Onyx RamirezPolitical Violence in Latin AmericaCollective Action Experiment

Historically, collective action has been necessary in order to precipitate some kind of change.

Collective action being, a group of people working together towards a specific cause. However,

people are going to work in their own individual best interests when furthering their causes. The

resulting problem is that most of the time, individual best interests do not align with the best

interests of the group they are a part of. Lichbach and Olson both propose theories about

collective action in regards to why it is that collective action problems come about, and, what are

the necessary and sufficient conditions for protest to come about under repression. I applied their

respective theories to the collective action experiment that we performed in class, specifically the

part in Lichbach’s theory where he assumes that the opposition to the government is a

homogenous group. And, in Olson’s theory, where he assumes that individual’s objectives are in

pursuit of a public good, that they each have individual, transitive, interests, and that the way to

solve collective action problems is by giving selective incentives to those that participate.

In the case of the collective action problem, the class was not homogenous, in fact, we were

independent actors in each situation. The same is the case in all collective action problems.

Under Lichbach’s theory on whether or not repression deters or inflames protestors, rebels and

terrorists, it is necessary to assume that the opposition is a homogenous group. This is to say, that

there is only one opposition group, with one line of thinking, rallying behind one leader, when in

actuality this is not the case. It will often be the case, as was such in the class experiment, that

people will have very different objectives. My objective in the game was to contribute “my fair

share,” while still ensuring that I could play the game. Whereas it may have been the objective of

someone else to contribute as little as possible, under the assumption that another player

could’ve picked up the contribution instead of them. The later case did in fact happen, as

ultimately the goal of the game, was to have as many points as possible. In relation to Lichbach’s

theory, it is impossible that the opposition be a homogenous group, as this is only possible if

there is one actor. But, the entire point of collective action, is that there be a collective and

collectives are diverse. As such, in many ways, it is difficult to regard his theory as unflawed.

Olson details that there is a tension between the two objectives that individuals have in

regards to collective action. Those two objectives being, their desire to obtain a public good, and

their desire to reduce their cost while gaining as much as possible from the public good.

However, Olson’s theory operates under the assumption that individuals are rational, rational

being that they are self interested, their preferences are transitive, and that they have perfect

information. By perfect information it is meant that everyone knows exactly what everyone else

knows. Additionally, rational individuals work in their own best interests, and if you’re working

in your own best interest, it’s not rational to assume a cost that someone else can assume.

However, in the case of the class collective action problem, many people were not acting in their

own best interests, and they were behaving irrationally. Not only were they unnecessarily

assuming more cost than their fellow classmates, but, they also didn’t have perfect information.

In fact, in some situations, they were blindly going into each round, having to choose how much

they were going to invest each go. As was the case with the round where everyone did have

“perfect” information, the expected response was that once everyone noticed how much each

other person was putting in, they would adjust their own contributions to match. i.e., either,

contribute less or more, depending on what others are doing. Actually, in my opinion they may

even contribute less in both instances, because they may believe that their weight is going to be

carried by someone else, in terms of selective contribution. Or, in the case that they notice that

others are contributing less than they are, they may again, lower their contribution, because if

you’re working in your own best interest it’s not rational to assume the cost when someone else

can.

Ultimately, Olson proposes that the way to solve collective action problems is by giving

selective incentives, or, rewarding participants and punishing non-participants. This generally

reigned true in the class’ collective action problem. In the round where there was a positive

incentive if participants contributed a significant enough amount, and a negative incentive if

people didn’t contribute “enough,” people generally contributed more. Additionally, because it

was never outlined how much exactly was “enough,” or a significant contribution, people tended

to contribute as much as they could so they wouldn’t be penalized. In this case, Olson’s theory

reigned true.