The Greenhills tact, consisting of 5,930 acres of rolling, sparselywooded terrain, located five miles north of the city limits, thirteenmiles from downtown Cincinnati, and easily accessible to the MillCreek Valley industrial areas, became one of the five regions in thenation selected in 1935 for the Greenbelt program. The town plancalled for streets following natural ground contours, interior blocksdeveloped as playgrounds and parks, and commercial, educational, andrecreational facilities grouped around a common in the center of thecommunity.

Cincinnati and GreenhillsThe Response to a Federal Community,

1935-1939

by Robert B. Fairbanks

My idea is to go just outside centers of population, pick up cheap land,build a whole community, and entice people into it. Then go back into thecities and tear down whole slums and make parks of them.1

R exford G. Tugwell's Greenbelt Town Program, initiated in 1935 throughthe Resettlement Administration of the federal government, represented

one of the earliest efforts of the emerging city planning profession to workfor the federal government in solving local urban problems. The project,heralded by historian Paul Conkin as one of "the most daring, original, andambitious experiments in public housing in the history of the United States"was also one of the most controversial New Deal undertakings.2 Unlike theslum clearance projects promoted by the Public Works Administration, thegreenbelt towns were more closely planned by federal rather than local offi-cials. And the concept of a federally built town seemed quite radical to thosestill adhering to the concept of a greatly limited central government.

Historians, examining the greenbelt towns, have emphasized the generalnegative reception these federal communities received. Joseph L. Arnold inThe New Deal in the Suburbs, typified those commenting on that hostile re-action when he observed that "It was obvious that the majority of those whowrote and spoke about the towns reacted negatively."3 Mark I. Gelfand, writingabout the project in a Nation of Cities, also stressed that the greenbelt townsaroused the opposition of the core city officials and private builders. "Thefriends of [the] central city," Gelfand contended,

perceived, any federal encouragement of middle-class migration to thesuburbs as the ruination of downtown areas; home construction firmsdisliked intensely the prospect of federal competition developing suburbansubdivisions.4

Despite such generalizations concerning the unfavorable reception accordedthe greenbelt towns by the particular metropolitan areas scheduled to receivethem, no systematic study has been done to verify these observations. AlthoughArnold devotes a chapter of his book to the public reaction to the greenbelt

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communities, he looks primarily at the national response to the phenomenon.What attention he gives to the reaction of the metropolitan area centers onthe strong negative response from the savings institutions and the real estatebrokers. He does little to examine the nature of the dialogue between the Cin-cinnati Metropolitan area and the federal government.

Funded by a $31,000,000 appropriation through the Emergency Relief Actof 1935, the Greenbelt Town Program mirrored an increased concern forregional planning, best exemplified on the federal level by the creation of theTennessee Valley Authority. Planners were no longer content to think in theopposing terms of urban and rural, for they now were concerned with the all-encompassing region emphasizing the wholeness of this unit whether it bethe Tennessee River Valley or the Cincinnati metropolitan region. Towardsthis end, the greenbelt town builders borrowed heavily from Ebenezer Howard'sgarden city concept first articulated in Garden Cities of Tomorrow issued in1898. The garden cities idea represented an attempt to synthesize the best oftwo worlds; a community of people integrated with the essentials of nature.5

The greenbelt residents would live in this ideal setting, but pursue their live-lihood in the city.

The greenbelt program also reflected the thinking of the Regional PlanningAssociation of America (RPAA) founded in 1923. Its most notable member,Lewis Mumford, often espoused the desire for "a more satisfactory layout,region by region, with the countryside and city developed together for thepurpose of promoting and enhancing the good life."6 Such thinking typifiedthe major thrust of the RPAA which broke up in 1933 but found three of itsformer members, Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, and Russell Black on thegreenbelt advisory board.7

John S. Lansill, the director of the Greenbelt Town Program, best articulatedthe basic objective of the innovative federal project which was

To obtain a large tract of land, and thus avoid the complications ordinarilydue to diverse ownerships; in this tract to create a community to be de-signed primarily for families of modest income; and arranged and man-aged so as to encourage a family and community life which will be betterthan they now enjoy. . . ,8

The program had other objectives too. According to the Resettlement Ad-ministration's Division of Suburban Resettlement, the agency charged withbuilding the towns, they would "provide work relief, increase employment andstimulate construction by promoting suburban housing for low income groupsemployed in industry."9 Not only then was the Greenhills project to providehousing for moderate income families and to furnish a model for the experi-mental development in urban-rural relationships, but it also was to be a relief

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measure by supplying jobs and business for the needy. The dual purposes ofproviding a quality project with a mass of unskilled labor would be a source oftension throughout the program's development.

Another source of tension was Rexford G. Tugwell, the director of theResettlement Administration and the prime mover behind the entire project.His combination of bluntness and blatant idealism produced numerous criticswho viewed anything tainted Tugwellian as radical or dangerous. Probablyjust as critical was Tugwell's relative administrative independence and themissing Congressional mandate in creating negative feelings toward the green-belts, or as the press called them, Tugwelltowns.10

Although the federal government during the New Deal became involved inmetropolitan America in a variety of ways through agencies such as the CivilWorks Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the FederalHousing Administration, few other projects took such a daring approach. As aresult, the initial choice of metropolitan regions in which to build the green-belts was crucial to the success of the experiment.

