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The Virtuous Egoist: Nietzsche, Virtue, and Social
Media.
Julian Rickards-Sherrington
2016
Bachelor of Arts (Philosophy) Honours
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Declaration
I declare that this Research Project is my own account of my research
and contains as its main content work which has not previously been
submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.
Julian Rickards-Sherrington
Fremantle
October 2016
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Abstract
Rapid advancements in technology have seen an increasing shift in how we
socialise and communicate with others. Many of our interactions now take place
online via social media. When interacting with others online, we have a greater
ability to ‘create a self’ and to behave towards others in a way that is not subject to
the same reproofs and constraints that exist when interacting with others. This is due
to the lack of a feedback mechanism within our interactions that communicates the
cost of our social behaviour to others. The freedom and licence that social media
offers us is the closest thing that allows us to experience Sartre’s dictum that
‘existence precedes essence’. Human beings have a greater ability to create a self on
social media, an ability that is a reflection of the existentialist idea of ‘radical
freedom’ and ‘authenticity’. This freedom is neither desirable nor sustainable,
without proper consideration of our embodied context and ethical relationships to
others. It is the argument of this thesis that Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy can be
used to interpret and analyse this new social reality. It is argued that a revised
interpretation of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist, and that a different understanding of
Nietzsche’s social and moral philosophy, can result in different social processes
taking place that are far more likely to result in a more cohesive social framework
online, in which people can enjoy the internet’s freedoms and pursue their own
interests, unhindered.
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Contents
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 5
Chapter One: Introduction........................................................................................... 6
Chapter Two .............................................................................................................. 20
Chapter Three ............................................................................................................ 34
Chapter Four ............................................................................................................. 48
Chapter Five: Conclusion .......................................................................................... 65
References ................................................................................................................. 75
Glossary .................................................................................................................... 80
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Dr Laura D’Olimpio of the University of Notre Dame who
supervised this thesis, and whose interest in me as an undergraduate provided me
with the opportunity to write it. Her suggestions, edits, and criticisms of the ideas
developed in this work allowed me to redefine and reformulate my concepts. Any
insights or innovations that may be present here are partially attributable to her. All
errors are, alas, my own.
I have also benefited from the tireless work and enthusiasm of Dr Angeline
O’Neill, my Honours Co-Ordinator. I would also like to acknowledge my fellow
Honours students Iris Kennedy, Jeremy Sheehan, Jessica Branch, Justine Ralph, Em
Bagg, and Jane Minson.
Finally, my deepest gratitude to Nadene, Bill, and Charlotte Egan, John and
Gail Rickards, James McNaught, Anthony Dermer, and Laura Willoughby for their
unflagging faith, encouragement, and forbearance.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Our way of life is changing. Our shopping, our planning, our banking, our
entertainment, and, most importantly, our social interactions, are now taking place
online. A recent Pew Study showed that twenty-four percent of American teenagers
go online “almost constantly”.1 Ninety-two percent of teenagers reported going
online daily.2 More than half (56%) report going online several times a day, twelve
percent report going on once every two days, six percent report going on weekly,
and only two percent report less than that.3 If this demographic change in the United
States is indicative of the West in general (and perhaps globally) then it obviously
offers us many benefits. Never before has there been such easy access to the fruits of
humanity’s endeavours, whether they be artistic, commercial, social, political, and
even sexual. For example, anybody with a Kindle can now purchase the Complete
Works of Plato for less than three US dollars from American book-selling website
Amazon.4 We can now communicate with family, friends, and business associates
on the other side of the world with the click of a few buttons, and expect a reply just
1 Amanda Lenhart, "Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015." Pew
Research Centre. Accessed May 29, 2016.
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Accessed May 29, 2016, from https://www.amazon.com.au/Complete-Works-
Plato-Annotated-ebook/dp/B007MJMUE6/ref=sr_1_4?s=digital-
text&ie=UTF8&qid=1474847976&sr=1-4&keywords=plato
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as quickly.5 Our news sources are varied and infinite.6 We can find likeminded
individuals who share our passion for the most obscure hobbies on group message
boards. We can organize parties, protests, conferences, and concerts online,
distributing information and advertising about them to thousands and in some cases
millions of people in the space of a few seconds. For many of us, the internet is a
liberation. So many of the constraints placed on us by our geography, our place in
time, and our access to information are gone.
The freedom and licence that social media offers us is the closest thing that
allows us to experience Sartre’s dictum that ‘existence precedes essence’.7 Human
beings have a greater ability to create a self on social media, an ability that is a
reflection of the existentialist idea of ‘radical freedom’ and ‘authenticity’. This
freedom is neither desirable nor sustainable, without proper consideration of our
embodied context and ethical relationships to others. There are some aspects to the
internet and our use of social media that can be limiting, restrictive, and harmful.
The activity that we repeatedly see online is the product of human beings, and thus
reflects the limitations and moral fallibilities of human activity in the real world.
5 The most obvious example being email in this case. However, it extends to other
social media platforms, like Facebook. 6 Most major media platforms now disseminate a large portion of their output online.
This includes government owned media like the ABC and BBC, to the privately
owned CNN and FOX news. A PEW study released in 2016 revealed that 62% of
American adults get their news from social media, and 18% do so often. The three
most popular websites were Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter. See at
http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-
2016/ 7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd.),
1973, 52.
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However, it is important to note that the harm that is done online can be
different from the harm that is caused by human beings in real social interactions.
The difference is a quantitative one, not a qualitative one. In this case, the difference
is caused by the lack of a feedback mechanism that deters people from behaving in
the same way at a later date. In the real world, insults and lies, abuse and
harassment, are usually met with social censure and, in extreme cases, punishment.
These deterrents function as a method for communicating to individuals the
unacceptability of their behaviour in a social framework. In the case of the internet,
our capacity to depict ourselves through a distorted image (or anonymously) allows
us to avoid such censorship. We are removed from the harmful consequences of our
actions by a computer screen, and in some cases we are also removed by time zones
and geography from the people whom we are attacking.
The internet is best understood as an information system. Like prices in
economics, or social mores in society, the internet is a process whereby we are able
to access information, more information than has ever hitherto been available to
human beings. However, the information that the internet provides us is not simply
factual information about various subjects, like an encyclopaedia. It also, especially
through social media, provides people with information about private individuals.
This creates a range of different incentives and constraints for people who choose to
use it, than would normally exist when interacting with people face to face.
Subsequently, when discussing social incentives and constraints in relation to the
internet, the most noticeable thing is their absence. Although the usual constraints
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created by the law apply to the internet as they would in reality (sexual activity with
minors being one example), the notion of social constraints are far more fluid. This
becomes more and more apparent when the focus of decisions made online are
further away from the agent making those decisions. For example, if I choose to
make a derogatory remark to my best friend’s girlfriend about her weight via an
email, I am more likely to receive negative feedback for this decision by losing my
best friend. However, if I choose to insult a girl who lives in South Dakota,
anonymously via Facebook8, I am unlikely to receive any negative feedback from
that decision here in Western Australia. From this example it can be inferred, that
social constraints apply to online behaviour successfully only to the extent that the
circumstances of the behaviour accurately reflect the individual’s circumstances in
the real world. Some forms of social constraint caused by the effects or reactions to
our online behaviour are less effective than they would be in real life.
One of the most successful facets of the online world is social media. The
social media website Facebook had over 1.5 billion active users as of August 2015.9
YouTube has over one billion,10 and Twitter has up to three hundred million12. In
1995, less than one percent of the world’s population had access to the internet. In
8 A glossary describing the social media platforms referenced is available at the end
of this thesis. 9 Josh Constine. "Facebook Climbs To 1.59 Billion Users And Crushes Q4
Estimates With $5.8B Revenue." TechCrunch. Accessed May 29, 2016.
http://techcrunch.com/2016/01/27/facebook-earnings-q4-2015/. 10 "All YouTube Statistics in One Place." Socialbakers.com. Accessed May 29,
2016, from http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/youtube/. 12 “About.” Twitter. Accessed May 29, 2016. https://about.twitter.com/company
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2016, it is now forty percent, roughly 3.3 billion people and it is growing daily14.
Naturally, such changes are occasion for philosophical reflection and observation.
These reflections raise questions related to character, ethics, and how we form and
maintain relationships in this new setting. In her book Alone Together, technology
specialist Sherry Turkle has argued that social media brings people together while
simultaneously distancing them.15 One of her main contentions is that the detached
medium of a computer screen enables people to more easily treat individuals as
objects rather than as subjects because they are removed from the realities of
interacting with other human beings. Although people have a greater connection to
others through social media, the facile nature of many of these connections leads to
lessening expectations of other people by individuals. Seeing as so many of our
interactions now take place online, this effect can in some cases lead to feelings of
loneliness, envy, anger, and unhappiness16. She writes, “Where we live doesn't just
change how we live; it informs who we become. Most recently, technology promises
us lives on the screen. What values…, follow from this new location? Immersed in
simulation, where do we live, and what do we live for?”17
The internet is an information system that can provide us with information
about diverse subjects and also about private individuals. It also is a system whereby
14 "Internet Users." Internet Live Stats, 2016. Accessed May 29, 2016.
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/. 15 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less
from Each Other (New York: Basic Books), 2011, 116. 16 Ibid, 95-99. 17 Ibid, 277.
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people can present information about themselves to others. However, the absence of
social constraints that is created by the internet allows individuals to present
information that is either inaccurate, or wholly fallacious. Social media creates an
opportunity for individuals to present themselves as they would like to be seen,
rather than as they really are. It also allows individuals to behave in ways online that
they would presumably not in the real world, or in ways that they would not be able
to. Take, for example, the online practice of ‘catfishing’. Popularised in the
documentary Catfish, ‘catfishing’ involves individuals manipulating others by
creating fictional online personas.18 An example of this is the case of Notre Dame
Football star Manti Te’o, who lied about having a deceased girlfriend in order to
boost his coverage in the media. The fake girlfriend, whose name was Lennay
Kekua, had her own Twitter and Instagram account. It subsequently came to light
that Lenny Kekua never existed, her photos were of someone else, and all attempts
to find evidence for her death (which involved a car crash and case of leukaemia)
resulted in nought.19
Although the case of Manti Te’o is one of relatively minor consequence,
there are many instances of ‘catfishing’ and online behaviour that are far more
sinister in intention, and damaging in effect. Many of the studies into the behaviour
18 Schulman, Yaniv, Catfish, DVD, Dir. Henry Joost & Ariel Schulman (New York
City: Supermache, 2010.) 19Timothy Burke and Jack Dickey, "Manti Te'o's Dead Girlfriend, The Most
Heartbreaking and Inspirational Story Of The College Football Season, Is A Hoax."
Deadspin, accessed May 29, 2016, http://deadspin.com/manti-teos-dead-girlfriend-
the-most-heartbreaking-an-5976517.
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of young people on social media have found that there are problems that arise with
its usage, with repeated occurrences of cyberbullying.20 A recurring figure on social
media is the troll, a person who sows discord by starting arguments or upsetting
people with extraneous or off-topic messages in an online community (such as a
newsgroup, forum, chat group, or blog) with the deliberate intent of provoking
readers into an emotional response or of otherwise disrupting normal on-topic
discussion, often for their own amusement. There are some incidents where internet
trolling becomes an expression of hateful sentiment, on occasion becoming
synonymous with harassment and abuse. In chapter three, I will be using the online
community known as the ‘alt-right’ as a case study, in order to illustrate such
incidents.
