circassian world · 2016. 12. 2. · created date: 12/25/2005 6:07:11 pm

R U S S I A

A N D H E R C O L O N I E S

B Y

W A L T E R K O L A R Z

ARCHON BOOKS,

1967

REPRINTED 1967 VITH PERMISSIoN

UNALTERED AND UNABRIDGED

FROM THE THIRD EDITION OF 19 '3

LIBRARY oF CoNGRESS CA,TALoG Cann Nuunrn: 67-T)926PntNreo rN THE UNITED STATES oF AMERICA

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P R E F A C E

The word'colonies' is employed in this book as a common denominatorfor a large number of territories which enjoy either leg_ally or factuallya speciai status within Soviet Russia. 'Colonies' are first of all thoseethnically non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. which, although notseparated from the metropolitan country by sea, have a status similar to

that of the overseas dependencies of any other power. These Russian

colonies are situated in Asia, on the fringes of Europe and Asia and inthe Far North.

The term 'colonies' is also extended to European countries orcountries of predominantly European culture like the Ukraine, the

Baltic States, Georgia or Armenia which have been reduced to colonialstatus by enforced dependence on the Moscow Government. Finally, asan exception rather than as a rule, the word 'colonies' is also used in itsoriginal sense for areas of settlement, mostly in. reference to the

colonization by Slavs of practically uninhabited territories.No Soviet writer would speak of 'colonies' or of 'colonial policy'

when describing the relationship between Moscow and the non-Russianpeoples of the U.S.S.R. He would refer to natsionalnayq pglttikawniin is usually translated into English as 'nationalities policy'. Thisbook uses 'nationalities policy' and 'colonial policy' in roughly the

same sense. This does not mean that 'nationality' and 'colony' areidentical. A colony is a territory and a nationality an ethnic group.Two or more nationalities may form part of one colony. In Soviet Russiaitself two contradictory definitions of the word 'nationality' have beenadvanced. Some Marxist-Leninist theoreticians have maintained that a'nationality' is on a lower level of development than a 'nation'. Accord-ing to this explanation the Ukrainians, for instance, would be a 'nation'

and the peoples of Daghestan only 'nationalities'. In the day_-to-daywork of the All-Union Communist Party and of the Soviet Govern-ment this distinction is not recognized and all non-Russian peoples ofthe Soviet Union are identified as 'nationalities'.

The colonial problem of Russia cannot be viewed in isolation fromthe colonial problem presenting itselfin other parts ofthe globe, for thestruggle for the fulfilment of national aspirations among the colonial

:-'oples has proceeded everywhere on a similar pattern. This struggle,.n be observed more easily in British, French or American colonies or: 'r.-colonies than in the non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. which.:i3 cut off from almost every contact with the non-communist world.I',-ur lessons may be drawn from the general trend in the colonial:.-rritories outside the Soviet Union.

First, the more advanced dependent peoples will appreciate material.,.'hievements only if such go hand-in-hand with political progress,' e. if the colonial power encourages the growth of self-government.

Secondly, the peoples of the colonial territories in order to fulfil:heir national aspirations create political movements and ideologies--orresponding to their own national and tribal traditions and different:':.rm those of their Eurooean colonizers.

Thirdly, national aspiiations can be properly defined only if theirrlonies enjoy at least a certain measure of democracy and freedom of,iiscussion. This implies the coexistence within one colony of variousrolitical groups with diverging views about the way in which to advancelheir development towards self-government and national independence.

Fourthly, recognition of self-government as a desirable political aimon the part of a progressive colonial power does not mean uniimitedrecognition of all national aspirations of a colonial people. Nationalaspirations cease to be 'legitimate' if they aim at the oppression ofethnic and religious minority groups and if the colonial power has theobligation to protect these.

If one admits that the essence of a modern colonial policy lies in theencouragement of self-government, then every colonial system, includingthe so-called 'Soviet nationalities policy', must be judged on the basisof this fourfold standard.

I have therefore concentrated in this book on the question ofthe extentro which the government of the U.S.S.R. has assisied or hampered thelegitimate national aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Empire.This does not mean that I seek to belittle or to deny any of the materialachievements carried out by the Soviet Government in territoriesinhabited by non-Russian nationalities. I take them for granted as thebasis of discussion. My contention is, however, that the essence of acolonial policy and of the political system of which it is a part cannot beestimated by refr-rence solely to material achievements. The DnieperDam no more indicates that the Ukrainian oroblem has been solvedr l ran Hi t ler 's nrotor h ichuays indicated any r i r tue in German Nazism.The Main Turknrenian Canal will be no more oroof of the success ofSoviet colonial policv than the Trans-Siberian Railway line is proof ofrhe success of the Czarist r6gime.

My original plan u'as to describe the working of Soviet colonialpolicy throughout the U.S.S.R. Practical difficulties have compelled

P R E F A C B

me to leave out of account the Soviet colonial territories on the Facificcoast and in Eastern Siberia. These Far Eastern territories, borderingon China, Japan and the United States of America, form a specialgeopolitical entity and I intend to write a separate book on them. I

have made an exception in the case of the Autonomous Province ofBirobidzhan which as an area of Jewish settlement is given its naturalplace in the chapter 'The Jews - a people of the Soviet Union'.-

The problems connected with Soviet colonial policy are so vast thatI have had to limit my subject in a further direction also. In dealingat greater or lesser length with some forty Soviet colonies one cannothope to tell the full story. One can but give examples and mention themost typical features in the development of a given nationality whileomitting or summarizing the secondary aspects of it. It may appear thatI have done less than justice in this book to the Baltic peoples. Indeed,I have dealt with them only very briefly because events in the BalticStates have been a repetition of what happened earlier in other partsof the Soviet Empire. It seemed best to pay greater attention to thoseearlier events than to the repetition of them.

A word must be said about the sources used. I have employed as arule only Soviet sources, primarily newspapers, journals, textbooks andbroadcasts, and also novels, plays and poetry. With insignificant ex-ceptions, I have refrained from using any other material which mighthave bearing on my subject. In particular, I have avoided the very largeRussian 6migr6 literature, statements by refugees from the SovietUnion, reports by non-communist foreigners of their experiences inSoviet Russia and news items published under a Moscow dateline inthe press of Western countries.

Thus, as the book is based not on the testimonies of critics of theSoviet r6gime but on evidence emanating from the r6gime itself, severalimportant factors pertaining to Soviet colonial policy have not beentaken into consideration. Among these is the forced-labour system towhich the reader will find only passing references. The use of Sovietsources, which to be more precise are mostly Soviet sources in theRussian language, has also affected the spelling of non-Russian names.Except for well-known personalities and places I have transcribed thesenames from the Russian. I have even used the official Russianizedforms, for instance, Ibragimov instead of Ibrahim. This may beirritating for Orientalists but it is symbolic of the Russian preponderancein the U.S.S.R.

I am indebted to Mr. J. B. Birks, Miss Dorothy Davies andMiss Marjorie Nicholson for many valuable suggestions. Thanks arealso due to Dr. W. A. Morison for translations of Russian poetry andto Mrs' Nancy Feeny for compiling the index'

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C O N T E N T S

PREFACE

ChAPICT t RUSSIAN COLONIZATION ANDS O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y

The essence of Russian exPansionRussia's two historiesRussian anti-racialismThe Russian character of the October RevolutionThe Russian character of the Bolshevik PartyRussian colonization under the Soviet r6gime

Local nationalismC'Jnstitutional federalismSoviet BudgetarY centralismThe 'soviet of Nationalities'Fallacies of Soviet statistics

Chapter tr INNER RUSSIABorderland Russia and Inner Russia

I Tnr Tanrlns - A TEsr CAsEThe fight for the 'Volga-Ural State'The first 'AlPhabetic Revolution'The second'Alphabetic Revolution''Ideological struggles in war and post-war period

Tartars 'at home' and in diasPora

lI Blsnrlnra - Tnr Nsw Orr- Rlpunltc'Greater Bashkiria' against'Greater Tartaria'Bashkir national oPPositionBashkir oil

III Tnr Cnuvnsn - NlttoNArrsM wITHour PeN-rsu 46

IV 'Frr.tNIsn Russr.q,' 48

Mordvinians: seven centuries of RussificationMari: national-religious resistanceUdmurts: a 'capital' versus a people

Komi - the northern coal rePublic

page \

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32

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C O N T E N T S

V Tns INNtn NonrnThe administrative structureEconomic SovietizationNationalism in the Far NorthCultural assimilationThe eclipse of the native

CuAPICT I I I ' L IQUIDATED' PEOPLES

I THp RussraN GEnrraaNsThe origin of the Volga GermansGermans of South RussiaThe Germans in the Soviet UnionThe 'liquidation' of the Russian Germans

II TgE CnrureN Tlnr, lnsEmigration of the Crimean Tartars: 1j}4-191jCrimean Tartar nationalismThe Crimean Province

III KnluucxsUnder the Czarist r6gimeUnder Soviet rule

Chapter MHE NORTH-WESTERN BORDER 88

I Cslr, i-rNcr ro ScANDTNAvTA 88Challenge of historyThe mission of St. PetersburgThe Murmansk railwayKola peninsula and MurmanskPetsamoThe Lapp issue

II KlnElr l - Ttrr ScaNnrNAvrAN Sovrrr RrpusLrc 97Russification of the Karelian A.S.S.R_The Stalin CanalThe Karelian Isthmus - a new Russian orovinceThe 'annexation' of Kalevala

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II I Tur Baluc SovrEr Rrpunr-rcsTwo Russian methodsThe Baltic diaspora in the U.S.S.R.Balt ic in form - Russian in essenceLiquidation of minorities in the Baltic StatesSoviet EstoniaSoviet LatviaLithuania: both ally and victimRussian Koenigsberg

104

C O N T E N T S

Chapter V THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

I TnP UrurNr'Little Russia' and'New Russia'

Ukrainian diaspora in the U'S'S'R'

Russian diasPora in the Ukraine

Stalinist centralism versus Ukrainian autonomy

Communist irredenta and'Ukrainization' policy

The first PurgesThe SkryPnik affairThe 'Great Purge'Comintern and'Western Ukraine'

TranscarPathian UkraineCommunists an<l anti-communists in the Western

UkraineRussian policy and the Uniate Church

Ukrainian nationalism in the post-war period

The Ukraine as a factor in Soviet'world politics'

National minorities in the Ukraine

The 'Polish PolicY' of the Ukraine

II Sovrsr MolPnvraMoldavia as A.S.S'R'Moldavia as Soviet Republic

II I BYELoRUssIA 153

Soviet policy in Eastern ByelorussiaKolas and Kupala - Byelorussian leaders'Greater BYelorussia'

Chaprer VI THE JEWS - A PEOPLE OF THE

S O V I E T U N I O N 1 6 3

Jews in the Communist PartY

Political and religious persecution of Soviet Jewry

Soviet Jewry in the war and post-war period

The social transformation of Soviet Jewry

The eastward migration of Soviet Jews

Jewish agricultural coloniesThe choice of Birobidzhan as prospective 'Soviet

Jewish State'Kalinin Declaration versus Balfour Declaration

Jewish colonization in BirobidzhanBirobidzhan - success or failure?

Chapter \T I THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES 181

Russia and the CaucasusThe first exodus of the mountaineersThe administrative chaos in the Soviet Caucasus

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C O N T E N T S

The second exodus ofthe mountaineersContinuity of Russian Caucasus policy: the ChechensChechen-Ingush Moslem oppositionGrozny - the oil cityThe abolition of the Karachay provinceA .good' people _ the OssetinsRe€ducation of the KabardiniansThe Circassians _ a reserve of Soviet Middle East

policyRussia's most polyglot colony: DaghestanThe two faces of Soviet policy in DaghestanThe fight against the Shamil cultDaghestan's language problemDaghestani literaturc

Chapter VIII TRANSCAUCASIA 208Transcaucasia and Russian historyTranscaucasia and Russian Middle East policy

I AnurNnNs Zl2First Russian-Armenian contactsRussia _ ,protector' of ArmeniansThe Armenian S.S.R.Armenian diaspora and Soviet repatriation policyThe role of the Armenians in t}re Soviet UnionThe survival of Armenian nationalism

II GroncrnNs'Georgian-Russian

brotherhood'Menshevism versus BolshevismStalin's fight against .national' BolshevismThree Georgian communists : Ordzhonikidze.

Yenukidze, BeriyaGeorgia's economic and cultural missionGreater GeorgiaAbkhazia

III AzrnsarozgeN 237Baku - the oil cityThe Bolshevik BakuMulti-national BakuBaku and AzerbaidzhanThe Nationalist oppositionRussian-Azerbaidzhani cultural synthesisThe other Azerbaidzhan

IV TnaxscaucAsrAN MrNonrrrrs 247The AssyriansRussia and the Kurdish problem

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C O N T E N T S

Chapter X SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAThe conquestThe'national-territorial delimitation'The revolutionary role of Soviet Central Asia

The fieht against Central Asiatic unityThe Russians as 'elder brother'

I KezarnstlNSovietization of the Kazakh villageIndustrial colonizationThe struggle for the Kazakh soul

II KtncnrzrsraNRussian colonization'Russian march to victory'

III UzsrrrsrlxSamarkand and TashkentSoviet cotton PolicYIndustrialization and RussificationUzbek culture under tutelageMir Alishir Navoi - Soviet national hero

fV TlozntrrstlNTadzhikistan versus AfghanistanTadzhikistan and PersiaTadzhikistan and IndiaTadzhik national oPPosition

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270

274

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v rutrneNrsuN 29o

Turkmenistan's crucial problem - irrigationGreater TurkmenistanPolitical and linguistic oppositionPost-war oPPosition

VI Tnr MrNonrrlrs or Sovrsr CsNrnnl Aste 296

Uigurs and DungansBaluchisAn Arab'Birobidzhan'?

Chapter X SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AS A

woRLD PROBLEM 303

Soviet nationalities policy in Eastern EuropeSoviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy

The future of the PeoPles of Russia

INDEX

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M A P S

Soviet Central Asia and its neighbours Front enclpaperCaucasus, Transcaucasia and Turkey Front endpaperThe Western Marchlands of the Soviet Union Back endpaperAutonomous Territories liquidated 1941146 Back endpaperAutonomous Territories of European Russia page 3e

I

R U S S I A N C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D S O V I E T

N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y

T H E E S S E N C E O F R U S S I A N E X P A N S I O N

Political reality has transformed the word 'Europe' into. an-emptygeographical .r-otion. From a merely geographical point of view Europe

is rtit'tfre continent bounded by the Atlantic in the West and the Ural

Mountains in the East. Politiially, however, Europe is divided into'Eur-Asia' and 'Eur-America'. Western and Southern Europe form a

unit with America, whilst Eastern Europe belongs to another 'political

continent' which includes the whole of Northern Asia and a large part

of Central Asia. This division which has become unmistakably clear

since the end of the Second world war is fundamentally an old division

which arose when Europeans started to colonize America'

Russia is the only big European nation which has remained aloof

from the colonization 6f A.iricu, if we leave out of account the

episode. ending in 1867, of the Russian occupation of Alaska and the

c'omparatively insignificant number of Russian immigrants going to the

Wes^tern Hemisphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many

subjects of the ezar did certainly go to America during this last stage,

buf only a small percentage of them were Russians in the ethnical sense;

most o"f them were Jews, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians,

Poles. etc.While practically all European nations were devoting their energies

to the coionization of the Americas and other overseas territories, the

Russians colonized the vast spaces adjoining their own original living-

sDace.^ The European peoples built a new great continent for what became

the new nations of Arnerica. In addition to North and South America

the Europeans colonized Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Africa;

they dispersed their efforts all over the globe. The Russians built

Eurasia for their own benefit.Many European nations were constantly losing the best, most.active

and most entirprising members of their younger generalio^n in theprocess of colonization; the Russians preserved their youth for them'

ielves. They invested their manpower almost exclusively for the benefit

of.their own people and their own Empire'

C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S

Russia's continental expansioa is unique in its scope, but otherEuropean nations, for example the Germans and the poies, have triedcontinental expansion too_. These two peoples, wedged in between theRussian colossus and the western seararing nationsiplayeo a auai rote.They participated in a subordinate positiJn in the ctlo'niruiio"-oi ilr"new world, and on the other hand, they also attempted to effect theirown _continental expansion and coronizition in Eastern rurof.. i" tt

"Middle 1g_.1 tJr: Germans crossed the Elbe, Oder and Vistula andcolonized Mecklenburg, _ pomerania, Brandenburg, sGia

-unJ gurt

Prussia. The Poles spread their culture and poriticai rure from th. ur"uor roznan and Lracow, the territorial nucleus of their national existence,to Lithuania and to what to-day is western Ukraine and westernB1'elorussia. Russia's strong position at the end of the Second worldWar_brought about changes on thggfp of Central and Eastern Europen hich deprived both Germans and poles of the fruits of their

"or*ir-gefforts' efforts which had gl*uy-r been modest compared witn nussra'sforu ard march to the Urals and beyond.It is a misconception of Russian history to consider it primarilv asan urge towards the sea. certainly, accesi to the sea *ur'of uitilm-

portance to Russian trade.arrd to the general deveropment of Russratowards the status of a world power. It ivas a great moment in Russianhistory when Russia reached the shores of th-e Baltic uoa". p"i"r-tt "Great and the Black sea coast under catherine II. sot it *^-u ru,greater moment when Ivan the-Terribre captured Kazan on october2nd,

1552, for tha,t event nor only brought abbut the transtormaii"" "iin"comparatively_ small national Russian State of Muscovy into a multi-national Empire, but also determined the future direction of Russianexpansion. Most of the s'bsequent territorial conqu"sts cu. u.-lr*"aback to.the liquidation of the tartar Khanate of Kazan. Th;r-th;li;",

of R'ssian.destiny were not st. petersburg-odessa nor st. r"t..ru*g-figa-Koenigsberg, but ran from Moscow"via Kazan a"a orenuu.s toTashkent, via Kazan across Siberia to vladivostot uoo uguio uiu-ru?unto Astrakhan and Baku.

Russia's maritime expansion was, in some.cases, only the crowningof her continental expansion, not a purpose in itsir. r'nu, n"*i"'oionor.alm at the conquest of the pacific shore. Russia's interest in theIl:tT ?ld th€ emergence of a Russian pacific policy were the more orress acctdental outcome of the conquest of Sibelia.

-

The idea of 'mobile fr-ontiers,' nbt the urge to the seas, dominatesRussian geographical and political thinking. i.ussia is a staie ..iri.n r,u,been expanding for centuries; her borders"have never marked the reallimils rl.prssian rule, the final dividing line between Russian subiectsand foreigners, but onry a temporary dimarcation *i,i""i'i*"alti""in international law or rear poritlcal importance. This appliesi; R;ri;',

c o L o

Eastern borders in particular, but it is also true to some extent of herSouthern and even of her Western borders.

In the East and South the demarcation line was usually only thefront line from which new thrusts into further unknown territories werelaunched as soon as the required manpower became available. Thebounds of the Russian Empire in the East, South and North were notdetermined by the resistance which other states opposed to Russianexpansion, but mainly by insuperable physical obstacles such as oceans,deserts, or mountains of great altitude. The idea of 'mobile frontiers'demonstrated by the entire course of Russian history, to.day still deter-mines Russian foreign policy and the Russian people's approach towardsthis policy.

The conquest of the Russian Eastern territories, in so far as it was theoutcome of deliberate political planning, was carried out with thememory of the Mongol yoke of the thirteenth and fourteenth centurresas the psychological and ideological background. There was not onlythe desire to ayenge the disgrace of that past domination, but also anever-present sense of the danger that the colonization work might suffera setback by a new irruption of Asiatic peoples into Russian land. Inorder to ban the menace of a new Genghis Khan, the Czar of Moscowhad to become Genghis Khan. There was a kind of logical cOmpulsionfor the Russians to penetrate deeper and deeper into the East, to buildstrongholds and fortified lines, conquer foreign peoples and exploreAsia's most distant territories. At least the first stage of the Russian ex-pansion to the East is comparable to the Christian 'reconquest' of Spainfrom the Moors, and later a belief in the fulfilment of a Christian missionaccompanied Russian expansion beyond the Urals.

R U S S I A , S T W O H I S T O R I E S

In the Soviet Union, it is true, the idea of a 'Christian mission' is nolonger popular, but the attitude towards the historic Russian expansionas such remains positive. The formation of the Russian Fmpire, themost immense agglomeration of land in the world, is viewed in Com-munist Moscow primarily as the outcome of the gigantic collectiveefforts of the Russian people.

There is, indeed, much evidence for the thesis that the RussianEmpire is chiefly an unconscious creation due to the sufferings but alsoto the enterprising spirit of a vanguard of the Russian people. TheRrlssian peasants left their homes to shake off the fetters of autocracyand bondage, and to gain freedom they were ready to walk barefootto the end of the world. This urge towards new land, born of despair,hunger and oppression, eventually gave rise to a kind of Russianpeople's imperialism.


Official Russian policy and Russian state imperialism often laggedbehind the peopie's initiative. Frequently, official Russia did no morethan endorse and legalize the facts which the people had created. Eventhe greatest figures of Russian history, like Ivan the Terrible and Peterthe Great, on several occasions simply followed in the wake of lawlessbands of fugitive peasants, the famous Cossacks, who had enlarged theboundaries of Russia without even knowins it.

In this way Russia lived a double life and-had a double history. Therewas the official history of the Czars and the no less important unofficialhistory of the Cossacks. Cossack history is not only a social history inthe sense of a history of the lower classes of the Russian people, buthistory in the strictest and widest sense of the word, a history of warsand conquests and territories. Despite the frequent wars which theofficial Russia of the Czars and the unofficial Russia of the Cossacksrvaged against each other, the latter became ultimately an essentialsource of Russian strength and greatness. The Cossack rebels, who fromthe beginning of the sixteenth century onwards had been settling on theDon, had a decisive share in conquering the southern steppes for Russiaand in enabling her to reach the shores of the Azov and Black Seas.From the Don the Cossacks went to the Volga, the Ural river and toWestern Siberia and later to Lake Baikal, to the Amur and the Ussuririver in the Far East. In the later stases of their develooment the Cossacksbecame organically united with'offi i ial ' history, lost their rebel characterand served in the famous Cossack units of the Russian army.

Associated with the Cossacks in the Russian people's colonizationmovement were the members of the persecuted religious sects emergingfrom schism in the Russian Orthodox Church. These'religious colonists'\\'ere more important in quality than in quantity. Just as the EnglishPuritans crossed the ocean in search of religious freedom, so theRussian dissenters or'Old Believers' covered tremendous distances onland to reach territories where official persecution and intolerance couldnot reach them. To be free to observe their ancient religious customs,u hich had been brushed aside by an ecclesiastical reform in the officialChurch in 1666, they went to the most distant areas of the RussianEmpire, to the Far North and to Siberia. The 'Old Believers' and themembers of other sects who were ready to brave any danger and everyconceivable hardship for the sake of freedom to worship God in theirown way were easily Russia's most tenacious and most valuablecolonls ts .

Ho*'ever, without the development of a vigorous Russian centralstate authority the spontaneous Russian people's colonization wouldhare ended in an impasse. Thus Russia's official and unofficial historyrre inseparably linked with each other and it is hardly possible to takeur a positive attitude towards the latter and to disown the former as


Soviet historians originally tried to do. These attempts to discriminatebetween two histories, characteristic of Soviet historiography in thetwenties and early thirties have been abandoned, and there are nogreater admirers of the centralistic order introduced by the greatRussian Czars and of their territorial conquests than the historians ofthe Stalinist epoch.

R U S S I A N A N T I - R A C I A L I S M

Neither official nor unofficial Russia knew any racial prejudice. Itwould, therefore, be an unjustified over-simplification of Russianhistory to describe the Russians as 'oppressors' and the non-Russiansas the 'oppressed' in the conquered and colonized territories of theRussian Empire. There was, of course, a Russian upper class in the newEastern territories, i.e. the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, butthere was no Russian master race since the serfs of the Russian squireswere not only 'natives' but Russians as well. Some nationalities suchas the Tartars also had an upper class whose prestige did not rankbelow that of the Russian squires. Russian and native oppressed classesjoined hands in common action against economic oppression. Russianand Tartar nobility on the other hand established close social relationswith each other which were not marred by any racial antipathies.

At no time in Russia's development was there any need for a bookhke Uncle Tom's Cabin since racial intermixture and assimilation werethe basic principies on which Russian colonization was built. The classicwork of Russian literature depicting the relationship of the Russianstowards Tartars, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, etc. in the multi-national Volgaregion is the Chronicles of a Russian Family by S. T. Aksakov, astriking illustration of the Russian-oriental synthesis which came intoexistence during the centuries following the conquest of Kazan.

The author of this remarkable work was no revolutionary but aconservative country gentleman belonging to a family tracing its originback to the ninth century. This family after transferring its seat toBashkiria had no objection to establishing the closest possible ties withTartars and Bashkirs, which Aksakov illustrates by numerous examples.He mentions one of his uncles, a wealthy nobleman who was so attractedby the Bashkirs that he used to spend the greater part of the summerrvith them. 'He spoke their language like one of themselves, and wouldremain whole days in the saddG nJver alighting even for a moment, sothat his legs were as bowed as any Bashkir horseman's.' Another ofAksakov's relatives married a beautiful Tartar girl whose family hadthen (at the end of the eighteenth century) already adopted 'an externalEuropean culture and spoke good Russian but retained the strictestMohammedan faith'. The young Russian-Tartar couple soon enjoyed

) N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S

a 'firm and honourable position' in Russian provincial society and theTartar lady turned out to be 'a most graceful and interesting womanof the highest fashion causing no little sensation and envy'. The mostremarkable evidence of the gradual growing together of Russians andnon-Russians in the Volga valley and the Transvolga region was thepersonality of Aksakov's own tutor at Kazan University, NikolayMtttraitovictr lbragimov. His family name and his external ipp"uran"6were completely Tartar or Bashkir; he had an enormous head, widecheek bones and small piercing eyes. Culturally, however, he was sototally Russian and Slav that he wrote an Introduction to the SlavonicGrammar for the perusal of Russian secondary schools. It was he whoencouraged Aksakov to take up a literary career.l

In Siberia, where the local nationalities were more primitive than inthe Volga region, the lack of racial prejudice expressed itself in a farmore robust way than in Aksakov's refined family circle. Rape andbarbarian acts of violence towards native women marked the first staeeof the 'physical rapprochemenl' between Russian Cossacks and tieSiberian peoples. This intermixture between Russians and natives waslater carried on on a voluntary basis with the blessing of the OrthodoxChurch. As a result of intermarriaee with the natives the Russians inmany parts of Siberia lost all simil-arity to the Russians of Kiev andNovgorod. Thus in the Lower Ob region, in the Northern part of theTobolsk province, the 'Russians' assumed the characteristic features ofthe Ostyaks: round face and slanting eyes; in the Tomsk area, Russiansmixed with Tartars, Kalmucks and Kirghiz and assumed their physicalcharacteristics; in the area of Lake Baikal black-haired and black-eyed'Russians' bear witness to Russian-Buryat mixed marriages.

Absence of racial pride and prejudice is thus for Russia not arevolutionary principle, but is both the natural prerequisite of thegrowth of the Russian Empire and the natural outcome of centuries ofracial intermixture. A conservative Russian nobleman would have beenas proud of being a descendant of Genghis Khan as of the most highly-born Slavonic ancestry. The Soviet r6gime may have transformed anti-racialism into a dogmatic principle, it may have formulated this principlelegally and politically, but Russian anti-racialism js no Bolshevikcreation, it is a component part of Russian history.

At the time of the establishment of the Soviet r6sime Russian coloni-zation was still unfinished. The Russians had cJlonized the Easternpart of European Russia, the Volga region and the Urals from thesixteenth century onwards, they had colonized the Black Sea coast andthe North Caucasus region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.A great effort was made to colonize Siberia in the period between 1886and 1916 when 4,500,000 persons went to that vast area, of whom, it istrue, 1,000,000 returned to Europe. But all these and many other


colonizing activities amounted to little when related to the giganticpotentialities of the Russian Empire. The North, not only the FarNorth, was a huge empty space. Siberia had hardly any major towns.The Russian Far East was badly underpopulated.

T H E R U S S I A N C H A R A C T E R O F T H E O C T O B E R R E V O L U T I O N

The October Revolution of 1917 instead of endine Russian colonizationgave it a new impetus. The Revolution was a Rus-sian revolution. It wasRussian not only in the sense that it took place in Russia, but also in thatit was carried out by people who were Russians in the ethnical orcultural sense.

This does not mean that it was backed by the majority of the Russianpeople or that it was the triumph of Russian national aspirations. Onthe contrary, the Revolution was the work of one Russian party only,the Bolshevik or Communist Party, which tried to impose itself on allnationalities of the Russian Empire in the first place and then on allnations of the earth.

The ideals of the earlier democratic Revolution of February 1917were understandable not only to Russians but to all nationalities of theRussian Empire. The political aspirations of the progressive nationalistsin Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Ukraine and Byelorussia were notfundamentally different from those for which the supporters of the'Provisional Government' fought in Moscow and Petrograd. TheOctober Revolution, on the other hand, was based on a principle whichfrom the outset was not acceptable to the non-Russian nationalities -the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry. This meant inreality the leadership of the Russian working class over the peasantsof all the peoples of Russia.

The triumph of Bolshevism could, therefore, be achieved only by theextermination of all movements which did not accept the leadership ofthe proletariat. These movements included not only the bulk of the bigRussian party of Socialist-Revolutionaries but also a large numberof local political forces like the Dashnaks in Armenia, the MussavatParty in Azerbaidzhan, the Alash Orda in Kazakhstan, the ShuroIslamiya movement in Turkestan, etc.

The October Revolution proclaimed the equality of all nations. ofthe Russian Empire, but this 'equality' was an empty formula in viewof the leading part which the Russian proletariat was called upon toplay. Mikhail Kalinin blurted out the truth when he said it was theaim of Soviet policy 'to teach the people of the Kirghiz steppe, the smallUzbek cotton-grower, and the Turkmenian gardener to accept theideals of the Leningrad worker'.z Kalinin, who was the head of theSoviet State between 1920 and 1946 thus admitted that there was no


question of working out a compromise between Russian workers,Ukrainian peasants, Uzbek cotton-growers, and Mongol cattle-breeders. The worker of Leningrad - or of Moscow - would simplyimpose his ideals on the others.

