COLD WAR, GLOBALISATION AND THE RISE OF US HEGEMONY:

FROM YALTA TO VIETNAM

AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THERE WAS A GLOBAL VACUUM OF POWER. EUROPE, THE TRADITIONAL FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL POWER, HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY WAR. BRITAIN WAS ON ITS KNEES, FRANCE HAD BEEN HUMBLED BY OCCUPATION AND GERMANY HAD BEEN ANNIHILATED ECONOMICALLY AND DEFEATED. IN THE FAR EAST, THE MAJOR POWER, JAPAN, WAS OCCUPIED AND DEFEATED AND THE EUROPEAN COLONIES WERE IN A FERMENT OF NATIONALISM. OF THE MAJOR POWERS ONLY THE USA HAD EMERGED FROM THE WAR RELATIVELY UNSCATHED – ITS ECONOMY HAVING BEEN SAVED FROM DEPRESSION BY THE WAR. THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAD UNTIL WWII BEEN ISOLATED FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND CONSUMED BY INTERNAL TURMOIL, HAD EMERGED AS A STRATEGIC POWER BUT, IN ITS FIGHT TO THE DEATH WITH NAZISM, HAD BEEN SEVERELY WEAKENED.

IN THE FIRST PART OF THE LECTURE, I AM GOING TO LOOK AT THE REASONS WHY THE COLD WAR BROKE OUT. I WILL EXAMINE WHY IT WAS THAT, AFTER FIVE YEARS OF WAR, THE US THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR ALLIES LOCKED IN ANOTHER BATTLE WHICH WOULD LAST FOR OVER 40 YEARS, ONLY ENDING WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN 1991.

IN THE SECOND SECTION, I WILL LOOK AT SOME OF THE MAIN EVENTS OF THE FIRST 30 YEARS OF THE CONFLICT – A CONFLICT, WHICH ALTHOUGH LABELLED THE “COLD WAR”, STILL RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE.

INTRODUCTION

ONE THING WE MUST BE CLEAR ABOUT IS THAT ANY COUNTRY’S FOREIGN POLICY IS ESSENTIALLY SELFISH. IN DEVELOPING AND EXECUTING ITS FOREIGN POLICY, A COUNTRY SEEKS TO ENSURE THAT IT DERIVES THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE FROM ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS, THAT IT PROMOTES ITS OWN OBJECTIVES AND POLICY GOALS. THE COLD WAR WAS NO DIFFERENT – BOTH THE US AND THE USSR DEVISED AND IMPLEMENTED FOREIGN POLICIES WITH THE INTENTION OF GAINING ADVANTAGE AND ASSURING THEIR OWN SECURITY.

THE USA IN 1945

AS THE WAR CAME TO AN END, WASHINGTON WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM. APART FROM THE USA ITSELF, ALL OF THE MAJOR CAPITALIST STATES HAD BEEN EITHER DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BY WAR. AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS WERE HAUNTED BY THE PROSPECT OF A RETURN TO THE ECONOMIC DEPRESSION OF THE 1930S. THEY FEARED THAT IF EUROPE WAS LOST TO CAPITALISM THEN IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE AS IT WAS SLOWLY STRANGLED BY COMMUNISM.

BUT TO AMERICANS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SHIED AWAY FROM INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS, THIS SITUATION ALSO PRESENTED OPPORTUNITIES. EVER SINCE THE REVOLUTION, AMERICANS HAD BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE GOD’S CHOSEN PEOPLE AND THAT CAPITALISM WAS HIS CREATION – THEIR VISION WAS TO CREATE A CITY UPON THE HILL. AMERICANS BELIEVED, AND STILL BELIEVE, THAT THEY HAVE WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS A MANIFEST DESTINY TO CIVILISE THE REST OF THE WORLD; THAT THEY HAVE A HIGHER PURPOSE TO SERVE IN THE WORLD THAN OTHERS – A GOD-GIVEN DUTY TO PROMOTE FREEDOM AND TO CHRISTIANISE THE WORLD. AS TOM PAINE PUT IT “THE CAUSE OF AMERICA IS IN GREAT MEASURE THE CAUSE OF ALL MANKIND.”

THE VERY CREATION OF THE USA HAD, OF COURSE, BEEN AN IMPERIAL PROJECT. FROM THE EARLY 17TH CENTURY WHITE SETTLERS HAD EXPANDED THEIR AREA OF OCCUPATION BY CONQUEST AND BY PURCHASING VAST TRACTS OF LAND FROM OTHER EMPIRES. IN THEIR OWN TERMS, THEY HAD CIVILISED THE CONTINENT AND, BY THE 20TH CENTURY, WERE INTENT ON CIVILISING THE REST OF THE PLANET WITH THEIR VERSIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM. IN 1919, THEY HAD TRIED TO REMAKE THE WORLD IN THEIR OWN IMAGE BUT HAD FAILED TO OVERCOME THE ENTRENCHED INTERESTS OF THE OLD EUROPEAN EMPIRES. IN 1945, AMERICANS HAD ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY.

AMERICA WAS, THEREFORE, BOTH IDEOLOGICALLY PREDISPOSED TO EXPANSION AND HAD GOOD PRACTICAL REASONS FOR INTERVENING IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

THE USSR IN 1945

AND THE SOVIET UNION ALSO BELIEVED THAT IT WAS JUSIFIED IN INSISTING THAT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS OUGHT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE POSTWAR SETTLEMENT. NOT UNREASONABLY, THE SOVIETS FELT THAT THEY WERE DUE RECOGNITION FOR THEIR ROLE IN DEFEATING HITLER. THE USSR HAD LOST ABOUT 20M OF ITS PEOPLE DURING THE WAR AND THE GERMAN INVASION HAD DESTROYED ABOUT ONE-HALF OF ITS INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY. THE RED ARMY’S WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST THE WEHRMACHT HAD ESSENTIALLY BROKEN THE BACK OF THE NAZI FIGHTING MACHINE – FOR EXAMPLE AT STALINGRAD, THE SOVIETS HAD LOST ABOUT 1M SOLDIERS BUT STILL INFLICTED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT DEFEAT ON THE GERMANS IN WHAT BECAME THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR.

