CIVIL & CRIMINAL LAWSUIT

PLAINTIFF

STEVEN D. CURRYVS.

DEFENDANT

COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES

CASE #13CV86

MONTROSE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

MONTROSE, COLORADO

FILED____/_____/_____

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CONTENTS

1). “CONTACT INFORMATION”: Page #3

2). “PREFACE”: Pages #4-5

3). “ARGUMENTS & DEMANDS”: Pages 5-6

4). “BACKGROUND & CASE HISTORY”: Pages #6-15

5). “SUMMARY”: Pages #15-16

6). “ASSIGNMENT OF JURISDICTION & AUTHORITY”: Page #16-17

7). “ORDER FOR REVOCATION OF BONDS”: Page #17-23

8). “LEGAL DEFINITIONS”: Page #23-25

9). “TIME LIMITATIONS”: Pages #25-27

10). “TRUE BILL OF INDICTMENT (a.k.a. “BILL OF PARTICULARS)”: #27-45

11). “DEMAND FOR ARREST”: Page #45

12). “DEMAND FOR SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE”: Page #45

13). “WARNING”: Page #46

15). “WE THE PEOPLE”: Page #46

16). “AFFIDAVIT”: Page #47

17). “CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE”: Page #48

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CONTACT INFORMATION

MONTROSE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 1200 GRAND AVENUEMONTROSE, CO 81401 (970) 252-4308

PLAINTIFF/ATTORNEY OF RECORDSTEVEN D. CURRY; PERSONAL ATTORNEY GENERAL21250 DAVE WOOD ROAD MONTROSE, CO 81403 249-8879 EMAIL: cwheileg@gmail.com

DEFENDANT(S):

STATE OF COLORADO; a.k.a. “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;” “State of Colorado Attorney General,” a.k.a. “John W. Suthers;” a.k.a. “Amy Colony;” a.k.a. “Davin Dahl;” a.k.a. “Jay Simonson;”

STATE OF COLORADO; “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;” a.k.a. “Governor of Colorado,” a.k.a. “John Hickenlooper;

STATE OF COLORADO; a.k.a. “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;”“Secretary of State,” a.k.a. “Scott Gessler;

STATE OF COLORADO; a.k.a. “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;”“Secretary of the the Treasury,” a.k.a. “

STATE OF COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL(S); a.k.a. “John W. Suthers;” “Amy Colony;” “Davin Dahl;” “Jay Simonson;”

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION; a.k.a. “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;”

MONTROSE COUNTY, a.k.a. “County Commissioners,” a.k.a. “David White;” a.k.a. “Ronald Henderson;” a.k.a. “Gary Ellis;”

COUNTY TECH SERVICE; a.k.a. “THE INSURER OF OATHS & BONDS;”800 GRANT STREET #400DENVER, CO 80203(303) 861-0507Web: CTSI.org

Montrose County District Court Judge, Mary E. Deganhart

Jefferson County District Court Judge, Tamara S. Russell

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COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINESA.K.A. C.S.M. BOARD OF REGENTS A.K.A. M.W. SCOGGINS; PRESIDENT A.K.A. TERENCE E. PARKER; PROVOST & EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT A.K.A. ANNE STARK WALKER; GENERAL COUNSEL A.K.A. MR. BRUCE GELLER; ADMINISTRATOR/CURATOR

1500 ILLINOIS STREET GOLDEN, CO 80401 303-273-3000 / 800-446-948

DANIEL HOTSENPELIER; a.k.a. “Mesa County District Attorney;”

RICK DUNLAP; a.k.a. “Montrose County Sheriff;”

PREFACE

A). “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” Colo. Const. Art. II, Section 3.

B). “Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.” Colo. Const. Art. II, Section 6.

C). “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Colo. Const. Art. II, Section 25.

D). "Liberty", as used in this section and section 3 of this article, connotes far more than mere freedom from physical restraint; it is broad enough to protect one from governmental interference in the exercise of his intellect, in the formation of opinions, in the expression of them and in action or inaction dictated by his judgment, or choice in countless matters of purely personal concern.” Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823 (1944).

E). "No provision of the Constitution is designed to be without effect," "Anything that is in conflict is null and void of law", "Clearly, for a secondary law to come in conflict with the supreme Law was illogical, for certainly, the supreme Law would prevail over all other laws and certainly our forefathers had intended that the supreme Law would be the bases of all law and for any law to come in conflict would be null and void of law, it would bare no power to enforce, it would bare no obligation to obey, it would purport to settle as if it had never existed, for unconstitutionality would date from the enactment of such a law, not from the date so branded in an open court of law, no courts are bound to

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uphold it, and no Citizens are bound to obey it. It operates as a near nullity or a fiction of law." "All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. All codes, rules, and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process!" [Rodriques v. Ray Donavan]

F). It must be understood, that, Mr. Curry offers no apologies for the length of this document, as there are NO “Constitutional” “Technical Constraints, or Limitations,” on “Crime Victim Statements,” “Pleas,” or “Claims.” And, that; the “knowledge” of the entire content, herein, are, by “intent,” the “service of responsibility” upon all effected parties.

ARGUMENTS & DEMANDS

1). The Plaintiff, now, “Crime Victim & Witness of Government Corruption and Fraud,” will:! A). Renew his earlier “requests,” and “motions,” that the State Attorney General, and his staff, be “disjoined” and, FOREVER, “prohibited” from interloping, interferring, or providing “aid & comfort” to any, and all, Defendant(s), and these “Private Procedings” be protected from their “violative” acts against the U.S., and the Stateʼs “COMMON LAW” Constitution, the Citizens of Colorado, and the Plaintiff;! B). Continue to argue, with fervor, that the State Attorney General cannot represent the “People,” and “Private Interests,” and, at NO TIME, litigate, or practice law, without violating his/their “Oath(s) of Office,” or “neglecting, and/or abandoning” his/their “Clients,” who, as vestments, are the “People,” and “Persons” of Colorado; and, “the unlawful & unauthorized conversion of public funds for private use;” ! C). Show that the State Attorney General continues to display a pattern of corruption, and a genuine willfulness to usurp, and undermine, these lawful processes, and to abuse, and exceed his powers, influence, and discretion, as defined, described, and constrained, by Colorado “COMMON LAW” and “U.S.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,” as provided for under U.S.C. Titles #18, and 42.! D). Show that the State Attorney General, and his Staff, has “made fraudulent appearances” in these earlier judicial proceedings, and that, their “appearences” are “unwarranted,” “illegal,” “unlawful,” and all such entries, submissions, pleas, and responses, be stricken from the record, and any future entries, etc., should be dismissed “on their face,” and termed, “inadmissable,” and “violative;”! E). Establish that the State Attorney Generalʼs “Motion(s) for a Change a Venue,” and “Motion(s) to Dismiss,” have been ‘corruptive,’ ‘contemptable,’ ‘delaying,’ and ‘obstructive’ behavior, and misconduct, on behalf the primary Defendant(s);

F). Based on the Defendantʼs failure to, ʻlegally & lawfully,ʼ answer any of the specific charges listed in the Plaintiffʼs “Complaint,” and the Defendantʼs repeated acts of “Fraud Upon the Court,” this Court, by LAW, should GRANT the Plaintiffʼs “MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT” of $888,000,000.00, plus PUNITIVE DAMAGES, TORT DAMAGES, ATTORNEY FEES, COURT COSTS, AND ALL LITIGATION

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EXPENDITURES, without Delay;

BACKGROUND & CASE HISTORY

NOTE: For a thorough background, case history, and all relevant, and material evidence, and Unconstitutional Rulings & Violations, all reviewers of this document are encouraged to review the Public Record available through PACER. Reference Cases #12M265 (State V. Curry-Trial Court), #2012CV4622 (State V. Curry-Appeals Court), #2013CV86 (Curry V. Blaine Reed Meteorites), #2013CV98 (Curry V. Colorado School of Mines).