The heroes of the October Revolution and of the'Civil War in thenon-Russian territories of what is now the Soviet Union were primarilyRussians or people of non-Russian nationalities who had severed theirlinks with their nation of origin and adopted Russian culture. In CentralAsia the triumph of Bolshevism was secured by the two RussiansMikhail Vasilyevich Frunze and Valerian Vladimirovich Kuybishev. NoSoviet textbook has ever tried to deny the role ofFrunze and Kuybishevin the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia or claimed thatany Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Turkmenian, or Tadzhik personality, tooka leading part in it. To make the Russian leaders of the revolution moreacceptable their names were slightly transformed and appear in the localCentral Asian folklore as 'Prunze-aka' and 'Koibashi-aka'.3 In themulti-national Northern Caucasus region the leaders of the revolutionwere the Russian Sergey Mironovich Kirov (Kostrikov) and the GeorgranOrdzhonikidze, in Byelorussia the Russianized Jew Lazar MoiseyevichKaganovich, in Azerbaidzhan the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan.

T H E R U S S I A N C H A R A C T E R O F T H E B O L S H E V I K P A R T Y

The strength of the Russian element inside the revolutionary vanguard,the Communist Party, can be gauged from official statistics on theethnical composition of the party membership.ln 1922, when the CivilWar had almost ended, 7l'96 per cent or 270'409 party members wereGreat Russians although their percentage of the total population was52'91 per cent. Other nationalities which had a greater number ofparty members than they were entitled to on the basis of their numericalstrength in the country were Jews (5'21 per cent), Latvians (2'53per cent), and Poles (l'5 per cent). The Latvian and Polish com-munists were mainly political 6migr6s, while the prominence of Jewishcommunists arose from the high proportion of Jewish people in thetown population of Western Russia. Russians, Jews, Latvians andPoles aggregated 81 '2 per cent of the total party membership, althoughthey represented at the utmost 55'5 per cent of the total population.The Ukrainians, the second largest nationality in the Soviet Union,accounted for only 5 ' 88 per cent of all communists, although one out ofevery five Soviet citizens was a Ukrainian. The largest non-Europeansroups among the party members were Tartars 3,940 (l '05 per cent),.\zerbaidzhani Turks 2,451 (0'65 per cent), Uzbeks 2,043 (0'54 percent). Kazakhs and Kirghiz together had 4,890 communists, or I '3 percent of the total.4 None of these figures corresponded in the least to the

numericar,-0",,;:. ffi;" ."J'r'l,n",n,",ues thesefigures were of little importance since they showed only the number ofthe rank and file communists belonging to a given nationality, withoutdisclosing their real political weight.

In this respect statistics on the ethnical composition of party con-gresses are much more revealing since the congress delegates are, forthe most part, leading officials of the party. At the Thirteenth Congress,held in May 1924, only I per cent of the delegates represented theTurko-Tartar peoples who were then almost 11 per cent of the entirepopulation of the Soviet Union. The Russians had 60.8 per cent of alldelegates; 11'3 per cent were Jews, 7 per cent Latvians and 4'7 per centUkrainians.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress, held in December 1927,when the im-portant decisions on the collectivization of agriculture were taken, thenon-European nationalities were again without adequate representation.The Turko-Tartar group had but 1.6 per cent of all delegates. Thepercentage of Russians had gone up to 62 per cent ; Jews and Latviansstill sent fairly large delegations, although their percentages had gonedown to 7 per cent and 4.7 per cent. The relative strength of theUkrainianshadincreasedto 9.8 per cent, i.e. almost double, and thenumber of Byelorussian delegates had gone up from 1.2 to 2.9 per cent.The delegations of a number of non-Slav nationalities, however,decreased slightly compared witt' 1924.5

Throughout its existence the Communist Party of the Soviet Unionhas remained a predominantly Russian and Slav body. The number ofnon-Russian party members, it is true, increased both absolutely andrelatively, but this statistical increase was not accompanied by acorresponding increase of their influence in the party and siatemachinery. Attempts have been made to shake Russian predominanceand to establish both a greater degree of national equality within theCommunist Party and a genuine federation within the Soviet Union.But these were foiled by Stalin and his associates during the big purgeo f 1936 /38 .

There is no doubt that Stalin upheld the Russian character of theOctober Revolution while his opponents wanted to broaden the basisof the Soviet r6gime by giving greater weight to the non-Russiannationalities. Both the left-wing and the right-wing opposition to Stalinagreed on that point for opposite reasons. For the extreme left, Russianpredominance was incompatible with the idea of the world revolution,The right-wing opposition around Bukharin and Rykov was guidedin its hostility to centralism by its generaliy more liberal approach toSoviet internal politics. Both groups were able to quote in support oftheir standpoints the works of Lenin, who in various proclamationsand appeals to non-Russian peopies had shown great understanding


for their national aspirations. In his'Letter to the Workers and Peasantsof the Ukraine' Lenin recognized the right of the Ukraine to completeindependence.o In another letter 'To the Communists of Azerbaidzhan,Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountain Republic' Leninadvised the Communist Parties of the Caucasus and of Transcaucasianot to copy the Russian experience but to show more mildness andcaution than the Russian Bolsheviks did. Lenin further suggested to thelocal communists that they should be ready to make concessions to thepetty bourgeoisie, to the intelligentsia and, particularly, to the peasantry. ?

How far Lenin was able to equate his practical policy with thesetheoretical precepts is another question. The forcible incorporation ofthe Caucasian and Central Asian territories into the Soviet Union, forinstance, took place under Lenin and was not primarily Stalin'sresponsibility. The fact remains, however, that Lenin's approach tothe national oroblem was not as crude and inelastic as Stalin's. Thosecommunists *ho play the founder of the Soviet State against his succes-sor when denoun^cing Russification and centralism are*thrrs not entirelywrong even if they do overstate the case.

Left-wing opposition to Stalin's nationalities policy was pre-dominantly theoretical but Bukharin and especially Rykov, who forseveral years had been at the head of the Soviet state administration,challenged Stalin in the practical field as well. As early as 1923, at theTwelfth Communist Party Congress, Rykov had declared 'It is impossibleto administer from Moscow on the basis of bureaucratic centralism acountry with more than 130,000,000 inhabitants covering one-sixth ofthe earth'. Rykov, the son of a Russian peasant, acted at least to someextent on the basis of this principle. Manifestations of local nationalismhad already been suppressed under his rule, but more drastic centraliza-tion measures and the large-scale persecution of federalist-minded non-Russian communists started only after his dismissal from the post ofSoviet Prime Minister and his replacement in 1930 by V. M. Molotov.Rykov's policy too had moved within the narrow framework of a one-party system, but in the days of inflexible centralism which Molotovintroduced under Stalin's supreme guidance the Rykov period appearedlike a golden age to the communist chiefs of the non-Russian peoples.The leading communists of the Caucasus and Central Asiatic republicsthus co-operated with the right-wing opposition in the hope that thedownfall of Stalin might lead to the fulfilment of some moderatenational aspirations.

From the point of view of the r6eime it was thus not enough to haveousted Rykov from office; it was iecessary to exterminate physicallyhim and his group which represented a federalist alternative to Stalin'snationalities policy. The official charges put forward against Bukharin,Rykov and many other members of the opposition asserted that they

10

C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N ,

wanted to 'sell' the Ukraine. the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia to'imperialistic powers'. These allegations sound fantastic and cannot be

accepted at their face value. Nevertheless, the charges against Rykovcontbined a grain of truth. Rykov did want to alter the status of thenon-Russian nationalities, not to please imperialism but to do justice

to the peoples of the Soviet Union.Togethei with Rykov and his co-defendants in the Moscow trial of

the so-called 'Anti-soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' the Stalinadministration exterminated communist federalists all over the SovietUnion. By wholesale police measures and mass trials it deprived almostall the important non-Russian peoples of an entire generation of theirpolitical leaders, economic experts and cultural workers. These purgevictims were described as'enemies of the people', 'bourgeois nationalists','agents of German fascism' if their homes were West of the Urals and'agents of Japanese militarism'if they belonged to an Asiatic nationality'The purge of the national deviationists from 1936 to 1938 was ex-clusively-directed against persons who had grown up in the BollhevikParty and who themselves had taken an active share in the liquidationof genuine local nationalists. Thus the non-Russian peoples lost twosets of their national itite dwing the period stretching from the OctoberRevolution until roughly the outbreak of the Second World War.The first included intellectuals who had championed the cause of theirpeoples under the Czarist r6gime and the second group wa,s .1d9

"pof those Bolsheviks who had taken their place and had tried to defendthe interests of the nationalities and territories of which they had beenput in charge. It is true that Stalin's purges affected both Russians andnon-Russians alike, but the non-Russians, having only a limited reserveof educated persons at their disposal, suffered proportionally muchheavier losses than the Great Russians who numbered 100,000,000'

The Eighteenth Party Congress of March 1939 formally concludedthe purge and elected a Central Committee the composition of whichwas highly characteristic of the Russian predominance in the SovietUnion.- The Committee of seventy which is the highest policy-makingbody in the U.S.S.R. included no more than two persons of Moslem andTurkic origin. These were the Party Secretary of Azerbaidzhan,M. D. Bagirov and the Party Secretary of Uzbekistan, LJsman Yusupov.The lattei was the only representative of the 11,000,000 Moslems ofCentral Asia on the Central Committee since the other'Central Asian',the then Party Secretary of Kazakhstan, Nikolay Skvortsov, was aRussian.

There were three famous Caucasians on the Central Committee;but they have never claimed to be the spokesmen of their respectivepeoples'since their main ambition has always been to strengthen theientlal state machinery of the Soviet Union; the Georgians, I. V. Stalin

u


and Lavrenty Beriya, and the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan. Anotherless-known Armenian on the Committee was I. T. Tevosyan. thenMinister for Shipbuilding. The rest of the Central Committee wereSlavs, most of them Russians, about half a dozen representatives ofthe Ukraine and one or two Byelorussians. The Slavs also includedeight communists of Jewish origin who were, however, completelyassimilated and could nor. be regarded as anythins but Ruisiani.Several of them were ousted from- the Commitiee dirins the periodof Nazi-Soviet co-ooeration.

Among the sixty-eight alternate members of the Central Committeeelected at the Eighteenth Party Congress, the non-Slavs formed againbut a tiny group, including one Tartar, one Bashkir (who was expelledin l94l), one Armenian, three representatives from Georsia and t*olocal NKVD chiefs bearing Geoigian names. Of the latt 'er, one wasstationed in Leningrad, the other in Vladivostok.

Among the rank and file of the Communist party the non-Russiansare, of course, more strongly represented than on the Central Com-mittee, but there is still a great disproportion between Russians andnon-Russians. This can be illustrated by a comparison between Mos-cow and the Ukraine. h 1949 Moscow (includin[ the whole of MoscowProvince) with 9,000,000 inhabitants had 600,000 organized communists.The Ukraine with its 40,000,000 inhabitants had only slightly more,namely, 684,000 party members, but the number of Ukrainiin com-munists is smaller than that, as the figure includes at Ieast 25 oer centnon-Ukrainians, mostly Russians. x

Since the October Revolution is a Russian Revolution and theBolshwik Party aRussian Party, they are both bound to pursue Russianaims. The aims of a Russian policy, like any other national policy, can

I At the Fifteenth congress of the ukrainian communist party, which was held in May1940, only 56 per cent ofthe delegates were Ukrainians, as many as 37.2 per cent wereGreat Russians,4 per cent were Jews and 2.8 per cent belonge<1 to othei nationalities(Pravda, May l6th, 1940.)

In the otlrer European border republics of the u.s.s.R. the position is roughly the sameas in the Ukraine: the organized communists represent 1 to 2 per cent ofthe total popula_t ion. The Party has 110,000 members in Byelorussia (1949),31,000 in Larv ia-(1949).i0 '000 in Moldavia (1951),24,000 in L i thuania (1949), 19.000 in Estonia {19511. ManyCommunist Party members of these border republics do not belong to the local nationali-tles but are Great Russian party and state omcials, skilled workers and technicians.

In the six Moslem Republics of the u.s.s.R. - Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Krrghizistan, Tadzhikistan and rurkmenistan - there are over 580,000 full party membersrrd candidates for membership in a population of nearly 20,000,000, including both\lorlems and non-Moslems. Most of the party members live in the industrial cintres,"nere the Russian element is numerically strong, particularly in Kazakhstan (229.000nembers in 1949) and Azerbaidzhan (108,000 members in 1951).

.{part from the Great Russians, the Party has recruited a fairly strong membership among(ieorgians and Armenians. There are 61,000 party members in Armenia (i951) and 166,000rr ceorgia (1949). This means that about 5 per cent ofthe population ofthese two republicsdre organized in the Communist Party.

t 2


take a great variety of forms. It can be peaceful or aggressive .9b1oad'liberal or despotic at home. The Soviet r6gime and the Bolshevik Partyhave interpreied the aims of a Russian policy in the most narrow-mindedway; they have followed the bad rather than the go_od examples of

Russian history, while acting in conformity with some of its fundamentallessons. Thus they have accepted the definition of the 'bourgeois'

historian, Klyuchevsky, who said Russian history was that of a country

which was being colonized.

R U S S I A N C O L O N I Z A T I O N U N D E R T H E S O V I E T R E G I M E

The Soviet leaders realized that the power and size of the RussianEmpire were due to successfully conducted colonization and that theSoviet Union too could not do without a colonization policy' The form

and methods of Russian colonization, but not its essence, changed to a

certain desree under the Soviet r6gime.In the fiist years after the Octobe*r Revolution the pace of colonization

declined owing to the general confusion and the hostility of the non-Russian peoples towards new Russian colonists. Moreover, agriculturalcolonization had lost a gteat deal of its previous attraction because thebest land had already been occupied by Russian settlers, and more landcould be made available only at the price of investing considerablesums in irrigation and improvements. Land conditions in AsiaticRussia were such that Siberia and Central Asia combined could notabsorb more than 200,000 to 250,000 agricultural settlers a year.Despite the existence of vast empty spaces in Russian Asia, thecolonization movement at the beginning of the First World War washeadins towards an impasse.s

Not-only the Soviet rdgime but any other Russian r6gime taking overin 1917 would have had to alter the methods of colonization policy.The Soviet Government, particularly since 1928, the beginning of theplanning period, continued to encourage agricultural colonization oni modeiate scale, but the emphasis was clearly shifted to industrialcolonization. To industrialize Russian Asia, to exploit its great nationalriches, in short, to carry out the Five-Year Plans, it was imperative todraw on the reserves of population of European Russia and to transferthem beyond the Urals. In the twelve years between the end of 1926 andthe beginning of 1939 alone, 3,000,000 people migrated from Centraland Western Russia into the new industrial centres of the Urals, Siberiaand the Russian Far East. In addition, 1,700,000 new settlers came intothe Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

The migration towards the East constituted, however, only one aspectof a general industrialization and urbanization process which also led

to a migration of 4,800,000 people into the provinces of Moscow and

l 3

ALITIES

Leningrad between 1926 and 1939, and to a minor migration of 350,000people into the Gorky Province.e

An important feature of the industrial colonization was the foundationof new towns and workers' settlements. Between l9l7 and 1947, theSoviet r6gime claims to have brought into existence 508 new towns androughly 2,000 workers' settlements of an urban type. A detailedanalysis of these figures shows that urbanization and Russification wenthand in hand, since many of the new towns became Russian industrialstrongholds in non-Russian territories. Out of the 508 new towns, 209sprung up in non-Russian Soviet Republics, including fifty-one iri Trans-caucasia, forty-seven in Central Asia, and forty-three in the Ukrainiancoal district - the Donets Basin. Almost half of the new workers' settle-ments were likewise built in the non-Russian Republics, including 230in Central Asia alone. As to the 299 new towns of Russia proper,many were founded in ethnically non-Russian territories or in areas withmixed populations: sixteen in the Far North, fifty-five in the Urals andfifty East of the Urals.lo

Despite all efforts made under the Soviet r6gime to shift populationsfrom the densely populated districts of European Russia to the scarcelypopulated North and East, little had been achieved up to the outbreakof the Second World War. The census of 1939 revealed that the unequaldistribution of Russia's population showed trifling changes comparedwith the Czarist period, notwithstanding all the new towns and newindustrial centres: six per cent of the Soviet population lived scatteredover two-thirds of the country's territory while forty-eight per cent ofthe people were concentrated in six per cent of the territory.lr

Only a bold policy of agricultural resettlement could remedy thissituation. Moreover, industrial colonization was bound to reach asaturation point if a sufficient food basis could not be provided for thenew 'mushroom towns' in Asia. To keep up the tempo of industrialcolonization agricultural colonization too needed a fresh impetus.Greater emphaiis on agricultural colonization was, therefore, one ofthe important features of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-1942). Torender agricultural colonization on a larger scale possible, the Sovietstate had to make higher demands on agricultural science, whose maintask it became to extend the cereai growing area towards the North andto make Russia's wheat belt as elastic as possible. On the other hand, theSoviet Government tried to create better opportunities for agriculturalcolonization by improving the organization in charge of it. VariousSoviet institutions dealine with resettlement and colonization mattershad been in existence siice 1925, but in 1939 a new authority wascreated - the 'Central Resettlement Board', which had its agents in allUnion Republics and Provinces. The outbreak of the war interruptedthe work of the board. and in 1945. when it was able to resume its

t4

activities, it was disbanded and a new resettlement organization wascreated and attached to the Council of Ministers of the RussianFederative Socialist Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). This was a logicalmeasure since the R.S.F.S.R. is the most important puryeyor of settlersfor under-developed areas.x

During the first post-war Five Year Plan (1946-50) the Soviet Govern-ment encouraged both industrial and agricultural colonization, but bothhad a very obvious strategic tinge. Colonists were directed to certainmilitarily vital areas, such as the Murmansk Province and the Russian-Manchurian border regions, but above all to the new strategic outpostswhich Russia had annexed at the end of the Second World War. Inthis latter category belonged the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet portionof the former East Prussia, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.A widespread propaganda campaign was started to popularize thenew territories as settlement areas: pamphlets describing their richresources and potentialities were lavishly distributed and the advantagesof settling in the new districts were eagerly discussed in collective farmmeetings - on the initiative of the communist rural organizations.

Alth6ugh one need not believe every word of Soiiet propagandaabout the spontaneous desire of the Russian people to migrate toremote areas in order to serve the motherland, it would be untrue tosuggest that administrative coercion is the only motive behind thecontinuous large-scale population movements inside the Soviet Union.It cannot be denied that there exists the enthusiasm of a young genera-tion which wants to build and to create, if possible in a new and un-known territory. There also exists the inborn 'wanderlust' of theRussian peasant and his natural ability to adapt himself to differentgeographical surroundings and climatic conditions. Another powerfulincentive for a semi-voluntary peasant migration inside Russia is thehope, if not the definite promise, that the collective farm statute will beless strictly applied in the distant territories than in the over-crowdedprovinces of Central Russia. Less rigidity in the application of the statutemay be worth a journey thousands of miles long, since it means forthe peasant more time to be devoted to his individual allotment outsidethe collective farm and a larger number of cows, sheep and goats forhis personal use.

Although the primary approach of the Soviet r6gime towardscolonization is an economic and strategic, and not a national Russianone, Soviet colonization policy serves to promote the triumph of theRussian people no less than colonization under the Czarist r6gime. Onlya people which is both numerically large and stubborn by character,a people which is used to hardships and privations and which has ex-

r A number of non-Russian Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Tadzhikistan, etc., alsobave resettlement organizations which are in charge of rninor local resettlement schemes,

l 5


perience in colonizing activities can carry out successful colonizationwork on such a large scale as is needed in the vast Euro-Asiatic plain.This is whv onlv

-Russians and Ukrainians can be relied uo6n u.

colonizers to any extent worth mentioning. Many other peoples maylocally participate in the great colonization of the Russian East andNorth, but the Russians themselves must necessarily lead and dominatethe colonization work everywhere. The role of the Russians in the workof colonization is that of a huge advancing army which is accomplishingthe main job, but which is assisted by a number of small satellite detach-ments to whom certain local tasks are assigned. The use of non-Russians for Russian colonization is common to both the Czarist andSoviet r6gimes, but the latter is by far more thorough and systematicin the mobilization of the non-Russian population and no longerpermits the alternative of emigration abroad.

Christians from the Baltic countries, Moslems from the Volga,Tartars and Mordvinians, Chuvash and Mari, cultured Jews andhalf-civilized Chukchi from beyond the Polar Circle - they are allthrown into action by the Russian colonizers for the ultimate benefitof the Russians. The more the peoples of Russia become intermingledand the more they are scattered through the Eurasian continent by aplanned colonization policy the less there is danger of the rise of'national problems' and the greater the likelihood of their absorptionby Russian civilization. From economic necessity the Soviet r6gime isinflicting a double blow on the non-Slav peoples: it pumps Russianand Ukrainian skilled workers, specialists and officials into the ter-ritories of the small Soviet nationalities and recruits unskilled labourfrom among the latter to send them to Russian industrial centres, inan endeavoirr to solve the manpower problem there.

L O C A L N A T I O N A L I S M

The Soviet nationalities policy is thus largely identical with the promo-tion of colonization and industrialization in the non-Russian territoriesof the U.S.S.R. It can also be defined in other ways; it depends on thestandpoint from which the definition is formulated. From the pointof view of Soviet Russia's neighbours the Soviet nationalities policy isan instrument of Soviet diolomacv. The Bolshevik 'Old Guard' con-sidered the nationalities policy ai an abstract policy of encouragingthe cultural and economic development of the peoples of Russia. Forthe non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union itself the nationalitiespolicy and the fight against local nationalism are identical notions.Each of these definitions contains a certain amount of truth. but therecan be no doubt that the fight against local nationalism has been thedominant element in the Soviet nationalities policv since the thirties.

l 6

1 7


Until then the communist leadership had most energetically foughtagainst 'Great Russian chauvinism' which had been described as the'maindangeron the national front'. Gradually the situation was reversed,the danser of 'Great Russian chauvinism' was more and more belittledand theiampaign against ' local nationalism' became increasing[1i merci-less. We have already referred to the political side of the purges, butthe 'fight against local nationalism' implied more than a struggle forpower between centralists and federalists. The expression 'local nation-alism' was used in the widest possible sense. Every assertion of nationalindividuality in the economic, cultural and political field was trans-formed in Soviet language into 'local nationalism'.

The main forms of local nationalist tendencies which the Sovietr6gime tried to stamp out were the following:1 . rHs 'FEDERALIST NATIoNAL ISM ' . Many a na t i ona l i t y o f t heSoviet Union realized that it was too weak by itself to resist Russiancolonization. It therefore tried to strengthen its position by enteringinto closer relationship with one or several other non-Russian peoplesof the Soviet Union to which it was ethnically related or linkedtogether by geographical circumstances. Whenever such tendencies wereexoressed the Soviet central Government denounced them as 'counter

revolutionary maneuvres' emanating from some sort of pan-ism. Sub-federations are considered undesirable within the U.S.S.R. howeverpolitically reliable those participating in them may be. Thus a regionalfederation of the three Baltic Soviet Republics is unthinkable underthe working of Soviet nationalities policy; and in four cases the Sovietcentral Government actually suppressed regional sub-federations afterhaving permitted them for longer or shorter transition periods (in theVolga region, Transcaucasia, Northern Caucasus region and CentralAsia).2 . r o c e l , N A T T o N A L T s M r N T H E E c o N o M I c s p H E R E . M e a s u r e sapplied to the whole Soviet Union were frequently transformed intomeasures against local nationalism, when put into practice in the ter-ritories of national minorities. People of many nationalities in theSoviet Union denied the Moscow Government the right to interferewith the internal economic structure of the territories which theyinhabited. A case in point was the collectivization of agriculture in1930-33, which, a, u ,rri., met with greater resistance in the ion-Russianareas than among the Great Russians. Other economic measures again,like the resettlement of the millions of nomads of the Soviet Union,affected exclusively non-Russian nationalities.3. nrr lGrousLy TAINTED NArIoNArts l r . The f ight against ' local

religion' has always been closely inter-twined with the fight against localnationalism. The Soviet leaders have disregarded the simple truth thata nation cannot be free if its relision is oooressed. In the inter-war


period the campaign against the religions of the national minoritieswas conducted by the state authorities, the Communist Party, theCommunist Youth League and by the 'Nationalities Commission' ofthe Central Committee of the S.V.B. (Soyuz VoinstvuyushchikhBezbozhnikov - League of Militant Godless).-After the waithe workof the S.V.B. was taken over by a 'Society for the Dissemination ofPolitical and Scientific Knowledge' which has a special anti-religiousdepartment ('Section for Propaganda Problems of Scientific-AtheisticKnowledge'). The Society which is closely connected with the Propa-ganda and Agitation Department of the Communist Party has branchorganizations in all non-Russian Soviet Republics. Although theprincipal target of the Bolshevik fight against religion was the RussianOrthodox Church, the non-Russians, particularly the Eastern nation-alities of the U.S.S.R. were affected by it more than the Slavs. Sincenationality and religion are almost identical in the Eastern provincesof the Russian Empire - as almost everywhere in the Orient - the fightagainst religion in these territories was implicitly a fight against nationalculture and nationai traditions as well.4. rrNGursrrc NArroNALrsM. The Soviet r6gime rightly feared thatthe languages of the non-Russian nationalities could too easily becomean instrument in the struggle against Bolshevism if they were not care-fully kept under control. The question of political terminology, fgrinstance, was of paramount importance. 'Bourgeois nationalists' couldobtain political advantages by what orthodox communists considered tobe an incorrect translation of such terms as 'Soviet', 'dictatorship of theproletariat', and 'general line of the party'. The r6gime tried, there-fore, to wrest from the 'nationalists' the weapon of the languages bychanging their character and introducing into each of them a largenum6erif Russian and Russianized so-cilled international terms. Tfredual aim of the Soviet language policy was to reduce on the one handthe differences between the local languages and the Russian, and on theother to widen the cleavage between languages belonging to one andthe same language group so as to weaken all pan-isms but pan-Slavism.

Not only was the victory of the Stalin group over the opposition forcesinside the Communist Party tantamount to the victory of centralism;it also implied the triumph of the Russian language and of Russiancivilization. It is a striking coincidence that the decree on the obligatorytcaching of Russian in allnationalminority schools was passed onthe veryd:rv on which Rykov and Bukharin were sentenced to death - on MarchI -rrh. 1938. The new partv leadership which Stalin installed in the variousnrrtional republics siarted its activiiy by launching a campaign for thestudv of the Russian language. For the non-Russian communists a goodcommand of Russian thus became a way to manifest their loyalty tothe Kremlin.

18

C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N

During and particularly after the Second World War official Sovietideology became less hypocritical by openly proclaiming that the Rus-sians were the'driving force'within the U.S.S.R. and not just one of the'180 peoples of the Soviet Union'.

On the very morrow of victory Stalin ordered that greater emphasisshould be given to the leading role of the Russian people in the SovietState. When addressing the Red Army commanders at a great victorycelebration on May 24th, 1945, Stalin demonstratively toasted the Rus-sian people whom he described as the 'most outstanding people of the

U.S.S.Rj and he paid tribute to the 'clear mind, steadfast character andpatience' of the Russians. This toast was not only a eulogy of theRussians, but also an oblique censure intended for the other peoples ofthe Soviet Union, whose mind, character and patience from Stalin'spoint of view had been less commendable during the Great PatrioticWar.

It seems that Stalin's subtly formulated reproach to the non-Russianswas justified. In the fatal years of 1941 and 1942 in particular, the Rus-sians had borne the brunt ofthe battle. In October 1942 Pravda droppedall propagandistic pretence and stated flatly that the Russians formedthe 'vast majority' of the army. This admission was very remarkable inview of the fact that the Russians constitute less than half of the popu-lat ion of the U.S.S.R.*

Stalin's toast to the Russian people was no toast in the ordinary senseof the word. It was the ultimate logical conclusion to be drawn fromthe Russian character of the October Revolution. It also supplied thekey for the understanding of the purges carried out after 1945 amongthe non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. The aim of these purgesu'as to eliminate from the cultural life and the national traditions of thenon-Russians everything that might possibly encourage among themany kind of anti-Russian sentiments.

C O N S T I T U T I O N A L F E D E R A L I S M

In examining the essentials of Soviet nationalities policy we cannot over-look the laws, decrees and constitutions of the U.S.S.R. and its con-stituent republics, but we must use them with care. Considered in isola-tion they give no more than a clue to the propagandist aspect of Soviet* The same Pravda arlicle which was quoted by Soviet Ilar Nerrs on October 16th, 1942'also complained about the insufficient military training of the non-Russian soldiers. Thenewspaper said: 'Not all the reserves arriving at the front from the national republics andprovinces are equally well trained. Some young soldiers are insufficiently familiar with mili-lary technique, particularly with their weapons. It is the duty ofmilitary training organiza-tions to attend to this, to give the young fighters a complete idea ofmodern war weaponsand teach them how to use them. Political work has always been an important activity ofour army organizations. It is of particular importance among Red Army men of non-Russian nationality. . . .'

l 9


nationalities policy, whilst the real position of the non-Russian nation-alit ies of the Soviet Union can be judged only on the basis of theapplication of the laws, i.e. in the l ight of facts. The constitutionalframework of the U.S.S.R., though not a guide to the fundamentals ofSoviet nationalities policy, acquaints us with the terminoiogy with whichthe latter operates and introduces us to the various degrees of Sovietterritorial autonomy.1. sovrer REpuBLrcs. The h ighest form of Soviet autonomy is en-joyed by the sixteen constituent Soviet Republics. According to Sovietlegal theory these sixteen Republics are fully fledged sovereign States,with all the prerogatives of a State including a constitutional right toleave the Union should their respective parliaments, the SupremeSoviets, so decide.

The sovereignty of the Soviet Republics is, however, a mere constitu-tional fiction, because in reality they have no say in questions ofinternalsecurity, high-level economic planning, tran sport, or hisher education, notto speak of foreign policy and defence. Since February lst, 1944, theSoviet Republics have possessed a nominal right to have foreignministers and defence ministers of their own, but the national foreignministers and foreign offices have a purely formal existence, while thenational defence ministries never came into being. It is dificult to seewhat functions such defence ministries could have had, in vierv of thecentraiized and predominantiy Russian character of the Soviet armedforces. Non-Russians, it is true, may rise to the highest posts in the RedArmy and Navy, but Russian is the official language of the Sovietmilitary apparatus. During the Second World War all military ordersilere written in Russian.

Even from a merely legal point of view the constituent Soviet Repub-lics do not own the natural riches on their soil. The coal of the Ukraine,the oil of Azerbaidzhan, the copper of Kazakhstan belong to the U.S.S.R.rs a rvhole and not to the individuai republics. The sarne applies to thea_cricultural land of the Republics.