The decision to locate one of the proposed Greenbelt Towns near Cincinnatiwas made only after careful consideration of the development of the nation'slargest ioo cities between 1900-1933. Such economic factors as number ofpersons employed in manufacturing, wholesale and retail sales, and unem-ployment typified the type of criteria used. Non-economic factors such aspopulation growth, the shortage of housing, enlightened labor policies, posi-tive civic attitude, and accessibility of cleared land near industry also helpeddetermine the sites.11

Cincinnati fit the greenbelt criteria very well. The Resettlement Adminis-tration was interested in locating its communities near stable cities. Economicand demographic data on Cincinnati demonstrated the city's stability. Govern-ment officials noted an upward growth trend, diversified manufacturing, and a"well-known civic consciousness" demonstrated by the charter reform move-ment of the twenties.12 Vacant land was also located north of the city, near theindustrial Mill Creek Valley. Although the city appeared to be recovering fromthe Depression, a housing shortage still existed. According to a governmentsurvey, the housing industry within the city was at a standstill, and the numberof houses declined between 1932-1934. A local housing survey noted more than8,000 dwellings were needed. And the hard times were not just limited to thebuilding trades since Hamilton County reported 67,500 individual relief casesas of October 1, 1935.13.

The Cincinnati metropolitan area passed one final test after some govern-ment engineers visited the city and recommended its selection. On July 15,1935 the metropolis became one of five within the nation to be chosen for theGreenbelt program. Only three projects would be completed.14

Since President Franklin Roosevelt's chief concern centered on increasing

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employment, he specified that the $31,000,000 allocated for the greenbeltproject could be granted only if all the necessary land was acquired and workstarted by December 15, 1935. This stipulation, given in September to speedup the creation of new jobs, caused much hardship for the project planners.Despite the pressure, they nearly met the goal. On December 16, work startednear the community of Mt. Healthy for the Greenhills project.15

Secrecy, not publicity, marked the early activities of the Greenbelt Project.Having already experienced the ideological and partisan wrath of opponentsof the WPA slum clearance projects, the federal government's decision to as-sume a low profile until the projects were begun seemed logical. Although theCincinnati Enquirer reported as early as October 12 that the area was chosenfor a greenbelt community, the official announcement did not appear untilthe next month.

What made government secrecy so important was its need to secure landoptions from nearby residents. Premature disclosure of the true identity behindthe options would: (1) probably cause land holders to inflate their prices; (2)give opponents of the project time to organize and prevent the transfer of land.Commenting later on this situation in his "Land Acquisition Report of Green-hills Project," Tilford E. Dudley suggested that Greenhills was built becausesecrecy was maintained during the important negotiations. Just the oppositehad happened at Bound Brook, New Jersey, where premature publicity pro-moted early opposition which successfully destroyed the project.16

If local officials had strenuously opposed the Greenbelt Town Program,Greenhills would never have been built. Before the Resettlement Administra-tion started acquiring land, Warren J. Vinton, of the Research Section, con-sulted with C. A. Dykstra, City Manager of Cincinnati, and Myron Downes,engineer of both the City Planning Commission and the Hamilton CountyRegional Planning Commission. Dykstra assured the Resettlement Adminis-tration that the project would be welcomed in Cincinnati and would receivewidespread support. Downes also agreed that the project would not conflictwith the Regional Plan of Hamilton County and emphasized his belief that itwould provide needed housing.17 The importance of gaining the cooperationof the planning commission was demonstrated when a dispute with the St.Louis planners actually aborted their Greenbelt project.

The other important contact involved securing a real estate agent to handlethe secret land transactions. The only agency within Cincinnati large enoughto help the government was the Frederick A. Schmidt Real Estate Company.Walter S. Schmidt, the company's president, had a reputation for opposinggovernment housing and this worried the Resettlement Administration, butit nevertheless contacted him. Had Schmidt opposed the secret project andleaked his knowledge of the subject to the local press, Greenhills might neverhave been built. Fortunately, his conviction that it was a worthy experimentallowed him to give full cooperation. As a result, his agents started securing

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land options on September 19, 1935.18

One other important early contact was made by the Resettlement Adminis-tration. Their choice of Alfred Bettman as their local legal adviser providedthem not only with a capable lawyer, but with the services of the city's na-tionally respected planner. Bettman, as chairman of the City Planning Com-mission and a member of the Regional Commission, was in a key place tohelp the Greenbelt project. As early as October, 1935, Bettman was advisingLansill concerning important issues. He would remain throughout the project'sdevelopment, one of its strongest supporters.19

By choosing a city such as Cincinnati with a national reputation for pro-gressive city planning and housing, the federal planners encountered littleopposition on the governmental level. Despite charges to the contrary, thefederal government only committed itself to a project after local officialsagreed to cooperate. Particularly attractive in Cincinnati was an impressivenumber of planning and housing professionals such as Alfred Bettman andBleecker Marquette, executive secretary of the Better Housing League, whowould not only be helpful to the federal planners as consultants, but whosesupport would be useful in countering negative public opinion once the projectwas publicly announced.20

Rumors, falsehoods and uncertainties best describe the initial reaction tothe early reports that a government Greenbelt project would be built nearby.The strongest opposition to the project came from those enterprises that weretied to the private housing business and feared that federal interference wouldsomehow hurt their well-being. As early as October 24, 1935, the building andloan associations wired Rexford G. Tugwell, protesting the project. They par-ticularly objected to their inability to obtain accurate information concerningthe program.21