The Plaintiff, and “The PEOPLE,” WHO, in the support, and the defense of the U.S. and Colorado Stateʼs Constitutions, and, WHO, have reviewed Jefferson County District Court Judge, Tamara S. Russellʼs September 4, 2013 “ORDER TO DISMISS,” and her recent “GRANTING” of the Attorney Generalʼs “DEFENDANTʼS MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES,” find as follows;

1). Jefferson County District Court has NOT had, NOR do they, NOW, or will they, ever, have, or be given, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, or the CONSENT OF, OR FROM, the Plaintiff, or “THE PEOPLE,” over this case;

A). Pursuant C.R.C.P. 407, the, ʻalleged,ʼ ʻcontemptable,ʼ and ʻfraudulent,ʼ “CHANGE OF VENUE” from the Montrose County District Court, proffered by Montrose County District Court Judge, Mary E. Deganhart, and the subsequent, and supporting, ruling by Jefferson County District Court Judge, Tamara S. Russell, GRANTING this “CHANGE OF VENUE,” was in clear, and direct, violation of C.C.R.P Rule 98 (a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(h), which states;

1). “All Parties must “assent,” and “agree” to the “CHANGE IN VENUE;”

2). “Venue shall remain in the county where the Complaint had originated.”

3). “Venue shall remain in the county where the “Tort,” and “Injuries,” took place;

4). “Venue cannot be changed if the pleader feels as though he may not be given a fair, and impartial, hearing, or trial.

5). “Venue can, only, be changed, if the “Change is in the interest, and the proper administration of Justice;

6). “For venue is a matter to be determined from all evidence in the case. Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346, 490 P.2d 690 (1971).”

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B). Pursuant Colo. Crim. P. 21(a1,2), the Jefferson County Court has NO JURISDICTION, and, thus, NO DISCRETION;

1). “For Fair or Expeditious Trial. The place of trial may be changed when the court in its sound discretion determines that a fair or expeditious trial cannot take place in the county or district in which the trial is pending.”

C). Ms. Russellʼs ruling “Pursuant CC.R.P. 8(a)(2),” where she states, “a complaint should set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the the pleader is entitled to relief,” is NOT LAW, but the “COLOR of LAW,” pursuant USC 18 #242; which states; “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulations, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State the deprivation of any rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;” and is in direct contradiction to the Plaintiffʼs Rights of Due Process, and contradicts C.R.C.P. Rule 97. Change of Judge, which states; “A judge shall be disqualified in an action in which he is interested or prejudiced, or has been of counsel for any party, or is or has been a material witness, or is so related or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.”

D). “Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction." [Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)]”

E). “Purpose of disqualification rule is to prevent judge with a "bent of mind" from presiding over action. Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1992).”

2). Ms. Mary E. Deganhartʼs “GRANTING” of the State Attorney Generalʼs ʻfraudulentʼ “MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE,” to Jefferson County, AND; Ms. Tamara S. Russellʼs subsequent “GRANTING” of the State Attorney Generalʼs ʻfraudulentʼ “MOTION TO DISMISS,” constitute severe violations of USC 18, Sections 201, 241, 242, 2071; and USC #42, Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986; and are, further, “CONSTITUTIONALLY-VIOLATIVE” for the following reasons;

A). Both, Ms. Deganhart, and Ms. Russell, have denied the Plaintiff his RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS, and EQUAL PROTECTION, by failing to offer a PUBLIC HEARING on the “MOTIONS,” ʻFACTS,” CIRCUMSTANCES,” and “EVIDENCE;”

B). Both, Ms. Deganhart, and Ms. Russell, using an “Unknown & Foreign System of Laws,” rather than, “Constitutional Law,” failed to consider, adjudicate, or rule, on the volumous filings of genuine “FACTS,” “CIRCUMSTANCES, and “EVIDENCE,” provided by the Plaintiff;

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1). “All facts proving crime charged admissible. All the facts which are necessary to prove the crime charged, when linked to the chain of events which supports that crime, are admissible. People v. Anderson, 184 Colo. 32, 518 P.2d 828 (1974).”

2). Pursuant C.R.E. Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence; wherein; “(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected,”

3). Both Ms. Deganhart, and Ms. Russell, in practicing an “Unknown & Foreign System of Laws,” as opposed to “Constitutional Law,” “FAILED TO REPORT THE MALICIOUS, AND GREVIOUS, MISCONDUCT, AND FRAUD UPON THE PEOPLE, AND THE COURT, AND THE PLAINTFF,” by the State Attorney General, John Suthers, the Senior Assistant Attorney General, Amy Colony, the Special Assistant Attorney General, Jay Simonson, and Special Assistant Atttorney General, Davin Dahl. These “Acts of Misconduct,” and “Acts of Fraud,” are stated below, in particularity;

A). The Colorado State Attorney General, nor his staff, as “Executive Officers,” are NOT, “Constitutionally Authorized” to “Practice Law,” “prosecute, or defend civil actions involving the Stateʼs institutions;”

1). “Doctrine of separation of powers applies with equal force to all three branches of government. People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973).”

2). “Indefiniteness which leaves to officer, court, or jury the determination of standards in a case-by-case process invalidates legislation as being violative of due process, as contravening the mandate that an accused be advised of the nature and cause of the accusation, and as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative power to courts or enforcement agencies. Dominquez v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961).”

3). “And no constitutionally exclusive right to prosecute state's civil actions. There is no constitutional provision which confers upon the attorney general the exclusive right to prosecute and defend civil actions in behalf of the state. Colo. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540 (1931).”

4). “As Colorado has neither identified nor required attorney general to serve as "people's elected chief law officer", as some states have. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).”

B). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” have, seriously, violated their “Oaths of Office,” to ʻprotect, serve, and protect,ʼ the U.S. and Stateʼs Constitutions, and have committed “Treason” against “The People,” who constitute “their clients,” and “their masters;”

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1). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” have “converted their clientʼs; a.k.a. “The Peopleʼs,” funds for private use;”

2). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” have embezzled public funds with which to prosecute, and defend against, Mr. Curry, and attempted to “Extort” funds from Mr. Curry, without WARRANT, DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, or the CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE;

3). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” abused their positions, and powers, to ʻinterlope, interfere, influence, prejudice,ʼ and in committing a massive fraud upon the Plaintiff, and “The People,” through the Denver County District Court, the Mesa County Combined Courts, and the Montrose County District Court, while prosecuting, and defending against Mr. Curry;

4). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” having condoned the activities of an “Organized Crime Syndicate,” have “aided & abetted” these criminal activities, and, thus, have accepted “charge” and “accountability,” of each of these felonies, and misdemeanors;

5). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” having come to the “aid & comfort,” “financial & legal assistance,” of a “Privately Charted Corporation,” a.k.a. “The Defendants,” a.k.a. “The Colorado School of Mines,” who have, for decades, been ʻunlawfully, and illegally,ʼ accepting, and soliticiting, State, and public funds, in direct violation of the LAW;

a). “Colo. Const. Art. IX, Section 7. Aid to private schools, churches, sectarian purpose, forbidden;”

6). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” have taken up “official quarters” in the, ʻpublically-funded,ʼ Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center, from which, they can, directly, ʻcontrol, interlope, interfere, influence, and prejudice,ʼ Coloradoʼs Judicial System, a direct violation of the U.S, and the Stateʼs Constitutional stipulations of “Separation of Powers;”

a). Pursuant C.R.S. 20-1-101. Bond and oath of district attorney and staff, which states; “(1) Every district attorney, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath to support the constitution of the United States and the organic law of the state and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his office. He shall also execute to the people of the state of Colorado a bond in the sum of five thousand dollars, with a good and sufficient individual, schedule, or blanket corporate surety bond, or other acceptable security, to be approved by the secretary of state, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office, as the same are prescribed by law, and upon any breach of such bond, an action shall lie thereon for the benefit of any county fund or person injured thereby.”

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b). “Each to perform its duties but to refrain from asserting power belonging to another department. It is incumbent upon each department to assert and exercise all its powers whenever public necessity requires it to do so; otherwise, it is recreant to the trust reposed in it by the people. It is equally incumbent upon it to refrain from asserting a power that does not belong to it, for this is equally a violation of the people's confidence. Indeed, the distinction goes so far as to require each department to refrain from in any way impeding the exercise of the proper functions belonging to either of the other departments. City & County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907 (1932); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).”

c). The Colorado State Attorney General, and his staff, as “Executive Officers,” have abused their positions of “authority,” and “power,” to ʻinfluence, direct, interlope, interfere, and prejudice,ʼ the District Attorneys of Denver, Mesa, Montrose, and Jefferson Counties, to inhibit, and prohibit, them from prosecuting all those responsible for the number of crimes mentioned in the Plaintiffʼs original “Complaint,” and “Claims for Relief;”

1). Pursuant C.R.S. 20-1-107; “It is the district attorney's duty to hold himself under proper restraint and avoid violent partisanship, partiality, and misconduct in the performance of his duties which may result in false accusations, and it is equally his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to bring about a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to obtain a just conviction. Wheeler v. District Court, 180 Colo. 275, 504 P.2d 1094 (1973)”.