The 'sovereignty' of the Union Republics is also rendered fictitiousbv the existence of the'Prokuratura'. the stronsiv centralized office of the

: . ,rLl I- Ur.rion Attorne,v-General ( 'Generalny Prokuror') which was foundedin 1933. The all-Union Attorney-General hilnself appoints an Attorney-Gcneral for each of the Union Republics and even the personnel of the'Prokuratura'in the provinces and districts of these republics is underhi,. supreme coinmand. Repubiican governments cannot interfere in thelclst *'ith the work of the 'Prokuratura' nor can they influence thecrrmposition of its local staff. The Attorney-General has a dual function.He acts as Public Prosecutor and he checks on the legality of measurescrrrricd out by the republican and local authorities. The Attorney-General of a Union Reoublic. on instructions from the all-Union

*

,{


Attorney-General, can rescind any local laws and decrees if they contra-

dict the so-called 'revolutionary legality'.The lesal svstem on which-thJ'Prokuratura' bases its work is in

itself rigoiousiy centralized. There is no all-Union Penal Code, it is true,

tut the"penal"Code of the R.S.F.S.R. is also in force in Kazakhstan,

Kirghizistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.

Theifact that there are separate penal codes for the R'S'F'S'R', Ukraine'

Bvelorussia. the Transcaucasian and some of the Central Asian Soviet

Repurblics is of little importance since their differences in content are

insignificant. Moreover many articles in the individual penal codes

hav! been superseded by all-Union laws and decrees (particularly the

decrees on the 'protection of socialist property' and on various 'state

crimes').often, the Soviet legal 'states' do not correspond t_o States in the

sense of living organisris. In numerous instances these 'States' have not

been created"by tistorical development or by the wiil of their peoples,

nor do they owe their existence to some parLicular geographica.l features'

They owe"their origin simply to a deciiion taken by the ̂ soviet leaders

o'. Ju"n by the sup-reme Sbviet leader only. Examples of such -'States'rvhich weie created by Soviet political opportunism are the Karelo-

Finnish s.s.R., the Moldavian s.s.R. and the Soviet Republics of

central Asia. Republics which were taken into the Soviet union en bloc

as an outcom. of -i l i tury operutions, such as Georgia, Estonia and

Latv ia are of a d i f ferent nuiur . . Or ig inat ing f rom pol i t ica l and economic

units gravitating around a centre, they possess the characteristics of

stateh6od in thJsense ofpolit ical and economic geography, evenifthe

Soviet central Government has considerably curtailed the exercise of

their actual state functions.Soviet legal theory, as taught in Soviet law schools, asserts that a

territory hai to answlr three r6quirements to become a Soviet Republic,

namely: (a) the nationalitY giving its name to the,Republic must have

an aUsotute majority in the territory concerned: (6) a Soviet Republic

must have a common border with at least one foreign State because

otherwise it could not secede from the Union if it wished to do so, and

(c) a Soviet Republic must have at least 1,000,000 inhabitants'l2

These 'conditions' too are only theory and are not fulfilled by all the

sixteen Soviet Republics. Thus the Kazakhs have no absolute majority

in Kazakhstan, nor have the Karelians and Finns combined in the

Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic. Moreover, the last-mentioned republic

did not fulfil condition (c), since it had less than a million inhabitants

rvhen promoted to the status of a fully-fledged Soviet^Republic. As to

condition (b) it has become an illusion, since several Soviet Republics

adioin onlv Soviet satellite States and Soviet-controlled territories (Bye-

loiussia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan).

2 l

O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S

2. euroNouous sovrEr REpuBLrcs. A considerably lower degreeof autonomy was granted to the 'Autonomous

Socialist Soviet Reniub-lics' (A.S.S.R.) but they are also oil icially described as 'states'. out orthe sixteen Autonomous Republics twelve are part of the Russian SovietFederative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), one each belongs to Azer-baidzhan and uzbekistan and two to Georsia. An A.S.S.R. i i extremelylimited in- its_scope of action and its autonomy is almost exclusively con-irned to the linguistic sphere. Formally and ligaliy, however, things aredifferent, since every Autonomous Republic pbssesses a constituti-on ofits own (although almost identical in r,rordine and content in all sixteenA.S.S.R.s), a'Council of Ministers' and a .SrJpreme Soviet'.3 . auroNouous pRovrNcrs. The next group of nat ional terr i tor ia lunits, the Autonomous Provinces (Avtononlnye obtastt) have lost muchof their importance b_y the introduction of ftre tg3o constitution pro-moting the more populous Autonomous provinces to AutonomousRepublics. out of the nine still existing Autonomous provinces sixbelong to the R.S.F.s.R. encl one each t6 ceorgia, Azerbaidzhan andfadzhikistan

The difference betr.l'een an 'Autonomous province' and an ordinaryprovince is that the former has rules of its own with resard to its official;. inguages. The 'Autonomous Province' has a special ;statute' adoptedrv the provincial Soviet and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of theR*pubiic to which it belongs; it also has a special ripresentation in the'Soviet of Nationalit ies' which the ordinarv

-province has not.

The 'Autonomous Provinces' of the n.s.p.s.n. are not placed directly-,nder the government of the Russian Federation but unclei the ExecutiveL ornmittee (Ispolkom) of a kind of super-province, ,Kray,, which can:-c translated as 'Territory'. Thus the Autonomous provinte of the cir--.1:sians belongs to the stavropol rerritory, the Khakass AutonomousProrince to the I(rasnoyarsk Territory, etc.l . LOwEn FoRMS oF NATToNAL AUToNol . ly . yet another form of::-Ltional autonomy was designed primarily for the small nationalit ies of:::r- Far North, the 'Nalional

Areas' (Okrugi). There are ten such' \. i t ional Areas' altogether, four of which extend. along Russia's Arctic-...r:t. The majority of the 'National Areas' cover hugi but almost un_:'..pukited. spaces and even from the legal point ofviJw they enjoy only., r ery l imited auronomy.

'\ational Districts' (Ra1,on.t') were devised for small but compact

::: i irorit ies wedged irrto alien surroundings. These 'National Districts'-.'.:ist very often of five to ten villages only. Before the Second world\\ '.rr there had been as many as 147'National Districts, in the R.S.F.S.R..:.oru-. lr{ost of them were located in the Far North, yakutia, Buryato_\ltrnsolio, Eastern Siberia and the Amur region'\ational

vil lage Soviets' (viltage council i) and'National collective

iC O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S

Farms', of which there are many hundreds, guarantee, in theory, the

:ights of the tiniest national minority group.The Soviet central Government has shown a singular indifference to

.:i own creations in the field of nationalities policy. 'National Areas' and'\.rtional Districts'have often suddenly passed out of existence. Fron-:rers of both Soviet Republics and Autonomous Soviet Republics have::r'cr been regarded as more than experimental lines which can be

,-:.rnged by deiree just as they were created by decree. Whole slices- of

::rritory have oftenbeen cut offfrom one republic and added to another.i rcn this appeared to be convenient from the economic point of view.

Crpitals of Autonomous Republics have been similarly shifted accord-.- s ro economic expediency. Moreover, even the internal administrative::rision of a constituent republic into provinces is not a matter to be

::'cided by the republic concerned, but belongs to the competence of the:::tral authorit ies in Moscow.

The Stalin Constitution of 1936 set itself the task of giving a final form:,r rhe administrative sub-division of the U.S.S.R. But ever since then:::'re have been numerous alterations which were not due to territorial: .:quests alone. A11 this is only too natural: Russia is a young country.'.:.,ie economic potential is steadily growing and whose administrative.:".-up, therefore, has to be elastic without being hampered by the.r.:!-rests of the local peoples.

S O V I E T B U D G E T A R Y C E N T R A L I S M

T:: real importance, or rather the factual insignificance, ofthe autono-:-.,rus units created by the Soviet constitution can best be shown by:r-,mining the budgetary means at the disposal of both the central: r,rernment and the regional governments and Soviets.

The expenditure side of the Soviet budget is usualiy sub-divided into' .r 'eroups: (1) f inancing of national economy; (2) social and cuituralrr..rsures; (3) administration; (4) defence, and (5) miscellaneous expen-: ::rre. Expenditure for national economy is covered by the central--Jcet to the extent of 86'3 per cent. Only 6'3 per cent is derived::.ri the budgets of the Union Republics. The remainingT'4 per cent

: rhe expenditure for national economy comes from the so-called 'local

:.:Jqets' which include the budgets of the provinces, districts, the" . - i counci ls and the rura l co-unci ls . Hal f o f a l l ' local ' nat ionaliJtroorl) expenditure is spent by the town councils and only an in-..::,ilrcant percentage - at any rate less than ten per cent - by- all.\.S.S.R.s, Autonomous Provinces and National Areas put together.l.reir combined share in the whole national economy budget is less than'-e per cent of the total. (A11 these and the following figures are based-': rhe budget of 1941, the first full year in which the present sixteen


Soviet Republics were in existence. The figures would hardly be differentin any other year.)

The central budget finances 93.8 per cent ofall expenditure for in-dustry, including the entire heavy and armament industry and also thelarger plants of the building, food, textile, fishing and timber industries.Only the small plants of light industry and the production of local fuelresources are financed by the constituent republics.

In the field of agriculture the share of the local budgets is somewhatbigger, for the ceniral budget absorbs 'only' 77.1 per Jent of the wholeexpenditure for agriculture. The Union buclget is responsible for MachineTractor Stations (M.T.S.), large-scaie irrigation schemes, those statefarms which grorv cereals, sub-tropical fruits, cotton and other technicalcultures and also for all cattle farms. The appropriations out of therepublican budgets go to small state farms growing vegetables or breed-ing poultry, rabbits and bees.

As far as transport is concerned the Union budget has a de factomonopoly since it iovers the entire air, rail, water ani road transp5rt ofall Soviet Republics with the exception of local road communications of'republican importance' which account for less than two per cent oftransport expenditure as a wirole.

With regard to social and cultural expenditure the preponderance ofthe Union budget is less marked; it directly controls only 35.7 per centof the appropriations in that field. However, even for social services andeducation the constituent republics have far less flnancial means at theirdisposal than the Union. Tireir share in the funds earmarked for socialand cultural purposes is no more than 14.3 per cent which, althoughnominally a figure referring again to 1941 only, may be considered a fairaverage. Fifty per cent of the funds in this category are covered by thelocal budeets. Over 300 educational institutions all over the U.S.S.R.,many research institutes, scientific libraries and all the Academies ofSciences are financed out of the Union budget. The republican budgetsprovide for secondary schools, libraries, museums, state theatres, etc.The republican and locai budgets also cover ninety per cent of theexpenditure on public health.

Administration costs are divided up as follows between the threesroups of budsets; Union budget 32:4 per cent, republican budgetsl-l per cent, local budgets 43.6 per cent. Al1 that is vital to state securityin all parts of the U.S.S.R. is covered out of the Union budget. The iocalbudgets, apart from providing appropriations for general administrativepurposes, finance registry offices, trafhc police and fire brigades.

The 'miscellaneous expenditure' is almost entirely charged to theL-nion budget (95.3 per cent).

Since the expenditure side of the republican and local budgets is small,the latter have little need of major resources of income. The pur-

it:


chase tax and the State's share in the profits of nationalized industry,

the two main sources of income of the Soviet budget, thus go mainly

into the central treasury and only comparatively small portions-are

diverted each year into the republican treasuries and local budgets.l3

The centralistic direction of Soviet financial policy does not prevent,

of course, the application of heavy state investments in the non-

Russian territoriel. On the contrary, Soviet statistics could prove only

too easily that a comparatively greater proportion of the budgetary

appropriitions goes to non-Russian territories than_to many territories

irihabiled by Russian people. The fact remains that. the republican

sovernments have no financial autonomy, no real say in regard to the

i.on"y spent on their territory. Ifthe Soviet Republics enjoyed- budgetary

autonomy the budgets would undoubtedly look different and the interests

of the individual p-eoples of the Soviet Union would not be sacrificed to

the interests of the Union as a whole; instead a compromise would have

to be worked out between all-union requirements and local aspirations.

T H E ' s o v I E T o F N A T I O N A L I T I E S '

The protagonists of Soviet nationalities policy might argue that the non-

Russian nationalities have a considerable, if not decisive, influence onthepreparation of the Soviet budget, through their predominant partici-pation in the Soviet of Nationalities. At this p,oint we again have to leave

Soviet reality as expressed in the budgetary figures and to revert to the

fiction of Soviet constitutional law.The Soviet of Nationalities is the Second Chamber of the Soviet

oarliament. which until 1936 was known as'Central Executive Commit-iee of the U.S.S.R.' (in Russian abbreviated as Ts.I.K.) and which sincerhen has been officially called 'Supreme Soviet' or 'Supreme Council'.The Soviet of Nationalities has equal rights with the First Chamber, theSoviet ofthe Union, and serves in theory as the constitutional safeguardfor the small nationalities, so as to check any preponderance of theSlavs.

Under the 1923 constitution there was a very wide measure of equalitybetween large and small nations in the Soviet of Nationalities. UnionRepublics and Autonomous Republics were placed on the same levelend had five representatives each, Autonomous Provinces one each-The new constitution greatly enlarged the Soviet of Nationalities butdiscriminated between Union Republics and Autonomous Republics.At present every Soviet Republic elects twenty-five members to the

Soviet of Nationalities, every Autonomous Republic eleven, everyAutonomous Province five, and every National Area one deputy.Aithough the non-Russian Soviet Republics and the AutonomousRepublics and Provinces usually include Russians in their delegations to

25

l C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S

the Soviet of Nationalities, the non-Russians and even the non-Slavshave a clear majority in that body. Had the deputies of the SupremeSoviet any real powers they could by a common effort easily prevent thepassage of any law which they thought harmful to their national interests;they could even defeat the adoption of the Union budget.

Membership of the Soviet 'parliament', however, signifies not muchmore than a title of honour for a distinguished Stakhanovite. a .Hero ofthe Soviet lJnion', a successful chairmin of a collective farm or a wr-terof nation-wide reputation. Both the Soviet of Nationalities and theSoviet of the Union meet for no more than a fortnight every year forpurely formal sessions, in which they have to give belated approval toall the measures taken by the government and to pass the budget. Thespeeches madeduring the'Supreme Soviet' sessions serve predominantlyfor propagandist purposes, although they also contain, here and there,elements of criticisms regarding points of detail and some minor recom-mendations which, however, never affect the substance of the budeet orthe general policy of the r6gime.

Even if the Soviet of Nationalities had more power and held longersessions it could not safeguard the individual national interests of ihepeoples of ,the U.S.S.R., in view of the fact that the overwhelmingmajority of the deputies are members of the Communist party. Theformidable totalitarian power of the Communist Party reducei evenfurther the importance not only of the Soviet of Nationalities but alsoofthe entire constitutional system created by Soviet nationalities policy.

. The organization and machinery of the All-Union Communisi pariyis c€ntralistic in the extreme. The party is the same in all Soviet Republics,Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Provinces, etc., and thus guaran-tees a complete uniformity of policy throughout the Soviet Union despitea1l constitutional federalism. The central machinery of the All-UnionCommunist Party is constantly checking on the goyernments of theconstituent republics lest they should take too literally the federal charac-ter of the constitution. An entire staff of party officials at the service ofthe 'Central Committee'is constantly being switched round in the SovietUnion so as to ensure that the Party shall remain one monolithic whole,* ithout regard to local frontiers drawn between Russia's nationalities.The Central Committee often endows its emissaries with extraordinarypo\\,ers reducing to nothing all the prerogatives which the governmentsof the Soliet Republics, or Autonomous Soviet Republics possess onpaper. After the completion of the emissaries' mission, Moscow,s inter-terence is then usually admitted by the formula 'with the assistance ofrhe Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party it has beenpo'sible . . . to overcome the difficulties on the agrarian front', or' . . . to iiquidate the nationalistic deviation', or'. . . to raise the levelof cattle breeding.'

26

i COLONIZAT ION AND NAT IONAL IT IES

F A L L A C I E S O F S O V I E T S T A T I S T I C S

Soviet propaganda has tried to conceal the basic truth about its nation-

alities irolic/not only behind a fictitious legal construction but also

behind a dense smokescreen of statistics.This propaganda makes belief that Soviet nationalities policy is

the sum'totil"of all the figures referring to the cultural and economic

advancement of the peoples of Russia in the last thirty years. It is quite

immaterial whether the Soviet statistics are accurate or not; they cannot

reflect the success or failure of Soviet Russia's handling of the nationali-

ties problem, because they refer solely to quantity and not to quality.

l. CUrrunel STATTSTICS. Soviet cultural statistics, for instance, re-

veal a fantastic growth of literacy among the non-Russian peoples, but

they do not say-what end the literacy serves. Does it smooth the path

for the beginning of a national cultural life of the peoples concerned?

Is it a prepiaratio-n for final 'Russification'? Or is it designed to fabricate

a uniform .Soviet culture" national in form but Bolshevik in substance?

Moreover, Russian and western concepts never fully tally. words like

literacy and iuiteracy have a different melning in the. Soviet Union and

in western Europe. The slogan of '100 per cent liquidation of illiteracy'

in a siven ureu oi the Soviet Union does not mean that any number of

p"opi" approaching this percentage can participate in cultural life even

in tire m&t primitive wiy. Afterthe formal liquidation_of_'illiteracy'

there still remains what Russians call malogramotnosl, which means a

low degree of literacy implying a technical knowledge of the alphabet

rvithoui the ability to make practical use of it'

Or let us take ihe impresiive number of books published since 1917

in the national languages. At the first glance these figu-res can tell us

nothing about the dultural development of the peoples for whom they

are priited. These statistics will reflect reaiity only as soon as we break

them up and find out how many books !n 1 given language are simply-

translaiions of the works of Lenin and Stalin, of the Short History oJ

the All-Union Communist Pafty, or propaganda pamphlets, and how

many books constitute genuine contributions towards the cultural en-

richment of the nationalily for which they are printed. There is no doubt

that this last figure will be in every single case discouragingly small'

2. BCONOTTITC STATTSTICS. Even less relevant for any assessment of

Soviet nationalities policy are economic statistics. These will tell us thepercentual increase bf industrial production in any national minority

ierritory of the Soviet Union, but the figures themselves will not answer

the queition how far this increase guarantees or endangers the survival

of the non-Russians of the U.S.S.R. This is a reproach not to Soviet

reality but to soviet propaganda, which is trying to conceal a most logical


and natural fact; that the theory of the Soviet nationalities policy has tobe sacrificed to the Five-Year Plans, since the contrary would beUtopian. Practice has shown that every new factory, every new coal-mine, every new oil-well in a non-Russian territory of the U.S.S.R. isnot primarily an asset for the people of that territory but rather for theGreat Russians, who alone have a sufficient manpower reserve to staffthe new enterpr ises.3. rHa NUMBER oF sovrET NArroNAlrrlrs. Finally, the most funda-mental figure of the Soviet nationalities policy - the number of peoplesin the Soviet Union - is also an arithmetical illusion if not Turiherelucidated. The number of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is usuallyB!v9n as 180, although there are other estimates, slightly higher anislightly lower. A scientific analysis based on the 1926 census gave thenumber of nationalit ies in the U.S.S.R. as 169, sub-divided into twelvebasic groups. According to this analysis Russia included 47 Turkic,39 Japhetic (Caucasian), 27 Ugro-Finnish, 17 Iranian, 9 palae-asiatic,8 Indo-European, 5 Semite, and other nationalities.ta Such figures,accurate as they may be from the point of view of the ethnog.iph.r,have no practical value and exaggerate the real scope of Soviei nalion-alities policy, which is big enough without any exaggeration.

At least half of the 180 peoples cannot be reckoned as nationalities ina cultural or political sense, even if the most generous criterion is applied.The Soviet cultural worker and communist propagandist must thereforeoperate with a figure considerably lower than 180. Alexander Fadeyev,the well-known Soviet writer and member of the Communist CentralCommittee, addressing the Peace Congress in Paris in 1949, said therewere'about seventy nationalit ies'in the Soviet Union. This is nearer thetruth in so far as nationalities which have arrived at a minimum desreeof cultural or even linguistic self-expression are concerned. There-areindeed newspapers in eighty languages of the Soviet Union. politicaland literary journals exist in fifty languages.15

The rdgime can reckon with thirty to forty-five nationalities in theactual sphere of Soviet 'home politics'. Thus forty-four nationalitieswere_represented among the delegates of the first post-war congress ofthe Communist Youth Leaguel6 and thirty-two nationalities among thedelegates to the Tenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions in 1949.1?Even the existence of thirty to forty nationalities which count politicallyis sufficient to make the tasks of the Soviet nationalities policy, with itsnarrow pattern and rigid principles, extremely complicated. How theSoviet rdgime has tried to solve the multitude of political, economic andcultural problems which are inherent in Russia's multi-national charac-ter, can be shown only by examining the application of Soviet nationali-ties policy in detail, nationality by nationality, republic by republic,province by province.

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L N O T E S T O C H A P T E R O N E

1. S. T. Arsarov, Chronicle,c of a Russian Family, translated by M' C'

Beverley, with an introduction ty Prince Mirsky. Routledge, London -

New York 1924, PP. 158, 209, 353.

2. M. K,q,LrwrN, Za ety gody - During these Years, Moscow-Leningrad 1929'vol . 3 , pp. 385i6.

3. P. Bennzov, tuIikhail Vasilyevich Frun.e, I\{oscow 1941, pp' 78179'

4. Sotsialnv i natsiotrulny sostav vKP (b), Itogi vse.toyuznoy partiit-toy perepisi

1927 gorla. - The social and ethnic composition of the A'U'C'P' (Bol-

shevif,s), Results of the all-Union party census of 1927, Moscow-Lenin-grad 1928 (publishecl by the Department of statistics of the central Com-mittee of the All-Union Communist Party).

5. International Press Correspondence, January 5th, 1928'

6. The Essentials of Lenin (2 vols.), Lnwnr,Ncr, and wtsnanr, London 1947,

vol. 2, p. 548.7. The Essentials of Lenin, vol' 2, p. 699.

8. OcnNovsrv, Ocherki po ekonotnicheskoy geografi S''S:'S'R' --Sketches onthe economic geography of the U.S.S.R., Moscow 1924' p' 87 '

9. Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, Volume U.S.S.R., Moscow 1948' p' 56'

10. Trud, November 5th, 1947.

I L S. S. BALZAK, V. V. V,lsvurlN, Y. G. Fr'tGIN' Ekonomicheskaya Geografya.S..S.S.R. - Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R', Moscow 1940' vol' 1'

p . 1 4 1 .12. A. I. DrNtsov, Sovetskoye gosudarstvennoye Pravo - Soviet

Moscow 19a7, pp. 23415.

13. Prof. N. N. RovrNst<v, Gosudarstvenny byudzhet ,S.,S.,S.R.budget of the U.S.S.R., Moscow 1944'pp.30148.

14. Sovetskoye Stroitelstvo, Nr. 37, August 1929, p. ll0.

15. Izvestiya, MaY 5th, 1949-16. Pravda, April 1st, 1949.

I7. Pravda, April 23rd, 1949.

public law,

- The state

29

VII

T H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O P L E S

R U S S I A A N D T H E C A U C A S U S

The Caucasus means more to the Russians than either Russian CentralAsia or the Russian Far East. The bonds between Russia and theCaucasus are strong and real and no official propaganda efforts areneeded to orove their existence. The idea of the 'Russian Caucasus' willbe alive among the Russian people as long as they continue to honourand read their great poets, because the Caucasns has become part andparcel of Russian national tradition through the works of Pushkin,Lermontov and Tolstoy.

Lermontov's works in oarticular show that the Russians have inter-preted the word 'Caucasui' not as a purely geographical notion, but asa whole period of Russian history and a political programme stronqlyflavoured with romanticism. While deploring the end of the primitivefreedom of the Caucasus peoples Lermontov, like Pushkin, consideredthe final triumoh of Russian civilization over the Caucasus tribes to bean unavoidable historical necessity. Thus the two greatest Russian poetsgave to the Caucasian peoples identical advice, namely to reconcile them-selves to the victory of the Russians.

Pushkin has expressed this conviction in the phrase: 'Humble thyself,Caucasus, for Yermolov* is coming'. Lermontov, on the other hand,predicted to the Circassians that one day they would proudly say 'We

may truly be slaves, but at least we are slaves of the ruler of the Uni-verse !' Since Lermontov's time Russia's power has grown considerablyand the service of a great master has indeed become the dubious conso-lation not only of the Caucasian peoples but of many others besides,throughout the Soviet Union.

The peoples of the Caucasus did not act in accordance with Push-kin's and Lermontov's admonitions; they stubbornly fought Russia andstruggled desperately for their freedom, because they did not realize thetremendous odds they were facing. They were too remote from the worldof political and diplomatic realities of the nineteenth century to under-stand either the hopelessness of their own situation or the power of theRussian Empire. They deceived themselves by the erroneoui supposition* General Yermolov (1772-1 863) was the principal Russian hero of the Caucasus conquest

that Russia would not fieht for the b".*r a"";;rtl""r"o,", ,f she werereally as great and mighty as was sornetimes asserted by some mountain-eers who had seen her immensity and later returned to their own people.r

T H E F I R S T E X O D U S O F T H E M O U N T A I N E E R S

The mountaineers of the Western Caucasus - the Circassians or theAdyge - who had lived close to the shores of the Black Sea, occupiedparticularly important strate_sic positions. In every war which Russiawaged against Turkey the fearless Circassians had constituted a gravemenace in the immediirte rear of the Russian Caucasus front.-Thealternatives, from the Russian point of view, therefore, could only beeither the total surrender or the total annihilation of the circassians.As only a minority of the Circassians were ready to accept surrender,a mass migration of the Circassians to Turkey appeared the onlypossible 'solution', both to the Russian conquerors and the Circassiansthemselves, whose indomitabie spirit of freedbm could not be reconciledwi th Russian ru le.

Thus between I 861 and I 864 about 500,000 Circassians left the Cauca-sus; but owing_to staivation, disease and the hardships of the journeyin overcrowded vessels, it is said that only half of them ever ieachedTurkey alive. Referring to this trek of the Circassians a semi-officialRussian publication admitted that 'a calamity of such proportions hasrarely befallen humanity'.2 This great exodus of the Circassians disposedof the problem of nationalities in large areas of the western part of theNorth Caucasus region and opened them up to Russian, Ukrainian andArmenian colonization.

After the departure of the Circassians a great deal still remained to bedone in the North Caucasus region from-a Russian national point ofview. Although thousands of Chechens, Nogai Tartars and Osseiins hadIikewise participated in the great exodus, these and other peoples oftheCentral and Eastern Caucasus continued to be a source of uneasiness1o the Russian State. Complete Russian victory over the rebelliousmountaineers was achieved only under the Soviet r6gime.

T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E C H A O S I N T H E S O V I E T C A U C A S U S

The Russian communist leaders came to the Northern Caucasus withprogressive ideas and plans for raising the material and cultural levelof its peoples. The Soviet Government was originally even determinedto give the small mountain peoples a chance to combine their forcesand thus become a political factor of some importance. In accordancewith the wishes of the more advanced mountaineers the Soviet Govern-ment decided that there should be one United Northern Caucasus

Reoubric "eereeatinJlffi"lj,]l;,ffi;]o,,un*. rhis Repub-l ic I officiaii i ca"lled'-Autonomous Mountain Socialist Soviet Republic'-

(Gorskaya A.S.S.R.) - was formed by a decree of January 20th, 1920'

its capiial was the city of Vladikavkaz. The Republic comprised no

fewerihan seven different Caucasian peoples: Kabardinians, Chechens,

Circassians (Cherkess), Ingush, Ossetins, Balkars and Karachay'

In its original form the Mountain Republic remained in being fol o{Y

about tweity months. The Russian c-ommunist rulers apparently felt

that the promotion of unity among the North caucasus peoples was not

in the inierest of Soviet ceniralism-and that it was safer to have them split

up again into several single units. The disintegralion-.of the Mountain

nep,iu[c started in September 1921 when the Kabardinians were given

a special Autonomoui Province. In January 1922 three more peoples

,."id.d from the Republic. The Balkars were made to join the Kabar-

dinian Autonomous Province and the Karachay and the Cherkess were

given a joint Autonomous Province. In December 1922 the chechens

ilere indlced to set up an Autonomous Province of their own, which left

only the Ossetins arrd the Ingush, in-the Mountain Republic' In.July-

tSi+ both these peoples were -endowed

with separate territorial lnits of

their own. The 6xperiment of a united North Caucasus Republic was

thus finally terminited. Administrative changes in the Northern Cauca-

sus continued even after the end of the Mountain Republic. In April

1926 the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Province was divided into

two provincer; und in January 1934 the Ingush merged with the Chech-

ens into a singie Autonomous Province'The auton5my which the Northern Caucasus peoples had enjoyed

existed very largely on paper' In reality thgl yele administered up

to 1934 from Rostov, thetapital of the huge North caucasus Territory,

which was almost as large as Great Britain and Eire combined. The

Executive committee of ihe North caucasus Territory (Krayispolkom)

was entitled to overrule any decisions taken by the various Autonomous

Provinces. In 1934 the Soviet bureaucracy administering the multi-

national parts of the North Caucasus reglon moved from Rostov to

Vladikavkaz. Only in December 1936 did the mountaineers gain a

greater say in the management of their affairs through_the transformation

6f thr." Autonomous-Provinces into Republics (Kabardinian-Balkar

A.S.S.R., Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and Northern Ossetin A'S'S'R')'

The repeated shifting of the Northern caucasus peoples from one

territoriai unit to anothir had left untouched the real problem: how to

make the mountaineers into reliable soviet citizens and how to associate

them with the socialist transformation of society. The continual changes

in the administrative boundaries had hindered rather than encouraged

these tasks. They had rendered particularly difficult the recruiting of

administrative personnel from among the local peoples and the intro-

183

duction of their;;;;:;::ffi:" ;^"*, words.the Soviernationalities policy in the Northern caucasus remained unsuccessful,and an endless stream of statements, ordinances and recommendationsissued by the Presidium of the central Executive committee (TsIK)in Moscow had been

-"^1_b1"^ to. remedy the situation to any'majoiextent. on May 10th, 1931, for instance, TsIK circulated a dlcree tothe effect that Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern caucasusshould operare at a quicker pace. Thi deiree stipulated that by the endof 1932 at least 70 per cent of officials in the Autonomous provincesshould be recruited from among the local nationalities, and that locall11qu1ge1 should be introduced into the administration. On July 5rh,1934, TsIK issued a statement recognizing that the decree put into forceover three years earlier had remained a-dead letter. A fr.rrther decreewhich Kalinin signed on January 7th, 1936, again denounced the non-implementation of the Soviet nationalities policv in the Northerncaucasus and revealed that the Russian language dominated everywherein local government bodies, from the proiincial administratio.r do*.,to the vil lage councils. of 1,310 officials in the Northern caucasus Ter-ritory only seventeen belonged to the mountain peoples. According tothe new decree the local languages were supposed to come into offi"cialuse in 1936 and 1937, but it is open to doubt whether that order had anvgreater practical results than its predecessors

T H E S E C O N D E X O D U S O F T H E M O U N T A I N E E R S

The Russo-German war fully revealed the discrepancy existing betweenpropaganda and reality with regard to conditions in the lortherncaucasus. one could hardly find a better example of the former thanthe optimistic and distorted picture which Mikhail Kalinin gave inoctober 1942 when the German troops were approaching the ciucasusMountains. Kalinin then said: 'The caucasus-ii the moit enlighteningdemonstration of the reforming,-beneficial effect of the Soviet tlyt.- onthe psychology and character of people r.vho, not without ."ur'on, ,u*danger to themselves everywhere. Th-e caucasians have now become asocial people who see in the collective system their buhvark, the founcla-tion of material prosperity and a higher inteilectual rife. . . . The wholecaucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The wholesoviet land, from border to border, has

-become their- beloved home.

