1

Abstract

Thepaperexploresthreetextsinthefieldofmegaprojectmanagementthat

intersubjectively,intermsofcommunitysentiment,mightbeconsidered‘classics’.

Wedeployfourcriteriaforastructuredanalysisthatdeterminesifthestatusofthe

worksinquestionmaybeconsideredclassic.TheworksexaminedareMegaprojects

andRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionbyFlyvbjerg,BruzeliusandRothengatter;(2003)

TheAnatomyofMajorProjectsbyMorrisandHough(1987)andIndustrial

MegaprojectsbyMerrow(2011).Basedontheseworksweconcludewitha

prospectusforfutureresearchthatwillservetodevelopthefieldofresearchinto

megaprojectmanagement.

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Introduction

Oneofthewaysinwhichafieldofresearchconsolidates,gainingcohesionand

consistency,isthoughsignificantandoutstandingworksthatplayadefiningrole.

Kuhn(2012,p.10)describesthewayinwhichsignificantscientificachievements,

oftenencapsulatedintheclassicsofadiscipline,becomeparadigmaticbybeing

disseminatedthroughtextbooksandothernormativetexts.Theparadigmformsthe

acceptedframeworkforthebodyoftheoryinadiscipline.Overtime,theboundaries

forwhatisconsiderednormalsciencewithinaparticularfieldincreasinglybecome

institutionalizedwithintheparadigmaticframe.

Thispaperexaminesthreeworksthatmightrightlybeconsideredclassicsinthefield

ofmegaprojectresearch:MegaprojectsandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionby

Flyvbjerg,BruzeliusandRothengatter;(2003)TheAnatomyofMajorProjectsby

MorrisandHough(1987);andIndustrialMegaprojectsbyMerrow(2011).Theextent

towhichtheyformaparadigmformegaprojectresearchisanothermatter.Two

mattersneedtoberesolvedbeforeproceedingfurther.First,whatconstitutesa

megaproject?Second,whatconstitutesaclassic?

Whatconstitutesamegaproject?

Researchintothemanagementofmegaprojectshasemergedonlyrelativelyrecently

asadistinctareaofstudy.Itdrawsonresearchintoprojectmanagementandcan

generallybeconsideredasub-setof,orspecialisationwithin,thebroaderfieldof

projectmanagement.Overall,theresearchpaintsadirepictureofthefieldof

practiceintermsofitsgoalachievement.Boatengetal.(2015)citethetendencyfor

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grossestimationerrors;Daviesetal.(2014)chartalitanyoffailurestoreach

specifications;Ewejeetal.(2012)notethedisproportionatelynegativeimpactof

megaprojectsoncorporatesurvival.TheproportionofglobalGDPspenton

megaprojects(Flyvbjerg,2014)certainlyjustifiesanincreasedfocusonthistopic,

especiallyinlightofthehistoryofflawedgoalattainment.

Someanalysts,suchasFlyvbjerg(2014),stressthatmegaprojectsshouldbedefined

quantitatively,intermsoftheircost:

“Megaprojectsarelarge-scale,complexventuresthattypicallycostabillion

dollarsormore,takemanyyearstodevelopandbuild,involvemultiplepublic

andprivatestakeholders,aretransformational,andimpactmillionsof

people.”(Flyvbjerg2014,p.6)

Wedemur,consideringthattherealmarkofamegaprojectistheorganizational

complexity,ambiguity,ambition,politicalityandriskthatareentailed(cf.Baccarini,

1996;Bakhshietal,2016).Notallexpensiveprojectsneedbecomplex,ambiguous,

ambitious,politicalandrisky;somewhatsmaller,butstillcostly,projectsmightwell

beallofthese.

Whatconstitutesaclassic?

Alexander(1989,p.9)describesclassicsas"earlierworksofhumanexploration

whicharegivenaprivilegedstatusvis-a-viscontemporaryexplorationsinthesame

field".Whilethisisonepossibleanswertothequestionofwhatconstitutesaclassic

thereareotherconsiderations.Multiplecategoriesandcriteriaexistthatdetermine

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aclassic.SöderlundandGeraldi(2012),forinstance,categoriseclassicsintofour

types,eachusingadifferentcriteriatodeterminewhetheratextisaclassic.Thefirst

typeiscalled‘obviousclassics’,atypeofclassicdeterminedbyitsprominenceand

acceptanceinthefield,signifiedthroughthenumberofcitationsreceived.Other

publicationsbecomeclassicsduetotheinfluenceandimpacttheyhavehadonthe

field,intermsofshapingitscurrentstate.Thissecondtypeofclassicstheycall

‘latentclassics’.ThethirdtypeiswhatSöderlundandGeraldi(2012)label‘potential

classics’,worksofscholarshipsthatpresentinnovativeideasandsolutionsignored

byscholarsatthetimeoftheirpublication.Thefourthtypeisthecategoryof

‘unintendedclassics’,worksneverintendedtocontributetoaparticularfieldtothe

extentthattheydid.AnexampleforthiscouldbeHenryGantt’sworkandthe

contributionthatitmadetothefieldofgeneralprojectmanagement(Söderlundand

Geraldi,2012).Whileweagreewiththesecategories,wearguethataclassicmust

meetacombinationofalltheabove-mentionedcategoriesandcriteria–ratherthan

justone.

AsSöderlundandGeraldi(2012)rightlyargue,theprocessofdeterminingaclassicis

nota“scientificexercise”(2012,p.568).Kuhn(2012)proposedfourcriteriafor

constitutingsomethingasaclassicalwork.First,onecharacteristicofaclassicisthe

noveltyoftheideawhichitconveys.Second,aclassicmustbecommunicated

effectivelysothatitcanreachabroaderaudience.Third,classicsmustbemeasured

bythewidespreadawarenessoftheworkamongstrelevantscholarsinthefield.

Fourth,disseminationofresearchinthemassmediaisaneffectivetechniqueto

measuretheimpactofclassics.Drawingonanother,perhapsunlikely,startingpoint

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forassessingaclassicinmegaprojectsandfordevelopingspecificcriteriaforthe

exercise,istheliterarywriterCalvino(2000),whooffersapostmodernliterary

perspectiveonwhatconstitutesaclassic,providingfourteencriteria.Hisdefinitions

aretailoredtowardsunderstandingthevalueofgreatworksinliterature,focusing

ontheroleofclassicsasformativepointsinasocietyorculturebutalsoconsider

theirpersonalimpactandthewaythattheyshapeperspectivesontheworld.1

Calvino’scriteriacanbecustomisedforanenquiryintoacademicclassics,focusing

lessontheimpactonanindividual,andmoreontheobjectiveinfluenceofthework

ontheformationofafield.Hence,thispapercombinesCalvino’s(2000)workwith

Kuhn(2012)andelementsofSöderlundandGeraldi(2012),toestablishfourcriteria

thatwereusedinourassessmentofwhetheraworkisaclassicinitsacademicfield.

Thefirst,andsimplest,criterionrelatestotheinfluenceofthework,orwhatKuhn

(2012)termsaspreadofawareness.Aclassicisaworkaboutwhichmuchisspoken;

“…aworkwhichconstantlygeneratesapulviscularcloudofcriticaldiscoursearound

it…”(Calvino,2000,p.6).Whetheritisinpraiseorcondemnation,aclassicmust

makeanimpact,andthesimplestwaytounderstandthisinanacademiccontextis

thenumberoftimesaworkhasbeencited.

Thesecondcriterionrelatestothepersistentvalueoftheworkintermsofitsimpact

onpublicdiscourse,asKuhn(2012)contends.Anacademicclassicshouldbeawork

thatisnotonlyofaparticulartimebutwhoserelevanceasapointofreference

1Calvinotalksofclassicswithasenseofromanticwonder.ToCalvino,“…theclassicshelpusunderstandwhoweareandthepointwehavereached…”(2000,p.9).Classificationofaworkofliteratureasaclassiccanbeaveryinterpretiveprocessandalthoughheprovidescriteria,Calvinoacknowledgesthat“…whatdistinguishesaclassicisperhapsonlyakindofresonanceweperceiveemanatingeitherfromanancientormodernwork,butonewhichhasitsownplaceinaculturalcontinuum”(p.7).