In part, such online behaviour is no different to ordinary behaviour whereby
people wish to present their best self to impress others or perhaps portray a certain
characteristics in order to make a particular kind of impression. Such behaviour may
be done consciously or unconsciously: to fit in, to stand out, and to explore one’s
own sense of identity. The online environment allows for a greater opportunity to
enact all of these desires and whims. The opportunity to break with one’s own
circumstances and what we perceive to be our own inherited weaknesses is a notion
that many people find deeply attractive. One of the opportunities that is offered by
social media is a greater ability to do this. We can create alternative lives on
20 Larry D. Rosen, "Social Networking’s Good and Bad Impacts on Kids," American
Psychological Association, accessed August 1, 2016,
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/social-kids.aspx.
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Facebook that are not accurate depictions of the lives we actually live. We can
manipulate photographs and information on our Tinder accounts in order to make us
appear more attractive than we actually are. Catfishing is an extreme example,
whereby we create a person who does not exist in order to satisfy a psychological
need. Paedophiles, for example, lie about their age on group message boards and
start grooming their victims for a future encounter at the predator’s home. In all of
these ways and more, selves are created using social media, seemingly reflecting the
existentialist ideals of ‘radical freedom’ and ‘authenticity’. Yet we must question
whether such individual freedom is desirable if it lacks an empathetic consideration
of our embodied context that includes our ethical and social commitments to others.
Hence, the thesis that ‘the freedom and licence that social media offers us is the
closest thing that allows us to experience Sartre’s dictum that ‘existence precedes
essence’. Human beings have a greater ability to create a self on social media, an
ability that is a reflection of the existentialist idea of ‘radical freedom’ and
‘authenticity’. This freedom is neither desirable nor sustainable, without proper
consideration of our embodied context and ethical relationships to others.
It would be prudent at first to account for the meaning of the two terms put
forth in this thesis; namely, ‘authenticity’ and ‘radical freedom’. Very often human
beings choose to say things and act in ways that are contrary to one’s own attitudes
and desires.21 From this it follows that, an authentic person is someone who behaves
21 "Authenticity", Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August 2, 2016,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authenticity/.
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in a way that is in accordance with desires, motives, ideals and beliefs that express
who that person really is.22 The notion of ‘radical freedom’ is not one concerned
with the metaphysical nature of man’s actions, but with life as it is experienced. It is
important to note that this thesis is not directly concerned with these terms, but
rather how they are a reflection of the constraints and incentives that we face when
we are online. In this case, the notion of ‘radical freedom’ describes the fact that
many of us are shielded from the social consequences of our actions when we
communicate to people online anonymously, especially when we communicate to
harass or abuse others. In a way, this freedom is greater than even Sartre and
Nietzsche could have envisioned, as the freedom to escape these consequences was
something that they regarded as inevitable. ‘Authenticity’, when online, is coupled
with this freedom. Due to the weakness of social constraints on our online
behaviour, the freedom to say and communicate whatever we like is available to us.
We can disregard fashion, good taste, and political correctness in the content of our
communication. Authenticity, in this case, is the satisfaction of the desire to express
ourselves, irrespective and immune to what others may think. The freedom of the
internet allows us to express thoughts and beliefs that are indicative of what we truly
feel and think. Wherein, lies the potential for social selves that reflect ‘authenticity’.
Whether many of the trends prevalent on social media are truly ‘authentic’ will be
examined in this thesis.
22 Ibid.
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The moral philosophy of Existentialism is not normative, but rather an
examination of the relationship between ‘values’ and psychology23. Existentialists
regard values as a projection by human beings on to the backdrop of an indifferent
universe, rather than as things that have an actual correspondence to the material
world. If this conclusion is accepted then moral philosophy becomes more akin to
moral psychology: an examination of the ‘mendacity, self-deception, and hypocrisy
in moral consciousness”.24 The manipulation of our image online is similar to the
existentialist desire for freedom and authenticity, to be able to ‘will a self’.
Nietzsche calls upon us to do this when he writes, “Active, successful natures act,
not according to the dictum “know thyself,” but as if there hovered before them a
commandment: will a self and thou shalt become a self”.25 Nietzsche’s idea of
willing a self and creating a self can be used to provide a philosophical insight into
the phenomena of social media, accounting for both its positive and its negative
effects.
It is also important to analyse Nietzsche’s concept of ‘will to power’ and
how it relates to this thesis. Nietzsche’s moral philosophy focused on the potential
for a life lived ‘beyond good and evil’. In doing this, he challenged the moral
assumption that exploiting, dominating, and hurting the weak were always morally
objectionable. Nietzsche justified this by arguing that the purpose of life is to exhibit
23 “Existentialism”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August 2,
2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/existentialism/. 24 Ibid. 25 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R.J.
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996, 294.
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strength and express its ‘will to power’—a process that often entails pain and
deception. Nietzsche says of life, “…it will want to grow, spread, grab, win
dominance, - not out of any morality or immortality, but because it is alive, and
because life is precisely will to power”.26 This ‘will’ is not a lacking in humans, but
a drive. It is the foundation of human energy and desire for satisfaction.27
Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’, is often cited by people as justification for the argument
that Nietzsche is an antisocial egoist. Indeed, the concept of exploiting, dominating,
and hurting the weak (‘the weak’ here being labelled on racial grounds) is a tactic
engaged in by the alt-right when advocating or promoting its political views online.
The relevance of the ‘will to power’ and Nietzsche’s moral philosophy will be
explored in chapter four.
Nietzsche’s encouragement to ‘will a self’ poses problems related to both the
dispositions and activities of individuals. In fact, there are dangers inherent in this
viewpoint. ‘Willing a self’ can have to two meanings, either sincerity in expression
or, fidelity to one’s values. Surely an individual who shows fidelity to their values is
expressing sincerity by doing so. However, the crucial distinction is between
whether emphasis is placed on one’s sincerity, or on one’s fidelity. Sincerity of
expression amounts to an individual believing himself to possess a sufficient amount
of knowledge to act in a way that will shape beneficial outcomes for himself, and for
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 153. 27 “Friedrich Nietzsche”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August 4,
2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
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others. By contrast, fidelity to one’s own values necessitates fidelity to a specific
role in life. Many of us take on multiple roles in our daily lives: spouse, parent,
professional, citizen. All of them contain their own incentives, obligations, and
constraints that we are obliged to adhere to. These roles provide a sphere within
which people can be trusted to act competently and to serve a larger process that will
determine larger social outcomes. In our behaviour on social media, due to the
weakness of social constraints on behaviour, and in the absence of third parties to
enforce civility, how much of the antisocial behaviour that one sees will be
determined by an individual’s willingness to censure themselves. If the individual
understands his online self to be merely an expression of his sentiment in sincerity,
in all likelihood such behaviour will be more prominent. An understanding of our
activity online to be an extension of our social selves, and our social behaviour been
a reflection of that, will in all likelihood lead to a different outcome. These differing
emphasis on sincerity and fidelity, will be explored in greater detail in later chapters
as differing interpretations of Nietzsche’s notion, “will a self”.
Nietzsche was highly critical of the society which he lived in, and found
much wanting in the culture of his day. He writes, “The surest way of ruining a
youth is to teach him to respect those who think as he does more highly than those
who think differently from him”.28 Although much of his criticisms are of society
and modernity, Nietzsche does not conclude from his criticisms that the solutions are
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, ed.
Maudemaire Clark and Brian Leiter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
1997, 153.
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social, or reformist, or political. Instead, he emphasises individual striving in one’s
own life and also in affecting the lives of others. Specifically, individuals need to
overcome their own culture and their own limitations29. It is the contention of this
thesis that many of Nietzsche’s ideas, which have had a significant influence on the
culture and history of the world, echo much of the behaviour that is observable on
the internet today, both positive and negative. It is worth noting that I am not
arguing that any antisocial aspects of social media are consciously based on a
philosophical blueprint that is derived from Nietzsche’s writings. Nor am I arguing
that the individuals online who behave in a certain way are self-declared followers
of Nietzsche, it is possible that they have never read or even heard of him. What I
am observing in this analysis are current trends online through the prism of
Nietzsche’s ideas, and arguing that doing so leads to a greater understanding of these
trends.
In the second chapter of this thesis I will be providing an overview of
contemporary Virtue ethics, in light of the apparent contradiction between Nietzsche
as an egoist and Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. Much of this chapter will be drawing
upon the writings of philosopher Christine Swanton who has written a book that
argues for Nietzsche as the latter.30
29 Ibid. 30 Christine Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche (Hoboken: Wiley &
Sons, 2015) Accessed August 3, 2016,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118939369.
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The third chapter will serve as a counterargument to Swanton and focus on
Nietzsche’s reputation as an egoist. Much of the work cited in this chapter will be
from multiple theorists and philosophers who can be used to support and analyse
Nietzsche in this way. The third chapter will also examine the connection between
the misinterpretation and misuse of Nietzsche’s ideas and examples of social media
being used in a way that is harmful to others.
The fourth chapter of this thesis will contain a rebuttal to the
counterargument put forth in the third chapter. As a correction to this view, it will
focus on Nietzsche’s ‘egoism’ as an aspect of his virtuous egoism that is ‘response
dependent’, a phrase coined from Swanton. Much of this chapter will entail a return
to Swanton’s writings. It will also be supplemented by the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre. This chapter will also examine the connection between social media and
virtue, and the assertion of a ‘social self’ that conducts itself online as if it were a
member of a community, and how this ties into Nietzsche’s own role as a virtue
ethicist.
The fifth and final chapter will be a conclusion and summary of the
preceding arguments and how they are essential to understanding the thesis’ central
claim. That, ‘the freedom and licence that social media offers is the closest thing to
that allows us to experience Sartre’s dictum that ‘existence precedes essence’.
Human beings have a greater ability to create a self on social media, an ability that
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is a reflection of the existentialist notion of ‘radical freedom’ and ‘authenticity’. This
freedom is neither desirable nor sustainable without proper consideration of our
embodied context and ethical relationships to others.’
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Chapter Two
My concern in this thesis is to analyse the current online trends of social
media usage through the prism of Nietzsche’s ideas in order to better understand
how people use social media to construct and create a self, especially when these
‘selves’ are used as avatars to project a particular image of themselves for certain
purposes. Before I critically examine these uses of social media, it is important to
clarify which reading of Nietzsche I am applying. I am supporting Swanton by
arguing that Nietzsche is a virtue egoist and therefore will be providing an overview
of contemporary virtue ethics, as well as critically assessing Swanton’s reading of
Nietzsche31. I will pay particular attention to the apparent contradiction between
Nietzsche as an egoist and Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist.
In the recent literature on virtue ethics, Swanton has attempted to establish a
connection between virtue ethics and Nietzsche32. Swanton states that “Many
writings on Nietzsche think that for Nietzsche …we have a basic instinct for cruelty
and…that this is healthy for this instinct to be manifested. This view is at the heart
of immoralist interpretations of Nietzsche.”33 Swanton contests this interpretation by
arguing that “for Nietzsche we have a basic instinct not for cruelty but for
31 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche. 32Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 134-135, 140. 33 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 149.