Other organizations also protested the aura of mystery surrounding theproject. The Real Estate Board of Directors called for the Resettlement Ad-ministration to make a complete statement of its plans and purposes for thelocal housing project. The directors noted that they would "look with disfavorupon the project" until they knew more about it. Not only had the close-mouthed nature of the project been unfair to local land owners, they charged,but it threatened the very tenets of local self-government. James P. Mulford,President of the Cincinnati Real Estate Board, wrote Tugwell a letter demand-ing complete information on the Mt. Healthy project, emphasizing that it hadcaused "a great disturbance in Cincinnati."22

Another group opposing the settlement included suburban residents locatednear to the proposed town site, who worried about the possible negative impactsuch a development would have on their property values. Even more important,they feared the resettlement of blacks in their area. One local merchant con-tended that

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They will bring people from the congested West End of Cincinnati to livehere and when these people use the woodwork and banisters in the newhomes for firewood, they will go back to Cincinnati. Mt. Healthy does notwant any mushroom booms.23

The likelihood of black resettlement in the Mt. Healthy project seemedlogical, since the city had just begun its first urban renewal project (LaurelHomes) in the slums. Business Week added momentum to the rumor by re-porting on October 19 that

A $10 million project at Mt. Healthy, Cincinnati, is planned to providehomes for the 1500 Negro families turned out of "the Basin" where HaroldIckes has undertaken a $6.5 million slum clearance project.24

Local opposition against the project became so intense over the race issuethat Congressman William Hess felt obliged to call a meeting in early Novem-ber to discuss the unannounced project. He emphasized that the plans had notbeen completed for the project which would house the "low income class" andasked those protesting to be patient until final plans were released.25 Laterthat same month, Alfred Miller, the regional director of the project, visitedCincinnati and met with residents of Mt. Healthy, the closest city to the project,and denied that the project was to be exclusively for Negroes.26

The visit failed to placate the suburban citizens who continued to hold nightlymeetings in early November to formulate plans of protest against the project.Charles Eisen, a former councilman of College Hill, predicted that such meet-ings would continue until the government assured the people that "certainrumors are unfounded." On November 11, the citizens voted to oppose andprotest the government's "underhanded affair and an underhanded way ofhandling the project," emphasizing their own lack of say in the project.27

After early protests to Washington failed, disgruntled citizens focused onlocal government. Such action was probably based on the assumption thatstrong resistance from local officials would impede the federal project. As earlyas November 6, the Taxpayers Association of Hamilton County sent a com-munication to L. B. Blakemore, the Clerk of Cincinnati Council, protesting theResettlement project. Observing that it would "hamper private constructionprojects" and would "hurt real estate values," the letter stressed that the Councilshould study all available plans and communicate with Washington.28 Severaldays later, Charles Eisen, an attorney representing five subdivisions near theproposed project, sent a letter to Cincinnati Mayor Russell Wilson, urging himand the Council to consider protests against the Mt. Healthy project since therewas "no social and economic need for this project." Certainly Hamilton County,which was an "industrious, beautiful and home-loving community," could pro-vide for its own.29

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INFORMATION FOR THE FHESS

United States Department of Agriculture

RELEASE FOR PUBLICATIONJANUARY 26, 1938, P.M. PAPERS WASHINGTON, D. C.

Special Note to Correspondents; This information i sbeing supplied to newspapers and press a s soc ia t ionsin Cinc inna t i , Ohio, fo r re l ease in the afternoonpapers on Wednesday, January 26. I t i s herewithmade ava i l ab l e to Washington correspondents fortheir information,

FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONANNOUNCES GRBENHILLS RENTALS

The 676 residential units in G-reenhills, suburban housing project of the

Farm Security Administration, United States DepaHfent of Agriculture, five miles

north of the Cincinnati city limits, will be available to families of the moderate

income group at an average basic rent of $5.52 per room per month, i t was announced

today.

Starting at a-minimum of $18.00 per month for a one-bedroom apartment, and

topped by a rent of $42,00 for a four-bedroom, single-family dwelling, this average

monthly basic rent will be $27.62.

The Greenhills project is divided into the following housing units:

112 one-bedroom apartnents40 two-bedroon apartnents18 single-family detached four-bedroon dwellings6 single-family detached three-bedroom dwellings

500 family units in group dwellings(in the group dwellings are 260 two-bedroom units, 208 have

^ three bedrooms and 32 have four bedroons)676 units in Greenhills project

There is diversity of room arrangements and exterior design. All houses

have hardwood floors, copper plumbing, modern kitchens and baths, and large closet

space. All are thoroughly insulated and the group dwelling have sound-proofed

walls. •1162-38

The objectives of the management in determiningthe rents were: (i) To make the homes in Greenhillsavailable to families of moderate income. (2) Toderive sufficient revenue to meet the costs of operat-ing and maintaining the buildings and projectfacilities. Analysis of registration cards of familiesinterested in living in Greenhills disclosed that theaverage income was $1,650 a year.