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persiststhroughtime.Inanacademiccontextthiscouldbejudgedthrough

referencetothelong-termcitationrateofthework,acriterionparticularlyrelevant

toolderworks.Ifanolderworkcontinuestobecited,despiteitsageandthe

changingwhimofthetimes,itclearlyhashadalastingimpactuponthefield.The

long-termsignificanceofrecentlypublishedworkswould,ofcourse,beimpossible

tojudge.

Thethirdcriteriaweconsiderinthispaperrelatestothewayinwhichclassicsserve

toshapeadiscipline.Calvinodescribesclassicsas“…thosebookswhichcometous

bearingtheauraofpreviousinterpretations,andtrailingbehindthemthetracesthey

haveleftintheculture…”(2000,p.5).Aclassichasaformativemorphological

functioninadiscipline.Influentialtextsprovideunitytootherwisedisparate

elements,providingacommonfocus,conceptsorlanguagetoadiscipline,framing

thecontextwithinwhichfuturedevelopmentscanbebuilt.Classicsdefinethe

discoursebyenunciatingsignificantaspectsofthedisciplinethathavehereto

remainedunexpressed.Kuhn(2012,p.10)talksofclassicsasbeing“…sufficiently

unprecedentedtoattractanenduringgroupofadherentsawayfromcompeting

modesofscientificactivity.”Heemphasisesthreefactorshere:thenewnessofthe

thoughtsexpressed,theirattractivenessandincompatibilitywithaspectsofprevious

waysofthinking.

Thethirdcriterionisboththemostdifficulttoassessandthemostessential.There

aremanyworksofpopularfictionthathavesoldconsiderablymorethanJoyce’s

(1986)Ulyssesbutthatareunlikelyevertobeconsideredclassics.Ulyssesheraldeda

wholenewapproachtoliteraryfiction,butmayneverselllikeStephenKing.To

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shapeadiscipline,aclassicmustservetoredefinehowthefieldisseen.Itmustsay

somethingsubstantiallydifferenttothenorm;inKuhn’s(2012)termstheirmustbe

noveltyinitsideas.

Thefourthandfinalcriterionthatwillbeusedasapointofcomparisoninthispaper

relatestothepersonalimpactthattheworkhasonthereader.Aclassicisaworkof

asignificantdepth,onethatoffersnewinsight,changingthereader’sperspective.A

classicisabookforallseasons,itissomethingthatonereturnstoagainandagain,in

Kuhn’s(2012)terms,asanexemplarytextthataidsone’sunderstandingofthe

world,Calvinoconcurs:“Aclassicisabookwhichwitheachrereadingoffersasmuch

ofasenseofdiscoveryasthefirstreading”and“…abookwhichhasneverexhausted

allithastosaytoitsreaders”(Calvino,2000,p.5).Whetherthisisthrough

expressionoftheacceptedknowledgeinafieldinwaythatprovidesrevitalisationor

integrationofestablishedconceptsorthroughfundamentallyreshapingadiscipline,

aclassicplaysaroleinframingthereader’sworld-view.Calvino(2000,p.7)

expressesthepersonalinteractionbetweentheworkandthereaderwhenhe

comments:“’Your’classicisabooktowhichyoucannotremainindifferent,and

whichhelpsyoudefineyourselfinrelationorevenoppositiontoit.”Asacriterionthis

onenecessarilyinvolvesasignificantsubjectiveassessment;italsoimpliesthatan

understandingofthedepthofaworkcanonlybeestablishedthroughaclose

readingofthetext.

LetusnowputthesecriteriatothetestusinganobviousPMcandidate.Isthe

PMBOKGuide(PMI,2013)aclassicoftheprojectmanagementliterature?The

PMBOKGuideinitsfivereincarnationswouldcertainlypassthefirsttwocriteria,

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bothintermsoftherawnumberoftimesithasbeencited,aswellasthelongevity

ofitsrateofcitation.However,theauthorsarenotconvincedthatthePMBOKGuide

iswritteninawaythatshowsthedepthofexpressioninwhichonewouldfindnew

levelsofinsightuponasecondreading.Ithasnotbecomepartoftheauthors’

fundamentalworldvieworpartofthewayinwhichwebothseeourselvesand

interprettheworldaroundus.Rather,itplaystheroleofaninfluentialnormative

text,onethatsummarisesbase-levelexistingknowledgeinthefield,ratherthan

transformingit.Onthisbasis,thePMBOKGuidecouldnotbecalledaclassicofthe

projectmanagementliterature.

Whatconstitutesaclassicworkonmegaprojects?

Inthispaperwedonotofferasystematicsamplingmethodbutapersonalselection

ofclassicworksthatseemsrelevanttothisspecialissue,inlinewithwhatKilduffand

Dougherty(2000)didpreviouslyforasimilaranalysis.Inthecaseofworkson

megaprojects,onecouldaskwhethertheworksayssomethingsignificantabout

megaprojectsthatissubstantiallydifferenttothebroaderliteratureonproject

management?Doesitservetoconsolidateresearchintomegaprojectmanagement

intoadistinctareaofresearch?Doesitprovideaunifyingforce,whetherthrough

attractionoropposition,thatbringsthefieldtogether,andestablishesabaseupon

whichothersbuild?

Wewillreviewthethreemegaprojectworksoutlinedaboveforthefollowing

reasons:First,wedecidedtofocusonscholarlybooksasbookscanbeclassifiedas

moreofamassmediumthanjournalarticles,oneofthecriteriaKuhn(2012)puts

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forward.Inotherwords,bookshaveahigherpotentialtodisseminatemegaproject

knowledgetoagreateraudience.Thechosenbooksfurtherprovidearepresentative

perspectivefromdifferenterasanddecades.Eachofthosedecadesfocusedon

differentaspectsofmegaprojectmanagementandthedifferenceshelpus

determinewhethertheircontributionwasground-breaking,innovativeor

revolutionaryatthetime,whichhelpsustocoverKuhn’s(2012)criteriaofnovelty.

Intheremainderofthispaper,wewilladdresstheoverarchingquestionsofwhether

thereareclassicsinthemegaprojectmanagementliterature,usingthefourcriteria

gleanedfromKuhn(2012),SöderlundandGeraldi(2012)andCalvino(2000).

Book1:TheAnatomyofMajorProjects,byMorrisandHough

MorrisandHough’s(1987)influentialworkTheAnatomyofmajorprojectspresents

theresultsofresearchintoaseriesofmajorprojects,mainlyintheUK,includingthe

ChannelTunnel;Concorde;theAdvancedPassengerTrain;theThamesBarrier;the

Heysham2NuclearPowerStation;theFulmarNorthSeaOilField;the

computerizationofPAYE,andProjectGiotto.Intermsofnominalvaluetheprojects

studiedinthisbookfallsubstantiallyshortofthe$1billionbenchmarkoftenusedas

acriterionforcategorizationasamegaproject(e.g.Flyvbjerg,2014).However,most

oftheprojectsandthedegreetowhichtheprojectsweresubjecttobroader

politicalinfluencesuggestthatthese‘majorprojects’areindeedwhatonewould

nowtermmegaprojects.

Thebookfocusesonthepracticalitiesofimplementation,stylingitselfasa“studyof

therealityofprojectmanagement”inthesurtitle.Theauthorsidentifythatthework

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answersspecificdeficienciesintheprojectmanagementliterature:“…project

analysishasoftentendedtogivetoolittleattentiontothemanagementand

implementationaspectsofprojects…andhasdwelttooexclusivelyontheeconomic

andfinancialaspects”(p.7).Thebookcanbeconsideredaprecursortothemore

recentstreamofresearchfocusingonthe‘actuality’ofprojectmanagement,

startingwithworksbyCicmiletal(2006),Winteretal(2006)andBerggren&

Söderlund(2008).

Criteria1&2:overallimpactoftheworkandimpactovertime:Theworkhasbeen

cited941times,accordingtoGoogleScholar(19/2/16),whichisaquiterespectable

numberofcitations.Reviewofthecitationrateforthework(Figure1)demonstrates

thelongevityofthework.Itisclearthatthisworkisnotonlyaninfluentialtextbut

alsoonethatreaderscontinuetofindrelevant.Onemightdrawtheconclusionthat

theworkisactuallybecomingmorerelevantovertime,perhapspeakingin2011,

andthattheworkwasaheadofitstime.However,thecitationratesneedtobe

understoodinthecontextofthebroaderfield.Previousresearch(Pollack&Alder,

2015)hasshownthatthecitationandpublicationratesforprojectmanagement

relatedpublicationshasbeengrowingandcanbegraphedwithasimilarcurve:all

shipssailhigheronarisingtideirrespectiveoftheircontent.Nonetheless,itissafe

tosaythattheworkcontinuestobeseenasrelevanttoawideaudience.Thiswork

comfortablypassesthefirstandsecondcriteria.