2). Pursuant C.R.C.P. Rule 252.3. Funding;

“(a) The Supreme Court shall provide for funding by the attorneys of the state through the attorney registration fee established in C.R.C.P. 227(A)(1)(a) and (c).

(b) An attorney whose dishonest conduct has resulted in any payment by the fund to a claimant shall make restitution to the fund including interest and the expense incurred by the fund in processing the claim and pursuing restitution. An attorney's failure to make full restitution may be cause for additional discipline or denial of an application for reinstatement or readmission.”

3). AND; Pursuant C.R.C.P. Rule 252.14. Restitution and Subrogation;

(a) “An attorney whose dishonest conduct results in payment to a claimant shall be liable to the Fund for restitution; and the Board may bring such

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action as it deems advisable to enforce such obligation, including costs of such action.”

4). AND; Pursuant C.R.C.P. Rule 251.6. Forms of Discipline, whereby; “Any of the following forms of discipline may be imposed in those cases where grounds for discipline have been established:

(a) Disbarment. “Disbarment is the revocation of an attorney's license to practice law in this state, subject to readmission as provided by C.R.C.P. 251.29(a). Disbarment shall be for at least eight years;”

5). AND; Pursuant C.R.C.P. Rule 251.1. Discipline and Disability; Policy -- Jurisdiction.

“(a) Statement of Policy. All members of the Bar of Colorado, having taken an oath to support the Constitution and laws of this state and of the United States, are charged with obedience to those laws at all times. As officers of the Supreme Court of Colorado, attorneys must observe the highest standards of professional conduct. A license to practice law is a proclamation by this Court that its holder is a person to whom members of the public may entrust their legal affairs with confidence; that the attorney will be true to that trust; that the attorney will hold inviolate the confidences of clients; and that the attorney will competently fulfill the responsibilities owed to clients and to the courts.

In order to maintain the highest standards of professional conduct, attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unable, or are likely to be unable, to discharge their professional responsibilities shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary or disability proceedings.”

(b) Jurisdiction. “Every attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado is subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in all matters relating to the practice of law. Every attorney practicing law in this state pursuant to C.R.C.P. 220, or admitted pro hac vice pursuant to C.R.C.P. 221 or 221.1, or certified to represent a single-client pursuant to C.R.C.P. 222 is subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Supreme Court when practicing law pursuant to such rules. Every attorney serving as a magistrate pursuant to Colorado Rules for Magistrates, Chapter 35, vol. 12, C.R.S., is subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for conduct performed as a magistrate as provided by C.R.M. 5(h).”

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4). The Plaintiff, and “THE PEOPLE,” in support, and in the defense, of the U.S., and Colorado State CONSTITUTIONS, have found, then, that, Ms. Deganhart, and Ms. Russel, along with the State Attorney General, John W. Suthers, and his staff, Mr. Daniel Hotsenpelier, and Mr. Rich Dunlap, to be in reckless, grevous, and egregious, violations of their “Oaths of Office,” and in violation of U.S.C. Titles #18 & 42, the Plaintiffʼs, and “The Peopleʼs,” 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, and 14th, Amendments, a.k.a. “The Plaintiffʼs Bill of Rights;”

A). Pursuant Colo. Const. Art. XII, Section 8. Oath of civil officers; which states; “Every civil officer, except members of the general assembly and such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully perform the duties of the office upon which he shall be about to enter.”

B). PURSUANT Colo. RPC Rule 1.0, which states; “(d) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive;”

5). Ms. Russell, without JURISDICTION, or “DISCRETION,” falsely asserts, “Plaintiff appears to to be attempting to file a criminal action against the Defendant for crimes not found in the Colorado Revised Statutes, such as “Influence Peddling” and “Gerrymandering.” Plaintiff “requests the Court to invoke individual criminal sanctions, prosecutions, and punishments....” However, Plaintiff has no authority to bring forth a criminal action.”

A). Pursuant PURSUANT C.R.S. 16-3-201. Arrest by a private person, which states; “A person who is not a peace officer may arrest another person when any crime has been or is being committed by the arrested person in the presence of the person making the arrest.”

B). “IV. ONLY PEOPLE CAN FILE A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT; There are only three ways a court can hear a criminal complaint: (1) One or more of the people sign a sworn affidavit that they have been injured. (2) A prosecutor, on behalf of the government (the People) brings an accusation before the Grand Jury and the Grand Jury either indicts or does nothing; (3) The Grand Jury by its “own will,” can investigate merely on the suspicion that the law is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not, and if it finds wrongdoing, it can present it to the court and it must go to trial no one can second guess the Grand Jury, unless the Grand Juryʼs actions violates anotherʼs inalienable rights.”

6). Ms. Russell, without JURISDICTION, DISCRETION, AUTHORIZATION, CONSENT, or any consideration of the Plaintiffʼs, or “The Peopleʼs” Rights, also writes in her ruling; “Defendantʼs request for reasonable attorney fees is hereby

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GRANTED,” pursuant “C.R.S. 13-17-201,” wherein, “such defendant shall have judgment for his reasonable attorney fees in defending the action.”

A). “GRANTING” such a motion without JURISDICTION, DISCRETION, AUTHORIZATION, or CONSENT of “The People,” constitutes criminal acts “EXTORTION,” “THEFT,” “FRAUD,” “RACKETEERING,” and “CONSPIRACY;” which require that Ms. Russell, Mr. Suthers, Ms. Colony, and others, so involved, be arrested by the U.S. Marshal, charged, arraigned, by the U.S. Attorney General, and tried in a “Constitutional Court of Record,” without the priviledge of bond, or bail, under Coloradoʼs RICO Laws, and under U.S.C. Title 18, and U.S.C. Title 42;

B). “There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights." [Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)]”

C). For the Jefferson County District Court to “GRANT” the “DEFENDANTʼS MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES,” even if this Court had JURISDICTION to begin with, is “Fraudulent,” and “Bogus,” as the “DEFENDANTʼS,” being a “Private Corporation,” could NEVER have, “legally,” or “lawfully,” retained “The PEOPLEʼS” Attorney General as their “Legal Counsel,” without violating their “State Charter,” the “COMMON LAW,” and the U.S., and State CONSTITUTIONS;

D). For this “ORDER” to have even a shred of “Merit,” or to be considered valid, even in a Court with JURISDICTION, the “DEFENDANTS” would have to show the “RETAINMENT CONTRACT” they signed with the Attorney General, and show, that they “PAID” “$10,070.00” for these “Legal Services.” Having produced NO “RECORDS” of these expenditures, the “DEFENDANTS,” to whom this “ORDER” is “GRANTING RELIEF,” constitutes “CRIMINAL FRAUD,” under any U.S., and Colorado “Title,” “Law,” “Article, or “Code.”

E). This “ORDER,” also, constitutes “CRIMINAL EXTORTION,” by all means, measures, criteria, definitions, established under U.S. and Colorado “COMMON LAW,” and “CONSTITUTIONAL” descriptions, identified in these “Titles,” “Laws,” “Articles,” and “Codes;”

F). Attached to this “ORDER,” was the “Affidavit of Amy Colony,” which included her “Spreadsheet Journal & Time Entries” for Amy Colony, Freiderick Haines, and Mary Brown, WHEREIN; this “Document” constitutes “Prima Facia Evidence,” that the State Attorney General, and his Staff, were, “unlawfully,” and “illegally,” involved, engaged, interloping, interfering, and directly influencing, all cases concerning Mr. Curry; ie, Case #12M265, #12CV4622, #13CV86, and #13CV98. Entries in this “Spreadsheet Journal,” include notations regarding the Attorney Generalʼs conversations with Eric Twelker, Esq., Blaine Reed, Bruce Geller, B. Buesher, V. Moscher, E. Henry, Defendantʼs Counsel, Anne Walker, Jay Simonson, and Davin Dahl; all in establishing this “FRAUD,” and “CONSPIRACY,” a.k.a. “Strategy” for the “DEFENDANTS,” a.k.a. “Colorado School of Mines,” and “Blaine Reed Meteorites;”

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G). Furthermore; This “ORDER” was, neither, “DATED,” nor was it “SIGNED,” by Jefferson County District Court Justice, Tamara S. Russel. With NO “DATE,” or “SIGNATURE,” along with its “COMMON LAW,” and “CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS,” this “ORDER” is “NULL & VOID,” and thus, “UNENFORCEABLE;”

7). On the 28th Day of October, 2013, Jefferson County District Court Judge, Tamara S. Russell, produced an “ORDER GRANTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HIS ATTORNEY FEES,” and awarded “the Defendant” $3,380.00 of the $10,700.00 the Attorney General had submitted in earlier motions. The Plaintiff has several questions for Ms. Russell;

A). If the Defendant(s) had not paid any attorney fees to their “legal counsel,” how are the Defendant(s) able to request “attorney fees?”