Many of the project's most vocal opponents appeared at the County Com-missioner's Meeting on November 20, 1935. The Cincinnati Times-Star re-ported that over 100 people attended the meeting and that "many comments ofa caustic nature were hurled by some of the speakers as they spoke of the'experimentation' by the Government officials." The Taxpayers Associationprotested that the project constituted "a menace to Hamilton County's self-government and the rights of citizens," while the Board of Real Estate arguedthat the project would not only wreck the building industry, but cause anexodus from the city since 1500 families would leave their present dwellings.30

And Randolph Sellers, the Secretary of the Property Owners Association, be-lieved a conspiracy was involved. Professor Tugwell, Sellers charged,

looked over the country and found that Cincinnati and this county werein pretty good shape. Now he wants to put us in the same position as theothers throughout the country. The result will be that values will drop andmortgage companies will go to the wall.31

Finally, the Greater Cincinnati Savings and Loan Exchange urged the Com-missioners to require specific plans from the Resettlement Administration be-fore allowing any construction to begin. As a result of the meeting, the countyofficials requested that a Resettlement Administration representative appear atthe Board's meeting on November 27, to answer questions concerning theproject.32

Although the Resettlement Administration declined this request, its officialannouncement of the housing settlement on November 25 signaled the be-ginning of its impressive campaign to sell Greenhills to the metropolitan area.The formal announcement of its Greenbelt project for Cincinnati emphasizedthat the land would remain on the tax duplicate; that over 7,000 local menwould be employed; that the government would turn the project over to a localauthority after its completion; and that officials would work closely with nearbylocal governments so that Greenhills would be a "normal American town."33

Albert L. Miller, the senior administrative officer in charge of Greenhills, ob-served that the project was a "model to encourage the same kind of develop-ments with private capital." Miller also noted that the ten million dollar projectwould provide homes for about 1,500 wage earners. He also confidently told thepress that once the full nature of the project was known, opposition would meltaway since "all thinking Cincinnatians will approve rather than condemn theproject."34

Unfortunately, the full scope of the government's project was not imme-diately made known. The government was still fuzzy on who would live there(i.e. if Blacks would) or how the project would pay local taxes. Except for theacknowledgement that it would be like a garden city, few actual town planswere announced. Even if they had been, some ideological objections would haveremained.

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Probably the most repeated argument against Greenhills after the officialannouncement related to the danger of a new federal-urban relationship inwhich the local unit would lose its autonomy. Part of this argument was prag-matic and specific. Organizations such as the Greater Cincinnati Savings andLoan Association, the Taxpayers Association of Hamilton County, the CivicClub, and the Chamber of Commerce opposed the project in part because theyfeared that the 5,000 acres of federally owned land would be taken off theHamilton County tax duplicates. Such fears appeared justified, since underlaw local government could not tax federally owned land. Alternatives to localtaxation, known as payments in lieu of taxes, had not been sanctioned by thecourts yet.35

The other aspect of that argument was more speculative and political.W. Ray Skirvin, Chairman of the Housing Committee of the Greater CincinnatiSavings and Loan Exchange, typified this argument when he called Greenhills"an attempt to create a socialistic community."36 The Chamber of Commercealso opposed the project and charged the Resettlement Administration withfostering "subsidy and paternalism."3? A special committee of the Civic Clubreviewed the project and reported that it was unalterably opposed to govern-ment owned tenant houses which denied home ownership. In fact, the wholenotion of a government owned community sounded dangerous. "This is a proj-ect," the committee's report warned, "which strikes at the fundamentals ofAmerican institutions and well-being." The federal government was wrong toturn its back on the American tradition of home ownership and to

. . . look to other nations for an example of land slavery and a return tothe feudal system wherein the citizen becomes a pawn of the state. . . .Private ownership of land has been our heritage and to this America owesher greatness.38

Despite the protest of those opposing the greenbelt project because it conflictedwith private interest or ideology, some groups supported the scheme. Theprestigious Cincinnatus Association, a leading civic organizaton, approved theResettlement project. Not only would it provide needed housing, but certainindustries would benefit during the construction period since most of the ap-propriated ten million dollars would be spent in Cincinnati. The associationalso contended that the majority of people in Mt. Healthy "are whole heartedlyin favor of it."39

Other civic organizations, including the Better Housing League, the city'sleading housing reform organization which had long advocated qualityhousing for the workingman; the Woman's City Club, an important civic as-sociation which identified public housing as answering a serious need; and theFederation of Churches, another organization sympathetic to the plight of thepoor, supported the project for altruistic motives.

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Labor, as exemplified by the Cincinnati Building Trade's Council endorse-ment, became one of the most vocal supporters of the project which wouldemploy thousands at union wages and provide needed housing for the labor-ing man. Another backer of Greenhills, the local Veterans of Foreign Wars,also had self interest in mind when supporting the greenbelt town. Many of itsmembers had returned from World War I to face a severe housing shortage,which for some had never ended. The building of low cost homes would greatlybenefit veterans.40

The appearance of Rexford Tugwell in Cincinnati on February 3, 1936, todiscuss Greenhills, encouraged even greater public reception of the project.Speaking before over 600 Cincinnatians at the annual dinner of the RegionalPlanning Commission, Tugwell asked his audience "to give us active coopera-tion." He also warned Greenhills' enemies that the project was too far along "tocause us to change them despite any opposition which has arisen or may arise."Tugwell chided those same opponents by asking

Where are those impulses—being good sports, helping the underdog, allthat—are you willing to sacrifice them all to save the interests of an inter-ested few? I don't believe it. I believe the great body of your citizens,unvocal as they may be, will still sense the rights and wrongs involvedhere.41

Tugwell also discussed the philosophy of the Greenbelt project and laid outits details, emphasizing the uniqueness of this urban-rural project. Greenhillswould not just be a housing development, but a complete community withschools, stores, and churches. Its tenants, who would be chosen by a local ad-visory board, could experience the best of two worlds here, working in the city,but living in a beautiful small town protected by a greenbelt.42