Figure1here

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Criterion3:Formationofadistinctdiscipline:Itislesseasytoassesstheinfluence

thatthisworkhashadinshapingthediscipline.Reviewingthepublicationsource

(e.g.journal,conferenceorbooktitle)ofthe67publicationsthatcitedthisworkin

2015showsthatapproximately28%ofthesepublicationsweregenerallypublished

insourcesdirectlyrelatedtoprojectmanagement.Approximately14%were

publishedinsourcesrelatedtogeneralaspectsofmanagement,27%werein

engineeringortechnologyrelatedpublications,while32%werewhitepapers,

unpublished,orwerenotlistedinsuchawaythatallowedthepublicationtobe

identified.Overall,thedatasuggeststheworkhashadabroadinfluenceandthatits

relevanceisnotlimitedtoprojectmanagementspecificpublications.However,only

9%ofthepublicationscitingMorrisandHough(1987)in2015mentioned

‘megaprojects’or‘megaprojects’inthefulltextofthepublication.Mostly,thework

isbeingreferredtoincontextsnotexplicitlyrelatedtomegaprojects.Thequestionis

canitbeaclassicofmegaprojectmanagementresearchifitisprimarilyreferenced

inareasthatdonottouchonthearea?Foraworktoplayaformativeanddefining

roleintheestablishmentofadiscipline,onewouldexpectthatasubstantial

proportionofworksinthefieldwouldcitethework.Inaddition,aGoogleScholar

search(19February2016)for‘megaproject’returns1520publicationssince2015.

MorrisandHough(1987)donotappeartobecitedbymanyoftheseworks.

Aclosereadingoftheworkalsoprovidesafurtherunderstandingofthewaysthatit

hascontributedtothefield.Theauthorsidentifiedawidevarietyoffactorsthat

affectedtheperformanceofthemajorprojectstheystudied,includingleadership

challenges,diffusesponsorship,governmentinfluenceoverindustry,contextual

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change,successmeasurementoverthelongerterm,estimationissues,production

beforespecificationsarecompleteandgovernmentassumptionofrisk.Inmany

casesitisdifficulttodifferentiatebetweenhowthesefactorsaffectmajorprojectsin

awaythatissubstantiallydifferentfromsmallerprojects.Forexample,theyidentify

thatmajorprojects“…requireanexceptionallevelofmanagement”(p.14),whichis

generallytakentobeleadership.Leadershipisalsoanareaofsignificantresearchin

thegeneralprojectmanagementliterature(e.g.Lloyd-Walker&Walker,2011;

Tyssenetal,2014)aswellasamajorsubfieldofcontemporarymanagementand

organizationstudies.ItwouldbeaccuratetosaythatwhileMorrisandHough(1987)

identifythatmajorprojectsseverelychallengetheleadershipqualitiesofthosewho

undertakethem(p.241)theydonotexploreindetailthewaysinwhichleadership

challengesarequalitativelydifferent,orwhetherthedifferenceissolelyamatterof

degree.Nordotheymakeanysignificantimpactonleadershipresearch,asfew

leadershipstudiesacknowledgetheirwork.

MorrisandHough(1987)identifysponsorshipasanissueinmajorprojects,noting

thattheseprojectsareoftensponsoredbyaggregateorganisations(p.15).Theygive

theexampleoftheConcorde,whichwassponsoredbysixorganisations,“…withno

oneauthorityinabsolutecontrol”(p.51).Theimpactofalackofauthoritativeclarity

insponsorshiphasalsobeenidentifiedinthegeneralprojectmanagementliterature

(e.g.Bryde,2008;Pinto&Patanakul,2015).Itremainsunclearwhethersponsorship,

aswithleadershipissuesonmajorprojects,isafundamentallydifferent

phenomenoninmegaprojectstotheissuesencounteredonsmallerprojects.

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Theinfluenceofgovernment,particularlyintermsofastrategicinterestin

developingindustryalsoemergesasarecurringtheme,particularlyintheConcorde

development,ICL’sinvolvementinthePAYEcomputerizationandtheHeysham2

reactor.TheConcordeprojectwasinitiatedatacross-nationalAnglo-French

governmentlevelasawayofpropellingtheEuropeanaeronauticindustrytothe

nexttechnologicallevel.“Itseemsthatthey[theFrenchGovernment]neverhadany

doubtthattheprojectwasnotcommerciallyviable,butregardeditasthevehicle

wherebytheirindustrycouldberesuscitated”(p.45).ThePAYEcomputerization

projectwassignificantlyre-scopedbeforecontractswerelet,toensurethatICL

couldsecurethecontract.ICL,theUK’slargestcomputercompany,hadbeen

sufferingpoorreturnssuchthatitwaspoliticallyexpedientforgovernmenttothrow

itasignificantcontractualbone;hence,thecontractwasawardedtoICLforpolitical

reasons(p.176),andhelpedtoensurethecompany’songoingviability,atleastfora

while.ForHeysham2,the‘ThermalReactorStrategy’adoptedbytheUK

Governmentdeterminedthetechnologiesthatcouldbeusedandthedirectionof

theproject(p.115).Itisunlikelythatgovernmentwillgetinvolvedinthedirect

operationofsmallerprojects(exceptwhereitistheclient);nonetheless,

governmentstrategycanhaveaninfluenceonsmallerprojects(e.g.Lowetal,2015;

Pollacketal2013).

Inacontextwheretheinfluenceofgovernmentinmajorprojectsappearsmore

pronounced,manyfactorsassociatedwithgovernment’srolealsobeenidentifiedon

asmallerscalebyauthorsresearchingsmallerprojects.Forinstance,government

involvementinstrategicpartneringandprocurement(Beachetal,2005)hasbeen

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identifiedingeneralprojectmanagementasawayofprovidinglong-termbenefits

toorganisations.Companiesmayenterintopartnershipsasawayofsecuringtheir

holdonasectoroftheprojectmarketortodevelopnewcapabilities.Other

companiesmightunderbidongovernmentcontracts(Manuetal,2015)asawayof

maintainingamarketpresencewhenstrugglingfinanciallyorasawayofenteringa

newmarket.

Theinfluenceofthecontextofmajorprojectsandoffactorsoutsidethestandard

remitofprojectmanagementalsostandsoutinMorrisandHough’s(1987)work.

Thecontextinwhichworkisdonehasalsobeenshowntohaveasignificantimpact

onworkatboththeproject(Klimkeit,2013)andprogramme(Pellegrinelli,2002)

level.Itispossiblethatthisismorepronouncedinmajorprojects,duetotheirlong

duration(Morris&Hough,1987,227).MorrisandHoughidentifythataconsiderable

percentageofthecostincreasesontheChannelTunnelcouldbeputdownto

inflationandexchangeratemovements(p.31),whileingeneral“…thecausesofthis

poorperformancearegenerallytobefoundinareaswhichhavetraditionallynot

beentheconcernofprojectmanagement…escalation,governmentorclientinduced

changes,increasedorderquantities,increasedsafetyrequirements,interestcharges,

landacquisitionchargesandsoon.”(p.12).Unanticipatedchangesincontextual

constraintscanbeparticularlyproblematicandthelongertheproject,themore

likelyitistoexperiencesignificantchangesincontextasunexpectedeventshappen,

afactorthatappearstobecontingentmoreontheprojectdurationthanthesizeof

theproject.

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MorrisandHough(1987)foundthatinmanycasestherewaspressuretoprogress

theprojectbeforeearlierstageswerecomplete.IntheThamesBarrierproject,the

designwasstartedbeforemanyrequirementshadbeenfinalised,resultingindelays

inproduction(p.83).Heysham2alsoexperiencedasituationwheredevelopment

workwasundertakenduringdesignandconstruction,ascompleteexplorationof

designchangeshadnotbeenconsidered(p.110).Theyidentifiedoverlappingdesign

andproductionasacauseofgreatconcerninmajorprojects(pp.216-7).Thesize,

technicaluncertaintyandcomplexityofmajorprojectsmakeitparticularlydifficult

toclearlyidentifygoalsandobjectives(p.211).Examinationoftheliterature

suggeststhattheseissuesarenotlimitedtomajorprojects,withissuesof

overlappingdesignandconstructionactivitiesidentifiedintheconstructionindustry

(Hossain&Chua,2014),whileissueswithuncleargoalsandobjectivesarefoundto

becommoninorganisationalchange(Costelloetal,2002)andITprojects(Müller,

2003).

