would be virtually impossible for a well educated college

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(or high school) student to walk into a national level CEDA/NDT debate tour-

nament with no previous training and repeat back the arguments made by

their competitors because of the rapid delivery and strong emphasis on de-

bate terminology/jargon. These three factors, untrained judges, accessibility

to untrained students, and a focus on real world practicality are three of the

most defining and appealing features of IPDA debate.

Choice Theory, Elaboration Likelihood Model, and IPDA Debating: Pickers

and Choosers

In his book The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less, Barry Schwartz dis-

cuses the complex dynamic of human decision making. Early on in this work,

Schwartz lays out five basic assumptions that become the outline for his book.

This article will argue that three of those assumptions should be incorporated

into the framework by which IPDA coaches, debaters, and theorists should

view the use of debate theory in the IPDA debating association. Those three

premises are:

We would be better off if we embraced a certain voluntary constraint on

our freedom of choice, instead of rebelling against them.

We would be better off seeking what was “good enough” instead of seek-

ing the best choices.

We would be better off if we paid less attention to what others around us

were doing.

A deeper understanding of these three principles can help to undergird a jus-

tification for clear and defined criteria regarding the use and discussion of

debate theory as it relates to IPDA debating.

First, why we will be better off if we embrace a certain voluntary con-

straint on our freedom of choice? While America is a country seem-

ingly built upon the freedom of choice and the motto “more is al-

ways better” seems to accurately define the private logic of our na-

tion, research has shown that we suffer from an overload of choices

and options to pick from. A recent set of studies, entitled “When

Choice is Demotivating”, identified the phenomenon that an over-

load of choices or complexities actually decreases the quality of deci-

sions made (Iyengar &Lepper, 2000). Schwartz (2004) explains the

phenomenon when he states “A large array of options may discour-

age consumers, because it forces an increase in the effort that goes

into making a decision (pg. 20)”. In other words, the larger the array

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of options to pick from, the more difficult and complex the decisions between

those options become.

In fact, this overload of options and complexities to choose between has

important ramifications that we should examine. According to Schwartz, they

turn us from choosers into pickers. Schwartz defines a chooser as “someone

who thinks actively about the possibilities before making a decision. A

chooser reflects on what’s important to him or her in life. What’s important

about the particular decision, and what the short-and long-range conse-

quences of the decision may be (Schwarts, 2004, pg. 75)”. In contrast, a

picker according to Schwartz, is someone “With a world of choices rushing by

like a music video, all a picker can do is grab this or that and hope for the best

(Schwartz, 2004, pg 75)”. Put simply, the greater the amount of choices or

complexity an individual is asked to pick from, the more likely they will move

from a picker to a chooser.

I believe similar frameworks for the evaluation of arguments or persuasive

acts was laid out by Petty and Cacioppo (1980) when they developed the

Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion. This theory posits that

there are two major routes of persuasion. First, the central route which is

typified by a well thought out logical exploration of the facts and substantive

arguments given for a specific proposition. Second, peripheral route that in-

volves situations where the receiver evaluates messages based on a much less

cognitive approach. This peripheral route is characterized by a decision calcu-

lus that focuses on issues such as source credibility, style of delivery, emo-

tional appeals, and attractiveness of the sender.

The clear distinction between these two types of message evaluation lies in

the ability and/or amount of elaboration involved by the receiver/evaluator of

the message. Specifically, two major factors play a role in an individual’s often

unconscious decision to use either the central or peripheral route of decision

calculus. The factor that plays a role in this calculus is that of motivation. The

greater an individual’s motivation to make a positive decision, the greater the

likelihood that they will use the more logically well thought out central route

of evaluation. The second major deciding factor, of which route to use as an

evaluator, is that of the availability of cognitive resources. In this context, cog-

nitive resources would include an individual’s educational level, knowledge of

the specific topic, and experience with the given topic. So the lower on the

scale an individual falls in terms cognitive resources the more likely they will

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default to the more emotional, and at times shallow, peripheral route of

argument/persuasion evaluation.

It seems to follow logically that individuals who use the central route of

decision calculus are more akin to Schwartz concept of choosers, whereas

the individuals who default to the peripheral route of argument calculation

would fall more closely into the picker quadrant of Schwartz theory. So to

make that clear and simple, if a person uses a central route of decision mak-

ing, they can be called a chooser, and if they use a peripheral route of deci-

sion making, they become a picker by definition.