The project would be expensive simply because it was not only providinghomes, but supplying relief. Tugwell also told the audience that Greenhillswould pay both state and local taxes. Furthermore, the federal governmentwould avoid any appearance of excessive interference and manipulation inlocal affairs.43

Although criticism of the project persisted after Tugwell's visit, the intensityand visibility of such opposition lessened. The Cincinnati Enquirer, which hadearlier opposed Greenhills, was symptomatic of the more receptive mood towardthe project by the public following the talk. On February 5, it editorialized that

Considered simply as an experiment in this restricted field, an experimentcalculated to pave the way for non-profit housing enterprises to serve thisspecific need, the several current schemes of the Resettlement Admin-istration have much to commend.44

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Both the Times-Star and Enquirer dislikedsome of the buildings, particularly the flat-roofed asphalt apartments "looking for all theworld like ill-designed army barracks." Charles

Taft, a staunch supporter of the project, sug-gested that the town's biggest problem was itsfailure to take care of the people it hadoriginally been designed for.

By April 3, the once hostile Enquirer even gave the project its conditional ap-proval. Civic boosterism overcame ideological conflict as the paper noted that

The entry of the Federal Government into the housing business is a dubi-ous undertaking. But that decision having been made, it is desirable thatCincinnati should have the benefits of the financial outlay.43

Only the Cincinnati Times-Star remained completely hostile to the project intothe spring of 1936.

Except for occasional outbursts from the project's old nemesis, the buildingand loan association and the realtors, whose spokesman, Randolph Sellers,voiced their fears over "the complete domination of business affairs by gov-ernment," the initial public reaction crisis had passed.46 Only occasional pro-tests now got newspaper coverage.

The project had weathered the initial adverse reactions. Neither the forcesof self-interest nor conservatism were able to halt the government's efforts byrallying public opposition. The Resettlement Administration was successfullyable to counter the bad publicity with its own effective propaganda. Yet theproject still faced numerous obstacles before becoming a reality. The approvalof the Regional Planning Commission and the successful arrangement for pub-lic utilities were the next goals for the Greenhills planners. Because of RegionalPlan requirements the federal government was forced to deal with the RegionalPlanning Commission several times during the project's construction. Thenature of the Greenhills plan dictated a revision in the county's thoroughfareplan. On May 28, 1936, the revisions were unanimously approved by theCommission.47

At the same meeting, the Commission voted on the acceptance of Greenhills'preliminary plans for its first subdivision. Mr. Houston Coates, a Commissionmember representing the village of Wyoming, said he had discussed Greenhillswith the officials of his village and it was their feeling that the effect of theproject "would be deleterious to the village and Hamilton County." Alfred Bett-man answered him by noting that the issue was not one of passing on theadvisability of the project, but on whether or not it conformed to the adaptedplatting rules. The proposal passed five to one with only Coates voting againstit.48

The County Commissioners proved just as cooperative. Even before Tug-well's local talk, the Commissioners worked with the federal government bygranting permission for a temporary water line out to the project. By June,1936, the working relationship between the two had progressed so far thatthe Commissioners stopped making their usual mandatory inspections of theproject. Although the county officials occasionally challenged minor aspectsof the plan, their criticisms were of a technical and not political nature. The

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three commissioners with one major exception voted in unanimity when actingon the project.49

The only major controversial issue centered on a technical question involv-ing Greenhills' water supply. When the planners received high bids from thecity for supplying water, they decided to dig wells. This brought an immediateprotest from five communities in the Mill Creek Valley who feared that theirown water supply would be threatened by the new wells. Noting that the waterlevel for the area had dropped nineteen feet in the last six years, representa-tives from Reading, Arlington Heights, Lockland, Wyoming, and Glendaleurged the County Commissioners to disallow any new wells.50

Old resentments against the project were resurrected around the water ques-tion when Commissioner R. C. Campbell charged that the federal governmenthad threatened to withdraw its local WPA projects unless the county allowedthe wells. Campbell remained firm in his opposition, prophesying water short-ages for the established communities if the new wells were dug. Since anotherCommissioner also opposed the wells, the Resettlement Administration finallydropped its plans for them and renegotiated with the city for water.51 The twofinally agreed on terms but only after the federal government promised to laythe necessary pipeline for the project. Yet the impact of this confrontation leftits mark on Campbell, who failed to vote for Greenhills' incorporation in June,

I939-52

The Resettlement Administration secured many of the other Greenhillsutilities from Cincinnati companies. On September 16, 1936, it signed a con-tract with Cincinnati Gas and Electric to provide electricity. It was not so suc-cessful with the Cincinnati and Suburban Telephone Company which balkedat constructing an underground telephone system unless the governmentpromised to pay the costs above the normal overhead system. The two partiesfinally agreed to terms on March 5, 1937. Bus service was started on May 1,1937 (for the workers) by a newly formed bus company, despite the protestsfrom the larger Cincinnati Street Railway and Ohio Bus Line Companies. Ex-cept for these minor difficulties, the project secured its utilities and serviceswith a minimum of problems.53

Probably one of the severest challenges to Greenhills after February, 1936,came not from within the metropolitan community, but from the RepublicanNational Committee. It attacked Greenhills, charging that it was forced uponthe taxpayers of Cincinnati and nearby towns. The Republicans stressed thatthe project would subject its tenants to regimentation and control.54 AlfredBettman, member of the Planning Commission, answered the allegations bynoting that all the agencies of local government representing Hamilton Countyhad given the project assistance because the people wanted it. Fred Hock,President of the Building Trades Council, agreed and observed, "The only oneswho didn't want it were the cheap little chiseling contractors who have beenerecting homes which will fall apart in ten years."55

