cognitive biases without borders (me)

Cognitive biases without borders: Assessing and reviewing the effect of culture on cognition.

byJosé L. Arizaga

Supervised byDr. David J. Henderson

August 21st 2012

Total word count: 5,988

MG420MSc in Management

London School of Economics and Political Science


José L. Arizaga

MSc in ManagementLondon School of Economics and Political Science

A bat and ball cost $1.10.

The bat costs $1 more than the ball.

How much does the ball cost?

!

" Algebraically, it is a very simple problem. A twelve year old could arguably solve it on

paper, yet many of us arrive to the wrong solution when attempting to solve it mentally. If

you answered $0.10 and kept reading, you were indeed subjected to a bias of

overconfidence as you placed too much faith on your intuition (Kahneman, 2011). This

overconfidence in one’s mental mathematical abilities is what prevented those mistaken

from carrying out a simple check; if the ball were indeed to cost $0.10, it would imply

$1.10 for the bat, which together would total an incorrect sum of $1.20. The correct

answer is $0.05.

This paper reviews cognitive biases in light of a cultural perspective and provides

testable propositions. It is motivated by the search for evidence that cognitive biases

grounded on self-views are not universal but in fact more predominant in certain

cultures. The five biases considered (self-serving, fundamental attribution error,

anchoring and adjustment, hindsight, overconfidence) can be accounted for using

three of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, masculinity).

The conclusion is that these cognitive biases depend to some extent on our self-

views which are themselves shaped by our culture. The main recommendation is to

incorporate a cultural outlook in future studies related to cognitive biases, as well as

to extend associations of the self beyond individualism and collectivism.


1

! The human brain, just as any other supercomputer, is limited in its abilities to process,

store, and access information, specially given the finite amount of time at its disposal. As a

result of this cognitive overload and limitation, we tend to seek solutions that are satisficing

(i.e. good enough) rather than optimal. Altogether, this characterises mankind as cognitive

misers (Fiske and Taylor, 1984) having a bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). In seeking such

satisficing solutions, we unconsciously make use of mental shortcuts, known as heuristics.

Although these shortcuts can be useful during times of overwhelming cognitive demands,

they can also lead to severe and systematic errors or biases which tend to go unnoticed and

can have undesirable effects (Gelfand and Brett, 2004). Our cognitive judgments are

therefore often biased because of our lack of mental effort and abilities. Metaphorically

speaking, our minds can be tricked by cognitive biases in the same way optical illusions can

deceive our brains. The fundamental problem is that most of the times biases go unnoticed

and can have harmful effects. Moreover, the error remains convincing even when one is

completely aware of its nature. Awareness of the error does not produce a more accurate

perception, which is what makes cognitive biases even harder to overcome.

! As a practical example, when meeting a person for the first time, we subconsciously

create a first impression in a matter of seconds as memories and associations are retrieved

which help us categorise the individual. Almost always, stereotyping occurs to some degree

as it is an energy-saving mechanism which allows us to ignore irrelevant details. A person

smiling with positive body language can be classified as friendly and open, whereas a

person with crossed arms and legs and a quiet voice may be categorised as shy, introverted,

or simply uninterested in what we have to say. Many argue however that strong and

prejudicial stereotyping has become an aid to misunderstanding rather than

understanding, resulting in unwanted biases (e.g. not all Mediterraneans are lazy or

careless spenders, nor are all Chinese masters in kung-fu or table-tennis) (McGarty et al.,

2002). But would people from certain cultures be more prone to stereotyping, as well as

other biases? One could consider our brains as the hardware, and culture as the software

or operating system. Logically then, analogous to different computer software (e.g. Mac

OS X, Microsoft Windows, Android) using different shortcuts to navigate and save time,

we would expect different heuristics, and thus biases, to predominate in different cultures.


2

! Over the past few decades, research on cross-cultural psychology has acquired great

importance and relevance to businesses as globalisation has become a dominating force in

social dynamics. Although research in this field developed and flourished in parallel to that

of cognitive psychology, both fields were initially viewed as separate and independent;

biases were widely considered universal. However, recent evidence has illustrated that

cognitive biases are not etic (universal) but rather emic (culture specific). In fact, since the

late 1990s, academics have been increasingly supportive of the notion that judgment

biases should be reevaluated in light of a cultural perspective (Gelfand and

Christakopolou, 1999, Gelfand et al., 2002, Heacox et al., 2000, Choi and Nisbett, 1998,

Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000). For example, to boost self-esteem, North Americans have

the tendency to enhance their self-views, whereas East Asians resort to self-criticism and

modesty which will help them fit better in their group (Kitayama et al., 1997). Different

cultures therefore employ different mechanisms to boost self-esteem, and so the type and

nature of cognitive biases may differ.

! Globalisation, and the increased interdependence and homogeneity it has generated in

society has indeed called for a growing need to understand how culture impacts many

aspects of organisational behaviour and psychology. Over the past few decades, the world

has witnessed an increase of cross-cultural business interactions, both inside and outside

organisation, among all levels of employees, and between more industry rivals (Triandis et

al., 1994). Proof of this importance is the recent advances in differences in perception,

attribution, and cognition between Americans and East Asians (Masuda and Kitayama,

2004, Masuda and Nisbett, 2001, Matsumoto and Yoo, 2006). Indeed culture is now

widely recognised as a crucial variable to be included in research related to human

behaviour.

" The principal contributions of this paper are therefore to review and integrate

contributions from cultural and cognitive psychology, and provide testable propositions

alongside. There already exist a few empirical studies which have shown a cognitive

dependence on cultural factors, although most have focused on reasons related to

individualism and collectivism. In order to contribute towards the advancement of cross-

cultural cognitive psychology, we require reading cross-cultural literature with cognitive

lenses, and vice versa. The central question that guided this research was: Do cognitive


3

biases differ across cultures, and if so, how and why? More specifically, we consider biases

that show some interdependence and are to some extent grounded on the self: self-serving,

overconfidence, anchoring and adjustment, fundamental attribution error, and hindsight

bias. We begin first by reviewing relevant cross-cultural literature as well as the evolution of

the field over the past century. This is followed by a review of cognitive psychology and its

formal integration with cross-cultural research. The present article aims to contribute

towards the continued debate regarding the effects of culture on our mental distortions, in

hope that employees and managers, as well as as people in general, can identify and avoid

these, thus benefiting interpersonally from today’s increased multi-cultural business

environment and society. It is a step towards understanding social cognition and

behavioural decision making across cultures. The main conclusion is that the cognitive

biases reviewed are a function of culture which both affects and is affected by our self-

views.

