coin in a box: packaging a wicked problem, richard j. campbell and conrad c. crane, sept. 2012
DESCRIPTION
Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP – 3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential improvement. That is, a standardized instructional framework 1 for insurgency and counterinsurgency based on a social continuum. The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of any instructional framework into doctrine.Keywords: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products, freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.TRANSCRIPT
1 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem
Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane
Author Note
Richard J. Campbell CIV, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), Counterinsurgency
Training Center – Afghanistan (CTC-A), Kabul. Mr. Campbell was the training developer at CTC-A
for 22 months. CTC-A will officially close 12 Oct. 2012.
Conrad C. Crane CIV, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, is the current director of the U.S.
Army Military History Institute. He was the lead author for The Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps
Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006).
Acknowledgments: the author would like to thank Paul J. Roberts (COL, SF), Michael G. Murray II
(USMC, MAJ), Prayoot Charoenthep (DIA, GS-15), Conrad Crane (CIV, AWC), and Ben Connable
(RAND Corp.) for their guidance, insights, and exchange of ideas. Technical assistance was provided by
Nicholas J. L. Butler (CAN, CAPT) and Joseph M. Henson (US, CIV).
Comments or questions concerning this paper can be addressed to Nicholas J. L. Butler until 12
Oct. 2012. E-mail: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The opinions, recommendations, and conclusions in this report are those of the author, unless stated, referenced, or
cited otherwise. NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, the U.S. Government, and private companies affiliated with the author, or
agencies, offices, or organizations listed above is not responsible for the content. You the reader and end user are responsible for
determining the value of the information contained herein and the relationship it has to your environment, position, and assigned
tasks, duties, and responsibilities.
2 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Abstract
Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP –
3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance
synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements
have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential
improvement. That is, a standardized instructional framework 1 for insurgency and counterinsurgency
based on a social continuum. The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results
indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility
and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN
doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of
any instructional framework into doctrine.
Keywords: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of
operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products,
freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game
dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.
1. The term ‗instructional framework‘ is being used to describe a foundational premise that curricula is based upon. Five things
are considered when developing curriculum. They are; the characteristics of the students; the characteristics of the instructors; the
context in which the training or instruction takes place; the content and / or material; and the overlap. This includes e-learning.
3 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem
―The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail,
because of the nature of these problems. They are ‗wicked‘ problems, whereas science
has developed to deal with tame problems.‖ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, pg. 155)
The term wicked problem was introduced by Rittel in a seminar in 1967 and then later defined by
Rittel and Webber in a journal article 2 (1973). The article provided 10 ―distinguishing properties‖ that
separated societal problems or wicked problems apart from scientific and engineering problems. The
definition that was set forth described the complex interplay that occurs when people try to solve
problems for other people. For instance, the authors explained that when people are involved in problem
solving, there is an abundance of useless information, an absence of important information, a
preponderance of contradictory information, as well as a degree of consistency, inconsistency, and
changes along the way. Added to this, there is a lack of consensus about the actual problem and
disagreement about the solution, plus resistance to logical arguments, and scientific evidence. There is
however lots of support for individual goals and agendas instead of support for pro-social solutions.
(Rittel and Webber, pgs. 155-169) If a small group is satisfied or if one individual is happy, then many
more are not and the problem is still not solved.
If social violence or armed conflict were added to the definition of a wicked problem, an insurgency
might even be called a wicked problem. An insurgency is a social phenomenon with the aim of societal
change. The desired change is typically linked to politics, corruption, the economy, land, religion, or
tribal or ethnic divides. In essence, people want to make plans for other people and use violence to do so.
2. At the time, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber were urban planners and attending the University of Berkley in California. The
article was titled; ―Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning‖ and was published by Policy Sciences. The thesis was that social
public planning problems could not be solved with a linear, analytical, systems, or step-by-step approach.
4 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
To understand the complexity of an insurgency, it must be put into context. The intent of an instructional
framework is to put a complicated topic, such an insurgency, into context. An instructional framework
helps students conceptualize and understand an abstract subject because an abstract subject often requires
an extended definition, but the definition and explanation have to be logical and make sense.
For instructional purposes, this project looked at the validity of using a social continuum to describe
an insurgency. For instance, at one end of the continuum there is a functional society with an efficient
government and governance, a productive economic system, societal growth and development, social
rules and laws, adequate services, safety and security, an effective police force, and a judiciary system
that works. Moving along the same continuum there is, more or less, a dysfunctional society with obvious
social unhappiness and unrest, a weak under developed economy, few services, civil disapproval,
corruption and patronage, nonviolent public protest, government indifference, ineffective policing, and
societal disturbances and disobedience. At the far end of the continuum there are mass mutinies, a failed
economy, public riots and revolt, no services, almost non-existent policing, limited safety and security,
lack of government, civic revolution, subversion, violence, armed conflicts, and terrorism.
If a social continuum can be utilized to describe an insurgency it would have several benefits. The
benefits for U.S., NATO, international, and host nation instructors and students would be:
An established commonly accepted lexicology.
An explainable framework that places insurgency in context.
A relevant societal based method of evaluation and assessment.
Standardization, Quality Control (QC), and Quality Assurance (QA).
Cross domain consistency: i.e. diplomatic – stability – military – civilian.
A step beyond a military centric approach when conducting a counterinsurgency.
The support of a more flexible yet concise polythetic approach for insurgency and COIN.
5 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Research Question
Can a social continuum framework be used to enhance the understanding of an insurgency? Or as
explained by Irregular Warfare (IW) literature, is there a collaborative framework that can help combined
and joint forces to ―understand, plan, act, assess, and adapt in concert with U.S. Government (USG)
interagency and multinational partners and the host nation‖ 3 to solve an insurgency? (2010, pg. 5)
Perhaps the word ‗solve‘ is incorrect, if we accept Rittel‘s and Webber‘s definition of a wicked problem.
Their definition says a wicked problem cannot be solved. If a social continuum framework is a valid
collaborative framework can it then be successfully used for COIN? The question has two parts. The first
is about utility and the second is about feasibility, or is it truly impossible to solve a wicked insurgency?
A review of literature or large scale meta-analysis, will attempt to answer the first part of these questions.
If a social continuum is validated as an instructional framework then feasibility and efficacy of the
instructional method will be explored.
Method
Materials
The meta-analysis of COIN references utilized primary and secondary references. The primary
references included nine international military COIN manuals, 10 scholarly research articles, papers, or
studies, and five contemporary books about insurgency, COIN, subversion, and terrorism. More
specifically, one military manual from each of the following countries were used; Australia, Canada,
Great Britain, France, and Germany, three U.S. manuals, and a concept paper. The nine manuals were
published between 2006 and 2011. Primary references also included 10 academic articles from between
2005 to 2012. Each of these used multiple cases, studies, or reports, or was a straightforward meta-
analysis. For example, one was a case study of 17 insurgencies; another was a case study of 30
3. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010).