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The Cincinnati Post also stressed how ridiculous the charges were since"the local opposition to this federal project has not uttered a chirp for manymonths."56

Whatever developing consensus there might have been was threatened inearly October, 1936, with the announcement of political manipulation by S. W.Moulding, the Assistant Superintendent of Construction for Greenhills. Mould-ing was charged in an affidavit by Republican County Chairman Charles H.Elston of coercing workers into joining the Democratic Duckworth Club andpaying membership dues. Moulding was immediately suspended and even-tually dismissed "for engaging in political activities on a federal project."57

The Times Star reacted most vehemently against the episode, calling it "oneof the most amazing stories in the history of the county."58 For that paper atleast, the voter manipulation reaffirmed the evil nature of Greenhills.

The project is more than a blow to the manhood of needy workers. Thisabominable thing has been wished on Cincinnati from Washington. Itmust have been wished on other cities in similar fashion. Unless it isstruck down, it seems the death of the Republic.59

The other two local newspapers did not think the mistakes of one manthreatened the Republic or the city. The Enquirer, while noting that the Green-hills political scandal might have significance on the national campaign, didnot attack the local greenbelt project. Nor did the Post use the Moulding affairto question the necessity of Greenhills.60 These papers were probably moretypical of the public response since no new organizations appeared to protestand fight the town development.

By the fall of 1937, then, the idea of Greenhills had been accepted by theCincinnati metropolitan community. Although the Times-Star still questionedthe project in its editorials and the Property Owners Association still publicizedits objection to the concept, no serious effort was made to halt the nearlyfinished town. Probably an important reason for this development was the veryreal economic benefits the community had gained. More than five milliondollars alone had been paid to local workers on the project. As early as June,1936, local officials had recognized the important economic advantages of theproject. In the midst of a rumor concerning Greenhills' fate, they had writtenHarry Hopkins warning that the cessation of the project would cause "a severedisturbance of the local relief situation."6!

Another reason that the project gained so much local support was that fed-eral officials were able to publicize effectively the benefits of Greenhills. AlbertMiller, the regional coordinator, spent much of his time lecturing to numerouscivic organizations. He reminded his listeners that the area would benefit bothfrom the increased payroll and that the new homes would remedy local con-

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gestion.62 Bruce Martin, the project advisor, was specifically charged with pro-moting good publicity for the new town. As a result, by 1937, a well-oiledpropaganda machine dominated the public's attention concerning Greenhills.

Another factor which aided public acceptance of Greenhills was that federalofficials appeared sensitive to local suggestions. All along, federal spokesmenemphasized that Greenhills was to be no "federal island," but an integral partof the community. Even before actual construction ever started, extensivesurveys were taken of prospective residents, asking them about their prefer-ences in building styles. These data may have influenced the architecture ofthe town.63

On January 7, 1938, an advisory board of Greenhills was established to helpthe Farm Security Agency (which had replaced the R. A.) in formulatingmanagement policies at Greenhills reflecting "the representative viewpoint ofCincinnati citizens." The impressive membership list included local govern-ment officials such as Charles Taft, Charles Merrell, and Alfred Bettman, alongwith other important local dignitaries including the Assistant County Super-intendent of Schools, a union leader, and the Executive Secretary of the Fed-eration of Churches.64

Probably no single transaction did more to make the new community ac-ceptable than when the project began paying "taxes." On July 1,1936, PresidentRoosevelt signed a bill authorizing the Resettlement Administration to payservice charges in lieu of property taxes, thus assuring local officials that newrevenue would be coming. The bill also waived exclusive federal jurisdictionover Greenhills. Alfred Miller quickly recognized the importance of this act."In these two provisions the bill sweeps away the two principal objections thathave been raised by the minority here that opposed the project."65 By Septem-ber 15, 1937, the Enquirer was able to»report that the government actually hadpaid "taxes" on Greenhills.66

Even with the apparent victory over the critics of the project, federal author-ities still had one major hurdle—attracting tenants to Greenhills. Alhough thou-sands visited the project, suggesting that public interest (or at least curiosity)was high, the actual number of applicants for the model community wasrelatively low. Under the headlines "Greenhills Apartments Going Begging,"the Enquirer reported that by February 18, 1938, only 1,269 n ad applied forhomes. This was a thousand less than had applied during the same time periodat Greendale, Greenhills' twin project in Wisconsin.6?

Miss Martha F. Allen, Farm Security Supervisor at Greenhills, explained theapparent lack of interest by blaming Cincinnati's conservative nature. Manypotential tenants decided against applying, according to Allen, once they dis-covered that the stoves were electric instead of gas. She also observed thatCincinnati did not have much of a floating population to settle.68

In a letter to Alfred Bettman several months later, Carleton F. Sharpe alsocomplained that registrations were not as rapid as expected. He laid much of

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the blame on the "ridiculous rumors pervading the city" about the project.69

Later, he devoted an entire lecture on these rumors in a talk to the SocialWorkers Club entitled "Myths of Greenhills." Most of the rumors emphasizedthe supposed regimentation within the new town. Others, however, were soabsurd as to suggest that the project was really a disguised army cantonmentor that those living in Greenhills would be the first drafted in a nationalemergency.70