B). In her ruling, Ms. Russell states, “C.R.S. #13-17-201. The statute authorizes fees incurred while “defending an action.” If the State Attorney General is not “Constitutionally-authorized” to “defend an action,” how is it, then, the State Attorney General is “authorized” to seek attorney fees?

C). In reducing the amount of “billable” attorney fees from $10,700.00 to $3,380.00, and knowing the State Attorney General could not “legally” represent the “Defendants,” and had been “Cooking-the-Books,” in overcharges, why did Ms. Russell execute this “Order?” Rather than do her “duty to report the State Attorney General for misconduct,” Ms. Russell chose to ignore, and furher conceal this fraudulent activity with what the Plaintiff would call “A Judicial Dodge,” to, somehow, legitimize the State Attorney Generalʼs acts of fraud, and extortion.

8). Having committed these criminal acts against the Plaintiff, they have, also, committed them against “THE PEOPLE,” both, and all, of whom, have lost the “Trust,” “Faith,” and “Confidence,” of Ms. Deganhart, Ms. Russell, Mr. Suthers, and his staff, and have found them unworthy of holding ʻElected,ʼ or ʻAppointed,ʼ Public Office, and have provided adequate evidence to their ʻunworthyness,ʼ and to their ʻunwillingness,ʼ to “protect, and defend,” the Stateʼs CONSTITUTION;

A). “Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.” [Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)]

9). It is, then, by the “ORDER OF THE PEOPLE,” that Ms. Degahart, Ms. Russell, and Mr. Suthers, and his staff, are to be stripped of their “titles,” “offices,” “positions,” “authority,” “honor,” “tributes,” “retirements,” “pensions,” and their “Liberties.” These “Liberties,” along with their “persons,” “files,” and “financial records,” shall be surrendered to their local County Sheriff, within 24 hours of the receipt of this “ORDER.”

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10). In consideration of their “affluence,” and “connections,” these individuals have with the State’s government, and their close associations with “Organized Crime,” all should be considered “Flight-risks,” and under the State’s RICO Laws, these individuals are NOT to be granted bond, or bail. They are, then, to be read their Rights under the Miranda Law, incarcerated, arraigned, prosecuted, and tried, in a “Constitutional Court of Record,” where each will have their day in court;

SUMMARY

1). The Plaintiff, and The People, in support, defense, and protection, of the U.S. and State “Common Law” Constitutions, FIND, that, the Plaintiff is the “Injured Party,” and that, the Defendants, and their, ʻalleged,ʼ “legal counsel,” are the “cause,” and the “perpetrators” of these “Criminal Injuries & damages;” AND; the Plaintiffʼs “MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT” was filed in the Montrose County District Court, and this Court was, and remains, the “proper venue;” AND; the Plaintiff is entitled to “relief” for his “Injuries,” in the amount of $888,000,000, plus Court Costs & Fees, Attorney Fees, and Costs of Litigation; AND; the Plaintiff is entitled to “Tort Damages,” due to the “Default of the Defendants,” for having failed to, ʻlegally & lawfully,ʼ answer to the specific charges raised in the Plaintiffʼs “Complaint;” AND, THAT; the Plaintiff is entitled to “Tort Damages,” due to the “Criminal Fraud,” and “Criminal Obstruction,” of the Defendants, and their ʻalleged,ʼ “legal counsel,” cast upon these judicial proceedings, this Court, the Plaintiff, and The People; AND; THAT; this case is, NOW, under the “COMMON LAW” “JURISDICTION” of a “Private Corporation,” a.k.a. “County Tech Service,” the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Attorney General, and the U.S. Marshal, wherein; the perpetrators of these “Criminal Acts,” will be held accountable, ʻpersonally,ʼ and ʻin common,ʼ for their violations of their “Fiduciary Duties,” and“Acts of Treason” against “The People,” and “Their Constitutions;”

2). The U.S. Marshal, and the U.S Attorney General, are, NOW, charged with the filing these “Orders” with the United States District “Common Law” Court of Record, in Denver, and the execution(s) of these “Constitutional Orders.” “Failure to Act,” or “Failure to Execute,” is not an option, as “The People” shall retain full “JURISDICTION,” and “AUTHORITY,” over these “Courts,” including our Colorado Supreme Court, our U.S. District Courts, and our “Law Enforcement Agencies.”

3). “Our Rights,” as in, “Our Constitution,” and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "Law of the land," "due course of law," and "due

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process of law" are synonymous. [People v. Skinner, Cal., 110 P.2d 41, 45; State v. Rossi, 71 R.I. 284, 43 A.2d 323, 326; Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72, 137 A.L.R. 1058; Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 A. 527, 531.]”

4). "A Constitution is not the act of a Government, but of a people constituting a government, and a government without a constitution is a power without right."–Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, 1791

5). "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty {For All} be lost in the pursuit." --James Madison

ASSIGNMENT OF JURISDICTION & AUTHORITY

1). The proper “JURISDICTION & AUTHORITY” for this matter will, FOREVER, remain “WITH THE PEOPLE,” and it is the “ORDER OF THE CRIME VICTIM, AND THE PEOPLE,” that the “County Tech Services,” the “State of Colorado Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Treasury,” who hold and insure the “Oaths & Bonds” of these “Public Officials,” will be “The People’s Delegated Jurisdiction & Authority” in this matter, as they are, respectively, the “People’s Servants,” and comprised of “People;” and, BOTH, who have their “Constitutional,” and “Fiduciary, Surety, and Performance, Duties” to the “People.”

A). CONSENT OF AUTHORITY - We read in the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Any authority our servants have is by our consent, if they act outside their authority they are subject to criminal charges under US Codes 42 and 18 and liable for damages under US Codes and common law.”

2). This “Revocation of Bonds,” and the “Crime Victim’s Claim for Relief,” are NOT, AT THIS TIME, SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, nor is this matter a subject promulogated to JUDICIAL DISCRETION!

3). Should the “State of Colorado,” and/or “County Tech Services,” default, or fail to perform their “Constitutional,” and “Fiduciary Duties” under this “Assignment By the People,” to their State, or Federal, Constitutions, “The

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People,” and the “Crime Victim,” will reassign the “Jurisdiction & Authority” of this matter, to the U.S. Marshal, the U.S. Attorney General, and, the Federal Securities & Exchange Commission, wherein, the “CRIME VICTIM,” and “The People” will, by the Power & Authority vested in them, petition this Commission, the U.S. Marshal, and the U.S. Attorney General, to revoke the “Bond(s)” for the “State of Colorado,” and/or “County Tech Services,” and those “Bonds” of the Governor, Secretary of State, Department Heads, other officers,

4). Should the “State of Colorado,” default on their “Fiduciary Duties,” they shall, along with the Governor, the Secretary of State, other Officers, Department Heads, Administrators, and Employees, respectively, will inherit the entirety of those “charges,” and “indictments,” levied upon the primary perpetrators, and will be charged, and indicted, by “The People,” as “Principles,” “Conspirators,” and “Accessories After the Fact.”

5). Should the U.S. Marshal, or the U.S. Attorney General fail in their “Constitutional Duties,” and/or “Constitutional Obligations,” to the Federal Securities & Exchange Commission, and “The People,” and they refuse to prosecute these Federal Crimes, “The People,” will petition the U.S. Supreme Court, to revoke the “Fidelity Bond” of the U.S. Marshal, and the U.S. Attorney General, Pursuant UBC #42 (5.2), which states;

“A city, county, state or federal district attorney (including a U.S. district attorney called a “U.S. Attorney,”) shall lose his bonding and shall not be bonded: if he fails or refuses to make a reasonably diligent effort to process the citizens’ complaint (USC Title #42).

