CIVIL PILOT ACCIDENT EXPERIENCEWITH HIGH PERFORMANCE

MILIIARY SURPLUS TYPE AIRCRAFT

R. G. SNYDER, PH. D.

Presented at 19th Annual lnternational AirS a f e t y S e m i n a r , N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 6 6 ,Madrid, Spain. Summary version publishedin A Sumrrary of the night Safety Founda-tion 19tI An{ral Air Safety Seminar, ed. by@ a f e t yFoundation. 196?. )

ABSTRACT

CIVIL PILOT ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE WITH HIGHPERFORMANCE MILITARY SURPLUS TYPE AIRCRAFT

Richard G. Snyder, Ph.D.

A new generation o[ private siDgle-enginejet executive aircraft, having very high per-formance fl8ht characte stics, will soon beavailable to genenl aviation pilots. In order toaflord some prediction of the adequacy of pres-ent pilot experience, requirements and regula-tions, and to provide some understanding offuture salety prohlems. civil pilot accideni ex-perience in a comparable operational aircraft,the North American F-51D ffghter, has beenstudied. Of an estimated 80 surplus F-5ID typeaircraft still operational in geniral aviation, i5were involved in accidents during a 26 monthperiod from 1962-1965, and were investigatedfor this report. Of these, 20 (80ao) wer; dueto pilot error, with poor techoique in landing

accounting tor 14 (fi%);S (20%) were dueto material failure or improper maintenance ofpower plant or landing gear. Six pilots and 6passengers were tatally injured (in non-surviv-able crashes t: serious iniury was sustained by 2pilots and 2 passenge$. 17 pilots and 4 passen-gers (56%) were uninjured. The structuralstrength of the cockpit and use of shoulderharness and crash helmets were found to con-tribute substantially to survival. It is concludedthat operation of single-engine light aircraftwith high pe ormance capability under presentairman licensing regulations is not consistentwith past high-performance civil aircraft ex-pe ence and may become increasingly inade-quate or even dangerous in the future.

CIVIL PILOT ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE WITH HIGHPERFORMANCE MILITARY SURPLUS TYPE AIRCRAFT

Richard G. Snyder, Ph.D.'

In 1958, a new gcncration of private jet ex-ecutive xircraft having very high perforntanceflight charrcteristics bccame avrilxble to ger-eral aviation pilots with th(j production andintroduction into the United States of theMo.ane-Saulnier M. S. 760 Paris. Since thenexecutive jet aircraft in the general aviationfleet have grown to over 600 and it is estimatedthet wel) over'2.000 jet r jrcralt wil l be in je,v-ice by 1975. The current cost of such aircraftrang€s from about $1,450,000 (Lockheed JetStar) to $595,000 (1121 Jet Commander) (1)and restricts ownership to companies who pre-sumably would employ only very well qrrali-fied pibts.

Recen t Fcde ra l Av ia t i on Regu la t i ons61.15(f) and 61.16(a) (3) deal with pj lot-nr-command type rating requirements on hlfbo-jet powered aircraft regardless of grcss weight,which cover some of the new and projectedsinglc-cngrrrc iet r ircfd[t qith ]es\ e\pensivFcosts. American Aircrafts'Model 800, for ex-ample, a new 6'8 passenger single-engine turbo-jet, has a maximum gross weight of 8700 lbs.,and maximum cruise of mach .82 (above 90,-000 feet), and their proiected Model 500, a 4-place turbojet, will gross out at 7500 lbs.,cruise at 425-450 mph., (25,000 feet), and costabout $75,000 (2), making such aircraft com-petitive in cost with many light twin prcp-driven business aircraft.

At the time tlat this study was initiated ther.ewas very little prior experience upon which toestimrte pilot prcblems in the ne\l' gencrationof high performance general aviation aircraft.Yet, under present Federal Air Regulations anypilot holding a private license can legally flypassenge$ in an aircmft under 12,500 lbs.gross weight without a tlpe qualiffcation rat-ing, with the exception of turbo-jets as notedabove.

There. is no regulation to prevent a pilot,with little over 40 hours total flight time, a

lAt tbe time of this studv Chief. Phvsical Anrhro-pology nes€arch, Piotectid and Survivai LaboratoLies,Civil Aeromedical IDstitute, Federal Aviauon AgeDcy,Ofice of Aviation of Medicine, Oliahoma City.

third clxss medicrl certiffcate, rnd a freshprivxte tickct in light aircraft, hom flying lllrdcauying passengers in certail high perfonn-arce Rircmfi; nor preclude wealthy pilots withminimal aeronautical experience in light air.craft and absolutely no experience in higlrspeed, high altitude, long t'at1ge cross-corlDtl'yflight, from puchasiDg and flying srrch models.

lvhile there presently are fe\t jet-powercdaircrrlt jr this weight aDd engile cxtegory. andmost of these are military surplus types, ther€is a pool of experience which has not previouslybccn studied h depth. This is represented bythe high performance military surplus ffghter-type ajrcraft. Sincc slroltly nfter Workl War II,sLrryhrs military ffghtor-type aircralt htvc becnx\.r iLLlu t, , civi l ni l^t\ . A \tu, l) ol t l ' ( . i f "\p|r i-ence shcruld provide reliable insight irb tuhuenr, ' l , lemr lo b, r 'r ,c, ' ,rnterrd s,rggr.st \ornc in)mediate steps to irrcrease current safety, xndpossibly reduce accidcnts with such aircmft inthe futufe. The ob;ectives of this study rverethus to examine xnd deffne civil pilot rccideDtexperience with crrrreDt operational surplus mil!tffy ffghters with padicular emphasis rrponaeromedical factors and protection rnd sirrvivaloI occlrplrts.

For the purposes of this study one typicalaircraft, the No h American F-51D "Mustarg"

was selected, and all accidents occurring dudlgthe years 1963-1964, rs well as one occurr.ing in1962 and two to February 1965, were thor-oughly investigated. The F 51D was chosenbecause there are still a number in curlent op-eration, its perfornrance is comparable to thato{ light jetsf, and 1963 was the lirst yer\r inwhich the records for all crashes, rather thanfatal accidents only, wele availablc for strrdy.

Aftcr World War II there was great interestin flying, but the aircraft industry could Dotmeet the new civil demand at this time, and

tMoran, -Sdulnh, M 5 760 weich\ Io . ,dpd 347u Xt(7650 lbs. ) ' lF F-5 lD 7,300-7.900 the Moranacrui \ " ( ar 3 i0 mph at 16.400' rhe f -51 rop sppcd J(ls ,50u leer i r 38b rnph. (he Morrne h; '32,800'ceiling, and the F-51, 41,000 foot ceiling.

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due to the release for public sole of )argcqurntitig of surplus militory oircraft, the CivilAcronoutics AdministratioD adooted Part 9 ofthe Civil Air Regulations in November, 1946,revised in 1964 (3). Under this regulation,certification of surplus military aircralt waspermitted in the "Limited" category "upon afindine that the service record had been satis-factorf. that the particular aircraft was in agood state of preservation and repair, and thatit was in a condition for safe operation." Car-riage of cargo or passengers for hire was notpermitted in these aircraft. Initially, largenumbers of such aircraft, including fightertt'pes, were thus certified, although their sub-sequent use greatly diminished as new civilaircraft were developed and marketed. Of thegreat numbers of World War II fighters pro-duced it is in some ways ironical that today theFederal Aviation Agency has active registra-tions of only 3 of 20 known P-38 Lockheed"Lightnings" (of 11,246 built), two of 4 knownP-47 Republic "Thunderbolts" (of 13,729 built),one of 6 lnown P-63 Bell "King-Cobras" (of3,303 manufactured), and only one active P-39Bell "Aircobra" (of 9,558 manufachrred) (4).However, as of 1963 there were still 80 activeP-511 on the U, S. Civil Registry out of 199total st i l l l isted in lhis country tof 15,757 de-livered). The 1964 Registry includes 203 total(5), (four aircraft being imported) of which52 "actives" are owned by individuals and 23"actives" are rsed in business. T'hree Musranesare currently registered by the Canadian De-partment of Transport (6), The 1965 U. S.Civil Aircraft Register lists 212 F-51 aircraft ofwhich 81 are actively registered ("eligible").Such aircraft are rapidly becoming collector'sitems, and even the Air Force Museum has notbeen able to obtain some models for itscollection.

The F-51, originally designated P-51, was aremarkable aircraft in that it was initially de-signed and a prototype (NA-73X) assemblednr only 117 days by North American Aviationat Los ADgeles for the British govemment in1940. There were manv versions. of whichthe firal model (XP-51J) flew in 1945. Twomodels, tLe "D" (or Mustang Mark lV, assupplied to the RAF and RCAF), and the "H"

werc produced iA the greatest quantity, 7,956of the former being supplied to the USAF in

19,{4 and 1945 (6,502 built lt luglewtxxl,California and 1,454 at Dallas, Texas). Al-though there are, to the atrthor''s knowledge,two P-514t, I A-36 and I F-5lH model stillflyable, most P-51's flying in civil operationtoday were former USAF "D" models or RCAFMustang Mark IV versions.

The "D" model saw considerable combat inlVorld War II, and was also used extensively inKorean combat operations from 1950 thro[gh1953 by the USAF and South Korean and SouthAfrican Air Forces. Several lendlease P-51's,still carrying U. S. markings, were also usedagainst United Nations forces by North KoreanForces (7). The USAF retired this aircraft in1957, and the RCAF also trsed it operationallyuntil 1957. As latc as 1958, other natioDs werelsing this aircraft hr their militaly air forces,aDd it still forms the fishter defense of at leastthree countres (Cuatemala, Nicaragua and theDominican Republic), some twenty yean afterit was built (8). The xircraft has seen militaryaction as recently as April 1965 when Domini-can Air Force F-51's took part in a revolt.

Cenerally acknowledged to be the world'sfastest propeller-driven aircraJt'. its servir.eceiling of 41,000 feet, dive limits of 505 mph.(525 in'H" models), and range with extemalfuel of 8li hours, made it a high escort figlterreportedly having superior performance to al1othe$ above 20,000 feet. The "D" model wasfirst to use a brrbble canopy and was poweredby the Rolls-Royce/Packard Merlin V-1650-7twelve cylinder liquid cooled Vee engine withtwo-speed, two-stage supercharger, developing1490 BHP for takeoff and 1695 HP under"War Emergency" power at 10,300 feet. Thelater "H model. the final production version,utilized the V-1650-9 engine delivering a "War

Emergency Rating" with water injection of2218 HP at 10.200 feet. and was rated at 487mph. at ,000 feet (11). This version reachedcombnt too late to see service in Europe in 1945,but some units used them in the final Japanese'Altl,oush lh" wodd Ch.\ C, cronn ll J Kn sDr"il t{r.li\ \til hekl bv n C"min An ron; ltesss.(hmilr BF rogniacttally An ME 209V1) (9), the Fede.ation A€rcnau-tiq!€ htemation.te litts 2 itrtemation.l and I US spedremrd nsde in F-51 t)?€ ftcr.ft: 4€.1.37 npL;verr5l25 Km. o$ser 469.5_49 mDh. for loo (m,'412.002frph over 3 Kn. An unofticiil world 3 Kn. reord of479 hph. was est$lishcd in 1952 by a modilied F-slD;howev€r, . camera fajlurc on one run precluded official.cloowl€demeDt ( r0).