National enmity has_given way to mutual understanding, estrangementto co-operation. . . . Is not everything that has taken place in the Lauca-sus during the twenty-five years of Soviet power a miracle? yes, it is amiracle. It is that for which Lenin fought af his life, that for which Stalin

ig"ghl and is fighting, that to which our party has always aspired.' AndKalinin went on to say that the peoples of th-e North..tr cuucarus were

184


displaying worthy resistance to the enemy,, derailing trains, blowing up

briilges, destroyiirg ammunition and fuel depots.s

Oity a few weeks after Kalinin had made,hit- p-untg.yl19 statement

little was left of the Caucasian 'miracle', and of the idyllic situation

which the Soviet President had depicted. when the German armies occu-

pied the Northern Caucasus region many mountaineers manifested their

irostility towards the Soviet r6gime. They attempted to use the retreat

of the Red Army to free themselves from what they considered.the.Russian yoke'. over twenty years of Soviet-rule had not altered their

ingrainedtonviction that Russia's foes were their friends. These peoples

ap'parently thought that they owed as little loyalty to R t,ssia as the

tndonesians deeried themselves to owe to the Dutch and the Vietnamese

to the French when their respective countries were occupied by -Japan.In the official Soviet view, of the seven peoples who in 1920 had formed

the Mountain Republic four had shown themselves particularly^unre-

liable in the crucial winter of 1942-43. They were the chechens (407,600

according to the 1939 census), the Ingush (92,074), the Balkars- (42,,660)

and the karachay (i5,73i). After the North Cauc-asus_region had been

cleared of the invaders, the Soviet Government found itself unable to

forgive these nationaiities for their disloyalty or even their indifference.

It ilso abandoned all further attempts to transform them into good

citizens of the U.S.S.R. and expelled them from the 'happy family of

soviet peoples'. A1l of them lost the special territorial administrative

units which the Staiin Constitution of 1936 had bestowed on them.

Early in 1944 Ihey were rounded up and deported to far away.places in

Sibeiia. For all practical purposes they ceased to exist. Thus were

abolished the chechen-Ingush Autonomous S.S.R. and the Autono-

mous Province of the Karachay. The Kabardinian-Balkar A'S'S'R'

was transformed into the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. after having been re-

lieved of the 'burden' of the Balkar traitors.Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasus differed to some extent from

czarist potlcy since it resulted in the building .of schools, the.atres,

libraries^and"hospitals, but for the four deported nationalities a1l this

had been of little use. From their point of view there is hardly any differ-

ence between the policy of General Yermolov and that of Generalissimo

Stalin. Indeed, th; Soviet r6gime deprived at least as many Caucasian

mountaineers of their homes as did the Czarist r6gime.

C O N T I N U I T Y O F R U S S I A N C A U C A S U S P O L I C Y : T H E C H E C H E N S

The Chechens, as the most numerous nationality left in the Northern

Caucasus after the emigration of the Circassians, offer a palticularly

good example of the continuity of Russian policy. lle I--1gi Soviet

Encycloprdia rightly summed up the historical role of the Chechens by

r85

H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O P L E S

describing them as the 'most active and strongest opponents of theczarist Government during the conquest of the ciucasur;. Th" Russianssuffered extensive and costly disasters at the hands of this people, whowere unequalled in forest warfare.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the chechens have challengedthe Russian Empire, but from 1818 onwards their resistance to Russianrule assumed major proportions. In that year General yermolov builta fortress to subjugate more easily the rand of the chechens. He calledthe new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. Thename of Grozny had a de,eper meaning than might appear at the firstglance: itwas the symbol of a political pr-ogrammeihat *ermolov definedin the following words: 'I wish that the te-rror of my name should suardour frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word sf,ouldbe for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Gioznv becameYermolov.'s.headquarters, and it was from Grozny that counfless Rus-sian expeditions set out oto punish raiders, avenge befeats, establish newposts, relieve beieaguered garrisons, or rescue retreating bands andarmies'.4 rhe Russian campaign against chechenia reachid its climaxin 1840, at the time of the great Chtchen rising under the leadership ofImam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movementled to the gradual submission of the chechens in the years 1g57-59.

The Russian authorities knew well that these new subjects of the czar,after all the trouble they had caused, would not easily reconcile them-selves to the loss of their freedom; so an attempt wis made to settlethe'chechen problem'by a dor-rble transfer of population. Immediatelyafter the conquest the inhabitants of.forty-fo.rf auls (mountain villages)were tran_splanted from the mountains to the plains, where they co.-uldmore easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were foiced toemigrate to Turkey, whele they were given hospitality on the expressdemand of the Russian Government. In the surnmei of 1g65, :9,OOOchechens, one-fifth of the_entire chechen population at that date,'leftRussia. Those who stayed behind did nof remain quiescent. rn'lglithere was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, and more trouble in 1886. ARussian monograph on thech-echens, pu_blished in.1894, said that they could not yet b"e cbnsidered'fully pacified'; they still looked across t[e border to Turkev whithermany.more dreamed of emigrating.s The emigration of the 39,000 hadnot eliminated the 'chechen problem', for the birthrate of these chech-ens was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

C H E C H E N - I N G U S H M O S L E M O P P O S I T I O N

The immediate consequence of the october Revolution in checheniawas a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the

186

chechens. rhey at ;" ;;ff";",rrip gf t_h,e Sheikh UzunHadii who proclaimed himseli Imam and Emir of the Northern Cauca-

iu. . tn . Emir was the a l ly of the communists in the st ruggle against the

*hit" Cuu.ds of Geneial Denikin. Having vanquished the White

armies, the Bolsheviks dropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope

with Cirechen nationalism. itre Ctrechens demanded the expulsion of all

Russians who in the course of the last century had settled in their 'living

,ou.".. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist

b'ands terrorize? thi Russian population of the area beyond endurance.

In the early trventies the Russian settlers in Chechenia sent a complaint

to Moscow on account of the endless raids and murders perpetrated by

Chechen bands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin

went personally to the Caucasus and attempted-to calm.down both

Russians and ihechens. With carefully chosen words he tried to persuade

them to live together in peace, to intermarry and to respect each other's

customs.6Whilst in consequence of Kalinin's personal intervention banditry

stopped in chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the

Soiiirt r6gime was never quite suppressed. In 1931 the little country still

had 2,6i3 mosques and Arab iChools, as rvell as 1,250 mullahs, 34

,fr.iptt and 25b re[gious elders. The mullahs who were powerful

opponents of the Sovi-et r6gime even managed to keep alive the illegal

Siliriah courts which were camouflaged as'reconciliation commissions'.

The hostile attitude of the Cheihens towards the Soviet Russian

r6gime was often manifested in the readiness to credit the most fantastic

an"ti-Russian rumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a wide-

spread belief that Kunta Hadji - the head of a popular Y.ot1:- sect who

tiad died at the end of the nineteenth century - was stili alive and was

soon to return to chechenia, where he would found a State based on

Moslem religious law. Apparently the chechens did not differentiate

between Cza"rist ancl Bolslivik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji

would appear as Messiah, for it was he who lead led them in the risings

asainst bzarism in 1864 and 1877, for which he was exiled to Novgorod.'ih.

Ingrrrh, whose fate Soviet policy had co-upled with that of the

Chechenf showed themselves no iess loyal to Islam. A delega_te who

represented Ingushetia at the 'second All-Union Conference of GodlesspJdagogists'iritg:t, stated that the influence of the Moslem clergy_was

stiil Jo -strong

among the Ingush that-.children refused to learn from

Loots wnlcfr ihey beiGvecl to 6e anti-religious. Whenever a teacher tried

to introduce anti-religious propaganda he encountered a hostile attitude

amons schooi childrJn and there-were cases in which teachers had even

to ieaie the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular

Soviet schools, where the children were taught in the winter, was counter-

acted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn

1 8 7


during the summer holidavs all that the Soviet authorities wished themto disregard' A number of Ingush party and communist youth Leaguemembers, instead of working againit ttr-e influence of reiigion, ,r.Jir,.-_seives to go to the mosques to pray.?

The difficulties existing between-the Soviet authorities and the chech_ens. and Ingush were not exclusi'ely due to the Borshevik failuie tounderstand the importance of the ieligious factor in the tife

-oi ttre

mountaineers. There were also extraord-inary difficulties or u i."nni.utnature, due to the fact that the directives ofthe centrar administrationwere issued in the Rr.rssian language and therefore did not ,.u"r, tn"chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the ordersreceived, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, o.falsified the decisions of the party and of the administraiion.s

c R O Z n - y _ T H E O I L C I T y

It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capitalof Chechenia that prevented.thelmplementation of any genuine crr"irr"o.1utglory an^d finally speiled the doom of the Chechen'pEopre. The actualliquidation of the chechens would probably not have'occurred haj notth^elargest town in their homelandbecome an oil city, ana indeed, oneof the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

. This oil city had- developed out of the littie fortress of Grozny. Al-though Grozny oilf ierds had been discovered as early as ts::. iheiwerehardly_ exploited at all in the nineteenth century.'rn Di, troi".u".,they^ already supplied r1'5 per cent of the entire'Russian oil. n.t*""n1913 and 1917 this_figure had risen to

.*^l p-r, cent, and in the followingfour yla1s to. near.ly 25 per cenr. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oilto total-Russian oil production had fallen to 9-.25-per cent, but in tJrmsof absolL'*e figures this output represented an increase

"r'zzi per-iint,

c_ompared to that before the First world war. The devetop'meni orGrozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the populutifn on uo'American scale'. In 18.90^t!: place had no more than

'o,obo inhabiiants,

against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939.lf ne"o -hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consiJne orshepherds and peasants, could not contribui. o"ytt ing,"o.rr, ,n.nii"on-in_g to the rise of the town which was styled, arm'ost r.ini.urrv, Cpiturof the Chechen-Ingush A.s.s.R.'. Among the oilwork.r, 6i G;;ryth"T:-y:1" probably at no time more thai one-tenth of .nativesl

anduntil 1936 there were but 9.7 per cent.

Unl ike.so many c i t ies. in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed i tsname under the Soviet 169ime, despite the imperialistic history c"iri."t.awitlr it. As a matter of fact, it was the Sovi'et oit citv of ciornv *r., i.r-,spelled the doom of the chechens and not the liitle rort..rJ *rrr.r,

188


Yermolov had founded to spread terrot among the mountaineers. The

struggle which Czarist Russian officers had begun_was.terminated.by

Sovie-t Russian police officials, who finally ensured Russian domination

over the northern slopes of the Northern Caucasus by expelling. the

Chechens bag and baggage. It is questionable whether the crimes

officially attriluted to the ehechens - particularly the help which.they

had siven to the Germans - would have been a sufficiently weighty

,euso-n for exterminating them as an organized community, had not the

Grozny oil been involved. To protect the Grozny oil-wells against all

futureiisks the Soviet authorities removed the Chechens from Grozny's

hinterland and transformed the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. into the

Grozny Province. Grozny is another instance of the danger which the

existence of oil-wells can bring to a small people. whether in T,atin-

America, the Middle East or in the Soviet Union, national self-deter-

mination, independence, autonomy and national rights count little as

soon as oil interests are at stake.Almost up to the very moment of their suppression as an ethno-

graphic unit, Russian propaganda made _ considerable use of the

Ltrechens in its attempt to impress the public abroad with the Soviet

nationalities policy. Even a year after the outbreak of the Second world

War the Chechens were still regarded as a'good people'. In August 1942

they were said to have played a prominent part in l jUig anti-fascist

meitins' in the town of Ordzhonikidze where 3,000 mountaineerspledeed their 'boundless devotion to our beloved motherland - the'Sovi"et

Union - and the great Russian people'. Delegates of the

Chechens, Ingush, Balkars - all peoples whom the Soviet Government

later deprived of their national existence - addressed the meeting and

spoke a^bout their strong friendship towards the Russians.e Data made

available on October 5ih, 1942, showed that forty-four Chechens had

been awarded decorations for valour in the field, not a bad record con-

sidering that far larger national units like the Turkmenians, Tadzhiks,

Kirghii and Estonians had not won many more by that date.

Piradoxically, the Chechens and Ingush continued to serve the.pur-

pose of Soviei propaganda even after their liquidation as political

entities. Their removal-from their homeland enabled the Soviet rdgime

to rewrite the entire history of the Northern Caucasus. This rewriting

consisted in blaming the Chechens and Ingush for a1l acts of anti-Soviet

resistance perpetratLd in the years following the October Revolution in

the Caucaius region, and in-whitewashing all other nationalities. This

new interpretation of Caucasus history was even elaborated in a state-

ment of tire Central Committee of tne Att-Union Communist Party' It

dealt with the opera The Great Friendship the libretto of which had not

taken into account the official reorientation with regard to the history

of the Caucasus. The Central Committoe ctaternent of February l0tht

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F I E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O P L E S

1948, said: 'The plot of the opera is historicalry false and artificial. Itple]:nd: to. depict the struggle for the establishm'ent of Soviet power andglli"_ldr!:p between the peoples in the Northern Caucasus in the years1918-20. The opera conveys the erroneous impression that such ca"ucas-ian peoples as the Georgians and ossetins hid been hostile durine thisepoch towards the Russian people. This is historically false sinc? theobstacle to the establishmeni of friendship between the peoples in theNorthern caucasus was during that period the Ingush andchechens,.r0*_ This pronouncement was a most a,uthoritive ixposition of the newSoviet theory about 'good' and 'bad' peoples.

T H E A B O L I T I O N O F T H E K A R A C H A Y P R O V I N C E

Another caucasian people who, together with the chechens andIngush, came to lose their territorial administrative unit were the Kara-chay, a people of the western caucasus who had suffered greatly in thenineteenth century under the pressure of Russian cossack iolonization.The Ka^rachay had been driven out into the mountains by the advancingwave of the cossacks who took possession of the caucasus foothills]Confined to the rocky mountajn area the Karachay lived in conditionsof great misery and earned a scanty tivelihood through nomadic cattle-breedine.

Befori the war the Soviet Government considered that the resettle--gt:l the Karachay into the plain was one of the great achievementsof Bolshevik Caucasus policy. Ii was just that resettleirent which in 1942offered to the Karachay the opportunity of getting into touch wittr theGerman armies and renderine iervice t6 tfr""rn.

From the point of view of iis ethnical composition the abolition of theAutonomous Province of the Karachay was hardly justifiable, since Slavcolonizatiol in the province was iniignificant. ii iDza the Russiansrepresented only 1.7 per cent and the Ukrainians 4.4 pe, cent of thepopulation, while the Karach.ay themselves formed ovei three-quartersof the inhabitants in the province. As neither Russian nor Slav nationalinterests were affected the Soviet Government decided io accompany theabolition of the Karachay province by a friendly gesture towirdi ttreGeorgians. only the northern part of tfre I(arachiy irovince was addedj" tl"

*i::lan pro.vince of Stavropol, while the southern part u4th the'capital' Klikhori,t was included in Georgia. The annexition of this* Before the chechens and rngush feil into disgrace the official Soviet history of the octo-ber Revolution and the Civir war attribxted tJthese trvo peoples the most daring exploitsin support of the Bolsheviks. This is what an official Soviet'puuricution ior i.ilig",'if"-sumption said about the Ingush in 1937:,'In the Revorution this people covered itsilf withundying glory. During the Civil War. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, puiru.O ti tf-r"

"n"_v, *u,

ft'-"-:l jo seek refuge $ith the Ingush. The-tngush faithfully protected him,.l,f Klikhori

-was originally called 'Mikoyan Shalhar'. T'he town was built in the late twenties

to give the Karachay people an aciministrative centre.

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T H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O

tenitory comprising 1,200 square miles was a nationai triumph forG;orgii, for ii enabled her, for the first time, to spread out to the northof the Caucasus.

A ' cooD ' PEoPLE - THE oSSETINS

After the expulsion of the Chechens from their homeland the Ossetins

became the largest mountain people of the Northern Caucasus. In 1939

there were alto-gether 354,000 ossetins in the u.s.s.R. of whom slightly

less than two-thirds lived in the Autonomous Republic of Northern

ossetia, with which we are here primarily concerned, and about one-

third in the Southern ossetin Autonomous Province of Georgia. The

two Ossetin territories adjoin each other and it would have been logical

to amalgamate them into a single Autonomous nepgltt-c. Representa-

tives of ihe two Ossetias went to Moscow in October 1925 to discuss the

unification of their people with the Soviet central Government andpersonally with Staiin whose own mother is of ossetin origin. This

discussion which is briefly referred to in the seventh volume of Stalin's

complete works, was inconclusive. The unification of the Ossetins would

have been possible only at the expense of Georgia and the Kremlin was

aOOarently not prepared to harm the interests of one of the constituent

r6dubtcs bf tne-u.S.s.R. for the sake of a minor nationality.'Czarist and Bolshevik authorit ies agree in their appraisal of the com-

paratively peaceful and placid ossetins, no less than in their judgment

bn tne turbulent Chechens. Of course, both r6gimes had encountered

difficulties among the Ossetins, too, but never on the sa-me scale as in the

case of other Caucasus mountain peoples.Czarist Russia started the conquest of the Ossetins in the period of

catherine II and skilfully exploited the class differences among them as

well as their hostility toward their western neighbours - the Kabardin-

ians. Many Ossetins considered the establishment of Russian rule as a

safeguard against the danger of attacks by more warlike mountainpeoiler. Ossetin folk-songs of the early epoch of Russian conquest

iefl6ct a pro-Russian spirit and state unequivocally that living under

Russian *1. *ut identi ial to l iving in peace.The ossetins appreciated that Russian occupation and protection

enabled them to settle in the plain from which they had been driven by

the Kabardinians, Part of that re-settlement had already started in the

second half of the eighteenth century. The major part of the re-settlement

action was, howevei, carried out much later, between the twenties and

the forties ofthe nineteenth century.The Ossetins were of use to Russia not only as settlers, but also as

soldiers. As early as the last years of the eighteenth century a number of

Ossetin officers distinguished themselves in Prince Potemkin's army in

r91


actioxs.against the Turks. An ossetin Major-General, K. Zankisov,fought in Poland against the insurgents of-Ig63-4 and he *u, bu noleans. thg 9{y ossetin Major-General of that epoch. Furthermor6, arr'ossetin Division' became famous in the course of the Russo-Turkishwar in 1877-8, when General Skobelev described its .chivalrcus gal-lantry' as being'above any praise'.l2

Russian cultural work among the ossetins started much earlier thanamong other mountain peoples. The first book to appear in the ossetinllng.uug: was-printed in Mbscow in l79g; its object was to r"ru" u, ukind of introduction to the study of the Bible. A tong period of fruit-ful association with the Russians and the general peaifut upprou"t ofthe ossetins towards Russian military aid political rule m'ade themmore open to the acceptance of Russian preponderance. The ossetinswere' as a matter of fact, the only people of ihe Northern caucasus toproduce a,gtga! writer.in jle person oi Kosta.Khetagurov (1g59_1906)who was half Russianized himself and wrote in boti the ossetin andRussian languages. The Soviet r6gime greatly popularized Khetagurovas a symbol of Russian-ossetin synthesis, whiih^he undoubtedlv"was.He had a complete Russian education, had studied at St. petersbuie andwas strongly influenced by such progressive Russian writers as H6rzenand.chernishevsky, which makes him particularly acceptable from theSoviet point of view.

-, Ultil.tfe Ossetins gave proof of their Ioyalty to Russia during the war

the soviet regime had had to overcome ossetin resistance toioth theestablishment of collective farms and the suppression of tribal customs.During the period of the coilectivization osietin peasants waged a sortof guerilla warfare against 'socialist property'

'and while Sutwardly

accepting collectivization, tried to transiorm the Kolkhoz into an instru-ment of their respective clans. ossetin chairmen of collective farms andofficials of local Soviets seem to have acted on the principle .I decidewho is a kulak and an enemy of the State and who is not'. t'hus, at leastduring_its initial stage, collectivization in ossetia became a downrightl1l:.: l:l"s

b,elonging ro a rival clan were rendered inno"uorr'byberng denounced as kulaks; real kulaks, on ihe other hand. were Dro-moted to the rank of respectable soviet citizens if they nappenei tobelong to the clan ciominating the rocal village council oi the 6oilectivefarm concerned.ls

All such'incidents' were forgotten when the ossetins redeemed theirJeputation by their brjlliant war record. In the fighting which resultedin the dislodgement of the Germans from the appioachis to the cauca-sus, ossetin partisans operating from behind iire enemy lines greatlyassisted. the Red Army.la.As a mark of appreciation foi their l8yalty,the soviet Government allowed the ossetiniio increase suustantialiv itreterritory of their national republic. A decree of April gth,lg44,stipuiated

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T H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O

that three districts were to be added to the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R.

in their entirety as well as parts of three other districts. The major por-

tion of this new Ossetin terlitory was sliced off the Stavropol Territory,

but a section of it came from Ingushetia, which had occupied the western

border area of the chechen-Ingush A.s.s.R. In this way the Northern

Ossetin A.S.S.R. grew from 2,390 square miles before the war to 3,250

square miles. ThiJterritorial change altered the ethnographic character

of the Republic, for together with its new territories Ossetia received a

fairlv laree number of Russians who mostly lived in the two new.OssLtin'io*nr, Mozdok and Malgobek. Rr.rssian communists thus ob-

tained a greater say in the running of the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. at

the expeise of their Ossetin comrades. In the small Northern Ossetin

Repubiic of the inter-war period (an Autonomous Province until 1936)

the ossetins had formed 84 per cent of the entire population against

13.4 per cent Russians and Ukrainians. In'Greater Ossetia'however,

the percentage of the Ossetins may have dropped to about 60 per cent

while the Siav share may have increased accordingly.In addition to the territorial expansion of Ossetia the Soviet Govern-

ment made still another'concession'to the Ossetins. The capital of the

republic, Vladikavkaz, was allowed to assume the Ossetin name of

Dzaudzhikau - a worthless gesture since Russian predominance in the

town was not affected by the -hange of its name. Dzaudzhikau remained

that which was implied in its former name of Vladikavkaz, meaning.Ruler of the Caucaius'. It continues to be one of the centres from which

Russian administration exercises its control over the mountaineers.

R E . E D U C A T I O N O F T H E K A B A R D I N I A N S

The chechens and the ossetins represent the two extremes in the attitude

of the local Caucasus peoples towards the Russians - the most irrecon-

cilable resistance in the case of the Chechens, and the most far-reaching

appeasemeltt in the case of the Ossetins. The Kabardinians, forming part

oiih" once powerful Circassian group which had been broken up by

Russian colonization and conquest, stafrd between these extremes. In

the Second World War their attitude was not beyond reproach. The

Kabardinians had their deserters and traitors, but the Soviet Govern-

ment did not consider they were bad enough to justify the abolition of

their Autonomous RePublic.During the important administrative reorganization which took place

in the Ciucasus iowards the end of the Second World War, the Kabar-

dinian A.S.S.R. was diminished by only 300 square miles, which were

incorporated into Georgia. This, however, was not meant to be a punish-

ment for the Kabardinians, but was directed against the Balkars who

had inhabited the area in question. The small administrative reform

193

achieved a duar r,;: l:;ffi#:;,r" Balkars it servedas a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to ex-press their loyalty towards soviet Russia in a very demonstrative. eyeneffusive. wav.

After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide forthe Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their alregiince to theSoviet state, a clear concep,tion of history which would u-nequivocallyshow that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabar-dinian people_. The task of formulating the details of this conception wasassigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose heabquartersare in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new con-ception-implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as thenational hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to lookup to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and giils to peter theGreat or Suvorov. According to the new official the-sis Temryuk. aKabardin ian pr i lce_who l ived around 1550, 'endeavoured to uui la-upa strong centralized state able to resist Turkish and crimean Tartaroppressors'.-Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapableof rvithstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own fbrcesonly; establishment of close contacts with MuscoW was therefore theonly wise Kabardinian policy.l5

^Ii is the sam-e story nutri.tt il told with some variation to all the peoples

of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain oftruth in the story, but never the entire truth,iince history is not so-simpleand so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes ofa one-sided propaganda.It is a historical fact that Temryut aitea Ivan the Terrible for pioiectionand even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in thi days ofgreater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stiess this fact. andlaid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudallords had engaged with the crimean Tartar Khanate. However. sinceevents_had pr9v9d the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyaltyof the Kabardinians to the Russians and th6 Soviet State, Temrwl: hadto be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

. Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the iim of re-educatingthe Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinianliterary almanac consisted-in showing that it was 'the friendship withthe Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better hfb.,10

wlfle a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense requiredby the Russians, education as such had been neglected during th'e firstpost-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was con-cerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the KabarOiniin A.S.S.R.were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form on_wards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The centralcommittee of the All-union communist party issued in l94g a state-

194


ment on 'serious shortcomings and mistakes' committed in Kabarda inthe field of national policy. It stressed that conditions in Kabardinianeducation were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., whichstipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schools in their ownlanguage.

Althoueh the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advancedthan the pioples of the Soviet Far North, they suffer from the same acuteshortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to thenationil culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948, theKabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-sixKabardinians out of a total of 559 students.l?

It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian cultureand Kabardinian language will become even more remote with theincreasing pressure of Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alonethe number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R.more than doubled; it increased from about 37,000 to 93,000. This in-crease was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion inKabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932, After the war thenumerical relation between 'natives' and colonists changed to the detri-ment of the former, owing to the forcible departure of the Balkars. More-over more Russian colonists came into the country to staff new factoriesspringing up around Nalchik.

T H E C I R C A S S I A N S - A R E S E R V E O F S O V I E T M I D D L E E A S T P O L I C Y

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people the SovietGovernment set up two Autonomous Provinces in the western part ofthe North Caucasus area; the Cherkess Province in the Caucasus foot-hills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.

Surrounded as they are on all sides by Russian territories these twonational units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies inparticular to the Adyge Province, whose capital - Maikop - used to bethe third largest Russian oil centre alter Baku and Grozny, before thedevelopmeniof the 'second Baku' between the Volga and'the Urals.

Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, whichhad a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55'7 per cent variousbranches of Adyge, 42'7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and therest made un of other Eurooeans and Armenians). The size of the Pro-vince was inireased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus foundthemselves in the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Provincewon doubtful 'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentage ofdisfranchized people. This was due to the arbitrary action of the localSoviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of'kulak', 'capitalist' and 'reactionary' with the result that I2 per cent of the

195

t E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O P L E S

entire adult population of the Province were deprived oftheir civic rishts.The Circassian (Cherkess) Autonomous Frovince is inhabitei by

three small Northern Caucasus peoples - the Cherkess, the Nogai Tar-tars and the Abazintsy, apart from Slav colonists. In 1933 tlie threeindigenous peoples had a narrow aggregate majority over the Russiansand Ukrainians.

_ Although the Circassians, as a people, have no political future inSoviet Russia itself, they may still be of service to the Soviet diplomacy.There are Circassians living in Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Trani-jordan. They are all descendants of the very Circasiians whom theCzarist authorities forced to leave Russia in the sixties of the nineteenthcentury. In Turkey the Circassians have largely become one with theTurkish people, but in the Arab countries they still form distinct com-munities. In Palestine they have kept to their own customs and language,and do not inter-marry with the Arabs. The Syrian Arabs dislike theCircassians, of whom both Turks and French had made use asainst theindigenous population of the country. In Transjordan, too, tlie Circas-sian minority has preserved its individuality.r8

The survival of circassian national sentiments in Syria. palestine andTransjordan may tempt the Soviet Union to create a .Circassian prob-lem'. Soviet propaganda may try at a given moment to arouse inierestfor the 'old country' among the Circassians in the Arab world. It shouldnot be too difficult for Russia to spread among the Middle Eastern Cir-cassians the story of the rebirth of the Circassian people in the U.S.S.R.,and of the existence of 'Circassian States' therein. Havine done thispreparatory work Russia may either encourage Circassian ie-immigra-tion into the Caucasus or she may use the Circassian on the spot as

-one

of several trump cards Russian imperialism holds in reseive in theMiddle East.

R U S S I A ' S M O S T P O L Y G L O T C O L O N Y : D A G H E S T A N

Daghestan represents the most difficult problem which the Sovietnationalities policy has to face, not only in the Caucasus, but in theSoviet Union as a whole. The very name of the Daehestan A.S.S.R.indicates that the country occupiej a special position"in the U.S.S.R.It is the only Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which does not bearthe name of a people but of a territory.

Daghestan is one of the most polyglot countries of the world. Ethno-logists record that its roughly 1,000,000 inhabitants are split up intothirty-two nationalities, in a territory of only 14,600 square miles.* The* In its original form Daghestan covered 19,800 square miles. In l93g the soviet Govern-ment separated from Daghestan parts of its lowlands with their predominant Ukrainian-Russian population, and its territory was thus reduced to about 13,000 square miles. Afterthe war, Daghestan 'inhsrited'

from Chechenia 1,600 square miles.

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T H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P B O P L E S

language and nationality issue in Daghestan is a new and superficial one.The fundamental problem is that of religion; and religion unites theDaghestani mountaineers under the green banner of Mohammed.