MorrisandHough(1987),focusingonIssuesintheestimationofmajorprojects,

suggestthatperhaps“thebiggestsingleimpactofgovernmentonmajorprojects,

andthecauseofthegreatestregrets,hasbeenthemakingofcommitmentswithout

aproperinvestigationoftheconsequences.”(p.225).Forexample,theConcorde

projectsufferedfromambiguousspecifications,withnoclearscheduleorbudget

againstwhichfuturegrowthcouldbemeasured(p.213).TheConcordetesting

programwassignificantlybeyondthescaleofanypreviousaircrafttesting,

significantlycontributingtooverspendingontheproject(p.47).Inaddition,

estimatesdidnotanticipatethelowuptakeoftheaircraft.Itwasarelativelylow

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volumeandexpensivenichecarrieratatimethatlessinnovative,sub-sonicplanes,

suchastheBoeing7serieswerecreatingmassmarkets.Thisresultedina

commerciallyunacceptableproduct(p.57).

Measuringsuccessisnotoriouslydifficulttoevaluateinmajorprojects.Morrisand

Hough(1987)foundthatoverrunswerenotalwaysthebestmeasureofthesuccess

ofaproject,asprojectsmightstillbeprofitabledespitedelaysoroverrunsdueto

changesinmarketconditions(p.13).Theyalsofoundthatsuccesscouldnotbe

evaluatedathandover.Fromtheowner’sperspective,successmaynotbe

assessableuntilafterthepaybackperiodorsubsequenttoaninternalrateofreturn

beingassessed(p.194).However,thesefactorsarenotuniquetomajorprojects,

withpoorestimationandunderestimationidentifiedinsmallerprojects(Longetal,

2004),althoughresearchdoessuggestthat,astheactualsizeofprojectsincreases,

thesizeofcostoverrunsalsotendstoincrease(Jørgensenetal,2012).Turnerand

Zolin(2012)discussthegeneralneedinprojectsforsuccessassessmentatthepoint

whentheimpactofprojectdeliverablesbecomesclear.Thesuccessofallprojects

canbemostaccuratelyassessedwhenitisclearwhethertheprojecthascontributed

toorganizationalobjectives.TheclassiccaseistheSydneyOperaHouse:overa

thousandpercentoverbudget,andfiveyearslateindelivery.AsFlyvbjerg(2014)

notes,themajorpoliticalwranglesintheprojectdestroyedthearchitectUtzon’s

career,potentiallydeprivingtheworldofothercomparableworks.However,viewed

fromtheperspectiveoftheimpactonAustralia,itisoneofthemostsuccessful

constructionsofthetwentiethcentury.

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MorrisandHough(1987)foundthatinsomecasesgovernmentultimatelyassumes

thefinancialrisksassociatedwithprojects,supportingcontractorsthrough

otherwiseuntenablesituations.Forexample,intheHeysham2development,itwas

acceptedthatthegovernmentultimatelyacceptedtheriskoftheproject’ssuccess,

asthedeveloperwastoosmalltobeabletoguaranteethestation’sperformance(p.

117).InthePAYEcomputerization,thegovernmentprovideda£200millionloan

guaranteetobailoutICL,allowingtheprojecttoprogress,albeitwithadifferent

managementstructure(p.163).Governmentsupportforcontractors,orassuming

whatwouldotherwisebeconsideredacontractor’sriskinaproject,appearstobe

oneoftheonlyfactorsidentifiedinthisstudythatisparticulartomajorprojects.

ThemajorityoffactorsidentifiedbyMorrisandHougharealsoapplicabletosmaller

projects.Thisisacknowledgedbytheauthors,whocomment“…mostofthefindings

arealsorelevanttothemanagementofprojectsingeneral”(p.211).Thereis

nothinginthisworktosuggestthatthepurposewastoidentifyfactorsthat

distinguishedmajorprojectsfromsmallerprojects.Thepurposeappearstobeto

learnabouttheprocessofprojectwork,usingmajorprojectsasthefocusof

analysis.Inthis,theworkmaybeverysuccessful.However,itisalsonotsurprising

thatmanyofthefindingsareapplicabletoprojectsingeneral.Thisgeneralrelevance

speakstoourearlierobservationthatwhiletheworkiscitedquitewidely,itisoften

inreferencesthatdonotmakeexplicitreferencetothemanagementof

megaprojects.

Theverdictonthiscriterionisnotpositive.Withrespecttothethirdcriteria,itis

unclearwhetherthisworkhashadastronginfluenceintheformationof

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megaprojectmanagementresearchasadistinctareaofenquiry.Althoughitmakes

manyinterestingobservationsaboutthemanagementofmajorprojects,asmostof

theseobservationsarealsoapplicabletosmallerprojects,itisunlikelythatthework

hasplayedastrongroleinthedevelopmentofanidentifyformegaprojectresearch

thatisdistinctfromgeneralresearchintoprojectmanagement.

Criterion4:Personalimpact,depthandinsight:Considerationofwhetheraworkisa

classicrelatesasmuchtotheeleganceofthewritingasthepertinenceofthe

findings.MorrisandHough’sworkfocusesonafactualanddescriptiveretellingof

theeventsthatoccurredintheprojectsconsidered.Itisunclearwhetheritisthe

kindofworkthatwouldprovidefreshinsightifreadagainadecadelater;theclarity

ofproseinMorrisandHough’sworkensuresthatitsfullmeaningisapparentatfirst

reading.Inotherwords,thetextdoesnotdisplaydeepandengagingcomplexity–it

makesitspointsclearlyandconcisely.

Thesignificanceofanyresearchworkneedstobeseeninthecontextof

contemporaryresearch.AtthetimeofMorrisandHough’s(1987)publication,very

littleresearchhadbeenconductedintothepracticalaspectsofproject

management.Researchtendedtofocusonabstractedprocess,withlittledirect

enquiryintothespecificactionsandcontextthatshapedaprojectandledtoone

outcomeinsteadofanother.Inthiscontext,MorrisandHough’s(1987)workwas

innovative,bringinggreateremphasistobearonthelivedexperienceofprojectsas

opposedtoidealisednorms.Inthisrespecttheirworkhasplayedasignificantrolein

shapingprojectmanagementmoregenerally.Withrespecttowhethertheirwork

containsdeepinsightintothemanagementofmegaprojectsorcreatesasynthesis

19

thatcarriesinnovationintothefield,theanswerisqualified.Theirworkcanbe

describedasofferingfindingsofinterestandrelevancebothtoprojectmanagement

andmegaprojectmanagementbut,accordingtothesecriteria,itshouldnotbe

consideredaclassicofmegaprojectmanagementresearch.

Book2:IndustrialMegaprojects:Concepts,StrategiesandPracticesforSuccessby

EdwardW.Merrow

Merrow’s(2011)IndustrialMegaprojectswillbereviewedinthissection,and

evaluatedagainstthecriteriatounderstandwhetheritcanbeconsideredaclassicof

megaprojectresearch.Theworkplacesemphasisonmakingbusinessdecisionsand

makingtherightprojectdecisionsbeforecommittingtoamegaproject.Thissuggests

thattheworkiswrittenwiththeprojectownerinmind,ratherthananacademic

audience.Implementationissuesreceivelessemphasisinthebook,beingtreated

onlyinthelatterchaptersofthebook.

MerrowacknowledgesthecontributionmadebyMillerandLessard(2000)tothe

megaprojectfield.Theseauthorsdealtwiththesettlementorshapingofprojects

anddecision-making,towhichalmostthreechaptersoftheirbookaredevoted.In

comparinghisworkwithMorrisandHough(1987),Merrowconcurswiththeir

disappointmentconcerningthepoorsuccessrateoflargeprojects.Merrowalso

acknowledgestheworkbyFlyvbjergetal(2003)asamajorcontributiontothe

megaprojectliterature.Hestatesthathesharessomeoftheconclusionsreachedin

Flyvbjergetal(2003)butexplainsdifferencesbetweenthetwobooksfociintermsof

Flyvbjergetal(2003)focusingonlargepublicsectorfundedinfrastructureprojects

20

(p.20)whereasMerrow’sfocusisonprivatesectormegaprojects.Hefurther

explainsthatwhileprojectsinthetwosectorssharesomecommonpathologies,

publicsector(anddefence)projectsare‘frequentlybesetbyaphenomenonknown

as“buy-inandhook”inwhichlowcostsarepromisedearly,knowingfullwellthat

eventualcostswillbemuchhigher.Althoughthisdeceptionisnotunknownin

privatesectorventures,itisnotverycommon,simplybecausethereisusuallyno

taxpayeravailabletofootthebilllater’(p.20).