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offensive, and most National Guard units wereequipped wilh this modcl in posFwar years.One 'H" model is currently in the civil reg-istry. The "D" model has a normal gross tak;-off weight with full intemal load ltncludingarmament) of 9600 lbs., and most civil modifilcations which have eliminated the fuselagetank, armament, and other weight will go;sabout 7600 lbs., putting them in the "under12,500Ib. category" for civil operation.

This brief gcneral background sho'rld hesullicicni to srggest that this AircraJt is not hyany stretch of the imagination in the samecategory as c Piper Cub. although presentFederal Air Regulations require similar aero-nautical experience for each. Until 1946, pilotsreceived an airman rating record in addition tothe airman certificate ;hich specified horse-power and the class and tyF of aircraJt whichtic pilot was permitted to fly. In t945, rhisregulation was modilied to state simply " . . .combining all SE rarings under ti,j00 lbs.weight classification" ( l2).

RESEARCH METHODS

A combination of techniques were utilizedin evaluating the validity of-data in this stucly,since some seemingly objective information(e.9., total pilot experience) is in fact subjec"tivp in practice. Thr, primary sorrrce of datawas official rccident reports of the accidentsinvolved. ln each case the accident was in-itially investigated by inspectors from theFlight Standards Division of rhe Federal Avia-tion Agency; in all fatal cases the investigationswere headed by the Civil Aeronautics Boardinspectors assisted by FAA General AviationDistrict Office Inspectors. This researcher wasnotified of the accidents through coordinationwith the Accident Studies Branch, AviationVedical Servjce. Operaring Data Division,Flight Slandards or through ceneral AviationDistrict Offices. ln seven cases, this researcherpart icipxtcd in the init ial on-the-scene' ir l-vestigation. In all cases the reports of theaccideDt investigation, including witness srate-ments,_ medical reports, and acaident findings,wete obtained for analysis.

Supplementary information on each case wasalso collected in several ways. Copies of thecomplete aircraft records of each aiicraft were

obtained through the assistance of the FAAAircraft Registration Branch. T'he AirmanCertification Branch, Control Systems Divisio[i FAA), provided copies of the airman recordsof the pilots involved in the accidents and theFAA Aeromedical Certificarion Division pro-vided a copy of the medical history of eichpilot. Crash injury data were obtained fromtLe various hospit.l$ and physicians involved.Informal follow-ups were also rrseftrl in obtain-irg backgro{rn(l facts not reported in the of-ficial reports. since pilots involved in acciclents,prutiorlnrly where error on thcir part might besuggested, are notoriously rehrctirrt to discusscertain {spects without considerable bias, In-formal interviews of respondents who witnessedthe crash or who were intimately associated orfamiliar with the pilot's background were con-ducted jn thc g'r is; of casrral Ianear tal l at thepilots home tield. Thts was paiticulariy pro-drrctive in obtaining a hroadei perspectire of^ctual pilot expcricnce and habits. For p\-ample, a pilot may claim 5000 hours flight time,with 50 hotrs in the P-51. But attempts toverify this with a former instructor or the;ech-u'ric who worked on the Dlanc miqht reveal aJifferent estimite 1

'Naw, this was his firstflight in a P.51."). Backsrorrnd [abits of thepilot involved may also be important ('Tourhorld sen that hny f ly when lrc getr loeded.").Irterested pi lots throrrghorrt the c-orr| l try as wellas several srrppliers o[ P-51 components kept intorrch with the writer. notitying him whencertain_ mator airftame pa s were ordered byindividualsr information on one incideni(which apparently was not reported to FAA)was obtained throtrgh such souraes.

A complete tabulation of all resistered F-51aircraft in this mrntry was prov-ided by theAircraft Registrafion Sianch. Fee. Iisting loca-tion of all aircraft, owners, and other pertmentdata. Finally, a personal knowledged of cur-rent civil operation of this Ine aircraft hasbeen gained in cross-country flights to all por_tions ot the country.

It was origiral ly r lought that th. total reg-istered-F-51 .rircraft owners (abo"t 80 pilot;)could be broken down into a contror groupconsist ing of civi l pi lots ha\ing no mil i tarytraining and laving gone through no organizedtransit ional training vprsus'Cavalier" ownerswho had passed an adequate civil flight check-

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orrt (TF-SID) rnd groundlichool progltm lntho TF-51 prior to solo. Ilowcvcr, the nr-rmberswerc so small thot meonlngfill stotisticd treat-ment was questionable. Ah Force Trainingand Accident statistics were also obtained fora compfiison of military-civil operational ex-perience evaluation ( Table 1I ) .

TIIE DATA

The twenty-five accidents occurring duringthis study are briefly sumrnarized as follows,and are grouped by official cause of the acci-dent rather than by actual sequence of

I. PILOT ERROR

A. Poot Technlque Dwlng Take-Off

Case #j 63lqT

The pilot was a 39-year-old physician (AME),holding a private pilot certificate for airplane,single-engine land. Claimed 3000 hours totalflight time, l0 hours total in F-51. He waschecked out in the F-51 aircraft 30 days priorlo this accident. with I:30 hours in previous24 hours. He held a Clads III Medi;l. Air-craft airftame had 797 hours total time and 72hours on the Rolls-Royce V-1650-7 engine.

Pilot, with one female passenger aboard,taded out for takeoff at a l.rge municipalairport to continue a doss-country flight. Whiletaxiing he experienced radio difficulty, makingapproximately 20 transmissions to the towerduring a l6-minute ground taxi and run-upperiod. Run-up was at approximately 40 de-grees heading. He took off on a hard-surface2800 foot runway (020) at 3111 p.m. Winddirection was WSW at 7 knots. The weatherwas clear, visibility 8 miles, temperature 72'F.No flight plan was filed. One witness noticedthat run-up took about ten minutes and thatthe engine sounded rough on first run-up, butnormal during a second run-up.

On take-off witnesses heard the engine mrss

rt ohont twcnty-fivc fcet oltlhrdo, strw tt bloworrt o puff of smoke (voriursly described as"whlte", "gray" and "black"), then catch again,and the witnesses saw the pilot begin nn 'un-

usrally steep climb." At about I00 feet alti-tude another large puff of "black" smoke wasobserved and the engine again mis-fired. Theaircraft continued to climb with the ensrneintermittently mi,'-firing until an altttrrde ofapproximately 400 feet was reached. Duringlhis climb the pilot maintained a slight hrm tothe right until he was about 30 degrees to theright of the runway heading, when he theninitiated a turn to the left with a nose-hiehattitude. The engine was described as operit-ing at this point at 3G40/ power. Wihressesdescribed continuous puffs of smoke and sput-tering engine until the airqaft had trrrnedabout Q0 degrees, when the aircraft appearedto be slidins down the inside of the left 30-45degree banli with a rapid loss of ahitude andlow airspeed. The geat was retracted; the noseremained unusually high. The aircraft stalledout at 150-200 feet, the nose cominq down andright wing up. struck the ground in a flar sprn,bounced, and slid with left wins low dou,n thewest side of the runway tow;d the controltower. The pilot does not recall much aboutthe accident. Both occupants received maiorinjuries. although the pilot was wear-ing ashoulder hamess (which failed ) and Navy-style crash helmet. The passenger had only aB-4 tlpe lap belt for protection. The aircraftwas demolished. There was no fire (Fig. 1).

It was the opinion of the investigating in-spector, "that this accident occurred as resultof faulty technique employed by the pilot inthe performance of emergency procedureswhich were necessitated by a loss of enginepower during take-off . . . when the pilot en-countered detonation, he failed to maintainsufficient ai$peed by reducing pitch attitudesufficiently to maintain level flight . . . whenthe pilot attempted the 180 degree tum backto the airport. This accident might not haveoccurred if the pilot had trtilized nrnway 310for emergency rse immediateiy after he wasairbone." Runway 310 was 8000 feet long(vs 2800 feet used). A violation of FAR 61.3(c) for operation with an expired medicalcertificate was filed.

'Tho arthor, a foder Alr Force lnstructor Dtlot in th6F-51, has floh r20o hou$, includtng 236 oirbar, in thislype ancraft. For the p$t 4 yearr, he hrs oEFrared hisovn F-51, mostly on FAA nedical rcsmrch;r scctdenrinvestigation flighrs, and has mnoer.d in the Nation6lAn 8do(. Durinq tht 6u^o of t[i\ kjde exFriene hehas bNme ldilisr enh the p$nliar oroblemi asecilredwrth civiloperstion of rhi! type of afcrrift.

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"*t lslSlJllTs

aiMft id a iun, after powd loss or rakFff, with idpsct b s llst-ert !tti-

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: . . . , ' r . , , .

FrclnEg. lntacr cockpit area of denolished F_51 (Car #2) from whict, r*o oL(,panh escaled wunou n_iu 'y . Bo 'h vorp . ,d . t , - 'n . t . . phoro , ) "u r ro r

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case #2 7 '11 1 &The pilot was a 34-year-old physician (AME),

holding a private pilot certificate for single-engine land. Ile claimed 5fi) horrrs total flighttime, and 15 hours in the F-51 (although 5horrr\ probahle total. with 2'; l ,eing on previorsflisht). He held a current Class II Modical.The aircraft airframe had 792 hours total time.

The pilot, with one female passenger aboard,attempted takeoff from a 4200 foot Lsphalt run-way at a small airport on a cross-country flight.The weather at 12:55 p.m. was clear, ceilingunlimited, visibility sixty miles, temperature65'F., airport altitude 5200 feet and wind calm.No flight plan was filed. Following normalrun-up the aircraft was lined up with the mn-way and the pilot reported that he graduallyincreaied power to 5G55 inches manifoldpressurc and used 20 degrees of flaps with 7'right rudder trim. Sixty-one inches of mani-fold pressure (full take-off power) was reachedat about 75 feet, when the pilot noted that theleft wing began to drop, He stated that hewas unable to stop this by lowering the noseand applying ailercn correction. Witnessesreported that he lifted off in a very steep 3-point attitude, (because he had been told bysomeone to "hold the stick way back on tale-off') at about 1800 feet from the starting point,then climbed steeply, tuming left 900 steepbank to a 30-40 degree heading from the run-way. The aircraft stalled; the left wing struckthe ground in the dirt to the left of the runwayat a point approximately 3000 feet down thelunway. The_ airdaft then hit on the nose,cartwheeled and came to rest right side up 50degrees to the right of couNe. The pilott fintwords were r€ported to be: "Boy, too muchtorqud'. (Fig.2)

Ttrere were no injuries to either pilot orpassenger reported, although the passengerwas bruised on the leg and dazed. There wasonly a lap belt in the rear seat. The aircraftwas a total loss. Both occupants wore helmets,The accident was due to faulty technique andpilot inexperience in this t)?e of aircraft. Thepilot was required to submit to a private pilotflight re-examination. (This pilot was reportedto have groundlooped other aircraft severaltimes Drior to this accident. )

B. Pooi Technique Dufing Flight (Stall-Spin)

Case #1 t67sLThis pilot was a 48-year-old adfrrster, hold-

ing a privale pi lot cert i f icale. singlc-enginel.rnd, and claimed 800 hours total flight time.I{e had ciaimed 100 hours in similar aircraft onan aircraft insurance policy application, andthe co-owner thought that he had flown theF-51 5-6 hours prior to the accident. llis ClassIII Medical was current. (On 1962 medicalhe had limitation for near vision, but no limita-tion was noted in f964.) This was intended asir demonstration flight with the prospectivepurchaser as passenger. The flight was initi-ated at 2:39 p.m. in clear weather; visibilitywas 6 miles, and wind from 290 degrees at 15knots. No flight plan was filed.