Under the Czarist r6gime Russian penetration into Daghestan wasincomplete. The country had been a Russian possession since the Treatyof Gulistan which Russia and Persia concluded in 1813, but there wasno real pacification of Daghestan until 1859, the year which ended the'Gazaval', the Holy War which the mountain peoples waged againstCzarist Russia under their national and religious leader Shamil. Evenduring the pacification process these peoples were largely left to them-selves. The Russians were concentrated in the small Dashestani towns ofTemir-Khan-Shura, Derbent and Petrovsk, and did nlot interfere withthe internal autonomy of the mountain villages. Only half-hearted effortsrvere made to impose Russian civilization upon the mountaineers. By1914 only fifty-four Russian schools existed in the whole of Daghestan.In the same ylar the country had more than 800 religious schools wherechildren learnt the Arabic language, the Koran and the Shariah. In 1917the sketchy attempts at Russification broke down completely; the Rus-sian schools were closed and mountain localities which had introducedRussian as the official language reverted to Arabic.

Thus Bolshevism had to start in Daghestan right from the beginningwith the imposition of Russian rule and Russian civilization. The Bol-shevik Party found it extremely difficult to gain a foothold in the isolated,deeply religious, mountain country. As an ideology Bolshevism has notconquered the mountaineers yet. The technical establishment of Bolshe-vik rule was, however, achieved in the greater part of Daghestan by thelate autumn of 1920, when the Russian White Guards were routed andthe Moslem nationalists withdrew to certain centres of resistance in thesouth ofthe country.

T H E T W O F A C E S O F S O V I E T P O L I C Y I N D A G H E S T A N

In November 1920 Stalin came personally to Temir-Khan-Shura, thetemporary capital, and proclaimed the autonomy of Daghestan. Stalinaddressed an 'extraordinary congress of the peoples of Daghestan' andsolemnly promised on behalf of the Soviet Government that the Shariahrvould be respected.

'Daghestan', Stalin said, 'shall be free to administer itself accordingto its own conditions, its ways and its customs. We are informed thatthe Shariah has great importance for the peoples of Daghestan. We arealso informed that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumoursthat the Soviet r6gime would ban the Shariah. I am entitled to declarehere on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist FederativeSoviet Republic that these rumours are lies. The Government of Russia

197


leaves to every people the full right to administer itself on the basis ofits own laws and customs. The Soviet Government considers theShariah as customary law of the same standing as that in force amongother peoples living in Russia. If it is the desire of the people ofDaghestan their laws and customs shall be preserved'.1e

Stalin's statement on the respect which the Soviet rdsime intended toshow towards the Shariah reasiured many mountaineeis as to the goodintentions of the new rdgime. Considered retrospectively this credulityis not surprising. At a later stage similar pledges which the SovietGovernment gave in various instances as to the preservation of foreisninstitutions arid non-interference in national customs have blinded oth-ermore advanced nations and their statesmen.

The Daghestani, of course, did not know that a month before his visitto Temir-Khan-Shura Stalin had already defined his Daghestan policyto a Russian communist public in a different way. Writing in thenewspaper Prayda on October l0th, 1920, Stalin recommended withregard to Daghestan that 'the direct method of combating religiousprejudices must be replaced by indirect and more cautious methods'.Instead of 'Cavalry raids' with the object of immediately communizingthe backward masses of the Daghestani peoples, Stalin added, 'there

must be a cautious and well-conceived policy of gradually drawingthese masses into the general stream of Soviet development'.2o

Thus Stalin wanted to give Daghestan only a short respite, but therewas no question of Soviet Russia observing genuine tolerance for anylength of time. As Stalin's real motives were not known to Daghestanhis-proclamation of Daghestan autonomy in Temir-Khan-Shuia borefruit and weakened the Moslem resistance movement led by ImamNazhmuddin Gotsinsky who had raised the old banner of Shamil. ByJanuary 1922, the anti-Soviet revolt had completely petered out and the'rebels' had reconciled themselves to the Soviet rdgime, which at thatearly stage seemed to adhere to thp promise to respect the religiouscustoms of the local population. ,rr 'People's Commissariat for theShariah' ('Narkomshariat') was set up in 1921 under the old Sheikh,Ali-Hadji Akushinsky.

At the time of the establishment of Soviet power Dashestan had about40,000 people who could be described us '. iergy' in t[e widest sense ofthe word - Mullahs, Kadis, Sheikhs, etc. It would have been unwise toantagonize such an important group of Daghestan's population. TheCommunist Party decided, therefore, to bring about a split in thcreligious front and encouraged the establishment of a 'progressive' pro-Soviet Moslem group advocating the revision of the Shariah. Quite anumber of Moslem ecclesiastic dignitaries walked into the communisttrap. In 1923 a congress of over seventy Sheikhs and Mullahs met inthe locality of Kakhib and sent a message of allegiance to Lenin and

198

Stalin. The message, drafted in Arabic, ran as follows:'To Lenin and Stalin, Moscow.

The congress of the clergy and the Sheikhs of mountain Daghestancomprising seventy-six people greets thee, leader of the great army ofthe toilers, liberating the whole world from the chains of slavery anddisgrace. We believe in the victory of thy army. We believe that Islamwill be freed from oppression with its help. Together with the poorpeople of our villagei we are waiting for thy recovery.x We shallhelp thy army.

Sheikh of Kakhib, elected chairman of the congress'.The Sheikhs and Mullahs who had tried to make a pact with the

Soviet r6gime found out in due course that Bolshevism had deceivedthem. As soon as Soviet rule had been to some extent consolidated, theCommunist Party branch of Daghestan came out with a strong anti-religious line and gradually did away with anything that recalled itsmomentary weakness and apparent readiness for concessions. The'Narkomshariat' was soon abolished. In 1925-26,death, birth andmar-riage registrations were taken away from the Kadis and handed over tothe Soviet state authorities. The'medresse', the religious schools, werealso liauidated.

Oespite all external measures the deep-rooted religious feelings ofthe Daghestan people could not be wiped out so easily. Religion re-mained triumphant even in the communist ranks. As late as 1930 up to80 per cent of the communists in certain Daghestan districts observedreligious customs. Even responsible party officials thought it necessaryto practise the outward forms of religion so as not to give offence tothe believers.2r

Samursky, who was both the secretary of the Daghestan Committeeof the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Executive Committeeof the Dashestan A.S.S.R.. admitted in 1935 that there was then still alarge num-ber of believers in the country; aithough, he added, the powerof the priests had been broken and the'new generation did not fill theposts of Mullahs and Kadis.zz-

Samursky himself, who had done his best to annihilate Islam inDaghestan, finally fell into disgrace with the Kremlin because his anti-religious policy had been so unsuccessful. In 1937 he was executed as a'bourgeois nationalist' and 'enemy of the people'. He was charged withhaving wilfully kept alive the 'counter-revolutionary activities' of theecclesiastics. Under Samursky's rule, so the official charge went on, theMullahs had been able to appeal for the observance of the reactionarycustoms of the Shariah, spread anti-Soviet literature, and agitate againstcollective farms.23 Fritjof Nansen, who during a trip to the Caucasus

. The message was sent at the time of Lenin's illness. It is reproduced from Samursky'sbook Dagestan (Moscow 1925, p. 136).

199


had met Samursky personally, said about the Daghestani politician thathe was a clever man, a good speaker and evidently had great influenceamong the local people.za

T H E F I G H T A G A I N S T T H E S H A M I L C U L T

After the death of Samursky the religious resistance continued. Thesmall Daghestani town of Buinaksk remained, together with Baku,Tashkent and Ufa, one of the four most important centres of Islam inthe whole Soviet Union. Not only did the Bolshevik fieht asainsrreiigion fail in Daghestan, but Soviet power was equally u"nsucctssfulin eradicating the historic traditions of the mountaineers ientred aroundthe great Imam Shamil.

Shamil is the unchallenged national hero of the mountain peoples ofDaghestan and Chechenia, whom he led in the fight against ezaristRussia between 1834 and 1859. In Daghestan his memorvis so univer-sally respected that even the Soviet rdgime had to accept tlie Shamil cult.During over thirty years Soviet historians tried hard to interpret Shamilin accordance with communist ideology. Some went so far as to depicthim almost as a forerunner of commiinism, and practically all agr'eedthat he was the leader of a progressive national liberation-moveirent.In all history textbooks as used in Soviet schools Shamil figured as abrave and capable military leader, a skilful organizer, a pr-omoter oftrade and an opponent of local feudalism.2s

After the Second World War the Soviet leaders became more andmore convinced that the benevolent attitude towards Shamil had beena mistake, and that it was time to put an end to all concessions toDaghestani anti-Russian nationalism. rn 1947 members of the Institutefor History of the All-Union Academy of Sciences were summoned fora long discussion on the Shamil problem. Most of the historiansparticipating in it could find no porraibility of reversing their judgmenton the progressive and democratic character of Shamil.z6 Althoughthe party leadership might have been expected to disagree with t[eattitude of theAcademy, it waited till 1950 for its formal denunciation ofthe Shamil cult. The _campaign was then conducted by the partysecretary of Azerbaidzhan, Baghov, and by his opposite number inDaghestan, Daniyalov. In separate statements, each about 10,000 wordslong, the two officials declared that practically everything written duringthe Soviet regime concerning Shamil had been wiong lrom beginningto 9{. Bagirov's statement was published in the party organ Aokhevita-nd Daniyalov's in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History), an organ ofthe Academy. Both sought to show that Shamil was no national herobut an agent of British and Turkish imperialism. He was no progressivepersonality, they said, but had opposed the only progressive solution

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for the peoples of Daghestan, namely, union with Russia. Both Bagirovand Daniyalov produced alarge number of historical documents refer-ring to Shamil's alleged treacherous and reactionary role. All thesedocuments, most of which were over 100 years old, must long since havebeen known to Soviet historians, but probably did not seem to themrelevant. The Daghestani party secretary went as far as to say that theannexation of Daghestan by Russia was the only way out of stagnation,since it had led to the development of Daghestani economy and broughtthe country into connection with progressive Russian culture.z7 Thecommunist offensive against the Shamil cult reduced to zero manycultural efforts which had been made in Daghestan under the Sovietr6gime. Many works which Daghestani and Russian authors had writtenon Daghestani history became obsolete.

In view of the liquidation of the Chechens, the dethronement ofShamil could not affect Chechenia, which had likewise fought againstCzarism under his leadership, but it had repercussions in Azerbaidzhan.Shamil's struggle had been very popular with the Azerbaidzhani people.Many Azerbaidzhani historians and writers had paid tribute to him.The sympathy which Shamil enjoyed in Azerbaidzhan was even theprimary reason for the launching of the anti-Shamil campaign. Thishappened in the following way. An Azerbaidzhani scholar, GeidarGuseinov, had written a learned thesis y'lisrory of nineteenth-centurysociql snd philosophical thought in Azerbqidzhan. The thesis wasgenerally believed to have considerable merit as a book of scholarshipand was awarded the Stalin Prize in March 1950. Two months later thiaward of the Stalin Prize was withdrawn bv soecial decision of theCouncil of N{inisters of the U.S.S.R. The omciit exolanation of thisgesture, extraordinary even for Soviet conditions, was Guseinov's esti-mate of Shamil's personality. His book had, indeed, contained a fewfriendly words about Shamil and his movement.2s Not only wasGuseinov hirnself sharply rebufted but also the reviewers of his book,and in particular the Azsrbaidzhani Academy of Sciences, which hadrecommended it for the Stalin Prize.

D A G H E S T A N ' S L A N G U A G E P R O B L E M

According to the Bible, mankind became divided into nationalities andstarted to speak different tongues because Man had challenged Godand had built the Tower of Babel. The language problem of SovietDaghestan originated in a similar way from the Bolshevik challenge toAllah and to Arabic, the sacred language of the Koran. Arabic hadacquired a monopoly as a means of education in the mountain country.It was the inter-tribal language which made the mountaineers forgetthat they belonged to different nationalities.

201

rhe difficurty "t;;.ffi;ffi: nes in the ract thatthere is no local language in the country which can in any way claimpriority over others. Even the most widespread of the local languages -the Avar - is spoken by only 1 58,000 people, just 22 per cent of the totalpopulation. The other more important nationalities of Daghestan areKumyks (95,000), Darghinians (107,000), Lezghians (100,000) andLakians (40,000).

The local Communist Party leadership was at first highly scepticalabout encouraging literacy in the languages of the Daghestanimountaineers. The party felt that a more highly developed languageshould be introduced instead, to take the place of Arabic. The questionarose whether Daghestan's new lingua franca and official languagewas to be Russian, which the Czarist r6gime had tried to impose,unsuccessfully, or Turkic. The Soviet authorities considered that Turkicwas for many reasons a more suitable choice. First, Turkic, unlikeRussian, was not a language of 'Unbelievers', but one spoken by Mos-lem peoples, and had thus a better chance to oust Arabic. The selectionof Turkic was furthermore a tribute to the culturally most advancednationality of Daghestan, the Kumyks, a Turkic people, the onlyethnical group of Daghestan who had produced a national literature,in Czarist times. Finally, the communist leaders indulged in considerableillusions about the role which Daghestan might be able to play inrevolutionizing the East, provided that it adopted the Turkic language.

This is what the party secretary, Samursky, wrote about this aspectof the Daghestani language problem, at a time when he fully reflectedthe official point of view: 'If one takes the interests of the WorldRevolution as the departing point one must recognize that educationin the Turkic language can render in Daghestan a much greater servicethan education in Russian. Daghestan, on the one hand, is a land of theOrient which has so far kept up contact with all (Oriental) countriesin the vicinity. On the other hand, Daghestan has come within the orbitof the Proietarian Revolution. Daghestan can and must serve as a linkbetween the U.S.S.R. and the Orient better than all other parts of theSoviet Union and it must become a channel of communist ideas in theNear East. The Near East either speaks the Turkic language or under-stands it. The Turkic language gives the Daghestani the possibility ofcontact with all nationalities in the Near East and this contact willintroduce a revolutionary current into the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial countries'.2e

The Communist Party leadership soon found out that the hopes whichit had pinned on the introduction of Turkic as Daghestan's lingua francacould not materialize. Daghestan was a bulwark of Oriental ideas inthe Soviet Union and could never become a bulwark of Soviet ideas inthe East with or without the Turkic lansuase. The Daehestani Com-


munist Party was a tiny and weak body. In 1927 it had only 651 mem-bers from the local nationalities and they were unable to convert theirown peoples to Bolshevism, let alone to become missionaries of com-munism in other Oriental countries.

In 1927-28 a special language commission of the Daghestan Com-mittee of the Communist Party reconsidered the language problem andrecommended that more attention should be devoted to the locallanguages. On the basis of this recommendation a language reform wasdecreed providing for elementary education in eight languages. A basicpolitical terminology was worked out for all of them. The recognizedlanguages were originally those of the Avars, Darghinians, Lezghians,Lakians, Kumyks, Tabasarans, Nogai Tartars and the Taty.* Later onrecognition was withdrawn from the language of the Nogai Tartars,3omost of whom lived in the territory separated from Daghestan in 1938.

Even after the language reform higher education was based on Turkicand Russian. Finally, however, Russian dominated the field at theexpense of both Turkic and Arabic. It was authoritatively stated asearly as 1930 that Turkic had already fulfilled its mission of 'diverting

the attention of the masses from the Arab language'.3zThe triumph of the Russian language in Daghestan was not only due

to the need of a lingua franca in a multi-national territory; it was alsoa tribute to the outstanding role which the Russians played in the centraladministration of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. In the inter-war period therecruitment of Daghestani mountaineers into administrative jobs hadhardly made any progress at all. In 1927 the percentage of the Dighestaniemployed at the headquarters of the Daghestan Government was2l .6per cent ; in 1929 i t was 25.3 per cent and in 1936,20 per centonly.33 It is not altogether the fault of the rdgime if it failed to recruitcivii servants from among the mountain people. The mountaineers weremore interested in exercising self-government over their villages than ingoing to the towns of the plain to administer their villages from there.The two most important towns of Daghestan, Makhach Kala (previously

* The Taty speak an Iranian language. In Daghestan they are largely identical with theso-cal led 'Mountain Jews' . According to the 1926 census there were 11,484 of such 'Moun-

tain Jews'in Daghestan and 10,270 inAzerbaidzhan. The returns are hardlycorrect as faras Daghestan is concerned, where the census took place at a time when the 'Mountain

Jews' were exposed to active persecution. In the year of the census the Jews sent a delegationto Moscow to complain about thejr plight. The Presidium of the Central Executive Com-mittee dispatched an 'instructor' to investigate the situation. He reported to Moscow:(l) anti-semite excesses, even murders, were not punished by the administration; (2) thecultural and medical services of the Taty were neglected and the central Governmentdeceived by wrong information; (3) national minority rights of the Taty were not observedin the local Soviets; (4) Taty were not accepted as workers in state enterprises; and(5) lower administrative organs were rude in their behaviour towards the Taty. Thesituation did not improve after the instructor had lelt Daghestan and the conditions inwhich the Taty found themselves remained for a while what a Jewish communist authordescr ibed as a 'pol i t ical scandal ' .31

203

f , P L E S

Petrovsk) and Buinaksk (previously Temir-Khan-Shura) are now calledafter Daghestani communists, but for that reason they have not becomecloser to the hearts ofthe Daghestani, nor are they likely to have changedtheir racial composition in which the Russian-Ukrainian elements usedto prevail. The last available figure referringto 1924 sho',ved that 55 percent of the inhabitants of Makhach Kala are Slavs while Russiansalone form three-fifths of the population of Buinaksk.

D A G H E S T A N I L I T E R A T U R E

The language problem which is also the problem of Daghestan'sculture is still unsettled. Even if Russian civilization triumphs there willstill remain the cultural heritage of the past, which is an Arabic heritage.Soviet cultural workers are fully conscious of this complication and aretrying to solve it in a 'dialectical' way. They cannot ignore the literarydocuments which the peoples of Daghestan produced in Arabic duringthe past centuries, but they have tried to deny the existence of acultural interdependence between the mountaineers and the ArabicMoslem world. The Arabic literary documents of Daghestan are nowsimply classified as'Daghestani l i terature', and the firc-t that they werewritten in Arabic is just an unimportant coincidence. The Arabicheritage is still an important foundation stone for cultural activities inDaghestan. The national poet of Soviet Daghestan, Gamzat Tsadasa(1874-1951), a former Mullah, would probably not have embarked on aliterary career had he not been underihe speil ofArab poetry from hisearliest youth. Even an official Soviet publication had to admit that arsmall library of ancient Arabii: texts was one of Tsadasa's most treasuredpossessions.3a The Soviet authorities were compelled to overlookTsadasa's 'Arabomania' as long as he wrote poems in praise of Stalinand the Bolshevik r6gime.

Tsadasa was the second national poet of Dashestan. The first wasSule iman Sta lsky (1869-1937). Ue. l i te Samur iky. rvas a Lezghian,and it is not unlikely that this 'enemy of the people' was the fi}st todiscover him. Stalsky was built up into one of the most outstandingpoets of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. FIis poems weretranslated into many languages of the Soviet Union. To a remarkabledegree they were always well-informed as to the official propaganda needsof the moment. At one stage Stalsky's poems attacked the 'kulaks' andhailed collectivization; then they boosted the Stakhanov movement;finally, they exposed the deviationists and bourgeois nationalists -always at the right time. This was the more amazing as Stalsky lived,according to an official biography, in considerable retirement in amountain village and was unable to get any first-hand information onpolitical matters. Stalsky was illiterate and no 'original version' of his


works existed. His poems were taken down by people among theaudience while he recited them. Maxim Gorky took Stalsky under hiswing and described him a 'Homer of the twentieth century'.35 This well-meaning but somewhat exaggerated tribute was often quoted in theSoviet Union, particularly by the Daghestani themselves, among whomit provoked a certain nationalist conceit. If we have produced a Homer,the young Daghestani Soviet intellectuals argued, we have made anoutstanding contdbution towards Soviet literature and are entitled tothe respect of the Russians themselves. Finally, the Daghestani had tobe told that their pride was based on a misunderstanding, since Gorkydid not mean to put Homer and Stalsky on the same level, but hiscomparison only referred to the way in which Stalsky's works wereproduced.36 Stalsky's works are still reprinted in Russia, although someof his poems in which he denounced the Russian conquest of theCaucasirs are no longer in harmony with the new Soviet patrioticideology.

Both Stalsky and Tsadasa are poets of the past even if the subjectsof their poetry are Stalin and the Five Year Plans. The poet of the futureis Effendi Kapiyev. He belongs to the young generation of Daghestan, isa product of the Soviet school, and no longer believes in the romanticismof the aul. His homeland is no longer Daghestan but the whole SovietUnion and his language no longer a Daghestani idiom but Russian.The effects of Soviet education on Kaoivev can be sathered from his ownwords in praise of the Russian laneuiei which ard included in his novelThe Poet:

" ;'Oh thou, great Russian tongue, I kneel before thee. Adopt me and

give me thy blessing . . . I belong to a very small people lost in themountains but I find thee and I am no more an orphan. Without theethere was and is no future, with thee we are truly omnipotent'.37

These words represent an extreme example of the spirit which theSoviet r6gime is trying to implant into all non-Russian territories ofthe U.S.S.R.

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L N O T E S T O C H A P T E R S E V E N

1. Kavkazsky Sbornik, vol. 21, Tiflis 1900, p. 102.

2. Kavkauky Sbornik, vol. 2, Tiflis 1877, p. 457.

3. Soviet War News, October 6th, 1942.

4. Beoonr-Ev, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasas, London 1908, p, 108.

5. E. Mrxsttr.tov and G. Vr,nrErov, Chechentsy - Chechens, Vladikavkaz1894.

6. Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti, Nr.50, April 1934, p. 10.

205

7. Antireligioznik, Nr. 11, November 1931, p. 72.

8. Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti, Nr.72, February 1936, p. 41.

9. Soviet War News, September 3rd, 1942.

10. Sovetskoye Iskusstvo, February 14th, 1948.

I l. U.,S.,S.fi. in Construction, Nr. 3, March 1937.

12. Izvestiya Severo-Osetinskogo Nauchno-Issledovatelskogo Instituta. Reportsof the North Ossetin Scientific Research Institute. vol. 9. Dzaudzhikau1947, p. 182.

13. Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti, Nr.35, February 1933, pp. 59/60.14. Izvestiya, July 8th, 1944.15. Yoprosy Istori i, Nr.12,1947, p. 148.16. Literaturnaya Gazeta, March 31st, 1948.17. Uchitelskaya Galeta, July 8th, 1948.

18. A. Hounaw, Minorities in the Arab llorld, Oxford University Press 1947,pp. 58, 85.

19. I. V. StrLnv, Sochineniya - (Complete) Works, vol. 4, Moscow 1947,pp.3esl3e6.

20. I. V. Steltw, Sochineniya - (Complete) Works, vol. 4, Moscow 1947,

P. 362.21. Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti, Nr.2, June 1930, p. 38.

22. N. Sarr,runsry, Krasny Dagestal,'- The Red Daghestan in RevolyutsiyaiNatsionalnosti, Nr.65, July 1935, pp. alla2.

23. Bonrs KeNDroov, Tserkov i Shpionazh - Church and Espionage, Moscow1938 , p . 95 .

24. Fnrorron NaNsnN, Through the Caucasus to the Volga, London 1931,p . 1 1 1 .

25. PaNrnarov^, Istori la S.S.,S.-R. - History of the U.S.S.R.,vol.2, Moscow1944 ,pp .155 /158 .

26. Voprosy Istorii, Nr. 11, November 1947,pp. 1341140.

27. Voprosy Istorii, Nr.9, September 1950, pp. 12113.

28. Pravda, May l4th and 16th, 1950.

29. Samursky, Dagestan, Moscow 1925, p. 118.

30. Narodnoye Obrazovanie, Nr.3, March 1950, p. 60.

31. LanrN, Yevrei i antisemitism v,S.S.S.R. - Jews and antisemitism in theU.S.S.R., Moscow-Leningrad 1929, p. 131.

32. Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti, Nr.2, June 1930, p. 75.

33. Sovetskoye Stroitelstvo, Nr. 123, October 1936, p. 65.

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B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L N O T E S T O C H A ]

34. Oktyabr, Nr. 7, July 1947, pp. 164lt66'

35. SurnnanN Srusxv, Stikhi i Pesni - Yerses and Songs, Moscow 1938, p' 10'

36. Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10th, 1948.

37. Ogonyok, Nr.7, February 1947'P.27'

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X

S O V I E . T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y A S AW O R L D P R O B L E M

An investigation of the soviet record territory by territory and nation-ality by nationality does not bear out the claim of the Kremlin ttrat tireu.s.s.R' has solved the probrem of nationalities. soviet nationalitiespolicy, instead of dcstroying Russian imperiarisrn, has in realitv triedto preserve and to consolidate it. This has^red to a crisis in ttre ieiatiunsbetween the central authorities of the Soviet Russian state unJ- tn.dcpendent.peoples fighting for national liberation. The Second worldwar lalo bare the extent of the crisis in a number of areas (NorthCaucasus, Crimea, Ukraine, etc.). Since the war the Sovieire$;_,"-nu,jl ':1::,:"1:.."'i !l-l,gh,:ling

,p security. measures and bv increasingrne mrgnt ot the centre at the expense of the non-Russian peonres.

The blame for the failures of Sbviet narionalities pori"y .i"niiie puton the soviet Government and the communist rarty arorie. a number offactors^ols.trucl a genuine solution of the problem on lines sues.srealn rne Borshevrk program.me. They have nothing to do with the'lhort_comrngs ot the soviet r6gime, but are inherent ii conditions within thel":yun Empire, independent of any political r6gime. rtr"r" ru"io.r u.",r . ,1. numerrcal disproport ion between the Russian people and thenon-l(usslans, particularly the non_Slavs of the Soviet Union, whichnaturally ensures Russian domination.

]' The. geographical distribution of Russians and ukrainians ahnosrrnrougnout the terr i tory of the U.S.S.R.

3' The numerical weakness of.maly.So-viet nationarities which preventstheir.independent cultural and political development.other more weighty reasons for the fairure of soviet nationalitiespollcy are connected wirh the poritical philosophy and strategy of whatis called 'stalinism' with its^totalitarian atmoiphere of c6'mputsionrendering. imp_ossibre the curtural and poriticar

'r"iJorrg

"i''"ii"in"nationalities of the U.S.S.R. From the point of view or tnJcommunistideology itself the Soviet nationalities policy was a failure beca.rse ii oionot and could not succeed in establishing a federatioo or.quuir-in it.territory of the U.S.S.-}., tl!, setting a"n example to the world. TheSoviet nationalities poricy djd not faii in an abiolute ,.nr., hor"u"r,

S O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y

since it greatly increased the efficiency of the Russian'melting-pot', underthe neutral term of 'IJnion of Socialist Soviet Republics'.

The U.S.S.R. as a melting-pot of races is in many ways similar to thatother big melting-pot, the United States of America. The melting-potprocess, while disposing in the long run of the problems of nationalitiesin a given territory, provides no model for a global solution. Neither theAmerican nor the Russian pattern can be schematically applied toAfrica, Eastern Europe or South-East Asia.

There are, of course, notable differences between the American andRussian melting-pots. The Europeans who are being Americanized ascitizens of the United States enter the meltins-oot of their own free will:from the outset they want to become Engli ihispeaking Americans andthey want their children to absorb English-American culture. TheSoviet melting-pot is of a strongly compulsory character and producessome modified specimens of Russians linked together by the doctrineof Leninism-Stalinism. On the other hand, the colour problem whichprevents the full integration of an American nation is absent in theSoviet Union. Because there are no Negroes in the territorv of theU.S.S.R. it is impossible to assess with ceitainty whether colour preju-dice is non-existent or whether it is non-existent in the hisher sense ofcomplete racial equality. It is a fair assumption, horveverl that were alarge coloured population included in the framework of the Soviet Unionit would not suffer from any speci.:l racial discrimination but only fromthe same repressive measures which the Soviet Government imposes onall peoples,iheir national cultures and traditions, within the bounclariesof the Russian Empire. The Soviet Government would undoubtedly tryto break the Negroes spiritually just as it has tried to break othernationalities and races. As long as the communist dictatorship lasts,racial equality in Russia will mean nothing but equality of subjection.

As far as absence of colour prejudice in Russia is a fact, it goes to thecredit of the Russian people and not of the Soviet r6gime. The Russianattitude to racial problems is by no means unique but is characteristicof all peoples who, in the course of their history, have been exposed toa process of drastic racial intermixture. In view of this intermixturewhich educates towards racial tolerance and broadmindedness. the Rus-sians, irrespective of the r6gime under which they live, would neverinsist on a policy of segregation, even to one slightly approaching thatprevailing in the Southern States of the U.S.A., or in the Union ofSouth Africa.

S O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y I N E A S T E R N E U R O P E

The value of Soviet nationalities policy for the outside world has beengreatly reduced, not only by its failure at home, but also by its inability

304

A S A W O R L D P R O B L E M

to bring about a just solution of the national and minority problems ofEastern Europe. In its early years Soviet Russia had a blueprint forsolving_the lastery European nationality problems: the programmeadopted by the Fifth world congress of the communist Interiationaliy .tS2!. This programme, if put into effect, might not have altered any-thing in- the present communist totalitarian structure of Eastern Europe,but within the general framework of a communist order it might havebrought about a more just solution than the pax Sovietici whichemerged from the Second World War. For instance, the programme ofthe Comintern provided for the independence of the SlovakJ and for aspecial r6gime of autonomy for nationally mixed territories such asTransylvania. For Hungary, the Communist International had demand-ed a frontier revision by which Hungarian-speaking areas of Slovakia,Rumania and Yugoslavia were to be added to th-e Hungarian State.when Russia had a chance to carry out the principles emboclied in thatprogramme she ignored them completely and worsened rather thanimproved the conditions created by the 'imperialist peace treaties' ofl9l9-20.In solving the nationality and minority problems of EasternEurope, Russia was not concerned with the estabnshment of some sortof abstract 'proletarian' justice as was the Comintern in 1924, but onlywith her own national interests. Russia divided the peoples of Easternand south-Eastern Europe into those which for the time being were able,in one way or another, to serve.her imperialist aims, and t"hose whichwere less useful. The former, in most but not all cases, Slav peoples, wereprivileged at the expense of the latter. Thus Russia favoure-d ciechs andRumanians against _Hungarians, backed Bulgarian claims againstGreece and supported the most far-reaching yugoslav ambitions a[ainstItaly and Austria.

Fundamentally these temporarily favoured nations were not muchbetter off than those nations whose interests had been consciouslyignored. Since all Moscow-sponsored settlements of minoritv andborder problems were based on expediency and changing "Soviet

TooS, not on_ firm principles, the favoured nations had aliay-s to fearthat.Russia might drop them at any time and reverse her atiitude to-wards claims on a disputed territorv.