Counterplans as Arguments

Now let us turn our attention to counterplan theory as it relates to debat-

ing in the IPDA. A simple precursor glance at the literature regarding coun-

terplan theory quickly tells the reader several things. First, at times the argu-

ments for certain types of counterplan justifications can be complex. These

discussions often include terms such as fiat, counterfactual fiat, permutation

theory, plan inclusive, plan exclusive, intrinsic permutations, opportunity

cost, counterplans as tests of affirmative advocacy, ground, fairness, net

beneficiality, agency counterplans, advocated perms, conditional counter-

plans, non conditional counterplans etc...

The second thing that becomes quickly apparent is that some of the great-

est debate minds in the history of our collective event do not agree with one

another when it comes to issues dealing with counterplan theory.

Remember that the majority of the discussions of the above mentioned

terms regarding debate theory were voiced out of concerns from collegiate

level policy debate divisions, most specifically the CEDA and NDT divisions.

While I believe, for reasons that I will mention later, those discussions were

valuable in the contexts in which they began, I believe that the IPDA as an

organization is a unique space and should hence take a different theoretical

approach.

To that end, I would like to advocate that counterplans in the context of

IPDA debating should be viewed simply as arguments. No need for fancy

names, in depth theoretical explanations, or fast paced philosophical discus-

sion in the midst of a round attempting to justify this or that theory of a

given counter plan.

In support of this I would like to advocate that all debate theory should

begin with the two initial burdens given to the affirmative and negative

12

debaters. The affirmative debater begins with the burden of proof and the

negative debater begins with the burden of rejoinder. The burden of proof is

the expectation the affirmative debater will provide, a case that on face

proves the resolution to be true. The burden of rejoinder deals with the ex-

pectation that the negative debater will make arguments aimed at attempting

to convince the adjudicator that the affirmative debater has not proved the

resolution to be true. So basically, the affirmative debater has to prove that

the resolution is true, and the negative debater has to prove that the affirma-

tive debater has not met his/her burden. Note, this does not mean that the

negative debater has to prove that the resolution is not true, simply that the

affirmative debater has not done his/her job.

In the context of policy debate resolutions, affirmative teams generally run

parametric cases with some description of harms, plan, and advantages.

These plans are set out in the first affirmative speeches and hence construct

the focus for the rest of the debate round. At this point the negative debater

is responsible to make arguments as to why the judge would reject the af-

firmative plan advocacy. To this, negative debaters often make case argu-

ments, solvency arguments, critical arguments (deep solvency take outs), and

at times employ the use of counterplans as a strategic choice.

For an in depth treatment of the history of counterplan theory and its role

in debating, see Hodge and Puckett (2009). While this article doesn’t propose

a new version of counterplan theory, it does hope to provide a fresh perspec-

tive on an historic theory. This article advocates that instead of viewing coun-

terplans as tests or opportunity costs, debaters and judges should simply view

counterplans as arguments. In other words, a counterplan is simply an argu-

ment deployed by a negative debater in an attempt to fulfill their burden of

rejoinder.

It is important to note that a counterplan has to fulfill one of two impor-

tant logical conclusions, if it is to successfully attack an affirmative plan. In

classic debate terminology these two ideas are simply understood as competi-

tion standards. For a counterplan to be an effective argument in a debate

round, it must ask the judge to favor itself over the plan action advocated by

the affirmative debater. To the extent that the counterplan legitimately asks

the judge to reject the affirmative plan, the counterplan is said to compete

with the affirmative advocacy. Principles of basic logic and historical debate

theory clearly lay out two scenarios by which a negative counterplan

“competes” with an affirmative advocacy. First, a counterplan competes with

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an affirmative plan if it is net beneficial. Second, the counterplan competes

with the affirmative plan if it is mutually exclusive of the affirmative plan

action. It is important to point out that a negative counterplan must meet

only one of the two above standards of competition (net beneficial, mutually

exclusive).

First, let us look at the concept of net beneficial. Many debaters and

coaches have misunderstood the concept of net beneficial to mean that the

counterplan must simply have more benefits than the affirmative plan.

Imagine a debate in which the affirmative topically argues that the USFG

should guarantee post conviction DNA evidence to be used in all death pen-

alty based court appeals. For the sake of debate, imagine that the affirma-

tive clearly captures the advantage of creating a more fair playing field for all

individuals that appeal their death sentences. Now imagine that the negative

counterplan is to feed all of the starving kids in the world. Next, the negative

argues that the judge should side with them, because they access more

benefits than the affirmative team, hence justifying a negative ballot. Any

marginal debater will quickly point out that the negative counterplan (while

a great idea) never really competes with the affirmative action of ensuring

DNA evidence during appeals. In fact, most affirmative will argue that the

judge could vote to do both the plan and the counterplan at the end of the

round. Then, according to the basic debate responsibilities, the affirmative

debater would argue that they have won the round because they accom-

plished the burden of proof. In other words, while the negative debater may

have proved that we should feed starving children, nothing about that argu-

ment functions to reject the idea that the USFG should guarantee DNA test-

ing for all death penalty appeals. To this extent, if a negative team claimed

that their plan was net beneficial because they solved for more than the

affirmative, they would be demonstrating a misunderstanding of true net

beneficiality.