ORDER FOR REVOCATION OF BONDS

1). Mr. Curry, as a “CRIME VICTIM,” and Pursuant 18 USC § 3771, is entitled to “execute” this “Order to Revoke the Fidelity/Surety Bonds” upon “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado,” a.k.a. “Governor John Hickenlooper,” “The State of Colorado Secretary of State,” Scott Gessler, for the “Bond Revocations” of the listed “Defendants,” for all violations stated in the attached “True Bill of Indictment;”

A). Pursuant, C.R.S. 20-1-101. Bond and oath of district attorney and staff, which states;

1) “Every district attorney, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath to support the constitution of the United States

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and the organic law of the state and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his office. He shall also execute to the people of the state of Colorado a bond in the sum of five thousand dollars, with a good and sufficient individual, schedule, or blanket corporate surety bond, or other acceptable security, to be approved by the secretary of state, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office, as the same are prescribed by law, and upon any breach of such bond, an action shall lie thereon for the benefit of any county fund or person injured thereby.”

2) “As the district attorney may direct, the assistant and deputy district attorneys and other employees appointed pursuant to this title may be required to file with the secretary of state the bond required by law to be filed by district attorneys.”

B). Pursuant, C.R.S. 10-4-301. Bond executed by surety company, which states;

(1) “Whenever any bond, undertaking, recognizance, or other obligation is, by law or the charter, ordinance, rules, or regulations of any municipality, board, body, organization, court, judge, or public officer, required or permitted to be made, given, tendered, or filed with surety and whenever the performance of any act, duty, contract, or obligation or the refraining from any act is required or permitted to be guaranteed, such bond, undertaking, obligation, recognizance, or guaranty may be executed as surety by a company qualified as provided in this title. Such execution by the company of such bond, undertaking, obligation, recognizance, or guaranty shall be in all respects a full and complete compliance with every requirement of every law, charter, ordinance, rule, or regulation that the bond, undertaking, obligation, recognizance, or guaranty was executed by one or more sureties or that sureties shall be residents or householders or freeholders, or either, or both, or possess any other qualifications.”

(2) “All courts, judges, heads of departments, boards, bodies, municipalities, and public officers of every character shall accept and treat such bond, undertaking, obligation, recognizance, or guaranty, when so executed by such company, as conforming to and fully and completely complying with every such requirement of every such law, charter, ordinance, rule, or regulation; except that such company may be required to justify, in such terms and for such amounts as may be satisfactory, to the court, person, or body authorized to approve such surety.”

2). Mr. Curry, as a “CRIME VICTIM,” and Pursuant 18 USC § 3771, is entitled to “execute” an additional “Revocation of the Fidelity/Surety Bonds” of “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado,” “The State of Colorado Secretary of State,” “The County of Montrose,” but will, in his mercy, reserve this “Right to

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Execute,” providing “The State of Colorado,” and “The County of Montrose” acts in “Good Faith,” adheres to their “Fiduciary Duties,” and remains within their “powers to govern,” by “Officially,” and “Publicly,” “Revoking the Fidelity/Surety Bonds” for these “Defendants,” and these “Officers,” and “Public Servants;”

A). Pursuant; C.R.C.P. Rule 265. Professional Service Companies, which states; (a)

“Rendering Legal Service Through a Professional Company. One or more attorneys who are licensed to practice law in Colorado may render legal services in Colorado through a professional company, as that term is defined in Section (e), provided that such professional company is established and operated in accordance with the provisions of this Rule and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.”

(2) Owners' Liability for Professional Acts, Errors, or Omissions. Each of the owners of the professional company shall be deemed to agree, by reason of the rendering of legal services by any attorney through the professional company, that each of them who is an owner at the time of the commission of any act, error, or omission in the rendering of legal services by any owner or other person for whose acts, errors, or omissions the professional company is liable, assumes, jointly and severally to the extent provided by this Rule the liability of the professional company for such act, error, or omission. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, any owner who has not directly participated in the act, error, or omission in the rendering of legal services for which liability is incurred by the professional company does not assume such liability, except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(D), if, at the time the act, error, or omission occurs the professional company has professional liability insurance that meets the minimum requirements stated in subsection (a)(3).”

(3) Professional Liability Insurance Policy Requirements. The professional liability insurance contemplated in subsection (a)(2) shall meet the following minimum requirements:

(A) Professional Acts Coverage. The professional liability insurance shall insure the professional company against liability imposed upon it arising out of the rendering of legal services by any attorney through the professional company and against the liability imposed upon it arising out of the acts, errors, and omissions of all nonattorney employees assisting in the rendering of legal services by any attorney through the professional company.

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(B) Policy Language. The policy or policies for the professional liability insurance may contain reasonable provisions with respect to policy periods, territory, claims, conditions, and other matters.

(C) Limits of Coverage. The professional liability insurance shall be in an amount for each claim of at least the lesser of $100,000 multiplied by the number of attorneys who render legal services through the professional company or $500,000. If the policy or policies for the professional liability insurance provide for an aggregate top limit of liability per year for all claims, the top limit shall not be less than the lesser $300,000 multiplied by the number of attorneys who render legal services through the professional company or $2,000,000.

(D) Deductibles and Defense Costs. The policy or policies for the professional liability insurance may provide for a deductible or self-insured retained amount and may provide for the payment of defense or other costs out of the stated limits of the policy. The liability assumed by each owner of the professional company who has not directly participated in the act, error or omission in the rendering of legal services for which liability is incurred by the professional company shall be the lesser of the actual liability of the professional company in excess of insurance available to pay such damages or the sum of the following:

(I) such deductible or retained self-insurance; and

(II) the amounts, if any, by which the payment of defense costs has reduced the insurance remaining available for the payment of damages incurred by reason of the liability of the professional company below the minimum limit of insurance required by subsection (a)(3)(C).

(E) Determination of Coverage. An act, error, or omission in the rendering of legal services shall be deemed to be covered by professional liability insurance for the purpose of this Rule if the policy or policies include such act, error, or omission as a covered activity, regardless of whether claims previously made against the policy have exhausted the aggregate top limit for the applicable time period or whether the individual claimed amount or ultimate liability exceeds either the per claim or aggregate top limit.

(F) Limitation of Vicarious Liability. The liability assumed by the owners of a professional company under this Rule is limited to the liability of the professional company for acts, errors, or omissions incurred in the rendering of legal services by any owner or other person for whose acts, errors, or omissions the professional company is liable and shall not extend to any

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other liability incurred by the professional company. Liability, if any, for any and all acts, errors, and omissions, other than acts, errors, or omissions incurred in the rendering of legal services by any owner or other person for whose acts, errors, or omissions the professional company is liable, shall be as otherwise provided by law and shall not be changed, affected, limited, or extended by this Rule.

(b) Compliance with Rules of Professional Conduct. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to diminish or change the obligation of each attorney rendering legal services through a professional company to comply with the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by this Court.

(c) Violation of Rule: Termination of Authority. Any violation of or failure to comply with any of the provisions of this Rule by the professional company may be grounds for this Court to terminate or suspend the right of any attorney who is an owner of such professional company to render legal services in Colorado through a professional company.

(d) Professional Company Constituencies. A professional company may have one or more owners that are professional companies, so long as each such owner that is a professional company and the professional company of which they are owners are both established and operated in accordance with the provisions of this Rule.

(e) "Professional Company" Defined. For purposes of this Rule, a professional company is a corporation, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, limited partnership association, or other entity that may be formed under Colorado law to transact business or any entity that can be formed under the law of any other jurisdiction and through which attorneys may render legal services in that jurisdiction, except that the term excludes a general partnership that is not a limited liability partnership and excludes every other entity the owners of which are subject to personal liability for the obligations of the entity.

3). Should it be discovered, that, “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado,” “The County of Montrose,” the “Secretary of State,” the “Governor,” or the “Insuring Underwriters of these Fidelity & Surety Bonds,” are acting in “Bad Faith,” or intend on “aiding & abetting” these “Public & Judicial Officers,” in any way, form, or fashion, which may be construed to be an act contrary to their “Constitutional, or Personal & Corporate Fiduciary Duties,” Mr. Curry, with his legal, and lawful, entitlements, will “execute” an “Order to Revoke the Fidelity/Surety Bonds” of the “State of Colorado,” “County of

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Montrose,” the “Secretary of State,” the “Insuring Underwriter(s) of these Bonds,” and the “Governor,” with the U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Marshal, and the Federal Securities & Exchange Commission.