The aircraft departed from runway 29R,climbed on a course to the left of the runway,entered scattered clouds at 1000-1500 feet alti-tude and subsequently reappeared in a lefttum which progressed to a steep tum. The air-craft was observed to either have snapped orspun out of control from the steep tum. Theaircraft was observed by numerous witnessesin an almost vertical dive, crashing into a grassstrip between a busy main highway filled withSunday traffic and a residential area and burstinto flame. Both occupants were killed. Mi-racdously no one else was iniured. Subse-quent tear-down of the engine revealed that itwas operating at the time of the accident.(Fis. 3 & 4).

It is interesting to note that two personscould be found to verify previous flight in thisaircraft by this pilot, and one stated that onthe three previous flights of short durations hehad observed, the pilot had had difficulty inmaintaining directional conhol on takeoff, "and

almost lost it on one occasion". Shoulderharnesses, parachutes, and helmets were usedin both seats. It is also ironical that the pas-senger, an airline transport pilot flying 707's,had stated prior to the flight thet he had flownthe F-51 in World War II, when in fact he hadbeen washed out of cadets in 1952. It is alsopuzzling why an experienced pilot will get intoa \trange high performance aircraft haring nodual controls with an inexperienced pilot.

Frctft 3. Site of n* wrrical frsh s a rott of a st u and s?in (Cae #l). MiE.uloulv tt ttnorci.d oDE EFa$ itlip betwm a bu\y clty highway and d hoiusinq aFa, c.usins fdral i'iuri.s tj the twoc{upants only. lPh&o by HdaU-E,Mt^a, t s Ansels, Catifomia)

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;s; l '

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Ftclrul. Thc force of this iEp&t ud re$ltiDg fire constituted non{urivable onditlons. (Photo by HdaA-Erdrl6. LG Ansef6, Califomia)

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case#2 )F 1 -32V /

The pilot was a 33"year,old Air Force ser-geant holding a commerci:rl pilot license withratings for airplane, single,engine lancl, and aClass II Medical. with waiver issucd for de-creased visual acuity. ("Corrective lcns shallhe wonr while performirs f l ighi d,rt ies., ')Prcvnrrs re.ord indicares h. F;i ted I im cdflight instmctor (Cessna 150) flisht test firsrtime, and failed commercial piloi fljght teststhree t imes before ccrt i f icatc issued iprccisionair work). One previous accident. Airmanwas due transfer to Army \.vith promotio ashelicopter pilot. Claimed 700 hours total flightexperience with 30 hours in P-51.

Tlris pilot departed a small field, in clearweather. on a cross-countr\ ferry fliqht. Thepilot had been r.pr.sented to the owrr.r ns a''well^qualified

F-51 pilot." The aircraft wasobserved to fly westeily after take-off at about1000 feet altftude. Aborrt 25 miles WSW ofthe departurc point witnesses hcard the enFinemissing and saw smoke coming from the'leftside of the aircraft. The airciaft was beingferried with the- landing gear locked dowrr bqicause of a faulty hydraulic system. The air-craft stalled, spull into a cornfield and wasdernolished. The pilot was killed.

Tcnrdown jnspection ol the cngine was rn-conclusive due to the ertreme damice, but themost probable cause for the cngine iai lur" *asloss of fuel pressure due to rupture jn the fuelpump diaphragm and resultiig flow out theoverboard discharge line. resulting tn thc whitesmoke reported. fiere *as al.o a deciJcdIack of lubricating oil in the left engine hankand all parts of both banks were ncw butheavily coated with rust.

It was- the opinion of the investigating in-spector that when the pilot experienced enginemalfunction he allowed the air.speed to beclmctoo low in the emergcncy land;g artenrpt rndlo\t conlrol. The recommended gl idt. sperdwith thF gear dowo is lZ5 mph, which ; i larabov, the normal approach iirsp.ed, and enin"xperiencpd pi lor corrld easi,y qet into diIf icr l ty in this siruation.

Case fi b3o1YThe pilot was a 38-ycar-old air-conditioniDg

mechanic, holcling a private pilot license, singlei

cngine land, with a Class III Medical. Hisestimated total flight time was 1200 hours (200listed o-n lllst Dredical), as the pilot kcpt notlight log. There wcre B35 liours on theaircraft.

This f l ight originared fnr t lk n,rrpn,e r,[ r.r l-inq color movi, { of an F-51 in f l i j l l i t . l t j l , f trp.m. rendezvous was made with an Ercoupefrorn which the ntovies werc to bc shot overthc o,.dn. f l ighr r:rs pnr., l l , .) ro t l ,p co:rsr-l ir)e. ur,d thc F-51 madc rrrrssr.s to orrc sidc ofthe Ercorpe. Ar originaliy plarr:rcd. thc F-51pilot w:rs tu he in the area-for nrr)y twenry-thirty miDutes, then retum to the airport andturn the aircraft over to tlre owner, who wouldfly out to the rendezvous area for additionalpictures. No acrobatic maneuver-s u,ere sched-uled. Instead, the pilot contimred to makepasses (about 10) past the ErcouDe at about3000 feet altihde, increasing the angle of barkon thF lrrms io approximately g0 degrces. Onthr lr. l t p.\s the pi lot approached in \ low nightin a climi attitude, then iDitiated a stcep cti;b-inq bflnk and rolle,l ovpl into Ir spin. Themovie f i lm showi that u pnrt iel rccovery wasmrde, " lhen rr recondary spin. arul the berin-nrng ot a rccold n.covcry lr ior to impdcti glhe ocean. Thl ir ircrcft w3\ nol rccover,.J an(lthe pilot was presrrmed to havc beer fatnllyinjrrred.

This accident was athibufed to the pilot'slack o( r ompeterrcy ind hir l inri icd cypFrir.ncebeing unablc to cope with the situ;tion inwhich he had p)aced htmself. No action onviolation 61..13 (c) (expired Class III Medicaicetificate ) was taken.

c[4se #4 Iq;lD

T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e d a 4 3 - y e a r - o l c l s c l f -employed dist butor. He was a comrnercialpilot hokling single .rnd rnulti-engine, iand andsca, inst[tn)ent, Airfranre and porvcrplarrt nrcch-anic ratirrgs. He clailred u flight ilstnrctorntiDg, but lo record of this corrkl be found.Tie l rad fni led thc I 'owefpl lnt rn, .c l . in ic tc\ tthc l i ' \ r t ime. Jr i leJ thr.pr ivxte t , i lot f l ig lr t testtwi.-o. und hnd thrcc krrown ar cidenrs pl lv iorrsto lhis or. . He clainreJ I9gB l ,o,r | \ lotJl f l ighttinre with 14 in t)re F-5L IIis Class II Medicalw.rs issued with the following linitatioD:"Holder

mr$t w€:r. contact lens, iight eye and

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corecting glasses, left eye, while exercisingthe privileges of his airman's certificate." Issuecion the basis of a statement of demonstratedability.

This pilot was on the )ast leg of a Iong, cross-country flight. Takeoff was lnitiated at 3:00p.m. and the crash occurrerl approximately 17bmilcs north in mountains after about 35 minutesof flight. The weather was very poor witl alow orercrst and rajn rcported lt'300 feet inthe area of the crash. fhe pi lot was on a VFRfl ight and no f l ight ptan h;d been f i lcd. Al-though he had an instrument rating, he hadnever flowa under instrument conditions. Sev-eral aircraft in the area repnrtcd tuming backdue to lhe wealher which ertended to over19.500 feet. There were fire penons aboardthis air.raft. the fuselage tani having beenremovcd and a platform with one safeiy beltproviJed behlnd the piloti seat. The pilofswife and eithcr two or three children wereseated- on thjs platform. (One three-year-oldwas observed on the pilot! lap or the originalIakeoff. ) No safety b;tt . harn.sses. pa.achit.".helmel!. nor c:1rr noi\e-slrppressors were sup_plied for anyone except rhe pilor, except I;rthe one belt in the reer. The Diiot was notobserved to be wearing glasses on taleofl, and_was belir.ved to have bien wexring two conrirctlenses, contrary to his medical waiver. The air_craft was found to have disintegrated priorto ground impact at an angle of about 85 de_grees, and evidence indicate: it may have beentransonic in a vertical dive. There was nooxygen equipment aboard and there h rroindication that _the pilot had any knowledgeabout the use of oxygen or high aititude fligh"t.Evidence indicates that he fliw at an altitudeof over 20,000 feet to avoid the weather, be-came hlT,oxic, and lost control of the aircraft.The aircraft was demolished with five fatali"t i es . (F ig .5 ,6&7)

C. Poor Technlque During Land.lng

case #1 2s ) L

This pilot, aged 41, was a freeJance profcs"sional pilot and a French national. He held aLircnc( d. pilot prolessionel, dr Irp class at ionet calrqorl multintotcurs a h?li(e pois\anr?n'cxcedant pa$ 3(n CV: as well as an FAA com-mercial piloti license. His last medical exam-

ination was issued 7 months previously. Tleonly prior e\pcrience the pi lor had hed withthe F-51 aircrclt was a 2o-min te f l ight priorto this flight.

The f l ight nriSinated in Errrope a. n trans-athntic ferry niqhr and proce;ded wftholtin. idenl to th, ' f irst lcfrrel inq srop (where hernrde hl. snco,nd la ding in an t -Str. Hn wasclcircd over the VOR rt 4ffn feet irt 4: l l p.m.lor,:r VOR/lLS jrpproich. report ing sit ir fac-ro l ry tnoolnd. a LI uas ohser \er l passing overlhe ort,.r mcrker st iehtly low fnr an ILS :rp-proach. but othcrwise normal. I le was c]earedto land on nrnway 12, \.vind 0 deFees at 2-4knots. The aircraft was observed to touchdown very slowly about 2,000 to 2,500 feetfrom the end of the runway. Two cye wit-ne_sses saw the aircraJt bounce, s\,ving to theleft with the left wing-tip almost shiling thenrnway. It was then recovered, at which pointporver was- applied and with its sudden ap-plication, the air.craft nosed rrp, r.olled to theleft in a climbing bank, then, ilmost inverted.\ i ,hsl ippcd to the grorrnd str iking inir i f l l ly onlhc lefFwjnc-t ip. t f ien cartwheeling onto thenose. The nrain wreckage came ib rest ap-proximately 3,200 feet from the end of the111w-ar, and 150 feet from the edge, heading180 degrees frorn init ial landing. Thc pi lot wail i l leJ and thc aircraft destroyed and- bumed.(F ie . 8 )

Weather at the time of this accidenr wasceiling measured 1500 feet broken. 3000 feetbroken, visibility 20 miles, wind 90. at S l-nots(note: differs from clearance weather giveir)ron active nrnway 12 wind was l ight and vari-able, 2-8 knoh.

- Flaps were full down, aileron l. left, rud-der 2" r'ight, elevator 13' back. RpM leverwas firll increase, and it was believed that futltakeoff power had been suddenly applied, withno change in trim setting to compensate fortorque. Examination of the wreckage showedrn 18" crowbar,- probably carried as;n emerg-ency escape tool, rrnder the front seat. Marksnn it could have hcen carrsed by iamming inrhe stop mecharism orr the elevator controlquadrant at the rear of the front seat, but itwas jmpossible to reconstruct this due to theextensive destructioq.