6 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
insurgencies; one more used six case profiles; yet another used 10 research papers and a meta-analysis of
89 insurgencies; and one more was an analysis of 648 terrorist groups. Five contemporary books were
also used as primary references. The books were either specifically about COIN or a very similar topic
like terrorism or state violence and were published between 2010 and 2012. Each of the books cited and
referenced sources of data and supported observations and conclusions with more than anecdotal evidence
(see Appendix A, Figure A1 for the list of primary references).
Secondary references consisted of 15 separate U.S. Military manuals and five documents on IW. The
secondary references were examined for supporting or peripheral information about U.S. Title 10, Title
22, security assistance and security cooperation, stability operations, insurgency, COIN, intelligence, joint
and tactical level planning, and implementation (see Appendix A, Figure A2 for the list of secondary
manuals and IW documents).
Procedures
Of the three types of primary references, the military manuals were reviewed first. During the
examination the best practices, good factors, means of resolution, recommendations and suggestions,
principles, tenets, imperatives, improvements, lessons learned, effective COIN practices, and conclusions
were located, extracted, and documented. The examination produced nine different lists (see Appendix B,
Figure B1 and Figure B2 for the lists from each manual). The third step was the meta-analysis of the
accumulated lists. The meta-analysis contrasted and compared the gathered information concentrating on
similarities, a pattern, or patterns, and redundant themes. The examination revealed five recurring themes
or persistent categories from the lists. The separate information from each list was categorized
respectively into the five categories and the results were posted on a plot chart. Redundant words, terms,
and phrases from the different lists were not re-posted a second or third time; however new additions
were added to the plot chart. The reemerging categories that were exposed by the meta-analysis were;
plans / operations; safety / security; stability / development; information / intelligence; and government /
7 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Safety Security
Info / Intel Stab/Dev
Plan/Ops
Govt. Gover
IW Core ActivitiesCT, UW, FID, COIN, SOIW Key ActivitiesStrat-Com / IOPsy-OPsIntel / InfoCIV-MilCT OPsSupport Law
Strat-Com / IO
Psy-OPs
CIV-Mil
Support Law
Cultural / Regional
CT OPs
Figure 1
SO
FID
FM 3-24 COINLegitimate GovUnity of EffortPolitical PrimaryUnderstand EnviroIntel drives OPsSeparate INS popSecurity / Rule / LawLong TermManage InfoAppropriate ForceLearn & Adapt
Grievances
JP 3-24 COINUnderstand OE LegitimacyUnity of EffortPolitical PrimaryIntel Drives OPsINS Isolate Security / RoLLong TermManage Info Appropriate ForceLearn & AdaptLowest LevelSupport HN
Gov Capacity
FM 3-24.2Attacking INS StrategyGov LegitimacyControl Area / Secure PopOPs from HN Area of StrengthHN Expand OPsInfo Engagement Pop SupportDiscredit INS Propaganda
INS Strategy
Secure Pop
Australian COINPolitical Primacy LegitimacyComprehensive ApproachIntelligenceReinforce Rule LawGood GovernanceDominant NarrativeIsolate the INSPresenceAdaptationHN Primacy
Great Britain AFM COINPrimacy of PoliticalUnity of EffortHuman TerrainSecure PopulationNeutralize InsurgentsGain Popular SupportOperate Within LawIntegrate IntelLong Term & Learn Adapt
Human Terrain
Control Areas
Canadian COINPolitical primacyUnity of PurposeComplex DynamicsExploit Intel / InfoSeparate INSNeutralize INSSustain CommitmentLong Term Planning
German COINSocial AffairsPolice / MilitaryAdmin / LawEconomy / InfraEnviron / Health
French COINCut-off INS PopMobilize PopPrevent ComebackShelter Inaccessible
Primacy of Political
Police / Military
Understand OE
Isolate INS
Unity of Effort
Gain Pop Support
Economy / Infra
Environ / Health
Long Term
Support HN
Discredit INS Propaganda
Good Gov
Advisers
Learn / Adapt
Build Capacity
Oil Spot
OP Within Law
Gov Legitimacy
Admim / Law
1
Exploit Intel
Intel Drives Ops
Manage Info OPs
Appropriate Force
Neutralize INS
governance (see Figure 1 above for the results of the first meta-analysis).
The rest of the primary references were next. This included the 10 academic research articles, papers,
or studies, and the five scholarly publications. Each of the steps described above were repeated for the
research articles and then the books. During the second and third meta-analyses the same reoccurring
categories were observed in the lists for the articles and books (see Appendix B, Figure B3, Figure B4,
and Figure B5 for the lists from the research articles and Figure B6 for the lists from the books). The plot
chart was then up-dated with the accumulated words, terms, and phrases from the rest of the primary
8 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Plan/Ops
Stab/DevSafety
Security
Govt. Gover
Info / Intel
Support Law Psy-OPs
CIV-MilCT OPs
Cultural / Regional
Strat-Com / IO
Stability Operations
Grievances
Gov Capacity
FID
Secure Pop
INS Strategy
Development
Policing
Pacification
Oil Spot
Legit Force
Democracy
Primacy of Political
Border Control
Amnesty / Rewards
Basic Services
Grievances
Reduce Corruption
Separate INS
Human Rights
Law Enforcement
Pop Focused
Political Process
Secure Areas
Expand Security
Isolate INS
Single Auth
Reintegration
Militias
Advisers
Sanctuaries Denied
Emphasis Intel
How Insurgencies End, 2012Embracing Fog of War, 2012Assessing Freedom of Movement, 2012COIN Scorecard, 2011Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 2010How Terrorist Groups End, 2008War by Others Means, 2008Analytic Support to Intelligence, 2008Money in the Bank, 2007Heads We Win, 2007Subversion and Insurgency, 2007Best Practices in COIN, 2005
Human Terrain
Understand OE
Unity of Effort
Discredit INS Propaganda
Long Term
Gain Pop Support
Economy / Infra
Environ / Health
Support HN Control Areas
Police / Military
OP Within Law
Gov Legitimacy
Admim / Law
Good or Effective Gov
Oil Spot
Expand
Expand Security
Small Business
Education
Narrative
Messaging
1st With Truth
Info OPs
Multi Lines
Info / Intel
Learn / Adapt
Build Capacity
Build Capacity
Build Capacity
Build Capacity
Build Capacity
Figure 2
Economy
Context
Context
COIN Assessment All-source Analysis
Intel Drives OPs
Irregular Warfare Strategy
Counter Violence
Counter Violence
Air Dominance
2 Strategic Commo 3 Support factors
One Democracy Factor
Sufficient Strength
Competent Gov
Positive Relations w/Pop
Improvements
Perception of Security
Kill or Capture
2
How Insurgencies End, 2012Embracing Fog of War, 2012Terrorism Studies A Reader, 2012Understanding COIN Doctrine Operations and Challenges, 2010Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict, 2010
Tipping Point
Deny Sponsorship
Deny Sanctuary
Metrics
Counter-Ideology Shape-Clear-Hold
IW Strategy
Weak State = violence
Small Local Projects
Investments
references (see Figure 2 above for the final display of terms, words, and phrases).
