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    First Theorem of Welfare EconomicsFirst Theorem of Welfare Economics

    Pareto efficiencyPareto efficiency

    No welfare enhancing trades can be madeNo welfare enhancing trades can be made

    It is impossible to make somebody else better off withoutIt is impossible to make somebody else better off without

    making somebody else worse offmaking somebody else worse off

    First theorem of welfare economics: theFirst theorem of welfare economics: the

    equilibrium of a competitive market economy isequilibrium of a competitive market economy is

    Pareto efficient ifPareto efficient if

    all goods areall goods are privateprivate no difference betweenno difference between private/social costprivate/social cost differencesdifferences

    Formalizes Adam Smiths concept of an invisibleFormalizes Adam Smiths concept of an invisible

    handhand

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    Invisible HandInvisible Hand

    Every individual neither intends to promoteEvery individual neither intends to promotethe public interest, nor knows how much he isthe public interest, nor knows how much he ispromoting it. He intends only his own security,promoting it. He intends only his own security,his own gain. And he is in this led by anhis own gain. And he is in this led by aninvisible hand to promote an end which was noinvisible hand to promote an end which was nopart of his intention. By pursuing his ownpart of his intention. By pursuing his owninterest he frequently promotes that of societyinterest he frequently promotes that of societymore effectively than when he really intends tomore effectively than when he really intends topromote it.promote it.

    It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, theIt is not from the benevolence of the butcher, thebrewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, butbrewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, butfrom their regard to their own interest.from their regard to their own interest.

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    Invisible HandInvisible Hand

    Idea behind invisible handIdea behind invisible hand

    Societal perspective:Societal perspective: A good should be produced if the utility to the userA good should be produced if the utility to the user

    exceeds the cost of producing itexceeds the cost of producing it

    Firm perspectiveFirm perspective Can make a profit if the utility to the user (theCan make a profit if the utility to the user (the

    maximum he/she is willing to pay) exceeds the cost ofmaximum he/she is willing to pay) exceeds the cost of

    producing itproducing it

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    Key Concepts I: Private / Public GoodKey Concepts I: Private / Public Good

    Public versus private goodsPublic versus private goods

    Private goodPrivate good Rival: if I eat an apple, somebody else cant eat theRival: if I eat an apple, somebody else cant eat the

    same applesame apple Excludable: I can keep other people from eating myExcludable: I can keep other people from eating my

    appleapple

    Public goodPublic good Non-rival: if I walk in a park, my neighbor can do soNon-rival: if I walk in a park, my neighbor can do so

    at the same timeat the same time

    Non-excludable: I cant keep my neighbor fromNon-excludable: I cant keep my neighbor from

    walking in the parkwalking in the park

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    Key Concepts II: Private / Social CostKey Concepts II: Private / Social Cost

    Private costs (benefits) of an actionPrivate costs (benefits) of an action

    accruing to the actor onlyaccruing to the actor only

    Social costs (benefits)Social costs (benefits)

    total costs of activity including those thattotal costs of activity including those that

    accrue to people other than the actoraccrue to people other than the actor

    Example: driving a carExample: driving a car

    Private costs: fuel, maintenancePrivate costs: fuel, maintenance

    Social costs include pollution, road wearSocial costs include pollution, road wear

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    External EffectsExternal Effects

    Any difference between private and socialAny difference between private and social

    costs is referred to as an externality orcosts is referred to as an externality or

    external effectexternal effect

    Recall how markets workRecall how markets work

    in seeking profits firm produce a goodin seeking profits firm produce a good

    If utility to consumer (maximum willingness to pay)If utility to consumer (maximum willingness to pay)exceeds the cost of producing itexceeds the cost of producing it

    Problem: if private cost are different from socialProblem: if private cost are different from social

    cost, firm doesnt act in societies best interestcost, firm doesnt act in societies best interest

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    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

    16

    A B

    Choices

    Cos

    ts

    Private-Social difference

    Private

    Left - social cost 15, private 10Left - social cost 15, private 10

    Right - private & social cost of 12Right - private & social cost of 12

    orporation will choose A as private cost is lower

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    Examples of Private v. SocialExamples of Private v. Social

    Conserving tropical forestsConserving tropical forests

    Private benefits: may be small for landownerPrivate benefits: may be small for landowner some sales of non-timber forest productssome sales of non-timber forest products

    Eco-tourismEco-tourism

    Social benefits:Social benefits: carbon sequestrationcarbon sequestration

    biodiversity conservationbiodiversity conservation

    EtcEtc

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    SummarySummary

    Markets work very well whenMarkets work very well when

    Assumption of first welfare theorem are metAssumption of first welfare theorem are met goods are privategoods are private

    private & social costs are equalprivate & social costs are equal

    Less satisfactory otherwiseLess satisfactory otherwise

    market failure & rationale for interventionmarket failure & rationale for intervention

    How best to intervene?How best to intervene?