Russia's primary concern was to increase her own national territoryat the expense ofher satellites and to push their western frontiers as faito the west as possible. As regards the internal frontiers between hersatellites, Russia assumed an unimaginative attitude and left thempractically untouched. The Soviet Gove-rnment did not even see to it thatthere was real fair play towards the minorities within the satellite States.Of all the small Eastern Furopean countries only one, yugoslavia, withits home-grown communist r6gime, tried to solve the natiola[ties prob-lem on the basis of federalist principles. The Srovaks, instead oflnoe-

305

) V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y

pendence, did not even get a proper provincial government, but only a'Board of Commissioners', A11 other minorities of Eastern Europe had tocontent themselves with the creation of totalitarian communist organiza-tions which pretended to defend their interests. These new organiiations,such as the Democratic Federation of the South Slavs in Hunearv. theHungarian People's Union in Rumania, the Turkish people'stouncilUnion in Buigaria, etc., etc., were modelled on the pattern of similartotalitarian organizations which had existed in the Soviet union, in theinter-war period, for small scattered minorities like Latvians, Assyriansand Gipsies. These Eastern Eu-ropean minority organizations are e(uallyindistinguishable in character from the minority oreanizations whiih theNazis built up from 1933 onwards for the German-minorities in EasternEurope. The members of these minority organizations have not thesl ightest in f luence on thei r pol icy, nor i sa! in the serect ion of theresponsible officials, who are appointed by the central Government. Nocultural or social activity outside the totalitarian bodies is possible; theyhold. a monopoly in the same way as does the Communist party inrelation to the people of the majority nationality. It is not even suflliientthat th-e minority organizations are communisi; they have to adhere tothe officially approved communism of Moscow. T[re Tito-Cominformconflict showed that active persecution of national minorities in EasternEurope is only suspended is long as complete ideological and poiiticaluniformity prevails. Tile slightest breach of discipline *ittrin the ianks ofinternational communism results in a revival bf nationalist antagon-ism and oppression of national minorities. Nothing is altered iritheviolent character of this oppression by the fact thlt it is nominallycarried out for the sake of the purity of a politicai creed and not admii-tedly on behalf of a national ideology. the tito-Corninform dispute ledto purges of the associat ions of Slav minor i t ies in both Hungarv andRumania, to the resumption of the Serbian-Bulgarian rivalriei aioundMacedonia and to acute hosti i i t ies between Albanians and yugoslavs.

The example of Eastern Europe is important because it indicates thekind of 'solution' which Russia may envisage for the many nationarityproblems in Asiatic countries which are either near her fiontiers, lik-ePersia, Afghanistan and Kashmir, or are the scene of particurarlv intensecommunist efforts, iike Malaya or Burma. The peoples of these iountriescannot expect from the soviet Union any genuine consideration oftheirnational claims. The Soviet Government and the international com-munist movement, for their own purposes, will encourage and exploitthese claims only as long as they can be fitted into the gineral paiteroof Soviet and communist Dolicv.


Soviet diplomacy has given abundant evidence, particularly by itsconduct in the United Nations organs, that it ignores principles, boththose related to nationalities policy and all others, and that it is guidedexclusively by opportunistic considerations. In the case of the Sudan, forinstance, Russia supported Sudanese-Egyptian unity instead of Sudaneseindependence, as lvould have been in l ine with the basic principles towhich Russia pays l ip-service in her orvn territory.l In the cise of-Libya,Eritrea and Somalia, Russia, during a certain period, supported Italianoverlordship, not because the Soviet experts considered this solution ajust one and in agreement with the wishes of the local peoples, butbecause I ta ly is the weakest ' imper ia l is t power ' . ln the case of Falest ineRussia sided with the Jewish minority against the Arab majority, notout of sympathy rvith the aims of Zionism, but to embarrass .imperial-

ism' . In Tndia, Russia 's agents, the local communis ls . pursued a pol icyopposite to that adopted towards Paiestine. So lons as India was-with-out independence they opposed Pakistan's urge iowards nationhoodbecause they feared that the emergence of a large Islamic State mightharm the cause of an Indian communist revolution and the interests ofSoviet Russia.2

S O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y A N D B R I T I S H C O L O N I A L P O L I C Y

In their tendency to over-simpliiy and to press all poriticar farcts into anarrow ideological pattern, the Russian communisf leaders conceive alldevelopments in coloniai territories in terms only of class strussle or'imperialist man oeuvres'. Thi s makes the undo gmitic, em piricar'b"ritishcolonial policy particularly incomprehensible to them. Soviet expertson nationalit ies problems are interested in Brit ish colonial policv. notin order to understand its functioning, but to engage in arbitiary,"naivecomparisons between conditions in backward iolonies of iropicalAfrica, for instance, and conditions in Central Asian and Tians-caucasian lands famous for their ancient civil izations. UnscrupulousSoviet propagandists and their syrnpathizers in other countriei com-pare the number of hospital beoi in cit ies l ike Tashkent and samar-kand with the sanitary installations in the forest regions of the Goldcoast, and measure the standard of education in Bafu with conditionsin the interior of New Guinea.3

A comparison between Brit ish and Soviet colonial policv can be ofconsiderable in terest prov ided that i t does not conf ine i tse l f - to s tat is t icsand points of detail, but is concerned with the basic methods applied indealings with dependent peoples, in the British and Russian b,mpires.such a comparison, made after the Second world war, is more favour-able to Britain than it might have been in the thirties, owing to thetransformation of the Empire in the post-war period and the-greatly

O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y

accelerated tempo in the itrplementation of constitutional reforms. Eventhe boldest changes carried out in this new era of British colonial ruleseem often to become outdated in a matter of months after their cominginto force, not because of more far-reaching demands made by colonia-ipeoples but as a result of the deliberate poficy of the colonial'power toimprove conditions in dependent territories.l . DEM.cRAcy AND TorALrrARrANrsM. The f i rs t and basic d i f -ference between Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policysprings from the difference between alotalitarian one-party state and idemocratic r6gime- The British Under-secretary of stat6 forihe colonies,A. H. Poynton, described the British coloni-al system as a 'practicaiillustration of democracy under tuition'.4 The political system as estab-lished in the non-Russian Soviet Republics can be described as totali-tarianism under tuition. In the British coronial Empire to-day there isalmost unlimited possibility for the development of nitional mdvements.The outlawing of a political movement may occur as the result of armedstruggle or threat of armed struggle, bui very rarely because of thenature of its cultural and political activities. In the Soviet union theolJy opportunity for .political expression by non-Russian peoples isoffered by the All-union communist party and the All-Union com-munist- You-th League, while all cultural aitivity has to be carried onthrough such totalitarian organizations as the 'union of soviet writers,.Not even the foundationqf an orthodox communist party, on a nationalbasis, is possible as was sholvn by the ban on an attempted MoslemCommunist Party in the early years of the Soviet r6gime.2. nrcrrrrv AND ELASrrcrry. Apart from the great differences inthe substance of the two policies there are also prof6und differences inthe forms. The Russian system makes little alrowance for the variousstages in the development of the nationalities of the u.s.S.R. All arepressed into the framework of four constitutional patterns: one of thesefour simply has to fit. The chief criterion for the selection of the con-stitutional pattern for a given nationality is not its political and culturalmaturity but its numerical size and its geographicai position. peoples ofsuch unequal developments as Armenians and Turkmenians, Estoniansand Kirghiz, volga.Tartars and Yakuts, are put constitutionally on thesame level. In practice, it is true, there are considerable differencls, sincethe central authorities intervene more directly in the affairs of the lessdeveloped nationalities than in those of the more advanced.

The British system, 'with its haphazard complexity and lack of co_ordination on any structural basis' (Amery) does mbre justice to thegreat variety in the degree of development among peoplei of such vastempires as the British or Russian. The wide ranee of British constitu-tional patterns includes at one end cases in which t[e nationality or groupof nationalities is advanced enough to be given complete independ'ence,

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e.g. Burma or India, and at the other end such territories as NorthernRhodesia or Nyasaland, where the indigenous peoples have acquired nomore than a token representation on the Legislative Council. Betweenthese two extremes there is a wide range of intermediary stages. Thissystem is so flexible that there are hardly two colonies in the BritishEmpire with a fully identical administrative and constitutional set-up.It means little to say that a Dominion like Ceylon or a self-governingcolony like Malta have incomparably greater political powers than anyconstituent republic of the Soviet Union. The so-called sovereign rightsof the Soviet Republics lag far behind even those rvhich the Queenand Legislative Council of Tonga, a British island Protectorate inthe Pacific, are exercising. African chiefs, like the Emir of Kano, theOni of Ife, or the Kabaka of Bu-uanda, with their traditional Africancouncils, are, in their spheres, less dependent on the British adminis-tration than the governments of the non-Russian Soviet Republics areon the Kreml in.3. orsrNrBcRATroN AND FEDERALTsM. The terr i tor ies of the Br i -tish Colonial Empire are either geographical entities like the Britishisland-possessions throughout the world, or were created as a resultof British conquest, like Nigeria, the Gold Coast, British Honduras, etc.,and have subsequently developed into economic and even political units.The national-territorial sub-divisions of the U.S.S.R. are in most casesof an artificial nature. Soviet nationalities policy has been dominatedby the idea of creating a maximum number of small self-contained unitsregardless ofeconomic, geographical and historical factors, and with theonly purpose of giving formal satisfaction to a 'national autonomy' ideawithout granting real home rule. With two or three exceptions, thenational-territorial units of the Soviet State were each formed for thebenefit of one specific nationality. Although in practice most of theseunits are bi-national if not multi-national, Soviet nationalities policyalways distinguishes between the nationality after which a given autono-mous territory is named and the national minorities.

British colonial policy, on the other hand, opposes the idea ofnational isolation and tries to find a satisfactory federalist solution forthe problem of 'plural' societies. British colonial policy, as it emergesfroh the Second World War, dislikes the idea of splitting up the pluralsocieties by 'partition'. Britain accepted the partition of India onlyreluctantly and never accepted it in Palestine as long as that countrywas a British responsibility. British policy is to induce peoples to staytogether within a given natural, historic or even geographic or onlyeconomic unit; to find a common political platform and to arrive at acommon patriotic conception. This may often be diflicult, sometimeseven an illusion, but it is the only truly humanitarian approach to theproblem, for it expresses belief in human progress, in sound reasoning,

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and it.presupposes the triumph of common sense over passion andIanauclsm.

Soviet nationalities policy, if consistently applied to the BritishEmpire, would mean the disintegration of most of the African coloniesinto a number of national republics and autonomous provinces. TheSoviet 'solution' for Nigeria, for instance, wouid have consisted increating national States for the Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo, Fulani, etc., andother states of a lower order for the smaller Nigerian nationalities. These'States' would have no l inks with each other, but would be directlysubordinate to a central imperial government. Every important step inthe economic l ife of these 'national States' lvould be decided by thisfar-away central administration. This is exactly the pattern i i, l i ichRussia lbllowed in Central Asia.

Britain went the opposite way. Instead of splitt ing up Nigeria, whosemain peoples differ from each other as much as Germans, English,Russians and Turks, the Brit ish Governrlent did its utmost to rnake ita united country. The 1946 Constitution created a Lesislative Councilrvith an African majority which, for the first tir.ne, iegislated for thervhole of Nigeria, whose population is far bigger than that of all fiveCentral Asiatic Republics put together.4. NlrtoNlr cllsroMs: BRITISFI RESrECT AND sovIET INTERFERENCE.The Soviet Russian colonizer considers that he is entit led to abolish ailinstitutions of a given nationality; to impose every possible reform ifthis is in i ine rvith the communist proeramme. Thus Russian Bolsheviksnever hesistated to introduce the principles of class struggle into themost backward atmosphere. They discovered an equivalent to the Rus-sian 'kulaks' everywhere, from the oasis of the Kara Kum desert in Turk-menistan to the Lapp settiements of the Arctic coast. The most violentmeasures of coercion against the guardians and symbols of primitivenat ional t radi t ions, the chic fs and r r ibat e ldcrs, ueie a lways iust i f ied inthe eyes of Soviet colonizers.

The British colonial adnrinistrator, whether he be a conservative or asocialist, feels he has no right to interfere rvith the customs of the peoplesunder his administration beyond what is necessary to maintain order.Brit ish colonial policy does not attempt to sweep away tribal customsand institutions simply because they are 'reactionary'. Customs are notabolished unless they are of a criminal nature. The Brit ish idea is thatbackward peoples, as they srow into a higher degree of civil ization, wil lthemselves throw off the ballast of their more primitive past. Graduaitransformation of the institution of Chiefs and Elders and its adaptationto modern conditions is the aim, not abolit ion.

It may be held against Brit ish colonial policy that it interfercs toolittle, rvhere Soviet nationalities policy interferes too much. This appliesin particular to British Protectorates which enjoy full inrernal autonomy,

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and which may engase in extreme fbrnrs of reiisious intolcrlnce i ' , ' i thoutthe local British ollicials preventine them.5. rsE LANGUAGE pRoBLEM. B-"oth Soviet nat ional i t ies ool icv andBr i t ish colonia l pol icy a im at the creat ion of a l ingua f i ' r rn . . . r in thei rrespective domaius. The Soviet Government conducts cultural propa-ganda for the Russian language. par t icu lar ly amongst rhe less developednationalities, while the cultural efforts promoted in British territoiieslead almost automatically to a further cxtension of the influence ofEnelish.

However, there is a considerable difference. The Enelish lansllase isa genuinely international one and not the laneuage of6ne couritry*andol1nu,il9n: The peoples in Brit ish colonies rvho acquire a knowledgeof English have a kcy to European and not specifically English civiliza-tion. It does not necessariiy follow that a people increasei its porit icaldependence on rhe Brit ish Empire simply because it adopts the Englishlanguaee as its principal cultural medium and iink with the ouisidervorld. The Russian language, orr the other hand, cannot claim to beinternational. Every cultural success it achieves among the non-Russianpegplg! of the Soviet Union benefits, in the lon,s run. 6nly rhe Russians,and it increases the power of Russia as the onlv state where Russian isthe language spoken. The Soviet Empire has alwiys discouraged attemptsto introduce an alternative linsua franca (Arabic, Azerbaidzhani rurkic,Chagatai) instead of Russian. The Brit isir authorit ies have not tried topiace Enelish in the same monopolistic position. Indeed, Brit ish coronialauthorit ies have been instrumental in eiving an honourabie status toF{ausa and to Swahil i as inter-tribal l;neu;ses. the tirst in NorthernNigeria, the second in East Africa.

_, -Flementary education in both Empires is given in local languaees.with regard to secondarv education the Brit ish and Soviet educatidnalpolicies adhere to different patterns. In vie'uv of the lorv desree of thedevelopment of the Afr icr r r languagcs secondary educar ion- is g iven inFnglish in all schools of Brit ish Africa. English is the language oT teach-l_ng even in schools run entirelv or predominantly by Africans. ln theSoviet Union many native schools switch over to teaching in Russianfrom the fifth form upwards and in rnany others from theiighth form.Thus in the Russian Soviet Federation forty-six lansuages are used inprimary schools but only twenty-tu'o languages in tie list three formsof secondary schools (the so-called'ten-year-schools').86 . o r r r r R E N C E S r N E D U C A T t o N . g r i t i s h a r r d S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n a lpolicics in the colonies dilTer not only in regard to the language question.The Soviet Government, with the heip of a totalitarian slatJapparatus,has been able to make iiteracy much more general than Brit isi colonialadrninistration could do rvith its much slower-working democratic mass-education projects. The Soviet Government has ilso given greater

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impetus to ,.iu.rrity'"*i"il"']iolnoi]j]n"" .r" British. Fourof the five central Asian Republics have not only got universities buteven 'Academies of Sciences'. In the U.S.S.R. the ierms ,university, and'acaderny' are used in a rather loose way. A Soviet .university' may bewhat the British would call a 'universiiy Colleee' or even u 'coli.n"'(the Fourah Bay College in Freetown, for instaice)'Academies' and 'universitjes' in the non-Russian republics andparticularly in the Asiatic republics of the Soviet Union are nbt supposedto serve the national interests of the peoples for whorn they are aliegedlyfounded. Unlike the university colleges of Ibadan and Aihimota';hichhave only African students the universities of Stalinabad, Ashkhabad,Baku, Samarkand, Alma Ata and rashkent are half European institu-tions. As to the so-called 'Academies of Sciences' they have two assign-ments. First, they are to help in the implementation of econoilicschemes which are carried out in the territory of a given Republic inthe all-Union interest, and secondly they must watch over the ideologicalorthodoxy of the local intelligentsia, their writings on history, i=heirpoetry, music and theatrical art. The existence of the .academies; makesit easy for the-rdgime to put into effect new directives governing thelntellectual and artistic life of a non-Russian nationalitylnd to iurge'nationalist' artists, writers and historians. If 'academies' with similirfunctions existed in the British colonies the local intellectuals wouldrightly consider them as redoubtable imperialistic instruments directedtowards spi r i tua l oppression./ . THE coloNrzATroN pRoBLEu. The most important commonproblem which both the Russian and the British Empires have to face isthat of Furopean colonization in non-European teiritories. Lenin ex-plained imperialism as the 'export of capitalt 6 Manpower investments,however, are a much safer basis for imperialist activities than capitalinvestments. It has happened that colonists have been expelled fromformer colonial countries, but as a rule European manpower in thecolonies is less endangered by political changes than European capital,mines and factories are. Russial imperial poficy was almost everywherebuilt on the solid basis of colonization by Russian workers and peasants.Thus one essential basis of Russian imp-eriaiism remained untouched bythe October Revolution.

The manpower export which is the rule as far as the Russian coloniesare concerned is an exception in the British colonies. The territorieswhich were originally colonized by the British, like the United States ofAmerica, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are no longer oart ofthe British colonial Empire. No British mass colonization ha"s evir beencarried out in Burma, India, British west Africa and the west Indies.Something like a mass immigration of Europeans took place only inEast Africa, in the two Rhodesias, in Kenya and Taneanvika. In tirese

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territories the European colonization has created a worse nroblem thanRussian colonization in Central Asia. This is due to the fact that thecultural, racial and economic cleavage between the indieenous popula-tion of East Africa and the European colonists is much greater than thecleavage between Russian and Ukrainian colonists, on the one hand,and the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Uigurs on the other.8 . ' r onsNrsATS iyA ' AND AFRICANIZATToN. Manv th ings wh ichare accomplished in the Soviet Union as part of a greit revolutionaryachievement and widely publicized inside the country and outside, arealso done in the British Empire, but as part of the day's work and un-noticed. Thus the Soviet 'korenisatsiya' (the gradual replacement ofRussian party and state officials in the national territories by'natives') has an exact equivaient in the 'Africanization' gradually car-ried out in the African Sr;tish colonies, also called 'Nigeiianization' inNigeria. 'Korenisatsiya' and Africanization do not mean quite the samethiig. Soviet nationaiities policy is satisfied if a'native'canbe appointedto a job with a high-sounding title, such as 'Chairman of the Councilof Ministers', or 'Chairman of the Supreme Soviet' of this or thatrepublic. It does not worry the Soviet leadership ifthe person in questionis a mere figurehead surrounded and guided by Russians. The British,prefer to give an African the subordinate job of 'assistant' or 'deputy'

so that he can acquire the necessary skill and knowledge for a higherjob, pending further promotion. But once chosen for a top position hewill be fully responsible for his offi.ce and not a puppet in the hands ofEnglish mentors.

Full Africanization will ultimately be possible at least in some Africancolonies, while the large number of Russian colonists in the Sovietdependent territories will prevent any genuine'korenisatsiya' from beingimplemented.9. srnarpcrc coloNrEs. Some of the general rules guiding Brit ishcolonial policy do not fully apply to what one may describe as 'strategic

colonies'. One can hardly deny that British policy towards Cyprus,Gibraltar or Malta has been less liberal than the British attitude towardsthe West Indian or West African colonies. However much one maycriticize Britain's handling of the Cyprus question, on the other hand, itis a fact that Britain has not prejudiced the future of that island byaltering the composition of its population. This is precisely what theSoviet Union has done with its strategic colonies. It has deported theJapanese from Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; it has expelled allGermans from the Koenigsberg Province.

The peaceful transformation of the British Colonial Empire, if carriedon boldly and determinedly, will more and more become the democratic

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western atternative," rj;#,i., il]in ,.-rnuoins relarionsbetween the former master-race and form-er dependent p*ptir. Britishcolonial policy is perhaps taking the longest t"ay, but other nations havemade s imi l r r e f for ts in the same di rect ion. The French colonia l Err rn i rehas become the French Union. Although the French union, comp,iredwith the British En.rpire, is a centraiistic body, its principles u." d.*o-crat ic . Tolerance and respect for human dieni ry are i rs bai is ancl i r reorc-sents a much h igher form of pol i t ica l organiz l r ion than the SovietEmpire. Nationalist organizations in the Frinch Union have been sub-ject to a number of vexations and in the case of Madagascar even tobloody suppression. Nevertheless. national i iberation moiements whichwouid never be allowed in Soviet Russia, are nolv conducting a lesal orat least semi-legal existence in Algeria, Morocco uni Tul-,ir iu.The United States have_gir1e1 a new deal to their dependent terri-tories; independence to the Phitippines, far-reaching autonomv to thevirgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Hawaii Islandls, while Aiaska isheading for statehood. Denmark has shown for years a humanitariannon-imperialist attitude.towards the_people ofi ts only remaining colony,Greenland. The Dutch had to_liquidate their Empire under the"pressureof events. only the Relgians, Portuguese and spaniards have refused tochange the status of their colonial territories.

whatever progress may have been made, the non-communist worldis still very imperfect and a great deal of courage will be needed tocorrect mistakes and redress the wrongs of the past in the field ofcolonial p91l"y. However, if the western world livei up to its own idealsit can establish an order in Africa, in the west Indies ind in South-EastAsia, which not only wil l not be overwhelmed by communist Russianexpansion and infi ltration, but which wil l put to shame the sovietnationalit ies policy. of course, colonial reforms must primarilv be con-cerned with the welfare of the colonial peoples, but thev cin simul_taneously be part of a great plan to take the initiative oi action anctpropaganda out of Russian hands. The western nations can and mustprevent Russia from posing as that force in the world whose task it isto solve the problems which the rest of mankind has left unsolved,including the nationalities problem and the problem of deoendentpeoples. western justice in the field of coloniai policy will uliimatelyacquire an explosive character in relation to those parts of the rvorldsuffering under political oppression and totalitarian rule. The convictionthat western civilization implies for everybody a greater degree of libertythan Soviet power and Bolshevism, wil l-become general noi only amongthe peoples outside the Russian grip but will spread to the nati,onalitieswithin the Soviet sphere of influence and everwithin the Soviet unionitself.

The complete news blockade by which the Kremlin has surrounded

3t4

the peoples of Russia and the peoples tluing l,nO., indirect Soviet rulewill not be sufficient, in the long run, to conceal the truth about what isgood and progressiye in the West and about such epocir-making changesas the granting of freedom to India. In the long run it will be impossi6leto hide from the peoples of Soviet Russia and her satellite countries,that'something has changed' in the 'imperialist world'. The first doubtsas to whether Bolshevism has discovered the universal medicine againstthe evils ol our time and whether Russia holds a monopoly of pro-gress,have already emerged among the satellites and have even crepf intoRussia itself.

To speak of changes for the better, outside the Soviet sphere ofinfluence, is in itself a heresy for every Russian communist and few canbe expected to admit their ixistence.'The aged Hungarian-born Sovieteconomist, Professor E. S. Varga, is the only Soviet personality, so far,to come out with a timidly formulated statement challenging the officialthesis that olly communist countries are on the way to progress whilethe rest of the world is declining. He said: 'The fact that a process ofpol i t icat l iberat ion is going on in the colonies, the fact that India has anambassador in our country and we have one in India, is after all some-

lhing new. One cannot simply say that this does not mean anything,.?In making this statement, for which he incurred the displeasure of theKremlin, Varga showed that the facts which are giving the l ie to Soviettheory and propaganda are becoming so strong that even Soviet com-munists can no longer ignore them.

The Kremlin is haunted by the fear that the Lenin prophecy will cometrue, according to which Russia will cease to be the model and will againbecome the backward country.s Russia is backward already in mlnyways - its lack of freedom is in itself extreme backwardness - but th-ebackwardness is still hidden under the veneer of technical prosress andpropaganda slogans about the fraternity and equality of the pEoples. Itis up to the free nations to make the Russians more conscious of theirbackwardness by showing them through deeds that there are better,juster ways of solving many problems than those adopted in Soviet ter-ritories. The British Commonwealth, as the largest federal orsaniza-tion in the world, has a special mission in this rejpect; it can ser"ve as aliving example that Russia too can become a Commonu'eaith, that some-thing like the 'United States of Russia' is not a Utopia but a practical,political possibility.

T H E F U T U R E O F T H E P E O P L E S O F R U S S I A

To.speak of s"ch a possiblity, however, means to envisage a change ofr6gime in Russia. This change alone could guarantee to th1 nationa]itiesof the U.S.S.R. something which one could rightly describe as a .future'.

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S O V I E T N A T I O N A L I T I B S P O L I C Y

If the Soviet rdgime continues in its present form there is no future forthe peoples of Russia in the sense of a genuine political and culturaldevelopment. The first thirty years of the Bolshevik r6gime have shownclearly what the nationalities of the Soviet Empire have to expect fromits continued existence: in the economic field further industrializationand urbanization connected with Russification; in the political andcultural field complete elimination of any genuine national initiative ofthe peoples concerned, through the communist inquisition and con-tinuous purges.

In discussing a non-Bolshevik future for E'trasia one can never divorcethe problem of the non-Russian nationalities from that of the Russianpeople. The Russians, a people of 100,000,000, will always have animportant part to play in the destinies of Europe and Asia. A politicallybalanced world order cannot refuse to allocate to them a place whichcorresponds to their numerical importance, their abilities, their culturaland economic efforts and the vastness of the space they occupy. Toincite the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union asainst theRussian people and to aim at the disintegration of the Russiin Empirewould be a short-sighted policy. Disintegration propaganda addressedto the non-Russian nationalities is perhaps]the easiest way to embarrassthe Bolshevik r6gime, but it will never^lead to its downfall for suchpropaganda would irritate the Great Russians and make them scenticalregarding the intentions of the Western world. If Bolshevism is to beovercome at its very birthplaces, Leningrad and Moscow, the Russianpeople must not be under the impression that they will have to pay forliberation from communism with the dismemberment of their Statethrough the loss of all territories which at various times have beenattracted by centrifugal forces. In other words, the Western nationsshould not become the splitters of Russia by attaching more importanceto the local nationalities than to the Russian people. Those peoples ofthe U.S.S.R. who for geographical, historical, cultural and economicreasons will not fit into a new Russian Federal State will leave. Russiaanyway, in the process of tremendous political upheavals which arelikely to accompany a change of r6gime. Responsibility for this action,however, should rest with these peoples alone. The Western nationsshould take no initiative in it and should not push the non-Russianstowards political separation. This non-interference should not bedictated simply by opportunistic, tactical considerations. The emergenceof a multitude of small national States in Eastern Europe, in theCaucasus and Central Asia, in the territory of what to-dav is theU.S.S.R. would increase the anarchy in the world and would not evenbenefit the nationalities concerned. The creation of small and medium-sized national States, encircling as it were the Great Russian people andcutting them offfrom the rest of the world would guarantee the interests

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of the peoples of Russia as little as the collapse of Austria-Hungary safe-guarded the interests of the peoples of the Danubian monarc[y.-Whatboth the interests of the peoples of Russia and the maintenance of worldpeace really require is the transformation of the mock federation, whichis the U.S.S.R., into a genuine federal union. This does not mean that anew Russia will necessarily remain in possession of all territories overwhich the soviet Government to-day extends its domination, nor does itmean that the internal divisions of the u.s.s.R. into Reoubiics andAutonomous Republics, etc., will remain as they are now. Numerous

ldjustments will undoubtedly be necessary. Thus ihere is no justificationfor the maintenance of such creations of Soviet propaganda as theKarelo-Finnish Republic, or the Moldavian Repubiic; no-r would it beplopgr fo_r a democratic Russian Federation to leep 'strategic colonies'like the Kurile Islands or the Petsamo region, the islands ofthe Gulf ofFinland and other territories which the Sbviet Government has wrestedfrom the Finns.

It would be in Russia's own interest to give the members of thefederation the maximum of freedom so as tolncrease the attraction ofjoining it. Such a genuine federation might comprise, as a minimumrather than as a maximum, the UkrainE, Byeloiussia, Armenia andGeorgia- together with-Russia ploper including all nationalities livingwithin the habitat of the Great Russian people. We have shown howRussians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians aie intertwined with each otherald no further lengthy_explanation is, therefore, necessary here to provethat a federal union ofthe three Slav peoples is reasonable and feasibleif there is full respect for each otheis peculiarities. The inclusion ofArmenians and Georgians in the federation could be warranted by thepositive character, in the past, of relations between the two chriitiancaucasian peoples and the Russians. Moreover, the fact that a largenumber of Armenians live intermingled with Russians in the Northeincaucasus re€ion and elsewhere in the Russian Empire, would have to beconsidered in any future settlement, as well as the interdependence ofRussian-Georgian economic relations.

The Baltic nations, on the other hand, cannot be expected to joina federal union with the Russians. A new democratic Russia will onlvgradually gain the confidence of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanianiand these three_small peoples might prefer to enter a regional federationcentred in the Baltic Sea.

_.The problem of Russia's Moslem border republics will be the mostdifficult to solve, but political reason demands^that thev should not beseparated altogether from the Russian body. The .ur"'fo, the presenrSoviet Central Asia remaining within the framework of a ltussianfederation is at least as strong as the French case for the retention ofAlgeria within the French Union.

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Any politica, ,""',", Jilil";: or Russia,s MosremRepublics must take into acco,nt the substa't ial changes broughtabout in ihese countries since the Russian conquest, 6oth in theecononr ic and ethnographic l ie lds. The Russian mass colonizat ion, inpar t icu lar . is a factor uhich must be considered. Not one of the s ixMoslem Republics of the U.S.S.R. can reaily be regarded as a ,Moslern

State' in the same sense as lraq, Afghanistan or lran. Thev are evenfar less Moslem in character than ]vforocco and Tunisia where Europeancolonization has left a fairly slrong imprint.

There is a tremendous scope for changes in the conditions of theMoslem and other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet union withoutdisinteeratins the Russien Enrpire the esta.blishment of freedom ofreligion alone would have fbr-reaching consequences. It would not onlybrine about the freedom of religious cults, as such, but in the case ofthe Russian Moslems it would mean freedom to keep up contacts withthe Mosiems of the world. It would also imply freedom to publish booksin Arabic lnd permiss ion to teach and ie i rn Arabic in qovernmcntschools. Thus the l \1o ' lems in Russia, rvh i le c i t izens o iu Russianfederation, would have e'ery possible chance to be sirnultaneouslymembers of the great rvorld community of Islam.