Discussion
From an instructional and institutional stance, it does appear that the stratification of an insurgency
into socially based categories could be beneficial. A social continuum could establish a standardized
framework and support QC and QA efforts. The terms and definitions used to explain an insurgency and
COIN might also be enhanced. For instance, the idea of a weak state, failing state, or small minded state
could easily be explained with a social continuum framework. Other topics like the difference between a
9 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
freedom fighter and an insurgent could also be discussed. In the U.S., a social continuum can easily be
reconciled with the IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 3, other IW and USAID documents
4, and civilian
publications about insurgency, violence, and underdeveloped states 5. Studying a community from this
viewpoint also supports stability approaches to instability. The layers of society, just like the layers of an
onion, can be peeled back further with a social framework explanation. A social network analysis and
cognitive behavioral analyses would be the next layers. It is also interesting to note that the five repetitive
categories identified during the meta-analyses were very similar to the logical lines of operations, lines of
effort, and lines of operations used in COIN doctrine 6. If a social continuum is used as a standardized
instructional framework it would support the integration of the conceptual social sciences into COIN
doctrine, as suggested by the Defense Science Board Task Force 7 (DSBTF, 2011) and as mentioned in
the Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan 8 (2011).
3. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010).
4. National Strategy For The United States (2002); Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, v.2.0 (2005); National Security
Strategy Of The United States Of America (2006); Quadrennial Review (Feb. 2006); The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug.
2006); The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006); Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report (2009); Joint Publication 3-24
COIN Operations (2009); Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services
Committee (2012); USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015, U. S. Agency for International Development Washington D.C.
5. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) in ―Rethinking Violence‖ cite Fearon and Laitin ―Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War‖; R.
Brubaker and D. D. Laitin, ―Ethic and Nationalist Violence,‖ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (Aug. 1998); I. W. Zartmen
ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder Colo. Lynne Rienner (1995); R. I.
Rotberg, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press (2004); M. A. Kocker,
―Insurgency, States, Capacity, and the Rural Basis of Civil War‖, Yale University (Oct. 2007); W. Rosenau, Subversion and
Insurgency, Rand Corp. (2007); D. C. Gompert and J. Gordon, Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for
Counterinsurgency, Rand Corp. (2008); G. H. McCormick, S. B. Horton & L. A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The ‗End game‘
Dynamics of Internal Wars (2006).
6. U.S. Army FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 COIN, pg. 5-3 (2006); U.S. Army FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN, pg. 3-8 (2009); U.S. Joint
Publication 3-24 COIN Operations, pg. IX-7 (2009); NATO AJP 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, pg. 4-9 (2011).
7. Office of the Sectary of Defense, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence –
Counterinsurgency Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations (2011).
8. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan Draft
Report, FOUO (2011).
10 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Should a standardized framework be used to explain an insurgency and should it be integrated into
COIN doctrine? Do COIN instructors, students, host nation, supporting forces and other elements really
need a uniform framework? Has the lack of a consistent educational framework for COIN caused
problems? The answer to each of these questions is yes.
When an individual from a NATO contributing country is supporting a country with an insurgency
and that person says they are the intervening counterinsurgent, or says the overarching objective of
NATO and U.S. COIN is to control the population and control groups within the population, there is
definitely a problem and it needs to be addressed 9. NATO Security Assistance missions and U.S.
Security Force Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, Internal Defense and Development, and Stability
Operations are not intended to control populations, nor are they designed to develop control over
population groups 10
. These statements appear to be out of context and are misleading. The intent of
NATO and U.S. COIN in the context stated above is to support, assist, train, mentor, monitor, and above
all educate host nation counterparts, so they can understand their insurgency, and then deal with their
insurgency. NATO and U.S. forces and supporting elements are unequivocally not the counterinsurgents.
The host nation government, military, police, and other elements within the host nation are the
counterinsurgents. Ownership of the wicked problem needs to be clear to all, as well as the responsibility
for the success or failure of COIN efforts.
Although clarifying and standardizing NATO and U.S. Government guidance are outside the purview
of this project the examples above reinforce the need for standardized curricula developed from concise,
informative, and correct doctrine. An approved instructional framework helps instructors, students, host
nation, and supporting elements on the ground understand the context in which they are operating in and
provides them with the correct language to discuss problems.
9. David J. Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (2006); U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009).
10. Mark Ulrich, Cutting the Gordian Knott, The Counterguerrilla‘s Guide to Defeating Insurgencies and Conducting Populist
Centric Operations (Draft, 2010).
11 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Research Question
The results of the meta-analysis indicated that a social continuum could be quite beneficial as an
instructional framework for insurgency curriculum. Therefore the next questions that were addressed
were; how feasible would it be to integrate the instructional framework into doctrine? And what would
hamper or help the integration of a social continuum into doctrine?
Method
Materials
The second phase of the project examined two sets of documents. The first set of references were
U.S. intelligence manuals which included; JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence (2007), U.S. Army FM 2-0
Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook (2010). The second set of references
was described earlier (see Appendix A, Figure A2 for the list of secondary manuals and IW documents).
Procedures
The feasibility study focused on the sociocultural content already in doctrine, the quality of that
content, and the prospect of clarifying or enriching that content. With the intent in mind, the three
intelligence documents were reviewed for any content that formally connected information and
intelligence to COIN operations and planning. Each of the listed U.S. manuals was then examined in an
attempt to gather enough information about the joint planning process to produce a graphic
representation. A graphic display would show the layers of the planning process, expose the complexities,
and would improve the overall analysis. It was also thought, for the sake of brevity, that a graphic
representation would be useful since 15 primary documents explained the COIN planning process or
aspects of it and eight others contained supporting content. This was estimated to be well over 2000 pages
of information. Although much of the written content had to be reviewed anyway, interlinking illustrative
12 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
slides would be the most proficient way to display the joint planning process for COIN. Six slides were
used to present the process from top to bottom or from the state department / diplomatic level to the joint
level (see Appendix C, Figure C1 through Figure C6 for the graphic representation).
Results
During the feasibility study, four potential problems or deficiencies were noted that might confound
efforts to integrate a social continuum framework into doctrine 11
. The first problem was that certain terms
and definitions associated with sociocultural information were neither standardized in COIN doctrine nor
nested within other doctrine that supported COIN. The second deficiency was that JP 2-0 Joint
Intelligence (2007), U.S. Army FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook
(2010) had minimal information about COIN and even fewer COIN terms. In the same three manuals the
term ‗Irregular Warfare‘ was only used twice and was neither explained nor defined. These findings were
significant and rather surprising because two of the publications were relatively new and intelligence was
supposed to drive COIN operations. The third problem was directly connected to the first two. If the first
or second deficiencies mentioned above were corrected, it would create a chain reaction. If one
publication was corrected, then several other manuals would have to be corrected. The fourth deficiency
was based on the theoretical underpinnings of COIN in U.S. Government and military doctrine. Lack of
an explanation in one and inconsistency and ambiguity in the others were the issues. Each of these four
problems will be explored in greater detail.
