Cognitive Ethology

“When a dog approaches a strange dog or man in a savage or hostile frame of mind he walks upright and very stiffly; his head is slightly raised, or not much lowered; […] These actions […] follow from the dog’s intention to attack his enemy, and are thus to a large extent intelligible.” Darwin

“Let us now suppose that the dog suddenly discovers that the man whom he is approaching […] is his master; […] Instead of walking upright, the body sinks downwards or even crouches […] It should be added that the animal is at such times in an excited condition from joy.” Darwin

We (1) ascribe mental states to animals and (2) explain their behaviour by appeal to mental states

Folk Psychological Explanations of Animal Behaviour

Allen and Bekoff: mentalistic explanations of animal behaviour are a consequence of our ‘folk psychology’

Folk psychology:

• Set of generalisations about the mind and behaviour of our fellow humans

‘If X wants B and doing A will achieve getting B, then X will do B’

• Ascribes intentional states (states directed at or about something): e.g., belief that p, desire to q

• States are real, internal components that cause behaviour

Folk Psychological Explanations of Animal Behaviour

Is it appropriate for a science of animal behaviour to…

… ascribe intentional states to animals?… explain their behaviour in intentional terms?

Worries of present-day animal ethology

• Anthropomorphic

• Unscientific (anecdotal)

Folk Psychological Explanations of Animal Behaviour

“I formerly possessed a large dog, who, like every other dog, was

much pleased to go out walking. He showed his pleasure by trotting

gravely before me with high steps, head much raised, moderately

erected ears, and tail carried aloft but not stiffly. Not far from my

house a path branches off to the right, leading to the hothouse,

which I used often to visit for a few moments, to look at my

experimental plants. This was always a great disappointment to the

dog, as he did not know whether I should continue my walk; and the

instantaneous and complete change of expression which came over

him, as soon as my body swerved in the least towards the path (and

I sometimes tried this as an experiment) was laughable. His look of

dejection was known to every member of the family, and was called

his hot-house face.” Darwin

Anecdotal observation

Folk Psychological Explanations of Animal Behaviour

Is it appropriate for a science of animal behaviour to…

… ascribe intentional states to animals?… explain their behaviour in intentional terms?

Cognitive ethology: YES

Cognitive Ethology

Fully scientific explanations of mind and behaviour are refined versions of, and therefore continuous with, FP explanations • Applicable to both human and non-human animals

Two central tenets: 1. Mental state predicates are part of theoretical vocabulary

of a productive, systematic, empirical theory (‘methodological naturalism’) • they need not be reduced to, or eliminated by, non-

mental predicates

2. Intentional states are physical states (‘ontological naturalism’)

Case Study: Play

Two chasing dog cubs: why doesn’t Y bite seriously?

1. Start with FP explanationsX wants to play; Y realises that X wants to play

2. Systematic study of play behaviour- Same action patterns occur in other, non-play contexts

• biting in predation• running in fleeing predators• mounting in mating

- An identifiable element (play bow) often closely associated with a potentially misleading action pattern

Case Study: Play

3. CE’s scientific, mentalistic theory of play in dogs/wolfs

• X wants to play and communicates its intention by a specific signal (play bow)

• Play bow establishes a ‘play context’

• Play context generates in Y the belief that X wants to play; this is a specific second-order state of Y

• This belief explains why Y’s biting is harmless

Levels of intentionality (Dennett)

0 order: X lacks intentional states (ITs)

1st order: X has ITs• X wants to q• X believes that p

2nd order: X has ITs about ITs• X believes that Y wants to q• X wants Y to believe that p

3rd order: X has ITs about higher-order ITs• X believes that Y wants Z to want q• X wants Y to believe that Z believes that p

Attributing Intentionality

Is it justified to attribute intentional states to animals?

= do (some) animals have (at least) 1st order intentionality (rather than 0 order intentionality)?