A future Russia would also have to accept the principle that whateverobligations a political and economic federation might impose on itsmembers, every nationality must be the supreme masler of ils languageand literature. All pressure from the central Government reeardi;g tlevocabuiary and grammarr of the locai ianguages and the conte'nts ofiheirliterature must obviously be discontinued if the peoples are to developfreely. If the local nationalities want to 'purify tlieir language fromRussian expressions they have been forced to absorb in large numbersunder the Soviet rdgirre, they should likewise be free to do s6. If two ormore p^eoples,belonging to the same language group should express thedesire for a single l iterary language no obstacle should be puf in theirryay t9 achieve this aim. The Turkic peoples of Russia, in particular,should be given the choice to decide whether they want to retain thelanguaees created in the Bolshevik period or whether they want topursue those tendencies towards linguistic and cultural unificationwhich Bolshevism represseci. Any cultural unification rvourd also havepolitical consequences rvhich would be reflected in the regional sub-divisions of a future Russian federation. While the Sovietidgime hastried to keep non-Rr,rssian peoples apart as much as possible, a newRussia would have to recosnize all trends not only towards culturalbut also towards polit ical inion, in so far as theie union ideas aregeouraphically and ethnically sound.

A democratic Russian federation will be abie to establish a newreiationship between Russians and non-Russians. cultural contacts

318

A S A W O R L D P R O B L E t v t

between Russians and the peoples historicaily rinked q'ith them canhave no real vaiue so long as they result from polit icai pressure and solong as admiration of Russian culture is officialiy demiindecj in the sanreway as admiration of Stalin.

Under the Bolshevik rdgime the Russian classics have been desecratecland reach the non-Russian peoples only as a by-product of the vast f loodof Soviet propaganda literature. After the siamp of oflrcial Bolslievikapproval has been removed the Russian c lass ics rv i l l acqui re asr in therreducational.and enlightening role- aryong the non-RLssian' peoples.Pushkin wil l again be read as p'shkin, Tolstoy as Tolstov'andBelinsky's critical r.vorks wiil be studied because of their merits and notwithin the framewo.!

9L a propaganda campaign against .cos_mopolitanism' or for the 'Greatness of the Motherland'.

-

Not only to the nationaiit ies of Russia but to the whole worid wil lthe true face of Russian culture become visibre again. Russian poets andwriters will ngain be able to enrich literature, muiic and art to tire benefitof all mankind, instead of.being doomed to servile propaganda pro-duction. The Russian people, at present represented to the iorld bv athin strata of dipiomats and bureaucrats, wil l become visible throushthe expression of their true politicai ideals, not those of rvorld revolutiinand world communism u-hich are advocated on this people's behalf.The people of Russia will resume contact with tlre outria" rvorld bvmaking genuine contributions at international conferences into whicirSoviet representatives invariably carry an element of discord. TheR"ussian Christians wil l enter into a reraiionship with other churches ofthe world, not to serve Russian state interests, but to promote christianco-operation on a u'orld-wide scale. A Russian labour movement wil lemerge, no longer issuing orders to the 'workers of the world' but keenon_ a free exchange of views with organized labour in the advancedindustrial countries. Thus in a1l fieldi the Russians lvould be equalpartners instead of stubborn, suspicious opponents. Not to believi insuch a future for the Russian people rvould mean not to believe in thefuture of human civilization, in iis strength to survive and shake offtotalitarianism.

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L N O T E S T O C H A P T E R T E N

7. Mirovoye Khozvaistvo i Mirovaya politika - world Economics andPolit ics, Nr. 6, June 1946, p.72.'

2. G: Y. AorxHanr, Paki.stan and Indiutt !{ational Lrnity, London 1943,o.24.

319

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L N O T E S T O C H A P T E R T E N

3. Statistical comparisons between British and Soviet colonial policy can befound in the following books: Perrr.re Durr, Britain's Crisis of Empire,London 1949, p.137; LnoNano BanNns, Soviqt Light on the Colonies,A Penguin Special, London 1944, pp. 197 l2l1; GEonce P,louonr, IlowRussia Transformed Her Empire, London 1946, pp. 100/103. (Mr. Pad-more's book contains interesting material about the Negro policy of theCommunist International.)

4. Information on Non-Selfgoverning Territories, Memorandum by theColonial Office on Proceedings in the General Assembly of the UnitedNations 1947, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948, p. 38.

5. Uchitelskaya Gazeta, April 4th, 1951.

6. V. I. Lurm:t, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Selected Works,London 1936, vol. 5, p. 81.

7. Prilozhenie k zhurnalu Mirovoye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika -Supplement to the Journal, V[/orld Economics and Politics, Nr. 11,November 1947, p. 4.

8. V. I. LnNw, Left-l(ing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Selected Works,London 1938, vol. 10, p. 57.

320

I N D E X

Abashidze, Grigol, 234-5Abazintsy, 196Abbas the Great, Shah. 212Abdul Hamid, Sultan. 215Abdurakhmanov, Yuiup, 272Abkhazian A.S.S.R.. 23'6-7Abkhazians, 236-7,248Abo, Treaty of, 89Abramson. S..274Academies of Sciences:

AII-Union, Institute of Historv. 92.200; Polar Commission, 57

--

Armenia.223Azerbaidzhan, 244Functions,312Kazakhstan,297Kirghiz Branch,274Tadzhikistan, 288Ukrainian, 129, 131, 143

Adyge, 182. 195-6Adyge Autonomous Province, 195-6Adzhar A.S.S.R., 235Adzharians, 236Afghanistan:

Herat, 281.284Kabul, 284K-adaghan-Badakhshan province, 2g4Maimana Province. 28u,Mazir i Sharif Province. 284Soviet policy, ?58-9, 28 1-5, 292-3, 306Tadzhiks in,259.284Turkmenians in, 259, 284Uzbeks in.259.284

Africa:British colonial policy compared with_ Soviet,nationalities' policy, 309-14East .312-13South - racial policy. 304

Aibek, Tashmukhamedbv, 260Aitakov, Nederby, 294Ak Mechet: see Kzyl OrdaAkhay, Akhmet. 80Akhmed Kh-an, Emir of Afghanistan, 2g4Akhundov, Mirza Fathali, 34,244-5Akhverdov, A.,245Aklavik. 64Aksakov, S. T.,5-6Akushinsky, Sheik Ali-Hadji, 198Aland archipelago, 89Alash Orda, 7, 263Albania.306Albaniairs in Ukraine, 145-7Alexander l, Czar, 119,zZ+sAlexander III, Czar. 105Alexander of Kakhetia, prince,224Alexander of Macedonia. 286

-

Alexandrovsk. 94

Alexey Mikhailovich, Czar, 213Alexeyev, Kuzma. 50Algeria, 314,317Alikhanov, A.1., 222Al ikhanyan, A . L ,222{,1!m Khqn, Emir of Bokhara, 285Alksnis, Gen., 107Ag-1{ta (Qryerly Verny), 2s6,2634,

267-8.297-8- 3t2Alma Ata Province. 297Alphabet:

All-Union Central Committee for theNew.35-6

Arabic alphabets reformed, 36Assyrian, 249-50Azerbaidzhani attitude. 242Chuvash. 48Georgian, 208Latinization, 33-7'Novgorodov Alphabet', 34\eligious -aspect bf refoi ms, 34, 37Russian alphabet, 37-8Turkic Alphabet, AII-Union Central

Committee for the New. 35. .Turkological Congress in Baku, 35

Altai region, 74Alter, Victor. 165Altynsarin, lbrai.27OAmanullah, King of Afghanistan, 2g3America, United States of: see United

States of AmericaAmery, L. S., 308Amu Darya river, 284-5, 290-2Amur region, 22Anarchists. 164Anatolian Turks, 242-3, 248,294Andizhan, 278.297Angren, 278Arabic language,,- Daghestan, 2Ol-2;

Central Asia. 299Arabs in Central Asia. 298-9Arabic alphabet reformed: see AlphabetAral, Lake, 255-6.275Archangel, 93Arctic: see Far NorthArgentina, 218Armavir, 214,249Armenia, 7, ,128,,209, 2ll-23, 248, 251Armenian Church, 214,219,223

'

Armenia-ns, ?1, 123, 2O8, Ztl-23, 227 -8,?124t, 247 -8, 25 1, 260, 29 r, 29 6, 308,317

Ashkhabad. 299.312Assyrians, 240, 248-50, 306Astrakhan, 82,85.240Ataturk, Kemal Pasha, 34,216Attorney-General, All-Union. 20-1

321

Austral ia. l . 312Austria, 305,dvars, 37, 202-3Avdal. Amin. 252Ayuka, Khan, 82Azadi. Davlet Mamedi. 293Azerbaidzhan, Persian: see Persia:

AzerbaidzhanAzerbaidzhan, Soviet, 7-8, 20, 128,

200-1, 203, 209, 211, 216-7, 229,23748.2s1.273

Azerbaidzhani Turks, 8-9, 217, 227,23942,244-7

Azizbekov, Meshadi-Bek, 239

Bagirov, M. D., 11, 200-1,242-3Bagramyan, Ivan Khristofor ovich, 222Bagrationovsk (formerly Eulau), 1 19Bakhchisaray,8lBakhmurov, P. M., 80Bakikhanov fam|ly,245Baku, 200, 211, 226, 235-7, 244, 246-7,

307,3r2Balkars, 183, 185, 189, 193Balkh, 285Balkash, 267Balkash, Lake,255-6Baltic Sea, 89-90, 104Baltic States, 104-21, 3l'7Baltic-White Sea Canal (Stalin

100*1Baltiisk (formerly Pillau), 119Baluchis, 296, 298-9Bandera, Stephen, 142

Bokhara, 257, 27 4, 27 8, 284-5, 288-9, 299Bolgarian Empire,46-7Bolshevik Party: see Communist PartyBondarenko. I. P.. 133-4Borislav. 137Borotbists. 130. 132-3Brazi l , 218Brest Litovsk. 159Bryansk, 126Bryansk Province, 120Buddhists. 67-8. 8 l-6Budget, Soviet State, 23-5Buinaksk (formerly Temir-Khan-Shura),

197-8.200.204Bukharin, Nikolay Ivanovich, 9-10, 18,

277-8Bukovina,139-40Bulashev. Z. G..44Bulgaria, 2 l 8, 305-6Bulgarians, in Crimea, 77; in Ukraine,

146-7'Bund' (General Jewish Labour Leagueof Lithuania, Poland and Russia). I 65

Burma, 300, 306, 309, 312Burmistenko. M. A.. 134Buryato-Mongolia, 22Byelomorsk, 100Byelorussia, 8-9, 21, 128, 145, 149,

l 53-6iCanal), Byelorussians, 123,136,153-61, 174,292,

317

Canada, Soviet and Canadian Arctictowns compared, 64: Armenians in,218; Bri t ish colonization. 312

Cantemir, Dimiter, 152Capitals:

Moscow, replaced by St. Petersburg(1703), 90; reinstated under Sovietr6gime, 91,2'76

Moving of, 23; Udmurtia, 54; VolgaGerman Republic, 73; Kalmuckia,85 ; L i thuan ia , 1 l '1 , 276: Ukra ine ,135,276; Azerbaidzhan, 239: Kaz-akhstan, 263-4: Uzbekistan, 275-6

Caspian Sea, 255, 290-1Catherine II, 2, 69, 7 6, 82, 92, 125, 140-1,

1 1 4

Caucasus, North, 8, 3 1, 182-205, 229, 3 l7Census, (1926), 28, 53, 73, 99, 127, 147,

154, 170-1,203,271; (1939), 14, 49,170-1, 185, 249, 268, 291

Central Asia, Soviet, 8, 10-11, 14, 21,123, l7 t ,208, 255-300, 307,316-7

Central Asiatic Economic Council.liquidation, 260

Central Resettlement Board, 14-15Ceylon, 212, 300, 309, 312Chagata|279Chainikov, K., 54

Banderovtsy (Ukrainian InsurgentArmy), i42-3

Bashkiria, 32-3 , 41-6, 265Bashkirs, 5-6, 32-3, 41-6, 81Basmachi movement, 274-5, 285Batu. Mekhmed Maksud. 279Batum, 235-6, 238Batyrov Sh. 8., 295Batyrsha, Aliev, 42Bazhan, Mikola, 142, 246Belgian colonial policy, 314Belinsky, V. G., 319Berdzhenishvili. N.. 234Berg, L. S., 152Beriya, Laventy, 12, 231, 239, 243Berlin, Treaty of, 214Bernshtam. Prof. A.. 2'74Bessarabia. 150-1.214Bialystok, 159Biarmia. State of. 56Biriya, Muhammed,247Birobidzhan City, 17 5, 177 -8Birobidzhan Province, 173-9Birofeld, 175Bobruisk Province, 120Bogoly'ubov, Nikolay Semonovich, 273

I N D P X

1) ' )

I N D E X

Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., 67, 183, 185Chechens, i83 , 185-9 , 191, 193, 201Chelyabinsk, 46, 241Cheremiss: see lvlariCherkess (Circassian) Autonomous

Province, 22,195,196Chernayev, Gen. M" G.,256Chernigov, 126Chernishevsky, N. G., 192Chernovitsy, 139Chernyakhovsk (formerly Insterburg),

45 ,1r9Chernyakhovsky, Gen. Ivan, 119Chervyakov, Alexander Grigoryevich,

1 5 6Chiaturi manganese mines, 229, 23 |China:

Armenians in,212,218Kazakhs in.259.298Kirghiz in, 259, 27 |Soviet policy, 258-9, 29'7 -8Uigurs in, 297

Chinese, 91,174Chinese Turkestan, 81, 259Chirchik, 278Chkalov (formerly Orenburg), 74, 255,

2634Chkalov, Yalery,255Chubar, Vlas Y., 134Chukchi. 59Chuvash, 3'l , 43,4G8Chuvashia. 46-8Circassians, 182-3, 185, 195-6Civi l War, 8, 3l, 72, 107, 244,256; Lat-

vians' part in, 107; Volga Cermans'part in, alleged, T2

Coalmining:Donets, 41,125Georgra,2SlKazakhstan. 263.267Komi Republic, 57-8Kuznetsk Basin, 41Ukraine, 20, 41, 123, 125Uzbekistan, 278

Coats of arms, Baltic States, 109;Byelorussia, 157 ; Annenia, 217

Collectivization:Abkhazia.237Estonia. 112Kazakhstan, 265-6Kirghizistan,2T2Latvia, 115National Collective Farms, 22-6, 106,

296-7Resistance to,1'7, 41, 55,61,132, 192,

272,2'.77-8Ukraine. 132Volga German Republic, 74

Colonization, early Soviet policy, 3;change in policy from agricultural to

industr ial colonization, 13-14; Cirec-t ion to mil i tary vital areas, 15; Rus-sians'dornination. i6Azerbaidzhan, 24 IBritish poiicy compared wfth Soviet

po l i cy ,3 l2 -3Catherine II. under. 69Czarist r6gime, under, l-6Crimea, 77-8Forced labour, by. 57, 100-lGermans, by,69-71Kaliningrad Province, 120Kalmucks, by, 81Karelia, 99-101Karelian Isthmus. 15. 102Kazakhstan, 263 , 267 -8Kirghizistan, 27G-1Komi Republic, 57Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians,

by, 105-6Murmansk Provincc. l5Orenburg, 256Ukraine. 125

Colour problem, absence of, in SovietUnion, 304

Cominform conflict with Yugoslavia, 306Comintern:

Congress, First, 128; Fifth, 129, 305;S i x t h , 1 1 6

Eastern European minorities, policyon. 305

Executive Committee, 132Lithuanian independence, defence of

(1928) , 116Nationalities pohcy, 129, 142Ukraine, Western, propaganda in, 136

Communist Party, 7-12, 26, 308Central Asiatic Bureau, liquidation,

260Central Committee, ll-12,26, 44, 47,

61, 109, 136, 156, 160, 189-90, 194-5,288

Chuvash membershio. 47Congress, 12th, 10;-13th, 9; l5th, 9;

1 8 t h , 1 1 - 1 2Daghestani membership, 202-3Estonian membership, 107, ll2Ethnical composition, 8-9, 12Jews' membership, 164-5Karakalpakia, 260Kazakhstan, 264-5Komi membership, 56Latvian membership, 107Lithuanian membership, 107Moldavian rnembership, 150-lPolitbureau, 107,144Russian element. 8-9Tadzhikistan, 260Tartar membership. 8-9

I N D E X

Transcarpathian Ukraine membership,139

Turkmenistan. 260Ukraine, Western. 139Uzbekistan,260

^ Volga German membership, 72Communist Youth Leazue:

Assyrians, 249Congress, first post-war, 28Function.308

-

Ingush members, 188Ukraine, 135

Co_ns^tit$ion,-( 1923), 25, I28; (1936), 23128,231, 294

Cossacks, 4,6, 124-5, l4l-2,237Cotton-growin g, Azerbaidzhan, 243 ;

Uzbekistan. 276-8.282Crimea, 76-81Crimean Tartars, 67-8. 7G8lCrimean War (1853-6), j7, 81, 244Culture, Soviet measures agaiist

national:Armenians, 222-3Assyrians, 249-50Azerbaidzhani , 243-6. 273Balt ic peoples, 108-9. ' l l3Bashkirs. 43-4Byelorussians, 155-8. 160-lCaucasus, Northern.' I 80-90Central Asia. 260-2Daghestani, 197-205Far North, 6l-3Finns. 102-4Jews,165-8Kabardinians. 194-5Kazakhs, 268-70KirgYtz,2724Kurds. 252Moldavians, 152Tadzhiks. 285-7Tartars, 38-40. 79-81Turkmenians, 293-5Ukrainians, l4l-4Uzbeks,279-82

Cyprus, 218,313Czechoslovakia, 129, 139. 305Czechs. 77.146-7

Daghestan A.S.S.R.. 196-205Danilevsky, G. P., 70-lDaniyalov, A. D.. 200-1Darghinians, 202-3Dashava, 137Dashkesan, 241Dashnaks, 7, 216Denikin, Gen., 187Denmark, colonial policy. 314Derbent. 197Derzhavin, Prof.. N. S.. 89Dimanshtein, semyon f,4.,,72, z5g

Dinmukhametov, Galey Afzaletdino-vich. 38-9

Dniepr_opetrovsk, Latvians in, 106; Jewsin . l7 l

Dolgano-Nenets National Area, 60, 62Dolgany,6ODonets Bas in , 14 ,125,12 j , I33 , 135Dostojevsky, F. M.,270Dovbysh: see MarchlewskDrogobych, 137Dudinka,62Dungans,29G8Dzaudzhikau, 183, 193. 214Dzerzhinsky, Feliks, 148. 157Dzerzhinsky fatlonal District, 1 57Dzhanashia, S. N.. 234Dzhaparidze, Alyosha, 239

Echmiadzin.214Education:

-

Arabs, 299Armenian schools, 241Assyrian schools. 249Baku schools. 24iBaluchis, 298-9Bri-tish colonial policy compared with

Soviet policy, 3l l-12Central Asia,26l-2Far North, 62-3Georgia, 233German schools, 120Kalingrad Province. 120Karakalpakia, 261Kirghizistan. 261Polish schools, 100-ll. 157Russian languagg compulsory, lgI urkmenistan. 298-9Uigurs, 298Uzbekistan, 261

Egypt ,218Pilg-ul, Robert Petrovich, 107Eikhe, Robert Indrikovich.

-107

Elista: see StepnovElphinston, Cbl. W. c..251Emba.267Fngels (formerly Pokrovsk), 73Enskoye, 94Epics,_national, Soviet interpretation of:

see Literature: EpicsErenburg, llya,179Erevan, 2ll, 214, 218. 22OEritrea. 307Erlich,'Henryk, 165Estonia, 21,104-13Estonians, 37, 49,7j,104-13, lg9, 309,

31'7Ethiopia,218Eulau: see BagrationovskEurope, Eastern, minorities: effect of

Soviet policy, 304-6

324

I N D E X

Evenki, 60-3,174Evenki, National Area oi 60, 63Executions: see Trials and purges

Fadeyev, Alexander 28 286-jFar East, 13, 31, 126Far North, 22, 59-64, 91 -6Farkhad Hydro-Electric Station, 28 1Farms. National Collective: see Collecti-

vization: National Collective FarmsFeffer. Itzik. 167Feodosia, 214Fergana, 289Fet. A. A.. 55Finland:

Arctic Highway, 95Communist exiles. Provisional Finnish

Peoples' Government, 101Karelia, Western, 97-8Petsamo, inter-war development, 95St. Petersburg, effect offoundation of,

90Soviet policy:

Karelian Isthmus, annexation of,101-2

Petsamo, annexation of, 94-5Viborg (Viipuri), annexation of,

101-2War , (1939) , 101; (1941) ,102;

armistice (1944),95Finnish peoples, 21, 37, 43, 48-58, 90-1,

93,99, 102-3Finnmarken : see Norway: FinnmarkenFioletov, Ivan,239Firdausi, 286Five-Year Plans, 14-16,934,236-7, 241,

267-8,276-8Forced labour:

Murmansk railway line, on, 9lKomi Republic industrialization, 57Peter the Great, under, 90Stalin Canal, on, 100-l

France, Armenians in, 218; colonialp o l i c y , 3 1 4 , 3 1 7

Francis Joseph Land, 64Fraydorf National District, 172Friedland: see PravdinskFrontiers, changes in national territories,

23 ,4 '1 ,10r ,183, 196, 257, 264; Nor -wegian-Soviet frontier established, 94

Frumkin. A. N.. 179Frunze,27 l ,297Frunze, Mikhail Vasilyevich, 8, 27 l-2Fyodor, Czar,224

Gafurov, Bobozhdan G., 285-6Gagauz, 152Gagry,237Galicia, Eastern, 137, 13940Gammal Svenskby, ll0

Gandzha: see KirovabadGasprinsky, Ismail Bey, 78Geller (Birobidzhan communist), 177Genocide: see Liquidation of nationali-

ties and autonomous territoriesGeorgia, 21-2, 74, 128, 190-1, 193, 209,

211, 223-37 , 248Georgians, 37 , 123, 190,208-9,211,

223-37 , 247 ,260, 317Germans, Azerbaidzhan, in, 248; Baku,

in, 240; Baltic States, repatriationfrom, 110; Black Sea areas, in, 71, 75;Georgia, in, 74, 248; KaliningradProvince, in, 120, 313; Ukraine, in,146; Volga Germans: see Volga Ger-mans

Germany, anti-Soviet carnpaign, 74;recognition of Soviet claim to BalticSta tes ,110

Gibraltar,313Gikalo. N. F.. 156Ginzburg, Baron, 175Gipsies, 175,306Glavsevmorput, 60, 64, 9lGlazov,54Gogol, N. V., 124, 134-5Gold Coast, 307, 309, 312Goloded, Nikolay Matveyich, 156Goloshchokin, Filip Isayevich, 265-6Golovanivsky, Sawa, 168Gomel, 155Gomel Province, 120Gorky (formerly Nizhny Novgorod), 49Gorky, Maxim,205Gorky Province, 14, 120Gorno-Badakshan, Autonomous Prov-

ince of, 283,290Gotsinky, Imam Nazhmuddin, 198'Great Kara Kum Canal project,29lGrechukha, M. S., 142Greece,218, 305Greeks, Baku, in, 240i Georgia, in,248;

Ukraine, in, 146Grinberg, A. A., 179Grinko, Grigory Fyodorovich, 134Grodno, 159Grozny, 186, 188Gudauti ,237'Gummet',239

Guseinov, Geidar, 201Gylling, Dr., 100

}{afi2.286Heckert District, 74Herzen. A.4.. 192Hitler, Adolf,226Honduras. British, 309Hrubeshov. 142Hrushevsky, Prof. Mikhail, 129, 131, 143Hughes, John, 125

325

Hugo, Victor, 113Hungaria, minorjt ies' pol icy, 305_6Hunganans. work on Murmansk rai l_

I3J, 91; in Transcarpathian Ukraine,1 3 8

Ibrahim Beg, 285. 289lgarka,63-4Ignatov, I . ,63Ikramov, Akmal, 277-8Ilminsky, N. N., 38l lova isky . D imi r ry l vanov ich , g9lmber, Vera, 179In{1q a^nd_ P.,ak-isr-an, 212, 219, 259, 282,

287-8, 298, 300, 307, 309_10, 312, 31iArmenians in.212.218lovie,tpol icy, 2_59, 282, 287-8, 298,307radzh lks in ,259

Indones ia , i ,218Industr ial izat ion of national terr i tor ics.

!?-t7., .44 -s. s7 _8.7 i , 23 | _3, 267 _8 j i ibashkrna, . l4 -5Georg ia ,23 l -3Komi Republic, 57-8Kazakhstan, 267-8Uzbekistan, 278

- Volga German Republic, 73Ingush, 183, 185. 187-90I nster_b^u rg : See Chernyak hovskrnra, )6'Intourist', 74Irakli II, King, 224, 235Ir lq.,^ A_rmenians in. 218; Assyrians in,

249-50; Kurds in.250.Ishimbay, 45-6Ismail Province, 137, 152Israel, Srate of, 165, 178. 307I ta ly ,305, 307tv111tri fergluJ e,2,4,3e,e2. to+5. t2B,

r>+, z++, I l+Izhevsk, 54

Jalil, Jasmeh, 252Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in

Moscow, 167-8Jewish Autonomous Republic, 173-9Jews, 8-9, 78, 1 t-l, 12i, 145_6, 1'49, 154_5,

159, 163-80, 203, 2t2, 240, 292Baku, in, 240Baltic States, extermination by

Germans, 1l IByeigrus_sia,_in, tS4-5, 159, 166,

169-71,175, t79Cent ra l As ia t i c Repub l ics , in , l7 lCo.mmunist Party membership, g-9,

164-5Crimea, in,78, 1i2, 175. 17gMoldavia, in, 149, 152

'

Moscow, in, 163, 165. 174'Mountain Jews', 203

I N D E X

National Districts. 172Stal inabad, in, 286Ukraine, in, 145-6, 168-9, 178_9

Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R,, 183, 185K a b a r d i n i a n A . S . S . R . , 1 8 5 , t 9 3 - . 5 '

- -

K a b a r d i n i a n s , 1 8 3 , t 9 l . l 9 l - 5Kleggyryh. Lazar Moiseyevich, 8, 131,

167, 179,265Kakhetia, 224{ral-evalg, Soviet interpretation of, 103Kalevala District. lOi(ypipo93. Sovier interpretarion of, 109t(atrntn ( lormerly Tver). 9gKalinin. Mikhai l :

Birobidzhan, association with, 174_5,

Caucasus, pol icy in. decree on North_crn ( aucasus f l 9_16), lg4; sratement(1942) . 184-5 ; in te rvent ion inChechen L'anditrv. 187

Crimean Republic. iecrec establ ishing,78

Jewish question. inrerest in. l j4 _5, l j |Proletariat leadership o\er peasanrry,

statement on. 7Kalinin Province, 99Kalinindorf National Distr ict, I72Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg),

118-9Ka l in ingrad Prov ince , I I9 -20 , 313Kalmuckia. 67-8. 85-6Kalmucks, 5, 67-8, 81-6Kalyandar. Sadvk. 279Kamenev, L. B.. 165Kandalaksha (formerly Kennanlahti) ,

mo\ed t rom Kare l ia to MurmanskProvince, 101

Kannanlahti: see KandalakshaKapiyev, Effendi,205Kara Kum desert, 290-1. 310Karabakh Autonomous Province, 217Karachay, 183, 185. i90Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous

Province, l83Karachay Autonomous Province, 185,

190-lKarasarKaraganda, 267Kale,lo-Finnish S.S. Republic, 21, 97,

1024.317Karakalpakia, 260-1. 27 sKarakalpakian s, 275. 27EKarakhan. L. M.. Z3lKarakol: see PrzhevalskKarelia, 92, 97, 99-103Karelian Isthmus, 15, l0l-2Karel ians, 21,92,9i-9Kale]o-Fi-nn_ish S.S. Republic, 21, 97,

1024.311

326

I N D E X

Karl Liebknecht District, 74Karsakpay. 267Kashka Darya Province, 299Kashmir, 306Kaspiskoye (formerly Lagan), 85-6Katayama, Sen, 265Katherinenstadt: see MarxstadtKarrel, M. 4., 177Kaunas (Kovno), l l i , 2i 6Kautsky, Karl,226Kazakhs, 8, 21, 257, 259-60, 261 -'1 1, 27 5,

278.291,296,29&,3r3Kazaklrstan,'7, 20-1, 126, 257-8, 260,

262-10,296-7Kazan,2, 255Kazan Tartars: see TartarsKazem-bek, 4.,245K e n y a . 3 l 2 - 3Kerbabayev, Berdy, 291Khakass Autonomous Province, 22'Khanbudagovism',243

Khandzta, 234Khanti-Mansi insk, 62Khanty, 61Khanty-Mansi, Nationai Area of, 60, 63Kharkov, 106.129,133, I 35, 139,241,276Kherson, ' l l ,125 , 171Khetagurov, Kosta, 192Khibinogorsk (formerly Kirovsk), 93-4,

1 0 1Khmelnitsky, Bogdan, 142Khodzhayev, Faisulla, 277-8, 280Khodzhibayev, Abdurakhim, 288-9Kholm, 142Khorezm (formerly Khiva), 257,274Khorezm Province, 296Khvylovy, Mikola, 130-l'Khvylovy-ism', 130, 144Kiev, 126-7, 129, 133, 135, 139, 17 1, 213,

249,276Armenians in, 213Assyrians in, 249Capital of Ukraine, 135,276Ethnical composition, 127Jewish population, 171

Kiev, State of, 123Kingisepp, Victor, 106Kingisepp District, 106Kirghiz, 8, 49, 189, 25'7, 259-60,262,

2 7 1 4 , 2 9 6 , 2 9 8 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 3Kirghizistan, 2l, 209, 257 -8, 260-1,

270-82,296-7Kir i l lov, I . K.,256Kirov, Sergey Mironovich (Kostrikov),

8, 91, 242-3Kirov Province, 120Kirovabad (formerly Gandzha),239,241,

1 A / <

Kirovsk : see KhibinogorskKishinev, 152

Kizlyar.2l4Klikhori, 190Klaipeda (formerly Memel), I17-8Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich, 13Koenigsberg: see KaJiningradKokand, Autonomous government of,