It.was the opinion nf the foreiSr invcstigat_ing l,oard that this pi lor lost cintrol of the

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Frcu!5. Vi.w of lillside into which air.raft oashed at 85. anele. Due to stru.tural failure as a result ofp \cpF l ing tFF dnF l imr t " o l rh " r i rc - " i1 . rhp rn . rd l r l i nn t rC"e l t ro ' ' o mr ,cc l . .C"sc . ! ,1 ' .(Pl,oto by lohn C. EArley, CARI)

S* t I, ,A*

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Mair wekage of aircreft ( Cai" rt4 ) which dnintFqrat.d Dior to lneact. Note thrr w.ckase i!@t inbeddpd deeply bto \oil. {Photo b} John d Larl^i. CAtu)

"ai

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s

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Frcuin 7. Clotles *..c shrcddcd ftom oc.uFnts whcn rn.ra{t hrd struchtrrl failuc in flight duc to €xces-sivc airspe€d. llin Nas Iargcst piece of pnofs slo*s. (Case #4). (rhoto b) John c. Earley,CARI)

.

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aircraft ("attempting to corect a poor landingwith power and failed to appreciate . . thetorque in a semi-stalled condition andtrimmed nose-high").

Case #2 1 7 T a c

Cdse #3 flqsK

This 22-year-old air force airman held a com-merical pilot siDgle-engine, land ).ating with aClass II Medical. Total time was 152 hourswith no previous flight time in F-51 aircraftand t hour dual in T-6 aircraft. Total time onthe aircraft was 1739 hours.

A 2l-year'old non-pilot ftiend decided to buvan F-51. Since this pi lot had not f lown a largcaircraft previously he was given one hour ofdEal instrucl ion. including f ive landings in anAT-6, of which his instructor commented, 'Hisflying indicated little knowledge of mediumweight aircraft. He had a tendency to flare tooIate and bounced on two of the five landings. the others being fair . . . I felt that hisbackground was too limited . . ." After flying asa passenger on two flights in the F-5I pilotFdby the former ou,ner, he then mounted theF-51 with his friend, the new owner! as pas-senger for his first flight. The former ownerstood on the wing and heJped him start. (Theform.r owner explained that he himself hadacquired all his knowledge concemins the F-51from rcading the T. O. Manual. r e flight wasinitiated to a small airport near an Air Forcebase. Upon arrival at this field no radio con-tact was made with the towe., and after a fewpasses over the field the F-51 made a high ap-proach to runway 14. Initial contact warmade2400 feet from the app166qh end o[ the 5400foot runway. The aircraft bounced violently5-10 feet; the right wheel and nose cane upwith the left wing tip low; the aircraft thencame down on the left wheel. The aircraftskidded 4 feet, tumed off to the rieht into thegrass, skidded sideways and went ;ver on itsback, -collapsing the vertical fin and carropy.It took firemen 40 minutes to release tLe occr-pants from the cockpit. There was no fire.Both occupants received major injuries.

The pilot was cited for violation of 61.47 and60.12 and his license was suspended for 6months. since he flew a passeneir on his firstf l ighl sithout t l 'e req'r ired n,. t , ,natng. ."-perience. (This.case is similar to referenc; tS. )

This pilot was aged. 47. a stagehand, andheld a private pilot license airplane single-engine, land and helicopter ratings, witl ClassII Medical with a limitation of glasses fornear-vision. Previous records indicate that in1959 his license was suspended for perfonningacrobatic flight within two airways (^FAR 60.16(b)), with a passenger having no parachute(43.48), pilot using a parachute out of date143.49(b) ), reckless operation (60.12), aircrafthrving no papers 143.10), and no periodic in-rpe( lion had been performed on the rircraftwithin the past year (43.22). Two monthslater, in Febmary l96q the pilot was in viola-t ion of CAR 43.40 and Section 610(a)(2) ofthe Federal Aviation Act for flying an aircraftwhile license suspended and fined g100, ofwhich a compromise $50 fine was accepted.In 1962 the pilot was fined another 950 for in-stalling another engine and failing to note it inthe engine log (43.20). In 1963 his licensewar ngain srrspended for operating an F-51wrrn a pa\renger undcr actl tal 'nstnlmentflight conditions while not having an instru-ment rating, violating FAR 13.34a, 4[].10(a)(1),CAR 60 .30 {a r (3 r and CAR 4U. l l . ope ro r ingthe aircraft in a careless manner {60.1i CARI,and as a result of the lollowing flight in whichno operating limitations were installed andno registratior certificate was carried (.13.19,43.10 and 60.11) for failure to properly planflight. (This pilot also reporteily

^flew irom

Chicago to Los {ngeles in an F.5l wearingonly a bathing suit and was reported to havebeen arrested in a maior city while thus attired.)

The flight was initiated at 7:45 a.m. for thepurpose of ferrying the aircraft cross-counrryfor re-license. Since weather was marginalthe pilot originally planned to fly at 3500'VFR,but elected to fly on top at g500. He had noradio communication except for a portable re-ceiver. After 2:15 hours of lliqht he claimedthat his engine started "acting up", he was lowon fuel, and he let down throrrgh holes in thecloud layers, attempting to land in a comfieldabout 4000' long. The field was soft andmuddy and the aircraft flipped over on itsback in the wheels-down landing attempt,rnaking deep rrrtr for 650 feet. The pilot waslreFd with mit lor injuries alter 45 mrnures.

Ftc,uE8. R6ult of p@r r@very tehnlque In bad lodinq. This Dilor had hsd orJv oe Drcvtous lllchti, F-sr before aftmpring ro fdry it a@$ the A-tla'ric O;rn (Cr\e #r r.

'(Offici;l photo U.'S.Naval Station, Keflavic}, lcelald )

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There was no fire. Damagc wits cxtensive tothe aircraft. We^th€r at thc crlrsh sito at thist ime was reported as 1500',7 milcs visibi l i ty,40 degrees, wiDd SW at l0 mph, and sky

Witnesses described the aircraft.rs circlingthe arca for 15-30 minutes prior to the accidcnt,going in and out of low clouds, and dcscribedthe engine as sorndinc normal. \o ( ngincmalfrrnction rvas found. No rbgistration certifi-cate, airworthiness certificate, operations limit-ations, technical order, aircraft or engine logs,weight and balance, nor equipment list was iDthe aircraft. The airspeed jndicator v/as notrange-marked.

It appeared that the pilot became lost on topof the overcast (he was 165 miles east of course),Iet dorvn through the overcast, and used poorjudgment in attempting a landing with gcardown and eanopy closed. (Fig.9)

Case #4

A 34-year-okl comptter manager, holding aprivate license with airplane single and multi-elrgiDc, larrd ratings, Class II Medical, issuedon hasis of medical uaircr for color \ ision.Total hours 341, of which 21 hours was statedto be flown in F-51 t,'pe aircraft.

Retulning home from a cross-country flightsome oil got on the windshield. The pilotelected to land with the canopy closed. Aftera successftrl touchdown the pilot lifted the tailin order to obtain better forward visibility andin so doing the propeller stmck the runway.There were no iniuries, Estimated damage:new propeller. Weather was clear, visibilityl0 miles, temperature 40"F, and the wind eastat 6 mph.

' ' /Case #5 N I , t >

This pilot was a 35-year-old automobile sales-man, holding a private pilot license wjth single-and mull i-"ngine iand ratings, and appro:ri-mately 1500 hours flight time, Class II Medical.There wcre 1041 horrrs on the aircraft. Thepilot failed the multlengine flight test on firsttry.

nosc came up the wing came np to 5G60 de-grees. From all cvidcnce thc pilot haci no pre-vidrs exper'icnre iD a

F-51 aircr.rft and thiswas his first flight. IIe madc his appronch toa lnlge m nicipal airport (10,000'runway) low,with very skrw rilspeed and nose-high rttihrde.In correcting he jammetl the thlottle to firllporver and tolque carrsed the left wirrg to drop,shiking an ILS localizer anteDnAe located l{n0/from the runrvav. fie pilot lost control o[ theai:craft and it contacted tlre ground lffr fromthe antennae, contirluing 400'further beforecomin!{ to a stop inverted. Both occupantswere killed and the aircraft was denrolished.

Weather was clear', visibility 15 rniles, rem-peDhrre 53"F., wind WNW 15 knots withgusts to 22 knots rt the time of the xccident.This aircra{t was licensed in the "resh.icted"

category.

Case #6

The pilot was a 27-year-old executivc pilotholding an airline trMsport pilot certificatewith ratings for sirgle ancl multi-eDgine land,DC-3, commercial rctorcraft'helicopter, singleergine sea, and Class I Medical. His totalpilot time \r'as claimed to be 6050 hours. Hestated that he had 50 hours in F-51 aircraftwith 10 hours in previous 90 days and 20 min-utes previou3 24 hours. There were 872 horrrson the aircraft.

Tlis pilot attenrpted to make a cross-windlanding on runway 29 (6000) with full flapsand in a 3-point attitude. The field elevationwas 5665', wind direction 330 degrees at 1Oknots, clear visibility 50 miles, Gmperatnre65"F. No flight plan was filed. Time 9:30 a.m.

As the touchdown occurred the pilot addedpower and the left wing came dox,n, strikingthe runway and causing the aircraft to spinaround in a 180' turn off the runrvay and thepilot to complctely losp control. Tlre pilot rvasnot inirrrFd brrl nr:r jor dnmage to the {t i lcrtrf toccurred. Cause of this accident was ! poorr€covery iD torgetting to conlpensate with rightnldder due to additiotral torque when the powerwas suddenly added.

This pilot took off for a 2s-min|tte locJl flishtwith one pas5enger. The takeoff was describedby a witness as "rough" and as power was added This case involved a 30-year,old auto dealer,the left wing dropped 20 degrees and as the holding a private license and Class III Medical.

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Frcu$ 10, Fiv€ occuDants ol this autonobile we uniniured when ancralt struck it after p ot l6t @ntrclin land ing ._ rca . " * l l ) . ,Pho(o by S lyc ,en Av ia r ion . In . . K€nt . wa\h ingbnr

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One prcvious accident the preceding year. Thepilot stated that he had 3m0 hours flight time(but only claimed 700 hours 12 rnonths earlier).He also claimed 3 hours previous F-51 time,but this was determined to be his first flightin this aircraft after initial purchase.

On his first flight in this F-sI (with a pas-senger) he attempted to land on a dirt 300fffield after a cross-country flight of apprcximately one hour. The pilot stated that a slightpropellcr oil leak had coated the bottom por-tion of the windshield to such an extent thathe corld not see throrrgl it. He did not at-tempt to open the canopy. Ile said that hcintentionally held the tail high oD the landnrgroll to permit vision and in so doing raised thetail so high that the propeller tips stmck therunway. Skid marks started at a point 700'from the end of thc nrnway. coltinued for 360feet, changed direction 20 degrces to the left,continued another 200 feet, then made a 180degree turn to the left and stopped. Propellergouges stated 210 feet after the first skidmarks. Aircraft damage consisted of a dam-aged propeller and cracked supercharger case,necessitating major repairs.

Tho passenger commented that he neverknew it was anything but a normal landinguntil the engine stopped and he noted that theProP was bent.

The weather was clear, visibility l0 miles,temperature 48"F., wind SW.

The pilot became ill after the accident andwas conlined to a hospital. Pi lot was given awritten reprimand for violations (CAR: f.f01(b) operating "restricted" aircraft with "limited"

on \ i . lc. 43.l0fh) and l.33fa1). carrying apa\scnq( r withnut recent flight exPcrionce.Although this pilot stated to the investigao).that he had had 4 landings and 3 hours dualF-51 time prior to the flight, the seller clailredthat he in f^ct neDer asked for anA sort olcheckont.