The initial occupation of Greenhills occurred April i, 1938 and was a majorpublicity event in Cincinnati. The Post, giving extensive front page coverageto the move, heralded the "pioneer" families of Greenhills. By February, 1939,the town was completed with about a ninety percent occupancy level. All oneand two bedroom apartments were filled and had extensive waiting lists.Greenhills, the federal town, was now a full-fledged member of the Cincinnatimetropolitan area.71

Despite the generally favorable publicity concerning the new community,some opposition remained. The Times Star expressed disgust not only withthe idea of Greenhills, but with its physical development. The newspaperobserved that

Instead of the comely rustic village we had thought of, we saw the oncebeautiful countryside desecrated, and on its tortured surface a confusedjumble of box-like shades, looking for all the world like ill-designed armybarracks. It was disillusioning J2

The Enquirer also disliked some of the buildings, particularly the flat-roofedasphalt apartments which "would look well in an army camp.73

A more telling criticism of Greenhills came from Charles Taft, a formersupporter of the project. He suggested that the biggest problem with the green-belt town was its failure to take care of the people it had been originally de-signed for. Minimum incomes were too high, credit ratings too strict, and thescreening process so stringent that the really needy were shut out of Green-hills. 74

The Cincinnati Enquirer expressed the same concern, wondering why resi-dents were coming from Hyde Park and Westwood rather than "the West Endor the flood ridden areas of the eastern part of the city." According to the paper,the average annual pay of the Greenhills resident was $1689 and more thanseventy-five percent of those buying homes were in the same income bracket. 75Therefore, such government activity really did threaten private development.The Enquirer noted that "Certainly many Greenhills residents are potentialowners who are not buying homes because they are getting more for theirmoney from the big hearted federal government."76 The same article also ob-served the high number of craftsmen, salesmen, and professionals living inthe project.

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Much of the Enquirer's criticism centered on the way Greenhills had beenpackaged. When Tugwell visited the city, he promised a project which wouldnot only help clear the congested slums, but would present revolutionary ideasconcerning planning. Neither of these goals had been achieved. Even worse,the project would be subsidized by federal monies.77

If some of the physical and social characteristics of Greenhills were openfor criticism, others were not. The government's push to achieve a sense ofcommunity within the project proved successful as manifested by the numer-ous committees and organizations which appeared. During the town's twoyear anniversary celebration, the community manager, C. F. Sharpe, partic-ularly keyed in on this unique aspect of the town. He noted that citizens whowere just "one in a thousand" in Cincinnati were able to participate in dozensof activities in Greenhills that they never could have in the big city.78

An important phase of Greenhills was completed on August 30, 1939, whenthe town's charter of incorporation was approved in Columbus. Incorporationproceedings took over a year and a half and included numerous governmentauthorities, such as the County Commissioners, the Regional Planning Com-mission, and the Secretary of State.79 The project had finally become a politicalentity.

Looking back on the entire greenbelt program, historians have tended toemphasize the negative local reception of the federal town building experi-ments. Yet the Greenhills experience suggests a more complex picture. Al-though the project was given a controversial reception particularly by certainspecial interest groups and others fearful of too much federal interference inlocal affairs, the project ultimately gained much acceptance within the metro-politan community.

The greenbelt town, conceived in Washington and implemented by federalofficials, did in fact, receive endorsement and support from many local officialssuch as the county commissioners, the city manager, and the city's planningboard. Eager for the new town to be accepted not only by these few but by theentire metropolitan community, federal officials dedicated themselves to abid-ing by "community standards" in their new town. As a result, the suburbantown project which had been planned for the needy, ignored the neediest.Although the two chief administrators of the greenbelts, Rexford G. Tugwelland Will W. Alexander, believed in equal benefits for blacks, prejudice pre-vailed and blacks were excluded from Greenhills. The new town of Greenhillswas completed, in part, because federal officials compromised and respondedto local demands. Yet this process watered down the government's revolutionaryprogram in town and social planning so that it was not very revolutionary. Thetown stands today as one of many bedroom suburbs, perhaps prettier than itsneighbor, but otherwise hardly distinguishable.

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ROBERT B. FAIRBANKS, a doctoral student at the University of Cincinnati, pre-sented this paper at the Society's fourth history symposium and received theLiterary Club prize for best paper.

(1) Quoted in Mark I. Gelf and, A Nation ofCities: The Federal Government and UrbanAmerica, 1933-1965 (New York, 1975),P- 133-(2) Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a NewWorld: The New Deal Community Program(Ithaca, New York, 1959), p. 305.(3) Joseph L. Arnold, The New Deal in theSuburbs: A History of the Greenbelt TownProgram: 1935-1954 (Columbus, Ohio,I97i),p. 191.

(4) Gelf and, Nation of Cities, p. 134. An-other quote supposedly about the greenbeltproject and first cited by Arthur M.Schlesinger, Jr. reads "we were doomed tofailure from the start." Schlesinger also em-phasized how Tugwell stressed the hostileenvironment, the reactionary press andpulpit, and the failure of the participants tofully commit themselves to make the projectwork. Tugwell did make these statementsin his foreword to Edward C. Banfield'sbook Government Project as cited bySchlesinger, but he did not write them aboutthe greenbelt project. Rather, these remarkswere Tugwell's appraisal of a rural reha-bilitation project in Casa Grande, Arizona,undertaken by his Resettlement Adminis-tration during 1935-36. See Arthur M.Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Vol.2: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston,1959), P- 37i; Edward C. Banfield, Govern-ment Project (Glencoe, 111., 1951), p. 11.(5) Conkin, Tomorrow a New World,pp. 61-64.(6) Quoted in Mel Scott, American CityPlanning Since 1890 (Los Angeles, 1969),p. 250.(7) Ibid. pp. 223,338.(8) John S. Lansill, "Final Report of theGreenhills Project of the Greenbelt TownProgram: 1948, "John S. Lansfill Papers,University of Kentucky Library, Lexington,Ky.(9) Ibid.(10) Cincinnati Enquirer, January 8, 1936.