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aggression, which…can be manifested in benign or malignant ways”.34 The work of
Swanton will serve as the lens through which I will examine the connection between
Nietzsche and virtue ethics. In order to understand the possibility of there being a
relationship between Nietzsche and virtue ethics, we must begin with a summary of
the latter and its relevance to moral philosophy over the past sixty years.
Virtue theory regards morality as being constitutive of a person’s character
over a lifetime, and that ‘goodness’ is a necessary precondition for happiness. Virtue
theory is teleological in so far as it regards happiness (or eudemonia) as the final
cause of human behaviour (especially moral behaviour) and it regards virtuous
characteristics as the means by which happiness is cultivated and maintained35. The
father of virtue ethics, Aristotle, writes that, “Every craft and every method of
inquiry and likewise every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good.
That is why they correctly declare that the good is ‘that which all seek”.36 Happiness
is thus achieved by developing habits of action and thought that are consistent with
or correlate to ‘virtue’ or ‘goodness’. It follows from this that ‘knowledge’ is
incredibly important in making moral decisions, not just the knowledge that
individuals already possess but also the limitations on our knowledge that are a
consequence of our ‘embedded context’.
34 Ibid, 149. 35 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 2014), 12, 185-186. 36 Ibid, 2.
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There are many kinds of knowledge, but the kind that is most important
when making moral judgements is phronesis, or, practical wisdom.37 This
knowledge is one that cannot be acquired through passive learning. It is acquired
through behaviour and through experience which subsequently leads to Aristotle’s
habituation38. ‘Practical wisdom’ is the process through which human beings
cultivate moral knowledge by practicing moral actions that inculcate emotional
dispositions in the individual that are indicators of ‘virtuousness’. As previously
stated, ‘practical wisdom’ is knowledge that is acquired only through experience and
practice, compared to a purely abstract knowledge. The argument that knowledge is
essential to the process of moral decision making will become important later in
understanding the relationship between Nietzsche and virtue theory. It is also
essential in understanding a virtue based alternative to the ‘radical freedom’ that is
constitutive of so much behaviour that is observable online.
Some contemporary moral philosophers have returned to the idea found in
Aristotle’s writings that morality is fundamentally character based.39 This trend
began with a paper written by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, titled Modern Moral
Philosophy.40 The main focus of Anscombe’s argument in this paper is what she
37 Ibid, 102. 38 Ibid, 181. 39 “Virtue Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August 4, 2016,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/. 40 Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33 (January 1958):
1-16, accessed August 5, 2016, http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/mmp.pdf
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regards as a ‘law conception of ethics’.41 This conception prioritizes itself with
notions of ‘obligation and duty’, examples of this would include Kant’s categorical
imperative.42 In the paper, Anscombe writes “The ordinary (and quite indispensable)
terms ‘should’, ‘needs’, ‘ought’, ‘must’ – acquired this special sense by being
equated in the relevant contexts with ‘is obliged’, or ‘is bound’, or ‘is required to,’ in
the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law…”43
As an alternative, Anscombe called for a return to character, virtue, and
flourishing as concepts whereby we may discuss moral problems.44 She writes,
“It may be possible…to discard the notion ‘morally ought’ and
simply return to the ordinary ‘ought’…One man – a
philosopher – may say that since justice is a virtue, and
injustice a vice, and virtues and vices are built up by the
performances of the action in which they are instanced, an act
of injustice will tend to make a man bad; and essentially the
flourishing of a man qua man consists in his being good…so a
man needs, or ought to perform, only virtuous actions; and
even if, as it must be admitted may happen, he flourishes less,
or not at all, in inessentials, by avoiding injustice, his life is
spoiled in essentials by not avoiding injustice – so he still
needs to perform only just actions.”45
The revival of virtue ethics over the past sixty years was largely born out of
the disagreements between ‘rule-based’ ethicists and ‘consequence based’ ethicists
41 “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
accessed August 5, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/ 42 Ibid. 43 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 15. 44 Ibid, 16. 45Ibid, 16.
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that had dominated modern philosophy since the eighteenth century. Karen Stohr
defines ‘traditional’ virtue ethics as “…an ‘agent-centred’ theory…contrast it with
‘act-centred’ theories like utilitarianism or Kantianism… right action is defined in
terms of what a virtuous agent would do, whereas in Kantianism and utilitarianism,
the definition of right action is primary.”46 Kantianism is a ‘rule-based’ theory
concerned with moral actions that conform to a predetermined, abstract ‘law’ about
the nature of morality.47 Consequentialism is a moral theory that focuses on the
consequences of moral decisions.48 They are both ‘act-centred’ theories because they
focus on the decision being made, instead of focusing on the decision maker. The
latter is precisely what virtue ethics does. In Aristotelian virtue ethics, a virtuous
disposition is an ‘emotional mean’ between extremes of excess and deficiency. ‘The
doctrine of the mean’, is central to understanding this view due to the fact that it refers
back to Aristotle’s argument for virtue as a form of ‘practical knowledge’. As a doctor
understands that there are degrees of excess and deficiency in the treatment of a
patient’s wounds, a virtuous person understands that the virtue of courage is a mean
between cowardice and rashness.
This conception of a return to virtue ethics has the potential for diverse
applications. Virtue ethics is particularly relevant to our behaviour on social media
46 Stohr, Karen, "Contemporary Virtue Ethics", Philosophy Compass 1 (January
2006): 22-27, accessed August 5, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00004.x. 47 “Deontological Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August
5, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ 48 “Consequentialism”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed August 5,
2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
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due to the fact that the willingness of individuals to conceptualise their behaviour in a
‘virtue’ framework is more likely to be efficient, compared to rule-based or
consequence-based moral theories. The reason for this is due to the fact that as long
as the internet continues to remains categorically focused around individual freedom,
the absence of third parties to enforce civility means that isolated individuals online
will have to do so. Our behaviour on social media becomes more morally fraught the
more that our self-projected image, our interactions, and our behaviour diverges from
the social reality that social media claims to mirror. Due to the fact that the individual
online is constrained by their ‘embodied context’, the implications of their actions are
not necessarily going to be made relevant to them. If the individual understands their
‘social media presence’ as an extension of their ‘social self’, then virtue ethics
functions as a trade-off between social civility and individual freedom. Of course, it
is entirely possible for ‘rule-based’ and ‘consequence-based’ moral theories to
institute a similar trade-off, through enforcement by third parties. Some websites, like
Twitter, have already begun to do so.49 However, the question then becomes as to
whether third party enforcement will still allow for the internet’s greatest benefit, its
freedom.
MacIntyre, in After Virtue, argues for social customs and social institutions as
the framework through which ‘virtue’ can be understood.50 By contrast, Rosalind
49 Elle Hunt, “Milo Yiannopoulos, right-wing writer, permanently banned from
Twitter”, The Guardian, accessed August 20, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/20/milo-yiannopoulos-nero-
permanently-banned-twitter 50 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 69, 173, 189, 229.
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Hursthouse argues that ‘virtue’ is a form of ‘ethical naturalism’, where virtues are
grounded in the natural world, particularly human psychology.51 She writes, “…the
virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being – are
those traits that human beings need to live as well as human beings, to live a good,
characteristically human, life. Ethical evaluations of human beings as good or bad are
taken to be analogous to evaluations of other living things as good or bad specimens
of their kind”.52 In this case, virtuous traits that result in human happiness over
multiple time periods, are to be regarded as virtues, akin to a form of natural selection.
Swanton’s application of virtue ethics has allowed her to make insights into
philosophers such as Nietzsche that have not been made by other Nietzsche scholars.
She writes that, “My appropriation of Nietzsche and Nietzsche-inspired psychology
is in the service of shedding some light…Virtue ethics, with its emphasis on the inner,
needs to take seriously the spirit of Nietzsche’s remarks”.53 There are large disparities
in opinion amongst contemporary virtue ethicists regarding the exact nature of ‘the
virtues’. However, what MacIntyre, Hursthouse, and Swanton have argued for is an
understanding of virtue as an individual responding to their moral ‘environment’. Due
to the fact that ‘moral’ environments change over time, it shouldn’t be surprising that
there are disparities in what is considered to be ‘virtuous’, over different time periods
and in different circumstances.
51 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
193-197. 52 Ibid, 21. 53 Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 11.
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Knowledge of these disparities is best articulated by Swanton when she
argues that the virtues should be pluralistic, and that they are best understood as
‘response dependent’54. Thus, “…an important aspect of virtue-ethical pluralism,
then, is that the modes of moral responsiveness to items in the fields of the virtues
are plural.” The advantage that this conception of virtue ethics presents for that it,
“…acknowledges the complexity of human responsiveness to the world. The virtues,
with their complex profiles, recognize that we are…not only agents of change in the
attempt to promote good, but also agents of change in the attempt to produce and to
create”.55
What can and cannot be construed as virtuous behaviour is dependent on
“modes of moral responsiveness to items in the fields of the virtues that are
plural”.56 On social media, the question becomes not so much, ‘What is one
responding to?”, as it is ‘Who is the person responding and what is their
understanding of virtuous behaviour’? Nietzsche is a useful philosopher for
analysing the implications of this question, due to the fact much of the diversity of
opinion about his writings are contingent on different assumptions about Nietzsche’s
use of moral and philosophical terms.
54Ibid, 23. 55 Ibid, 23. 56 Ibid, 23.
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Nietzsche is an egoist57. The main target of most of Nietzsche’s criticisms is
the idea of altruism. “The greatest obstacle to reading Nietzsche in a virtue ethical
way is his self-ascription as an egoist and his attacks on altruism”58, writes Swanton.
For example, Nietzsche strongly disliked the ethical content of Judaism and
Christianity. Two Nietzsche scholars have written that “What he finds objectionable
in the Jewish moral outlook he usually finds in the Christian perspective as well.”59
Nietzsche describes altruism as a commitment made to denigrate and neglect one’s
own capabilities and potential for greatness, for the benefit of others. As an
alternative, Nietzsche regularly advocates aristocracy as a necessary aspect of any
great society. He writes “Every enhancement so far in the type "man" has been the
work of an aristocratic society—and that is how it will be, again and again, since this
sort of society believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between
men, and in some sense needs slavery.”60 The full implications of Nietzsche’s
advocacy for aristocracy, and his attack on altruism will be explored at greater detail
in chapter four.
Philosophical egoists, by definition, tend to be amoral in their moral outlook.
Philosophical egoism and virtue ethics appear to be irreconcilable. However,
Swanston has argued that Nietzsche’s egoism can be described as virtuous egoism61.
57 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 109. 58 Ibid, 111. 59 Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said. (New
York City: Knopf Doubleday, 2012), 11. 60 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 151. 61 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 109.
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Nietzsche’s criticisms are not simply of altruism, but also of forms of egoism. In
fact, it would be more accurate to say that Nietzsche attacks both non-virtuous
altruism and non-virtuous egoism, or ‘immature egoism’.62 It is easier to understand
and defend the statement that Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist if one chooses to interpret
his advocacy of egoism and his criticisms of altruism as ‘response dependent
virtues’. Nietzsche writes, “Let us for the time being agree that benevolence and
beneficence are constituents of the good man; only let us add: ‘presupposing that he
is first benevolently and beneficently inclined towards himself!”63 Nietzsche is
sceptical of any individual’s ability to act in a way that will create beneficial
outcomes for other people. The reason for this is that doing so would be a
misallocation of a person’s talent and effort. The conscious goal of aiding
individuals, presupposes a greater amount of knowledge that any person is capable
of possessing, and is thus likely lead to unexpected harm.