IN RETURN, THEY ARGUED THAT EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH HAD BEEN USED BY NAPOLEON, KAISER WILHELM AND HITLER TO INVADE RUSSIA, SHOULD BE UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO PREVENT FURTHER INVASIONS FROM THE WEST – THE BOLSHEVIKS ALSO REMEMBERED THAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS HAD INVADED RUSSIA IN 1919 TO SUPPORT THE WHITE RUSSIANS. IN 1945, THEY HAD A MAJOR ADVANTAGE WHEN MAKING THIS CASE AS THE RED ARMY ACTUALLY OCCUPIED THE TERRITORY THAT WAS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THEM.

LIKE THE AMERICANS, THE SOVIETS ALSO UNDERPINNED THE PRACTICAL WITH THE IDEOLOGICAL. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY PROCLAIMS ITS UNIQUE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO CHART A COURSE FOR THE EVENTUAL VICTORY OF COMMUNISM OVER CAPITALISM. IT WAS LENIN WHO PROVIDED THE COMMUNISTS’ EXPLANATION FOR THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THROUGH HIS THEORY OF IMPERIALISM. LENIN’S THEORY PROVIDED AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION HAD BROKEN OUT IN RUSSIA AND NOT THE MOST ADVANCED CAPITALIST STATES, AS MARX HAD PREDICTED. HE ARGUED THAT ADVANCED CAPITALISM WOULD GENERATE SUPER-PROFITS AND WOULD THEN SEEK TO MAXIMISE WEALTH BY EXPORTING THOSE PROFITS TO POOR COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD THEN BE EXPLOITED. EVENTUALLY, CAPITALIST NATIONS WOULD DIVIDE THE WORLD INTO COLONIES, HE SAID, AND THEN GO TO WAR OVER THEM. LENIN HAD ESSENTIALLY EXPANDED UPON MARXIST THEORY,

WHICH PREDICTED THAT THE OPPRESSED PROLETARIAT WOULD RISE UP AGAINST THE RULING CLASSES, BY ARGUING THAT RUSSIA – THE NATIONAL SURROGATE FOR THE PROLETARIAT – HAD RISEN UP AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST ORDER – MARX’S RULING CLASS. FOR LENIN, THE RUSSIANS WERE THE “CHOSEN PEOPLE” WHOSE HISTORICAL MISSION IT WAS TO LEAD ALL OF MANKIND ALONG THE ROAD TO PROGRESS BY ACTING AS THE VANGUARD FOR ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE COLD WAR

AT THE END OF THE WAR, NEITHER THE USA NOR THE USSR WANTED OR NEEDED TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT. THE USA DID NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN THE HUGE ARMIES THAT HAD BEEN CONSCRIPTED TO FIGHT THE WAR. AND FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PURSUE FURTHER CONQUESTS IN EUROPE, DESPITE WHAT MANY IN THE WEST BELIEVED.

BUT THE GRAND ALLIANCE WHICH HAD DEFEATED NAZISM HAD BEEN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. STALIN HAD SUSPECTED THAT THE USA AND BRITAIN HAD PUT OFF THE D-DAY LANDINGS BECAUSE THEY PREFERRED THAT RUSSIANS DO THE DYING. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY AMERICANS, AND CHURCHILL, WERE DYED IN THE WOOL ANTI-COMMUNISTS WHO BELIEVED THE SOVIETS TO BE INTRINSICALLY EVIL.

SO, WHY DID THE COLD WAR BREAK OUT?

FIRST, I THINK BECAUSE OF THE CENTURIES-OLD CONTEST WHICH HAD RAGED OVER EASTERN EUROPE. BOTH WESTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA HAD SOUGHT TO DOMINATE THE STRATEGICALLY VITAL EAST OF EUROPE. IN 1945, THE CONFRONTATION OVER EASTERN EUROPE, AND ESPECIALLY POLAND, WAS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS. FOR THE SOVIETS, THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY WAS DEPENDENT ON THEM PREVENTING INVASION FROM THE WEST, AS I HAVE SUGGESTED.

IN THE US, HOWEVER, PUBLIC OPINION HAD BEEN PERSUADED BY ROOSEVELT THAT A DEAL COULD BE DONE OVER EASTERN EUROPE – CATHOLIC AND POLISH-AMERICAN CONSTITUENCIES WERE VERY POWERFUL SHAPERS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND WERE OUTRAGED WHEN THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO CAVE IN.

FOR HIS PART, STALIN BELIEVED THAT THE WEST, AND CHURCHILL IN PARTICULAR, WERE RENEGING ON THE DEALS THAT HAD BEEN DONE DURING THE WAR ABOUT THE POSTWAR SETTLEMENT. AT TEHERAN IN 1943, ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL AND STALIN HAD AGREED THAT RUSSIA WOULD ANNEX EASTERN POLAND WHILE POLAND WOULD BE COMPENSATED WITH EASTERN GERMANY. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT POLAND WOULD BE PART OF A SOVIET ZONE OF INFLUENCE. THE NEXT YEAR IN MOSCOW, CHURCHILL AND STALIN HAD DIVIDED UP THE BALKANS. BY THE TIME OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE, IN FEBRUARY 1945, STALIN WAS EXPECTING THESE DEALS TO BE RUBBER-STAMPED AND THUS AMERICAN AND BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO RE-OPEN THE POLISH QUESTION DID NOT GO DOWN WELL.

FROM THE AMERICANS’ POINT OF VIEW, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET CONCERNS. THEY ALSO SERIOUSLY OVERESTIMATED THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SOVIET POLICY – THEY HAD SOLE POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB WHICH THEY REGARDED AS AN “INSTRUMENT OF GREAT POLITICAL POTENTIAL”; WASHINGTON SOUGHT TO USE SOVIET REQUESTS FOR AID AS BARGAINING COUNTERS FOR CONCESSIONS OVER EASTERN EUROPE, BUT WERE REJECTED.

SO, THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICANS, NOW LED BY HARRY TRUMAN, EXACERBATED STALIN’S PARANOIA. STALIN WAS IN SOLE CONTROL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND HIS PERSONALITY WAS WRITTEN ALL OVER IT. HE WAS IDEOLOGICALLY ANTIPATHETICAL TO THE WEST; HE WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ABOUT SOVIET SECURITY; AND BY NATURE HE WAS DECEITFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND HAD SHOWN IN THE PURGES OF THE 1930S THAT HE WAS QUICK TO SPOT AN OMNIPRESENT ENEMY.