Cross-cultural literature

" Culture is defined as the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the

members of one group or category of people from another (Hofstede, 1980). It is learned

through membership in a group or community. Culture symbolises a fundamental part of

an individual’s physical and social environment, affecting thoughts, feelings, and

behaviours (Fiske, 2000). Culture does not only provide a model of self, it is a model for

self; it defines what the self is, yet prescribes how people should manage their self in

everyday life (Lehman et al., 2004).

" The evolution of cross-cultural psychology has undergone significant changes since it

was first documented over 100 years ago. Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) provide an

exhaustive review of how this area and its research methodologies have evolved over time.

For example, one of the first studies in the field of cross-cultural psychology is that of

Rivers’s (1905) in which he observed individuals from New Guinea and India being more

susceptible to optical illusions than individuals from England. This is an example of the

first phase out of the four identified by Matsumoto and Yoo, during which, studies were

limited to cross-cultural differences.


4

" The second phase aimed at identifying meaningful dimensions of cultural variability,

as one of the limitations of the first phase was that researchers claimed that inter-group

differences had a culture source despite there being intra-group variability. This error was

described as the cultural attribution fallacy, in which differences between groups being

compared were inferred as “cultural” when there was no empirical justification. The most

notable work that tackled this issue was that of Hofstede’s (1980) with his eminent cultural

dimension theory. Following the necessity for psychologists to identify meaningful dimensions

of cultural variability that describe subjective elements of culture, Hofstede initially

identified four cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/

collectivism, and masculinity/femininity. There are several other frameworks which also

attempt to identify dimensions across cultures such as that of Trompenaars, Hall, and

GLOBE, and one that seeks to consolidate all aforementioned frameworks into one (Steers

et al., 2010). However, this study will use Hofstede’s model as a lot of the research in cross-

cultural cognitive psychology is grounded on his dimensions, thus allowing for a more

comprehensive review.

" The third phase in cross-cultural psychology further contributed in addressing issues

regarding cultural attribution fallacy, as Hofstede’s dimensions were still based on

generalising assumptions (e.g. not all Americans are individualistic despite the US scoring

amongst the highest on individualism). An eminent work in this third phase identified self-

construals as an important mediator of cultural differences (Kitayama and Markus, 1991).

More specifically, they theorised that the cultural context of an individual shapes their

construal of the self (e.g. autonomy and independence in the West, interdependence and

harmony in the East), which ultimately affects cognitive performance, social interactions,

and other mental processes and behaviours.

! However, Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) have since argued that a fourth phase is

required. They claim that, despite all the advances in the field, it is necessary, via linkage

studies, to empirically link the observed differences between groups with the specific cultural

sources that are hypothesised to explain these differences. The present study is grounded

on literature from the aforementioned second and third phases, creating linkages and

propositions that will hopefully lead future studies towards the fourth evolutionary phase of

cross-cultural research.


5

National Cultural Dimensions

" Since the 1980s, and as a result of the increased complexity and challenges around the

world, many researchers have strived to design a tool with which to measure differences

and similarities across cultures. Several attempts have been made to capture this essence.

Four currently favoured models are those of Hofstede, Hall, Trompenaars, and the

GLOBE project, although this article will only make use of three dimensions of Hofstede’s

framework: power distance, masculinity, and individualism. These models seek to accomplish two

main things: to provide a well-justified set of cultural dimensions across which cultures can

be compared and contrasted, and to offer a quantitative assessment (numeric score) for

rating cultures (see Appendix for comprehensive list)(Steers et al., 2010). In a way, these

models serve us as a heuristic to better understand cultures.

Individualism/Collectivism

" Many authors argue this dimension is the most important and probably the most

researched. It refers to the relative importance of individual versus collective interests

within society; whether the peoples’ self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we”.

Members of collectivistic cultures prioritise group goals and interests over their own. An

emphasis is placed in developing an interdependent self (Kitayama and Markus, 1991).

The opposite is true for members of individualistic cultures, where the self generally takes

precedence over the group, and society encourages developing an independent self-

construal. Most studies on cognitive psychology have focused on individualism and

collectivism, linking these to several psychological differences across cultures (Triandis,

2001, Matsumoto and Yoo, 2006).

" Extensive comparisons have truly been made between Western and non-Western

cultures, generally describing the former as individualistic (IDV) and the latter as

collectivistic (COL). Despite it being a generalisation at large, countries scoring highest on

COL include Venezuela, Indonesia, Taiwan, and China whereas those highest on IDV

include the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Sweden (see Appendix A

for full list). Individualists tend to develop a separate, detached and independent self,

focusing on one’s own attributes, abilities and traits (Kitayama and Markus, 1991) (Gelfand


6

et al., 2002). Americans view themselves at large as better than others (Heine et al., 1999).

On the other hand, collectivistic people generally construe the self as fundamentally

connected to others, defining one self in term of one’s roles, status and obligations

(Kitayama and Markus, 1991).

Power distance

" This dimension refers to the degree to which members of a society accept an unequal

distribution of power. Cultures high on power distance (PDI) are considered hierarchical,

paternalistic, and centralised in power and decision-making. Moreover, assertiveness is

discouraged and self-regulation is encouraged when interacting with people of higher

status (Matsumoto et al., 2008). Countries ranking highest on this dimension include

Malaysia, Panama, Russia, and China (see Appendix B). Subordinates in these countries

expect to be told what to do and generally do not challenge leadership or people in higher

ranks. On the other hand, cultures that endorse low PDI are more egalitarian,

consultative, and democratic. People view each other more as equals regardless of formal

positions. Examples of countries scoring low on PDI include Austria, Sweden, Israel, and

the United Kingdom (see Appendix B). Control is disliked in these countries, and attitudes

towards people in higher ranks are informal and on a first name basis. What is more,

underlings may indeed challenge their superiors’ views and decisions.