A). The “Entitlements” of Mr. Curry, as a “CRIME VICTIM,” and as a “NATURAL, LIVING, BREATHING, FEELING, and, MERCIFUL, HUMAN BEING, to “Execute” these “Orders,” are NEVER to be construed as “threats,” but as;

“HIS ORDAINED RIGHTS TO PROTECT & DEFEND HIS FREEDOMS, AND LIBERTIES, AND TO SEEK OUT JUSTICE FOR HIS DEMANDS OF RELIEF UNDER COMMON LAW!

Any interpretation to the contrary shall be seen as an abrogation to these RIGHTS, and will NOT be tolerated!

4). “Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.” [Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)].

5). “We (judges) have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." [Cohen v. Virginia, (1821), 6 Wheat. 264 and U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200] "

6). JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: “The right of action created by statute relating to deprivation under color of law, of a right secured by the constitution and the laws of the United States and comes claims which are based solely on statutory violations of Federal Law and applied to the claim that claimants had been deprived of their rights, in some capacity, to which they were entitled." Owen v.lndependence 100 Vol. Supreme Court Reports. 1398:(1982); Main v. Thiboutot 100 Vol. Supreme Court Reports. 2502:(1982)

A). Title 18 US Code Sec. 241 & Sec. 242: "If upon conviction, you are subject to a $10,000.00 fine, ten years in jail, or both, and if theft results, life in prison."

B). Title 42 US Code Sec. 1983, Sec. 1985, & Sec. 1986: “Clearly established the right to sue anyone who violates your constitutional rights. The Constitution guarantees: he who would unlawfully jeopardize your property loses property to you, and that's what justice is all about. "Judges are deemed to know the law and are sworn to uphold it and can hardly claim that they acted in good faith for willful deformation of a law and certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, for that would make the law look unintelligent for a knowledgeable judge to claim ignorance of a law, when a Citizen on the street cannot claim ignorance of the law. Therefore, there is no judicial immunity."

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LEGAL DEFINITIONS

OATHS: Colo. Const. Art. XII, Section 8 (2012)

Section 8. Oath of civil officers

“Every civil officer, except members of the general assembly and such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully perform the duties of the office upon which he shall be about to enter.”

LIMITS TO JURISDICTION/AUTHORITY/DISCRETION: “Trial courts have jurisdiction to determine federal constitutional questions, and it is their duty to do so by virtue of par. 2 of art. VI, U.S. Const., which provides that the constitution of the United States and all laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby and by § 8 of art. XII, Colo. Const., requiring officers to take an oath to support the constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1913 amendment to this section which provided that the supreme court should have exclusive jurisdiction to determine such matters. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921).”

“Any state constitutional provision prohibiting trial courts from passing on constitutional questions takes from a defendant the right of interposing the defense that the act under which he is prosecuted is unconstitutional, and is invalid as violating the "due process of law" clause. People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).”

18 USC § 1016 - Acknowledgment of appearance or oath

Whoever, being an officer authorized to administer oaths or to take and certify acknowledgments, knowingly makes any false acknowledgment, certificate, or statement concerning the appearance before him or the taking of an oath or affirmation by any person with respect to any proposal, contract, bond,

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undertaking, or other matter submitted to, made with, or taken on behalf of the United States or any department or agency thereof, concerning which an oath or affirmation is required by law or lawful regulation, or with respect to the financial standing of any principal, surety, or other party to any such proposal, contract, bond, undertaking, or other instrument, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

FIDUCIARY

A person owing a fiduciary duty to another.

DEFINITION FROM NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY

“A person or company that has the power and obligation to act for another under circumstances which require total trust, good faith, and honesty. Fiduciaries can include trustees, business advisers, attorneys, guardians, administrators of estates, real estate agents, bankers, stock brokers, title companies, or anyone who undertakes to assist someone who places complete confidence and trust in that person or company.”Definition provided by Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

SURETY BOND

• in business law family law wex definitions• Sometimes, when a party owes others legal duties, the party posts a

surety bond to guarantee their performance. The surety bond is like a security deposit, with the party promising to do something as the renter and person they owe obligations to, or obligee, is like the landlord. Thus, if the party that made the promise fails to perform their duty, the obligee is compensated out of the bond. 

Surety bonds are most frequently used to secure fiduciary relationships, and international, large, or complex transactions . For example, many jurisdictions require guardians to post a surety bond before formally taking responsibility for their wards. Similarly, a company making a large purchase from a foreign supplier might require the supplier to post a surety bond.

31 USC § 9303 - Use of eligible obligations instead of surety bonds

(a) If a person is required under a law of the United States to give a surety bond, the person may give an eligible obligation as security instead of a surety bond. The obligation shall—

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(1) be given to the official having authority to approve the surety bond;(2) as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, have a market value that is equal to or greater than the amount of the required surety bond; and(3) authorize the official receiving the obligation to collect or sell the

obligation if the person defaults on a required condition.

RULE 65.1. PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A SURETY

Whenever these rules (including the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions) require or allow a party to give security, and security is given through a bond or other undertaking with one or more sureties, each surety submits to the court's jurisdiction and irrevocably appoints the court clerk as its agent for receiving service of any papers that affect its liability on the bond or undertaking. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without an independent action. The motion and any notice that the court orders may be served on the court clerk, who must promptly mail a copy of each to every surety whose address is known.

TIME LIMITATIONS

1). The “CRIME VICTIM,” with respect and reverence to the “RULE OF SEVENS,” requires review, deliberation, execution of relief, and to make full restitution, WITHOUT DELAY, by “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado” its “Secretary of State,” and/or other State Administrators, and “Insurers,” no-later-than TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS, from the receipt of this filing. A Maximum FOURTEEN (14) DAY EXTENSION may be Granted, providing “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado,” or “The Secretary of State,” are able to provide the “Claimant” a proper, civil, lawful, legal, and reasonable, cause for this extension.

2). Should “County Tech Services,” “The State of Colorado,” choose NOT to accept their “Fiduciary Duties,” as in failing to review, deliberate, execute, provide full restitution, or choose not to communicate, or act in “Good Faith,” with the “Claimant” after THIRTY-FIVE (35) DAYS, the “Claimant” will invoke his “RIGHTS” to “REASSIGN JURISDICTION & AUTHORITY” to the Federal Securities & Exchange Commission, the U.S. Marshal, and the U.S. Attorney General.

A). “1) Regulations.— Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this chapter, the Attorney General of the United States shall promulgate regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance by

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responsible officials with the obligations described in law respecting crime victims.(2) Contents.— The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall—(A) designate an administrative authority within the Department of Justice to receive and investigate complaints relating to the provision or violation of the rights of a crime victim;(B) require a course of training for employees and offices of the Department of Justice that fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims, and otherwise assist such employees and offices in responding more effectively to the needs of crime victims;(C) contain disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from employment, for employees of the Department of Justice who willfully or wantonly fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims; and

(D) provide that the Attorney General, or the designee of the Attorney General, shall be the final arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be no judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney General by a complainant.”

B). 18 USC § 1034 - Civil penalties and injunctions for violations

(a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under section 1033 and, upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever amount is greater. If the offense has contributed to the decision of a court of appropriate jurisdiction to issue an order directing the conservation, rehabilitation, or liquidation of an insurer, such penalty shall be remitted to the appropriate regulatory official for the benefit of the policyholders, claimants, and creditors of such insurer. The imposition of a civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative remedy, which is available by law to the United States or any other person.(b) If the Attorney General has reason to believe that a person is engaged in

conduct constituting an offense under section 1033, the Attorney General may petition an appropriate United States district court for an order prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct. The court may issue an order prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct if the court finds that the conduct constitutes such an offense. The filing of a petition

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under this section does not preclude any other remedy which is available by law to the United States or any other person.