BUT THE QUESTION OF PERSONALITY ALSO AFFECTED US POLICY. THE ARRIVAL OF TRUMAN AS PRESIDENT BROUGHT INTO THE WHITE HOUSE SOMEONE WHO HAD NO FOREIGN POLICY EXPERIENCE AT ALL. IN CONTRAST TO THE OUTWARD LOOKING, INTERNATIONALIST ROOSEVELT, WHO HAD WEATHERED THE POLITICAL STORMS OF THE WAR, TRUMAN WAS A STEREOTYPICAL MID-WESTERNER – SUSPICIOUS OF FOREIGNERS AND ESSENTIALLY INWARD LOOKING. CERTAINLY UNSCHOOLED IN THE ARTS OF DIPLOMACY AND PREDISPOSED TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE WITH THE SOVIETS.

BUT MOST WORRYING FOR THE WEST WERE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIETS TO EXERT INFLUENCE BEYOND THEIR ZONE OF OCCUPATION. IN EARLY 1946, MOSCOW SOUGHT TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE INTO IRAN. ALTHOUGH THE THEY WERE REPULSED, FOR MANY IN THE WEST THIS WAS PROOF POSITIVE OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. WINSTON CHURCHILL, NOW OUT OF POWER, PROCLAIMED THAT “AN IRON CURTAIN HAD DESCENDED IN EUROPE”.

IN 1947, GEORGE KENNAN, A SOVIET EXPERT AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, SPELT OUT WHAT WOULD BECOME US POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS FOR THE NEXT FORTY-ODD YEARS. HIS “CONTAINMENT” THEORY WAS THAT THE USSR WAS EXPANSIONIST AND THAT A FAILURE TO SPREAD COMMUNISM WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE FIVE KEY INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE WORLD – THE USA, UK, GERMANY AND EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE USSR – AND THAT FOUR OF THEM WERE IN THE WEST AND SHOULD STAY THAT WAY. KENNAN ARGUED THAT ELSEWHERE THE WEST COULD AFFORD TO BE FLEXIBLE, BECAUSE POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY WERE EXPENDABLE. IN THE PERIOD UP TO 1991 US POLICY WOULD SOMETIMES BE FLEXIBLE AND ON OTHERS RESULT IN MASSIVE RETALIATION WHEN THE CONTAINMENT LINE WAS BROKEN. HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT, BY THE CLEVER USE OF POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC POWER THE USSR WOULD BE FORCED INTO COLLAPSE.

IN THE SAME YEAR, COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES IN GREECE AND TURKEY, BOTH TRADITIONALLY BRITISH SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, EXPOSED THE UK’S INCAPACITY TO DEFEND WESTERN INTERESTS AND IT WAS LEFT TO TRUMAN TO STEP IN. IN WHAT BECAME KNOWN AS THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, HE PROCLAIMED THAT THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN “FREE PEOPLES” AND GOVERNMENTS WHICH RELIED ON “TERROR AND OPPRESSION” AND THAT AMERICANS HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO WAYS OF LIFE. HE ASKED FOR PERMISSION FROM CONGRESS TO OPPOSE “A CERTAIN IDEOLOGY” WHEREVER IT APPEARED IN THE WORLD. THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS GOT $400M OF AID AND TRUMAN HAD TAKEN ON AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT TO OPPOSE COMMUNISM; HE HAD DIVIDED THE WORLD BETWEEN TWO OPPOSING WAYS OF LIFE AND MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THERE

WAS NO CHOICE OTHER THAN BETWEEN THE AMERICAN WORLD VIEW AND THAT OF THE SOVIETS. KENNAN NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN THAT HIS IDEAS ABOUT CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN USED TO JUSTIFY AN OPEN-ENDED ENGAGEMENT WHICH POTENTIALLY INVOLVED MILITARY AS OPPOSED TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COUNTER MEASURES HE HAD SUGGESTED.

LATER THAT YEAR, ANDREI ZHADANOV, A CLOSE ALLY OF STALIN’S, REPLIED FOR THE SOVIETS. HE REVIVED STALIN’S ANALYSIS, MADE IN THE 1930S, WHICH POSITED THE EXISTENCE OF “TWO CAMPS” IN THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM; ZHADANOV DECRIED THE USA AS EXPANSIONIST AND SAID THAT THE USSR WAS THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO AMERICA’S WORLD SUPREMACY; AND HE ARGUED THAT THE USSR HAD OFFERED COOPERATION BUT HAD BEEN REJECTED BY WASHINGTON.

SO, WHY DID THE COLD WAR BREAK OUT? HISTORIANS PUT FORWARD THREE THEORIES:

1. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW HOLDS THAT THE US SIMPLY REACTED TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE USSR TO ITS EXISTENCE. SUPPORTERS OF THIS ORTHODOX APPROACH ARGUE THAT, IN THE FACE OF SOVIET AGGRESSION, AMERICANS HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONFRONT THE CHALLENGE OR FACE A SLOW DESTRUCTION OF THEIR WAY OF LIFE BECAUSE COMMUNIST EXPANSION WOULD STRANGLE CAPITALISM.

2. A LATER ANALYSIS PROMOTED THE IDEA THAT THE USSR WAS A BARRIER TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN POSTWAR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES. THIS REVISIONIST LINE DOES NOT DENY THAT THE USSR WAS SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE – ALTHOUGH IT DOUBTS WHETHER IN THE 1940S MOSCOW WAS CAPABLE OF DOING SO – BUT POINTS TO WASHINGTON’S OWN EXPANSIONIST AIMS AND ITS TRADITIONAL HOSTILITY TOWARDS SOVIET COMMUNISM AS EVIDENCE OF AMERICA’S EQUAL CULPABILITY.

3. MORE RECENTLY HISTORIANS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE COLD WAR WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF A COMPETITION FOR

WORLD DOMINATION BUT THE RESULT OF A SEARCH BY BOTH EAST AND WEST FOR POSTWAR SECURITY. THEY SUGGEST THAT GLOBAL DISORDER, MUTUAL DISTRUST AND A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER’S PRIORITES LED TO THE CONFRONTATION WHICH DOMINATED THE FIFTY YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II.

NSC 68 AND THE KOREAN WAR

FOR ALL THE TENSION BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR IN THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS, NEITHER WAS KEEN TO RAISE THE MILITARY STAKES. EACH HAD REDUCED THE SIZE OF THEIR MILITARIES AS THE DEMANDS OF RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED CIVILIAN LABOUR AND PRODUCTION.