! In addition, PDI has been shown to be highly correlated (0.67) with individualism and

collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) in the sense that typically, the higher the PDI the greater the

degree of collectivism. This is specially common in Asian cultures guided by Confucian

values which emphasise loyalty towards the group, respect towards the elder, and a set of

hierarchical relationships between members of society. Other studies (Triandis, 1995) have

combined the four types of self related to PDI and IDV dimensions (same, different,

interdependent, dependent) and categorised cultures as vertical individualism (high PDI,

IDV), horizontal individualism (low PDI, IDV), vertical collectivism (high PDI, COL), and

horizontal collectivism (low PDI, COL). These will be referred to later in the study.


7

Masculinity/Femininity

! The masculinity (MAS) end of this spectrum represents a preference in society for

competition, assertiveness, confidence, achievement, and material reward for success.

Femininity on the other hand depicts a society which values cooperation, modesty,

relationships, and consensus building. Examples of masculine cultures include Japan,

Venezuela, and Italy, whereas those feminine (scoring low on MAS) include Sweden,

Denmark, and Thailand (see Appendix C). Children in Italy are taught from a young age

that competition is good and that it is important to be a winner in life. Status is acquired

through material possessions such as luxury cars, a big house, a yacht etc. (Hofstede,

2003a). Sweden on the other hand, a very feminine culture, focuses on keeping a healthy

work/life balance. Their culture is based on lagom, which means not too much, not too

little, not too noticeable, everything in moderation (Hofstede, 2003b).

Cognitive biases

! Over the past few decades, the study of cognitive biases has been fuelled by two events

in the field of social sciences (Matsumoto and Yoo, 2006): the emergence of behavioural

decision theory from the affluential work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974),

and the social cognition movement in social psychology which focused on the mental

limitations of the individual (Gelfand and Brett, 2004). Academics define cognitive bias as a

replicable pattern in perceptual distortion, an inaccurate judgment, or an illogical and

irrational interpretation of reality (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Simply put, cognitive

biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing techniques within

our subconscious (CIA, 2007); distortions in the human mind. These cognitive biases have

been shown to affect important business processes such as decision making and strategic

planning (Barnes, 1984), negotiations (Bazerman and Caroll, 1987, Gelfand et al., 2002)

and self identities (Swann and Bosson, 2010). In this article, we review five cognitive biases

that affect and are affected by the self.

Self-serving

" This bias refers to the individual need to maintain relatively high levels of self-esteem.

Many people like to feel good about themselves. People use different mechanisms to


8

preserve and even enhance their self-esteem, which can ultimately result in self-serving biases.

For example, if sitting an exam and obtaining a high score, an individual will tend to

associate this to their intelligence and their hard work. If, on the other hand, the result is

poor, one will tend to blame the exam difficulty or the professor’s inability to teach.

! Cultural differences in self-esteem and self-enhancement have long been a subject of

great debate and research (Kitayama and Markus, 1999, Kitayama and Markus, 1991,

Swann and Bosson, 2010). An eminent review on the topic is that of Heine and colleagues

(1999) which claimed that self-esteem was pursued more vigorously in Western cultures.

The debate is split however; some are in agreement with higher self-esteem being more

predominant in the West (Kitayama et al., 1997, Chiu, 1993, Cai et al., 2007, Tafarodi et

al., 2010, Radford et al., 1993) (Tafarodi et al., 2010), others claim it is equally present in

the East (Kobayashi and Brown, 2003, Schmidt and Allik, 2005).

" In Western cultures there is indeed a tendency for people to see themselves as better

than others. The aim is to enhance one’s positive attributes to stand out and be that rising

star in the classroom, at work, and life in general (Gelfand et al., 2002). However, studies

have shown that Japanese do not exhibit these type of self-serving biases (Kurman and

Sriram, 2002) although at the same time, these studies have been criticized for measuring a

Western-defined self-esteem, using methodologies developed in the West. The truth is that

self-esteem has a different foundation in the East than it does in the West. Although in the

latter, as mentioned above, self-serving biases are used to enhance one’s own position, in

the former, individuals enhance their self-esteem by fitting in with the group through a

subordination to the group’s interests and norms, displaying humility, and focusing on

individual areas of weakness to improve (Gelfand et al., 2002, Kitayama et al., 1997). This

difference in foundation of the self-esteem between individualists and collectivists is what

Tafarodi and Swann (2001) refer to as self-competence and self-liking, respectively, in their two-

dimensional self-esteem model.

! During negotiations for example, North Americans have been consistently found to

experience self-serving biases through which they view their own behavior and attitudes as

superior (e.g. more fair, constructive, effective) whereas this feeling is attenuated by

collectivistic values (Gelfand and Christakopolou, 1999). Whereas individualists seek to


9

maintain a positive self-image, collectivists desire a maintenance of harmony. Studies have

in fact shown that Japanese are more likely to exhibit a modesty bias rather than a self-

serving one (Tafarodi and Swann, 1995, Tafarodi et al., 1999).

" Based on the work of Triandis (1995), vertical individualism (high on PDI and IDV)

such as Slovakians, French, and Polish, (see Appendix D) tend to have the need, as an

individual, to be above average and excel above the rest. Horizontal collectivism however,

lie on the other end of the spectrum in this regard (see Appendix G). Even cultures of

horizontal individualism (low on PDI and high in IDV) such as Sweden (see Appendix E)

do not encourage this concept of “being the best” or “unique” but instead seek an

egalitarian approach. We would therefore expect self-serving biases aimed at enhancing

one’s self attributes and views to be strongest in vertical individualistic cultures and lowest

in horizontal collectivistic ones.

" Proposition 1: Self-serving biases aimed at maintaining one’s own positive self-concept and

" characteristics will generally be more present in vertical individualistic cultures, and least

" present in cultures of horizontal collectivism.

! In the West, situations of success have a greater impact on self-esteem than an

equivalent failure, whereas the opposite is true in the East (Kitayama et al., 1997).