It is important to emphasise what Nietzsche is arguing for by first stating
what he is not arguing for. “All naturalism in morality that is, all healthy morality, is
dominated by an instinct of life…”64 The phrase “instinct for life” is ambiguous and
can mean different things to different people based on their understanding of the
term. The ‘life denying’ philosophy, the ‘morality of decadence’, that Nietzsche
criticizes could be extrapolated and justified on the basis that it is ‘life affirming’.
62 Ibid, 109 63 Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, 207. 64 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other
Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 171.
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Some may say that a ‘life affirming’ philosophy would be one that would affirm all
lives. Nietzsche responds to this that the self-overcoming nature of his philosophy
means that to affirm life is to be preoccupied with one’s own life, rather than an
uncritical adulation of the lives of others.65 It does not mean that one has to exhibit
disgust towards others, particularly those whom we regard as mediocre and weak.66
Nietzsche’s egoism does not in fact make any commentary on the attitude we must
necessarily have towards such people.67 It also does not mean that people have an
obligation to affirm or exalt superior individuals above themselves.68 Again, this
contradicts Nietzsche’s belief that the mature individual affirms their life through
self-overcoming. This is not something that will be achieved through preoccupation
with the lives of others. It also is not necessary to regard one’s own life as being
superior to other lives.69 This comparison implies a standard where one’s worthiness
is deemed in relation to other people, which is again a symptom of the ‘life denying’
philosophy that Nietzsche is trying to refute. The final, most important, and most
fatal misconception regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy is that “each person should
put their own life first in their practical reasoning and actions.”70 As previously
noted, there are large differences in opinion regarding the nature of Nietzsche’s
philosophy. One of the reasons for this is due to the fact that his use of language is
artistic and literary, as opposed to philosophical and argumentative. Above are
65 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 115. 66 Ibid, 116. 67 Ibid, 116. 68 Ibid, 116. 69 Ibid, 116. 70 Ibid, 116.
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numerous arguments about Nietzsche’s egoism as antisocial and nihilistic. The
implications of this interpretation will be examined in the next chapter.
The alternative to the depiction of Nietzsche as the ‘antisocial egoist’, is an
understanding of Nietzsche’s egoism as not only a response-dependent virtue but
also a constrained vision of human nature and human potential. One of the illusions
that social media provides individuals with, through communication and self-
representation, is the ability to influence and affect others. It is largely from this
illusion that much of the negative effects of social media originate. Analysing
Nietzsche as a virtuous egoist is beneficial in this context due to his respect for the
integrity of the individual. “All that remains is what it is one understands by one’s
advantage; precisely the immature, undeveloped, crude individual will understand it
most crudely”71. In this sentence, Nietzsche argues that the morality of the ‘mature
individual’ is not the morality of self-gratification or self-importance, nor is it
antisocial in its effects or intent. Swanton argues that, in a social context, this
individual develops a sense of honour and “accords others respect and wants them to
accord respect to him”72. The mature individual is allowed to become a person once
71 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book For Free Spirits, 51.; The complete
passage is: “We all of us, to be sure, still suffer from the all-too-little regard paid to
the personal in us, it has been badly cultivated – let us admit to ourselves that our
minds have, rather, been drawn forcibly away from it and offered as a sacrifice to
the state, to science, to those in need, as though what would have to be sacrificed
was in any case what was bad. Even now let us work for our fellow men, but only to
the extent that we discover our own highest advantage in this work: no more, no
less. All that remains is what it is one understands by one’s advantage; precisely the
immature, crude individual will understand it most crudely. 72 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 112.
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he is free of a morality that constrains him unjustly through pitying self-sacrifice. As
Nietzsche’s morality evolves, he sees its culmination in “an ever more highly
evolving conception of usefulness and honourableness”73 and acts in accordance
with his “own standard with regard to men and things”74. The idea that the mature
individual possesses a ‘social self’ that behaves as if it were a member of a
community, will be explore in greater detail in chapter four.
The connection between Nietzsche and Virtue ethics at first seems tenuous.
Upon closer examination of both it becomes apparent that these supposed difficulties
are not as large as they first appear. An overview of contemporary virtue ethics
shows that there will be disparities in what is regarded as ‘virtuous’ over differing
time periods and circumstances. Swanton’s application of virtue ethics to Nietzsche
reveals that a philosophy that at first appears to advocate egoism and amorality, can
have virtuous features, depending on what factors these virtues are responding to.
The argument for Nietzsche as an egoist will be used to analyse many of the harmful
and negative trends prevalent on social media in the next chapter. As an alternative
to both this interpretation of Nietzsche, as well as this negative behaviour, chapter
four will outline the full implications of Nietzsche’s virtuous egoism and how it can
successfully be applied to our lives on social media.
73 Ibid, 112. 74 Ibid, 112.
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Chapter Three
In this chapter, I will present a counterargument to Swanton’s thesis that
Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist. I will do this by focusing on and analysing Nietzsche’s
reputation as an egoist, a fascist, and a nihilist. The chapter will focus on how
Nietzsche’s ideas are misrepresented and distorted in order to promote goals and
ideas that are the antithesis of Nietzsche’s vision, something that has been done
repeatedly in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. The ‘supposed’ influence of
Nietzsche on National Socialism is the most famous example of this, and thus will
be examined in detail. Returning to the present day, I will then focus on how trends
on social media are indicative of a misapplication of Nietzsche’s ideas in order to
lend credence to self-serving ends. This behaviour on social media is common, I am
using a Nietzschean framework to analyse some of these trends. As a case study, I
will be citing the online phenomenon known as the ‘alt-right’, an informal
movement that cites Nietzsche’s ideas as an influence on its political views. Critical
examination of the alt-right shows that the connection between Nietzsche and their
ideas are largely unfounded. The correction to this interpretation will be laid out
fully in chapter four, arguing for a better way of interpreting Nietzsche’s moral
philosophy as exercise of virtue.
As previously stated, an alternative vision of Nietzsche’s philosophy argues
that it is the seed from which much of the intellectual justification for fascism,
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Nazism, and immorality can grow.75 Much of this interpretation has arisen from
historical contingencies, mistranslation (in some cases wilful), and intentional
distortion of Nietzsche’s writings.76 A majority of the contemporary scholarship on
Nietzsche has rejected and refuted this interpretation. Two Nietzsche scholars have
addressed the relationship between Nietzsche and fascism by writing, “The central
ideal of Nietzsche’s philosophy was the individual and his freedom to shape his own
character destiny…What can such a thinker have in common with National
Socialism’s manipulation of the masses for goals that swallowed up the
personalities, concerns, and life of the individual?”77 Here Solomon and Higgins
point out that Nietzsche’s philosophy, properly understood, is focused on individual
freedom. Yet, in spite of this, this interpretation of Nietzsche continues to remain
relevant and influential in the public sphere. This is demonstrable by the prominence
of movements such as the ‘alt-right’, which cites Nietzsche as an influence on its
worldview.
For a long time, ‘Nietzsche as an antisocial egoist’ was the historically
dominant interpretation of Nietzsche and is largely the reason for his association
with anti-Semitism, nationalism, and Nazism78. Subsequent scholarship and new
translations of Nietzsche’s work have showed that this interpretation is not only
ungenerous but inaccurate, and a consequence of historical factors that had nothing
75 Solomon, and Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, 3-52. 76 Ibid, 9-11. 77 Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Witrich, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the
Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1. 78 Ibid.
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to do with Nietzsche himself79. Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth, edited and rewrote his
work to reflect her and her husband’s anti-Semitic and nationalist views80. This
action is from where much of Nietzsche’s negative reputation originates. It was this
decision that allowed the Nazis to deploy a bastardized version of Nietzsche’s
philosophy to serve their own nefarious ends. Anyone who questions the potential of
philosophers to influence historical and political affairs should note that in 1932
Nietzsche’s sister received a bouquet of flowers from Adolf Hitler, and two years
later the same man gave her a wreath for Nietzsche’s grave inscribed with the words
“To a Great Fighter”.81
Comparisons between Nietzsche and fascism began to be made not long after
the end of the Second World War. Albert Camus wrote that, “If Nietzsche and Hegel
serve as alibis to the masters of Dachau and Karaganda then that does not condemn
their entire philosophy. But it does lead to the suspicion that one aspect of their
thought, or of their logic, can lead to these appalling conclusions”.82 Thomas Mann
put it more forcefully when he wrote that, “In Kant and Nietzsche we have the
moralists of German militarism”.83
79 Walter Kauffmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974). 80 Ibid, 4-5. 81 John Rodden, Repainting the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern
German Education, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 289. 82 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, trans. Anthony Bower
(New York City: Knopf Doubleday, 2012), 137. 83 T.J. Reed, Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996),
189.
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One of the ways to understand the relationship between Nietzsche and
fascism is through the framework of Wittgenstein’s ‘family relationships’. In his
Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, “consider for example the
proceedings that we call ‘games’…look and see whether there is anything common
to all”.84 After elaborating on differing kinds of games, he writes “…we can go
through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; we can see how
similarities crop up and disappear.”85 Wittgenstein concludes from this that, “I can
think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family
resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build,
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the
same way…"games" form a family.”86 It is possible to understand the similarities
between Nietzsche and Hitler as ‘family resemblances’, of the kind excogitated by
Wittgenstein. Indeed, one historian of philosophy writes that Nietzsche was, “…the
child of Darwin and the brother of Bismarck”.87 Hitler’s ideas have been described
as a form of ‘social Darwinism’, and the man himself as a spiritual successor to
Bismarck.
Other theorists have also argued for a ‘family resemblance’ between
84 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Hoboken: John Wiley &
Sons, 2010), 95. 85 Ibid, 95. 86 Ibid, 95. 87 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York City: Simon & Schuster, 1965),
522.
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Nietzsche’s ideas and those of National Socialism. One of them, Richard Wolin,
acknowledges that in his personal life Nietzsche was more concerned with “cultural
grandeur”, than with politics88. However, he also states that Nietzsche “was a
dogged defender of power, cruelty, and the warrior ethos…personified by several of
history’s more sanguinary tyrants: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and
Napoleon”.89 A family resemblance between power, cruelty, and egotistical and
abusive behaviour should surprise no one, as we will see when we analyse some of
the tactics of the alt-right.
Nietzsche shared many traits with Adolf Hitler. They were both opponents of
democracy, egalitarianism, socialism, and parliamentary government. Nietzsche
wrote that “Where there have been powerful governments, societies, religions,
public opinions, in short wherever there has been tyranny, there the solitary
philosopher has been hated”.90 Hitler’s mistrust and contempt for democracy is also
evident from his writings. “...democracy will in practice lead to the destruction of a
people's true values…for the outstanding achievements of individuals...are now
rendered practically ineffective through the oppression of mere numbers.”91 Both
men despised Christianity. Nietzsche wrote, “I abhor Christianity with a deadly
88 Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with
Fascism: From Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 31. 89 Ibid, 31. 90 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 139. 91 Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle, ed., The Nazi Germany Sourcebook:
An Anthology of Texts (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2013), 105.