Cnse #8

The pilot was a 37,year-olcl machine shopfoleman holdilg a studcnt pilot license (soloendorsenrent PA-22, PA-2U, Cessna 172). IIistotirl flight expcrierce rvas 106 horrrs. He helda Class III Meclical with limitation for defectivevision (200/20 both eyes distant vision andrcquired to cany 2nd pair of glasses). There

were 346 horrrs on this aircraft, a single-placemilitary version. Although he stated that hehad 20 hours Iogged in the F-51, this was ach-ally his fint flight.

Al 4 00 p.m.. aJter a local initial solo flight.tle shdent owner attempted a landing on a2500' runway. Following initial touchdown,which appeared normal, the aircraft rolled ap-proximately 1200' down the runway when itdrifted over into a snowbank located along thcrjght side of the runway. At this point thepilot applied power vigorotsly and thc rircraftw.rs ol>served to swerve to the left rather ab-nrptly. TIre left wingtip stmck thc nrnwayarrd as thc aircraft kept turnilg to the left themnway was stmck bv the right wing and theprop blades. The right landing gear failedduring this glou d'loop and the aircraft thenslid backwards off the runway, coming to restsome 150' from the edge of the runway.

Damage was extensive to the right wing,prop and landing gear. No flight plan h.dboen filed. The weather was clear, visibility30 miles, temperature 30"F., and wind 195 de-grees at 15 knotsj described as perfect flyingconditions.

Thir pi lot had never had any training inother than light single-engine airplanes. HisstudeDt license was not eudorsed for the F-51.His training h the F-51 ailcraft was limited toa "do"it-yourseif" cockpit checkout and stndy-ing manflats. A violatior of FAR Part 61.?3was noted.

Case #9

This incident involved a 39-year-old autodealer, holding a commercial pilot's license forsingle-engine land aircraft, and a Class II Medi'cal with no restdctions. He had approximately43(X) hours flight time. The aircraft had about1000 hours total time on the airframe and 400hours on the engine. Records indicate oneviolatior for lowlevel acrobatics resulting in a30-day suspension.

Vinor d.rnr.,ge to t l ,e r i tht winAtip sa! r,-polted to have occurred rvhcn tho pilot lostcontrol during a cross-rvind landing on a con-crete mDway. Wind and weather coDditionswere not reported and no accident report wasfiled.

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FcuEg. The pilot of this amalt was trapped for 45 ninuts alter beonjns lost tn p@f warher andattempting to.land -in.a nuddy omf,etd wirh gear doM (Cas€ #3): (phoro'by Terry Wright

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Case #10 )12. t 1-This case involved a 37-year-okl oil investor

executive, holding a privatc pilot ccrtjficatcwith single and multi-cngine land ratings, andCla5s II Medical. His total flight time was2465 hours. He had 3 hours dual in the F-51,phrs 20 hours of ground school training. Theaircraft had 1671.40 total airframe time and285:50 hours on the engine (40:05 since over-haul ).

The pilot departed a municipal airport at5:10 p.m., intcnding to land at another air?orta short distance away. After tAkeoff the towernotified the pilot that his gear was still do\lrl,and he retracted it. Weathcr was VFR, clear,wnrd 90 degrees at 10 knots. No flight planwas filed. Upon arrival at the destination citythe pilot contacted the tower, but oD final clis"covered that he was lined up on the mongairport. He then broke traffic and flew overthe intended landing airpo and entered thecorrect traffic pattem, with his gear still down.At thit Foint he evidentl) placed his gcar inthe up position, thinking he wa! putting itdorvn. The aircraft landed gear up, sliding1580 fcet on the 8000' harcl surface runway.Thc pilot prrlled the emergency gear extensiourelease handle and cut the switches. Inspec-tion revcaled the wheel well doors were par-tially open with outboard edges resting on therunway, but no marks leading up to them. Thegear subsequently was found to cycle normally.There were no iniuries, but major damage oc-curred to the propeller and scoop.

The FAA opinion given for this accident wasthat the pilot became embarrassed and con-firsed when he leamed that he was on finalapproach to the wrong airport, and inadvert-ently retracted his gear instead of extending it.Competency of the Airman was not given asa factor by the inspector.

Ca.se *11 S Il 8t1V

The pilot was a 4o-year'-old blacksmith, hold-ing a private license, with single-engine landrating issued 6 months previously, and a ClassIU Medical. He claimed approximately 400total hours, showing 185 hours total on hisprivate application 6 months earlier, and statedthat he had 90 hours in F-51 aircraft,

The pilot departed a small airport for a local

flight v/ith one paisenger. After flying in thelocal area, at 5100 p.m. he approached thesinglc 240d gravel and grass landing stripmaking a low flat final. At roundort on thenrnway threshold the tail lowered radicallyancl the left wing came down and scraped thegrass for 50-75 feet. The left main gear andtail were also in contact. At this point thePilot advanced full throttle abmptly, the leftwirrg again came dom and the aircraft veeredto the left. fie aircrrft then rotrted at anangle of 80" with the ght wing ̂ lmost straightrip, the nose came down and struck the gravel.The fuselage continued in a swerving lcft hrm958 feet, impacted two parked cars (55 insidea lo parking area), coming to rest oD top ofthe second car, which contained 5 occupants.No injuries occurred to anyone involved. Bothcars and the aircraft were demolished. (Fig. l0)

The weather w.rs clear, visibilit)' l5 nriles.temperahue 58'F. wind South rt 15-90 mph,and gusty.

It shonld l)e noted thtlt this wos the thirdxccklent in two years for this pilot il1 F-51's.hr Junc 1960, while holdiig oniy x studcnt'slicense md c.rrrying a passengor', he crashedon his first take-off attempt. The same monthhis license was revoked for one year for at-temptins to (lo acrobatics otl lwo .rcarionrwith ^ pass€nger aboard while only a strrdc'ntpilot and fo: reckless flying (CAR 43.52).After his aircraft was repaired aid he was re-leased a shrdent license, he then had a landingaccident on a srbsequent flight (student, witha passenger ) in which torque again was beyonclhis control and the aircraft suffered majordamage when it came to rest on its back. Atthe time of his first F-51 accident, it was be-lieved his total flight time was about 25 hoursand by his third accideDt it is doubtful thAt hehad over 11 hours total F-51 time.

Case #12

This 3S-year'-old pilot, presideDt of a manu-factu Dg company, held a private pilot certifi-cate, with siDgle and multi-engine IaDd ratings.His total flying time appeared questioDable asprevious records indicate some discrepaneies.(Pilot listed 258 hours total flying time on thisaccident report: yet inspector noted his per-sonal log books showed approxinrately 3500

hours total time; at the time of his medicalexamination 5 months earlier, he listed 5000+hours and 650 hours last 6 months.) He hadfailed the multi-engine flight t€st on his firstiry. , t . . rtutt '{ l tLut hc harl f lown l2 horrrs inthe F-51 in the last 90 days, and 7 hours in thela-st 24 hours. IIe held a Class II Medical withno limitations. There were 635 hours on theaircraft.

The weather conditions were reported as(2:39 p.m.) daylight. clear. cei l ing unlimited,visibility 15 miles. temperaturc 90.F, wind 190degrees at 12 knots, with gusts to 19 lorot!("perfect day'). No flight plan was filed.

Following a non-stop cross-country flight of3 hours and 28 minutes. the pilot atiemited awheel landing at a large municipal airport( Runway 18, 7000', hard surface ) behind aBoeing 7O7 Jet Airliner. The pilot stated thatjust as he was making initial contact with therunway, he encountered quite severe furbu-lence. The aircraft bounced and as it toucheddown the second time, the pilot "attempted topin the aircralt on the runway with fbrwardelevator control pressure", but when the air-craft bounced a second time, he initiated a goaround. AJter making a second apDroach [emade a normal 3-poini landing without furtherincident. After parHng the aircraft, he foundthat he had damaged the tips of all 4 prop

, Neither the pilot nor his passenger werernjureo.

The pilot had received 5 hours of dual fliehttime in the F-51 prior to this flight. and wasconsidered proficient for solo flisht.

Case #13 : , 2bTIn this case, the pilott backsound was that

of a 37-year-old aircralt rnechinic, hotding anaircrafl single-engine commercial pilot license.He claimed 3163 hours (and 3800 hours onmedical application 17 months earlier), and2O:30 hours in F-51 aircraft. The total timeon the aircraft was 1744:30.

The weather was clear, ceiling unlimited,visibility 15+ miles, temperature 70"F, wind290-degrees at 12 l(nots. No flight plan wastiled.

This flight was initiated to check out anotherpi lot (stated by the pi lot to be a "qua)if ied

fighter-twe pilot") in the rear seat of a dual-

controlled F-51. After some aitwork, seventouch-and-go landings on a 00 run\ray weremade (a witness observed 5, of which only Imadc contact with the runway). AJter ihescvcnth klrr:lr"anrl-go, the aircraft was con-tinued on a large closed pattern. The pilotr.tracted the gear from the front cockpit as therear pilot can extpnd, but not retract, the gear.FrrJI flaps were lelt on and the approach wasmade with power rrntil torrchdowi.- The eearwarning honr hlew ns the prop hit the nrniay.Neither pilot had lowered thc qear. The aii-craft slid 645 feet. Maior damigc to the aircraft occurred to the prop anJ air scoop.Neither Dilot was initlled--

-

_It was determined that the pitot was respon-sible in failing to rrse a checklist and propercocfuit procedures. Although he did no1 h;ldan instructori rating. the prrrpose of the flightwas familiarization and chec*out, rather thandual flight instruction. However, the pilotviolated Part 502.4(a), ii of FAR since the air-cralt could only be used for demonstration, anda caution letter war sent to the pilot, (Thispilot had had his Airman Certificale suspendedand was fined for a CAR violation the Dreviousyear. )

Case #14

The pilot. age 30, held a private pilot certifi-cate. with ratings for single and multi-cngineland aircraft. anJ a Class III Medical certifi;atewith no limitations. The pilot stated that hehad 850 hours flight experience, with 2 hoursin the F-51 type aircraft limited to observarronflights from the rear seat. This was his firstattempt to make a landing,

Approach was made to a 4,700 foot strip ofthe local municipal airport. The weather wasclear. visibility 30 miles. temperature 50., andwind 250' at 5lnots. No nisit Dlan was filed.The pilot reported "on ,pp.o""h to landingfyiction lock was loose, at torrchdown I reacheddown to turn off booster pump, throttle ad-vanced from being loose. At that time I reachover and put friction lock on to hold it, lookedover and saw that I was airbome partly be-cause throttle was advanced. theni trild tocut power and found I couldn't close throttlebecause friction lock was too tisht and found Icouldn't free it, at that time I went ofl mnwav

and hit ditch and knrrcked gears off and camcto a stop on the bellie." (sic). The pilot, inbouncing, lost control and tried to correctgroundloop with brake unsuccessfully. Pilot'sexperience had been with tricycle gear smallaircraJt.

II. MATERIAL FAILUNE

A. Po@eryrlant

Case #1

The 42 -yea r -o ld p i l o t . execu t i ve v i ce -president of an airline, held an ATR withsingle and multiengine land and sea rating,11,340 hours total flying time, and 7 houls totaltime in F-5I aircraft of which 5 hours had beenin the last 90 days. He held a 1st Class Medical, with no limitation. The aircraft had 1245:35total airframe hou$.