The first confounding problem was based on lexicology, conceptualization, and the lack of consistent
definitions and guidance about information, data, and / or intelligence generated by the social sciences.
An explanation for IW and a standardized definition for it were generally missing too. A definition for the
sociocultural factors was found in the JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2012)
11. The terms ‗potential problem‘ and ‗deficiencies‘ were used for lack of a better term.
13 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
and the same definition was used in JP 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
(2009). However, the definitions in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), JP 3-24
Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF, 2011) were
different. JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence (2007), FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010), and TC 2-50.5 Intelligence
Officer‘s Handbook (2010) did not use the term sociocultural factors at all. This brought-up the question
of whether or not the three intelligence manuals were relevant in a COIN environment. FM 2-0
Intelligence (2010) did have a definition for the term civil considerations (pg. 1-8). The three different
sociocultural definitions are listed below.
―sociocultural factors — The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the
relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment.‖
(JP 1-02 Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, 2012, pg. 305)
(JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2009, pg. GL-9)
Sociolcultural factors: ―society, social structure, culture, power, and authority and interests.‖
(JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009, pg. xxii & pg. VIII-3)
―social science disciplines (anthropology, ethnography, human geography, sociology,
socialpsychology, political science, and economics).‖ (Defense Science Board Task Force,
2011, pg. 48)
An explanation for the lack of a definition for the term sociocultural factors, in intelligence doctrine,
might be that ―Intelligence products are generally placed in one of seven production categories‖ (JP 2-0,
2007, pg. I-16). The sociocultural factors were not one of the categories. FM 2-0 Intelligence (2010)
restated the fact that there were seven production categories. TC 2-50 Intelligence Officer‘s Handbook
14 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
said, ―Army unit intelligence staffs produce and receive, directly or indirectly, six categories of
intelligence support from the U.S. intelligence community‖ (2010, pg. 1-3). However many intelligence
products there are, the sociocultural factors did not seem to fall into any of the categories. In fact, none of
the different definitions for the sociocultural factors fit the descriptions for the categories of intelligence
products. This generated the following questions: Should an eighth production category be devised to fill
this gap? Or should a new category be created for information pertinent to COIN operations?
The discovery initiated a broader look at key COIN terms and definitions. The examination led to the
discovery of the second deficiency. That is, intelligence doctrine contained very little COIN related
Sociocultural factors: @ @ $ @ $ @ $ @
Freedom of movement: @ @ $ @ @
Ends scope: @ $
Core grievances: @ $ @
Root causes: @ @ $ @ $
Prerequisites: @ $
Breaking point: @ $
Comprehensive COIN: @ $ @ $ @ $ @ $
Systems perspective: @ @ $ @ @ $ @ $ @ $
End game dynamics:
@ = Used $ = Defined
US GOV JP 3-24 JP 1-02 JP 2-01.3 JP 2-0 FM 3-24 FM 2-0 TC 2-50
3
Figure 3
15 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
information. The investigation of key terms started with a list of what was thought to be significant terms
and concepts that were found in COIN doctrine and would be used in COIN curriculum. The list was
based on the researcher‘s understanding of COIN and personal experiences. It was in no way an official
list. From there, the list of significant terms was cross referenced in several official COIN publications to
see if they were used and defined. The list included; freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances,
root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, comprehensive COIN, systems perspective, and end game
dynamics. The list could have included many more terms such as; irregular warfare, civil military
operations, sanctuaries, safe havens, tipping point, and non-state actors and so on, depending upon the
theoretical slant (see Figure 3 on the previous page for the results of cross referencing).
According to the unofficial list of terms, the three U.S. COIN references were not standardized. The
matrix (Figure 3) shows some of the terminology gaps in the three COIN publications and exposes even
greater gaps in the examined intelligence doctrine. Intelligence and information are supposed to support
COIN operations, and intelligence is supposed to drive COIN operations. Numerous scholarly reports,
studies, and papers, and many U.S. and International military manuals have stressed this point for some
time now, but the fact was missing in all three intelligence publications. It might be wise to note these
deficiencies, so they can be corrected and so COIN and intelligence doctrine can be better synchronized
and the concepts nested in field manuals and joint publications.
The third problem was directly linked to the first two problems. U.S. Security Force Assistance and
Foreign Internal Defense arrangements with other countries are multifaceted and involve various
elements, agencies, departments, and organizations on both sides. A social continuum framework and the
five mutually supporting categories support one another and makeup the whole. If one area is affected
then there are consequences in other areas. This would include doctrine. Changes to security doctrine, for
example, would affect planning and operations doctrine, and information and intelligence doctrine. COIN
efforts have to be unified and synchronized, so they can support each other. To solve this ripple effect,
16 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
perhaps several JPs and FMs should be revised simultaneously or in conjunction with each other, or
perhaps one document should be designated as the primary reference and the others follow.
The fourth problem that was uncovered during the feasibility study was the theoretical foundations
of COIN that were in doctrine, or were not in doctrine. Today COIN is an important topic, so one would
hope that COIN doctrine was based on substantiated hypothesis, or something even more profound like
scientific evidence. The gold standard in psychology and psychiatry are hypotheses or theories that have
been proven with cross cultural validation studies. To this scientific community this is proof of concept.
By now one would think that COIN guidance and doctrine were based on such evidence.
The DSBTF Report (2011) recommended that the Intelligence Community (IC) develop intelligence
requirements for COIN that encompassed four specific needs; support for current and near-term
operations, and support for population-centric and whole of government approaches 12
(2011, pg. 62).
Before any authority in the IC can develop intelligence requirements for COIN, in some way shape or
form COIN concepts have to be integrated into intelligence doctrine. This first step has to be done before
the second step. This should include a theoretical or better yet a scientific foundation.
The DSBTF Report (2011) also suggested that the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide ―is
used as a starting point for doctrine.‖ (2009, pg. 62) Just like the previous suggestion this one needs to be
revisited, or several caveats need to be added. The recommended caveats are below.
1. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) appeared to use the term
counterinsurgent rather loosely. From the diplomat to the private the correct usage should be; the
host nation has invited NATO and U.S. support agencies and forces to assist them with their
insurgency. NATO and U.S. agencies and servicemen and women are not counterinsurgents.
12. Office of the Sectary of Defense, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence –
Counterinsurgency Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations (2011).
17 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
2. The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) said the intent of COIN was to control
the population and groups within the population. These statements support claims that NATO and
U.S. forces invade and occupy other countries with the intent of colonization. The guidance may
need to be examined and clarified.
3. The cross referencing of the unofficial list of COIN terms indicated that the U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) might be lacking. IW information was nil since the term IW was
used only once and was not explained.
4. There did not seem to be any theoretical or scientific basis for the guidance in U.S. Government
Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), other than an ―intellectual framework‖ (Preface). This
observation was based on a review of the guidebook and the fact that there were not any citations
or references listed in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guidebook (2009).