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hatred”92. Hitler objected to Christianity as “a rebellion against the natural law of
selection by struggle and survival of the fittest”.93 Nietzsche also promoted “…the
development of the possibility of international species-unions which will set
themselves the task of rearing a new master race, the future ‘lords of the earth’”.94
Hitler writes that, “The Jew uses every possible means to undermine the racial
foundations of a subjugated people…” Hitler goes on to describe the Jewish people
as, “…responsible for…the ultimate idea of bastardizing the white race which they
hate… Never in this world can the Jew become master of any people except a
bastardized people.”95
Nietzsche had ambivalent feelings towards the Jewish people.96 In
Beyond Good and Evil, he wrote, “…the Jews achieved that miracle of
inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple of
millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination…” Nietzsche
concludes that, “It is in this inversion of values ... that the significance of
the Jewish people resides: with them there begins the slave revolt in
morals.”97
92 Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rudiger Bittner
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 259. 93 Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York City: HarperCollins, 1991),
219. 94 Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration
(Oakland: University of California Press, 1988), 290. 95 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. James Murphy (London: Hurst & Blackett,
1939). Accessed August 15, 2016. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt. 96 Solomon and Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, 12. 97 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 84.
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In many cases the evidence for a relationship between Nietzsche and Hitler
seems considerable. However, to observe these resemblances is not to equate them.
Numerous scholars of Nietzsche have stressed the two men’s significant differences,
differences that result in a greatly reduced parity between the two. Solomon notes on
Nietzsche and anti-Semitism that, “Germany had a long history of anti-Semitism,
dating back (at least) to the Middle Ages…It is much to Nietzsche’s credit, then,
living where he did and surrounded by anti-Semites, that he refused to share their
intolerance and openly came to denounce anti-Semitism”.98 Walter Kauffmann
closely analyses Nietzsche’s advocacy for a ‘master race’ and finds Nietzsche’s
thought process to be greatly different from Hitler’s. He writes that, “…it was
perfectly clear that Nietzsche looked to art, religion, and philosophy – and not to
race – to elevate man above the beasts, and some men above the mass of
mankind”.99 Kauffmann elaborates that, “…no man could presume to know with any
certainty who among his fellow men might be chosen and who damned; and all men
might have to be treated with respect as “potentially human beings”.100 Kauffmann’s
proviso in this last quote provides a hint to what is the most significant difference
between Hitler and Nietzsche. Nietzsche does not presume to know the exact details
of what superior person would emerge in his ideal society, or where they would
emerge from. He does not base his advocacy for a ‘master race’ on any form of
determinism, particularly not genetic or ethnic determinism as will be evidenced in
98 Solomon and Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, 11. 99 Kauffmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 285. 100 Ibid, 285-286.
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the next chapter.
Returning to the present day, I would argue that there exists a ‘family
resemblance’ between this misinterpretation of Nietzsche, and the unrestrained and
antisocial behaviour that is observable on the internet today. Ideas, even irrational
and inaccurate ones, contain their own internal logic and have an influence that
exists independently of their lowly origins. A good example of this would be the
continued prevalence of racism and anti-Semitism across the world today, in spite of
the disastrous consequences these ideas have had when put into practice. Solomon
writes that, “The literature about and against Nietzsche is voluminous, but despite a
great deal of scholarship in the past half century, old myths and prejudices remain
prominent in the public consciousness”.101 As previously stated, these resemblances
between Nietzsche and fascism can be used to understand the angry, antisocial, and
egotistical behaviour that is observable on the internet today.
One case study that strongly highlights the ‘family resemblance’ between the
antisocial interpretation of Nietzsche and the antisocial internet of today is the
online phenomenon known as the Alternative Right, or the ‘alt-right’. The ‘alt-right’
is a political group that advocates an alternative to political conservatism,
particularly in the United States.102 It rose to prominence in 2016 for its support of
101 Solomon and Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, 3. 102 Benjamin Welton, "What, Exactly, Is the 'Alternative Right?", The Weekly
Standard, accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.weeklystandard.com/what-exactly-
is-the-alternative-right/article/2000310.
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Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump103, and for its opposition to
multiculturalism and immigration104. Numerous commentators have linked it to
white supremacism, white nationalism, anti-Semitism, and reactionary politics. The
alt-right derives much of its notoriety from its presence on social media, especially
its use of internet memes to advance its views105. As stated in chapter one, the harm
that is done by the alt-right through social media is quantitative, not qualitative.
Using internet memes to function as a wall of anonymity in order to express hateful
views is what creates the lack of a feedback mechanism that would normally deter
such behaviour in the real world.
In spite of what many people may think about the politics of the alt-right
movement, the popularisation of unpopular ideas does not necessarily translate into
what one would typically call ‘antisocial’ behaviour. This is where the alt-right
movement’s presence on social media becomes important. Members of the alt-right
movement have repeatedly targeted individuals and groups online, especially Jewish
organisations, with abusive and derogatory content.106 The repeated use of internet
memes to advance racist views online has provoked a response from the Anti-
103 Abby Ohlheiser, "Anti-Semitic Trump Supporters Made a Giant List of People to
Target with a Racist Meme," The Washington Post, accessed August 18, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/03/anti-semitic-
trump-supporters-made-a-giant-list-of-people-to-target-with-a-racist-meme/ 104 Cathy Young, "Donald Trump’s Hate for Political Correctness Is Comfort Food
to Racists," Newsday, accessed August 18, 2016,
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/columnists/cathy-young/donald-trump-s-rant-
against-political-correctness-is-comfort-food-to-racists-1.11391400. 105 Abby Ohlheiser,"Anti-Semitic Trump Supporters Made a Giant List of People to
Target with a Racist Meme". 106 Ibid.
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Defamation League in the United States. ‘Pepe the Frog’ (also known as the ‘sad
frog’) has been a popular internet meme since 2005, when it appeared in an online
cartoon Boy’s Club.107 On September 28, the Anti-Defamation League declared that
Pepe’s image was a hate symbol, particularly when used with racially charged
symbolism.108
109
The Anti-Defamation League justified its decision by stating that,
“…it was inevitable that, as the meme proliferated in
on-line venues such as 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit, which have
many users who delight in creating racist memes and
imagery, a subset of Pepe memes would come into existence
that centred on racist, anti-Semitic or other bigoted themes.
In recent years, with the growth of the "alt right" segment of
the white supremacist movement, a segment that draws some
107 “Pepe the Frog”, The Anti-Defamation League, accessed September 28, 2016,
http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/hate-on-display/c/pepe-the-
frog.html?referrer=https://en.wikipedia.org/#.WAWiJPl96Ul 108 Mary Bowerman, “Pepe the Frog declared a hate symbol by Anti-Defamation
League,” USA Today, accessed September 28, 2016,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/09/28/pepe-the-frog-internet-
meme-declared-hate-symbol-anti-defamation-league/91210140/ 109 “Pepe the Frog.”
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of its support from some of the above-mentioned Internet
sites, the number of "alt right" Pepe memes has grown, a
tendency exacerbated by the controversial and contentious
2016 presidential election. Though Pepe memes have many
defenders, the use of racist and bigoted versions of Pepe
memes seems to be increasing, not decreasing.”110
111 112
Above are Pepe memes that the Anti-Defamation League used as an example
of the content that the alt-right proliferates online in order to promote its views, or to
abuse the people it targets. The influence of Nietzsche on the politics of the alt-right
is often implied, and on the ‘Alternative Right’ blog, Nietzsche is directly cited as an
influence on the ‘movement’. As noted in chapter one, the alt-right seems to be
enacting Nietzsche’s will to power, by denigrating others in order to advance its own
aims. The similarities between Nietzsche and the alt-right are useful in order to
understand what this movement is indicative of, even though there are large
divergences between Nietzsche and the politics of the alt-right. One of the alt-right’s
110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid.
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greatest attractions to individuals is its rejection of political correctness.113 Many
members of the alt-right movement regard ‘political correctness’ as a form of
censorship imposed by society’s mediocrities. This opinion congeals well with
Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy quoted earlier. It isn’t hard to think of many
members of the alt-right community envisioning themselves as philosopher kings,
deposed and oppressed by a tyrannical majority in the form of ‘society’. Nietzsche’s
criticisms of democracy, socialism, collectivism and other forms of group
association all lend credence to the similarity between Nietzsche and far right
philosophies like National Socialism, and, the alt-right.
It is important to refer back to the notion of ‘willing a self’ that was quoted
from Nietzsche in the first chapter and how this relates to the activities of the alt-
right. Much of the content that is proliferated by the alt-right is done anonymously,
through websites like 4chan and 8chan. Such abuse and harassment is obviously a
reproof from any form of social censure or punishment by one’s peers, due to the
fact that the identity of the person is wholly unknown. It is also different from the
behaviour referenced in chapter one of ‘catfishing’, where one creates a fake
persona. To what extent this kind of behaviour constitutes philosophically traditional
conceptions of ‘self’ is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to
stress the complete divergence in outcome between this behaviour taking place
online, and it taking place in the real world. What the lack of social constraints
113 “What You Need To Know About The Alt-Right Movement”, NPR, accessed
September 15, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2016/08/26/491452721/the-history-of-the-
alt-right
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within the online sphere has created for internet users is the freedom to act in a way
that is divorced of social realities. In this way, how we choose to communicate to
individuals is subject only to our own desire. We are ‘radically free’ in this way, in
fact it provides greater freedom than Sartre or Nietzsche would have thought
possible, due to the fact that we are free of the social consequences of this
behaviour. This freedom, coupled with the individual’s desires, is what amount to
sincerity in expression referenced in the first chapter. It is in this way that the
members of the alt-right can be said to be ‘willing a self’. Without a conscious
acknowledgement of our online presence as a facet of our ‘social self’, this kind of
behaviour will be more likely to occur.
Although much of Nietzsche’s reputation as a fascist is a result of
mistranslation, distortion, and historical contingencies, there still remain similarities
between Nietzsche’s philosophy and visions of the world that are prejudiced,
antisocial, and reactionary. Notable philosophers and intellectuals like Camus and
Mann made this observation not long after the downfall of National Socialism, a
political movement that Nietzsche’s name is likely to be forever tarnished with.
Much of the similarities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and these visions are due to
Nietzsche’s dislike of all forms of collectivism, especially the idea that society
should dictate to individuals what they can say, and what they can think. Although
similarities exist between Nietzsche and the far right, the differences between the
two are considerably more important when properly examined. These differences
will form part of the focus of the penultimate chapter of this thesis, displaying how
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Nietzsche’s ideas are radically different from these groups that he has been
associated with. The rest of chapter four will focus on a corrective to this
interpretation of Nietzsche, which is of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. This corrective
will not only function as a different interpretation of Nietzsche, but also offer a
corrective ethic to the behaviour online that the alt-right embodies.
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Chapter Four
In the previous chapter, I examined interpretations of Nietzsche as an
antisocial egoist, and that his moral philosophy confers upon others only a
responsibility to disparage others in favour of one’s self. In this chapter, I will
defend a more accurate interpretation of Nietzsche’s work that can be understood
and extrapolated by using a virtue ethics framework. The two key philosophers I will
be using to support this claim are MacIntyre and Swanton, both contemporary virtue
ethicists who have written about Nietzsche. This will be done by analysing
Nietzsche’s moral and social philosophy as a process of excellence that is applied to
individuals. Once this process has been fully analysed it will then be applied to
current trends on social media, and how it can offer an alternative to its negative
effects and outcomes.