BUT, IN THE US, THE MACCARTHYITE WITCHHUNTS HAD BEGUN AND THE FEBRILE ATMOSPHERE WAS TURNED TO PARANOIA BY TWO EVENTS IN 1949. FIRST, THE SOVIETS EXPLODED THEIR OWN A-BOMB. WESTERN POLITICIANS AND MILITARY HAD NOT EXPECTED THIS TO HAPPEN SO SOON AND ASSUMED THAT SPIES HAD SOLD WESTERN SECRETS TO MOSCOW. LATER THAT YEAR, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS UNDER MAO ZEDONG DEFEATED THE PRO-US GOVERNMENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK. AT ONE STROKE THE WORLD’S MOST POPULOUS NATION HAD GONE COMMUNIST AND MACCARTHY’S SUPPORTERS BLAMED FELLOW TRAVELLERS IN THE US GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, FOR THIS REVERSE.

IT WAS THESE EVENTS, AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE, THAT PITCHED THE COLD WAR INTO A NEW PHASE, ONE WHICH, AS KENNAN HAD FEARED, TURNED THE COLD WAR INTO A TRIAL OF MILITARY STRENGTH.

IN APRIL 1950, THE US NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DREW UP NSC 68. THIS DOCUMENT COMPLETELY ALTERED THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE COLD WAR. IT ADVOCATED “AN IMMEDIATE AND LARGESCALE BUILD-UP IN OUR MILITARY AND GENERAL STRENGTH AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES WITH THE INTENTION OF RIGHTING THE POWER BALANCE AND IN THE HOPE THAT THROUGH MEANS OTHER THAN ALL-OUT WAR WE COULD INDUCE A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.” WASHINGTON’S TWIN OBJECTIVE WAS; FIRST, TO BUILD UP A LARGE AND EXPENSIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE OF TROOPS AND

WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STOPPING THE RED ARMY. PERHAPS THE MOST ICONIC WEAPON OF THE TIME WAS THE B-52 INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER, STILL IN USE TODAY. THE AMERICANS ALSO PLANNED TO DEVELOP A HUGE FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER THE SOVIETS.

NSC 68 ASSUMED THAT MOSCOW SOUGHT WORLD DOMINATION, THAT THE USSR RELIED ON ITS MILITARY TO PURSUE ITS AIMS AND THAT ONLY MILITARY OPPOSITION WOULD STOP IT; AND THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO EXPAND WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO ITS PEOPLE OVERTHROWING THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP. THE US, THEREFORE, HAD MOVED BEYOND CONTAINMENT TO EMBRACING THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

NSC 68 ALSO ARGUED THAT ANY LOSS OF POSITION FOR THE WEST, FOR EXAMPLE, A SUCCESSFUL WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN A COLONY, WOULD BE EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION. THE NOTION OF THE COMMUNIST OMNIPRESENCE HAD BEEN BORN AND WOULD COLOUR US POLICY IN THE 3RD WORLD FOR DECADES TO COME.

FOR GEORGE KENNAN, THIS SWITCH IN POLICY WAS TOO MUCH. HE HAD DISAGREED WITH TRUMAN’S DECISION TO REBUFF MAO ZEDONG IN FAVOUR OF SUPPORTING THE NATIONALIST RUMP WHICH HAD HOLED UP IN FORMOSA, NOW TAIWAN. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE USSR WAS INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING WORLD DOMINATION. AND HE THOUGHT THAT TRUMAN SHOULD BE WILLING TO TRY NEGOTIATION AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY. NSC 68 WAS NOT AT ALL TO HIS LIKING. TRUMAN’S POSITION WAS THAT THE SOVIET’S ONLY UNDERSTOOD POWER AND THAT DIPLOMACY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE POSITION OF STRENGTH HAD BEEN BUILT.

IN FACT, THE CHINESE REVOLUTION HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN A CAUSE FOR JUBILATION IN MOSCOW. TRUE, IT SEEMED TO INDICATE THE INEXORABLE FORWARD MARCH OF COMMUNISM. BUT THE ARRIVAL OF THE CHINESE IN THE FRATERNAL CAMP PRESENTED A CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIET’S PREVIOUSLY UNCONTESTED POSITION OF LEADERSHIP. IT ALSO MEANT THAT MOSCOW WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ITS FELLOW COMMUNISTS IN THE OVERWHELMINGLY UNDEVELOPED CHINA AT A COST TO ITS OWN LIMITED RESOURCES. FINALLY, IT

DIVERTED MOSCOW FROM ITS PRIME CONCERN, WHICH WAS EUROPE.

BEFORE THE INK WAS DRY ON NSC 68, THE HARDLINERS IN WASHINGTON APPEARED TO BE PROVED RIGHT. ON 25 JUNE 1950, THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY INVADED SOUTH KOREA AND THREW DOWN A CHALLENGE TO WASHINGTON THAT IT FELT COULD NOT BE IGNORED.

KOREA, A JAPANESE COLONY SINCE 1910, HAD BEEN LIBERATED BY SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES AT THE END OF THE WAR. THE TWO ARMIES MET AT THE 38TH PARALLEL, WHICH BECAME THE TEMPORARY BORDER PENDING UN-ORDERED NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THE FAILURE OF BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON THE TERMS FOR RE-UNIFICATION LED TO VIRTUAL CIVIL WAR IN THE SOUTH. IN AUGUST 1948, WASHINGTON SUPPORTED THE PROCLAMATION OF A REPUBLIC IN THE SOUTH AND INSTALLED A FORMER JAPANESE COLLABORATOR SYNGMAN RHEE AS PRESIDENT. THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED NORTH IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED JURISDICTION OVER THE SOUTH. ALL THIS TOOK PLACE AS BOTH US AND SOVIET TROOPS LEFT THE COUNTRY.

THE NORTH KOREAN LEADER, KIM IL-SUNG, WHO HAD LED THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE, SOUGHT STALIN’S PERMISSION TO RE-UNIFY KOREA MILITARILY AND RECEIVED A RELUCTANT BLESSING FROM MOSCOW. FOR MANY HISTORIANS, THESE EVENTS INDICATE THAT THE KOREAN INVASION WAS, IN FACT, A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION RATHER THAN AN ATTEMPT AT COMMUNIST EXPANSION.