If the COIN Guidebook (2009) is used as a starting point for doctrine then it might be wise to revise
the COIN Guidebook (2009) first. If so, hopefully the revision would include a validated theory,
increased clarity, citations, and references. A theory that is proven and understood increases consistency
and interoperability and obviously enhances chances of success. Unproven theories or guesses produce
confusion, conflicts, and less chances of success. This brings up yet another question: What academic
construct is being used for the three COIN manuals that are currently being revised?
Perhaps the JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (2009) and FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006)
should be contrasted and compared with the COIN Guidebook (2009) because the first two documents
had more concise and referenced material than the COIN Guidebook (2009). Several observations support
this claim. First, the work of McCormick, Horton and Harrison (2006) and Hoffman (2007) were
18 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
referenced and used correctly. The terms ―ends‖ or ―end game dynamics‖ 13
and ―ways and means‖ 14
are
proof (JP 3-24, pgs. xi, II-3 & II-4). The JP 3-24 also used the McCormick, Horton and Harrison (2006)
term ―breakpoint‖ or ―breaking point‖ (JP 3-24, pgs. xiv, II-28 & II-29), and briefly discussed the idea of
―decelerating decline‖ 13
(JP 3-24, pgs. II-28 & II-29). However, the concept was not fully explained. A
more detailed explanation would have included, ―tipping point‖, and the ―accelerating decline‖ 13
for the
state. Second, the JP 3-24 also used IW terminology and referenced an IW Strategic Guidance Policy, an
IW Joint Publication, and several IW Service Publications 15
. Thirdly, the JP 3-24 somewhat supported a
polythetic approach, but did not actually say so. This was evident with the references to the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) term ―fragile state‖ 16
which USAID still uses today 17
.
As far as application, Christopher, Colin, and Grill (2010) said, they were impressed with the material
in FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006). In fact, in their opinion ―FM 3-24 receives strong
empirical support‖ (2010, pg. 60). The authors statements were based on a quantitative test of
performance for ―20 distinct approaches to COIN‖ (2010, pg. xiv). The authors further described the
―population-centric‖ approach in FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency as a ―blend of classic and
contemporary COIN thinking‖ 18
(2010, pg. 58). However, a word search for the term ‗population-centric‘
reveals that there are more definition, cross referencing, and nesting problems with the term if it is used.
At this point it is not known whether or not the theoretical construct from the JP 3-24 (2009) or FM 3-24 /
MCWP 3-33.5 (2006) will be used in the revised manuals.
13. McCormick G. H., Gordon H., Steven B. Horton, and Laruen A. Harrison. Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of
Internal Wars. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp 321-367.
14. Hoffman, F. G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
15. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare; JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations; JP 3-26, Counterterrorism; FM 3-05.201, Special
Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations; FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict.
16. United States Agency for International Development‘s (USAID‘s) Fragile States Strategy (2005).
17. USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015, United States Agency for International Development‘s Washington D.C.
18. Christopher P., P. Clarke and B. Grill (2010). Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency.
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA.
19 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Discussion
To improve COIN doctrine, the institutional management of COIN, and COIN instruction, a
standardized instructional framework should be considered. Formal development, integration, and
evaluation are parts of that process. It is further suggested that a social continuum, as briefly described in
this paper, is considered as the basis of a COIN instructional framework. The results of the meta-analyses,
as illustrated, support these two recommendations. These suggestions would indeed package COIN more
appropriately, improve management, and facilitate delivery.
The subsequent investigation directed towards feasibility and efficacy of a social continuum revealed
that there were several obstacles that might impede the integration of any instructional framework into
COIN doctrine. The first hurdle was COIN doctrine itself. Terms and concepts need to be standardized
and coordinated across various domains, and then nested accordingly in other doctrine. Synchronization
and nesting of content at different levels of the U.S. Government is needed too. Doctrine for such an
important and far researching topic should never be developed in a vacuum. Since three important COIN
manuals are being revised right now, this is the most opportune time to accomplish a multiple level, multi
service, cross domain revision and put COIN in a box. Definitions can be standardized, concepts can be
clarified, information and procedures coordinated, and cross referenced, and shared for the betterment of
doctrine, and for the benefit of society.
The second barrier is information and intelligence doctrine. As demonstrated, the three intelligence
references that were examined had very little COIN related content. From this observation it would seem
that information and intelligence doctrine has some major gaps to overcome before it can support COIN
or drive COIN operations fully and thoroughly. Lack of progress in this area has already been noted 19
.
Because of the high profile nature of Intelligence in COIN, one would think these deficiencies would
19. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010)
20 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
have already been addressed and that intelligence related COIN content would have been developed,
vetted, packaged, and passed on. This does not seem to be the case. The conclusions in this paper
pertaining to intelligence were drawn from the cited material. There may be other published references
that counter these conclusions. More research and study seems to be needed to identify and then rectify
the perceived problems.
The third obstacle is COIN content, nesting, synchronization, and the ripple effect. If the deficiencies
above are corrected, then concurrently or in sequence other doctrine will also have to be revised. This
would include information and intelligence, planning and operations, stability and development, and
government and governance. Multiple players on a battlefield going different directions with different
guidance, and information, different agendas, and goals accomplish absolutely nothing. Insurgents will try
to split the host nation government, military, police, and the population, and try to separate any element,
agency, or force that is assisting or supporting the host nation and / or government. Insurgents will
succeed at this task unless there is a coherent cohesive plan that everyone knows, understands, and
follows. Putting COIN in a box would provide a standardized set of words, terms, theories, concepts,
guidance, and end states.
The fourth deficiency that was uncovered related to the theoretical constructs that were found, or not
found in COIN doctrine, at multiple levels. This point was adequately discussed in the body of this work
and will therefore not be readdressed. However, at this time a fifth deficiency will be added to the list.
During the research phase of this project it was noticed that there was little COIN content designed
specifically for Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP) involved in COIN. A review of CTC-A data also
revealed that LEP Mentors and LEP Trainers in Afghanistan and Afghan National Police had the lowest
attendance rates at the COIN Leaders Course in Afghanistan (respectively in the order listed) 20
. These
20. Attendance data and student characteristics were collected by CTC-A staff and archived. The content is archived at the U.S.
Army Combined Arms Center, COIN Center and the Afghan National Defense University.
21 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
findings were also surprising because Policing plays such a vital role in proto-insurgencies and during the
decline of an insurgency 21
. In fact, LEP and ANP attendance rates were so low at the COIN Leaders
Course, it is suggested that perhaps The DoD Inspector General and / or DSBTF examines the reasons for
this deficiency. One of the NATO Contributing Nations did have a caveat against the participation in
COIN, but most LEPs in Afghanistan were U.S. contractors. For some unknown reason LEPs in
Afghanistan had not participated in the COIN training that was available and it looked like the LEP
program in Afghanistan provided no ―in house COIN training‖ to LEPs or ANP. This perceived lack of
content and training adds another confounding element to the development of COIN doctrine.
Together all of these deficiencies show that there is still a lot of work that needs to be done and that
work will require a team effort. If the work is not done or cannot be done, then Rittel and Webber (1973)
were right. A wicked problem like an insurgency cannot be solved. If this is the case then how did society
and the world as we know it get to where we are today?