Similarly, successful and positive feedback is considered more motivating in the West

(Heine et al., 2001, Lehman et al., 2004). North Americans are more accepting of

feedback that makes them above average and affirms their positive qualities (Gelfand et al.,

2002) (Kurman and Sriram, 2002). Japanese on the other hand are more accepting of

negative feedback as it enables them to identify their weaknesses, and improve these in

order to better fit in their group. Moreover, group performance feedback has significant

impact on self-evaluations in the East, yet very little in the West (Earley et al., 1999). There

is in fact evidence that Asians have unrealistic positive views of the self when asked to

evaluate themselves on dimensions that are central to their cultural definition of the self

(e.g. communal traits, collectivistic, harmonising etc.) (Kurman, 2001, Kobayashi and

Brown, 2003).


10

Overconfidence

! A classic example is that of the bat-and-ball puzzle used at the very beginning of this

study. An overconfidence in our mental processing is what probably lead most of us to a

wrong answer, blindly accepting it to be correct until proven wrong. A well documented

better-than-average finding is that of Svenson (1981) in which he found that 93% of

American drivers rated themselves as better than the median. People exhibit

overconfidence if they make average probability judgments that exceed the proportion of

items answered correctly (Li et al., 2009).

" Overconfidence has been linked to efforts in maintaining self-esteem. People like to

think they are right. The most common technique involves asking participants to answer a

number of general knowledge questions and assign a probability of answering them

correctly; if their mean confidence scores are higher than their mean accuracy scores,

overconfidence was indeed present (Fischhoff, 1982). The reason why many of us fail to

avoid the overconfident bias can be explained by the argument recruitment model (Li et al.,

2009). When people are confronted with a general knowledge question, they try to seek or

recruit arguments for and against our intuition. Arguments are then weighed, and a final

decision is made which will serve as our answer to the questions. Overconfident people will

be biased towards first arguments and not pursue further retrieval or recruitment of

arguments that may help improve our judgment accuracy. It has been referred to as a self-

serving mechanism, which helps preserve one’s self-esteem, specially in Western cultures.

! Proposition 2: Related to Proposition 1, and in viewing overconfidence as a self-serving bias,

! vertical ! individualists will tend to exhibit stronger overconfidence biases, whereas these will be

! weakest !for horizontal collectivists.

Anchoring and adjustment

! In many situations, people tend to make estimates by starting from an initial value

which is then adjusted progressively until it lies within a region of acceptance (Mussweiler

et al., 2004). These adjustments are normally insufficient because it requires mental effort.

In other words, different starting points result in different estimates, which are biased

towards the initial values. This is known as the anchoring bias (Kahneman and Tversky,


11

1974). Anchoring biases are robust and have been shown to be present in many

judgmental domains, such as estimates of self-efficacy (Cervone and Peake, 1986), price

estimates (Mussweiler et al., 2000), hindsight and egocentricity bias (Chapman and

Johnson, 2002, Epley, 2004), and negotiation outcomes (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001).

In fact, during a negotiation, the first offer typically serves as an anchor as studies have

revealed it is highly correlated (0.8) with the final outcome. Hence the importance of

preparation prior to a negotiation in order to make the first offer and anchor the other

party high, if selling, or low, if buying.

" Anchors can originate externally or internally to the individual. In one study,

participants gave a lower estimate (8,000 feet) of the height of Mount Everest when asked

by researchers whether it was higher or shorter than 2,000 ft., but provided a higher

estimate (42,500 ft.) when asked whether it was higher or lower than 45,500 ft (Jacowitz

and Kahneman, 1995). The actual height of Mt. Everest is about 29,000 ft. Similarly,

anchoring can occur when asked a comparative judgment, followed by an absolute one:

“Is the river Nile longer or shorter than 9,500 km? How long is the river Nile?”. Assuming

we don’t know the answer, studies have repeatedly shown that our final estimate will be

relatively close to the numeric anchor, even if it has been generated randomly, as our

thinking has been biased by it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). These are both examples of

external anchoring.

! As covered in the previous section, cultures high in power distance accept unequal

distribution of power and it is discouraged to challenge members of higher social or

professional status. Members from hierarchical cultures (high in PDI) are therefore

expected to exhibit greater anchoring biases when interacting with people of higher status,

so long as this status difference is made known of course. Moreover, we would expect the

anchoring bias to be stronger if status differences are large and the other person is also

from a culture high on PDI. This has practical implications on how we view ourselves and

evaluate our self-efficacy, as these can be anchored to views and feedback from superiors.

Similarly, during negotiations with a person of higher rank, an underling will be more

anchored to the offers proposed by the superior.


12

! Proposition 3: Members from cultures high on PDI will generally exhibit stronger external

! anchoring biases when knowingly interacting with people of higher rank status.

! Proposition 4: The greater the status differences between interacting people from cultures high

! in PDI, the greater the tendency to experience an external anchoring bias by the member of

! lower status.

" In terms of internal anchors, these are self-generated and take place inside our minds.

For example, when trying to estimate ourselves the freezing point of vodka, we will

probably generate an initial internal anchor of 0°C (the freezing point of water), and

adjust downwards (since it is generally known that the freezing point of alcohol is lower

than that of water) until a plausible value is reached. The difference with respect to

external anchors is that we know from the beginning that the initial value is wrong and

know that appropriate adjustment is required (Epley and Gilovich, 2005).

! Epley and Golivich (2006) showed that being motivated to engage in effortful thinking

improves adjustment, thus reducing the effects of self-generated (internal) anchors.

Adjustment is effortful, so increasing the motivation to seek more accurate estimates

generally does improves accuracy, though evidence suggests this is only applicable to

internal anchors and not external (Epley and Gilovich, 2005). People who are

overconfident in the accuracy of their judgments think too little about ways in which they

could be wrong (Koriat et al., 1980). Adjustment initiates from the initial anchor and

progresses towards a reasonable value as information is retrieved. For each piece of

information retrieved we decide whether to stop at the current value, or continue

adjusting. Overconfidence may hamper the retrieval of such information, thus adjusting

less and ending nearer to the initial point estimate or anchor. Studies have revealed that

the individualistic West generally shows higher levels of overconfidence, whereas modesty

and humility is valued in the East. The West promotes a self as a super-hero and above-

average member of society which typically results in high levels of overconfidence.