A one-hour pleasure flight was planned bythis pilot and no passenger was aboard. Theweather was clear, visibility 50 miles, temper-ature 50'F, wind SW at 5 L'nots. No flightplan was filed. At 10,000' altitude, about 40minutes after takeoff (14:ff i) . while cruisjngabout 20 miles from the municipal airport ofdeparture, the pilot stated that, "with no warn-ing the engine apparently threw a rod. Smokepoured out of the cowling and into the cockpitvery quickly." He called the tower and re-ported that he had a fire and might have toiump, but decided, since no flames were evi-dent, to belly it in instead. He noted that theaircraft was descending at a very high rate asthe prop seemed to flatten out and was wind-milling. The pilot selected an 80(/ pasture,and made an excellent landing, flaps and gearup, on the first third of the field, skidding ap"proximately 400'. There was no injury to thepilot. The aircraft suffered major damage tothe propeller, left wing lower half of fuselage,and tore out the coolant radiator.

Investigation showed that the right side ofthe aircraft and canopy was covered with oil,aDd thrt the engire had four holes in the crank-case, with one of the engine connecting rods inthe bottom of the lower cowl. At the time ofthis report, engine teardo\rn had not been com-pleted, and it was the inspectois opinion thatthe forced landing was caused by engine fail-ure, (It was subsequently reported to the

author that this aircraft had been flown forthe last l0 hours wjth only 20# oil pressureindicated. Normal is 70-80 psi, with 50 psiminimum allowable (14).

Case #2

fie 39-year-old pilot held an Airline Trans-port Rating, as well as an Instnrment rating.and had 10,450 total llight hours, and a lstClass Medical. Pilot time in F-51 aircraft wasrrnknown, but available records show most ofprevious time in multi-engine aircraft.

Pilot was on a VFR ferry flight from Nica-ragur to the United St.rtes. At a point about30 miles from the U. S. border th. cngine ap-parently lost coolant and "floze rrp". The pilotmade a successfill ianding on the beach withgeAr and flaps up. No ilvestigatioD wlrs nadeby thc FAA since this wtrs not undel U. S.jrrrisdiction.

2zS tDCase #3

The pilot, age 42, held .r commerci.l pilot'certificrte with single and molti-engine l.ndand instrument ratings, and a Class II Medicalcertificate requiring glasses be wom dudngflight. Total flight time was 7,000 hours, with800 hours in the F-51 aircraft, primarily as atest pilot.

The accident occurred while the pilot wasputting on a lowlevel precision flight exhibi-tion at an Air Force Base. The weather wasclear, visibility l0 miles, temperature 50', withlOK South \tind. After 23 minutes of acro-batics the pilot approached for a landing, roll-ing on the fiDal approach with genr and flapsdown. As he became inverted, at an altihrdeof approximately 150 feet, the engine stoppedmnning. The pilot rolled the aircraft upright,but it hit the grourd 750 feet short of the nrn-way, causing major damage to the aircraft.The pilot was reportedly uninjured. Althoughhe was wearing a shoulder hamess, he was notwearing a crash helmet.

The reason for the engine failrrre has not yetbeen established.

B. Lantling Ceat Failute

case #1

The pilot w{s aged 45, and preside[t of anaviation business. He held airline transDort and

5'iLz /

_ .

flight instnrctor ratings for airplane, single andrnrrltl-crgirro, lond ond sca, helicopter, and aninstnunent rating. Ile held o current Class IMedical with no restrictions.

At 6:45 p.m. a short 30 minute flight to aneighboring airyort was planned to check outa military version F-sl for an airshow. On theIong final into the 5000/ runway 29, the pilotdid not get a green gear-down indication sopulled up and circled the field. The gear wascycled 5 times without getting a geen light sothe pilot $ent through the emergency gearprocedure and had the tower check the geardown on a fly-by. It appeared to be down al-though there \ras still no green do*'n light.The pilot then made a s-Doint touchdo*'n andafter rolling approximateli 100d the dght gearcollapsed and the aircraft slid off the runwayto the dght, tuming 120".

Major damage to the aircraft included thepropeller, right flap, right lower outboard skinand ribs damage, wing tip tom.

The pilot was not iniured.fie right main gear lock pin was not en-

gaged. As of this date, the aircraft has notbeen repaired and no determination for causeof this malftrnction has been made.

there was no indication from the tower thatthe gear wa.s not down. The aircraft skiddedfor 3000 before coming to rest. Damage con-sisted of 2' wom off prop tips, 1" wom offlanding gear doors, tires blown.

There was no injury. Du ng the approachthe bottom of each tire had been causht bveech Ianding gear door and both geari wereheld rigidly in the 45' extension.

The aircraft was ownd by an AviationMuseum and it was determined that irnorooermrintenance was the cause of the gear ie-quencing malfthctioD.

DISCUSSION

Twenty-five accidents occured during theperiod of this study as outlined in the datasection and summarized in Table I. Theseaveraged Dearly one per month, of which 1occurred in 1962, 12 occurred in 1963, 10 in1964, and 2 to February 1965. If one assumesthat all 80 actively registered aircraft wereoperated during this period, this means that31.2* or probably close to one o\rt of everythree F-51's flying was involved in a majoraccident. The apparent decline of the acci-dent rate in 1964 may be due to the accom-panying decline in operational aircraft, which isestimated to be between 50-80 by 1964.Furthermore, this accident rate is Fobably ex-tremely high if actual horrrs flown were con-sidered. Many of these aircraft may fly onlya few hours per year. Probably the highestusage is reported by one executive who claims300 hours per year on business flights. It isinteresting to note that t0 of these accidentsoccurred du ng a six-month period in theSpring of 1963.

Airman ratings of pilots involved in theseaccidents consisted of 4 holding that of airlinetransport, 7 commercial, 13 private, and I shrdent pilot. Four held Class I Medical certificates, l2 Class II, and 9 Class III. Averageage of the pilots was 37 years, with a rangefrom 22 to 48 years.

Primary cause factors, as determined by theFAA CADO Inspector or CAB Safety Investi-gator, are listed on Table II. Pilot error wasattributed to 80.0E with 56.06 (14 accidents )involving poor landing techniques. In 5 cases(20.04) material failure was listed as primarycause (but in at least one of these (Case #22)

Case #2

The 43-year-old pilot, an aircraft companyvice-president, held a private license for air-plane single and multi-engine land, and a ClassII Medical. He claimed 7 hours total time inthe F-sI of which 2:O5 hours were flown iD thelast 90 days. -There were 1857:55 hours totalon the airframe, and 9125 hours since last en-gine periodic inspection.

Weather was reported to be clear, visibility50 miles, temperature 85'F., and wind West atl0 knots. No flight plan was filed.

After a local flight of 45 minutes, the pilotmAde Arl Approach on a 10.000' concrete munic-llxl nrnwrly. Genr was lowered on downwindwith l/! flaps. On buse leg a final checkshowed genr green light on, no hom, and full rqrs u,t'rc lowered on final approach; "my firstindic.tidr th.rt I had a oroblem was a soundlike both tires were flat, i then realized that Iwas lower than normal altitude for landing.Next the prop tips touched the concrete and Isoon smelled smoke." During the approach

s r q t V

_ -

1 . u 5 4 g a v2 .3 .4 . N 6 3 2 8 75 . N 9 1 4 5 R6 . N 1 3 3 57 ' N 6 3 0 9 T

B .

1 u . N 2 5 t T ,1 1 . N 5 4 4 1 v

1 3 . N 6 3 1 4 714 . Nz999A

; ; ' N 6 3 4 5 ri ; . N 1 4 5 1 D: : . N '77 24c1 : ' N B 6 7 B E

N 6 3 6 2 72 1 . N 5 4 6 7 v

2 2 .

2 4 .

N 7 7 1 5 CN225tDN 2 8 7 1 D

the-pilot had definite waming of the failure l0tlight horrrs prior to occunence). For compari-son purposes. USAF F-sI accidents occurrinqdrrring the years l95l and lg52 are qiven-(Tahle l l l ) . Mil i tary pi lot error varied be-tween 45-50U and material failure between35-38{. althongh considerahle differences inpilot training and tpe of flying is involved, andwill be compared in another section. The in-cidence of pilot error involved in civil accidentsis thus nearly t\rice that of the military pilotflying the same ty'pe of aircraft; however, it isalso interesting to note that civil mainrenance(lack of experienced mechanics, parts or propermaintenance) does not seem to Dresent as muchof a problem as would be expecled, the militaryhaving twice the material failures of the civilpilots. Quite possibly the different t),pe ofIlgnt Usage may partty account lor thjs,

By far the most prevalsnl 1r.0" of pjlot erroraccident involved the landing phase. fie F-5Ihas several traits which requiri particular judg-ment in landings and which may easily get th;inexperienced pilot in difficulty. The longnose makes forward visibility poor on final ap:proach and non-existent in ihe 3-point landingattitude, and for the pilot not .rsei to "o-1r"n-sating for this it can_cause control difficul_ties.An important characte stic is that of enqinetorque, which is probably greater than in inyother aircraft. It requires the pilot to con-stantly trim. particularly rudder a.nd elevator,

with- _every change of power setting. If heshotlld initiate a go'around, this mears tlatthe trim has to be rapidly chanced after in-iliated {5 to 7 degrees-right ruddir trim). andwill require considerable right rudder force tomaintain directional stability, This sihration iscompounded by the lack of visibilitv in land-ing attitude and also if the throttle is jammedforward suddenly. Torque, contrary to a re-.ent checl-pilots evaluation for FIginA Mag-azin" (14), is indeed an important lactor inboth landing and takeoffs as

-these cases indi-

cate. There are 2 primary normal, landingtechDiques, the 3-point and wheel landing, andif the pilot bounces and attempts to use powerto control the situation he mai instead ge1 intodifficulty fast. Mastering tail-low wheil land-ings is generally recomme;ded prior to attempt-ing 3-point, particularly if. as seems to often bethe case, the pilot is mainly experipnced in tri-cycle gear. It is also neccssary to be aware oIcloss-wind conditions, and in cases in whichcross-wind is greater than I0 l:nots, over 30degrees of flaps should not be used.

Trainin* The most obvious point broughtout by lhese case histories is lhat a maiorfactor in these accidents is the civilian Dil;ttgene-ral lack of pilot proficiency and tr;iningin the F-51 type aircraft. Former militarypilots have often observed with completeincredulity, civil operations of suplus highperlormance military aircraft by relatirely

_ Terrr II

cwIL F-51PRIMARY CAUSE FACTORS

RECENT AIRCNATT MAJOR ACCIDENTS

NtMAJOR TOTAL ACCTDENTS ..,._....._......_......._..,..,............,.25PILOT EnROR ...... ,..,.....................9()

Poor technique in takeoff,.._......_.-.._..,.....-_....,.._..-._...,,_-...- 2Poor technique in flight ( stall-spin )....................._-.--..,. 4Poor technique in lalding _.-.-. ._... . . . . . . .-. . . ._... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. .14

MATERIAL FAILURE . ,,...._........ ..,............, 5Pou/er plant .._-......,,._.....-..,,._-..-. 3Landing gear _,,. . . . . ._.-_.._... . ._..-. , . . 2

lncludes 1 accident in 1962, 12 in 1963, 10 in 1964,and I to February, 1965, over a 26 month period.