Conclusions
This is the latest and last paper, in a series of papers, produced under the NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A), COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) moniker. The NTM-A, CTC-A
COIN Leaders Course is effectively closed. The previous papers produced by CTC-A were about COIN
doctrine and the ongoing revisions. This present paper takes the next step.
The topic of this paper advances the discussion from foundational content to a proposed instructional
framework, which then leads to curriculum development, and on-to instruction and QC and QA. This of
course is the logical sequence, unless we fail to learn from our past mistakes. In the past we published
COIN manuals and asked military training units and contracting company to develop COIN curriculum
21. Byman D. (2007). Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corp. Santa
Monica CA.
22 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
and then provide COIN instruction, with absolutely no oversight. As a result, there has been lots of
useless information, a lack of important information, contradictory information, inconsistent information,
and many changes along the way. Plus, a lack of consensus about whether or not there was a problem and
disagreement about a solution, and resistance to logic, arguments, and scientific evidence. COIN efforts
could easily fall into the definition of a wicked problem too, if we allow that to happen. Packaging COIN
is one thing, delivering COIN is yet another. The next step needs to be addressed now.
Wars in the World 22
reports 60 countries currently involved in wars with a total of 362 militias,
guerrillas and separatist groups involved in those wars. The majority of these conflicts are reported to be
in Africa with 24 countries and 107 militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and anarchic groups drawn in.
Second place goes to Asia with 15 countries at war and 84 militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and
anarchic groups involved. Europe is next with eight countries and 57 militias, guerrillas, separatist
groups, and anarchic groups at war. Middle East ranks fourth with eight countries and 91 militias,
guerrillas, separatist, and anarchic groups participating. The Americas have 5 countries and 24 wars
between drug cartels, militias, guerrillas, separatist groups, and anarchic groups. These numbers have
been steadily increasing.
The rest of the world may not want to be involved in these wars and may not need to be involved
some of these wars. Unfortunately due to circumstances, relationships, events, or location certain
countries are involved and cannot opt out. Asymmetric tactics would not be used if there were no benefits
and they would not be used if there were no chances of success. If the total number of conflicts continues
to rise, putting COIN in a box and dealing with these wicked problems head-on may become the only
option others countries may have too.
22. Wars in the World Daily News on Wars in the World and on New States (21 Sept. 2012). http://www.warsintheworld.com
23 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Future Prospects Estimate
For me, the biggest problem now in doctrine development is recognizing and developing alternatives
to a resource heavy Clear-Hold-Build approach. While decision-makers in Washington are
understandably reluctant to initiate any large or long land force commitments, the services and even SOF
are balking at making any major commitments to Foreign Internal Defense or advisors. This new
framework promises to be useful in helping determine some of those other methods of COIN that may be
appropriate, but then the services, and the much weaker interagency, have to be willing to buy into them.
That will be the biggest challenge during a period of recoil from COIN and constrained budgets 23
.
23. The Future Prospects Estimate above was provided by Conrad Crane. Mr. Crane is the current director of the U.S. Army
Military History Institute and a noted military historian. During the early concept and design stages of Army Field Manual 3-24 /
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006) Mr. Crane was selected to be the lead author. GEN
Petraeus made the selection. During the final stages of this project he was provided a draft copy of the paper and asked if he
would considered reviewing it and then write ―a short conclusion, future prospects, or recommendations piece?‖ He took time out
from his busy schedule and provided the entry above. The piece was presented word for word as extracted from an email
correspondence, except for one minor change. The acronym for FID was spelled out. The contribution was not presented as a
quote since it was written specifically for this paper and was an integral part of the project. His personal contributions to the
development of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency are documented in; Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine,
operations, and challenges. Edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, Rourledge (2010).
24 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix A
Figure A1
Primary References
International Military Manuals
U.S. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, V. 2.0, 2010
French Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, 2010
German Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, 2010
British Army Field Manual Vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, 2009
U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009
U.S. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 2009
Australian Army Joint Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 2008
Canada Counter-Insurgency Operations, 2008
U.S. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2006
Reports, Studies, Meta Analysis
Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 2012
COIN Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years, 2011
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, 2010
How Terrorist Groups End, 2008
War by Others Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capacities for Counterinsurgency, 2008
Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies, 2008
Money in the Bank, Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations, 2007
Heads We Win, The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency, 2007
Subversion and Insurgency, 2007
Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, 2005
Books
How Insurgencies End, 2012
Embracing Fog of War, 2012
Terrorism Studies A Reader, 2012
Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine Operations and Challenges, 2010
Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict, 2010
25 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix A
Figure A2
Secondary References
Military Manuals
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 2011
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 2011
JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, 2011
JP 3-07, Stability Operations, 2011
FM 2-0, Intelligence, 2010
JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 2010
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 2009
FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 2009
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 2009
JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, 2009
JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 2011
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 2008
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 2007
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 2007
JP 3-13, Information Operations, 2006
Irregular Warfare Documents
National Strategy For The United States Of America (2002)
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 2.0 (2005)
The Irregular Warfare Special Study (Aug. 2006)
The Irregular Warfare Roadmap (Sep. 2006)
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (May, 2010)
26 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B1
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
International Military Manuals
U.S. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, V. 2.0: Irregular
Warfare Core Activities, counter terrorism CT, unconventional warfare UW, foreign internal defense FID,
counterinsurgency COIN, stability operations SO; Irregular Warfare key related activities, strategic
communication strategic communications, information operations IO, psychological operations Psy-Ops, civil-
military operations civ-mil, support to law enforcement, Intel, counterintelligence operations (2010, pg. 5)
French, Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level: cut-off the insurgents from the population,
mobilize the population to prevent any offensive comeback by the enemy, make shelters inaccessible to
guerilla units (2010, pg. 33)
German, Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency: establishing security and
state order in crisis areas; political, economic, social, legal, executive, and psychological measures taken by
civilian and military forces; example measures: social affairs, education, police, administration, law, economy,
infrastructure, environment, health, military (2010, pg. 3 and 6)
British Army Field Manual Vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency: primacy of political purpose, unity of
effort, understand the human terrain, secure the population, neutralize the insurgent, gain and maintain popular
support, operate in accordance with the law, integrate Intel, prepare for the long term, learn and adapt (2009,
pg. 1-1)
U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations: counterinsurgents must understand operational
environment, legitimacy is the main objective, unity of effort is essential, political factors are primary, Intel
drives operations, insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support, security under the rule of law is
essential, counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment, manage information and
expectations, use the appropriate level of force, learn and adapt, empower the lowest levels, support the host
nation (2009, pg. xv thru xvi)
27 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B2
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
International Military Manuals
U.S. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency: offensive operations - establish civil security, establish