For a counterplan to be net beneficial, it must demonstrate that the coun-

terplan is a more beneficial option than the plan alone, and/or the plan plus

the counterplan (permutation). In other words the negative team must ar-

gue that there is an offensive reason that the counterplan is preferable to

either the plan alone or the plan and the counterplan passed simultaneous.

To the extent that the negative debater successfully makes this argument,

the counterplan is said to compete with the affirmative advocacy, because it

asks the judge to pick between the plan and the counterplan by

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demonstrating that the two shouldn’t coexist. This is usually done by arguing

that there is some type of disadvantage that links to the plan avoided by the

counterplan. In fact, the disadvantage tacked on to the affirmative plan is often

called the net benefit of the counterplan. The second competition standard a

negative debater can appeal to is that of mutually exclusivity. In this instance

the negative debater must convince the judge that the plan and the counter-

plan cannot coexist in the same world. It seems clear if there is a world in

which the plan and counterplan cannot coexist, the judge is forced to pick be-

tween the two. Hence, the counterplan competes with the affirmative plan.

Imagine a round where the affirmative plan is to send 10,000 troops into Af-

ghanistan and the negative counterplan is to remove all troops from Afghani-

stan. It seems clear that the judge can’t vote to both send 10,000 troops and

remove all troops at the same time. To the extent the plan and counterplan

actions are mutually exclusive (can’t be done at the same time), the judge is

forced to pick between the two competing options.

To the extent that the counterplan asks/forces the judge to pick between

itself and the affirmative plan, the counterplan becomes a competitive argu-

ment in the round functioning to fulfill the burden of rejoinder. It doesn’t mat-

ter if the counterplan is an opportunity cost, test, conditional, unconditional,

etc. It simply functions as an argument designed to prove that the affirmative

has not proved the resolution true.

Counterplans Viewed As Arguments: Answering Puckett, Choice Theory +ELM

Answering Puckett:

Puckett (2010) brought up two interesting questions regarding counterplan

theory in academic debate. First, the counterplan’s inability to access the reso-

lution by the decision maker, and second the fact that giving the negative de-

bater the power of fiat unfairly skewed ground in favor of the negative debater.

In my estimation, viewing a counterplan as an argument clearly answers

both of these questions. Puckett frames the first question by stating “the deci-

sion-maker can only access if the resolution is true or not; whether the coun-

terplan is better and should be enacted is outside the scope of the decision-

maker. The decision maker, by way of the ballot can only vote to NOT do the

plan. They can never vote to do the counterplan (2010, pg. 21)”. This issue was

also asked some ten years ago by Michael Korcock (1999) when he was origi-

nally developing his theory of counterplans as opportunity costs, a view that

was hotly debated both then and now (Katsulas. J.P. 1999; Lane, G. 1999; Per-

kins, D. 1999). I think viewing the counterplan as a competing argument

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answers this first objection clearly. I agree that the judge is not voting to do

the counterplan, but to “NOT do the plan”. According to the counterplan as

argument paradigm, a judge would vote against an affirmative team, because

the judge deemed that the counterplan upheld the negative burden of rejoin-

der, hence proving that the affirmative plan did not meet the burden of proof.

The second major objection brought up by Puckett was that “the question

is ’whether the action of the resolution should be taken;’ the question is NOT

‘whether alternative action should be taken (2010, pg. 21)”. According to

Puckett, the negative team could never meet this burden, because negative

fiat does not exist. Puckett goes on to state that “all negative votes lack access

to any action (except inaction) (2010, pg, 22)”. While this is simply a semantic

twist, and in one sense I certainly agree with Puckett, this view of counter-

plans over complexualizes the position for no reason. If one views the com-

peting counterplan simply as an argument in the round, the judge could vote

for the negative counterplan simply because it provided a competitive argu-

ment that proved that the affirmative team did not uphold their burden of

proof. In other words, a vote for the counterplan isn’t a vote for action or non

action, it would be a vote for rejoinder.

Choice Theory and ELM:

Finally, lets return to the beginning of this paper and discuss how viewing

counterplans as arguments would most effectively meet the basic assump-

tions of choice theory. The three basic ideas advocated by choice theory ac-

cording to Schwartz were:

We would be better off if we embraced a certain voluntary constraints on

our freedom of choice, instead of rebelling against them.

We would be better off seeking what was “good enough” instead of seek-

ing the best choices.

We would be better off if we paid less attention to what others around us

were doing.