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre frames moral philosophy in the present
day as a conflict between ‘individualism’ and what he refers to as the ‘Aristotelian
tradition’.114 In his argument, MacIntyre regards Nietzsche’s writings as an
extension and conclusion of Enlightenment morals; namely, the idea of grounding
morality solely on rationality and secularism. MacIntyre goes on to claim that
Nietzsche’s importance lies in his, “proposal to raze to the ground the structures of
inherited moral belief”.115 His analysis of Nietzsche supports the theory that
114 MacIntytre, After Virtue, 300. 115 Ibid, 256.
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Nietzsche is a denier and destroyer of shared morality, seeking to replace it with a
society of isolated, amoral egoists. MacIntyre cites passages from Nietzsche’s work
to support this interpretation, such as the following:
“A great man – a man whom nature has constructed and
invented in the grand style – what is he? …If he cannot lead,
he goes alone; then it can happen that he may snarl at some
things he meets on the way… he wants no “sympathetic” heart,
but servants, tools; in his intercourse with men he is always
intent on making something out of them. He knows he is
incommunicable: he finds it tasteless to be familiar; and when
one thinks he is, he usually is not. When not speaking to
himself; he wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it
requires more spirit and will. There is a solitude within him
that is inaccessible to praise or blame, his own justice that is
beyond appeal”.116
MacIntyre interprets this passage by arguing that Nietzsche’s conception of
‘the great man’ represents, “individualism’s final attempt to escape from its own
consequences”.117 Basing an ethical framework on individualism is a mistake
because the ‘individual’ is not what necessitates morality, what necessitates it are
human relationships. For morality to be based on any form of isolation from human
relationships, would be to undermine the foundations on which morality is built.
MacIntyre argues,
“…relationships which constitute communities whose
central bond is a shared vision and understanding of goods.
To cut oneself off from shared activity in which one has
initially to learn obediently as an apprentice learns, to isolate
oneself from the communities which find their point and
116 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kauffmann, trans. Walter
Kauffmann and R.J. Hollingdale (Vintage: New York City, 1968) , 499. 117 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 300.
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purpose in such activities, will be to debar oneself from
finding any good outside oneself. It will be to condemn
oneself to that moral solipsism which constitutes Nietzschean
greatness.”118
MacIntyre’s critique of Nietzschean individualism is fundamentally a
critique of his egoism, which is the greatest obstacle to any interpretation of
Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. 119 There are similarities in the criticisms that
MacIntyre makes of Nietzsche and the assumptions made by those people who
condone the latter’s egoism. The only difference of course is that the former is a
detractor, while the latter is an endorser. For example, both assume that Nietzsche’s
egoism in conjunction with his advocacy for the ‘mature individual’, necessitates an
asocial, isolated individual, free from all social and moral concerns. This is evident
in MacIntyre’s argument about Nietzsche’s moral philosophy as a natural extension
of individualism and Enlightenment morality. He writes of Nietzsche, “…the
Nietzschean stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an alternative to the
conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more
representative moment in its internal unfolding”.120
An alternative to this interpretation is Swanton’s argument that virtue ethics
must be understood as ‘response dependent’. This is due to the fact that different
moral situations will warrant different responses and actions from people, and this
becomes significant when examining the character of the individual who is making a
118 Ibid, 300. 119 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 111. 120 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 259.
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moral decision. Swanton writes that, “Different types of responses are warranted by
the different types of morally significant features in the items constituting the field
of the virtues”.121 She goes on to write, “…What counts as bias, self‐indulgence,
selfishness, self‐centredness, or narrowness of concern is not in my view something
that can be determined without looking deeply into the agent.” Instead, “we need to
know in a deep sense, what the agent's behaviour expresses…”122
The above passage is relevant to examining Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. It
is easy to assume that many of Nietzsche’s views are an expression of his “self-
indulgence, selfishness, self-centredness, or narrowness…”123 This is done by
equivocating Nietzsche’s thought with the immoral behaviour of people who claim
to be influenced by him. However, as examined in chapter three, the similarities
between Nietzsche and these actions do not stand up to scrutiny.
This is evidenced in Nietzsche’s own personal correspondence with his
sister, Elisabeth. In spite of the accusations of anti-Semitism, Nietzsche is notable
for the fact that he refused to condone or support such beliefs. His brother-in-law
Bernhard Forster, was a prominent German nationalist who regularly wrote anti-
Semitic tracts about the ‘Jewish question’.124 Nietzsche’s letter to his sister in
121 Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, p. 24. 122 Ibid, 177. 123 Ibid, 177. 124 Carol Diethe, Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power: A Biography of Elisabeth
Forster-Nietzsche (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 36.
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response to her husband’s literary activities reveals that Nietzsche held no
ambivalence about such views:
“…I’ve seen proof, black on white that Herr Dr Forster
has not yet severed his connection with the anti-Semitic
movement…Since then I’ve had difficulty coming up with
any of the tenderness and protectiveness I’ve so long felt
toward you. The separation between us is thereby
decided…Now it has gone so far that I have to defend myself
hand and foot against people who confuse me with these anti-
Semitic canaille. After I read the name Zarathustra in the
anti-Semitic Correspondence my forbearance came to an end.
I am now in a position of emergency defence against your
spouse’s party. These accursed anti-Semitic deformities shall
not sully my ideal”.125
As previously stated, Nietzsche’s advocacy for the ‘great man’ and a ‘master
race’ was not based on any form of ethnic or genetic determinism, indeed he was
hostile to such ideas. The following paragraphs will analyse Nietzsche’s moral and
social philosophy as a process of excellence that is applied to individuals. Once this
process has been fully analysed it will then be applied to current trends on social
media, and how it can offer an alternative to its negative effects and outcomes.
However, what of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. It would seem that this idea of
Nietzsche’s would derail any attempt to account for his status as a virtue ethicist.
Many scholars of Nietzsche, such as Solomon, regard the ‘will to power’ as a minor
factor in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and that all it indicates is Nietzsche’s dislike of
125 David Farrell Krell, Nietzsche: A Novel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 324.
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hedonism.126 However, presume this is not the case. Just as Nietzsche did not regard
‘pleasure’ as a good, he also did not regard ‘power’ as intrinsically good either, what
was ‘good’, was whether or not this power was exercised excellently.127 Nietzsche
notes that there are different kinds of ‘will’, than the ‘will to power’. There is the
“will to memory”, and the “will to truth”.128 Even if one were to argue that these
different wills were simply different parts of the ‘will to power’, it would still follow
from this conclusion that there is no single thing called ‘power’. Following from
this, it becomes important to remember that Nietzsche did not regard ‘power’ as the
final end or telos of his moral philosophy, but rather the application of the will of
individuals. Focusing on these individuals allows for a more congruent reading of
Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist, and his philosophy as being as process of excellence.
After ‘altruism’, as discussed in chapter two, the main focus of Nietzsche’s
criticism is ‘immature egoism’.129 If altruistic actions are to be rejected, then surely
it follows that all of our actions should be done for the sake of the self and solely for
the sake of the self. In fact, Nietzsche’s writing does not support this interpretation.
What Nietzsche advocates is an entirely different moral response that did not
conform to the intellectual climate of his day. This is what Swanton refers to as the
‘collective-individual.’130
126 Robert C. Solomon, Living with Nietzsche: What the Great ‘Immoralist’ Has To
Teach Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 85-88. 127 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 119. 128Ibid, 122. 129 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 51. 130 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 116; Christine Swanton,
“Nietzsche and the Collective-Individual,” in Individual and Community in
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Nietzsche does not assert that individuals are divorced from their society, or
that they should strive to be. If this were true, it would reveal a contradiction in
Nietzsche’s admiration for art and culture, and the harsh criticism that he made of
those who failed to admit the latter’s importance. This is evidenced in the preface to
Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, where he writes that, “Art is the
supreme task and the truly metaphysical activity in this life…”131
The contradiction here is the fact that any kind of culture, especially high
culture, is rarely produced in isolation. Although we regularly romanticize the lone
artist struggling in solitude, the reality is that many people are required in order to
guarantee that Beethoven’s symphonies, Shakespeare’s plays, and Rembrandt’s
paintings are preserved and disseminated to others, especially in the transferral of
cultural knowledge from one generation to the next. Great art is dependent on the
many. Nietzsche’s personal values suggest that he implicitly understood this and so
his ‘collective-individuals’ are not without culture. They have a stake in the society
that they live in. Yet, these people are not responsible for, or accountable to, the
whole society. Nietzsche’s denunciations of altruism were consistent. So, where do
the “collective-individuals” locate themselves?
Nietzsche’s Philosophy, ed. Julian Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 174-195. 131 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond
Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14.
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Is it possible to be a member of a society without the ‘interests’ of said
society becoming preeminent over the lives of the individuals who compose it? This
is the relevant question when analysing Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. As stated in
chapter three, Nietzsche’s antagonism to collectivism is due to its propensity to
frustrate and restrict the capabilities of the individuals within that collective.
Nietzsche writes that, “In his heart every man knows quite well that, being unique,
he will be in the world only once and that no imaginable chance will for a second
time gather together into a unity so strangely variegated an assortment as he is.” But,
instead of embracing this uniqueness, he “…knows it but he hides it like a bad
conscience—why? From fear of his neighbour, who demands conventionality and
cloaks himself with it.”132
Examples of the frustrating and restrictive effects of collectivism would be
the ‘slave-morality’ that Nietzsche describes in his book, On the Genealogy of
Morality. Nietzsche saw kindness, humility, and sympathy as the essence of the
‘slave-morality’ framework. This is not because Nietzsche disparages these
qualities, in and of themselves. It is due to the fact that they are grounded in what
Nietzsche regarded as resentment, an envious desire to have what others do not.
Unfortunately for his later reputation, Nietzsche originated this quality in the Jewish
people of the ancient world. He writes:“...the Jews achieved that miracle of inversion
of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple millennia acquired a new and
dangerous fascination--their prophets fused 'rich', 'godless', 'evil', 'violent', 'sensual'
132 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 127.
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into one and were the first to coin the word 'world' as a term of infamy.” According
to Nietzsche, a consequence of this was “…an inversion of values (with which is
involved the employment of the word for 'poor' as a synonym for 'holy' and 'friend')
that the significance of the Jewish people resides: with them there begins the slave
revolt in morals.”133
Nietzsche goes on to argue that Christianity universalised these qualities in
people, by making them synonymous with the deity, and it is from here that much of
the weakness and decay of Western culture originates.134 However, an important
caveat in Nietzsche’s opinion of Christianity is his admiration for the figure of Jesus
Christ. Nietzsche writes that, “…there was really only one Christian, and he died on
the cross.” Nietzsche stresses a distinction between the man Christ and the people
who claimed to be his followers, “It is false to the point of absurdity to think that
Christians are characterized by their ‘beliefs’…only the practice of Christianity is
really Christian, living like the man who died on the cross.”135 Jesus Christ could be
used as an appropriate example of the ‘collective-individual’ that Nietzsche
describes. One whose social concerns were tied to his personal ones. The collective-
individual and virtuous egoist is one who “cultivates what is personal”.136
133 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson,
trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145. 134 Ibid, 167. 135 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other
Writings, 35. 136 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 116.