civil control, support Host Nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support
to economic and infrastructure development, conduct information engagements, secure the populace
continuously, isolate the insurgency from populace, prevent crime, destroy, disrupt, interdict, deny or
neutralize elements of the insurgency, secure national and regional borders, integrate with and support HN
security forces (2009, pg. 5-1)
Australian Army Joint Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency: political primacy and
legitimacy, comprehensive approach, Intel, reinforcing the rule of law, support good governance, dominant
narrative, physical and moral isolation of the insurgent, presence, adaptation, HN primacy (2008, pg. 3-3 thru
3-8)
Canada, Counter-Insurgency Operations: effect political primacy in the pursuit of strategic aim, promote
unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies, understand the complex dynamics of the
insurgency including wider environment, exploit Intel and Info, separate the insurgents from their physical
and moral sources of strength including addressing their grievances, real or perceived, neutralize the INS,
sustain commitment to expand political capital and resources, conduct longer term post insurgency planning
(2008, pg. 3-2 thru 3-3)
U.S. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency: conduct information operations, conduct combat operations/civil security
operations, train and employ HN security forces, establish or restore essential services, support development
of better governance, support economic development (2006, pg. 4-4 thru 4-5); provide continuous security for
the local populace, eliminate insurgent presence, reinforce political primacy, enforce the rule of law, rebuild
local HN institutions (2006, pg. 5-18)
28 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B3
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
Reports, Studies, Meta Analysis
Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns (examines Freedom of Movement
concept in literature): context shapes the availability and meaning of freedom of movement data, a
standardized definition needs to be developed for freedom of movement, the freedom of movement
assessments process should capture contextual assessment, recommended five categories of freedom of
movement (2012, pgs. 51 thru 58)
Counterinsurgency Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30
Years (cases studies of 30 insurgencies worldwide that begun and were completed between 1978 and
2008): good COIN; two strategic communication factors, three tangible support factors, two government
legitimacy factors, one democracy factor, one intelligence factor, sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight
as guerillas, competent government, avoid excessive collateral damage, establish positive relations,
improvements in infrastructure, population supports COIN, establish and secure areas, air dominance,
provides basic services, perception of security was created (2011, pg. 2)
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers (case study of 30 recent INS & performance of 20 COIN approaches):
numerous mutually rein-forcing lines of Op, good vs. bad practices predicts outcome, strategic com principles,
reduce tangible INS support, Gov legitimacy, democracy, Intel, sufficient strength, competent Gov, avoid
CIVCAS, positive relationship with population, improvements development hearts & minds reducing
corruption, popularity, pacification community policing, Oil Spot, Legitimacy of Gov, air dominance, basic
services, cost benefit, border control, security, amnesty reintegration (2010)
How Terrorist Groups End (an analysis of 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006): most groups
have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed
members, a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43%),
policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40%) against terrorist groups that cannot or will not
transition to non-violence, religious groups take longer to eliminate than other groups, religious groups rarely
achieve their objectives bigger groups do better than smaller ones (2008, pg. xiv)
29 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B4
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
Reports, Studies, Meta Analysis
War by Others Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capacities for Counterinsurgency (12 research
papers on specific cases and an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II): 4 types of
insurgencies, local-local international-global local-global, understand shape act, COIN demands nonstop
learning, networking and cognition figure importantly in COIN, enhance the effectiveness of government,
government must provide safety, military force may be needed to protect population, proto-insurgency most
crucial task understand groups and popular grievances, greatest payoff in COIN targeted job training and
placement, justice system, lower education capacity, information power is crucial for international-local
insurgencies, smarter use of information in analysis, strategy, and planning, reduce reliance on direct large-
scale military power (2008, pgs. xxix thru xlvi)
Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies (analysis analytic techniques that can be used
to support COIN): in early phase intelligence and police, intelligence aimed at identifying cell members and
their locations and insurgent command structure, intelligence focused on required information elements,
discerning patterns predictive analysis analyzing insurgent networks friendly enemy interactions, friendly data
generally not captured, sharing data amongst agencies (2008)
Money in the Bank, Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations (6 case profiles,
Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu & Kashmir, Columbia): unfettered adaptability and
ability to be objective in the face of failure, ability to learn, civic and humanitarian actions along with credible
pledges of protection in return for cooperation, information operations should be employed to publicize
actions, manage gaps between populations expectations and the COIN ability, information and intelligence,
diversify sources of intelligence, create a competent indigenous police force (2007)
30 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B5
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
Reports, Studies, Meta Analysis
Heads We Win, The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (research project for US DoD on how to
improve US COIN capabilities): improve cognitive capabilities to understand shape and operate, cognitive
profiles for COIN personnel should be developed, attract people that that match the profiles, stress COIN
cognitive abilities during recruitment, professional education should address analysis strategy and operations,
COIN training expanded and improved, integrate intuition reasoning rapid adaptive decision making under
stress and uncertainty , study the path to which suicide terrorist are trained (2007)
Subversion and Insurgency (a set of case studies that explore the elements of subversion, definition of
subversion and ideas for combating subversion): strengthen counterintelligence or counter subversion
capacity, build police capacity, develop public information strategies (2007)
Best Practices in Counterinsurgency (study of 17 insurgencies and 36 other aspects of others to
consider): human rights, basic needs, law enforcement, emphasis on Intel, political process, focus on
population, security, secure areas and expand, isolated INS from population, single authority, psychological
operations, amnesty, reintegration and rewards, police in the lead, police expanded diversified, military learn
COIN, advisors embedded, INS sanctuaries denied, population control, political process, secure borders
(2005)
31 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix B
Figure B6
Words, Terms, and Concepts From Primary References
Books
How Insurgencies End (study of 89 INS): modern INS last about 10-yrs; clear tipping point, deny state
sponsorship, withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency, desertions, defections, infiltrations,
popularity, no support, terror campaigns loose, deny sanctuary, anocracies do not often succeed against
insurgencies, insurgencies with two or more parties are longer, more violent, and more complex endings,
governments are better off without support, support creates dependency (2012, pgs. xi thru xvii)
Embracing Fog of War (2-yr study of COIN assessment): context, COIN assessment, all-source analysis,
information, Intel, measurement or metrics are critical, layered context, effects based language should have
been removed by 2008, COIN information is best analyzed at the level at which it is collected (2012, pgs. xii
thru xxv)
Terrorism Studies A Reader: counterterrorism is not very different from counterinsurgency, ascertain
objectives and identify target groups, map the ideas, effective counter-ideological work (2012, pg. 361 thru
363)
Understanding Counterinsurgency Doctrine Operations and Challenges: oil spot, shape clear hold build,
stability and development, intel drives operations, political factors are primary, isolate insurgences from
population, must understand the environment, logical lines of operations, surge operations, irregular warfare
strategy, civil-military integration (2010)
Rethinking Violence States and Non-state Actors in Conflict: studies have linked state weakness to a rise
in intra-state violence, weak poor underdeveloped states are far more likely to experience violence than
wealthier states, when weak states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide guarantees of
protection collective fears of the future prompt ethnic violence, state weakness and violence needs to be taken
seriously; it is one of the few empirical regularities that has been documented through a variety of different
kinds of evidence and tests (2010, pg. 7 thru 8)
32 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
Joint Publication 5-0Joint Operation PlanningAug 2011, Chapter I, pg. 4Discusses the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX)
SecDef
Joint Planning In Doctrine
The joint planning and execution communityOr JPEC uses the APEX system to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations.