1 1 1

Kokhtla-Jdrve, 111Kola,92,94Koia Peninsula, 9Z-3, 96-7Kolarov, Vasii, 147Kolarov District, 147Kolarovka, 147Kolas, Yakub, 157-8Komi, 37, 48, 53, 55-8Komi A.S.S.R., 55-8Komi-Permyak National Area, 56'Komzet' (Committee for the agricultural

settlement of Jewish toilers), 171*2,t7 5-6

Kondopoga, 100Koreans, in Birobidzhan , 174; in Central

Asia, 296Korne ichuk , 4 , .Y . , 144Koryaks, 59Kosior, Stanislav, 132-4Kostomarov, Nikolay Ivanovich, 89Kostroma Province, 120Krasnodar, 249Krasnovodsk, 291Krasnoyarsk Territory, 22Krumin, Y., 108Krushchov, Nikiia Sergeyevich, 134-5Kruus, Hans, 113Kry lov , I .4 . ,270Kuli-zade, Mamed,245Kulumbetov, U. D., 265Kumyks,37 ,202-3Kunanbayev, Abai,27OKunta, Hadji, 187Kupala, Yanko, 157-8Kupradze, V. D.,233Kurbanov, 289Kurganov, Grigory, 239Kurdish Republic, 251-2Kurds, 250-2Kurile Islands, 15, 313, 317Kursk, 126Kursk Province, 120Kutuzov, Field-Marshal Mikhail, 38Kuusinen, Otto W., 101Kuybishev, Valerian Vladimirovich, 8Kuybishev Province, 120Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbass), 41Kzyl Orda (formerly Ak Mechet), 25(

zo5-4Kzyl Orda Province, 296

Ladoga, Lake,97-8, 100Lagan: see Kaspiskoye

327

Lakhuti, Abulkasim, 287Lakians, 202-3Lakoba, Nestor Apollonovich, 237Languages:

Alphabetic Revolutions: see AlphabetBaltic States, Russian introduced. 109British policy compared with Soviet

policy, 311Daghestan, 201-4Finnish in Kareiia. 98-9Hebrew, ban on, 166Far North native languages, 63Northern Caucasus, decrees, 183Karelia, Soviet decree on equal rights

fgr Karelian, Finnish and Russian;Finnish as official language, 98-9

Political terminology, introduction ofinternational terms, l8

Russian language, imposition and obli-gatory teaching in schools, 18, 37;introduction into Baltic States. 109:domination in Daghestan, 203

Turkmenistan. 294-5Lapps:

Norway, in: see Norway: LappsRussia. in: see SaamiSoviet policy, 95-6Sweden, in: see Sweden: Lapps

Larin, Yury, 175-6Larindorf National District. 172Latinization of Atphabet: see AlphabetLatvia, 21, 106-9, lll, ll+6Latvians, 8-9,37 ,104-l I, 114-6,306,317Lazarev,I. L., 222Lazi.235-6Lazistan,236League of Militant Godless, 18, 166Lebanon.2 lSLenin, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov:

Bashkirs' relations with Tartars. viewson. 32

Central Asia, policy towards, 258Central Asiatic State University, sanc-

tioning offoundation of, 280Crimean Republic, decree establishing,

78Daghestani Moslem dignitaries, mes-

sage of allegiance from, 198-9Georgia, policy on,227Imperialism as 'export of capital', 312Kalmuck Autonomous Province.

decree establishing, 85Kalmucks, proclamation to, 83, 86Karelian folklore, in, 103Letter to the Communists of Azer-

baidzhan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagh-estan and the Mountain Republic.10,228,230

Letter to the Workers and Peasants ofthe Ukraine, l0

Stalin as expert on nationality prob-lems. appreciation of, 2l I

Tartars' relations with Bashkirs, viewson,32

Turkestan, statement on, 258Ukrainian independence, attitude to-

wards. 130kninakan.220Leningrad (lormerly St. Petersburg), 14,

5^7.-9, 62-3,90-1, 93, 96, tO2, lo6:'t 14,249Assyrians in, 249Latvians in, 106Migration to, 14Port, as, 114

Leningrad Province, Karelian Isthmusincorporated, 102; Estonians and Lat-vians in. 106

Leninsk, 278Lenkoran. 248Lermontov, M. Yu., 181,209,2'70Lezghians, 202-3, 240liberbe-rg @irobidzhan communist), I 77Libya, 307Liquidation ofindividuals: see Trials and

purgesLiquidation of nationalities and autono-

mous territories:Armenians in Turkey, 215Balkars. 185. 193-4Baltrc minorities, I l0-1Chechens, 189.201Crimean A.S.S.R., 67 -8, 7 6-81Crimean Tartars, 67 -8, 7 6-,81Greeks, 146Ingush,185Jews, 146, 163Kalmuck A.S.S.R., 67-8, 81-6Karachay, 190Volga German A.S.S.R., 67-76

'Lishentsy' (disfranchised persons), 170Literature:

Azerbaidzhani, Soviet attitude. 273Bashkirs, counter-revolutionary or-

ganizations defeated, 43; plays criti-cized. M

Central Asia,26L2Crqneqn Republic, Soviet policy,

79-80Daghestani, Soviet influence, 204-5Epics, national, Soviet interpretation

of, Kalmuck Dzhangar, 35; FinnishKaleuqla, 103 ; Estonian Kalevipoeg,109; Kirghiz Manas,272; Azetbaid-zhant Dede Korkud.273

Georgia,234-5Kabardinian, Soviet influence, 194Kirghiz, Soviet interpretation, 2j 24Latinization of alphibet, effeit of, 35

I N D E X

328

I N D E X

Literature: continuedPersian, Soviet interpretalion, 245-6.

286-'7Tadzhikistan, 286-7Turkmenistan, Soviet interpretation,

293-5Ukraine, l2+5,1434Uzbeks, Soviet policy, 279

Lithuania, 104-l I, 116, ll8-20, 149Lithuanians, 37, 104-ll, 1 16, 1 18-9, 317Livonian War (1558-82), 104Loennrot, Elias, 103Luft (Volga German Premier), 74Luxemburg District, 74Lvov . 139. 141Lyubchenko, Panas Petrovich, 133

Macedonia, 306Machine Tractor Stations, 24, 120,291Madagascar, 314Madatov, Prince V. G.,222Maikop, 195Maikov. A. N..270'Main Turkmenian Canal', 291-2Makeyevka, 127Makhach Kala (formerly Petrovsk), 197,

2034Makharadze, Philip, 228-30Makhtumkuli (Turkmenian poe0, 293Maksum. Nasratullah. 288-9Malaya, 306Malta. 309. 313Malgobek, 193Manos,Soviet interpretation of , 27 2-3Manchurian border regions, coloniza-

t ion , 15Mans i .6G-1 . 63Manuilsky, Dimitry, 145Mar Shimun, 248-9Marchlewsk (formerly Dovbysh), 148Marchlewsky, Julian, 148Marchlewsky District, 148Mar i ,37 ,48 , 51-3Mar i A .S.S.R. , 51-3Mariupol (Zhdanov), 125, 127, 146Marr . N . Y . .236Marshak. Samuel. 179Marxstadt (formerly Katherinenstadt),

"12-3Maty.ushkin, Gen.,237Mazeppa, Hetman, 124, 153Mdivani. Budu.228-30Medvezhegorsk, 100Mekhti, Gusein,245Melitopol, 147Memel: see KlaipedaMensheviks, 16+5, 22G7, 229Menshikov. Prince. 77Merv, 290Mgaloblishvili, c., 230

Michael. Grand Duke. 221Middle East, Soviet policy, 196, 241,

250-lMigration (see also Colonization):

Abroad, ban on, 16Asiatic territories. to. 13Caucasian mountaineers' exodus, I 82,

1 8 5Crimean Tartars emigration to

Turkey, 76-8Finns from Karelian Isthmus, 102German emigration, 74Kalmuck emigration, 82Kazakhs to Sinkiang, 268Mass populations, transfers of, 6'l-8,

75-6Military vital areas, to, l5Resettlement organizations, l4-1 5, 99Uzbeks,279

Mikhoels, Prof. Solomon, 167Mikoyan, Anastas,8, 12Mikoyan Shakhar: see Klikhori'Mil l i Ist iklal ' ,279Minchegaur,24lMinsk, 154, 156, 159Mirzoyan, C. I . ,265Mitskevitch-Kansukas, V. S., 108Mogilev, 126Mogilev Province, 120Moldavia, Soviet, 21, 149-52,317Molotov, V. M., as Prime Minister, 10;

on incorporation of Western Byelo-russia, l53

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, ll0, 149, 159,166

Monchegorsk, 93-4Mongolia, Outer, 31Mordvinian A.S.S.R., 48-50, 53Mordvinians, 37, 47-50, 296Morocco, 314, 318Mosashvili, IIo, 235Moscow:

Assyrians in, 249Capital as, replaced by St. Petersburg

(1703), 90; reinstated under Sovietr6gime, 91,276

Communist Party members, 12Jews in , 163,165,174Latvians in, 106Mari belief re foundation. 52Migration to, 13Population, l2

Moscow Province, Tartar workers, 41;Karelians in; population, 99

Moslems, 42-3, l8'7 -8, 197-8, 2O0, 202,235-6, 243, 264, 275, 296-300, 317-8'Mountain Jews': see Jews: 'MountainJews'

Mountain Republic (Gorskaya), I 83, I 85Mozdok, 193,214

329

M.T.S.: see Machine Tractor StationsMurmansk, 31,914,96Murmansk Province, 15, 93-4, 101Murmansk Railway: see Railways: Kirov

RailwayMussavat Pafiy, 7, 239-40

Nakhichevan,2l4Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.. 217Nalchik, 194-5Namangan,278Nanai, 174Nansen, Fritjof, 199-200Narva, I 12'Narimanovism', 243National Areas, 22-3, 25, 59-63National Collective Farms: see Collecti-

vization: National Collective FarmsNational Districts, 22-3, 74, 96, 99,

146-8, 157, t72,297Dungan, 297Bulgarian in Ukraine, 146-7German. 74Gipsy, planned, 172Greek. 146Jewish, 172Karelian in Kalinin Province, 99Polish, in Ukraine, 148; in Byelo-

russ ia ,157Saami,96Ukraine, in, 14G8, 112

National Village Soviets, 22-3, 146, 298Albanian in Ukraine, 146Baluchis. 298

Navoi. Mir Alishir. 280-lNekrasov, N. A., 75Nenets National Area. 59. 62Nentsy, 59-63Nestorian Church. 249Netherlands, colonial policy, 314New Guinea, 307New Zealand. l . 312Nicholas I. Czar. 141Nicholas lI, Czar,215Nigeria,309-13Nikolay, Grand Duke, 248Nikolayev, 125Nikopol manganese mines, 231Nizami,244-6Nizhny Novgorod: see GorkyNjemen, 117Nobel, Ludwig,238,240Nobel, Robert, 238, 240Nogai Tartars, 196,203Norilsk, 63-4'Norman theory'of origin of first Russian

State, 88-9North, Institute of the Peoples of, 59,

62-3 ,9r ,96

Northern Pechora Railway Line: seeRailways: Northern Pechora

Northern Sea Rqute, Chief Administra-tion of: see Glavsevmorput

Noteborg, treaty of (1326),92Norway:

Finnmarken, Soviet historian's denialof Norwegian rights to; early Rus-sian settlements, 92

Fishermen's settlements in Russia, 93Hammerfest, 94Lapps, Soviet pol icy, 96Arctic towns eclipsed by Sov.iet towns,

94Vadsoe, 92, 94Yardoe,92,94

Novaya Zemlya Island, 64Novgorod,98, 102r-ovgorodov, N., 34Novosibirsk, 106Novozlatopol National District, 172Nyasaland, 309Nystad, treaty of (1721),89

Ochemchir i , 237Odessa, 125o i l :

Azerbaidzhan, 20, 238, 24A3Bashkiria, 45*6Chechenia, 188Georg ia ,231Crozny oilfields, 188Komi Republic, 57Kazakhstan, 263, 267Ukraine, Western, 137Uzbekistan, 278

Oirors, 37Oistrakh, D., 179Oktyabrsk, 45-6'OId Believers', 4Old Bolsheviks, 164-5, 229Olenogorskoye, 94Onega, Lake, 100Omsk, 255-6Omsk Province, German collective

farms, 76Oranienbaum, 90Orazov, Ak Murad, 293Ordzhonikidze, 189Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantino-

vich (Sergo), 8, 90, 23G-lOrozal iev, K.,2734Orel Province, 120Orenburg: see ChkalovOri i , Israel, 213Ormon Khan, 274Orthodox Church, persecuted sects, 4;

Soviet campaign against, 18, 52; BalticStates, 104; new Soviet approach, 167;Uniates forced to join, 14O-l

I N D E X

330

I N D E X

Osel Island: see Saaremaa IslandC)ssetin Autonomous Province,

Southern ,19 lOssetin A.S.S.R., Northern, 183. 191-3Ossetins, 37, 183, 191-3, 236, 248'Ozet' (Society for the agricultural settle-

ment of Jewish toi lcrs), I7l-2, I75

Pakistan: see India and PakistanPalestine, 165, 178, 196, 307, 309-10Pamir, 255, 283-4Pan-Iranianism, 244-5, 286, 290Pan-Turkism, 18, 244, 294Panch, P., 144P d r n u , 1 1 2Pasternak, Boris L., 179Pechenga: see PetsanoPechora region, 57-8Peipus. Lake, 106, 109Persia:

Armenians in, 212-3, 218-9Asterabad Province, 292Assyrians in, 250Azerbaidzhan, 219, 246-7, 292Baluchistan, 298Karun river, 2[J7Khorazan Province, 292*3Kurds in, 250-2Literature, Soviet interpretation of,

245-6,286-7Soviet policy, 245-7, 25U2, 258-9, 282,

28s-7 , 292-3, 298, 306Turkmenians in, 259

Pcrvomaisky, Leonid, 168Peter the Great. 2, 4, 38, 44, 82, 89-90,

92-3, t02, 104-6, 128, 152, 186,194,2t3, 224, 237-8, 246

Peterhof, 90Petrovsk: see Makhach KalaPetrovsky, Gr.igory Ivanovich, 134Petrozavodsk, 90, 99-100Petsamo, 91-5, 317Ph i l ipp ines ,314Pillau: see BaltiiskPilsudsky, Marshal, 116Pionersk (formerly Neukuhren), I 20Pogodin, Nikolay Petrovich, 89Pokrovsk: see EngclsPoland:

Continental expansion in MiddleAges, 2

Jews in, 163Soviet policy, 104, 135-7Vilna, claim to, I I 1

Poles, 8, 110-11, 146-9, 157. 159Byelorussia, in, 147-9, 157, 159Communist Party membership, 8Lithuania, in, evacuation, 1 10; schools

and newspapers, 1 l0-11Schoo ls , 110-11, 157

Ukraine. in. i46-9Polesia, 1-s9-60Poltava, 126Poltava Province, 126Polyarnoye, 94Portugal, colonial pol icy, 314Postyshev, Pavel, 132-lPotseluyevsky, Prof. A., 29.1-5Poynton, A. H., 308Pravda, 1942 article on Russians in the

army, 19; accusations against Tartarideology, 39; criticisms of UkrainianCommunis t Par ty . l+41 acr ion aga ins tByelorussian'Stsepuro Affaire' , 156;Stalin's article on Daghestan (1920),198

Pravdinsk (formerly Friedland), 119Pripet Marshes, 159Provinces Autonomous, 22-6Prussia, East, 15, 118-20Przhevalsk (formerly Karakol), 27 2Przhevalsky, N. M., 272Pugachov, Emelyan, 42, 50Pulatova. Nure. 252Purges: see Trials and purgesPushkin, Alexander S., 90, 1 38, l8l ,270,

3 1 9Pushk ino ,138

Quazi Mohammed (Kurdish leader),t < 1 1

Radek, Karl 8., 165Railways:

Kirov Railway Line (Murmansk Rail-way) ,91 ,98-100

Komi Republic, 57-8Mari sect opposition, 52Murmansk Railway: see Kirov Rail-

way, aboveNorthern Pechora Railway Line, 57-8Transcaucasian line from Baku to

Batum,238Turksib, 265

Rakhimbayev, Abdullah, 289Rakovsky, K. c., 128-9, 132Razin, Stenka, 50, 237Reindeer-breeding, collectivization in

Far North, 60-1Religion:

Alphabetic reforms, aspect of, 34, 37Anti-religious department of Society

for the Dissemination of Politicaland Scientific Knowledge, 18

Baltic States, 104Daghestani, 197-9Ingush,187-8Karelians, 97-8Jews, 165-7Lcague of Militant Godless, 18. 166

331

I N D E X

Religion: continuedLithuanians, 104Local religions, Soviet campaign

against, 17-18,33,37Mari national religion, 51-2Mordvinians' national religion revival

attempt, 50Ukraine. Western. Soviet interference

with Uniate Church, 141Resettlement organizations, 1 4-1 5, 99Rhodesia, Northern, 3O9, 312-3Rhodesia, Southern, 312-3Riga, l14Riga, Peace of, 153Rilsky, Maxim, 144Rizenkampff, Prof.,290Rogri Island (Pakrisaared), evacuation

ofEstonian Swedes, 110Roman Catholic Church, Lithuanians,

104; Western Byelorussians, 160;Western Ukraine, 140, 141

Rostov, 146,183,249'Rot Front' District, 74Rothschilds, 238,240Rovno, 139Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich, 107Rumania, 129,137,139, 150-1, 218,

305-6Runo Island (Ruhnu), evacuation of

Estonian Swedes, 110Rykov, Alexey Ivanovich, 9-11, 18, 278Ryskulov, Taras Ryskulovich, 27 2

Saadi (Persian poet), 286Saami (Lapps), 95-6Saami National District. 96Saaremaa Island, 89-90, 110, ll2St. Petersburg: see LeningradSakha l in . 15 .313Salekhard, 62Samarkand, 256, 2'15-6, 280, 289, 299,

307, 312Samoyeds: see NentsySamursky, N., 199-200, 202,204Saratov. 49. 74Scandinavia, history, 88-9; Soviet ideo-

logy; Czarist r6gime, under, 89-92;founding of St. Petersburg, 90-1;building of Murmansk Railway, 91-2;evolution of Murmansk Province,93-5; Soviet policy towards Lapps,95-6; significance of Karelia, 97-102;building ofStalin Canal, 100; annexa-tion of Karelian Isthmus, 101-2

Scandinavian origin of Russian State,88-9

Sciences, Academy of: see Academy ofSciences

Scythians, 89Semper, Johannes, 113

Semyonov-Tyanshanky, P. P., 27 0Senchenko. I.. 144Serbs in Ukraine, 125Sevastopol sieges (1855 and 1942), 80-1Severnaya Zemlya,64Shamil, Imam, 186, 197,2W-1Shen Shi-tsai, 298Shaskolsky, l . P.,92Shaumyan, Stepan, 239-40Shchusev, A. V., 152Shemakha,244Shevchenko, Taras, 138Shikhlinsky, Gen. A. 4..,245Shiraz. 286Shirokogorov, S. M., 6l-2Shiroky (Moldavian Communist), 150Shirvani, Khagani,244Shishkov, Vyacheslav, I 18Shotemor (Tadzhik Communist), 289Shumsky, Oleksandr, 130, 131Shuro Islamiya movement, 7Siabandov, Samand Alievich, 252Siberia, colonization, 6, 1 3; lack of racial

prejudice, 6Siberia, Central, 3lSiberia, Eastern, 22, 3lSiberia, Northern, National Areas, 59Siberia, Western, 106-'7, 126,255

Estonian and Latvian immigration, 106Kuznetsk Basin: see Coalminine:

Kuznetsk BasinUkrainians in, 126

Siberian Tartars. 6Simbirsk: see UlyanovskSinkiang, 268,29'7-8Skobelev. Gen.. 192Skrypnik, Mikola, 128-9, 132-3Skvortsov, Nikolay, 11Slepoy, Metropolitan, 141Smolensk, 106Socialist-Revolutionaries, | 64, 240Society for the Dissemination of Political

and Scientific Knowledge, 18Sofronov, Anatoly, 284Solovyov, Sergey Mikhailovich, 89Somalia, 307Soronbayev (Kirghiz Communist), 273Sovietsk (formerly Tilsit), 119Spain, colonial policy, 314Spinoza, Baruch, 167Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich :

Abkhazian assassination plot, alleged,237

Azerbaidzhan. views oru 242Bashkir oil workers, letter to, 45Central Asia, policy towards, 258Daghestan policy, proclamation on

autonomy (Nov. 1920), 197-8;article in Pravda (OcL 1920), 198;message of allegiance from Moslenr

332

I N D E X

Stalint continueddignatories (1923), 199

Georgia, policy towards, 165, 225-31,23G7

Jews, policy towards, 165-6, L74,179Kalmuck poem on 60th birthday, 83-5Karelian poem on, 103Mari letter. 52-3'Marxism and the National Question',

r65Nationalities policy, early, 9-ll, 32Nizami, views on, 246Ossetins, discussions with (1925), 191Persia, interest in, 246Russian people, toast to (24 May 1945),

t 9'Skrypnik affair', liquidation of, 132Tadzhikistan, policy towards, 283, 287Transcaucasia, policy in, 128-9, 2ll,

227-8,23rTurkestan, statement on (1923), 258Ukraine, policy in, 128-9, l3+5

Stalin Canal: see Baltic-White Sea CanalStalin Prizes, 2Ol, 235, 288Stalinabad, 288-9,312Stalindorf National District, 172Stalingrad, 74Stalino (formerly Yuzovka), 125, 127Stalino Province, 127Stalsky, Suleiman, 204-5Stavropol, 22, 190, 193, 214Stephen the Great, 152Stepnoy (formerly Elista), 85-6Stolbovo, treaty of (1617),97Sudan, 307'Sukhorukovism', 50Sukhum,237Sultan-Galiyev, M., 33Sumgant,24lSurkhan-Darya Province, 289Suvorov, Gen.,38, 194Sverdlov, Ya. M., 165,167Svetlogorsk (formerly Rauschen), 120Sweden:

Karelia, Western, under, 97-8King Charles XII, 89, 124King Gustavus Adolphus II, 97-8Lapps, Soviet policy, 96Territories lost to Russia. 88-90

Swedes in Estonia, evacuation of, 110Sydykov, Abdukerim, 272'Sydykovism', 272Syr Darya river,256,28lSyria, Circassians in, 196; Armenians in,

218; Kurds in, 250

Tabasarans, 203Tabriz,247,25O,287Tadzhikistan, 22, 257, 2@, 282-90, 296

Tadzhiks, 49, 189, 257, 259, 260, 278,282-90.298

Tagirov, 4,. M.,44Taimyr National Area, 61Tallin, 112Talyshi, 248Tanganyika, 3 12-3Tannenberg, Battle of (1410), 109Tartar-Bashkir Republic, 32-3Tartar A.S.S.R.,3240Tartars (Kazan or Volga), 5, 8, 3243,

47,91,242, 308Crimean Tartars: see Crimean TartarsNogai Tartars: see Nogai TartarsSiberian Tartars: see Siberian Tartars

Tar tu .112Tashkent, 2W, 261-2, 275-6, 279, 281,

290,298-9,307, 312Tashkent Province, 296Tatishchev, V. N., 256Taty, 203Tavriel i , T.M,247Tbetl234'feheran,247

Temir-Khan-Shura: see BuinakskTemir Tau, 267Temrluk Idarovich, 194Teptyars, 42Terijoki, 101Tevosyan, I. T., 12Thaelmann District, 74Tiflis, 21 1, 224-7,229,236-7Tigran the Great, 208Tikhonov, Nikolay, 281Tilsit: see SovietskTimoshenko, Marshal, 152Timur the Lame,256Tiraspol, 150Tokombayev, Aaly,273Tolstoy, Count Alexey, 125Tolstoy, Count kon Nikolayevich, l8l,

3 1 9Tonga, 309Topchibashev, Mirza D zhaf ar, 245Toroshelidze, M., 230Towns, new: see UrbanizationTrade Unions, lOth Congress (1949),28Transcaucasia, 14, 3l, 17 l, 208-52, 307Transjordan, 196Trebizond, 235Trials and purges:

Lbkhazia.237'Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights andTrotskyites', I I

Azerbaidzhan,243Bashkiria, zl4Birobidzhan Province. 177Byelorussia,156Crimea. 79Daghestan, 199

J J J

Trials and purges. continuedGeorgia,229-31Glavsevmorput, 64Jews. 165. 177Kazakhstan, 265Kirghizistan, 272-3Latvians, 107Tadzhikistan, 288-9Tartaria,33Turkmenistan, 293-4U k r a i n e . 1 3 1 . 1 3 3 - 4Uzbekistan, 278Volga German Republic, 74

Trotsky, Leon,33, 165'Isadasa. Gamzat. 204-5

Tsarskoye, Selo, 90Tsitsianov, Prince Pavel Dimitrievich,

238Tukay, Gabdullah,40Tukhachevsky, Marshal, 107Tumanyan, Ovanes,212T u n i s i a . 3 1 4 . 3 1 8Turkestan: see Central AsiaTurkestan-Siberian Railwav: see Rail-

ways: TurksibTurkey:

Arabic script, abolition of,34-5Armenian claims, 220-lArmenians in, 214-5, 217Circassians in, 196Communist Party, Crimean Tartar

leadership,78Crimean Republic as Soviet

propaganda in, 78Crimean Tartars, immigration of, 76-8Georgian claims, 234-5Kars Province, 221Kurds in. 250.252Soviet policy, 21 6-8, 220_1, 233-5

Turkic Alphabet, Al1-Union CentralCommittee for the Nerv, 35

Turkic peoples, 28, 32-3, 42, 7 8, 217, 242,247 -8, 259 , 27 5, 318

Turkish Ceorgians: see LaziTurkish language, demands for creation

of, 78Turkmanchai, treaty of (1828), 214Turkmenians, 49, 91, 189, 257, 259-60,

275,2,18, 284, 291-6, 308Turkmenistan, 29M, 298, 310Turksib: see Railways: TurksibTursun-zade, Mirzo, 286-8Tver: see KalininTychina, Pavel, 144Tyutchev, F. I., 55

Udmurt A.S.S.R., 53-5Udmurts, 37, 48, 53-5Ufa. 43, 45,20OUganda, 309

I N D E X

Ugro-Finnish peoples, 28, 43,99Uigurs, 296-8,313Ukhta-Pechora region, 57-58Ukraine, l l , 14, 20, 41, 12349, 152-3,

/ J l

Ukrainian Insurgent Army: seeBanderovtsy

Ukrainians, 8-9, 78-9, 123,137-8, 142,r49, 1 53, 17 4, 190, 196, 260, 264, 267 -8,2',7 1, 288, 29 1 -2, 303, 3 13, 3 17Communist Party membership, 8-9Crimea, in, 78-9Polish areas, repatriation from, 142

Ulyanov, I. N., 48Ulyanovsk, Chuvash claims, 47Umarov, Sultan, 261Uniate Church, history, 140; Soviet inter-

ference, l4lUnited States of America, colonization

by Europeans, 1; Jewish immigration,I 63 ; Jews' contribution towards Auto-nomous Province of Birobidzhan, 1 75Armenians in, 218Alaska, 314Colonial policy, 3t4Hawaiian Islands, 314Puerto Rico, 314Racial policy, 304Virgin Islands, 314

Universities:Alma Ata, 26'l , 312Ashkhabad,312Baku, 312British and Soviet colonial universities

compared,3 i2Central Asiatic State, 261,279-80Samarkand,3 l2Sta l inabad,3 l2Tashkent ,312Uzbek State, 280

Urbanization:Arctic towns foundcd, 63-4Azerbaidzhan, 241Bashkiria, 45-6Foundation of new towns (.191 r--47),

1 4Karelia, 99-100Kazakhstan, 267Komi A.S.S.R., 58Mari A.S.S.R., 53Murmansk Province, 93-4Uzbekistan, 278

Uruguay, 218Uzbekistan, 2l-2, 209, 257, 260-1,

274-82, 296-7, 299Uzbeks, 8, 91, 257, 259-62. 27 4-82, 281,

291, 296Uzun, Hadji Sheikh, 187

J J +

I N D E X

Validov. Akhmed Zak-, 13'Vai idovism',43Valikhanov, Chokhan, 270, 27 2Vandervelde, Emile, 226Vares, Johannes, 113Varga, Prof, E. S., 315Vasilkov (Ukrainian Communist), 136Veli-Ibragimov, 79'Veli-Ibragimovism', 79Vepsians in Karelia 99Verhaeren, Emile, 113Verny: see Alma AtaViborg (Viipurt 101-2Village Soviets: see National Village

SovietsVilna, 1 10-1 1, 116-' / , 160, 222, 276Vinnitsa Province, 126Vipper, P. Y., 104Vitebsk, 106, 126, 155Vladikavkaz: see DzaudzhikauVoguls: see MansiVolga German Republic, 67,12-6Volga Gennans, 69-75Volga Tartars: see TartarsVolynsky, Artem, 213Volobrinsky (Birobidzhan communist),

r77Volzhsk, 53Vorkuta, 58'Vorkutugol' (coal trust), 57-8Vorrnsi Islands, 110, 112Voronezh, 126Voronezh Province. 120Vorontsov-Dashkov, Count, 21 5Voroshilovgrad Province, 127Votyaks: see UdmurtsVoytinsky, Vladimir, 226Vurgun, Samed,.241-2

Wachtang VI, King, 22.1Waldheim, 175Weitzmann. Chaim. 167Werfel. Franz.22VlWest Indies, 312-4

Yakovlev, I. Y., 48Yakutia, 22Yakuts, 308Yamalo-Nenets National Area. 59-60. 63Yangi-Yul,278Yanovsky, Y., 144Yaroslavl, 98Yaroslavl Province, 120Yekaterinoslov: see DniepropetrovskYenukidze, Abel, 230-1Yermolov, Gen., l8l , 185-6, 189, 225Yermolayev, Col.,290Youth League, Communist: see Com-

munist Youth LeagueYugoslavia, Yugoslav Communists conr-

pared with 'Borotbists', 130; nation-alities' policy, 305-6

Yulayev, Salavat, 42Yusupov, Usman, 11,282Yuzovka: see Stalino

Zankisov, Maj.-Gen. K., 192Zeittn,22VlZelenogradsk (Cranz), 120Zelili (Turkmenian poet), 293Zelinsky, Prof. N. D., 152Zhdanov: see MariuoolZhdanov, A. A.,91,-146Zinoviev, G. E., 165Zionism, Soviet policy, 165, 168, 307Zlatoust, 46Zola, Emile, 113Zyryans: see Komi

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