Merrow(2011)accessesadatabaseofmorethan318projects,predominantlyinthe

areasofOil&GasProduction,PetroleumProcessingandRefining,Mineralsand

Metals,Chemical,LNG,PowerGenerationandPipelines.Whileitisnotclear

whetherthedatasupportingthisworkhasbeensubjectedtoindependentand

scholarlypeerreview,Merrowgoesintoconsiderabledetailaboutthedata

collectionandanalysismethods,givingthereaderreasonableconfidenceinthe

validityofthefindings.Theworkfillsagapintheliterature,complementing

Flyvbjergetal’s(2003)focusonpublicsectorfundedmegaprojects.

Criterion1&2:Overallimpactoftheworkandimpactovertime:Atthetimeof

writing,thebookhadbeencitedover90times,since2011(Figure4).Fromthe

citationrateitisobviousthattheresearchcommunityhasbeguntotakenoticeof

Merrow(2011).Thenumberofcitationshasconsistentlyincreasedsinceits

publicationin2011.Theprimarysourceofcitationsareprojectmanagement

journals.Otherjournalsrelatedtoplanninganddefencehavealsobegunto

21

acknowledgethework.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatprominentproject

managementresearchreferencesthiswork(e.g.Mancinietal,2015;Brookes&

Locatelli,2015;Brookesetal,2015;Atkinson,2015;Mišić&Radujković,2015;

Flyvbjerg,2014).Theoveralltrendofcitationsandtherecognitionbeingawardedto

thisworkinprojectmanagementjournalsaswellasbyprojectmanagement

researcherssuggestitsimpactwillriseovertime.

Figure2here

Criterion3:Formationofadistinctdiscipline:Acloserreadingofthebookprovideda

betterunderstandingofhowithascontributedtothediscussionofmegaprojects.

Thebookstartsbyintroducingsevencriticalmistakesthatcancauseproblemsin

megaprojectsrelatedtostrategy,moneyandpeople.Mostofthesepointscanalso

befoundinthegeneralprojectmanagementliterature,suchasschedulepressure,

adequatedecisionmaking,upfrontplanningandshaping,relationshipbetween

constraintsandappropriateriskallocation.Theseissuesarenotmegaproject

specific.Somepointsofmorespecificinterestincludeallocationofaproject’s

potentialvaluetoprovideastablefoundationforitsexecution,adiscussionthat

goesfurtherthantheliteratureonvaluemanagement(e.g.Thiry1997).Another

importantpointsuggeststhatprojectcommissionersshouldavoidmakingthe

projectmanagerascapegoatforfailure;manythingscangowrongandtheproject

managementcannotbeheldaccountableformanyofthese.

ThetwomostvaluableaspectsinMerrow(2011)aretheviewsonshapingstrategy,

andtheimportanceplacedonteamsinmegaprojects.Shapinghadearlierbeendealt

22

withextensivelyinMiller&Lessard’s(2000)workonlargeengineeringprojects.

Merrow’s(2011)innovationwasthediscussionofacountryadvanceteamdoinga

reconnaissanceoftheenvironmentinwhichmegaprojectswillbecarriedout,

consideringtheprevioushistoryofprojectsinthearea,payingattentiontolocal

content,takingintoconsiderationreligiousandculturalcontextandevaluatinglocal

labouravailability.Theseaspectsarelikelytobefoundintheliteratureon

developmentprojectsbutemphasisingtheirimportanceisofconsiderablevalueto

themegaprojectfield(vanMarrewijk,2015).

Considerableattentionisalsodevotedtoteams,withthepointofdifferencefrom

theprojectmanagementliteraturebeingtheemphasison‘ownerteams’.Whilethe

projectmanagementliteraturehasstartedemphasisingtheroleoftheproject

ownerorsponsor(Bryde2008;Andersen2012)theroleofthewholeteamisrarely

discussed.Theroleoftheteambecomesespeciallyimportantinmegaprojectsdue

tothecomplexitiesinvolved,requiringmultipleexpertstomakestrategicdecisions

atthefrontend,notnecessarilyineasydecisionalignmentwitheachother.

Proposedalternativeorganizationalmodelsforteams,suchasthehubandspaceor

organicmodels,mightbeusefulinstructuringthemultipletypesofteamsinvolved

inmegaprojects.

Intermsofmegaprojectclassicsthebook’sprimaryaudiencewouldseemtobe

ownersorsponsorsofmegaprojectwhilecoveringdetailsotheraudiencesmight

appreciateaswell.Itisverymuchapractitioners’text–thereislittleinthewayof

theoreticalorempiricalinnovationinthetext,despiteitbeingwelldocumented.

Whileshapingisanimportantfeatureofthebookitisnotabreakthroughtopic:

23

previousauthorswroteaboutshaping(Miller&Lessard2000,Williams&Samset

2000andEdkins,Geraldi,Morris&Smith2013).Contracting,governance,riskand

successhadalsobeendiscussedpreviouslyinprojectmanagementliterature.The

workoncomplexprojectsintheseareasisalsoapplicabletomegaprojects(Pryke&

Smyth2006;Zheng,Roehrich,&Lewis,2008andThamhain2013).

Criterion4:Personalimpact,depthandinsight:Itistoosoontoevaluatetheimpact,

depthandinsightofthebook,as,atthetimeofwriting,ithadonlyrecentlybeen

published.Itissafetoassumethatitsimpacthasnotyetreacheditspeakandthat

thebook’sreceptionwilldevelopfurther.Ifonewantedtocoverthefieldof

megaprojectscomprehensivelybyconsideringboththepublicandprivatesectors

onewouldfinditnecessarytoconsiderthistext.Oneoftheimportantfeaturesof

thebookisitsrelianceondataandtheguidanceprovidedforevaluatingfailure

basedonevidence.Anotherimportantaspecthighlightstheimpactofsafety,which

isusuallyonlydiscussedintheconstructionmanagementliterature.Safetybecomes

extremelyimportantinthemegaprojectsector,especiallywherehazardous

materialsarepresent,afocusofmanyofthecasesinthebook.Theworkisan

interestingcomplementtootherresearchinthefield,butaccordingtothecriteria

establishedinthispaper,couldnotyetbeconsideredaclassicinthefield.

Book3:MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbition,byFlyvbjerg,Bruzelius

andRothengatter

ThissectionreviewsFlyvbjergetal’s(2003)bookMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomy

ofAmbition.Theworkprovidesadetailedexaminationofthephenomenonof

24

megaprojectsandtheirunderlyingproblemsseenfromtheperspectiveofrisk

management.Thebookusesthreecasestudiesofrecentlycompletedroadandrail

crossingsinEurope:theEurotunnelconnectingEnglandandFrance,theØresund

LinkconnectingSwedenandDenmarkandtheGreatBeltLinkconnectingDenmark

withcontinentalEurope.Thebookshowsthatconventionalpracticesofmegaproject

managementdonottakeintoaccounttheuniquechallengesthatattendtheir

planning,design,constructionandoperation.Afourthcasestudy,acrossingproject

betweenDenmarkandGermany,thatisstillintheplanningstages,isusedto

demonstratehowsolutionsproposedbytheauthorscanhelptoincreasethe

successrateofmegaprojects.Inaddition,Flyvbjergetal’s(2003)workusesdata

fromotherlargeinfrastructureprojectsintheUnitedStates,Europeandelsewhere

tosupporttheirargument.