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    Market FailureMarket Failure

    Social benefits > private benefitsSocial benefits > private benefits Good is underprovidedGood is underprovided

    Provider has too little financial incentive, i.e.,Provider has too little financial incentive, i.e.,doesnt capture all benefitsdoesnt capture all benefits

    Example: rainforestExample: rainforest

    Social costs > private costSocial costs > private cost

    good isgood is over-provided Provider does not account for all costs itProvider does not account for all costs it

    imposes on societyimposes on society

    Example: transportation, fossil fuel.Example: transportation, fossil fuel.

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    Policy ResponsesPolicy Responses

    What to do if there is a difference betweenWhat to do if there is a difference between

    private and social costsprivate and social costs

    Impose a tax (or subsidy)Impose a tax (or subsidy)

    equal to difference between private and social costsequal to difference between private and social costs introduce of property rightsintroduce of property rights

    Based on the view that an excess of social overBased on the view that an excess of social over

    private costs arises from the inability to own certainprivate costs arises from the inability to own certain

    key resources, such as the atmosphere.key resources, such as the atmosphere.

    Afterwards market outcome will be Pareto-Afterwards market outcome will be Pareto-

    efficient againefficient again

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    Side note: Equity & EfficiencySide note: Equity & Efficiency

    First welfare theorem maximizes the sizeFirst welfare theorem maximizes the size

    of the pie, but says nothing about itsof the pie, but says nothing about its

    distributiondistribution

    Pareto efficiency is separate fromPareto efficiency is separate from

    distribution and any concept of equity.distribution and any concept of equity.

    It states that all opportunities for mutual gainIt states that all opportunities for mutual gain

    are exploited. But not that the outcome is in anyare exploited. But not that the outcome is in anyway fair.way fair.

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    Greenhouse GasesGreenhouse Gases

    Two views on COTwo views on CO22emissionsemissions

    social costs of burning fuels > private costssocial costs of burning fuels > private costs Solution: impose a carbon tax.Solution: impose a carbon tax.

    use of the atmosphere for waste disposal withoutuse of the atmosphere for waste disposal without

    any paymentany payment atmosphere should be someones propertyatmosphere should be someones property

    if we want to pollute it we have to obtain their permissionif we want to pollute it we have to obtain their permissionand compensate them for damage to itand compensate them for damage to it

    Leads to tradable SOLeads to tradable SO22/CO/CO

    22permitspermits

    Requires well-defined property rights!Requires well-defined property rights!

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    Cap & Trade SystemsCap & Trade Systems

    Amount to establishing property rightsAmount to establishing property rights

    in environmental assetsin environmental assets Give out limited, tradable rights to carryGive out limited, tradable rights to carry

    out an environmentally harmful activityout an environmentally harmful activity

    Leads to mitigation bankingLeads to mitigation banking

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    Examples of Cap -&-Trade:Examples of Cap -&-Trade:

    Title IV of Clean Air Act AmendmentsTitle IV of Clean Air Act Amendments

    SOSO22 permit marketpermit market

    Number of permits: 50% of historic emissionsNumber of permits: 50% of historic emissions

    Permits are grandfathered (allocated based onPermits are grandfathered (allocated based onhistoric emissions)historic emissions)

    Advantage of permit market:Advantage of permit market: Firms with lowest abatment cost will abateFirms with lowest abatment cost will abate gives firm incentive to innovategives firm incentive to innovate

    Initial cost estimates by industry > 1000 per ton SOInitial cost estimates by industry > 1000 per ton SO22 EPA: 250-350 per ton SOEPA: 250-350 per ton SO22 (Phase 1)(Phase 1)