! Proposition 5: Following Proposition 2, internal anchoring biases are more likely to be strongest in

! vertical individualist cultures, where overconfidence is proposed to be highest, and weakest

! in horizontal collectivistic cultures, where overconfidence is expect to be lowest.


13

Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE)

" The FAE, also known as the correspondence bias, refers to the tendency to overestimate

the effect of dispositional (internal) qualities and underestimate situational (external)

factors, when attributing another person’s behaviour (Ross, 1977). It is probably one of the

most documented and researched bias in social perception. For example, when we observe

someone arriving late to a meeting, we tend to think it is because he or she is an

unorganised or lazy person, instead of thinking it could be because of severe delays on the

train they normally take.

! There is evidence that the FAE is learned since young children do not make

dispositional attributions until reaching a late stage of their childhood (Langdridge and

Butt, 2004). Moreover, the FAE is arguably not universal as differences have been

accounted for across cultures, predominating in the individualistic West and not as much

in the collectivistic East (Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000). However, this is arguable as there

is also evidence supporting that FAE is prevalent in both Western and non-Western

cultures (e.g. China, India, and Taiwan) (Krull et al., 1999, Choi and Nisbett, 1998,

Miyamoto and Kitayama, 2002).

! The FAE increases when the observer is cognitively busy engaged in a competing task

(Gilbert and Krull, 1988, Gilbert et al., 1988). As reviewed in the earlier section, members

from masculine cultures champion competitive, proactive, and achievement-oriented

behaviour. Feminine cultures are more engaged in achieving harmony with nature and its

environment, and emphasise a passive are reactive approach to life. In comparison to

feminine cultures, we would therefore expect people from masculine cultures to be more

cognitively engaged in competing tasks, thus exhibiting a stronger FAE.

! Proposition 4: Members from masculine cultures are expected to engage in more competing

! tasks, which ultimately results in stronger FAE.

" Attitude diagnosticity refers to the property of socially constrained behaviour that

suggests a true attitude of the individual. It has been found to be a critical factor in

moderating cross-cultural differences in FAE (Miyamoto and Kitayama, 2002). In their


14

studies, participants were asked to judge whether an argumentative essay reflected the true

opinion of its writer. The essay content was considered highly diagnostic of the writer’s

attitude if it suggested a desire to defend the essay position i.e. long, persuasive, well

composed, and enthusiastic. Individualistic Americans showed strong FAE regardless of

attitude diagnosticity of the essays, whereas collectivistic Japanese only showed strong FAE

when the essays were diagnostic. For essays which were low on diagnosticity Japanese

showed very weak and nonsignificant FAE. Therefore:

" Proposition 7: When there is evidence that an individual’s behaviour does not represent their

" real self, collectivists will show significantly weaker FAE than individualists. Otherwise, the

" strength of the FAE is expected to be fairly similar for both.

Hindsight

" Imagine you have been out on a date. A few days later, the person you went out with

calls asking to meet again. At that point, you might believe you knew all along they would

call. However, the reality may be that previous to the call, you were in fact rather uncertain

and were starting to doubt their interest. Misremembering the degree to which one

accurately forecasted an outcome is known as the hindsight bias. We have heard many times

the “I knew it all along”.

! Hindsight biases can be explained via anchoring (Fischhoff, 1975) as we deliberate

choose the outcome information as an anchor to our previous estimates. Indeed hindsight

bias seems to be very robust (Christensen-Slazanski and Willham, 1991). Although this bias

has been assumed to be universal, there is also evidence that it is not. Koreans and

Easterners in general have showed greater hindsight bias than Americans and Westerns

(Yama et al., 2010, Choi and Nisbett, 2000 for reviews). A study has however revealed that

Japanese exhibit marginally less hindsight bias than Canadians (Heine and Lehman,

1996). Others have even claimed that there is no difference across Eastern and Western

cultures and that hindsight bias is in fact a universal phenomenon (Pohl et al., 2002).

These are the few studies that have investigated cultural differences regarding hindsight

bias and there is still no overall agreement. It is clearly an understudied area which

requires greater efforts.


15

" The degree to which one exhibits hindsight bias is related to how surprised one is after

finding out the outcome; the more surprised one is, the less likely one will suffer the bias

(Brighman and Wasserman, 1999, Ofir and Mazursky, 1997). Estimating that Mt. Everest

is 30,000 ft. will not cause much surprise when being later told that it’s in fact 29,000 ft.

Estimating the total length of the Great Wall of China (including that built by all

dynasties) to be 6,000 km will generally cause greater surprise when finding out it’s actually

more than 50,000 km1. Greater hindsight bias would be expected in the second example.

The question is, are different cultures more prone to being surprised, and therefore biased

in hindsight?

" Self-serving motives may be able to account for different levels of surprise across

cultures. The more one is surprised after finding out the outcome, the greater the feeling

that they were unable to predict a relatively accurate outcome, thus undermining their

intellectual and cognitive abilities. This dissonance between their inaccurate estimate

(expressed through surprise) and the actual value might create a feeling of discomfort

which is relieved by a hindsight bias (i.e. believing one estimated a value closer to the real

one) in order to preserve one’s self-esteem. By this logic, self-serving attitudes are likely to

moderate the likelihood of exhibiting hindsight bias. As covered previously, Western

cultures normally display greater self-serving biases that enhance and distinguish the self.

We therefore expect people high in IDV to show greater hindsight bias, in agreement with

the work of Heine and Lehman.

" Proposition 8: Individualism generally leads to a greater need for enhancing the self. Hindsight

" biases will predominate more in cultures high in IDV as a mechanism to protect one’s self-

" esteem.


16

1 http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/en/goc/goc-2.htm

http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/en/goc/goc-2.htm

http://www.thegreatwall.com.cn/en/goc/goc-2.htm

Concluding remarks

" The cognitive biases reviewed in this study have not been selected at random. There

exists considerable interdependence between them since, to a certain degree, they are

grounded on our self-concepts. How we view ourselves affects how we think, how we

process information, and how our minds trick us in the process. Culture has a clear impact

on the self, which, considered to be our mental software, affects the type of mental

shortcuts our brain — as mental hardware — uses to cope with the colossal amount of

information we are exposed to. These shortcuts typically lead to a distortion of reality.