THE INVASION ALMOST SUCCEEDED AND WITHIN A FEW WEEKS THE NOTH KOREANS WERE IN SIGHT OF VICTORY. BUT US-LED UNITED NATIONS FORCES RETALIATED AND SOON HAD DRIVEN THE NORTH KOREANS BACK TO THE 38TH PARALLEL. TRUMAN, NOW UNDERSTANDING THAT MOSCOW WAS A RELUCTANT ALLY OF KIM’S AND BELIEVING THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT JOIN THE WAR AGREED TO THE INVASION OF THE NORTH AND SOON US FORCES WERE WITHIN SIGHT OF THE CHINESE BORDER. HOWEVER, TRUMAN HAD MISCALCULATED AND THE CHINESE ARMY SUPPORTED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED A COUNTERATTACK AND DROVE THE US-LED FORCES BACK TO THE 38TH PARALLEL. OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS THE WAR BECAME A BLOODY STALEMATE AROUND THE OLD TEMPORARY BORDER.

THE KOREAN WAR WAS SIGNIFICANT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:

FIRST, IT CONVINCED THE AMERICANS THAT NSC 68 HAD CORRECTLY ANALYSED THE SITUATION AND THAT MILITARY MIGHT WAS THE KEY TO EVENTUAL SUCCESS.

SECOND, IT PROVOKED THE US TO EXTEND EVEN FURTHER THE NOSTRUMS OF NSC 68. CONTAINMENT, EVEN BY MILITARY MEANS WAS NO LONGER THE OBJECTIVE. TRUMAN’S AUTHORISATION TO INVADE THE NORTH WAS THE FIRST TEST OF ROLLBACK – NO LONGER WOULD THE WEST BE CONTENT TO REACT, IN FUTURE IT WOULD SEEK TO PUSH BACK THE COMMUNIST DEMON.

THIRD, THE KOREAN WAR CONVINCED THE WEST OF THE NEED TO TURN WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN INTO BULWARKS AGAINST COMMUNISM. BOTH COUNTRIES WERE NOW SET ON A PATH TO RE-INDUSTRIALISATION AND RE-ARMAMENT.

FOURTH, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS DETERIORATED AS BEIJING WAS FORCED INTO WAR AS A RESULT OF STALIN’S MISCALCULATION AND WAS PREVENTED FROM MOPPING UP THE NATIONALISTS ON FORMOSA.

BY THE TIME THE KOREAN WAR ENDED, IN JULY 1953, TRUMAN WAS GONE, STALIN WAS DEAD AND THE COLD WAR HAD BECOME A STALEMATE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.

DWIGHT EISENHOWER, WHO BECAME PRESIDENT IN 1953, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRICE TAG WHICH CAME WITH NSC 68. YES, HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF A HUGE NUCLEAR FORCE SO THAT HE COULD THREATEN WHAT HE TERMED “MASSIVE RETALIATION” BUT HE WAS LESS KEEN ON HAVNG A LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCE. WHILE HE SUPPORTED THE POLICY OF ROLLBACK, HE PREFERRED THE NOTION OF FIGHTING “LIMITED WARS” – EISENHOWER DID NOT WANT TO RISK LARGE AMERICAN CASUALTIES AGAIN AFTER THE UNPOPULARITY OF KOREA. HIS PREFERRED TACTIC WAS TO RETALIATE IN A MANNER, AND IN PLACES, OF HIS CHOOSING. AS THE FOCUS OF THE COLD WAR SHIFTED TO THE 3RD WORLD, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BECAME HIS WEAPON OF CHOICE.

MEANWHILE, IN MOSCOW, STALIN’S DEATH HAD NOT BROUGHT CHANGES TO THE AIMS OF SOVIET POLICY. THEY REMAINED:

- THE SECURITY OF THE USSR - THE STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC

CAPACITY- AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC UNDER

SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

BUT THE TACTICS DID CHANGE. THE NEW, MORE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WHICH EMERGED FIRST UNDER GEORGI MALENKOV AND LATER UNDER NIKITA KHRUSCHEV BROUGHT MORE FLEXIBILITY TO STALIN’S FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HAD LEFT THE USSR ISOLATED. MOSCOW NOW SOUGHT TO BROKER AN END TO THE WAR IN KOREA; IT TOOK ON A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN THE UN; AND THE SOVIETS EVEN UNDERMINED THEIR OWN IDEOLOGY BY SUGGESTING THAT, PERHAPS ONLY TEMPORARILY, COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM MIGHT BE ABLE TO CO-EXIST. THE NOTION OF “PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE” BECAME THE MANTRA FOR THE 1950S. THE USSR HAD GOOD REASONS FOR THIS APPROACH AS THE COST OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION THREATENED TO PREVENT IT DELIVERING BENEFITS TO ITS PEOPLE – CONSUMER GOODS AND EVEN FOOD WERE OFTEN IN SHORT SUPPLY.

AFTER HE CAME TO POWER, IN 1955, KHRUSCHEV THREW CAUTION TO THE WIND AND REJECTED SOME OF THE MOST CHERISHED OF STALIN’S POLICIES. HE AGREED TO THE END OF SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND THE SOVIETS TOOK PART IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WHICH DISCUSSED A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM – OF WHICH MORE LATER. AND HE TRASHED STALIN’S “TWO CAMPS” IDEOLOGY BY TAKING A DIPLOMATIC PLUNGE INTO THE 3RD WORLD. WHEREAS STALIN NEVER LEFT THE USSR AFTER 1945, KHRUSCHEV POPPED UP EVERYWHERE.

KHRUSCHEV’S POLICIES, THOUGH A POLAR OPPOSITE OF STALIN’S, WERE FIRMLY ROOTED IN LENIN’S IDEAS THAT PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY NEUTRALITY IN THE HISTORIC STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM WAS AN OPTION. INDEED, KHRUSCHEV WAS ABLE TO ARGUE THAT HIS POLICIES HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEUTRALISM – WHICH HE ALSO PROMOTED IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN WEST GERMANY – WOULD EVENTUALLY DELIVER VICTORY TO COMMUNISM AT A REDUCED RISK OF WAR.

DURING THE 1950S, SOVIET POLICY THUS SEEMED MORE IN TUNE WITH THE WAY THE WORLD WAS DEVELOPING. THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAD UNLEASHED NATIONALIST SENTIMENT THROUGHOUT THE COLONIAL WORLD. INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAD BECOME INDEPENDENT IN THE LATE 1940S AS HAD INDONESIA. IN 1955, THE NEWLY EMERGING NATIONS MET AT BANDUNG IN INDONESIA IN A CHALLENGE TO THE DOMINANCE OF BOTH THE USSR AND USA. AS THEY BUILT A NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, KHRUSCHEV’S APPROACH WAS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THESE YOUNG NATIONS. HE SEEMED MORE DYNAMIC THAN THE AILING EISENHOWER, WHOSE POLICIES HAD RESULTED IN THE CRUSHING OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS IN IRAN AND GUATEMALA BY THE CIA AND WOULD LEAD TO A CIA-LED INVASION OF INDONESIA, IN 1958.