Inattentiontoriskorpoorriskmanagementingeneral,itisargued,incombination

withalackofaccountability,createsatoxicenvironmentof“appraisaloptimism”

thatleadstoinaccurateestimateswhilepoorimplementationofprojectsleadsto

highfailureratesandlargecostoverruns(Flyvbjergetal,2003,p.73).Thesearethe

mainproblemswithwhichtheauthorsdealaninresponsetowhichtheyoffer

multiplestrategies.First,theyarguethatriskmanagement,especiallyaccountability,

shouldbeamoreprominentaspectofthedecision-makingandgovernance

processesinmegaprojects.Second,megaprojectsrequirebetterinstitutional

arrangementsinwhicheitherthedecision-makerscarrytherisksofthedecisions

madeortherisktakersmakeimportantdecisions.Bothscenarioswouldcreate

incentivestoproducemoreresponsibledecision-making,astherewouldbeaclear

25

accountabilitybetweendecisionsmadeandriskstaken.Lastly,transparencyshould

beusedasatooltomanageandenforceaccountabilityofdecision-makers.For

instance,theassumedroleofgovernmentistorepresentandprotectthepublic

interest.Transparencyinthatcasemeansthepublichasthepossibilitytoverifythis

assumptionatalltimes.

Criterion1:overallimpactofthework:Asoutlinedabove,thefirst,andsimplest,

criteriontoassessaclassicrelatestotheinfluenceorimpactofthework,whichin

anacademiccontextismeasuredbythenumberoftimesaworkhasbeencited.

MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionistheoneofthemostcitedworksin

thefieldofmegaprojectsormegaprojectmanagement,with2292citations

(www.googlescholar.com,accessed28September2016).Despitethefactthat

booksandbookcitationshavelongbeenneglectedinbibliometricanalysesin

comparisontoacademicjournalarticles(Torres-Salinasetal,2014),acitationcount

isaclearindicationoftheinfluenceandimpactaworkhasonaparticularfieldand

topic.FromthatperspectiveFlyvbjergetal’s(2003)bookisinastrongpositiontobe

consideredaclassicworkinmegaprojectmanagement,especiallyincomparison

withothertextsinthefield.

Criterion2:impactovertime:Thesecondcriterionessentiallydealswiththe

longevityoftheimpactandinfluenceofabookonaparticularfield.Thelong-term

significanceofcitationsofMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionhavebeen

steadilyincreasingsincefirstpublicationin2003(pleaseseefigure3).Startingwith

11citationsinthefirstyear,thebookhasbeenconstantlycitedmorethan200times

26

peryearforthelast5-6years,whichisagoodindicationofthelastingimpactthe

workhasmadeonthefieldofprojectmanagement.

Figure3here

Criterion3:Formationofadistinctdiscipline:Thethirdcriterionweconsiderinthis

paperrelatestothewayinwhichclassicsservetoshapeadiscipline,providing

morphologicalunitytoanotherwisedisparategroup,affordingacommonfocus,

conceptsorlanguagewithwhichtodevelopadiscipline,andsetthecontextwithin

whichfuturedevelopmentscanbebuilt.Toshapeadiscipline,aclassicmust

therefore(re)definehowthefieldisperceived.Putsimply,itmustbethe(oroneof

the)book(s)thatcomestomindwhenthinkingaboutthefieldofmegaprojects.

Kuhn(2012)highlightsthatscientificevolutionisnecessarilybasedonpastcodified

scientificachievementsacceptedbyarelevantcommunityofpracticeasthe

theoreticallyparadigmaticfoundationofafield.Classicbooksareoftenreadinitially

togainagoodunderstandingoftheparticularfield,Kuhnsuggests.Theseclassical

workshelptointroduceconceptsandattractadherentsfromcompetingmodesof

scientificactivity.Theybecomenodalpointsinthecreationofactionsnetworks

linkinganinvisiblecollegeofscholarsbecauseoftheirneworunprecedented

conceptsorparticulartheories.

HowdoesFlyvbjergetal’s(2003)bookscoreinrelationtoKuhn’s(2012)description

ofclassics?MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitiondoesnotintroducemany

neworunprecedentedconceptsorexplainindividualtheoriesinadifferentway.

Accordingtotheauthors,threefeaturesaresystematicallymismanagedin

27

megaprojects,namelyuncertaintyaboutfacts,high-decisionstakesandvaluesin

dispute.Riskassessment,essentialtodealingwiththesefactors,isusuallyabsentor

inadequate(Coates,2004).Noneofthesepropositionsorfindingsisparticularlynew

foreithermanagementorprojectmanagement.

Wenowlookatafewspecificargumentsproposedinthebookinmoredetailand

reviewtheirnoveltyandimpact.Oneofthefirsttopicsthebookdiscussesisthe

relationshipbetweencostestimatesandprojectperformance.Moreprecisely,

Flyvbjergetal’s(2003)arguethatpoorestimationsleadtounsuccessfulprojects,

especiallyinregardstocostoverruns,aninsightthatisnotnewtothefieldof

projectmanagement.AsAtkinson(1999;2006)demonstrated,manystandard

projectsfailtomeetthiscriterionlongbeforetheriseofmegaprojects.Inparticular,

Atkinson(1999)arguesthatitispoorplanning,inaccurateestimatingandlackof

controlthatleadstocostoverruns.Moreover,thePMBOK(PMI,2013)describes

costestimatingasacoreprocessintheplanningphaseofaprojectandtherefore

regardsitasavitalcomponentindeliveringasuccessfulproject.Poorexecutionof

thisprocessmustthereforenecessarilyleadtopoorprojectperformance.

AnotherargumentputforwardinMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionis

thatpeople’sunderlyingpoliticalorpersonalagendasdrivewoefulestimates,such

asthoseofoverallprojectcostortheusagerateofaparticularpieceof

infrastructure(i.e.abridgeortunnel).Giventheseestimates,aninformation

asymmetrybetweentwopartiesinwhichonepartypossessesmoreinformation

thenanother(Forsytheetal,2015)enablesexploitationoftheprojectsituationonce

workiscommenced.Whilethisconceptisabsolutelyrelevant,itis,however,not

28

newtothefieldeitherofmanagementorprojectmanagement.Itismerelya

particularspecificationofthePrincipal-Agentproblemoutlinedbyagencytheory.

Agencytheoryremindsusthatmuchoforganisationallifeisbasedingeneralon

practitionersorstakeholdersactinginself-interesttoserveparticularpurposes

(Eisenhardt,1989).Inparticular,agencytheorycontributestounderstandinghow

informationcanbeusedasacommodityinanorganisationalsettings,which

Flyvbjergetal(2003)describeintheirbookasthe‘biasofoptimism’discernible

whenenrollingsupportforaproject.

Theauthorsarguethatestimatesandthusriskmanagementarehighlyinfluencedby

theoptimismbiasofprojectmanagers(Flyvbjergetal,2002;Flyvbjergetal,2004).

Flyvbjergetal(2003)usetheterm‘ambition’todescribethisbehaviour.Whilethis

argumentisvalid,importantandrelevantitisnotanewfinding,neitherinthe

specificfieldsofprojectandmegaprojectmanagement(e.g.Flyvbjergetal,2002;

RazandMichael,2001)norintheorganisationalliterature(Heaton,2002;March

andShapira,1987).Thistypeofmanagerialbehaviouralsofindssupportinlarge

partsofthepsychologyanddecision-makingliterature(KahnemanandLovallo,

1993;KahnemanandTversky,1979).AsHeatonshows,managersareoptimistic(i.e.

ambitious)whenthey“systematicallyoverestimatetheprobabilityofgoodfirm

performanceandunderestimatetheprobabilityofbadfirmperformance”(2002,p.

33).

Twofactorscontributetooptimisticbehaviour:First,managersbelievethatthey

havecontrolovertheorganisation’sperformance(MarchandShapira,1987)with

peoplegenerallybeingoptimisticaboutthingstheythinktheycancontrol.The

29

notionofcertaintyandbeingabletocontroltheoutcomewhenstrictlyfollowing

certainprocessesisembeddedintraditionalprojectmanagementthought(Cicmilet

al,2006).Hence,itisnotsurprisingthatprojectmanagersareoptimisticabouttheir

abilitytodeliverasuccessfulproject.

Second,highdegreesofcommitmenttowardsparticularprojectsorpiecesofwork

escalateoptimism.Theescalationofcommitment(Staw1981)isawell-known

phenomenonsuchthat,asHeaton(2002)outlines,“peoplearemoreoptimistic

aboutoutcomestowhichtheyarehighlycommitted”(2002,p.33).Commitmentto

deliveringasuccessfuloutcomecanhaveavarietyofdifferentdrivers,suchas

people’sfinancialinvestment,theirprofessionalreputation,oremployability(e.g.