When closing business deals, negotiating terms of a contract, evaluating a possible merger

or acquisition, or reviewing performances and actions of others, the last thing we want is

for reality to be distorted. As globalisation has led to a substantial increase in multi-cultural

interactions between people and organisations, it is necessary to study these distortions in a

light of a cultural viewpoint, though beyond the overstudied individualistic and

collectivistic nature of the self. Moreover, the practical implications of testing the above

propositions are extensive, as it not only applies within a business context but also a

personal one. The individual, like an atom, is the basic unit of matter within corporations,

institutions, societies, and the world in general. Understanding how and why this atom is

limited in its abilities is of monumental importance in order for it to succeed in the

increasingly complex world that we live in.


17

References

BARNES, J. H. 1984. Cognitive biases and their impact n strategic planning. Strategic

Management Journal, 5, 129-137.

BAZERMAN, M. H. & CAROLL, J. S. 1987. Negotiator cognition. In: STAW, B. M. &

CUMMINGS, L. L. (eds.) Research in organizational behavior. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

BRIGHMAN, J. C. & WASSERMAN, A. W. 1999. The impact of race, racial attitude, and

gender on reactions to the criminal trial of O. J. Simpson. Journal of Applied Psychology,

29, 1333-1370.

CAI, H., BROWN, J. D., DENG, C. & OAKES, M. 2007. Self-esteem and culture: Differences

in cognitive self-evaluations or affective self-regard? Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 10,

162-170.

CERVONE, D. & PEAKE, P. K. 1986. Anchoring, efficacy, and action: The influence of

judgmental heuristics on self-efficacy judgement and behaviour. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 50, 492-501.

CHAPMAN, G. B. & JOHNSON, E. J. 2002. Incorporating the irrelevant: Anchors in

judgements of belief and value. In: GILOVICH, T., GRIFFIN, D. & KAHNEMAN,

D. (eds.) Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgement Cambridge, England:

Cambridge University Press.

CHIU, L. H. 1993. Self-esteem in American and Chinese (Taiwanese) children. Current

Psychology: Research and Reviews, 11, 309-313.

CHOI, I. & NISBETT, R. E. 1998. Situational Salience and Cultural Differences in the

Correspondence bias and Actor-Observer bias. Pers Soc Psychol Bull, 24, 949-960.

CHOI, I. & NISBETT, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and

recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 890-905.

CHRISTENSEN-SLAZANSKI, J. J. & WILLHAM, C. F. 1991. The hindsight bias: A meta-

analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48, 147-168.

CIA. 2007. Chapter 9: What are cognitive biases? [Online]. Available: https://www.cia.gov/

library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/

psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art12.html.

EARLEY, P. C., GIBSON, C. B. & CHEN, C. C. 1999. “How did I do?” versus “how did we

do?” Cultural contrasts of performance feedback use and self-efficacy. Journal of Cross-

Cultural Psychology, 30, 595-619.


18

EPLEY, N. 2004. A tale of tuned decks? Anchoring as adjustment and anchoring as activation.

In: KOEHLER, D. J. & HARVEY, N. (eds.) The Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision

making. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

EPLEY, N. & GILOVICH, T. 2005. When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring:

Differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self-generated and externally-

provided anchors. Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 18, 199-212.

EPLEY, N. & GILOVICH, T. 2006. The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the

Adjustments Are Insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311-318.

FISCHHOFF, B. 1975. Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of event outcome

knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1,

288-299.

FISCHHOFF, B. 1982. Debiasing. In: KAHNEMAN, D., SLOVIC, P. & TVERSKY, A. (eds.)

Judgment under uncertaintiy: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.

FISKE, A. P. 2000. Complementarity theory: why human social capacities evolved to require

cultural complements. Pers Soc Psychol Rev, 4, 76-94.

FISKE, S. T. & TAYLOR, S. E. 1984. Social Cognition, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley.

GALINSKY, A. D. & MUSSWEILER, T. 2001. First offers as anchors: the roles of

perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81,

657-669.

GELFAND, M. J. & BRETT, J. M. 2004. Cultural differences and cognitive dynamics:

Expanding the cognitive perspective on negotiation. In: GELFAND, M. J. & BRETT, J.

M. (eds.) The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University

Press.

GELFAND, M. J. & CHRISTAKOPOLOU, S. 1999. Culture and Negotiator Cognition:

Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic

Cultures. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 248-269.

GELFAND, M. J., HIGGINS, M., NISHII, L. H., RAVER, J. L., DOMINGUEZ, A.,

MURAKAMI, F., YAMAGUCHI, S. & TOYAMA, M. 2002. Culture and egocentric

perceptions of fairness in conflict and negotiation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,

833-845.

GILBERT, D. T. & KRULL, D. S. 1988. Seeing less and knowing more: The benefits of

perceptual ignorance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 193-202.

GILBERT, D. T., PELHAM, B. W. & KRULL, D. S. 1988. On cognitive busyness: When

person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,

733-739.


19

HEACOX, N. J., GWYNE, J. W., KELLY, R. T. & SANDER, S. I. 2000. Cognitive aspects of

decision-making San Diego: SPAWAR Systems Centre San Diego.

HEINE, S. J., KITAYAMA, S., LEHMAN, D. R., TAKATA, T., IDE, E., LUENG, C. &

MATSUMOTO, H. 2001. Divergent consequences of success and failure in Japan and

North America: An investigation of self-improving motivations and malleable selves.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 599-615.

HEINE, S. J. & LEHMAN, D. R. 1996. Hindsight bias: A cross--cultural analysis. Japanese

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 317-323.

HEINE, S. J., LEHMAN, D. R., MARKUS, H. R. & KIYATAMA, S. 1999. Is there a

universal need fo positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106, 766-794.

HOFSTEDE, G. H. 1980. Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values,

Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications.

HOFSTEDE, G. H. 2003a. National culture - Italy [Online]. Available: http://geert-

hofstede.com/italy.html [Accessed 19th Aug 2012.

HOFSTEDE, G. H. 2003b. National culture - Sweden [Online]. Available: http://geert-

hofstede.com/sweden.html [Accessed 19th Aug 2012.