CRIME VICTIM’S TRUE BILL OF INDICTMENT

(a.k.a. “BILL OF PARTICULARS)

Pursuant 18 USC § 3771 - Crime victims’ rights, which states;

“(a) Rights of Crime Victims.— A crime victim has the following rights:

(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.(b) Rights Afforded.—(1) In general.— In any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a). Before making a determination described in subsection (a)(3), the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall consider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the criminal proceeding. The reasons for any decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on the record.(2) Habeas corpus proceedings.—(A) In general.— In a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a State conviction, the court shall ensure that a crime victim is afforded the rights described in paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (8) of subsection (a).

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(B) Enforcement.—(i) In general.— These rights may be enforced by the crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representative in the manner described in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (d).”

"People have the unbridled right to empanel their own grand juries and present "True Bills" of indictment to a court, which is then required to commence a criminal proceeding. -- United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 504 U.S. 36, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992).

A). The PLAINTIFF,, a.k.a. “The CRIME VICTIM,” and “AFFIANT;” PURSUANT “THE LAW OF THE LAND,” HIS “INALIENABLE RIGHTS,” and HIS “NATURAL LAW” ...........DOES INVOKE, and EXERCISE, these “RIGHTS,” and “PROTECTIONS,” afforded him, to, “LAWFULLY,” ‘CHARGE,’ ‘INDICT,‘ AND ‘HOLD ACCOUNTABLE,’ the “PERPETRATORS OF THESE CRIMES,” known to all PEOPLE, as; Colorado Governor, JOHN HICKENLOOPER; Secretary of State, Scott Gessler; the COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION; Montrose County District Court Judge, Mary E. Deganhart; Jefferson County District Court Judge, Tamara S. Russell, Montrose County District Attorney, Daniel Hotsenpelier, Montrose County Sheriff, Richard Dunlap, Colorado State Attorney General, JOHN W. SUTHERS; Senior Assistant Attorney General, AMY COLONY; Special Assistant Attorney General, DAVIN DAHL, and Assistant Attorney General, JAY SIMONSON;

B). In the “Spirit,” that, “Any Injury to ONE, is an Injury to ALL,” the “Perpetrators of these Malicious, and Egregious Crimes against Mr. Curry,” are, also, “Malicious, and Egregious Crimes Against The People,” and “Crimes Against the Constitutions of Colorado, and the United States;”

1). The “Criminal Violations” listed below are “non-exclusive,” and other “Criminal & Civil Charges” may be filed at any time by the “CRIME VICTIM,” or by the U.S. Attorney General, or by “The People,” as they may deem ‘Lawful,’ and ‘Appropriate;’

2). CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO  

ARTICLE XXIX ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT

ETHICS: Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, Section 6 (2012)

Section 6. Penalty

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“Any public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official or government employee who breaches the public trust for private gain and any person or entity inducing such breach shall be liable to the state or local jurisdiction for double the amount of the financial equivalent of any benefits obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional penalties may be provided by law.”

COUNT #1). 18 USC § 2 - Principals

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by

him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

COUNT #2). 18 USC § 3 - Accessory after the fact

Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.

COUNT #3). 18 USC § 4 - Misprision of felony

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

COUNT #4). 18 USC § 1510 - Obstruction of criminal investigations

(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b)

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(1) Whoever, being an officer of a financial institution, with the intent to obstruct a judicial proceeding, directly or indirectly notifies any other person about the existence or contents of a subpoena for records of that financial institution, or information that has been furnished in response to that subpoena, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(2) Whoever, being an officer of a financial institution, directly or indirectly notifies—(A) a customer of that financial institution whose records are sought by a subpoena for records; or(B) any other person named in that subpoena;about the existence or contents of that subpoena or information that has been furnished in response to that subpoena, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.(3) As used in this subsection—(A) the term “an officer of a financial institution” means an officer, director, partner, employee, agent, or attorney of or for a financial institution; and(B) the term “subpoena for records” means a Federal grand jury subpoena or a Department of Justice subpoena (issued under section 3486 of title 18), for customer records that has been served relating to a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate—(i) section 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1344, 1956, 1957, orchapter 53 of title 31; or(ii) section 1341 or 1343 affecting a financial institution.(c) As used in this section, the term “criminal investigator” means any individual duly authorized by a department, agency, or armed force of the United States to conduct or engage in investigations of or prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.(d)(1) Whoever—(A) acting as, or being, an officer, director, agent or employee of a person engaged in the business of insurance whose activities affect interstate commerce, or(B) is engaged in the business of insurance whose activities affect interstate commerce or is involved (other than as an insured or beneficiary under a policy of insurance) in a transaction relating to the conduct of affairs of such a business, with intent to obstruct a judicial proceeding, directly or indirectly notifies any other person about the existence or contents of a subpoena for records of that person engaged in such business or information that has been furnished to a Federal grand jury in response to that subpoena, shall be fined as provided by this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

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(2) As used in paragraph (1), the term “subpoena for records” means a Federal grand jury subpoena for records that has been served relating to a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, section 1033 of this title.

(e) Whoever, having been notified of the applicable disclosure prohibitions or confidentiality requirements of section 2709 (c)(1) of this title, section 626(d)(1) or 627(c)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u (d)(1) or 1681v (c)(1)),section 1114(a)(3)(A) or 1114(a)(5)(D)(i) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act  [1] (12 U.S.C. 3414 (a)(3)(A) or 3414 (a)(5)(D)(i)), orsection 802(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 436 (b)(1)), [2] knowingly and with the intent to obstruct an investigation or judicial proceeding violates such prohibitions or requirements applicable by law to such person shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, fined under this title, or both.

COUNT #5). TITLE 18 § 2383. Rebellion or insurrection

Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. COUNT #6). 18 USC § 1519 - Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

COUNT #7). 18 USC § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally

(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.(b) Whoever, having the custody of any such record, proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals,

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removes, mutilates, obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any office under the United States. As used in this subsection, the term “office” does not include the office held by any person as a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the United States.

COUNT #8). 18 USC § 1951 - Interference with commerce by threats or violence

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section—(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.(3) The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.

(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 ofTitle 15, sections 52, 101–115, 151–166 of Title 29 or sections 151–188 of Title 45

COUNT #9). TITLE 18 § 1834. Criminal forfeiture

(3) The court, in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of this chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States—

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(4) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and

(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation, if the court in its discretion so determines, taking into consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the property in the offense.

(b) Property subject to forfeiture under this section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except for subsections (d) and (j) of such section, which shall not apply to forfeitures under this section.

COUNT #10). 18 USC § 241 - Conspiracy against rights

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured—They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

COUNT #11). 18 USC § 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts

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committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

 The term “law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States, the District of Columbia, a State, or political subdivision of a State, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of, or make arrests because of, offenses against the United States, the District of Columbia, a State, or a political subdivision of a State.

COUNT #12). 18 USC § 201 - Bribery of public officials and witnesses

(a) For the purpose of this section—

(1) the term “public official” means Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror;(2) the term “person who has been selected to be a public official” means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been officially informed that such person will be so nominated or appointed; and(3) the term “official act” means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.(b) Whoever—(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent—(A) to influence any official act; or(B) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or(C) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or person;

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(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for:(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person;(3) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such person to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to influence the testimony under oath or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent himself therefrom;(4) directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity in return for being influenced in testimony under oath or affirmation as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return for absenting himself therefrom;shall be fined under this title or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.(c) Whoever—(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty—(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official; or(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official or person;(2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United

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States to hear evidence or take testimony, or for or because of such person’s absence therefrom;(3) directly or indirectly, demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or for or because of such person’s absence therefrom;shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.(d) Paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) and paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c) shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying.(e) The offenses and penalties prescribed in this section are separate from and

in addition to those prescribed in sections 1503, 1504, and 1505 of this title.

COUNT #13). 18 USC § 371 - Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

COUNT #14). 18 USC § 401 - Power of court

A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or

command.

COUNT #15). 18 USC § 1001 - Statements or entries generally

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(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.