IN 1957, THE SUCCESS OF THE SPUTNIK LAUNCH – THE FIRST MAN-MADE OBJECT TO REACH SPACE – AND THE VICTORY OF FIDEL CASTRO IN 1959 SEEMED TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIETS WERE THE FORCE OF THE FUTURE.

IN FACT, THE SOVIETS WERE MERELY ADAPTING THEIR TACTICS TO SUIT THE SITUATION. LIKE THE US, THE SOVIETS ALSO VIEWED THE 3RD WORLD AS ANOTHER BATTLEGROUND IN THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST – AND ONE WHICH CARRIED A LOWER RISK OF MUTUAL ANNIHILATION IF THINGS WENT WRONG. BUT, FOR THE MOST PART, KHRUSCHEV’S GRAND GESTURES WERE JUST THAT.

AND THE SOVIETS FOUND THAT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE 3RD WORLD BROUGHT WITH IT SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC COSTS WHICH THEY COULD ILL-AFFORD. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTORTIONS THAT MOSCOW WENT THROUGH IN ORDER TO WOO THE 3RD WORLD ALSO UPSET THE CHINESE, WHO BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE GOING SOFT ON THE HISTORIC STRUGGLE.

BUT, AND THIS IS A BIG “BUT”, KHRUSCHEV FOR ALL HIS FAILINGS PUT THE USSR ON THE GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC MAP. NO LONGER COULD THE SOVIETS BE IGNORED. HIS POLICIES MEANT THAT THE US WAS NOT LEFT UNCHALLENGED IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD AND WASHINGTON WAS FORCED ONTO THE DEFENSIVE. IMPORTANT COMMUNIST GAINS WERE MADE TOO, ESPECIALLY IN INDONESIA AND CUBA.

IN FACT HIS PROPAGANDA WAS TOO GOOD. THROUGHOUT THE 1950S THE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ARSENAL WAS PITIFULLY SMALL. BUT KHRUSCHEV WAS GOOD AT PERSUADING PEOPLE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD OVERTAKEN THE US IN THE ARMS RACE. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1960, JOHN KENNEDY CASTIGATED HIS OPPONENT, RICHARD NIXON – WHO HAD BEEN EISENHOWER’S VICE PRESIDENT – WITH THE CHARGE THAT HE HAD ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO BECOME STRONGER THAN THE USA. KENNEDY WON THE ELECTION BY A WHISKER AND EMBARKED ON A NEW ARMS RACE TO MAKE GOOD THE DEFICIT.

EVENTUALLY, KHRUSCHEV’S FAILURE TO DELIVER THE SUCCESS HE HAD PROMISED LED TO HIS DOWNFALL IN OCTOBER 1964. HAVING PLUNGED THE USSR INTO A NEW ARMS RACE, HIS FAILURE TO FACE DOWN THE US DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND HIS INABILITY TO TURN ROUND THE WOEFUL SOVIET ECONOMY WERE TOO MUCH FOR HIS COMRADES. HE WAS OUSTED BY LEONID BREZHNEV, WHO INSTITUTED THE NEXT CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE COLD WAR.

BY THE END OF THE 1960S, BREZHNEV FACED AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT WORLD FROM THAT SEEN BY HIS PREDECESSORS.

FIRST, THE WORLD WAS INCREASINGLY MULTI-POLAR WITH THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AND EUROPE AS A POTENTIAL CENTRES OF WORLD POWER. IN 1969, THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT OCCURRED AS THE TWO FRATERNAL POWERS FOUGHT A BORDER WAR AND CHINA, NOT THE USA, BECAME MOSCOW’S PRINCIPAL ENEMY.

SECOND, THE HUGE EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY WHICH HAD BEGUN IN THE EARLY 1960S HAD BROUGHT THE SOVIETS WITHIN REACH OF MILITARY PARITY WITH THE USA. MOSCOW WAS WITHIN SIGHT OF A MUCH CHERISHED GOAL OF BEING AN EQUAL OF THE USA’S, NO LONGER HAVING TO NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS.

AND THIRD, THE SOVIET ECONOMY WAS IN AN EVEN WORSE MESS THAN UNDER KHRUSCHEV. BREZHNEV’S EARLY EXPERIMENTS WITH “MARKET SOCIALISM” HAD FAILED TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND QUANNTITY OF GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND DISCONTENT WAS RIFE. THE ONLY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE SOVIETS WERE RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMY

OR GAINING ACCESS TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY.

THESE THREE DRIVERS RESULTED IN THE POLICY KNOWN AS “DETENTE”. DETENTE WAS A MORE THOROUGHGOING VERSION OF KHRUSCHEV’S POLICY OF “PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE”. WHAT MARKED IT APART FROM PREVIOUS POLICIES WAS NOT THE THEORY BUT THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION INVOLVED. THE AIM OF DETENTE WAS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE WEST ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES LIKE ARMS CONTROL, TRADE, CRISIS SETTLEMENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MORE. IT AMOUNTED TO A POLICY OF ACTIVE COLLABORATION WITH THE WEST.

DETENTE WAS A RESPONSE BY THE SOVIETS TO THE NATURE OF THE WORLD THEY FACED, NOT DRIVEN BY IDEOLOGY BUT A PRACITICAL WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS THEY FACED AND OF ACHIEVING LONG-HELD POLICY OBJECTIVES.

IN EUROPE, DETENTE ACHIEVED POLICY GOALS PURSUED BY MOSCOW SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. POLITICAL CHANGES IN WEST GERMANY BROUGHT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO POWER UNDER WILLY BRANDT, WHO SIGNALLED THAT HE WANTED THE TWO GERMAN STATES TO BE RECONCILED. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN WHICH WEST GERMANY RECOGNISED THE EXISTENCE OF EAST GERMANY AND THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND IN 1945.