Planning Doctrine
FM 2-0, Intel, 2010
FM 3-24.2, Tactics In COIN, 2009
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intel Prep of the Op Environment, 2009
JP 3-24, COIN OP, 2009
JP 3-06, Joint Urban OP, 2009
JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 2011
JP 3-57, Civil-Military OP, 2008
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 2007
JP 2-0, Joint Intel, 2007
JP 3-13, Information Op, 2006
FM 3-24, COIN, 2006
Figure C1
The graphic representation of the COIN planning process did show the multiple layers and
complexity of COIN planning. The graphic representation might be a good addition to both the FM 3-24
and JP 3-24 if each respective publication illustrates the interface between joint and tactical level
planning. Joint planning should be based on strategic intent and tactical level planning should support
joint and strategic intent. Another addition might be where does information plug into the planning
process?
33 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR Input OP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS
JIPOE J2Mission Analysis, Intent, CCIRs, PIRs, FFIR, EEFIs, RFIs, ISR, Collection PlanGEOINT, HUMINTSIGINT, MASINTOSINT, TECHINT, Sync & Sharing
Info/Intel, Risk asses
Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nominate / PrioritizeCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment
SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHATerrorist Planning Cycle: USSOCOMBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation
COIN Planning Doctrine
AJP – 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine For COIN, Feb. 11
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coor During Joint Op, Jun. 11
JP 3-0, Joint Op, Aug. 11
JP 5-0, Joint Op Planning, Aug. 11
JP 3-07, Stability Op, Sep. 11
FM 2-0, Intel, Mar. 10
JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, Jul. 10
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Mar. 09
FM 3-24.2, Tactics In COIN, Apr. 09
FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, May 09
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intel Prep of the Op Environment, Jun. 09
JP 3-24, COIN Op, Oct. 09
JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, Nov. 11
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Op, Jul. 08
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, Apr. 07
JP 3-13, Information Op, Feb. 06
FM 3-24, COIN, Dec. 06
There are many publications that discussThe planning process. The list Shows theones that were used for this illustration ofCOIN planning or Intelligence PreparationBattlefield / Operational Environment IPB or OE.
KEY: DoS = Dept. of State; SA = Security Assistance; SC = Security Cooperation;
FID = Federal Internal Defense; IDAD = Internal Defense & Development; SFA =
Security Force Assistance; FHA = Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Figure C2
34 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR InputOP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS
JIPOE J2Mission Analysis, Intent, CCIRs, PIRs, FFIR, EEFIs, RFIs, ISR, Collection PlanGEOINT, HUMINTSIGINT, MASINTOSINT, TECHINT, Sync & Sharing
Info/Intel, Risk asses
Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nominate / PrioritizeCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment
Terrorist Planning Cycle: USSOCOMBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation
USAIDRelief MissionDislocated Civ/SupSecurity MissionsTech Assist/Sup Foreign ConsequenceStability OPsNation Assistance OPsHumanitarian/Civ AssistSecurity AssistNoncombatant EVAC
FID
DiplomaticInformationalMilitaryEconomicFinancialIntelligenceLaw Enfor
Indirect SupDirect SupCombat OPs
ATFMFFMSIMETPOCMOCAO
HN = IDAD
SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHA
KEY: DoS = Dept of State; JF CDR = Joint Force Commander; JIPOE = Joint Intel Preparation of Op Environment; SA = Security Assistance; SC =
Security Cooperation; FID = Federal Internal Defense; IDAD = Internal Defense & Development; SFA = Security Force Assistance; FHA = Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance; AT = Anti-terrorism (AT) activities; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; FMS = Foreign Military Sales; IMET = International
Military Education & Training; PO = Peace Operations; CMO = Civil-military Operations; CAO = Civil Affairs Operations, as well as, Psychological Op;
IW = Irregular Warfare; CT = Counter terrorism; UW = Unconventional warfare; FID = Federal Internal Defense; COIN = Counterinsurgency; SO =
Stability Operations; COIN = Counterinsurgency Assistance; USAID = US Agency for International Development
Irregular WarfareCTUWFIDCOINSO
USASOC
NSW
AFSOCMARSOC
JSOC
Figure C3
35 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
JIPOE J2Mission Analysis, Intent, CCIRs, PIRs, FFIR, EEFIs, RFIs, ISR, Collection PlanGEOINT, HUMINTSIGINT, MASINTOSINT, TECHINT, Sync & Sharing
Info/Intel, Risk asses
Joint Targeting PhasesCommander’s OBJ Guidance & IntentDevelop, Validation, Nomination/PrioritizationCapabilities AnalysisCommander's Decision & Force AssignmentMission Planning & Force ExecutionCombat Assessment
Terrorist Planning CycleBroad Targeting selectionIntelligence Gathering & SurveillanceSpecific Target SelectionPre-attack Surveillance & PlanningRehearsalsActions on the OBJEscape & Exploitation
JIPOE I Define the OE
1.Identify JF operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDR Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis
DoS DiplomaticJoint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF CDR InputOP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS
SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHA
HN = IDAD
Figure C4
36 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
Joint OP PlanningOperational ArtOperational DesignJoint OP Planning(National SecurityPolicy & Strategy)JF Cdr Input OP ApproachMission StatementPlanning GuidanceIntent & CCIRCONOPS
SocietySocial StructureCulturalPower/AuthorityInterests
Info/Intel/ISR
SWEAT – MSOSewersWater Electric AcademicTrashMedical FacilitiesSafety
Info EnvironmentSocio-culturalCivil factorsRoot CausesINS Desired End StateINS Narratives
JIPOEIntel CollectionProcess ExploitationAnalysis ProductionDissemination IntegrationEvaluation Feedback
Establishing, Communicating & Ensuring Understanding of IntentDetermining Roles, Responsibilities & RelationshipsEstablishing Rules & ConstraintsAllocating AssetsMonitoring & Assessing the Situation & Assessing ProgressRevising the Above
AreaStructuresCapabilitiesOrganizationsPeopleEvents
FHAShapingCrisis ActionStabilizationNormalization
SA & SC = FID, IDAD, SFA, FHA
PMESII-PT (Operational Variables)
PoliticalMilitary EconomySocialInformationInfrastructurePhysical Environment Time
JIPOE I Define the OE
1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDR Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis
Figure C5
37 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
Appendix C
JIPOE II Describe the Impact of OE
1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDRs Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis
JIPOE III Evaluate the Adversary
1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDRs Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis
JIPOE IV Determine Adversary Course of Action
1. Identify JF Operational Area2. Analyze Mission & JF CDRs Intent3. Determine Significant Characteristics of OE4. Establish Limits JF Areas of Interest5. Determine Level of Detail Required vs. Time6. Determine Intel/Info Gaps, Shortfalls, Priorities 7. Collect Material & Submit RFIs to Support Analysis
Figure C6
38 COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM
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