Vo10080.08.0

16.056.020.012.08.0

- _

T^BI,E III

USAF F5IPRIMARY CAUSE FACTORS

AIRCRAFT MAJOR ACCIDENTS ( 13)

TOTAL MAJOR ACCIDENTSPILOT EnROR .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._r15

Inadequate flight preparation ,..,.., IJncorrect opcration aircrirft systems ............... 22Poor technique in grorud opentions . .... 37Poor technique in flight ... ... .......... 53Miscellancorrs pi lot error..-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-.-. .-. . . . .- 2

MATERTAL FAILURE . ., .. . . ....,........-.. 82Power plant .. .-. . . . .-.-. .-. .-. . 5IAirframe .-..-. , . . , . . , -. . .-. , . . , . , , . , ILanding gear ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2IFuel system ........ ...- 4Electrical systemHydraulic systemOrdnance system

NI

... ........... 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . ._... ._... . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . I

1952 l95lNr 7o

259 1009o

10050

II6

I

22

I2

118 45

1 8 736 1459 234 2

98 3856 22

2 12 l2 t2 T

33

InstrumenlsBrakes ... . .

MAINTENANCE, SUPERVISORYOR OTHER PERSONNEL ..

MISCELLANEOUS

inexpe:ienccd pilots (16). VArious respondentsbesides the arrthor have personally observedincidents which would trrm grey the hair ofany experienced military pilot, but which areoften technically acceptable under presentFederal Air Regulations pertaiDing to pilotexperience. For every accident repo ed abovethere have probably been several cases wherepure hrck has prevented the toll from beingmuch greater. A few examples: A 40year-oldshdent pilot with 35 hours total llight timein fixed tricycle gear light aircraft purchasedal F-51, checked himself out by looking at thepanel and reading the manual, and managedto successfully fly itj a s2-year-old p vate pilot(300 hours ) (Class II Medical ) with about 5hours total time in the F-51 "checked out" hisl7-year-old son, a student pilot, who after 45

UNDETERMTNED ." less than .5%

22 IOB 2

millutes of rttcnrpting to land, successfirlly dirlso, but hasn't attempted to fly it since; a 50-year-old ment-packer with a student license,Class III NIedical, and 400 hours in lightdrcraft bought an F-51, decided that he hadbetter first fly something heavier than he wasrrsed to, so bought a T-8 but cracked it up onhis first try and evidently still hasn't gotten upcourage to fly his F-51 after 2 years; anotherstudent pilot, 40 houls total time, bought andchecked himself out in an F-51, fortunatelygetting it down successfully after a fashion; a68-year-old tancher, private license, and recenttirne in small aircraft bought an F-51, Ilew itonce and immediately sold it. Legally, thesepilots were within reg lations (except that thestudent Dilots did not have endorsements forthis typi aircraft), but professionally it would

scem that their judgment corrld be questioned.There a re many o the r i ns tances whereinadequate knowledge of the aircraftt normaloperating procedures have occurred. In fact,it may be considercd a tribute to the Rolls-Royce engine that additional accidents havenot occurred due to mistreatment.

It is useful in understanding this problem tocompare military versus civil training. Duringthe period from 1944 to 1950, Air Force pilotswere trained in formal flight and groundschool programs and in less extensive checkoutprograms (mostly National Cuard) until 1957.This training varied during this period but by1950 training of aviation cadets in the F-51,after 6 months extensive flight (of at Ieast 160hours ) and ground school in the T,6 aircraft,amounted to a gorous &month period ofground school labout 350.500 hours) plus 40-60hours of flisht time in the F-51 before thestudent was

-considered proficient. The flight

time included 5-7 hours of flight in a dual"controlled TF-51 prior to solo, with emphasis insolo flight on formation, acrobatics, instrumenttraining and cross-country navigation. Cun-nery was at that time a separate post-graduatecourse of another 6 weeks.

In contrast, civil pilot checkouts in this sameaircraft occur with as little as 25-40 hours totaltime in light tricycle gear aircraft and mayconsist only of reading the operatort manualand locating the instruments in the cock)it.This 'do-it-yourself ' approach is a maiorcontributor to the accidents which haveoccurred to date. Note that 5 (2m) of theabove accidents occurred on the initial flisht.

Probably one of the most direct remarks"onthis problem was made by a student pilot whohad a major accident (Case #2, p. 24) whilecarrying a passenger on his initial flight. Thefollowing was appended to his accident state-ment. "Following this accident on landing, thefollowing information was relayed to me. Thatduring World War II a minimum of 160 hoursto 250 hours was considered the standardtransition time in AT-6 tlpe aircraft prior toentering the P-51 program, Thus, my knowl-edge gained from the five 'take-off and land,ings' conducted lrom the rear cockpit beingmy first and only experience in an Af-6, coulihardly be e:rpected to prepare or in any wayq|lalrly me tor solo operation in a P-51 t}?e

ruircroft. C)ccupyhrg the rclrr cml?it I cx-l)crlenccd \rr[f i( ient diff icrr l ty thrr i | l t trvo o[thc t ive landi| lgs m king i l ncccssnr'-y [or. thr.instructor to take over and conrnlete thelarrdlngs. It is inconceivable thAt I r;ted, withno previous experience in the aircraft, anunlimited endorsement from the instructor and(previous owner), that I was qualified toperform solo flight in the P-51."

Fortunately some F-51 type aircraft lrrebeing operated by highly qualified formermilitary pilots, but often when snch pilots arewilling to assist the new F-51 pilot in a check-out, the new pilot may reftrse (Pride?). Forexample, in Accident Case #17, TABLE I, theowner parked his aircraft in a T-hangarbetween two other F-5l s hoth of whoseowne$ wele thoroughly competent F-51 pilots.Yet, he refused their offers of assistance, and,rfter some l4 months ol putterinq ard orl 'srrm-ably reeding the manual, checkea himself out.The few landings he made before his finalcrash were all described as "controlled crashes"with "rather spectaculat" bounces.

Scllers of F.5l type aircraft. pArricularly themajor dealers, often report that a prospectivepurchaser will refuse any sort of checkout, andin many cases will actually distort his previousexperienc€. (Note cases indicated in data).Twenty-one out of the 25 pilots listed in thisstudy did not have as much F-51 exDe ence asthe average military cadet student pilot, andcertainly had no controls at rll orer their pro.f iciency other than successful ly gett ing into theair and back again without crashing.

There are at this time three dual-controlledTF-slt in active | lse. although only one isrrsed in a training program. Trans-FloridaAviation (now Cavalier Aircraft Corp. ) ofSamsota, Florida, has the only adequate F-51training program now available. Purchasersof theh executive modified F-SI ("Cavalier")are required to undergo this traiDing; whichconsists of a checko t propFam of 5 hours dlalflight time in their TF-51 pltrs approximately20 hours of ground briefings on operation andsystems. The flight time is va ed accordingto the individlal needs, and if the pilot stilldoesnl measure up they may suggest more TFtime and T-6 time. Between tS20 pilots havechecked out under this program (7 Cavaliersplus 2G25 partial modifications) which is the

- -

only formal traiDing progrom available for civilpilots in F-51 aircraft today.

Until the fall of 1964 none of the pilots whohad gone through this progam had- been in-volved in any accid€nt; however, in late 1964,two accidents (Cases #18 and #21) didinvolve two pilots shortly after receiving thistraining, one involving inadequate landingtechnique in turbulence and a second confusionin the cockpit check resulting in a gear-uplanding.

Any discussion of training and experiencemust include some reference to a practicesuspected to be rather widespread. ar euidencedby many of these cases. of pi)ots lying abouttheir actual tlight time. T'he underlyrng er-planation otten points to insurance rates; thusa pilot will often list more flight time than heactually has in order to get better rates oninsurance that is already quite costly. In thisrespect the aviation insurance undetwrrtcrs aredoiDg themselves harm when they insure apilot without further evidence or backEroundknowledge of his abitity.

An examination of pilot flight time as givenon accident rcports and applications for medicaland airman ratings often reveal questionablediscrepancies. For erample. pilot (Case #2)stated on an accident report that he had 700hours of flight time occurring less than a yearprior to the accident reported in this study.Further. he srated rhar h; had 3000 hours offlight time. Since this pilot was an auto dealerand not a professional pilot, it is doubtful thathe flew 2300 hours (l9l hours l)er month; thatypar. On his accident report h'e further statedhe had been checked oui in the F-51, had 4Iandings. and 4 hours flight timer but a checkrevealed that he had refused a checkout, andthis flight was his first (with a passenger).The passenger in one of these fatai accidlnts.a Boeing 7O7 airline pilot. was found to havemade rrp his entire mil i tary f l ight erpenence(r'sed _to get his airline jobi anl was actually\rashed out of military flight school. That thi:practice is limited to these cases is also doubted:for examp)e. an official at American Flyers. thecountrys largest training school, noted thatthey occasionally get young pi lots /21 yearsold. for exampie) for flifhi training oflenclaiming-exaggerated flight time (10,000 hours).Some pilots apparently donl keep log books.

Inlutles and Sutuiaal Aspectt The 25 acci-dents recorded here invoivcd 37 individualsand resulted in fatalities to 6 pilots and 6passeDgers, serious injury to 2 pilots and 2passengers, and minor or no injury to 17 pilotsancl 4 passengers. None of the fatal accidentswere suwivable, that is, the aircraJt were sobadly demolished that survival of an mcuDantcould be considered impossible. The twoaccidents in which iniuriei occurred to the 2pilots and 2 passengers provide several survivalpomters,

In the first accident the aircraft ran off themnway on landing when the pilot lost controland ended upside down, shattering the canopyand trapping them for 40 minutei. The piiotreceived a fractured right rrm. the passeigera fractured nose. fractured jaw. concuision, irdlacerations of the scalp and rieht thumb. Al-lhough the pi lot had-a crash-helmet. he didnot wear it on this llight because the phonejacks were incompatiblJ, borrowinq a headsetinrlead. The passenger's injuries might havebeen reduced had he been wearir,q a crashhelmet, and might have been avoidJd had hehad a shoulder hamess, as it is believed thatmost of his facial iniuries mcurred in iack-knifing into the ffoss brace forward of his seat.

The second accident occurred when enslnefailure on taleoff resulted in loss of con-troland the aircraft crashed in a flat sDin. Thepilot was wearing a hard hat and- shoulderhamess. but the passenger had only a B-4 lapbelt ior protection. The pilott shoulderhamess failed however, and ;ubsequent testsof this l9"year-old hamess indicated [hat failureoccurred ai only 600 pounds. This allowed hishead to snap forward and strile the toD of theconlrol stick, brealing off the top 3i incheslFig. ll). He receivid a severe cirebral con-cussion, c,erebral contusions, bilateral compoundfrachrre of tie temporal bone, subdrrral ilema-toma and hydroma, frachrres of the gth and10th ribs, a vertical split of the 3rd ltrmbarvertebral body. and minor anterior compressionfractures of the 3rd and 4th lumbar veitebrae.In this instance the force was both vertical andto the right horizontally, and the crash helmetoffered iDsufficient protection to the templearea. On the other hand it may readily hiveprevented his serious head injuries from beingmore extensive and fatal.