Gilson,1989).Assuch,themoreisatstakefortheparticularindividual,themore

committedtheyareandthemoreoptimistictheyarethattheprojectwillperform

well.Asanexample,ifacontractorseesachancesignificantlytoimproveits

reputationbysuccessfullydeliveringaproject,thecompanyismorelikelytoengage

intheprojectorhaveahigherinterestintheproject.Quitesimilarly,ifapolitician

canproduceamajorpieceofinfrastructurethatwillchangethefaceofacityintheir

periodofcandidature,theunderlyingdriveforelectoralsuccessmightmakethem

morelikelytosigntherelevantdocuments.Inbothcases,therelationshipbetween

personalriskandrewardplaysakeyrole.Conversely,whereaprojectisnot

successful,whereitappearstobefailing,thiscanalsoleadtoenhanced

commitment.InStaw’s(1981)terms,therecanbeanescalationofcommitmentto

failingprojects,asthoseresponsibleforthemseeknottobeassociatedwithfailure.

30

MarchandShapira(1987)outlinethat“managersrecogniseboththenecessityand

theexcitementofrisktakinginmanagement,buttheyreportthatrisktakingin

organizationsissustainedmorebypersonalthanbyorganizationalincentives”

(1987,p.1408).Theself-interestednatureoftheagentisdemonstrated(Jensenand

Meckling,1976),wheretheagentmayormaynotbehaveasagreedwiththe

principal(i.e.inthebestinterestoftheorganisation),whichexplainsthenotionof

managerialambitionoroptimismwithinprincipal-agencytheory.

ThesearejustsomeexamplesofthepointsputforwardinMegaprojectandRisk:An

AnatomyofAmbitionthatindicatethatnotalloftheargumentsmadeinthebook

canbeclassifiedasnovelorsubstantiallydifferenttowhattheorganisationalor

projectmanagementliteraturehadalreadyproduced.However,thebookachieves

somethingfarmoreimportantthanproducing(andtesting)individualhypotheses.

Theauthorshavemanagedtoprovideabiggerpictureofhowdifferent,existing

theoriesandconceptsbelongtogether,usingmegaprojectsasaplatformfordoing

so.Inthenextsectionwewillexplainfurtherwhatwemeanbythisstatement.

Asoutlinedearlier,oneofthecharacteristicsofaclassicisthatitprovidesaunifying

forcethatbringstogetherafield,constitutingmorphology,establishingabasison

whichotherscanbuild.WearguethatMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyof

Ambitiondoesexactlythatforthefieldofmegaprojects.Thenumbersofconcepts

thathavebeenusedandintroducedinthebookarevast.Itencompassesand

combinesmanydifferentorganisationalconceptsthathavepreviouslybeen

31

discussedlargelyinisolationfromeachother,suchas(project)governance,risk

management,transparency,decision-making,privatisationandaccountability.

MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitiondeliversamonumentaland

unprecedentedeffortcombiningthesedifferentconceptsintoonecoherent

framework,thusprovidingabiggerpictureofhowmegaprojectsoperate(whichcan

toacertainextentevenbeappliedtoorganisationsand‘normal’projects).Weargue

thatthisisthetruevalueofFlyvbjergetal’s(2003)work.

Providingacoherentframeworkforabiggerpicturehelpsafieldtodevelop

commongroundsandestablishformalproblemsthataresufficientlyopen-endedto

leaveavarietyofnewproblemsforresearcherstoresolve(Kuhn,2012).Oneofthe

mainproblemsofmanyacademicorscientificdisciplinesistheamountof

knowledgethatisproducedduringthecourseofestablishingadistinctfield.The

knowledgeproducedisoftenlargeinquantityandnotalwayscoherent;oftenitcan

makecompetingclaims(Bredillet,2010).Thedevelopmentandestablishmentofthe

fieldmightthereforebecomestalledduetointernalconflictsanddebatesthatarise

asaby-productofsuchknowledgeoverload.Abiggerpicturecanserveasavaluable

solutiontothisissue,asitrequirestakingastepbacktogainperspective(Boschet

al,2007).Oftenthisallowsustolookatthingsfromadifferentperspectiveandby

doingsoidentifyopportunitiesforinnovationorareaswheremoreknowledgeis

required(Chrissley,2012).However,itisnotsufficienttoaddthisstepofcapturing

thebiggerpictureattheendordoingitinisolation;itmustbe“anintegral

mechanisminwhichtoexploreandanalyseacomplexprobleminaholisticway”

(Boschetal,2007,p.230).

32

Academicorscientificfieldsthatoffernewinsightsandprovideabiggerpicturewith

relevantpracticalexamplescanbedescribedas‘paradigms’(Kuhn,2012).Paradigms

providemodels,frameworksandopen-endedproblemsthatagroupsof

practitionersfromwithinthefieldandotherfieldsaimstoresolve.Wearguethat

MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionisaworkthathasmadeanearlyand

formativecontributiontoagrowingstreamofresearchonmegaprojects.More

precisely,Flyvbjergetal’s(2003)bookhascertainlyattractedanenduringgroupof

followersawayfromstandardprojectmanagement.Oneindicationofthisimpact

canbeseeninthenumberofpublicationsonmegaprojectsinacademicjournals.A

searchoftheScopusdatabasewasconductedwith‘megaproject’asthesearch

term.Thenumberofpublicationsresultingfromthissearchincreasedsignificantly

from2003(Figure4).

Figure4here

Theyears2002and2003showedonly22and25articlesonmegaprojects,

respectively.Thisnumberwentupto40articlesin2004,52in2005,and115articles

in2015.Thearticlespublishedinthefieldofmegaprojectmanagementincreasedby

afactorofover4inthefirsttenyearsafterpublicationofFlyvbjergetal(2003).The

mainfindingofthisScopusanalysis,however,isthatthefieldstagnatedintheyears

leadingupto2003,hardlyexisting,withanaverageofonlyabout10publicationsper

annumintheyearsleadinguptoit.

Criterion4:Personalimpact,depthandinsight:Thefourthcriterionaddressesthe

personalimpactthataworkhasonthereader.Aclassicalbookisnotonlyabook

33

thatofferssignificantdepths,newinsights,orabiggerpictureofaparticulartopic.A

classicalbookiswrittenwithacomplexitythatmakesthereaderre-readit,aseach

timethereisasenseofdiscoveryofnewconcepts,problems,orideasthatthe

readerfailedtopickupearlier(Calvino2000).Thismeansthatthereader–whether

agreeingordisagreeingwiththeargumentsputforward–keepsthinkingaboutthe

book.Onecannotbeindifferenttothework.Somefactorscontributetoabook

achievingthis.Onefactor,andprobablythemostimportantone,isthewayinwhich

thebookhasbeenwritten.MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitioniswritten

inaclearandlogicalwaythatisprovocativetoreadratherthanbeingrambling,

simplisticorpoorlystructuredacademicallybecauseitsmainfocusisonthe

practitionerwiththeexpectationthatthethereaderwillexpecttofinditeasyto

followthelineofargument(Olson,1996).Indeed,onanumberofoccasionsithas

beenengagedwithinvariousways(e.g.vanMarrewijk,Clegg,PitsisandVeenswijk,

2008;vanMarrewijk,Ybema,Smits,Clegg,andPitsis,forthcoming).

Havingpraisedthebookforitsacademicengagementthisisnottosaythatthisisits

onlyaudience.AfinalaspectthatmakesMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyof

AmbitionstandoutfromthecrowdisthatFlyvbjergetal(2003)foundawayto

combineacademicrigourwithpracticalapplicability.Theywereabletoexpressthe

underlyingideas,solutions,andargumentsinawaythatallowsalargespectrumof

readerstoengageinthesubsequentdiscussionaroundthebook.Assuch,itdelivers

anoutcomethatmanyacademicsaimfor;itbridgesthegapbetweentheoryand

practice.Moreover,Flyvbjergetal(2003)reignitedtheterm‘megaproject’,makingit

awidelyusedterm,notonlyinacademiccirclesbutalsointhebroaderindustry.