(11) "Greenhills—idea, execution and de-velopment of Greenhills as authorized bythe Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, Cin-cinnati and Washington: 1935-39" (Green-hills Papers) Cincinnati Historical Society;U.S. Farm Security Administration, InterimReport of the Resettlement Administration(Washington, 1936), p. 18.(12) Warren J. Vinton, "Report on Cincin-nati, Ohio and the Selection of a Site for aSuburban Resettlement," Lansill Papers.(13 ) Albert Miller, "Greenhills: The Re-settlement Administration's Low RentCommunity Near Cincinnati, Ohio,"Speech delivered to Citizens Committee onSlum Clearance and Low Rent Housing,June 24, 1936, Greenhills Papers.(14) The other two completed projects wereGreendale, Wisconsin (Milwaukee) andGreenbelt, Maryland (Washington, D.C.).(15) Arnold, New Deal in the Suburbs,p. 42.

(16) Tilford E. Dudley, "Land AcquisitionReport of Greenhills Project," LansillPapers.(17) Vinton, "Selection of Site," LansillPapers.(18) Dudley, "Land Acquisition Project,"Lansill Papers.(19 ) Letter, Alfred Bettman to John S.Lansill, Oct. 7, 1935, Alfred BettmanPapers, University of Cincinnati Library.(20) Letter, Albert L. Miller to Alfred Bett-man, May 14, 1936, Bettman Papers; BetterHousing League, Board of Directors Min-utes, Jan. 30,1936, p. 2, BHL Papers,University of Cincinnati Libary.(21) Lansill, "Final Report," Lansill Papers.(22) Enquirer, November 5, 1935, Novem-ber 8, 1935; Cincinnati Post, November 5,1935-(23) Enquirer, November 12, 1935.(24) Business Week, October 19,1935,p. 29.(25) The fears were not allayed when alocal man, Herbert Faber, reported that he

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had talked with Tugwell's assistant, Wil-liam Alexander, who noted that the Negroeswould have to find new homes once theWest End slum clearance project gotunderway. Enquirer, November 2, 1935.

(26) Enquirer, November 10, 1935.(27) Ibid. November 12, 1935.(28) Ibid. November 7, 1935.

(29) Ibid. November 14, 1935.(30) Cincinnati Times-Star, November 20,

1935-(31) Enquirer, November 21, 1935.

(32) Hamilton County, Ohio, Board of

County Commissioners Minutes, November

20, 1935, P- 301.

(33) Enquirer, November 26, 1935.(34) Ibid.(35) Enquirer, November 2, 1935; Novem-ber 27, 1935; Cincinnati Post, November

25, 1935-(36) Ibid., November 27, 1935.

(37) Enquirer, January 24, 1936.

(38) Times-Star, January 1, 1936.

(39) Ibid., January 8, 1936.

(40) U.S. Department of Agriculture, Press

Release, January 26, 1936, Greenhills

Papers; Enquirer, January 24, 1936.(41) Rexford G. Tugwell, Address to Re-

gional Planning Commission Dinner, Feb-

ruary 3, 1936. Bettman Papers; Enquirer,

February 4, 1936.

(42) Tugwell, Address at Planning

Commission.

(43) Enquirer, February 4, 1936.

(44) Editorial Enquirer, April 3, 1936.(45) Enquirer, April 3, 1936.

(46) Times-Star, February 6, 1936.(47) Hamilton County, Ohio, Minutes of the

Regional Planning Commission, May 28,

1936, p. 9-(48) Ibid., p. 11.

(49) Commissioner's Minutes, January 22,

1936, p. 434.

(50) Ibid., June 10, 1936, p. 142; Times-

Star, August 12, 1936.

(51) Enquirer, August 22, 1936; August

13, 1936.

(52) Ibid., April 13, 1939-(53) Justin R. Hartzoz, "Summary Reportof Characteristics of Residential Plans Sub-

mitted for Approval, March 11, 1936,

"Lansill Papers; Enquirer, March 24, 1937.

(54) Post, September 24, 1936.(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid. September 25, 1936.

(57) Enquirer, October 16, 1936; Post,

October 15,1936.

(58) Editorial, Times-Star, October 9, 1936.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Enquirer, October 10, 1936.

(61) Post, June 9,1936.

(62) Miller, "Greenhills: Low Rent Com-

mittee," Greenhills Papers.

(63) Hartzog, "Summary Report of Charac-

teristics," Lansill Papers.

(64) Post, January 7,1938.

(65) Times-Star, July 1, 1936.

(66) Enquirer, September 15, 1937.

(67) Enquirer, February 18, 1938.(68) Post, February 18, 1938.

(69) Letter, C.F. Sharpe to Alfred Bettman,

April 14, 1938, Bettman Papers.

(70) Enquirer, April 22, 1938.

(71) Ibid., February 21, 1939.

(72) Editorial, Times-Star, October 4, 1937.

(73) Enquirer, February 21, 1939.(74) Ibid.

(75) Ibid.

(76) Ibid.

(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid., April 1,1940.

(79) Ibid., August 30, 1939.

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