I believe each of these guidelines can give us sound advice when deciding

what type of theoretical frameworks to use in the context of parliamentary

debate. This can be demonstrated by a quick discussion as to how these relate

to the use of theory in IPDA debating.

The first principle asks us to constrain our range of choices and to

decrease our complexity. Remember, this position argued that the greater

number of choices available and the more complex those choices, the more

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complex those choices, the more likely the evaluator is to become a picker in-

stead of a chooser. If there is one thing that I think we can agree on in the com-

munity, it is that the majority of us want the judges/critics in our rounds to be

choosers instead of pickers. We want our critics to evaluate the depth and sub-

stance of our arguments instead of defaulting to peripheral based selection cri-

teria deployed by those judges who, because of a lack of motivation and/or cog-

nitive ability, choose to not make evaluations from a central route of decision

making. To the extent that we intentionally and knowingly endorse overly com-

plex theoretical models of argument, we as a community will create a system

that makes the role of effective judging infinitely more difficult. I believe that the

IPDA community would be benefited by seeking out the most simplistic (yet logi-

cal) model of theoretical underpinning in relations to its use of debate theory in

debate rounds. Using less complex models of theoretical meta-debate will allow

the debaters more time and opportunity to focus on the more important real

world and substantive issues of case debate.

Since many IPDA judges are not well schooled in historic debate theory and

often have no experience evaluating the philosophical components of complex

debate terminology, I believe it would be beneficial to adopt the most simplistic

version of theoretical framework possible. In relationship to counterplan debat-

ing, I believe that framework would be to explain a counterplan as simply an-

other competitive argument within the round that asks the critic to reject the

affirmative team. It seems that there is no need to explain the intricate details of

opportunity cost so eloquently articulated by its pundits (Hodge & Puckett,

1999). There is no substantive need to appeal to complex economic theory in an

attempt to justify negative fiat in relationship to decision maker voting para-

digms.

I can imagine the blank eyes of the “first time critic”, as two experienced de-

baters begin to pontificate about the rejection of the negative counterplan, be-

cause they have abused the basic reciprocal nature of fiat etc……Given the fact

that the judges tend to have little experience with this type of theoretical mate-

rial, this type of complexity runs the risk of turning an otherwise good judge into

a picker rather than a chooser, simply due to the complexity of the argument.

Why take that risk when you can simply explain that your counterplan functions

just like any other negative position in the round? It is an argument.

The second principle of choice theory deals with the idea that we should be

seeking choices that are “good enough” instead of the best options. One quick

17

look at the 1999 edition of the Journal of Contemporary Argumentation and

Debate will show several brilliant theorists in search of the best way to run

counterplans in debate rounds. I believe that the IPDA debate community

should reject the temptation to enter in to this overly complex discussion and

simply adopt a view of counterplans as competing arguments. Clearly this view

is sound both logically and theoretically. To that end, clearly counterplans

viewed as arguments is a framework that will suffice within the given time

limits, judging parameters, and mission of the IPDA as an organization.

The final principle laid out by Schwartz in relation to choice theory argues

that we would be better off if we didn’t compare ourselves to what everyone

else around us is doing. I think this is sound advice that the IPDA community

has been taking for a while. While I believe that there is a place to have in

depth theoretical discussions regarding debate frameworks, I don’t believe

that those discussions should be taking place in IPDA debate rounds. It seems

antithetical to the genetic make- up and vision of the activity. These types of

discussions seem to exclude individuals who have not been schooled in debate

theory and terminologies. Due to the fact that IPDA has untrained judges,

smaller time limits, and self imposed limits on rapid delivery methods, IPDA

debate rounds do not serve as good grounds for in depth theoretical argumen-

tation. In contrast, I believe IPDA debate rounds would be truer to spirit and

better served by having in depth discussions of substantive policy issues relat-

ing to germane ideas connected to the actual resolution area.

Conclusion:

In a world where high complexity and infinite choices have been valued,

recent research has proven that this increased arena of choice has not come

without its costs. IPDA is a debate community like no other in the United

States. It has largely stayed true to its mission of creating a debate format that

is accessible to individuals of all backgrounds, while providing a high level of

training for real world situations. This article has argued to use choice theory

as a foundational framework for evaluating the use of theory arguments in the

context of the IPDA debate community. It also advocated the use of counter-

plans as arguments as the best way to implement counterplan theory into the

IPDA debating context. Clearly, this view of counterplans can assist the IPDA in

maintaining the integrity of the event by creating space for more substantive

argumentation and less procedural focus. Hopefully, this article will be part of

a larger discussion relating to the ever advancing principles and use of rhetori-

cal strategies in the context of the IPDA community.

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