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Nietzsche argues that each individual’s contribution to society, within a
moral framework, is to cultivate one’s own preferences and desires. This does not
mean that Nietzsche presumes that there will be a beneficial or equal outcome for
each individual, even for those with the same interests. However, it is the best
framework within which to allow for individuals to ‘flourish’, to use the Aristotelian
term. If we refer back to Nietzsche’s statement that, “Every enhancement of the type
"man" has so far been the work of an aristocratic society—and it will be so again
and again”, this trend results in “…a society that believes in the long ladder of an
order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery
in some sense or other.”137
A different understanding of Nietzsche’s assumptions when he uses such
phrases leads to a radically different conclusion about Nietzsche’s intentions in
writing it. Nietzsche’s vision is not a society of predestined individuals who are
ranked at the expense or benefit of others. Instead, it is a philosophy of moral
behaviour where different people with different values, ‘cultivate what is personal’,
and in doing so inadvertently contribute to the greatness of the society at large. The
slavery that Nietzsche mentions here is perhaps not be taken literally as economic
slavery, his hostile response to racism and anti-Semitism suggests that he did not see
people as innately slavish or successful. The slavery that Nietzsche is referring to
here are the inevitable failures that occur in life. What is important, for Nietzsche, is
how we deal with such inevitable disappointments.
137 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil¸ 151.
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This different interpretation of Nietzsche’s writings allows us to re-examine
social media in a different light. On first observation, social media is simply a
method of communication, performed through the medium of the internet. However,
it is also a social process that transfers information. The sources of this information
are diverse, ranging from formal organizations that influence whole societies (i.e.
political, economic, the media, and the entertainment industry), to informal
associations and relationships that individuals voluntarily enter into (i.e. Facebook,
Tinder). However, the information that we receive through the internet is only half
of the story. The information we receive also facilitates decision making in response.
In chapters one and three I claimed that the harm performed on social media
is quantitative, not qualitative. It is not ‘qualitative’ due to the fact that much of the
abuse administered online is no different from any other comment that one might
hear on the street in a face to face confrontation. It is ‘quantitative’ due to the fact
that the absence of usual deterrents and constraints on such behaviour allows it to
increase and flourish, unchecked. This situation includes our ability to communicate
to others anonymously, to create fake personas or ‘selves’ online, and to direct
abusive or hateful rhetoric to others without the usual consequences of social
censure. The point to this thesis has been to identify the underlying logic or rationale
behind this activity, and how it responds to the different kinds of incentives and
constraints that social media creates.
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It would at first be prudent to address the issue of ‘free speech’ before
examining social media in greater detail. One possible defence of the alt-right’s
tactics online is that to cause offense, even intentionally, is not in and of itself an
immoral act due to the fact that offence, in itself, is not wrong. The issue becomes a
question of a trade-off between individual liberty and the unintentional harm that is
done to others by exercising this freedom.
The three normative moral theories of western philosophy provide different
interpretations of this trade-off. The utilitarian ethic usually cites John Stuart Mill’s
“harm principle” when analysing this topic, “That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others.”138 This philosophy is enshrined in Australia’s
legal system, where the potential for harm in the exercising of free speech is taken
into account. One example of this would be Section 18C of the Racial
Discrimination Act.139 Compare this to the United States constitution’s first
amendment, “Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech…”140 This position reflects deontological ethics,
where the government’s allowance for free speech is morally and legally required,
138 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13; “John Stuart Mill”, Stanford Encyclopaedia
of Philosophy, accessed September 2, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/ 139 “Racial Discrimination Act 1975 – Sect 18C”, Commonwealth Consolidated
Acts, accessed September 2, 2016,
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/rda1975202/s18c.html 140 “First Amendment”, Legal Information Institute, accessed September 2, 2016,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment
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without forbiddance.141 This position was best described by Kant, when he wrote
that, “…act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it become a universal law”.142
A virtue ethics analysis of this trade-off yields a different interpretation. Note
that it is not the intention of this thesis to go into great depth about the complications
and particularities related to freedom of speech, as such a task is beyond the scope of
this thesis. However, it would be useful to examine how the notion of free speech
applies to a virtue ethics framework. In virtue ethics, there are greater variances
allowed when judging an action. These include the effects of the act, the intention of
the moral agent, and the moral agent’s overall character. This style of moral
examination is referred to by MacIntyre as a “socially embedded argument”143
where the,
“…individual’s search for his or her good is generally
and characteristically conducted within a context defined by
those traditions of which the individual’s life is a part and this
is true both of those goods which are internal to practices and
of the goods of a single life”.144
141 “Deontological Ethics.” 142 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31. 143 Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of
a Tradition” in The Good Life, ed. Charles Guignon (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1999), 313. 144 Ibid, 313.
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For MacIntyre, the application of ‘internal goods’ over a period of time is
what constitutes a ‘living tradition’. Analysis of this tradition entails a discussion
between the practitioners of that tradition and the people who are exterior to it, about
what these goods are, and what they are not. In the case of free speech, it is
necessary for its defendants and its critics to discuss whether the alt-right’s
exercitation of free speech is a vice, or a virtue.
To take the alt-right’s behaviour into the real world would be to subject it to
constraints and deterrents that would make the group unlikely to flourish in the same
way that it has online. The alt-right regards the internet as the forum where the
desired outcome of an aristocratic society will take root. The nature of this outcome
is intended to be aristocratic in form, where one group or individuals is ranked
higher than another. The fallacy at work here is the presumption of a result
occurring through individual intention, rather than as a systemic outcome from each
individual behaving in a constrained manner. It is in fact this understanding of
aristocracy as a systemic outcome that lies at the heart of understanding Nietzsche as
a virtuous egoist.
The virtuous egoism that I have argued Nietzsche’s writings embody,
envisions aristocracy as the outcome of a process of excellence that is applied to
individuals. It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche does not make the same
mistake as the alt-right in assuming that this ‘aristocratic society’ can be designed. In
order to clarify this, we need to return to the dichotomy introduced in chapter one,
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between sincerity in expression, and fidelity to one’s values. The alt-right exercises
sincerity in expression when it prioritizes the sincerity of its beliefs, and where this
sincerity can only be validated by creating or instigating outcomes that are reflective
of this. By contrast, fidelity to one’s own values is more concerned with an
individual’s loyalty to their own objectives, which are pursued for their own sake
and to one’s best ability. When this pursuit is subjected to a process of excellence,
the outcome becomes secondary to the activity itself, due to the fact that the
outcome is likely to be produced by larger systemic factors than simply by individual
intention.
This process of excellence is one where individuals ‘cultivate what is
personal’ within them and behave accordingly. Due to the diverse nature of human
capabilities and desires, and due to the sheer number of people living in the world,
what kind of outcome that would result if such a process was applied universally is
impossible to say. However, it would create different incentives and constraints that
would undermine and remove the harmful and toxic effects of altruism and
immature egoism. The incentives in this case would be of people striving to achieve
their own desired goals and ends within their own capabilities and means. This is far
more likely to produce a healthy and robust high culture than any other. The
alternative is a social process whereby the beneficial desires of individuals are
judged by third parties, and where certain individuals pay the costs in order to
benefit others. This different process becomes the decider in how individuals will
subsequently behave as well as direct their attention and labours. These third parties
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could be the Church, the state, numerous institutions, and advocacy groups like the
alt-right that wish to reduce the options available to other people.
In order to support this argument for virtuous conduct online, it is important
to examine what this virtuous conduct would look like. One examples of ‘collective
individuals’ behaving in a manner that was an extension of their social selves, is the
‘I’ll ride with you hashtag’ that emerged on social media in the wake of the 2014
Sydney hostage crisis. Amassing 120,000 tweets on Twitter, the hashtag was a
message of solidarity to Australian Muslims who feared that they might be subject to
retributive violence from people on public transport, due to the religiously motivated
nature of the attack.145 Another example would be the ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’ where
participants filmed themselves having a bucket of ice water poured on their heads, in
order to promote awareness of motor neurone disease. The challenge became an
online phenomenon, raising one hundred million dollars for the ALS Association.146
What these two examples illustrate are individuals pursuing solitary activities that
nevertheless have a systemic effect on society. One of the benefits of the internet is a
more efficient allocation of information, access to this information is something that
allows individuals to behave as ‘collective individuals’ when online, and to
communicate with people whom they never would have previously been able to.
145 Brittany Rupert, “Martin Place siege: #illridewithyou hashtag goes viral”, Sydney
Morning Herald, accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/martin-
place-siege-illridewithyou-hashtag-goes-viral-20141215-127rm1.html 146 “The ALS Association Expresses Sincere Gratitude to Over Three Million
Donors”, ALS Association, accessed September 4, 2016,
http://www.alsa.org/news/media/press-releases/ice-bucket-challenge-
082914.html?referrer=https://en.wikipedia.org/
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In this chapter, the argument of Nietzsche as an antisocial egoist has been
shown to be a fallacious distortion and misuse of his work. One alternative to this
popular interpretation has been of Nietzsche as a virtuous egoist, who argued for a
different social process to be applied to people, in order for them to realise their
fullest potential. MacIntyre’s argument for virtue ethics as an ‘embedded social
argument’ means that the moral capabilities of the individual are constrained by
different systemic factors that often exist independently of any individual’s intention
or behaviour. It is the argument of this thesis that a process of excellence needs to
become customary in our usage of the internet, where its users understand
themselves as ‘collective-individuals’ whose activities on social media are an
extension of their social selves. If this process were to become recognized as part of
our ‘lived tradition’, then the chance of such antisocial behaviour increasing would
most likely decline.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
In this thesis I have argued that the freedom and licence that social media offers
us is the closest thing that allows us to experience Sartre’s dictum that ‘existence
precedes essence’. This is due to the fact that we have a greater ability to create a self
on social media, using online avatars and tools available to us through social media’s
inbuilt mechanisms that require users to establish and build personal profiles. Social
media encourages us to add further details and information that is shared in public,
inviting us to project an image of ourselves for others to see and judge, perhaps
explaining why social media often relies on images rather than words. Social media
promises us liberty – the liberty to connect with others all over the world
instantaneously and to portray ourselves as we would like to be seen; seemingly
reflecting the existentialist ideas of ‘radical freedom’ and ‘authenticity’. Yet this
freedom is neither desirable nor sustainable, without proper consideration of our
embodied context and the ways in which we ought to conduct our relationships to
others. Furthermore, the untrammelled freedom of social media websites and
platforms paradoxically limit this freedom through the costs that such freedom
imposes on its users.
The internet, particularly social media, allows human beings to create an
online self. I have connected this freedom to the existentialist notion of ‘radical
freedom’ espoused by Sartre, but more specifically to Friedrich Nietzsche’s
commandment ‘will a self’. Nietzsche wrote that, “Active, successful natures act, not
according to the dictum “know thyself,” but as if there hovered before them a
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commandment: will a self and thou shalt become a self”163. This thesis has explored
in great detail the ramifications of how creating an online self reflects Nietzsche’s idea
of the will to power and how we should critically analyse this endeavour, as applied
to social media today.
Chapter two contained the main argument that Nietzsche was a virtue ethicist,
citing virtue ethicists and philosophers to support this claim. The most important and
influential moral philosopher for this argument was Christine Swanton, who has
argued that the virtues are response dependent, meaning that what is or is not
understood as virtuous behaviour is contingent on what the moral agent is responding
to in a particular time and place. This new interpretation of virtue ethics allowed for
Nietzsche to be interpreted as a virtue ethicist, with his criticisms of altruism and
immature egoism as manifestations of virtue in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy.