THIS WAS A MAJOR TRIUMPH FOR MOSCOW AND ALLOWED IT TO MOVE ON TO THE BIGGER ISSUE OF WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THE POSTWAR SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS ISSUE WAS THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, WHICH OPENED IN HELSINKI IN 1973. AFTER TWO YEARS OF TALKS, THE HELSINKI DECLARATION SECURED JUST WHAT THE USSR HAD SOUGHT SINCE 1945 – AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXISTING EUROPEAN FRONTIERS. THIS SUCCESS WAS QUALIFIED THOUGH BY THE WEST’S INSISTENCE THAT THE FINAL TREATY INCLUDE REFERENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH FOUND SUPPORT AMONGST SOME SOVIET SATELLITES.

IN EUROPE THEN, DETENTE BROUGHT IMPORTANT GAINS FOR THE SOVIETS BUT ITS TRUE TEST WOULD BE IN THE WAY IT ALLOWED THE USSR TO MANAGE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USA. AND THE

AMERICANS WERE READY FOR DETENTE FOR ONE REASON ABOVE ALL ELSE: VIETNAM.

IN THE 1950S, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY WAS BOOMING. TO MANY IN THE US THE POSTWAR FEARS OF DEPRESSION SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A BAD DREAM. ON THE BACK OF THE VAST INCREASES IN DEFENCE SPENDING WHICH FOLLOWED NSC 68, IT WAS NOT JUST THE MILITARY WHICH PROFITED. MASSIVE INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENT IN, FOR EXAMPLE, ROADS AND AIRPORTS – WHICH BOTH HAD DUAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN USE – AND A BOOM IN JOBS MEANT THAT, SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST THE AMERICAN DREAM SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REALISED. THIS WAS ALL IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE STATE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

IN FOREIGN POLICY TERMS THOUGH, THE PICTURE WAS ALSO THE OPPOSITE OF THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION. EISENHOWER’S PROMISE TO ROLLBACK COMMUNISM WAS NOT BEING DELIVERED. TO SOME IT SEEMED AS IF COMMUNISM WAS GETTING AN EASY RIDE.

BUT JUST AS KHRUSCHEV WAS SEEKING FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND WAS SEEMINGLY WILLING TO EMBRACE 3RD WORLD NATIONALISM, AMERICA WAS HEADING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

WHILE THE USA LED THE TRULY ENORMOUS TASK OF NATION-BUILDING IN WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN – DEVELOPING MODERN, CAPITALIST DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WHERE BEFORE THERE HAD BEEN DICTATORSHIP, IN THE 3RD WORLD AMERICA PROJECTED ITSELF IN A DIFFERENT WAY. GONE WAS THE POSITIVE IMAGE WHICH EMBRACED FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY AND IN ITS PLACE THE US DEFINED ITSELF IN TERMS OF WHAT IT WAS OPPOSED TO – AND IT WAS OPPOSED TO CHANGE.

BUILDING ON THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, EISENHOWER HAD REDUCED THE DEBATE TO A SIMPLE TEST – IF YOU’RE NOT WITH US, THEN YOU’RE AGAINST US. TO BE WITH THE US COUNTRIES HAD TO SUBSCRIBE TO WASHINGTON’S ANTI-COMMUNIST WORLD VIEW. FAILURE TO PASS THE TEST AUTOMATICALLY MADE YOU SUBVERSIVE AND COMMUNIST.

MOST OBVIOUSLY, THE EFFECTS OF THIS CAN BE SEEN IN TERMS OF WASHINGTON’S APPROACH TO THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM.

DESPITE ITS OWN HISTORY AS THE FIRST COUNTRY TO THROW OFF IMPERIALISM, THE US WAS DOGGED BY ITS FEAR THAT CHANGE WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY COMMUNISTS. IT MADE EVERY EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE SIGNS OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD MAINLY THROUGH SUBVERSION BY THE CIA.

OF GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE THOUGH WAS AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO RESIST NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST FORCES IN VIETNAM, A COUNTRY OF NO REAL IMPORTANCE TO THE US EXCEPT THAT WASHINGTON CONVINCED ITSELF THAT VIETNAM’S LOSS WOULD TIP OTHER COUNTRIES INTO COMMUNISM – THE SO-CALLED DOMINO THEORY.

IN 1945, HO CHI MINH, WHO HAD LED RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, DECLARED INDEPENDENCE FROM FRANCE WITH WORDS TAKEN FROM THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WITH AN AMERICAN SECRET AGENT BY HIS SIDE. WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, TOLERATED THE RETURN OF THE FRENCH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT AND SOON HO WAS FIGHTING THE FRENCH TO ACHIEVE FULL INDEPENDENCE. IN 1954, AT DIEN BIEN PHU, THE VIETNAMESE INFLICTED HUMILIATING DEFEAT ON THE FRENCH, WHO LIKE THE BRITISH IN GREECE, PROVED UNABLE TO DEFEND WESTERN INTERESTS.

AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1955, A PEACE DEAL WAS REACHED WHICH TEMPORARILY SPLIT VIETNAM AT THE 17TH PARALLEL, WITH HO’S NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN THE NORTH AND A TEMPORARY FRENCH ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTH. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN 1956. THE AMERICANS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE DEAL BECAUSE OF COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT WITH HO’S NATIONALISTS. INSTEAD THE AMERICAN SET UP A PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH UNDER ANOTHER JAPANESE COLLABORATOR NAMED NGO DINH DIEM AND THE DIE WAS CAST. THE AMERICANS EMBARKED ON A PLAN TO SET UP SOUTH VIETNAM AS AN ANTI-COMMUNIST STATE – AND WHY DID THEY DO THIS? WELL, BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT HO WOULD WIN THE ELECTIONS. BUT THEY HAD DECIDED TO “SINK OR SWIM” WITH SOUTH VIETNAM.

DURING EISENHOWER’S PRESIDENCY, US MILITARY NUMBERS IN VIETNAM NEVER EXCEEDED 1,000. BUT THE ELECTION OF JOHN

KENNEDY, IN 1961, CHANGED THAT AND SET THE COURSE WHICH STILL WOULD DEFINE AMERICA FOR A GENERATION.