    500-700 per ton SO500-700 per ton SO22 (Phase 2)(Phase 2) Permit price ~150 per ton SOPermit price ~150 per ton SO22

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    Examples of Cap -&-Trade:Examples of Cap -&-Trade:

    Fox River in WisconsinFox River in Wisconsin

    Allowable firms to trade pollution rightsAllowable firms to trade pollution rights

    Problem: each trade had to be approvedProblem: each trade had to be approved

    Only 1 trade in many yearsOnly 1 trade in many years

    Lessons: Permit market works bestLessons: Permit market works best

    Clearly defined property rightsClearly defined property rights

    Many potential buyers and sellersMany potential buyers and sellers

    Low transaction costLow transaction cost

    Uniformly mixing pollutantUniformly mixing pollutant

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    Examples of Cap -&-Trade:Examples of Cap -&-Trade:

    Wetlands bankingWetlands banking

    www.wildlandsinc.comwww.wildlandsinc.com

    KyotoKyoto Chicago Climate ExchangeChicago Climate Exchange

    www.chicagoclimatex.comwww.chicagoclimatex.com

    http://www.wildlandsinc.com/http://www.wildlandsinc.com/http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/http://www.wildlandsinc.com/
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    Kyoto ProtocolKyoto Protocol

    Cap-and-trade on emissions by industrialCap-and-trade on emissions by industrial

    countries and transitioning countriescountries and transitioning countries

    No significant restrictions on emissions byNo significant restrictions on emissions bydeveloping countriesdeveloping countries

    Clean development mechanismClean development mechanism Develop countries can get credits for reduction inDevelop countries can get credits for reduction in

    developing countriesdeveloping countries

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    Kyoto Protocol Kyoto Protocol Annex B CountriesAnnex B Countries

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    Historic EmissionsHistoric Emissions

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    Kyoto - targetsKyoto - targets

    European Union (15 members) -8%

    US -7%

    Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6%

    Croatia -5%

    New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 0%

    Norway +1%

    Australia +8%

    Iceland +10%

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    Example: Burden-sharing agreementExample: Burden-sharing agreement

    (Europe)(Europe)

    Austria -13% Italy -6.5%

    Belgium -7.5% Luxembourg -28%

    Denmark -21% Netherlands -6%

    Finland 0% Portugal +27%

    France 0% Spain +15%

    Germany -21% Sweden +4%

    Greece +25% United Kingdom -12.5%

    Ireland +13%

    EuropeanCommunity

    -8%

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    Kyoto ProtocolKyoto Protocol

    Doesnt tackle India-China problem:Doesnt tackle India-China problem:

    Large fraction of world populationLarge fraction of world population Historically low per-capita emissionsHistorically low per-capita emissions

    Very few grandfathered permitsVery few grandfathered permits Problems is not theirs but of developed worldProblems is not theirs but of developed world

    Could not stabilize emissions without radically newCould not stabilize emissions without radically new

    technologiestechnologies

    India / China has no incentive to joinIndia / China has no incentive to join

    Without participation by China / IndiaWithout participation by China / India Kyoto Protocol will not come close to solving theKyoto Protocol will not come close to solving the

    problem so other countries have little incentive to join.problem so other countries have little incentive to join.

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    An Agreement on GHGsAn Agreement on GHGs

    Developed worldDeveloped world

    lead in development of new technologieslead in development of new technologies

    might be sufficient to bring developing countriesmight be sufficient to bring developing countries

    on boardon board

    Clean coal technologiesClean coal technologies

    China could use all of its coal, as could IndiaChina could use all of its coal, as could India This would be of immense value to them.This would be of immense value to them.

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    An Agreement on GHGsAn Agreement on GHGs

    Chinas dilemma:Chinas dilemma: burning coal generates terrible pollutionburning coal generates terrible pollution

    domestic political issue.domestic political issue.

    Switch away from coal will increase energy costsSwitch away from coal will increase energy costs

    Development of clean coal technologiesDevelopment of clean coal technologies valuable to China (reduces other pollution)valuable to China (reduces other pollution)

    should encourage China and India to participateshould encourage China and India to participatein an agreement to reduce GHGsin an agreement to reduce GHGs

    understanding that tight standards would onlyunderstanding that tight standards would onlyapply once a new technology were in place.apply once a new technology were in place.