One of the important tenets of virtue theory that was expounded in chapter two
was the idea of ‘practical wisdom’ in moral decision making. Compared to abstract or
theoretical knowledge, practical wisdom (or phronesis) was described as a form of
knowledge that is acquired over an individual’s lifetime and their experiences. It was
argued that this conception of moral knowledge would be important when examining
our behaviour on social media, due to the fact that the most important aspect of our
moral knowledge was its limitations, and the dangers of presuming that the internet
grants us greater access to knowledge than it actually does.
163 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 294.
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The chapter then summarised virtue ethics in the twentieth century, beginning
with G.E.M Anscombe’s essay Modern Moral Philosophy¸ where she criticized the
‘law conception of ethics’ that had dominated moral philosophy since the eighteenth
century, particularly the work of Kant. As an alternative to this, Anscombe advocated
a return to such notions as ‘character’, ‘goodness’, and ‘flourishing’ when examining
morality. It was noted that there are many diverse applications of virtue ethics in
contemporary literature. One argument being the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and his
argument that social institutions were the best way to understand the virtues, another
interpretation was Rosalind Hursthouse’s ‘ethical naturalism’. The most important
theorist cited, however, was Swanton and her argument that virtues are ‘response
dependent’. Swanton herself had applied her conception of virtue ethics to Nietzsche’s
moral philosophy, arguing that Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist.
As previously noted, the greatest obstacle to interpreting Nietzsche as a virtue
ethicist is his egoism. This egoism is usually justified on two grounds, Nietzsche’s
attacks on altruism, or his advocacy for aristocracy. Nietzsche regarded altruism as
the injunction to denigrate one’s own capabilities and talents for the benefit of others.
Alternatively, he saw aristocracy as necessary aspect of any great society. In Beyond
Good and Evil, he wrote, “Every enhancement so far in the type "man" has been the
work of an aristocratic society”.
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Swanton responds to these difficulties by arguing that Nietzsche’s egoism can
be understood as a form of virtuous egoism. Swanton argues that this position is more
easily defended when one takes into account the fact that Nietzsche was not only a
critic of altruism, but was also a critic of ‘immature egoism’. Nietzsche writes that,
“Let us for the time being agree that benevolence and beneficence are constituents of
the good man; only let us add: ‘presupposing that he is first benevolently and
beneficently inclined towards himself!”164. Nietzsche goes on to specify that, “All that
remains is what it is one understands by one’s advantage; precisely the immature,
undeveloped, crude individual will understand it most crudely.”165 Nietzsche’s egoism
was clarified further by elaborating on what he did not mean to say. Nietzsche’s
egoism does not make any commentary on the attitude people must necessarily have
towards people. It also does not mean that people have an obligation to affirm or exalt
superior individuals above themselves. This would contradict Nietzsche’s belief that
the mature individual affirms their life through self-overcoming. This is not something
that is achieved through preoccupation with the lives of others. It also is not necessary
to regard one’s own life as being superior to other lives. This comparison implies a
standard where one’s worthiness is deemed in relation to other people. The final, most
important, and most fatal misconception regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy is that
“each person should put their own life first in their practical reasoning and actions.”166
164 Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, 207. 165 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book For Free Spirits, 51. 166 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 151.
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The third chapter functioned as a counterargument to the thesis laid out in the
second chapter that Nietzsche’s egoism was a form of ‘virtuous egoism’. Instead, it
posited that Nietzsche’s moral philosophy entailed an antisocial egoism that rejected
the concerns of other people. The chapter began by noting the observations of many
philosophers and scholars that there was an uncomfortable relationship between
Nietzsche’s writings and the totalitarian regimes of the early twentieth century,
particularly National Socialism. This relationship was framed as a ‘family
resemblance’ between two systems of thought, the question then being examined
whether this relationship did in fact exist, and whether the similarities between the
two were greater or of more importance than the differences.
This began by focusing on the similarities between Nietzsche and Adolf Hitler.
Both of them were opponents of democracy, socialism, collectivism, and
parliamentary government. They also despised Christianity, while Nietzsche had
ambiguous feelings about Judaism and Jewish culture. However, further examination
revealed that the differences between Nietzsche and Hitler were greater than the
supposed similarities. Despite Nietzsche’s feelings, he became a fierce opponent and
critic of anti-Semitism, this was in a country with a long history of this prejudice. As
some scholars noted, Nietzsche’s opposition to anti-Semitism was abnormal in his
time. The conclusion of this examination was that although certain resemblances
between Nietzsche and totalitarianism existed, the differences were considerably
greater. However, this did not mean that this ‘family resemblance’ did not exist and
that its influence did not continue to promulgate itself into the present day.
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This conclusion brought the focus back to present day, to social media in
particular. It was argued that there existed similarities between Nietzsche’s thought
and much of the antisocial and egotistical behaviour that was observable on social
media today. As a case study of this behaviour, the online political movement known
as the ‘alt-right’ was cited. This group gained much of its notoriety by using internet
memes to function as a wall of anonymity, expressing hateful views without a
feedback mechanism that would normally deter such behaviour in the real world.
In chapters one and three I claimed that the harm performed on social media
is quantitative, not qualitative. It is not ‘qualitative’ due to the fact that much of the
abuse administered online is no different from any other comment that one might hear
on the street in a face to face confrontation. It is ‘quantitative’ due to the fact that the
absence of usual deterrents and constraints on such behaviour allows it to increase and
flourish, unchecked. This situation includes our ability to communicate to others
anonymously, to create fake personas or ‘selves’ online, and to direct abusive or
hateful rhetoric to others without the usual consequences of social censure. The point
to this thesis has been to identify the underlying vision behind this activity, and how
this vision responds to the different kinds of incentives and constraints that social
media creates. The similarity between the alt-right’s tactics and Nietzsche’s notion of
‘willing a self’ were then analysed. Noting that the anonymity provided by internet
memes and aliases allowed internet users, and the alt-right, to act out in ways that they
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would not normally be able to do in the real world. The ‘freedom’ that this platform
allowed for individuals culminated in their ability to create a self.
The fourth and penultimate chapter of the thesis provided a response to the
counterargument that focused on Nietzsche as an antisocial egoist. It then went on to
examine in greater detail how Nietzsche’s philosophy can be interpreted as an exercise
in virtue, and how this virtue theory could be applied to our behaviour on social media.
It began by focusing on Nietzsche’s reputation as anti-moral and as a precursor to
Nazism, however Nietzsche’s own writings were cited in order to demonstrate that
such interpretations do not withstand empirical analysis.
The chapter began by examining different interpretations of Nietzsche’s
notion of the ‘great man’. MacIntyre’s criticisms of Nietzsche were examined at first,
particularly the thesis that Nietzsche’s moral philosophy was the logical conclusion
of attempting to ground morality on the ‘individual’. MacIntyre argues that the fallacy
behind this exercise is due to the fact that morality is born out of the fact of human
relationships, not solely the individual. However, upon closer examination, it became
apparent that MacIntyre’s critique did not withstand scrutiny. Firstly, an examination
of Nietzsche’s relationship with his sister showed that Nietzsche did not ground his
advocacy for the ‘great man’, or ‘aristocracy’ on any form of genetic or ethnic
determinism. Instead, it was argued that Nietzsche urged for a process of excellence
to be applied to all individuals, and that the ideal individual that would emerge from
this process would be the ‘collective-individual’. After examining Nietzsche’s views
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on art, Christianity, and individualism, the conclusion was reached that Nietzsche’s
collective-individual was the person who “cultivated what is personal”.167
Nietzsche argued that each individual’s contribution to society, within a moral
framework, is to cultivate one’s own preferences and desires. This does not mean that
Nietzsche presumes that there will be a beneficial or equal outcome for each
individual, even for those with the same interests. However, it is the best framework
within which to allow for individuals to ‘flourish’, to use the Aristotelian term.
Nietzsche’s vision is not of a society of predestined individuals who are ranked at the
expense or benefit of others. Instead, it is a philosophy of moral behaviour where
different people with different values, ‘cultivate what is personal’, and in doing so
inadvertently contribute to the greatness of the society at large. The slavery that
Nietzsche speaks of is perhaps not be taken literally as economic slavery, his hostile
response to racism and anti-Semitism suggests that he did not see people as innately
slavish or successful. The slavery that Nietzsche is referring to here are the inevitable
failures that occur in life and lead to unequal outcomes among people.
The constraints and incentives created by social media were also examined in
this chapter, as well as the problems created by the fact that the internet was a format
structured categorically around individual freedom, at the expense of other factors
(social cohesion, being an example). It was argued that in order to reduce much of the
antisocial trends that were observable on social media, while still retaining the
167 Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 116.
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individual’s freedom, it would be important for the internet’s users to restrain
themselves and to engage in self censure. It was argued that virtue ethics was the most
efficient means for facilitating this kind of behaviour, due to the fact that the individual
would understand their online presence as an extension of their ‘social selves’ and
thus would behave accordingly, without having to resort to third-party enforcement of
civility.
This different interpretation of Nietzsche’s writings allows us to re-examine
social media in a different light. On first observation, social media is simply a method
of communication, performed through the medium of the internet. However, it is also
a social process that transfers information. The sources of this information are diverse,
ranging from formal organizations that influence whole societies (i.e. political,
economic, the media, and the entertainment industry), to informal associations and
relationships that individuals voluntarily enter into (i.e. Facebook, Tinder). However,
the information that we receive through the internet is only half of the story. The
information we receive also facilitates decision making in response.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse fully, areas for future
research could focus on ways to facilitate the process of people realising their ‘social
selves’ in an online community. This process could take place in schools, in the
workplace, and on community message boards. Examples could be cited of how
particular website administrators are attempting to create certain constraints in which
the costs of antisocial behaviour online are paid for by its practitioners. There are also
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many other philosophers whose ideas could be used to analyse the ever changing
landscape of social media and the internet.
In conclusion, the freedom that the internet provides us is unlikely to produce
a net social benefit without consideration of our relationships to others, and
understanding our online presence as an extension of our ‘social selves’. Nietzsche’s
philosophy is useful in examining the moral dilemmas created by our lives moving
more and more online. This is due to the fact that his philosophy appears to attract
justifications for behaviour that is inexplicably antisocial and hostile, which could in
part be the reason for his continued fame amongst people who are not philosophers.
Revising our interpretations of Nietzsche and our understanding of his assumptions is
not simply an exercise in theoretics, it is also an attempt to alter the climate of opinion
that will lend credence to an alternative way of understanding our social selves and
our ethical obligations to others, even if they only exist to us on a screen.
Page 75 of 80
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Glossary
Facebook: An online social networking service.
YouTube: A video sharing website.
Twitter: An online social networking service that enables users to send and
read short 140-character messages called ‘tweets’.
Tinder: A location-based social search service application (using Facebook)
that facilitates communication between mutually interested users, allowing
matched users to chat. The app is commonly used as a dating service.
4chan: An English-language image board website. Users generally post
anonymously, with the most recent posts appearing above the rest. 4chan is
split into various boards with their own specific content and guidelines.
8chan: Also called Infinitechan, is an English-language image board website
composed of user-created boards. Each board is moderated by its respective
creator, with minimal interaction from other site administration.
Reddit: A social news aggregation, web content rating, and discussion
website. Reddit's registered community members can submit content, such as
text posts or direct links.
Instagram: An online mobile photo-sharing, video-sharing, and social
networking service that enables its users to take pictures and videos, and
share them either publicly or privately.