KENNEDY WAS A MAN OF ACTION. HE WAS THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD CLOSE THE MISSILE GAP; HE WAS THE MAN WHO WOULD REACH THE MOON; HE WAS THE MAN WHO WOULD ROLLBACK COMMUNISM WHERE HIS PREDECESSOR HAD FAILED. HE TOLD AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD “BEAR ANY BURDEN TO WIN THE FREEDOM OF MAN”. AND KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED NOT TO LOSE VIETNAM. AS THE VIETNAMESE SOUGHT TO REMOVE THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH, KENNEDY FIRST SENT MORE MILITARY ADVISERS AND THEN FIGHTING TROOPS TO SE ASIA. BY 1963, AMERICA WAS EMBROILED IN A WAR WHICH KENNEDY THOUGHT HAD TO BE WON. WHEN HE WAS ASSASSINATED, THERE WERE 16,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM. HIS SUCCESSOR, LYNDON JOHNSON WAS SUCKED FURTHER INTO THE QUAGMIRE AND BY THE END OF 1968 THERE WERE 568,000 AMERICAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM.

ALL THE WHILE THAT THE US WAS BOGGED DOWN IN VIETNAM, THE USSR HAD CLOSED THE MISSILE GAP AND WAS REAPING THE PROPAGANDA BENEFITS OF SEEING THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL NATION UNABLE TO DEFEAT A BUNCH OF ASIAN PEASANTS.

RICHARD NIXON, WHO WON THE 1968 ELECTION, WAS, DESPITE BEING THE CONSUMATE COLD WAR WARRIOR, ABOVE ALL A PRAGMATIST. HE REALISED THAT IT WAS NOT IN AMERICA’S INTEREST TO OPPOSE EVERY SIGN OF AGGRESSION, RATHER HE WAS KEEN TO PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. NIXON’S PRIORITY WAS TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM SO THAT THE US COULD CONCENTRATE ON THE REAL PROBLEMS FACING IT. BUT HE WANTED TO PRESERVE THE SOUTH AND TO RETREAT WITH HONOUR.

HIS FIRST MOVE WAS TO EXPLOIT THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AND, IN 1972, HE BECAME THE FIRST US PRESIDENT TO VISIT COMMUNIST CHINA. BUT THE REALITY WAS THAT IT WAS THE SOVIETS WHO HE NEEDED IN ORDER TO ESCAPE FROM VIETNAM AND IT WAS JUST AT THIS POINT THAT BREZHNEV’S NEED FOR ACCESS TO AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY MEANT THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS BOTH HAD AN INTEREST IN TALKING.

OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS, DETENTE BECAME THE FOCUS OF COLD WAR DIPLOMACY AS THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS TALKED ABOUT VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING. THREE SUMMIT MEETINGS TOOK PLACE IN 1972, 1973 AND 1974 BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS AND AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED ON ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC MISSILE REDUCTION, THE OUTLAWING OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND TRADE. AND THE SOVIETS ALSO HELPED NIXON TO REACH A DEAL WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO WITHDRAW AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM, IN 1973, WHILE PRESERVING THE SOUTH FROM ATTACK.

WHILE NIXON WAS ABLE TO SECURE HIS CHERISHED GOAL OF AN END TO THE VIETNAM WAR, THE SOVIETS GAINED ENORMOUSLY FROM DETENTE.

- THEY WERE AT LAST BEING TREATED AS EQUALS BY THE USA

- THEY HAD MARGINALISED THE CHINESE- THEY HAD SECURED AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR

AILING ECONOMY

BUT BY 1975, DETENTE WAS DEAD. NIXON’S WATERGATE PROBLEMS INCREASINGLY CONSUMED HIM BEFORE HE RESIGNED IN 1974; THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR EXPOSED SUPERPOWER CO-OPERATION AS ONLY SKIN DEEP AND THE INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE SWIFT DEFEAT OF THE SOUTH’S GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1975 SOUNDED THE DEATH KNELL FOR THIS LATEST PHASE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

SO, HOW CAN WE SUMMARISE THE FIRST 30 YEARS OF THE COLD WAR?

FIRST, IT CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A STRUGGLE TO FIND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER TO REPLACE THE OLD EUROPEAN IMPERIAL SYSTEM. BOTH THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD EMERGED AS THE MAJOR POWERS IN 1945 – WITH AMERICA BY FAR THE STRONGER OF THE TWO. AND THEY HAD EMBARKED ON A CONTEST, YES, FOR SURVIVAL BUT ALSO TO RE-MAKE THE WORLD IN THEIR OWN IMAGE.

BOTH POWERS WERE IDEOLOGICALLY PRE-DISPOSED TO EXPANSION, BOTH FELT THAT THEIR SECURITY DEPENDED ON SUCCESS IN THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY, NEITHER

UNDERSTOOD THE OTHER AND THEY VIEWED EACH OTHER AS MORTAL FOES. IN THIS SENSE THE COLD WAR WAS INEVITABLE.

SECOND, NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE SOVIETS HAD FIXED COLD WAR FOREIGN OR MILITARY POLICIES. BOTH ADAPTED THEIR APPROACHES ACCORDING TO THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES HAD DIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE POLICIES THEY DEVISED AND FOLLOWED – SOME MORE THAN OTHERS. BUT THE IDEA THAT SOVIET POLICY WAS MONLITHIC WAS AS MUCH A NONSENSE AS WAS THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SIMPLY DEFENDING FREEDOM.

FINALLY, AFTER ALL THE CONFLICT OF THE PRECEDING 30 YEARS, BY 1975 BOTH THE USA AND THE USSR HAD BECOME WEAK. THE USSR, WAS HAMSTRUNG BY AN INEFFICIENT ECONOMY UNABLE TO DELIVER QUALITY GOODS TO ITS CITIZENS AND WAS RUNNING AN INCREASINGLY FRACTIOUS EMPIRE.

FOR ITS PART, THE USA HAD JUST EJECTED A PRESIDENT WHO WAS A CRIMINAL. AND 58,000 OF ITS TROOPS HAD DIED IN A WAR THAT IT SHOULD NEVER HAVE FOUGHT, IN WHICH AT LEAST 2 MILLION VIETNAMESE DIED, AND WHICH HAD TORN THE COUNTRY APART. AND ALL IN THE NAME OF IDEOLOGY.

IN 1975, THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE FACING DIFFICULTIES OF DIFFERENT KINDS AND FOUND THEMSELVES IN AN INCREASINGLY MULTIPOLAR WORLD. IT SEEMED, THOUGH, THAT THE COLD WAR HAD WANED AND THAT COMPETITION BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR WAS LESS INTENSE. THE TWO YOUNG LIONS OF 1945 HAD HAD THE SHINE KNOCKED OFF THEM BY 1975.