COUNT #16). 18 USC § 1018 - Official certificates or writings

Whoever, being a public officer or other person authorized by any law of the United States to make or give a certificate or other writing, knowingly makes and delivers as true such a certificate or writing, containing any statement which he knows to be false, in a case where the punishment thereof is not elsewhere expressly provided by law, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

COUNT #17). 18 USC § 1025 - False pretenses on high seas and other waters

Whoever, upon any waters or vessel within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, by any fraud, or false pretense, obtains from any person anything of value, or procures the execution and delivery of any instrument of writing or conveyance of real or personal property, or the signature of any person, as maker, endorser, or guarantor, to or upon any bond, bill, receipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or any other evidence of indebtedness, or fraudulently sells, barters, or disposes of any bond, bill, receipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or other evidence of indebtedness, for value, knowing the same to be worthless, or knowing the signature of the maker, endorser, or guarantor thereof to have been obtained by any false pretenses, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but if the amount, value or the face value of anything so obtained does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

COUNT #18). 18 USC § 1038 - False information and hoaxes

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(a) Criminal Violation.—(1) In general.— Whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of section 46504, section 46505(b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123 (b) of title 49, shall—(A) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both;

(b) Civil Action.— Whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of section 46504, section 46505 (b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123 (b) of title 49 is liable in a civil action to any party incurring expenses incident to any emergency or investigative response to that conduct, for those expenses.

COUNT #19). 18 USC § 1031 - Major fraud against the United States

(a) Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, any scheme or artifice with the intent—(1) to defraud the United States; or(2) to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,in any grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance, including through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, an economic stimulus, recovery or rescue plan provided by the Government, or the Government’s purchase of any troubled asset as defined in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or in any procurement of property or services as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime contract with the United States, if the value of such grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance, or any constituent part thereof, is $1,000,000 or more shall, subject to the

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applicability of subsection (c) of this section, be fined not more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(g)(1) In special circumstances and in his or her sole discretion, the Attorney

General is authorized to make payments from funds appropriated to the Department of Justice to persons who furnish information relating to a possible prosecution under this section. The amount of such payment shall not exceed $250,000. Upon application by the Attorney General, the court may order that the Department shall be reimbursed for a payment from a criminal fine imposed under this section.

COUNT #20). 18 USC § 1621 - Perjury generally

Whoever—(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

COUNT #21). 18 USC § 1622 - Subornation of perjury

Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

COUNT #22). 18 USC § 1623 - False declarations before grand jury or court

(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or

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makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or without the United States.(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need not specify which declaration is false if—(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the offense charged under this section.In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the time he made each declaration believed the declaration was true.(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.

(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.

COUNT #23). TITLE 18 § 1957. Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity

(3) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

(b) (3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense under this section is a

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fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.

(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction. © In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity. (d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are—

(3) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or

(2) that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in paragraph (2)(D) of such section). (e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate and, with respect to offenses over which the United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postal Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postal Service, and the Attorney General. (f) As used in this section—

(3) the term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined in section 1956 ©(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956 ©(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution;

(2) the term “criminally derived property” means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense; and (3) the term “specified unlawful activity” has the meaning given that term in section 1956 of this title.

COUNT #24). 18 USC § 2381 - Treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years

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and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

COUNT #25). 18 USC § 2382 - Misprision of treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.

COUNT #26). 18 USC § 2384 - Seditious conspiracy

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

COUNT #27). TITLE 42 Sec. 2000d-7. - Civil rights remedies equalization

(a) General provision

(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.

(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.

(b) Effective date

The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall take effect with respect to violations that occur in whole or in part after October 21, 1986.

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COUNT #28). TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63 > § 1341

§ 1341. Frauds and swindles

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.

COUNT #29). 18 U.S.C. 1343—Elements of Wire Fraud

The elements of wire fraud under Section 1343 directly parallel those of the mail fraud statute, but require the use of an interstate telephone call or electronic communication made in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (wire fraud is identical to mail fraud statute except that it speaks of communications transmitted by wire); see also, e.g., United States v. Profit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n. 1 (8th Cir.) (the four essential elements of the crime of wire fraud are: (1) that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money; (2) that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire communications were in fact used) (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1341 (West 1994)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2289 (1995); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1994) (two elements comprise the crime of wire fraud: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) use of interstate wire communication to facilitate that scheme); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (essential elements of wire fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute the scheme), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 193 (1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (to prove wire fraud government

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must show (1) scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant's knowing and willful participation in scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Wire fraud requires proof of (1) a scheme to defraud; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication to further the scheme.").

COUNT #30). ANTI-COURRUPTION ACT NO #6494

The term “public officials” means the persons falling under any of the following:

(a) The public officials under the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act, and other persons who are recognized by other Acts as public officials in terms of qualifications, appointments, education and training, services, remunerations, status guarantee, etc; and

(b)The heads of organizations related to the civil service provided for in subparagraph 1(d) and the employees of such organizations.

The term “act of corruption” means the act falling under any of the following:(a) The act of any public official's seeking gains for himself/herself or for any third party by abusing his/her position or authority or violating Acts and subordinate statutes in connection with his/her duties; and

(b) The act of causing damages to the property of any public agency in violation of Acts and subordinate statutes, in the process of executing the budget of the relevant public agency, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public agency, or entering into and executing a contract to which the relevant public agency is a party.

COUNT #31). TITLE 18 USC > PART I > CHAPTER 93 > § 1918

Sec. 1918. Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the Government

Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he - (1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the

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overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or (4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

DEMAND FOR ARREST

Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, THE PLAINTIFF, a.k.a. “CRIME VICTIM,” a.k.a. “COMPLAINTANT,” and, “We the People” DEMAND the arrest of the above named felons.

Pursuant to the statutes herein, in particular the Laws of the United States in general, THE PLAINTIFF, a.k.a. “CRIME VICTIM,” a.k.a. “COMPLAINTANT,” and “We the People” DEMAND that you pursue and prosecute ALL ET AL offenders that have violated their Oath of Office and the Laws of the United States.

DEMAND FOR SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE

Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, THE PLAINTIFF, a.k.a. “CRIME VICTIM,” “COMPLAINTANT,” and, “We the People” DEMAND the seizure and impound of ALL books, and records, of Judge Deganhart, Judge Russel, Sheriff Dunlap, District Attorney Daniel Hotsenpelier, Montrose County, County Tech Services, THE STATE OF COLORADO, a.k.a. Colorado Secretary of State, Colorado Attorney General, Governor Hickenlooper, on the account of ALL corporations, government departments, municipalities, Counties/Townships as evidence of the ongoing felony.

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WARNING

Should any person try to cover up the felony complained of herein, BE YOU HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE: You may be indicted under USC Title 18 sections 3, 4, 241, 242, 1918, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384 and 5 USC 7311.

THE PLAINTIFF, a.k.a. “CRIME VICTIM,” a.k.a. “COMPLAINANT,” being first truly sworn, states that he has knowledge of the felonies herein complained of: that it is not submitted to be vexatious, but to obtain prompt, due, and imperative JUSTICE.

“WE THE PEOPLE”

“THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY”

“We do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, and upon courts to preserve the spirit of liberty.” For these are “false hopes,” in which

“liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constituion, no laws, no courts can even do much to help it.” But, “while it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.”----------Judge Learned Hand; 1944.

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AFFIDAVIT

The Plaintiff, being a NATURAL PERSON, AND A CITIZEN of AMERICA, and the State of Colorado, does, HEREIN, swear, UNDER OATH, that, this Document is true, correct, and accurate in every regard to the best of his knowledge, under the PENALTY OF LAW;

AND, THAT; as a U.S., and Colorado Citizen, the Plaintiff has the RIGHT, and the OBLIGATION, to petition the Montrose County District for RELIEF against said DEFENDANT(S), for extreme, and repeated violations of his RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, and ALL PURSUITS ALLOWED BY LAW, under the Plaintiffʼs CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH, NINETH, TENTH, THIRTEENTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THIS NATURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENT;

AND, THAT; It is, NOW, the “duty and obligation” of the “County Tech Service,” Governor, the U.S. Marshal, the U.S. Attorney General, UNDER LAW, to ‘hear,’ and ‘act’ upon, the arguments, charges, and warrants, HEREIN;

SO SIGNED, AND NOTARIZED THIS DAY, THE _____OF NOVEMBER, 2013;

X________________________________ Steven D. Curry/Plaintiff/PAG/Affiant

X________________________________ Notary Public

SEAL

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The Plaintiff attests, UNDER LAW, that; An exact copy of this “ORDER” will be served upon Montrose County, County Tech Service, the Governorʼs Office, the Jefferson County Court, the Montrose County District Attorney, the Montrose County Sheriff, the Montrose County Commissioners, County Tech Services, the U.S. Attorney General, and the U.S. Marshal.

X____________________________________ Steven D. Curry/Plaintiff/PAG/Affiant

Date of Service:______/________/_________

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