Cognitive Ethology:

• this can be settled empirically

• test competing hypothesis of intentionality

Attributing Intentionality – Vervet Alarm Calls

Vervet monkeys

• can emit three distinct types of alarm calls in response to three different types of predators

e.g. ‘leopard alarm call’ when a leopard is detected

Attributing Intentionality – Vervet Alarm Calls

0 order hypothesis:

stimulus behavioural response (vocalisations)• leopard leopard alarm calls• snake snake alarm call• bird of prey eagle alarm call

Prediction

Behavioural responses are ‘automatic’, i.e. invariant across different contexts

• leopard alarm is emitted whenever a leopard is detected irrespective of, for example, the presence of conspecifics

Attributing Intentionality – Vervet Alarm Calls

Observation

• Vervets do not call in the presence of leopard when there are no vervet conspecifics around

• Rather, the vervet silently hides in the bushes

Contradicts the prediction of the 0 order hypothesis that vocalisations are ‘automatic’

Favours 1st order hypothesis:

Vervet believes that they are no conspecifics around (and adjusts his behaviour accordingly)

Cognitive Ethology Defended

1) Difficult and unnatural to describe some behaviours (like play) in non-mentalistic terms

In certain disciplines, mentalistic interpretations are standard (e.g. primatology)

2) Mentalistic are superior to non-mentalistic interpretations

Non-mentalistic concepts do not capture the difference between the same behaviour in different contexts (e.g. aggressive vs. playful)

Cognitive Ethology Defended

3) Allowing generalisations across species

• Mental states have evolutionary functions• Intentional descriptions pick out cognitive states

according to their functions, rather than their neurobiological properties

• In different animals, the same function may involve cognitive states with distinct neurobiological properties

Functional-level generalisations would be missed if the only legitimate way of describing cognitive states was in terms of their neurobiological properties

Against Cognitive Ethology: Relying on FP

Stich, Dennett:

1. An aim of CE is the prediction and explanation of animal behaviour

2. FP are unsuitable for that aim, because

• FP notions can be applied with scientific precision only if the intentional content can be specified determinately

• Intentional content cannot be specified determinately in non-human animals

3. Therefore, CE should abandon FP notions for its aims

Against Cognitive Ethology: Relying on FP

Intentional content cannot be specified determinately in non-human animals

Determinate content:

The dog believes that there is a squirrel

Problem: the dog would behave similarly if the squirrel were a look-alike toy

If dog has a belief, then its content is not there is a squirrel (in our biological sense)

but (perhaps) there is a squirrel OR a look-alike toy OR…

Against Cognitive Ethology: Relying on FP

Intentional content cannot be specified determinately in non-human animals

Response (Allen & Bekoff)

1. Failure to distinguish squirrels from toy-squirrels on this occasion is no good evidence for the claim that the dog generally lacks a definite concept of squirrel

2. Dog may lack our concept of squirrel, but he may have a similar one – excluding some components of our concept (e.g., being a rodent) and including others (e.g. being tasty)

Against Cognitive Ethology: The Privacy of Mental States

1. Mental states are private – observably only to the individual having the experience

Even more so for non-human animals

2. Private states cannot be studied scientifically

Therefore, mental states cannot be studied scientifically

Against Cognitive Ethology: The Privacy of Mental States

Response (Allen & Bekoff)

The argument proves too much:

• Creates general ‘other minds’ problem (we cannot know which states our fellow humans are in, or even whether they have minds at all)

• Generally shelved by psychologists: they study the mind e.g. via inference to the best explanation

The Intentional Stance

Cognitive Ethology

FP ascribes intentional states, which are real, internal components that cause behaviour

Intentional Stance (Dennett)

FP does not describe the internal causes of behaviour

• because the internal mechanisms of behavioural control are radically different from FP claims

• not because the present categories are in need of refinement

The Intentional Stance

FP categories are instrumental (devices of interpretation)

• They help to “describe, predict and explain” behaviour

• Instrumental metaphorical Metaphorical: describe systems as if they genuinely

possessed intentional states

• X has belief = X’s behaviour can be explained by attributing belief and assuming rationality

FP is a provisional framework to be replaced by a neurobiological theory of behavioural mechanisms