_ 2 9 _

Frcult 11. Viw of intenor of F-51 rlr.aaft h which rhe pilot addprld r8O. ttrh aftc panial agtno feI-ke on. rak@If ard _srruck grcud in a ftat \pi;. Note l8r foBdd bendDs oI istrat brae wndstruc* by rigm shoddq or qomd-paseDger (no \hould"r hames.. no hetrnel). The tud ooe-h.lf

D6s brci<e.nd h.ad strucl roD ot stict ud panel Pilot wal sFaring a h.rd hetner. (phoro byJohr C. Eadey, CAnI)

- 3 0 -

The passenger, a 5' 7,'2" 125 pound femalc.also survived this crash, receiving a fractureof the head and neck of the right Lutrrerus,dislocation of the radial head on the ght withfracture of the proximal ulna (Monteggia'sfracturp). parl ial radial nerve palry. a maiorIaceration of the right alm 3" below theshoulder and minor lacerations of thc scalp,left leg, face, forearms and wrists. Theseinjurics occurred as a rcsult of jackkniffng ofthe body forward and striking the fusclagccross brace behind the pilot's seat (Fig. 12).This is a strong struchrral membcr of 24STaluminum channel, riveted at both orrds k)p mary structure, and it would takc a veryhigh forcc to bcnd this forward as was done.

Evidently the passenger hit this brace withher right arm, protecting her face and bodyfrom further injury. She also received a linearfracture of the sacrum (note the buckling ofthe rear seat floor structure in the photo) dueto impact and bums across both thighs ftomthe seat belt. The passenger was 2 rnonthspregnant at the time of this impacti however,there appeared to be no damage to the fetusnor symptoms of miscafiiage post-impact.

A major feature in survival of the aboveimpacts is that the F-51 cockpit is stressed for40 C impact force, and a Iess sturdily con-structed aircraft probably would have beendemolished in such impacts.

In a previons shrdy on the use and effec!iveness of shoulder hamess in 82 accidentsinvolving surplus single-engine military trainers

- (BT-13, B-I5, PT-19, PT-26 and PT-17) flownby civil pilots it was shown that pilots did notapprcciate the use of the shoulder hamess, butthat when these were wom they provided asignificant decrease of head injury in severeacciJents {16). Since the 2l persons receiv-ing no injury in the study were all wearingshoulder harness, it may be assumed that theywere of assistance in preventing injury to thehead or body.

FAA Inoestigation Techniques. In thecourse of this study, which was designed pri-marily to assess human factors and medicalconsiderations of these accidents, some jnter-esting cross-sectional and longitudinal aspectsof Federal Aviation Agency investigative, re-porting and recording techniques and relia-bility were noted.

With respect to the accidents covered in tfiisreport, it was found that pilot flight experience reported was gFossly inaccurate. Pilotsrcported more time (apparendy for insurancepurposes) than they have in fact. Pilots mayreporl 5 to l0 hours of experience in t),?e evenwhen the accident may have occurred oo thefirst flight (See accidents #I, 15 and 2l). TheCADO inspector rrsually lists flight experienceon the basis of what the pilot tells him, whichmay not be fact.

This raises a question as to reliability of FAArecords as they pertain to statistical utility.They would, for example, tend to provideeironeous information concemiug both totalpilot experience and time in particrJar tlpes.Similarly, aircraft records are not always rrp todate, simply because the Aircraft RecordsDivision has not been notified by the owner orother channels concemed, for example, ofdestruction or junking of an aircraft carried asregistered (inactive). Thus, in this category ofaircraft, total registration is very inaccurate.In 1963. FAA rdcords showed a total of 199F-51 aircraft, 901 in 1964. and 212 in 1965.Actually only about 80 held current registra-tions linc)uding those destroyed in these acc!dents) making the total closer to 60 activelyflying, and less than l20 could be accountedfor. However, it should also be pointed outthat while such discrepancies may be typicalfor military srrrplus type aircralt, ttey may notbe for more recently manufactured lightaircraft.

Several iDstances were fotnd in these caseswhere FAA treatment of accidents crccumrgundr.r comparable circumstances appear.d todiffer from region to region. However, rn gen-eral, these cases do demonstrate that accidentsarc investigated as thoroughly as possible underthe multiple tasks presently demanded ofGADO Inspectors, ard recommendations ap-pear to be based upon competent evaloation ofthe facts.CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATTONS

In summary, it is hopcd th.rt this stud) h.rsprovided some accident data involving cunentcrl,cf lence wit l , hrAl, ptsrlormr'rce l icht I ircr:r i t*h'.h -.,) 1,,. ' rs, i ' r l i l c"rstd.r i lgi 'r t ' rr. , . r ' , .g-ulations and safety for the new r:incration oisingle-cngire gencnl avintion jei rrircraft ftll-jng outside the present weight and tnrbojetrestrictioDs,

F!@E 12. Viee hon above of 18' fonrrd badirg of ST duinM brace due to impact of My (Photoby John c. Edley, c aI) - u -

(1) For the single engine rating, current licens-ing is unrealistic and training requirementsare inadequate. The holder of a privatepilot's license, Class III Medical certiffcateand little over forty hours total cxpcriencein J-3 Cubs is presently licensed to also flypassengers cross-country in either a 2300hp F-SI or a single-engine iet aircraft withno further training or license necessary. Itis rc( ommcnded that some further rcquirc-ment be neccssary to fly high peformanceaircraft such as the F-51 and jct aircraftwhich prcscntly do not comc rrnder thetypc rating system. This could bc eithcr i th" form,'f a cert i f i( .rt", , f tr: l inir)g [r,nn rr l.rpproved school using a dual TF-51 (or.T-33 type ) aircraft, an instNctor's crdorsc-ment as required for thc shrdent pilot (butwhich nevertheless does not prevent abtrsc),use of th€ type-ruting system for aircraftabove a certain horsepower (as well asweight ), or rcversion to the old horsepowerlimitations. In any case, few of the pilots inthis study were adequately checked outand quaiiffed to fly such aircraft.

(2) Eighty-two per cent of maior aircraft acci-dents involving F5I aircraft in 1963-64were due to pilot-error (inadequate hain-ing and competency), with 14 (58*)caused by poor landing technique. Thtreewere due to poor takeoff technique, 3 tostalling and spinning in flight, and 2 weredre to forgetting to put the landing geardown. Only 5 were due to material failureor improper maintenance of the engine or

landing gear, Maior cause of these accr-dents was overwhelmingly pilot inerperi-

(3) Civil operation of F-51 aircraft rcsulted inan accident rate estimated at about 329, orinvolvement of nearly one out of everythree aircraft activeli flown during l96li-u.

(4) Weather was not a factor in 88* of thesecases. All but 2 accidents occuned inclear daylight weather with excellent visi-bility; a strong cross wind was a fector in

(5) Maintenance to date does not appear topresent a major problem, in that only 204(5) were due to material failure of eitherairframe (landing gear) or engine, and oIthese only 2 (41U) could be attributed topoor or inadequate maintenance.

(6) Survival of a crash in an F-51, providedthat it is not totally demolished, appearsto be more favorable than in most civilt)'pe aircraft since structurally the cockpitis designed to take 40 G impact forces,while light aireraft are only required toresist loads equal to 9 C forward and 4.5C downward. (CAM 4b.260a), now FAR25.561 (b) (3). Of the survivable crashes827o (17 pilots,4 passengers ) avoided in-jury entirely. Six crashes were fatal(24Vo), kil\ing six pilots and six passen-gers, and two pilots and two passengerswere sc ously iDjured. Wearilg:r shoulderharncss ald crash helmet o{Iers the bestpossiblc protection ilr aD xccideDt.

ACKNOWIEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to gratefully acknowledgetlle generous assistanc€ provided during thecourse of this study by numerous fellow pilots,FAA and CAB accid€nt investigators, ph)sicians and aviation medical examiners, andmany otheis. Palticular credit should go toJohn C. Earley, AM-1I9, Protection and Survi-val Equipment Laboratory CARI, who assistedon several investigations. Others who pro-vided valuable assistance included l,ester R,Robinson, Chief, AircraJt Regtstration Branch,AC-350; Eddie H, Kjelshus, Chief, AirmanCertification Branch, FS-960; Dean Mitchell,Chief, Medlcal necords Section, AeromedicalC€rtification Division, AM-3I5; Lois Bracher,Operating Data Division, FS-980; and JackVeregee, Acrcident Studies Branch, Office ofAviation Medicine, Washington, D. C., all ofthe Federal Aviation Agenc)'; and Robert H.Shaw, I-os Angeles, and Allan CrawfordSeattle, of the Civil A€lonautics Board; MasonAmshong, formerly Manage r, Operatlons aadFlight Test, Trans-Floride Aviation, Fla.;Charles L14ord, Everett, Wash.; Ja$es Morton,Michigan City, Indiana; Ed Weioer, LosAngeles Calif.; "Col." Lefty Gardner and 'Col."

Robert Papre, Confederate Air Force, Brown-wood, Texas; M. M. Fleming, Departnent ofTransport, Canada; William Russler, USAF,Directorate of Aerospace Saf€ty, Norton AFB,Calif.; Capt. He.tor Quintanilla, USAF "Pro-

iect Bluebook', and the staff of the USAFAerospace Museum, Da)'ton, Ohio.

REFERENCES CITEDl. Alr@ft od Na@m Dlro.tory lg8t Flutrs Anftr.,

4 .1 Ptbtc' cutd. pp. S7-29 Zrit-DrviB. N-. i2. StarJleld, R. L t9O4 "N@ ShrldEngir. Buh4r

Jot slded for Esrly Debut.' Aa;6 A;dio' 28{6):l&l8. NdvPnl'r

3. Ferleml Avlation Agency 1963 'Alsaft AilMnhiDes;Surplu. Military ALe R" Civil At Resulariod - NewParr 9a Elf.ctiv" lbuory I0, 1984. I$u"d De(sbd5. 1903. As pubfhhed ih tle F..ldd nee$er tL De.cmbq 1963 ?28 F. R. 13304r

4. Creen, W. l9€1. "!Var Pla.es of the S@nd WoildWal'. Vol. Mkitai Hsnovq House. Cre B -

5. FFd@l Aviarior Ag;nq. 1944. Unucd Stds CtatAnduf Regntd AC No. 20-64, lAnuary.

0. Flqning, It. M. l9O4 PersDal CoDnunbadd. FlishtSrsDdsrdc and RegrlorioB Divi.ion, Civit A!,ratioDBn!.h, Deprnmgnt of Transpon, Caneda.

7. PeMal knowledge of the adhor.8. Cren Ww' and J. Fricks l95a Trr€ .rlL Fq.a ol ths

worid. Hanov€r HouF, N. Y.9. Seliqawa, E. ( Ed.) I9€O 'Pan 10. Ewin.ntel An-

qak-.' Ahht@\ C@o4 MiIlioN i'1wtt aa rrrS..ond WotA wd pp. 128J30 X;ntosha Co., Ltd.

Jobnsr, A. 1965 Pdonsl @nnunication. Mimi Fh.Crcen, W. 1980 "The North Aned.e MustsC ta-ntus Fkhtdr ol thc Se.ond WdU wd DD.

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Hrnover Hous.. N Y.Federsl Aviation Astucy 1945 neir\ued Part 20, Clv'[Air negulations. Efectlve, tuly r, rS{5.Ruslq, W. 1904 Per$nal cemrunicati,on. Re.sriLdd Statistlcs Grcuq, Directorste of A€Mp.e Safety,Norton AFB, Calif.'Bocl(, n. tg€l "Pllot Report: Ca"ali.r 2000" FUnBp. loil ( April ) .Anonymo!. 1964. "CmlstoDe mFtinS the Mustmg.Iita.eptor pp. 5-7 . lstdy.D. Hevd, H. and A. H. HasbboL 1951. Ue drutElt..tlae!"jc ol .ShouAet Hatus in srr'@l.6 MuitdryAk raft Fltun bg ciuillan Ptl.ts. CoEal VDive6itiMedical ColleS€.' AF T€ch. Rept. No. 8461.

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