JACOWITZ, K. E. & KAHNEMAN, D. 1995. Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks. Pers

Soc Psychol Bull, 21, 1161-1166.

KAHNEMAN, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and

Biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.

KITAYAMA, S. & MARKUS, H. R. 1991. Culture and self: implications for cognitin emotion

and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.

KITAYAMA, S. & MARKUS, H. R. 1999. Yin and yang of the Japanese self: The cultural

psychology of personality coherence. In: CERVONE, D. & SHODA, Y. (eds.) The

coherence of personality: Social cognitive bases of personality consistency, variability, and organization.

NY: Guilford.

KITAYAMA, S., MARKUS, H. R., MATSUMOTO, H. & NORASAKKUNKIT, V. 1997.

Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: Self-enhancement in

the United States and self-criticism in Japan. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

72, 1245-1267.

KOBAYASHI, C. & BROWN, J. D. 2003. Self-Esteem and Self-Enhancement in Japan and

America. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34, 567-580.

KORIAT, A., LICHTENSTEIN, S. & FISCHOFF, B. 1980. Reasons for confidence. Journal of

Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 107-118.


20

KRULL, D. S., HUI-MIN LOY, M., LIN, J., WANG, C., CHEN, S. & ZHAO, X. 1999. The

fundamental fundamental attribution error: Correspondence bias in individualist and

collectivist cultures. Pers Soc Psychol Bull, 25, 1208-1219.

KURMAN, J. 2001. Is self-enhancement related to modesty or to individualism-collectivism?

A test with four Israeli groups. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 4, 225-237.

KURMAN, J. & SRIRAM, N. 2002. Interrelationships among Vertical and Horizontal

Collectivism, Modesty, and Self-Enhancement. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33,

71-86.

LANGDRIDGE, D. & BUTT, T. 2004. The fundamental attribution error: A

phenomenological critique. The British Psychological Society, 43, 357-369.

LEHMAN, D. R., CHIU, C.-Y. & SCHALLER, M. 2004. Psychology and Culture. Annual

Review of Psychology, 55, 689-714.

LI, S., BI, Y. & ZHANG, Y. 2009. Asian Risk Seeking and Overconfidence. Journal of Applied

Social Psychology, 39, 2706-2736.

MASUDA, T. & KITAYAMA, S. 2004. Perceiver-induced constraint and attitude attribution

in Japan and the US: A case for the cultural dependence of the correspondence bias.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 409-416.

MASUDA, T. & NISBETT, R. E. 2001. Attending holistically versus analytically: Comparing

the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 81, 922-934.

MATSUMOTO, D. & YOO, S. H. 2006. Toward a new generation of cross-cultural research.

Psychological Science, 1, 234-250.

MATSUMOTO, D., YOO, S. H. & NAKAGAWA, S. 2008. Culture, emotion regulation, and

adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 925-937.

MCGARTY, C., YZERBYT, V. Y. & SPEARS, R. 2002. Social, cognitive and cognitive factors in

stereotype formations, Cambridge University Press.

MIYAMOTO, Y. & KITAYAMA, S. 2002. Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The

critical role of attitude diagnosticity of socially constrained behavior. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1239-1248.

MUSSWEILER, T., ENGLISH, B. & STRACK, F. 2004. Anchoring effect. In: RÜDIGER, F.

P. (ed.) Cognitive illusions: a handbook of fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory.

Psychology Press.

MUSSWEILER, T., STRACK, F. & PFEIFER, T. 2000. Overcoming the inevitable

anchoring effect: Considering the opposite compensates for selective accessibility. Pers

Soc Psychol Bull, 26, 1142-1150.


21

NORENZAYAN, A. & NISBETT, R. E. 2000. Culture and causal cognition. Current Directions

in Psychological Science, 9, 132-135.

OFIR, C. & MAZURSKY, D. 1997. Does surprising outcome reinforce or reverse the

hindsight bias? Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 69, 51-57.

POHL, R. F., BENDER, M. & LACHMANN, G. 2002. Hindsight bias around the world.

Experimental Psychology, 49, 270-282.

RADFORD, M. H. B., MANN, L., OHTA, Y. & NAKANE, Y. 1993. Differences between

Australian and Japanese students in decisional self-esteem, decisional stress, and coping

styles. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 24.

RIVERS, W. H. R. 1905. Observations on the senses of the Todas. British Journal of Psychology,

1, 321-396.

ROSS, L. 1977. The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution

process. In: BERKOWITZ, L. (ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology. New York:

Academic Press.

SCHMIDT, D. P. & ALLIK, J. 2005. Simultaneous administration of the Rosenberg Self-

Esteem Scale in 53 nations: Exploring the universal and culture-specific features of

global self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 623-642.

SIMON, H. A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,

69, 99-118.

STEERS, R. M., SANCHEZ-RUDE, C. J. & NARDON, L. 2010. Chapter 3: Culture, values,

and worldviews. In: STEERS, R. M., SANCHEZ-RUDE, C. J. & NARDON, L. (eds.)

Management across cultures: challenges and strategies Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

SVENSON, O. 1981. Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Acta

Psychologica, 47, 143-148.

SWANN, W. B., JR. & BOSSON, J. K. 2010. Self and Identity. In: FISKE, S. T., GILBERT,

D. T. & LINDZEY, G. (eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

TAFARODI, R. W., LANG, J. M. & SMITH, A. J. 1999. Self-Esteem and the Cultural Trade-

Off: Evidence for the Role of Individualism-Collectivism. Journal of Cross-Cultural

Psychology, 30, 620-640.

TAFARODI, R. W., SHAUGHNESSY, S. C., YAMAGUCHI, S. & MURAKOSHI, A. 2010.

The Reporting of Self-Esteem in Japan and Canada. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,

42, 155-164.

TAFARODI, R. W. & SWANN, R. W. 2001. Two-dimensional self-esteem: Theory and

measurement. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 653-673.


22

TAFARODI, R. W. & SWANN, W. B., JR. 1995. Self-liking and self-competence as

dimensions of global self-esteem: Initial validation of a measure. Journal of Personality

Assessment, 65, 322-342.