34

Discussion

Anybookconsideredworthwhileonthecriteriawehaveoutlinedwillbesubjectto

criticism;indeed,criticismistheharbingerofpraise.Thosethingsthatarenot

worthyofcritiquerankfarbelowthosethataresodistinguished.Whilewehave

praisedMegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbitionthepoliticalityofprojectsis,

perhapssurprisingly,inviewofFlyvbjerg(1998),notrenderedinthisworkinas

conceptuallyacohesivemannerasonemightexpect.Itisnotjustthatthereare

‘politicalsublimes’andother‘sublimes’(Flyvbjerg,2014)atworkattheoutset.

Megaprojectsinvolvemultiplecompetenciescharacterisedbyspecificrationalities,

suchthattalk,decisionsandactionswillnotnecessarilybealigned,inanalltoo

familiarorganisationalpolitics(Clegg,1989).InBrunsson’s(2002)terms,getting

megaprojectsoffthegroundandkeepingthemgoing,presentsampleopportunity

forparticipantstomakeclaimsaboutqualitiesorconvictionstheydonotnecessarily

have,leadingtotheorganisationofhypocrisy.Facingdemandsforcertaintywhile

confrontingmuchthatisunknowableandundecidablemaywellmakehypocrisythe

norm.Thereisevidencetosuggestthatthisisthecaseinthefrequentfailureof

megaprojectstoachievethoseespressgoalsthatareusedtoenrolandenlistinitial

support.

Flyvbjergetal’s(2003)ideasofprojectrationalityanddeceptivebehaviourssuggest

thatprojectsroutinelyexceedestimatesoftheirriskintermsofcosts,completion,

andotherperformanceindicatorsbecausethoseassociatedwiththeir

commissioningandimplementationusedeceptiveindicatorsandmisleading

projections,resultinginthemisallocationofscarceresources(Flyvbjergetal,2003).

35

Ifthiswerethecaseitwouldimplicateawholeprofessionofprojectmanagement,

aswellasalltheancillaryprofessionsassociatedwithit,inactionnetsthat

governmentministersandtheirpublicserviceadvisers,aswellasmerchantbankers

andshareholders,createeitherthroughduplicityor,attheveryleast,lackof

knowledgeorevenstupidity.

Givenduplicitousorstupidprojections,projectmanagerswillnotinfalliblyfixthem–

theyare,afterall,human.Implicitly,argumentsthatseethefailuresofmegaprojects

asresidinginalackofrealismthatdeliberatelymisleadsstakeholdersaboutthetrue

costsandcomplexityoftheprojectsassumesanorminwhichlarge-scale

organisationsarecharacterisedbyrationalbehaviours.Inprojectsthatarenotas

organizationallycomplex,ambiguous,ambitious,politicalandrisky,thefaçadesof

rationalitymaybeeasiertomaintain.Thecomplexityandambiguityofmegaprojects

canmakethemaintenanceoftheserationalityfaçadesmuchmoredifficult.

Inmegaprojects,everydaymanagersandengineersworktocreatesomesensein

contextscontainingamultiplicityofdifferentandvariablerationalitiesandcultures.

Theydrawoncontractualdocuments,BIMmodellingandothermaterialitieswith

variableinterpretations,incompletedataandmanyopportunitiesforgapstoarise

betweentalk,actionsanddecisions.Thisamplifiesthepotentialfor‘breaks’tooccur

andfor‘fixes’tobemoreadhocandindeterminateintermsofschedule,costsand

designvariables(thebreak-fixproblemasoutlinedbyFlybvjerg(2014).Ifthe

problemsofmegaprojectsresideinaninabilitytomaintainafaçadeofrationality

thatdisciplinesprojectsfromthestartandfixesthemwhentheybreak,ifruptures

tothefabricofrationalityareinherenttowhatprojectmanagersdo,perhapsa

36

closerapproximationbetweenthedisciplinesofprojectmanagementandcurrents

inorganisationstudies,representedbyscholarsinactor-network-theory(Law,1992)

wouldbeuseful.Suchethnographieswouldentailthatapictureoftheactor

networksassociatedwithmoreandlesssuccessfulmegaprojectsmightbe

developedovertimethroughthickdescriptionsgleanedfromcloseandprolonged

encounterswithmegaprojectrealities.

Translationisacoreconceptofactor-networktheory.Translationreferstothefact

thatinasocialworldofmeaningandcollaboration,conflictandcommunication,

projectsarealwaysinprocess,beinginterpretedindifferentindexicalcontexts,from

differentpositionsofinterest,makingsensemakinginherently‘political’—hence,

projectsarealwaysbeingtranslated.Translationnecessarilyentailstransformation

inwhichinterestsarecontinuouslybeingidentified,attractedandtransformed

(CzarniaskwaandSevón,2005).Megaprojectsowetheirbeingtotheir‘assembly’by

actorsandactants—bothhumanandnon-human—toformevolvingactor-networks.

Withacomplexmultiplicityofothersinvolved,megaprojectsmaybestbetreatedas

complexandmechanicalculturesofsolidaritythatarefragileinconstructionand

easilysundered(vanMarrewijk,2015).Hence,thefocusshouldbeonthemeansof

assemblyandtheactionnetsinvolved,andafutureclassicmustincludethoseideas

toaddresssomeofthefield’smostprominentquestions.

Conclusion

Threesubstantiveandinfluentialworksonmegaprojectswerereviewedand

evaluatedintermsofwhethertheycouldbeconsideredclassicsofmegaproject

37

managementresearch.TheAnatomyofMajorProjectsbyMorrisandHough(1987)

isaclearlyinfluentialwork.Thisisevidentinthetotalcitationstheworkhas

received,thesteadyflowofthesecitations,aswellastheinnovativenatureofthe

publication’sfocus.Readinthecontextofthetimeatwhichitwaspublishedtheir

workrepresentedasignificantchangeinhowresearchintoprojectmanagement

wasconducted,shiftingfromafocusonabstractedprocesstoenquiryintothelived

experienceofmanagingprojects.However,fewofthesourcesthatcitethiswork

focusspecificallyonmegaprojects,castingdoubtonhowinfluentialthisworkhas

beeninsettingtheboundariesofmegaprojectmanagementresearch.Manyofthe

findingsinthisresearchareequallyapplicabletoallprojects,notspecificallymajor

(ormega-)projects.Althoughtheworkcouldpossiblybeconsideredaclassicof

generalprojectmanagementresearch,itshouldnotbeconsideredaclassicin

megaprojectmanagementresearch.

Merrow’s(2011)IndustrialMegaprojects:Concepts,StrategiesandPracticesfor

Successhasprobablyhadinsufficienttimetomakeaconclusiveassessmentofits

impactonthefieldonthebasisofcitationsalone.Nonetheless,theevidencefor

conclusionsintheworkisbasedon385privatesectorprojects,suggestingthe

possibilityforasignificantcontributiontoourunderstandingofhowmegaprojects

aremanaged.Clearguidanceonhowtomeasurethesuccessofmegaprojectsisone

verypracticalcontribution.However,weconcludethatwhileitmakesasignificant

contributiontomegaprojectresearch,basedonthecriteriaestablisheditfallsshort

ofbeingaclassicinthefield.

38

Oftheworksanalysed,thegreatestclaimforthestatusofaclassicofmegaproject

managementresearchismadebyFlyvbjerg,BruzeliusandRothengatter’s(2003)

MegaprojectandRisk:AnAnatomyofAmbition.Thesustainedhighcitationratefor

theworkindicatesapersistentimpactuponthefield.Althoughtheworkmaynot

introducemanynewideasorconcepts,thewayinwhichthedifferentandoften

previouslyunalignedtheoreticalconceptswerecombined,testedandanalysed

providesarigorousframeworkformanyoftheunderlyingissuesencounteredin

megaprojects.Theclarityoftheargumentsandtheirexpressionmakesthisbooka

masterpieceinthefieldofprojectmanagement,prizedforitsrelevance,theoretical

synthesisandaccessibility.Evenoveradecadelater,theissuesarestillrelevant,

whichunderlinesthelongitudinalimpactofthework.Nonetheless,inviewof

Flyvbjerg’s(1989)workandourdiscussionofethnographyinformedbyactor

networktheory,thereisaneedstilltoaddresstheinternalpoliticalityof

megaprojectsthroughreal-timeresearch.

39

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Figures

Figure1:CitationsperyearsincepublicationofMorrisandHough(1987)

Figure2:CitationsperyearsincepublicationofMerrow(2011)

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Figure3:CitationsperyearsincepublicationofFlyvbjergetal(2003)

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