TRIANDIS, H. C. 1995. Attributes of Individualism and Collectivism. In: TRIANDIS, H. C.

(ed.) Individualism & Collectivism. Oxford (UK): Westview Press.

TRIANDIS, H. C. 2001. Individualism and collectivism: past, present, and future. In:

MATSUMOTO, D. (ed.) Handbook of culture and psychology. New York: Ofxord

University Press.

TRIANDIS, H. C., KUROWSKI, L. & GELFAND, M. J. 1994. Workplace diversity. In:

TRIANDIS, H. C., DUNNETTE, M. & HOUGH, L. (eds.) Hanbook of industrial and

organizational psychology Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press.

YAMA, H., MANKTELOW, K. I., MERCIER, H., HENST, J.-B. V. D., SOO DO, K.,

KAWASAKI, Y. & ADACHI, K. 2010. A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and

conditional probabilistic reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 16, 346-371.


23

Appendix

A. Individualism2

Country IDV Country IDV Country IDV

United States 91 Slovakia 52 Kuwait 25

Australia 90 Spain 51 Arab Emirates 25

United Kingdom 89 India 48 Serbia 25

Hungary 80 Japan 46 Tanzania 25

Canada 80 Argentina 46 Morocco 25

Netherlands 80 Iran 41 Egypt 25

New Zealand 79 Russia 39 HK 25

Italy 76 Brazil 38 Chile 23

Belgium 75 Turkey 37 China 20

Denmark 74 Uruguay 36 Bangladesh 20

France 71 Zambia 35 Singapore 20

Sweden 71 Greece 35 Vietnam 20

Norway 69 Croatia 33 Ethiopia 20

Switzerland 68 Philippines 32 Thailand 20

Germany 67 Iraq 30 South Korea 18

South Africa 65 Romania 30 Taiwan 17

Finland 63 Mexico 30 Peru 16

Poland 60 Nigeria 80 Trinidad 16

Luxembourg 60 Bulgaria 30 Ghana 15

Estonia 60 Ireland 30 Costa Rica 15

Malta 59 Slovenia 27 Indonesia 14

Czech Republic 58 Portugal 27 Pakistan 14

Austria 55 Malaysia 26 Venezuela 12

Israel 54 Saudi Arabia 25 Guatemala 6


24

2 Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html

http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html


B. Power distance3

Country PDI Country PDI Country PDI

Slovakia 104 Slovenia 71 Czech Republic 57

Malaysia 104 Bulgaria 70 Spain 57

Iraq 95 Tanzania 70 Malta 56

Saudi Arabia 95 Morocco 70 Pakistan 55

Panama 95 Egypt 70 Japan 54

Guatemala 95 Vietnam 70 Italy 50

Philippines 94 Sierra Leone 70 South Africa 49

Russia 93 Brazil 69 Argentina 49

Romania 90 France 68 United States 40

Kuwait 90 Poland 68 Luxembourg 40

Arab Emirates 90 HK 68 Canada 39

Serbia 86 Colombia 67 Netherlands 38

Mexico 81 Turkey 66 Australia 36

Venezuela 81 El Salvador 66 United Kingdom 35

Nigeria 80 Belgium 65 Germany 35

China 80 Thailand 64 Sweden 31

Bangladesh 80 Peru 64 Norway 31

Ghana 80 Portugal 63 Ireland 28

Indonesia 78 Uruguay 61 New Zealand 22

India 77 Zambia 60 Denmark 18

Singapore 74 Greece 60 Israel 13

Croatia 73 South Korea 60 Austria 11

Ecuador 73 Taiwan 58


25




C. Masculinity4

Country MAS Country MAS Country MAS

Slovakia 110 Greece 57 Romania 42

Japan 95 HK 57 Peru 42

Austria 79 India 56 Croatia 40

Venezuela 73 Argentina 56 Bulgaria 40

Italy 70 Bangladesh 55 Tanzania 40

Switzerland 70 Belgium 54 Vietnam 40

Iraq 70 Morocco 53 El Salvador 40

Ireland 70 Canada 52 Ghana 40

Mexico 69 Luxembourg 50 South Korea 39

United Kingdom 66 Malaysia 50 Uruguay 38

Germany 66 Arab Emirates 50 Surinam 37

China 66 Pakistan 50 Guatemala 37

Lebanon 65 Brazil 49 Russia 36

Poland 64 Singapore 48 Thailand 34

Philippines 64 Malta 47 Portugal 31

Colombia 64 Israel 47 Estonia 30

South Africa 63 Indonesia 46 Chile 28

Ecuador 63 Turkey 45 Finland 26

United States 62 Egypt 45 Costa Rica 21

Australia 61 Taiwan 45 Slovenia 19

Nigeria 60 France 43 Denmark 16

Saudi Arabia 60 Iran 43 Netherlands 14

New Zealand 58 Serbia 43 Norway 8

Czech Republic 57 Spain 42 Sweden 5


26




D. Vertical individualism5

Country PDI IDV

Slovakia 104 52

Belgium 65 75

France 68 71

Poland 68 60

Italy 50 76

Czech Republic 57 58

Malta 56 59

Spain 57 51

E. Horizontal individualism6

Country PDI IDV

New Zealand 22 79

Denmark 18 74

Australia 36 90

United Kingdom 35 89

United States 40 91

Austria 11 55

Canada 39 80

Israel 13 54

Sweden 31 71


27

5 Ranking based on sum of PDI and IDV, in decreasing order

6 Ranking based on differences between IDV and PDI, in decreasing order

F. Vertical collectivism7

Country PDI IDV

Guatemala 95 6

Malaysia 104 26

Saudi Arabia 95 25

Venezuela 81 12

Italy 50 76

Indonesia 78 14

Philippines 94 32

China 80 20

Singapore 74 20

Russia 93 39

Vietnam 70 20

HK 68 25

South Korea 60 18

G. Horizontal collectivism8

Country PDI IDV

Costa Rica 35 15

Ireland 28 30

Trinidad 47 16

Jamaica 45 39

Argentina 49 46


28

7 Ranking based on differences between PDI and IDV, in decreasing order

8 Ranking based on sums of PDI and IDV, in increasing order

cognitive biases without borders (me)

Documents